

Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2013

A HISTORY OF JAPAN

A HISTORY OF JAPAN

VOL. III
THE TOKUGAWA EPOCH
1652-1868

BY THE LATE

JAMES MURDOCH, M.A.

Sometime Assistant Professor of Greek in the University of Aberdeen

REVISED AND EDITED BY

JOSEPH H. LONGFORD, D.LITT.

Late H.M. Consul at Nagasaki; Emeritus Professor of Japanese, King's College, London University; Barrister-at-Law, Middle Temple; Vice-President of the Japan Society, London

Author of The Story of Old Japan, The Story of Korea, Japan of the Japanese, The Evolution of New Japan, The Nations of To-day: Japan, etc.

LONDON

KEGAN PAUL, TRENCH, TRUBNER & Co., LTD.

BROADWAY HOUSE: 68-74 CARTER LANE, E.C.

1926

635362

14.5.56

CONTENTS

	PAGE
JAMES MURDOCH	vii
INTRODUCTION	xvii
CHAP.	
I. THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL STRUCTURE . .	1
(a) <i>The Regulative Machinery</i>	1
(b) <i>The Social Structure Generally</i> . . .	27
II. IYETSUNA'S MINORITY (1651-63)	62
III. CHINESE PHILOSOPHY AS AN INSTRUMENT OF GOVERNMENT	91
IV. IYETSUNA (1663-80)	151
V. TSUNAYOSHI (1680-1709)	173
VI. THE FORTY-SEVEN RŌNIN	218
VII. IYENOBU AND IYETSUGU (1709-16) . . .	238
VIII. FOREIGN RELATIONS (1640-1720) . . .	259
IX. YOSHIMUNE (1716-44)	313
X. IYESHIGE AND IYEHARU (1744-86) . . .	366
XI. IYENARI'S MINORITY (1786-93)	402
XII. IYENARI (1793-1841)	428
XIII. THE SHINTO PROPAGANDA	467
XIV. FOREIGN INTERCOURSE (1721-1853) . .	497
XV. DUTCH LEARNING IN JAPAN	537
XVI. THE REOPENING OF JAPAN	569
XVII. II, TAL O	664
XVIII. THE FALL OF THE BAKUFU	711
XIX. IMPERIAL GOVERNMENT RE-ESTABLISHED .	776

APPENDICES

	PAGE
I. LIST OF EMPERORS	789
II. LIST OF SHOGUNS.	791
III. LIST OF YEAR-NAMES OR NENGO	792
IV. LIST OF PROVINCES	794
V. THE LEGACY OF IYEYASU	796
LIST OF AUTHORITIES CONSULTED	815
INDEX	819

JAMES MURDOCH

JAMES MURDOCH was born in 1856, at the village of Stonehaven, not far from Aberdeen. His father farmed a small plot of land and also kept a village general shop. Young Murdoch had very little schooling in his early years, and he had to help on the farm or in the shop as soon as he was big enough to be of use. In some way or other, he got sent to the grammar school when he was about eleven years of age. The master asked him if he knew his multiplication table, and, receiving a reply in the negative, put into his hands an arithmetic book and told him to learn the first table. After an hour or so the master asked young Murdoch if he was ready to repeat the table, and the boy shook his head. Again and again the question was put during the day, only to meet with the same unsatisfactory response, and the master thought a very dull pupil had been sent him instead of the bright boy he expected. Just before the school closed for the day, the boy brought the book to the master and said he had memorized the table. He then went on to repeat without a single error the multiplication from twice one are two to twelve times twelve are one hundred and forty-four. It will be admitted that this was a remarkable feat of memory for a boy who had never previously been brought into contact with the multiplication table. This retentiveness of memory he held through life. In conversation, he would often quote an author textually or, taking down a book from his well-filled shelves, would turn to the exact page where the reference was to be found.

While at school, Murdoch's time out of school hours was occupied in helping his father in the shop, an occupation for which he conceived a great distaste. His bent was towards learning, and he eagerly devoured every book he came across. The grammar school had a bursary for the Aberdeen University which was competed for every year. Murdoch determined that he would win the bursary, and every moment that he could spare from his duties in the shop after school hours he devoted to study with this object. Often he sat up all night conning his books in the

dim light of a candle, and only putting out the light and scrambling into bed when he heard his father coming to call him in the morning. It was not a healthy life for a young and growing boy, and it undoubtedly left behind a certain delicacy of constitution which continued through life. But he succeeded. He won the bursary and proceeded to the University. Aberdeen was then in the front rank of the Scottish Universities. Alexander Bain was one of the Professors, and he took a great interest in the young student, whose origin was not much unlike his own. Murdoch lived on his meagre bursary, his father not being able to supplement it, and devoted himself assiduously to his studies. When he easily graduated he came out first in no less than five subjects, an achievement unprecedented in the whole history of the University, and proceeded to take the degree of M.A. At the same time he won more than one scholarship, which gave him the advantage of going to Oxford or to a Continental University if he so wished. He chose Oxford, but, as he himself said afterwards, he found that Oxford had nothing to teach him after Aberdeen. He then went on to Göttingen in Germany, where he studied Sanskrit under Professor Benfey, and subsequently to the Sorbonne in Paris.

His inclination was towards mathematics, but he had been compelled to take up the classical languages as there were no scholarships for the study which he preferred. By now he had become one of the finest of classical scholars, with a remarkable knowledge of Latin and Greek literature and no inconsiderable acquaintance with Sanskrit, while he spoke and wrote French and German with fair proficiency. To these languages, he afterwards added Spanish and Portuguese in order to study the writings of the Jesuit and Dominican missionaries to Japan in the original. At 24, he was made Assistant Professor of Greek at Aberdeen. Shortly afterwards he was offered the second Mastership of a school in Australia at six hundred a year, soon becoming headmaster at a thousand pounds a year, a fortune to a boy brought up as Murdoch was. He was a born teacher, and he inspired his pupils with devotion, making them think for themselves rather than learn their lessons by rote. But the work of administration such as falls on the shoulders of a headmaster was intolerably irksome to him. As a result he resigned his post, and for a while took a position as second-master in another

school. Here he found himself not much happier. He hated the restrictions placed on teachers, the necessity of going into society and talking amiable nothings, the restraint on education itself due to the insincerity of religious and social convention. To the great surprise of those who recognized his educational capacity he threw up his tutorial position and went into journalism. Those were the early days of the Labour movement in Australia, and he was ambitious to organize a great Labour Party, which should take the destinies of Australia into its hands. Suggestions were made that he should stand for Parliament, but he disliked the idea of promising the millennium when he knew that, in the existing circumstances, the millennium was not obtainable. So he continued to devote himself to journalism, believing that political education was necessary before there could be any hope of a material change in social conditions.

At this time the Labour movement in Australia was greatly agitated by the question of Chinese immigration. The idea of a "white Australia" was just being born, and its conception was in large measure due to the fear of the working classes in Australia that the capitalists were determined to reduce the labourers to a position of serfdom by means of the introduction of cheap labour from the Orient. Murdoch received a commission from a leading newspaper to investigate the subject, and took passage for China. In order to see how the Chinese lived on board the steamers which brought them to Australia and brought them back again to their own country when they had made what they regarded as a "pile", he travelled the first part of the journey in the steerage. Besides the Chinese there were a number of Europeans in the third class, rough fellows most of them. But Murdoch could make himself popular in any company when he liked, and the study of men of all conditions and ranks was a pronounced hobby with him. He found the food and conditions in the steerage abominable, the passengers in the third class being treated with the greatest contempt and indifference to their comfort, it being evidently believed that no complaint by them would have any effect on the company, as of course they were generally persons without any influence, while the Chinese were accustomed to take philosophically any outrage that might be put on them. Murdoch headed a deputation to the Captain, without any effect being produced except a volley of curses, for the man was a bully

and did not know that he was talking to a journalist. The scathing articles that subsequently appeared in one of the most important of the Sidney journals probably made him sorry that he had not shown more discretion. An amusing incident arose out of the conditions on board. The cabin passengers regarded those in the steerage from the upper deck as though they were a lot of queer animals. One of the most objectionable of the cabin passengers was a gentleman dressed in the height of fashion, with a heavy gold chain and gold rings covering his fingers, who one day brought a lady to witness the antics of the peculiar population in the steerage. The Europeans were engaged in throwing about the "spuds" with which they had been regaled at the midday meal that day, and which they had found uneatable. Suddenly, as the jewelled gentleman was looking at their antics with contemptuous superiority and pointing out the skill or the reverse with which the missiles were thrown, a very squashy potato caught him full in the face and he retired suddenly much discomfited. Complaint was made to the Captain, who threatened all manner of things and apparently held Murdoch responsible as the ring leader. When, therefore, Murdoch went ashore at the next port and, having purchased a first-class ticket at the agency, appeared in the saloon attired in the usual costume of ocean travellers instead of the garments he had worn in the steerage, the Captain was at first almost speechless with indignation. When he recovered his flow of profanity was so great, as he ordered the supposed steerage passenger to get back to his quarters, that he almost burst a blood vessel. Nor was his equanimity restored when Murdoch coolly showed his ticket and produced his card. But he sobered down when he realized the mistake he had made and its possible consequences, and he was very subdued for the rest of the voyage. The lady, who had been indignant at the outrage upon her escort of the moment, became a great friend of the erstwhile steerage passenger, and, being a cultivated woman, discussed poetry and philosophy with him during the remainder of the voyage to Hong-Kong, to the great disgust of the jewelled gentleman.

After completing his investigations in Hong-Kong and Canton, and sending the results of his inquiries on the Australian coolie traffic to his paper, Murdoch came on to Japan, where he found a University friend established as a teacher in one of the schools

in Kyushu. This was in the year 1889. The life attracted him and also the country and people. He went into Kobe and Tokyo, and then returned to Australia to settle up his affairs, having determined that he would enter the Japanese Government service as a teacher. He returned to Japan in the following year, but before settling down to teaching he made a tour through the country, having at the time some idea of preparing a guide-book. While on this tour, he took the opportunity of investigating a well-known coal mine in Kyushu, belonging to one of the big semi-Government commercial companies which still exercises great influence in Japanese affairs. He was amazed by what he discovered; the miners, he found, being absolutely serfs, working under conditions that were little better than those which prevailed in the worst mines in Russia. He wrote several articles on the subject, which were published in the *Japan Gazette*, then a journal of some influence, and the result of his revelations was the institution of a series of reforms in the mines which removed some of the worst evils to which he had called attention.

Murdoch's first employment in Japan was that of a teacher in the Middle School at Nakatsu in Kyushu which had been established by the former daimyo. His second position was at the First High School. There he became a well-known member of the scholastic society in Tokyo, at a time when the professorships at the University were filled by some very distinguished men, both English and American. He brought out a volume of verse entitled *Don Juan in Japan*, and some imitations of Aristophanes' Birds, in which he made fun of conditions in the local foreign community and of the reputations of some very serious and solemn persons. In later years he published a novel, entitled *Felix Holt Secundus*, the scene of which is laid in Australia and Japan. Another novel, suggested by Burton's photographs of Japan and the Japanese, entitled *Ayame-san* was also issued about this time, the beautiful photographs of Burton, who was Professor of Engineering in the Tokyo University, being used as illustrations. Some years later, he wrote an autobiographic novel, but on failing to find a publisher at the first attempt, he put it away and took no further interest in it. Another literary venture, some time in the 'nineties, was the issue of a weekly, with drawings and caricatures by Bigot, a French artist who for many years lived in Japan, the letterpress being in the

main written by himself. It was called the *Japan Echo*, and only ran a few weeks. There were, in fact, six numbers.

About the year 1893, Murdoch took part in a curious adventure. Socialism was fairly strong in the 'eighties and early 'nineties in Australia. A man named William Lane, who was both a visionary and a practical man of affairs, organized a Communist colony in Paraguay, where he had obtained a grant of some 25,000 acres of land from the Paraguayan Government, and to this land of promise he conducted a group of families and single men from Australia, like-minded with himself, there to form a community to be called New Australia. Murdoch, who knew Lane in Australia and had formed a very high opinion of him, determined to throw in his lot with the community, to which he offered his services as schoolmaster. His offer being gratefully accepted, he sailed from Japan, and arrived in South America to find a war going on between Chili and the Argentine. As a result his steamer was held up at Monte Video for more than a month. He made an investigation into the local politics and the course of the war, and his story of the events was the first connected account to reach the outside world. On finally arriving in Paraguay, he found the new colony already dispirited by its earlier experiences of a life for which many of those who took part were quite unfitted. There were constant bickerings and dissensions, leading to disputes in which there were threats of the use of arms. "My experience of the practical working of socialism," he once said, "was the serving out of meat to a community almost starving, with envy and jealousy so strong that the butcher weighed the meat with one hand while he kept a revolver in the other." Lane had developed from the gentle and thoughtful leader of equalitarians into an autocrat. The strain developed a curious fanaticism and mysticism in a man hitherto known for his equable temperament and total absence of religious credulity. One morning he rode up to the place where Murdoch was lying on the grass prior to the assembling of the school and remarked that he had been consulting with God about the affairs of the community. Saying this he eyed Murdoch sharply. "Maybe," said Murdoch gravely, finding that an answer was required. Eyeing Murdoch again, but getting nothing further, he rode away. "But that incident decided me," said Murdoch; "when the leader professed to be ordering his movements and policy by the instructions of a

supernatural being, New Australia was no longer any place for James Murdoch." So he left the community, which lingered on after several secessions, and so far as it still exists has quite altered its character.

On his journey back to Japan, via England, he had the misfortune to suffer from sunstroke at Rio de Janeiro, and for some weeks was in a very critical condition. In fact, he never fully recovered from this unpleasant experience. Returning to Japan in a condition of impaired health, he accepted the post of English teacher at the High School at Kanazawa. There he remained for some years, his health meanwhile being slowly restored, though he never showed the great vitality which marked his earlier years in Japan. It was at Kanazawa that he began to study the history of Japan, the idea having attracted him for some years, so that in returning to Japan from Paraguay he took the opportunity of a stay of some weeks in London to make a study of the material in the British Museum of the early voyagers to Japan. At first, it had been his intention to devote himself to the period of early foreign intercourse with Japan, from the year 1542, when Japan may be said to have been discovered by the Portuguese, to the year 1639, when the country was finally closed to foreigners, with exception of the small Dutch colony which for the next two and a half centuries maintained a precarious existence on the tiny islet of Deshima, in Nagasaki harbour. The result of his labours and investigations was the publication by the *Japan Chronicle* of the first volume of his *History of Japan*, which he called "The Century of Early Foreign Intercourse". It was carried out in collaboration with Mr. Yamagata Iso, now Editor of the Seoul Press, who was responsible for the Japanese sources, while Murdoch's work consisted in reading and collating the letters of the Jesuit and Dominican fathers in Spanish and Portuguese and the sifting of the wheat from the chaff in the accounts of the Christian movement in Japan in the sixteenth century compiled by Leon Pages and Charlevoix, who sometimes show a childlike faith and credulity that, however admirable it may be as disclosing a deeply religious nature, is unfitted for sober history. Having accomplished a work that alone will prove an enduring testimony of his great capacity and the skill with which he pieces together the fragments of an engrossing story of the past, Murdoch conceived the idea of treating the

whole of Japanese history from its early and legendary beginnings to the present day. To do this he felt that it was necessary to study the documents in the language in which they were written. He had already obtained a certain familiarity with colloquial Japanese, but though he was by this time approaching fifty years of age, he determined that he would master one of the most difficult languages in the world. Not only did this mean the capacity to read a Japanese book or newspaper in the ordinary language of to-day, but the study of archaic Japanese, which is a very different matter. Nevertheless, by dint of his indomitable will, he persisted until he could read the ancient records with comparative ease. He then entered on the work of writing a systematic History of Japan, of which the first volume, bringing the history down to the date of the discovery of Japan by the Portuguese, was issued by the Asiatic Society of Japan about ten years ago. His intention was to complete it in two more volumes, thus making four in all, the History of the Tokugawa period forming one volume and that of the Meiji era, the concluding volume of the series of four. For some years he took up his residence at Shinagawa, a suburb of Tokyo, almost on the site of the place formerly occupied by the British Embassy when the murderous attack was made upon its inmates in the time of Sir Rutherford Alcock. There he worked at the accumulation of materials for his History. Subsequently he took a position as English teacher at the High School at Kagoshima. He purchased a piece of land in the name of the Japanese lady with whom he had become united, and formed an orchard for the growing of oranges and lemons. He also contributed many articles to the *Japan Chronicle*, one series dealing with the philosophy of Herbert Spencer and others being fragments from his studies in Japanese history, particularly with regard to the incidents affecting the Dutch colony at Deshima. He was visited at Kagoshima by Sir Claude MacDonald, who took a great liking to him, and when the Australian Government asked that an Englishman should be engaged as Professor of Japanese at the University of Melbourne, the British Embassy recommended Murdoch. With some hesitation, for he had made up his mind to live on his fruit farm at Kagoshima for the remainder of his life, Murdoch accepted the post, and about five years ago left for Australia. He has made an almost annual visit to Japan

since that date, sometimes with a view to the engagement of Japanese assistants, sometimes to see about text-books for his students. He was in Japan in the autumn of 1921, and was expected to arrive again this year at the very time that the news of his death was received, May, 1922.

As a teacher Murdoch acquired an extraordinary control and influence over his pupils. His teaching was quite different from the conventional method, and especially from that followed in Japan. It aimed at making the pupils think for themselves, at encouraging them to reach solutions by their own efforts, after the way had been pointed out. Many of the students who received instruction from him now hold important positions in Japan, and it is to their honour that they never forgot their old teacher and were always ready to do him any service on his own account. Curiously, he never lost his Scottish accent, though he was not in Scotland after he was twenty-five years of age, or if so only for a very short time. He described his accent, himself, as a strong Doric, and to the last Englishmen had sometimes a difficulty in following his rapid and strongly accented speech. This was scarcely a good foundation either for teaching Japanese students English or for teaching English students Japanese. Yet he was remarkably successful as a teacher because of the intellectual quality he put into his work. Of a somewhat high-strung and nervous temperament, he was rather apt to take offence where none was intended, but he never bore malice and was incapable of a mean action even towards his enemies. Almost from his University days he was an Agnostic, the religion in which he had been brought up being not so much abandoned as that conviction slipped away from him. It seemed to him to have no basis in reality. The great historical work upon which he was engaged, which competent critics, who have seen the beginning, declare would have taken rank as the standard history of Japan, will now never be finished. How far he had got in his survey of the Meiji era is unknown. The Tokugawa era, was, it is believed, completed, but it is improbable that the history of the Meiji era is very far advanced, and it is now doubtful whether one with the knowledge and competence of Murdoch will ever be found willing to complete the task. He was sixty-five years of age and when in Japan last year said he felt in better health than he had done for years, and looked forward to some ten years

more of life to accomplish what he had in view. But it was not to be. His work is left unfinished, but it is a noble fragment. His life is an example of the genius that lies in the Scottish as in other peasantries, which only requires favourable circumstances to develop. His Japanese wife, who was devoted to him, accompanied him to Australia, but as was natural, with a somewhat inadequate knowledge of English and a life that was different from any she had experienced, she was not very happy there. Presumably she will return to her own country now and take up her residence on the little property purchased at Kagoshima. Murdoch had cherished the idea of returning there to end his days, for he had no relatives left in Scotland, though he had a son in America by his first wife, an Englishwoman. His life has been strange and even romantic as well as useful. There are many with whom he has been brought in contact during his variegated career, besides the students whom he taught, who will hear with regret that he is no more.

INTRODUCTION

THIS volume is the third of a series, the second of which was printed and published at Kobe, in 1903, at the office of the *Kobe Chronicle*, afterwards the *Japan Chronicle*. The first was published later, in 1910, by the Asiatic Society of Japan and was also printed at the *Chronicle* office in Kobe. It deals with the History of Japan from the origins to the arrival of the Portuguese in 1542. Volume II deals with the Century of Foreign Intercourse, 1542-1651, and the present volume covers the period between the latter year and 1868 when the Tokugawa Shogunate came to an end.

The serious student will naturally prefer to use this instalment of Japan's history in conjunction with its predecessors, but those who begin here may be assured that the author's enthusiasm for his subject communicates itself in so lively a fashion that both pleasure and instruction may be had by dipping into his pages at almost any point. Shoguns, statesmen, scholars, swordsmen, ladies wielding "influence" from their elegant seclusion, the tax-paying peasantry and the despised merchants are shown to us in their mutual relations, vividly bringing the life of the past before the eye of imagination.

The author passed away after having committed to writing this last result of his industrious researches among Japanese and foreign records but before he was able to see it published. The task of preparing the manuscript for the printer, adding a supplementary chapter and reading the proofs was undertaken by the late Professor J. H. Longford, formerly H.B.M.'s Consul at Nagasaki and himself the author of *The Story of Old Japan*. He has enriched the text with many footnotes. Unfortunately he did not live to end the work and it was transferred to my less worthy hands for completion.

It will be seen that the author had planned to continue his History in a fourth volume which was to have treated of the thronging events and changes of the Meiji era, 1868-1912, but now those who would study the history of Japan in its modern phase must seek other guides, of whom there are many, but none who will be able to quite supply the place of the erudite and entertaining James Murdoch.

L. M. C. HALL.

CHAPTER I

THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL STRUCTURE

A

The Regulative Machinery

IN the preceding volume of this history, dealing with the period of early Foreign Intercourse (1543–1661), the salient facts of the first fifty years of the régime of the Tokugawa Shōguns were recorded. The description, however, of “The Tokugawa Administrative Machine” that was contained in Chapter XVIII of that volume requires some amplification in order to facilitate an intelligent appreciation of the wonderful system of government that owed its initiation to the political genius of Iyeyasu, the founder of the dynasty, and was so faithfully and so efficiently carried out by his descendants and their ministers who served them, that it ensured perfect peace, broken only by one short, sharp civil and religious uprising in a remote corner of the empire, during 250 years, to a country that had been almost continuously rent by the worst agonies of bitter civil war for nearly five centuries, and made that country one of the happiest, most cultured, and most prosperous in the world, notwithstanding repeated and crushing natural misfortunes of fire, storm, flood, earthquake, famine, and pestilence, which, in the destruction of life and property they involved, would have broken the hearts of any people less optimistic or less confident in themselves and in their future. The study of the whole system and its results affords a marked illustration of the apotheosis of feudalism, that, in interest and instruction, is not surpassed in the feudal history of any country in the world.

When Iyeyasu became Shōgun in 1603, it was among his old Mikawa vassals who had so loyally helped to make his fortunes that he found his chief councillors, and great executive officers. Of these men of Mikawa, the most prominent were Sakai and Ōkubo; and after these came Ii Naomasa, Honda Tadakatsu, and Sakakibara Yasumasa. For some years these men, whether nominally invested with office or not, were under the Shōgun the real directors of the

Bakufu policy and administration. In 1614, the Ōkubo family fell into disgrace, compromised in a political plot;¹ complicity in another similar intrigue proved fatal to Honda Masazumi, the chieftain of the junior Honda line, in 1622, and this incident led to the eclipse of the Hondas for some time. After the death of Yasumasa in 1606, the Sakakibaras ceased to take any prominent part in the Yedo administration, while the great Ii family, at the head of the Fudai Daimyō, though still trusted, became less influential on the death of Iyeyasu. In fact, by Iyemitsu's time, the Sakai was the only old Mikawa family that maintained its pride of place in the councils of the Empire. The administrative machine was now manipulated by a brood of *novi homines*, whose families had been of comparatively little importance in the preceding warlike generation when the foundations of the Tokugawa greatness were laid.

The eldest of these new men was Doi, Toshikatsu, Oi no Kami, (1573–1644), who frequently appears in Cocks's Diary as Oyen dono. The son of an uncle of Iyeyasu, he had been adopted by Doi Toshimasu, and brought up with the future Shōgun Hidetada. Later on, together with Sakai Tadayo and another old Mikawa vassal, Aoyama Tadatoshi, he had been entrusted with the guardianship of Iyemitsu. In 1623, this Aoyama was deprived of his fief and dismissed from service, and thus ceased to be a rival to his two former coadjutors.

Yet it is questionable whether either of these two men exercised so much influence over Iyemitsu as was wielded by his foster-mother, Kasuga no Tsubone (1579–1643), the daughter of one Saitō Toshizō, a former retainer of Akechi Mitsuhide.² She had married a samurai of the Ukita family, a certain Inaba Masanori, but apparently had soon been divorced. Shortly afterwards, on the birth of Iyemitsu in 1603, it was resolved to obtain a wet nurse for the child from the Kyōto district; but when the Shoshidai invited applications for the post, none were received, for the Kamigata ladies were loath to exchange the refinements and luxury of the old capital for what they regarded as the barbarous wilds of the Kwantō. So, when Fuku, the daughter of Saitō Toshizō, on hearing of this, hurried up from her country home in Mino to apply for the position,

¹ The families and individuals mentioned in this and the succeeding paragraph are described in Vol. II, Chap. XX.—J. H. L.

² *Vide* Vol. II, p. 706, footnote.—J. H. L.

she found no difficulty in obtaining it, and presently was on her way to Yedo Castle. It was his nurse, Fuku, that Iyemitsu had mainly to thank for the frustration of his parents' intention to set him aside and make his younger brother, Tadanaga, the Head of the House of Tokugawa. This and manifold other services Iyemitsu, to his credit, never forgot, and when he came to sit in the Shōgun's seat, the Lady Fuku, or Kasuga no Tsubone as she was called from 1629¹ onwards, became a great power to be very seriously reckoned with. Among the Court ladies and female attendants her word was law, and in this sphere her influence lasted long beyond her lifetime, for the organization she gave to the domestic economy of the Shōgun's palace was, in its main outlines, at least, that which prevailed there down to the fall of the Tokugawas.

But the influence of Iyemitsu's foster-mother was far from ceasing at the outer doors of the harem. Before her death in 1643, there was scarcely a member of the two great Bakufu Councils that was not either her relative or her protégé (*Kobun*). The only exception, perhaps, was Doi Toshikatsu; but with Doi she had always been on the very best of terms. With the Sakai family she was still more intimate, for Sakai Tadayo was the father-in-law of her adopted son, Hotta Masamori.

From 1633 onwards, Iyemitsu applied himself to giving the Bakufu Administrative Machine the specialized organization that was to endure for full two long centuries. In that year, he had three great councillors, Sakai Tadayo, Doi Toshimitsu, and Sakai Tadakatsu. The first of these was a man of highly conservative instincts, and Iyemitsu was perhaps not very sorry for the incident that led to his retirement in 1634. In that year the Shōgun had made his famous visit to Kyoto at the head of 307,000 armed men; and Sakai Tadayo had been left behind as Commandant of Yedo Castle. A fire broke out in Sakai's own quarters, and reduced the western *enceinte* of the castle to ashes. This was serious, but it need not necessarily in itself have proved fatal to Sakai's fortunes. But in his consternation, he abandoned the castle and took refuge in one of the Uyeno Temples. It was this step that especially aroused Iyemitsu's wrath. The masterful Shōgun even went so far as to brand Sakai as a coward—the very greatest slur that could be cast upon a Samurai. Sakai fully expected to be ordered to disembowel

¹ In that year she had gone to Kyoto, had had an audience with the Emperor, and had been the recipient of an extraordinary high Court rank—the 2nd class.

himself; but, thanks no doubt to the good offices of Kasuga no Tsubone, his punishment stopped short with his discharge from office.

After that the reorganization of the machinery of the state administration went on apace. Together with the two remaining Toshiyori—Sakai Tadakatsu and Doi Toshikatsu—were now associated three younger men—Matsudaira Nobutsuna, Hotta Masamori, and Abe Tadaoki. These five constituted the Great Council, which was presently to become known as the Rōjū. At first its specific duties were to control the Daimyō, the Ōbangashira or Commanders of the Great Guard of the castle and the Yoriai Hatamoto—that is, the special class of Hatamoto that, like the Daimyō, had to spend alternate terms in residence in Yedo. The work of this Great Board was carried on in a peculiar way—a fashion, however, that became more or less common in the lesser Boards and Bureaux as well. Each of the five Councillors attended to all the business of the Board for one month in five; the other four members meanwhile, though not appearing publicly in an official capacity, repairing to the Council Chamber daily in order to keep in touch with the details of the business transacted by their colleague, and to be ready with advice if needed.

Each of the members was, of course, a Fudai Daimyō. But that did not necessarily mean that the Rōjū was recruited exclusively from the ranks of the existing Fudai Daimyō. A mere Hatamoto¹ might be raised to the Great Council, a new fief being created for him to qualify him for the position. For example, the father of

¹ Hatamoto: the immediate vassals of the Shōgun, one of the most important classes in the social system of the Shōgunate. The literal meaning of their title is "beneath" or "the foundation" of the "flag", signifying their direct personal attachment to the Shōgun or to the Tokugawa family. They were originally termed "Shōmyō", or "small names", in distinction to the "Daimyō", or great names, and they took precedence immediately following the latter, the main distinction between the two being that none of the Hatamoto possessed estates or annual incomes exceeding 10,000 *koku*. They varied very much among themselves, both in estate and rank. They were eligible to fill all the offices in the Government under the Go Rōju and did actually hold very many of them and exercised most important functions, which brought them into much prominence in public. As one instance, it may be mentioned that the officials, who negotiated the early treaties with Perry, Harris, and Lord Elgin, were all Hatamoto, and not of very high degree at that. They were said to number about 80,000 in all, but this number included the subordinate vassals referred to below and the real landowning Hatamoto were not often of that number. All of them were the most devoted vassals of the Shōgun. They fought for him to the very last, and when he fell, they shared his downfall, many of them descending into extreme poverty and distress. They are frequently mentioned throughout the volume. The terms Baishin, Kenin or Kerai, and Gokenin, all mean "vassals of a vassal", the samurai retainers of a feudal chief who was himself the vassal of the Shōgun, though Gokenin was mainly applied to the Shōgun's direct vassals under the rank of Hatamoto.—J. H. L.

Hotta Masamori was a simple Samurai with an income of 1,000 *Koku*; but when Masamori entered the Rōjū he was enfeoffed with a domain of 26,000 *Koku* at Kawagoye; and at his death in 1651, he was in possession of as much as 145,000 *Koku* as Lord of Sakura in Shimosa. It was a general rule that no Tozama, or outside Daimyō, was eligible for membership of the Rōjū; yet I have noted one or two instances of Tozama entering the Great Council, though such cases mainly occur towards the closing years of the Bakufu regime.

To obtain an approximately accurate idea of the nature of the personnel of the Great Council, and to correct certain current misconceptions¹ perhaps the most expeditious plan will be to attempt a rough analysis of the lists of officials appended as a supplement to the last volume of the *Tokugawa Jikki*. These lists extend from 1651 to 1786, but here we shall confine our attention to the period 1651–1715, that is, from the death of Iyemitsu, the third, down to the accession of Yoshimune, the eighth Shogun.

In 1639, Iyemitsu relieved Doi and Sakai from the ordinary routine duties of the Great Council, and ordered them to reserve themselves for questions of the greatest moment. These two men were now styled the Ō-toshiyori-shū, or Great Elders, and Hotta Masamori was added to their number in 1641. Here we really find the origin of the *Tai-rō*, or Regent. Doi died in 1644, and just before the death of Iyemitsu in 1651, besides the *Tai-rō*, there was a Rōjū of four members. As Hotta Masamori and Abe Shigetsugu, one of the Rōjū, committed *Junshi*, to accompany Iyemitsu to the other world, the *Tokugawa Jikki* lists begin in 1651, with a *Tai-rō*, and three Rōjū. One of these died in 1653, and his place was taken by a new member, Sakai Tadakiyo; but the other two, Matsudaira Nobutsuna and Abe Tada-aki, remained in office down

¹ For instance, some assertions on p. 575 of the preceding volume of this work are not altogether correct. The following from p. 29 of Professor Wigmore's *Introduction to Materials for the Study of Private Law in Old Japan*, is also at fault in more than one respect: "We talk of the Shōgun having this or that policy, but it is a phrase only. The real rulers of Japan (that is, of the part which the central power reached) were these Councillors. From the time of Iyemitsu, the Third Tokugawa Shōgun, there was probably not a single occupant of that commanding position (except Yoshimune, the eighth Shōgun) who did not register without hesitation whatever decree the Councillors agreed upon. They practically elected themselves, but they seem to have had wonderful success in attracting to their number the ablest men in the ruling class, for no country in Europe had a more tranquil history than Japan during the 250 years of their government. When the Shōgun was a minor, one of them was chosen to serve as Regent, and, during his incumbency, possessed a controlling influence."

to 1662 and 1671 respectively. As both these men had been promoted to the Great Council in 1634, their tenure of office was a long one—28 years in the one case, and 37 years in the other.

Including these two men, as well as Sakai Tadakatsu, the Regent, we find between 1651 and 1751, only thirty names in the official lists of Great Councillors. In the majority of cases their tenure of office was for life. As many as a dozen of them actually died in harness; and of the fourteen who resigned, many did so merely on account of the hopeless burden of age. The remaining four were assigned for service in the Nishi Maru or Western Enceinte of the castle.¹ We find one of the thirty holding office for 32 years, another for 25, another for 24, another for 22, and five others for between 15 and 18 years. On several occasions we note terms of consecutive years passing without any change in the personnel of the Rōjū; and only on five occasions do we meet with as many as two new appointments in the course of any single year. Such being the case, a steady, consistent, and consecutive policy was only what might have been expected.

During this time, besides Sakai Tadakatsu, who resigned in 1656, there were three Tairō. Sakai Tadakiyo held this office from 1666 to 1680 (there being no Regent between 1656 and 1666), and Hotta Masatoshi from 1681 to 1684. Both these were taken from the Rōjū. But with the third Regent this was not the case. On two occasions (1697–1700 and 1711–14) we find Ii of Hikone, the chief of the Fudai Daimyō, filling this office. It will thus be seen that while the regency was not hereditary in the Ii family, as is sometimes asserted, a member of that family did not necessarily owe his appointment to the Rōjū, nor was he necessarily taken from that Council. Furthermore, neither Sakai Tadakiyo nor Ii of Hikone, on the first occasion, was appointed to act for the Shōgun in his minority. And lastly, the case of Hotta indicates that the Regent might be taken from other families than those of Sakai, Ii, Honda, and Sakakibara, to which the legacy of Iyeyasu would confine them.

As regards the real amount of power wielded by the Rōjū, it differed greatly from time to time. On certain occasions it was confined to the discharge of mere routine functions. At one time during this period (1651–1715) we find that it is the Shōgun's adjutants and personal favourites who really decide the important

¹ That section of the castle which was usually set apart as the residence of a Shōgun who had abdicated or of an heir apparent.—J. H. L.

issues ; at another, we are driven to the conclusion that it is the Shōgun's Chinese scholar who is the power behind the throne. Later on, we shall sometimes find one member of the Rōjū all-powerful and his so-called colleagues little better than ciphers. Then on certain occasions the ladies of the palace had to be seriously reckoned with, and on others it was the heads of the collateral branches of the Tokugawa House—the Go-san-ke—that settled the most weighty issues. The assertion that the Rōjū Councillors were the real rulers of Japan for 250 years will simply not stand the test of investigation.

In connexion with the personnel of the Rōjū, yet one more point is worthy of notice. Many of the appointees had previously had a long official career in one or other junior office. Of the thirty Councillors already alluded to, as many as one-third were promoted from the Junior Council, the *Wakadoshiyori* ; and of these ten, at least four had had a previous official training as Temple Magistrates. Three others had also served, first as Temple Magistrates, and later on as Shoshidai at Kyōto, while we find two instances of Temple Magistrates being promoted to the Rōjū direct.

The Junior Council or *Wakadoshiyori* was established in Iyemitsu's time. Before this, two companies of military pages—the Shoimban and the Koshōgumi—had been organized. In 1633, Matsudaira Nobutsuna, Abe Tada-aki, Hotta Masamori, and three other favourites of the Shōgun were named “ Kashira ”, or commanders of these semi-military bodies, and at the same time were appointed General superintendents of the Hatamoto and of the Samurai. At first they were known under this latter title, but they were also spoken of as the Company or Board of Six. On the promotion of the three above-mentioned members to the Rōjū in 1634, the “ Six ” ceased to be appropriate ; and Hayashi Razan, the Chinese scholar, then proposed the designation “ Little Rōjū ”. About the same date the term *Wakadoshiyori* (Young Elders) became current, and before long established itself as the title of the Board. Besides its own special duties of controlling the Hatamoto and the Samurai, its members had to assist the Rōjū with their advice when asked for it.

The lists of Junior Councillors in the *Tokugawa Jikki* begin with the year 1662. Between that date and 1680, we find the Board with no more than two members ; between 1680 and 1715, it generally consisted of three, and, on rare occasions of four Councillors.

Altogether between 1662 and 1715, there were thirty-two appointments. As the Junior Council was regarded as a sort of stepping-stone in an official career, the tenure of office in it was of much briefer duration than it was in the Rōjū. Katō, Etchu no kami, held his appointment from 1690 to 1711, and Akimoto, Settsu no Kami, his from 1682 to 1699, but with perhaps two exceptions, no one else during this period (1662–1715) was a Junior Councillor for more than ten years. In most cases four, three, or two years proved the limit; in several cases, indeed, a single year or even a few months. Of these thirty-two Junior Councillors three died in office and nine resigned. Of the remaining twenty, nine or ten were promoted to the Rōjū direct, two became Shoshidai at Kyōto and one Jōdai at Ōsaka. Of the others, five were made Sōshaban, two Sobayōnin, and one was assigned for duty in the Nishi Maru.

In the fourteenth article of that notorious forgery, the so-called Hundred Laws of Iyeyasu, the order of official precedence is given as follows:—

1, Tairō; 2, Orusui; 3, Rōjū; 4, Kyōto Shoshidai; 5, Ōsaka Jōdai; 6, Sunshū Rioban; 7, Wakadoshiyori; 8, Sobayōnin; 9, Kōke; 10, Sōshaban; 11, Jisha Bugyō; 12, Okudoshiyori; 13, Nishimaru Rusui; 14, Ōmetsuke; 15, Kotaiyorai Hatamoto; 16, Hirayorai Hatamoto; 17, Kanjō Bugyō; 18, Machi Bugyō.¹

¹ Translations of most of these titles will be found either in the text of the present chapter or elsewhere in the volume, but they may be given here succinctly for the convenience of the lay reader:—

1. Tairō: also called Karō and Ō-Doshiyori. Premier or Regent, the latter during the minority of a Shōgun. 2. Ō-Rusui, Chief Caretaker. Rusui means an official who had charge of a mansion or castle in the absence of the owner, and the Ō-Rusui, in accordance with his title, was in charge of the Yedo castle during the absence of the Shōgun at Kyōto or elsewhere. He exercised a general supervision over the women's apartments and with the help of a large staff, was responsible for the custody of all military stores, and for many other important functions. In the household of a Daimyō he was also in charge of all correspondence with the Shōgun. 3. Rōjū: also called Toshiyori, the Elders, five in number, the chief Ministers, practically the cabinet. 4. Kyōto Shoshidai. The representative of the Shōgun at Kyōto, having his residence at the castle of Nijo, practically the Governor of the Imperial city, and always a Daimyō of Tokugawa descent. 5. Ōsaka Jōdai, Governor of the castle and city of Ōsaka. 6. Sunshū-Regoban, Governor of the castle at Sumpu (Shizuoka) in the family domains of the Tokugawa. 7. Waka-doshiyori, the junior elders, the assistant ministers of the state; like their seniors, five in number, whose principal duties were the control of the *hatamoto* and *kenin* while those of the elders were the control of Imperial Palaces and the Daimyō. 8. Sobayōnin, Chamberlains or Personal Secretaries to the Shōgun, who communicated to him and advised him on the reports of the Rōjū. 9. Kōke, Masters of Ceremonies, fifteen in number, one of whom was always on guard in the palace by day. 10. Sōshaban, literally monastery guards, supervisors of ceremony and etiquette, varying at different periods from two to twenty-four in number, one of whom always kept guard in the palace at night. 11. Jisha Bugyō, Commissioners of Temples and Shrines, supervisors of all matters relating to

After this follows the gradation of thirty-three chiefs of other subordinate offices or bureaux. Now, apart from the fact that the Wakadoshiyori had no existence in the days of Iyeyasu, it would appear that this table is inaccurate in several respects. In the time of the fifth Shōgun, Tsunayoshi (1680-1709), at least, both Sobayōnin and Sōshaban were regarded as higher in position than the Junior Council.

In 1633, Iyemitsu appointed Inaba Masanori and Kuze Hiroyuki chiefs of the Shōgun Kinji (Chamberlains) and made them a medium of communication between himself and the Rōjū. At various times in the history of the Tokugawa Bakufu we find the Sobayōnin, or, as they were often called, the Goyōnin, wielding an influence as great as that of the eunuchs of the Byzantine Empire. The Sōshaban also dates from 1632 or 1633. The Sōsha were of the nature of Masters of Ceremony, charged among other things with the duty of arranging the details of presentations to, and audiences with, the Shōgun.

The three great "outside" offices were those of the Sunshū Rioban or Sumpu Jōdai, of the Ōsaka Jōdai, and of the Kyōto Shoshidai.

The first of these three was of no very great practical importance. The Commandants of Sumpu (now Shizuoka) Castle were usually taken from the Ōbangashira. Their duties were to keep the Castle in repair, and to administer the domains depending on it.

The position of Ōsaka Jōdai, or Representative of the Shōgun in the Castle of Ōsaka, was a much more onerous one. Besides maintaining the great stronghold in repair, this functionary had to control the Machi-Bugyō of Ōsaka and the Bugyō of Sakai, and occasionally to discharge judicial functions himself in difficult suits between the townsmen and the people in the neighbourhood. The office dated from the time of Hidetada, the second Shōgun—

Temples, including the exercise of judicial functions over priests, nuns, etc. 12. Ōku-doshiyori, Inner of Household Elders, at the head of whom was the Ō-oku-doshiyori. Female officials and Ladies in Waiting in the innermost chambers of the palace supervising all the female employees of every degree. 13. Nishi Maru Rusui, keepers of the Western Castle, the residence of the heir apparent or abdicated Shōgun. 14. Ōmetsuke, the great Censor, the chief of the Metsuke, spies, or more politely, supervisors, who kept a watch on all other officials, and travelled through the whole country observing and reporting to the Shōgun the local condition of each district. 15. Kotai yoriai Hatamoto, Hatamoto who spent alternate years in Yedo. 16. Hira yoriai Hatamoto, Hatamoto who remained on their estates. 17. Kanjō Bugyō, Commissioners of Finance. 18. Machi Bugyō, Commissioners controlling the municipalities.

from 1619, to be precise. Between 1652 and 1662 there were six *titulaires* at once, who took turns in discharging the duties of the position. The occupant of the post was of Daimyō rank, with an official revenue of 10,000 *Koku* in addition to his fief, and was appointed sometimes from among the Temple Magistrates, sometimes from the Wakadoshiyori and occasionally from the Sōshaban. Now and then he was promoted to act as Kyōto Shoshidai, and, on rare occasions, to the Rōjū direct.

The Kyōto Shoshidai was by far the most weighty of the "outside" offices. Although the office under this name was established by Nobunaga, it was really a replica of the Rokuhara Tandai¹ of the thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries. After Sekigahara (A.D. 1600), Iyeyasu conferred this post and title first on Okudaira Nobumasa, and later on, on Itakura Katsushige (1601). The latter was succeeded (1620) by his son Shigemune, who held the post for more than thirty years (1620–54). The most important of the Shoshidai's duties was to exercise surveillance over the Emperor and the Court Nobles; but in addition to this he exercised control over the Machi-bugyō of Kyōto, the Bugyō of Fushimi and Nara, the Kyōto-daikwan and the functionaries of the Shōgun's castle of Nijō. Like the Ōsaka Jōdai, he had an official income of 10,000 *Koku* in addition to the revenue of his own Daimyoate. Between 1665 and 1715, we find two Junior Councillors and three Temple Magistrates advanced to the position of Shoshidai; and of these five, four ultimately were called to the Rōjū.

The other important administrative and judicial organs of the Tokugawa Bakufu were the Three Magistracies—Temple, Town, and Finance. Although the magistracies are sometimes regarded by foreign writers as forming a single class, the first of the Three was of much higher rank and of much greater consequence than the other two. So much is indicated even by the scale of the official emoluments. While those of a Finance Magistrate (or Commissioner) were only 1,500 *Koku*, and those of a Town Magistrate only 3,000 *Koku* per annum, a Temple Magistrate had 10,000 *Koku*. Furthermore the post of Temple Magistrate was the lowest rung in the ladder of the highest official hierarchy. Between 1651 and

¹ Tandai, the title given to governors or chief magistrates of important cities under the Kamakura Shōgunate. One at Rokuhara was charged with the surveillance of the Emperor and his court at Kyōto. This office became very important under the Hōjō Regents, and was always held by a senior member of the family. *Vide* Vol. I, p. 45.—J. H. L.

1715, there were some six-and-thirty Temple Magistrates; and of these, at least thirteen were promoted to higher things. Two were called to the Rōjū direct, and eight others entered it after terms of service as Junior Councillors or Shoshidai, while two were assigned to duty in the Nishi Maru, and another became Ōsaka Jōdai.

Of all the Town Magistrates during this period (1651–1715) only four received promotion to higher grades. Two became Ōmetsuke and two others Rusui. As regards the contemporary Finance Magistrates, the record of advancement in position is equally meagre. One became a Town Magistrate, one an Ōmetsuke, one a Sobayōnin, and two others Rusui.

In the preceding volumes of this work a great deal was said about the rise of various sects of the Buddhist priesthood into great feudal powers. The bitter enmity of the warrior monks had been one of the prime factors that contributed to the fall of the Taira. Yoritomo had done his best to conciliate the priests, and although he subjected those in his own domains to secular control he was chary of interfering with the great fanes of Kyōto, Nara and Kōya-san. Even in the palmiest days of the Hōjō, these western monasteries were never subjected to the jurisdiction of the Bakufu law-courts, although they had given infinite provocation at the time of Toba II's attempt to free himself from the thralldom of Kamakura in 1221. Only once, for the brief space of a year or so, did the Hōjō venture to instal a Shugo¹ in the province of Yamato, which was almost entirely under priestly rule. Towards the end of the Ashikaga period, the Monto sect came to own whole provinces, while the Shingon priests of Kōya and its offshoot, Negoro, could easily raise armies of quite 20,000 men. How the power of these sacerdotal potentates was broken by Nobunaga and Hideyoshi has been told in the immediately preceding volume. Hence the Tokugawas never had any great difficulty in dealing with the Buddhist Church. One of Iyeyasu's friends had been the Zen priest, Sūden or Denchōrō. This doughty ecclesiastic acted as his secretary, accompanied him in all his campaigns, and now and then rendered yeoman service with the sword as well as with the pen. At the great battle of

¹ Shugo: originally the rôle of officials sent by Yoritomo to the provinces to overlook the Governors. In time, they acquired such authority that they developed into the daimyō of later ages. *Vide* Vol. 1, p. 385, where the title is translated "High Constable".—J. H. L.

Mikata-ga-hara¹ he presented three heads as trophies of his prowess, and in consequence was granted three black stars as armorial bearings. Appointed Abbot of the Nan-zen-ji² and the Kon-chi-in, he was in 1608 entrusted with the general administration of all the temples and shrines of the Empire. He died in 1633, and Iyemitsu then resolved to put the supreme control of the secular affairs of the priesthood into secular hands, and a Board of three Temple Commissioners or Magistrates was established. In addition to their duties in connexion with ecclesiastical affairs, these Commissioners were also charged with the settlement of suits and disputes between feudatories. Between 1651 and 1671, there were rarely if ever more than two Temple Commissioners; during the next quarter of a century there were three, and from 1696 onwards generally as many as four, although now and then no more than three.

So far we have been brought into no contact with the common people, the farmers, and the townsmen—the great bulk of the nation at large. All the Boards and Councils and Commissioners so far named were concerned with the affairs of the aristocracy, the gentry, or the Church; at the very lowest. It is only with Machi-Bugyō and the Kanjō-Bugyō that we come into touch with the toiling multitude of plebeians.

The Town Magistrates (Machi-Bugyō) were practically Mayors of Yedo with judicial as well as administrative functions. From 1651 down to 1702, they were two in number; for the next seventeen years there were three of them, and from 1719 onwards, again only two. As was usual in all the Boards, they acted in rotation—for a month at a time.

The Finance Magistrates were at first three in number; but between 1662 and 1665, and again from 1689 to 1694, we find no

¹ Fought in 1573, between Takeda Shingen and Iyeyasu, in which the latter was completely defeated. It was really a series of battles fought outside the town of Hamamatsu. *Vide* Vol. II, p. 128.—J. H. L.

² Nan-zen-ji is a famous temple of the Zen sect of Buddhists in Kyōto, dating from the thirteenth century. It was, at different periods, the residence of two very contrasting historical personages, the Emperor Kameyama (1259–74) after his abdication, and in an out-house the notorious robber Ishikawa Goyemon, who combined in himself the virtues and vices of Robin Hood and Dick Turpin. He was at last captured and sentenced to be boiled in oil together with his young son. Taking the child in his hands he jumped into the cauldron where he held the child above his head till his strength failed. He then plunged it in the boiling oil, head downwards, and sank himself, bidding defiance to the very last to the jeering crowd around. Kon-chi-in is a sub-monastery of the Temple with a very picturesque garden.—J. H. L.

more than two. From 1696 onwards there were generally four. About this date the work of the Board was reorganized, one half of its members being assigned to purely financial (*Katte-gata*) and the other to judicial (*Kuji-gata*) duties. The Finance Magistrates dealt with the lawsuits of the commoners on the Shōgun's country domains, as the Town Magistrates did with those of the citizens of Yedo. Under them were the *Gundai*, *Daikwan*, or *Jitō*,¹ who collected the revenues and administered justice in the vast Shōgunal estates, which lay mostly in the *Kwantō* and the Provinces of *Kai*, *Suruga* and *Idzu*, but which were also scattered here and there in enclaves over the Empire from the south of *Mutsu* and *Dewa* on to Central *Hyuga* and *Amakusa* in *Kyūshū*. However, in common with the *Jisha-Bugyō*, the *Kanjō-Bugyō* had the stress of their judicial business from the west of the Empire considerably relieved by the occasional delegation of their functions to the authorities working under the *Ōsaka Jōdai* and the *Shoshidai* in *Kyōto*. In *Ōsaka*, two *machi-Bugyō* had been installed as early as 1617. After *Sekigahara*,² a *Tokugawa Gundai* had been assigned the duty of collecting the revenue in *Kyōto*, and the neighbouring provinces, and this official in course of time was also entrusted with the discharge of judicial functions. In 1665, an extra officer was appointed, and the two colleagues were thenceforward known as the *Kyōto Machi-Bugyō*.

One great item in the policy of the Yedo Bakufu was to discourage and prevent litigation. Every effort was to be made to settle disputes by conciliation, by arbitration, by mutual compromise, and concession. For the first generation of their Shōgunate the *Tokugawa* had no regularly constituted Supreme Court of Judicature. During the early period of *Iyemitsu's* sway grave cases, especially those of criminal import, were investigated and decided in the mansion either of *Sakai Tadayo* or, afterwards, of *Doi Toshikatsu*. Now, at last, with the institution of the three sets of Magistrates, and also of another set of officers presently to be mentioned, a Supreme Court of Justice was organized. It was composed of all the *Bugyō*, of the *Ōmetsuke* or Great Censors, while one of the *Rōjū* was to exercise a supervision over the proceedings of the bench by repairing from time to time to the Court room, where provision

¹ *Vide* Vol. I, p. 386.

² *Sekigahara*; the battle of that name which consolidated the power of *Iyeyasu*, fought in 1600. *Vide* Vol. II, pp. 414-42.—J. H. L.

was made to enable him to make his entrance and exit unseen and unheard, his actual presence being known to no one. On very extraordinary occasions we meet with the Shōgun himself attending the sittings. But then this was nothing new or unprecedented in the history of Japan, for the first Sei-i-tai-Shōgun, the great Yoritomo, had time and again sat in the seat of judgment, had patiently and laboriously sifted testimony and passed sentence and rendered awards.

This High Court, which at first had no special building of its own, and which only came to be known as the Hyōjōsho after it had been in existence for some years, was ultimately housed in the Yashiki that had been erected for the Tensō, or Imperial Envoy from Kyōto on his yearly visit. Its chief business was to serve as a Court of Appeal, but it also rendered decisions on difficult points of law and procedure submitted to it, while in certain important matters, such as troubles in a Daimyō's household, it exercised original jurisdiction.

Mention has just been made of the Ōmetsuke, or Great Censors, and two instances of Town Magistrates and one of a Finance Magistrate being promoted to this office have been noted. Metsuke had existed since 1617, when sixteen of them were appointed. They were now put under the supervision of the Wakadoshiyori. But the Ōmetsuke or Great Censors date only from 1633. By early foreign writers they are called "spies", but that term does them injustice; at all events such espionage as they exercised was open and public. Their chief office was to see to it that the laws and especially the regulations of the Shōgun's Court were properly obeyed, and that the official procedure in all cases was correct. The Ōmetsuke (at first, four, and later on five in number) were supposed to direct especial attention to those of Daimyō rank, while the Metsuke had to supervise the lower Hatamoto and Samurai. But in addition to this, the Boards of Censors had also jurisdiction in legal matters. Some of the great Clans (or properly Fiefs) had Metsuke of their own; and in several cases their chief work consisted in the administration of the Criminal Law.

One other high official was attached to the Hyōjōsho, whose duties at first were of no great importance. A member of the Hayashi family was employed to read and interpret the difficult Chinese characters and passages that might crop up in the documents submitted as evidence in Temple suits. This was the origin

of the post of Jusha, or official Chinese Scholar—a position that ultimately became a very important and influential one. Here it is not advisable to enter into details about the inferior bureaux, the army of smaller officials and menials that swarmed in the Shōgunal Palace. Only one point may be noted in connexion with them—a point that characterized nearly the whole of the Tokugawa Civil Service. The Head of a bureau did not appoint the immediate subordinate he controlled. In certain cases, for example, the Chief of a Bureau was the appointee of the Rōjū, while he himself was under the control of the Wakadoshiyori, and in a similar manner the Sub-chief although under the control of the Chief, was rarely if ever, a nominee of his own. The term *Jiki-Shihai* (direct control) indicated the relation between the appointing and the appointed person, not between the latter and his immediate superior, who was said to be a *Kashira-Shihai* (head control). Still another point to be observed is that, with the exception of the Kyōto Shoshidai and the Ōsaka Jōdai, and latterly the Tairō, every office or position had two or more occupants at the same time—and that the Ōmetsuke or the Metsuke were perpetually in evidence to see to it that the correct procedure was followed in each and every case.

Yet withal, the personnel of what the Japanese call the *Yōshoku* (Cardinal Offices) of the Tokugawa administration was not very numerous. During the period 1651 to 1715, we find an occasional Tairō, from three to five Rōjū, from two to four Wakadoshiyori, a Shoshidai in Kyōto, a Jōdai in Ōsaka (between 1652 and 1662, as many as six at one time), from two to four Temple Commissioners, two and rarely three Town Magistrates, from two to four Finance Commissioners, and four or five Ōmetsuke. All told, in 1664, for example, these great officials numbered no more than eighteen or nineteen—in 1715, they totalled twenty-five, and the number fluctuated between these two extremes. In addition to these were the Shōgun's Adjutants (Sobayōnin) and Envoys (Sōshaban), and the Jusha or Chinese Scholar. Their influence was, indeed, very great at times. But it was a "backstairs" influence, based on the personal ascendancy of exceptional, or exceptionally favoured individuals with the Shōgun.

Now let us consider how far and in what measure this administrative machinery controlled Japan. In the first place all the great cities of the Empire, Yedo, Kyōto (with Fushimi and Nara), and Ōsaka (with Sakai) were completely in its power, together with

the great highroads connecting them. Then the vast Shōgunal domains, producing about 4,000,000 *Koku* per annum were in their hands, as were also those of the Tokugawa Hatamoto. It is hard to say what was the exact extent of the lands held by these. The lowest estimate I have met with is 3,000,000 *Koku*, the highest, that of Caron in 1636, 5,000,000 *Koku*. And the higher figure is probably a nearer approximation to the truth than the other. As the whole assessed national revenue amounted to between 28,000,000 and 30,000,000 *Koku*, it will be seen that at least one-fourth of the soil of the Empire was under the immediate and direct control of the Bakufu, with, allowing for the great cities, probably more than one-third of the total population of Japan. Then the Fudai Daimyo were at its mercy. It is true that these Fudai were largely masters in their own domains, and that the Bakufu did not interfere with the details of their administration. But in the event of mal-administration or anything else provoking a scandal, a Fudai might very soon find himself deprived of a part or even of the whole of his fief, or removed to another one of less value. Under Hidetada and Iyemitsu such occurrences were frequent, and even in the times of Iyetsuna and Tsunayoshi they were by no means rare. In short the Fudai were really and truly vassals of the Bakufu, and in a sense its administrative agents as well. In an early *Bukan* of Iyetsuna's time we find 129 of these Fudai, the total of their assessed revenues amounting to 6,176,700 *Koku*, which would mean something between a fourth and a fifth of the national superficies, and perhaps a fifth of the total population.

At this date (middle of the seventeenth century) we find the remainder of the Empire portioned out among twenty-three great feudatories ; but of these as many as seven were collateral members of the Tokugawa House.

A comparison of the distribution of the great fiefs as given in the *Bukan* of 1614, with that of Iyetsuna will perhaps serve to elucidate more than one important point. In 1614, the list stood as follows :—

<i>Family and Personal Names.</i>	<i>Fief.</i>	<i>Revenue. Koku.</i>
1. Maeda Toshitsune . .	(Kaga, Noto, Etchū) . .	1,195,000
2. Shimadzu Iyehisa . .	(Satsuma, Ōsumi, etc.) . .	729,500
3. Matsudaira Tadanao . .	(Echizen)	670,000
4. Date Masamune . .	(Sendai)	615,000
5. Gamō Tadasato . .	(Aizu)	600,000
6. Mogami Iyechika . .	(Yamagata)	570,000
7. Tokugawa Yoshinao . .	(Owari)	539,500

<i>Family and Personal Names.</i>	<i>Fief.</i>	<i>Revenue. Koku.</i>
8. Kuroda Nagamasa . . .	(Chikuzen) . . .	523,000
9. Katō Tadahiro . . .	(Higo) . . .	520,000
10. Tokugawa Yorinobu . . .	(Suruga and Tōtōmi) . . .	500,000
11. Fukushima Masanori . . .	(Aki) . . .	498,200
12. Matsudaira Tadateru . . .	(Echigo) . . .	450,000
13. Ikeda Tadatsugu . . .	(Bizen) . . .	445,000
14. Asano Nagakira . . .	(Kii) . . .	395,000
15. Mōri Hidenari . . .	(Suwō and Nagato) . . .	369,000
16. Hosokawa Tadaoki . . .	(Buzen) . . .	359,000
17. Nabeshima Katsushige . . .	(Hizen) . . .	357,000
18. Tanaka Tamamasa . . .	(Chikugo) . . .	325,999
19. Ikeda Toshitaka . . .	(Himeji, Harima) . . .	320,000
20. Uyesugi Kagekatsu . . .	(Yonezawa, Dewa) . . .	300,000
21. Tokugawa Yorifusa . . .	(Mito) . . .	250,000
22. Tōdō Takatora . . .	(Tsu, Ise) . . .	243,000
23. Horio Tadaharu . . .	(Matsuye, Idzumo) . . .	240,000
24. Satake Yoshinobu . . .	(Akita, Dewa) . . .	205,800
25. Yamanouchi Tadayoshi . . .	(Tosa) . . .	202,600
26. Katō Yoshiaki . . .	(Matsuyama, Iyo) . . .	200,000
27. Mori Tadamasa . . .	(Tsuyama, Mimasaka) . . .	186,000
28. Ii Naokatsu . . .	(Hikone, Ōmi) . . .	180,000
29. Ikoma Masatoshi . . .	(Takamatsu, Sanuki) . . .	173,000
30. Kyōgoku Takatomo . . .	(Miyazu, Tango) . . .	123,000
31. Terazawa Hirotaka . . .	(Karatsu, Hizen) . . .	120,000
32. Torii Tamamasa . . .	(Taira, Iwaki) . . .	120,000

In this list, Nos. 3, 7, 10, 12, and 21, were Tokugawas—four sons and a grandson of Iyeyasu, while Nos. 28 and 32 were then the greatest among the Tokugawa Fudai Daimyō. The other twenty-four were “outside” Daimyō—magnates who, partly the allies, partly the opponents of Iyeyasu had been on a footing of practical equality with him down to the battle of Sekigahara in 1600, and who had been theoretically on the same footing down to 1603, when the victor of Sekigahara was invested with the Shōgunate.

A learned American writer is responsible for the following remarks :—

“ The political divisions were the fiefs of the various territorial lords. Theoretically the Emperor was the foundation of government, and the Shōgun was only his generalissimo, the preserver of peace, and the leader in war. Practically, the Shōgun wielded all the power of the Central Government. This is not saying that he was practical master of the country, for into a few of the fiefs of the powerful lords on the west and north no central administrative power ever entered. In fact a Tokugawa man might not venture into the districts of the great Shimadzu family, the lords of Satsuma, and its neighbourhood, without incurring more or less peril. The Shōgun thus occupied a double position towards the greater lords, who owed allegiance directly to the

Emperor. He was as a feudatory only *primus inter pares* ; at the same time he was as generalissimo vested with political authority over them. But the Tokugawa rulers were too wise to exercise this right unless the occasion made it unavoidable, and almost the only practical ways in which it found recognition were in the compulsory journeys of these Daimyō to Yedo in alternate years, in the equally compulsory residence of their wives and heirs in Yedo while absent in their fiefs, and in the oath of fealty that had to be taken at the accession of a new Shōgun."

Although all this is correct in the main, the above passage is not unlikely to give rise to some misconceptions. So much will appear perhaps from an investigation into the changes that took place among the great outside feudatories between 1614 and 1664. To begin with the north. There, in the first place, when Gamō Tadasato died without children in 1627, his brother Tadatomo was chosen to succeed him in the headship of the house. But the new chieftain was transferred to Matsuyama in Iyo with a reduced revenue of 240,000 *Koku*, while the Daimyō of Matsuyama, Katō Yoshiaki, replaced him in Aizu with an assessment of 400,000 *Koku*. By this juggling of the cards one-third (200,000 *Koku*) of the great Aizu fief passed into Tokugawa hands. Then, in 1643, Yoshiaki's grandson Akitomo, on account of internal disturbances in the clan, was stripped of his domains, and the fief was then wholly portioned out among Bakufu vassals. Meanwhile, Gamō Tadatomo had died at Matsuyama in 1634 without heirs, and his domains were forthwith confiscated and the major portion of them bestowed on a Tokugawa Fudai. Already the powerful house of Mogami had been still more drastically dealt with. In 1622, its chief was disenseffed for maladministration, and transferred to a small patch of 10,000 *Koku* in Ōmi, the larger section of the Mogami lands (570,000 *Koku*) being appropriated as Bakufu soil, and the rest distributed among Fudai.

In the west the Bakufu laid an equally heavy hand upon some of the great feudatories. In 1619 Fukushima was removed from Aki and consigned to a domain of 45,000 *Koku* in the cold and mountainous wilds of Shinano. Hereupon, Asano was transferred from Kii to Aki, but with an assessment of only 420,000 *Koku*, while Iyeyasu's seventh son, Yorinobu, was shifted from Suruga and Tōtōmi to Kii (550,000 *Koku*), Suruga mostly reverting to Bakufu domain and Tōtōmi being carved out among Fudai. The net result of this manœuvring was a gain of about half a million *Koku* to the Tokugawas. One branch of the Ikeda family had ruled the greater

portion of Harima from Himeji Keep ; but by removing this branch to an equally valuable fief at Tottori, the Shōgun was enabled to assign Himeji and the command of the great Inland Sea Coast route to one of his trusted Fudai. In the west, on the coast of the Sea of Japan, there had also been developments highly advantageous to the Bakufu. Horio of Matsuye in Idzumo had died without heir in 1634, and the Bakufu thereupon assigned his estates (260,000 *Koku*) to Kyōgoku, whose 123,000 *Koku* at Miyazu presently passed into Tokugawa hands. Then, when Kyōgoku died in 1637, the Shōgun confiscated the Idzumo fief and assigned 186,000 *Koku* of it to a Fudai.

Presently the Yedo Bureaucracy had yet another small windfall of 173,000 *Koku*. This time (1640) it was "maladministration" again. Ikoma, who had held Takamatsu in Sanuki, was banished to a petty estate of 10,000 *Koku* in Dewa, and a Tokugawa relative and Fudai presently ruled in Takamatsu in Ikoma's stead.

Kyūshū, in the extreme west, was supposed to be the weak spot in the Tokugawa system. It is true that the Bakufu never ventured to push things too far with the Shimadzu of Satsuma in the extreme south, although, in 1753, it actually depleted the Kagoshima treasury and crippled the clan terribly by imposing on it a huge riparian *corvée* in the Province of Mino. In 1632, however, it showed little hesitation in dealing with Shimadzu's immediate neighbour in a very masterful manner. Katō Tadahiro's Higo domains (520,000 *Koku*) were assessed at about five-sevenths of the value of those of the Shimadzu family. It was true that while the approaches to Higo were many and open, the inaccessibility of Satsuma and Ōsumi counted as a great tower of strength. But then, while there was not a single fortress in Satsuma, Kumamoto Castle was, after Ōsaka, the greatest stronghold in the Empire. Yet when the Bakufu determined to dispossess him (1632), Katō did not venture to make any resistance, and quietly made way for Hosokawa Tadatoshi, who was removed from Kokura in Buzen to replace him. Buzen was then divided between two Fudai, the Bakufu appropriating for itself a stretch of country in the middle of the province, in the vicinity of the famous shrine of Hachiman at Usa. Considerably before this, Tanaka of Chikugo had died (1620) without heirs, and his fief of 320,000 *Koku* had escheated to the Shōgun. In 1638 Terazawa had been stripped of the Island of Amakusa as a result of the Shimabara *émeute*, and a little later he

died insane, and the remainder of his estates was then bestowed on a Fudai, while shortly after the death of Iyemitsu the erstwhile illustrious house of Uyesugi was deprived of one-half of its 300,000 *Koku* at Yonezawa in Dewa.

To sum up :—Of the twenty-four great outside feudatory houses in existence at the death of Iyeyasu (1616), we find that by the death of Iyemitsu in 1651, or shortly after, no fewer than nine had either become extinct or dispossessed of their lands, that one had been stripped of a half of its revenues, and that three had been transferred to other domains in order to make way for Tokugawa relatives or Fudai. *And all this had gone on without the slightest consultation with the Emperor.* There had been no question of war or rebellion whatsoever. From the foregoing facts it should become evident that the three first Tokugawa Shōguns, at all events, were a good deal more than mere *primi inter pares*. They were acting boldly and without any contradiction, as the *de facto* sovereigns of the Empire. One cardinal point of their policy was that no feudatory should come into direct contact with the Emperor or his Court. The great Yoritomo had never gone so far as this. All that he had insisted on was that vassals of his should not accept Court rank or rewards without his sanction ; and the Hōjōs, while adhering to this principle, never interfered with the Court promotion of such as had been in the first instance recommended for Court rank by themselves. Even when the Court did bestow honours upon Kamakura Bakufu vassals who were not provided with a Bakufu recommendation, the Court was not called into question for its action—the offending vassals alone were punished for disobedience to the regulations of their immediate over-lord. And from 1190 to 1333, there were many Japanese who were not Bakufu vassals. Between these and the Court the Kamakura administration did not presume to interfere overmuch. Under the Yedo Bureaucracy ¹ the state of affairs was vastly different. From the Lūchūs to Yezo no one could approach the Sovereign except through its officials, and its officials had been careful to post “ No Thoroughfare ” at all the seven great entrances into Kyōto.

In another important direction the Yedo Bakufu had arrogated much more to itself than the Kamakura Bakufu had ever presumed to do. In the matter of intercourse with foreign powers the

¹ i.e., under the Tokugawa administration.

Kamakura authorities had often received or solicited instructions from the Imperial Court. Neither Nobunaga, nor Hideyoshi nor the early Tokugawas ever deigned to consult the Emperor on such a matter at all. In the great Korean war, whether in opening hostilities or bringing them to a close, the Emperor was never consulted. Neither was he in the matter of intercourse with the Portuguese and Spaniards, the English, Dutch, Chinese, Koreans after the resumption of friendly relations with the Peninsula Kingdom. And perhaps the most momentous step of all—the decision to expel Europeans and to close the country to all Occidental intercourse—was taken without any consultation with the Imperial Court.

One consideration that has probably betrayed some foreign writers on the Tokugawa regime is that the policy of the first three Shōguns was in some respects very different from that of their twelve successors. From 1651 onwards, the Yedo Bakufu was extremely conservative, striving above all things to keep matters as they had been at the death of Iyemitsu, and evincing in many matters of cardinal importance a circumspection and caution now and then approaching the verge of timidity. On the other hand, in the days of Iyeyasu, Hidetada, and Iyemitsu, it had been innovating, constructive, bold, and aggressive. Hideyoshi had made and unmade great Daimyō, and moved them about from fief to fief without the least reference to the Sovereign—in fact, it was by the mere fiat of Hideyoshi that Iyeyasu himself had been established at Yedo as virtual lord of the Kwantō in 1590. Towards the great Outside Houses, the three earliest Tokugawa Shōguns, as has just been shown, imitated and continued Hideyoshi's policy. Under Iyeyasu as much as 6,000,000 *Koku* of the national assessment had been confiscated and repartitioned; under Hidetada 5,000,000 *Koku*; and under Iyemitsu about an equal amount. That is for the first half-century of the Yedo Bakufu a total of 16,000,000 *Koku*. During the next half-century the total confiscations amounted to no more than 3,680,000 *Koku*, and for the next thirty years it scarcely exceeded 300,000 *Koku*. And during those last eighty years few, if any, of the great Outside Houses had been the sufferers. So much will appear from an inspection of the list of Kokushu Daimyo in the Bukan of 1654. It is as follows :—

<i>Family Name.</i>	<i>Fief.¹</i>	<i>Revenue. Koku.</i>
Mayeda	(Kanazawa)	1,022,700
Shimadzu	(Kagoshima)	720,000
Date	(Sendai)	620,000
Hosokawa	(Kumamoto)	540,000
Kuroda	(Chikuzen)	520,000
Asano	(Aki)	420,000
Mōri	(Sūwō and Nagato)	369,000
Nabeshima	(Saga, Hizen)	357,000
Tōdō	(Tsu, Ise)	323,000
Ikeda	(Tottori, Inaba)	320,000
Ikeda	(Bizen)	300,000
Hachisuka	(Awa)	257,000
Yamanouchi	(Tosa)	222,000
Satake	(Akita, Dewa)	205,000
Arima	(Kurume, Chikugo)	200,000
Uyesugi	(Yonezawa, Dewa)	150,000

Now, every one of these sixteen great Outside Houses of 1664 continued to rule its own old fief down to 1871, when the Feudal System was abolished in Japan! In fact the only considerable Tozama family that disappeared during these two centuries after 1664, was that of Mori of Tsuyama, whose fief of 186,000 *Koku* in Mimasaka was bestowed upon a Tokugawa relative and Fudai in 1697.

Within their own fiefs these great feudatories exercised absolute authority in most respects. But there were certain things which they could not venture to do. They could erect no new castles, and the repair of such as existed had to be notified to the Shōgun. They could build no ships of war. They could coin no money. And down to 1638 they could not move their troops beyond their frontiers without express order from the Shōgun. Inasmuch, however, as this regulation had enabled the Shimabara insurrection to gather way and make serious head, it was modified so far as to allow neighbouring Daimyō to act promptly in the case of the recurrence of any similar contingency. But no such contingency ever recurred. Then the Daimyō himself could not leave his fief without the Shōgun's permission, while all marriages in his family had to be sanctioned by the Bakufu. In cases of minority, in early times at least, we find the Bakufu appointing an agent of their own to

¹ The titles of the fiefs in this list wherever they differ from those already given in the list on p. 17, represent the capital towns of each fief instead of the provinces in which they lay.—J. H. L.

assist the clan councillors—in other words they installed a temporary Tokugawa Resident in the fief. But the great hold of the Bakufu over the Daimyō was the *Sankin-Kōtai* system, in terms of which the Daimyō had to pass alternate terms (generally a year) in their Yedo *yashiki* and on their fiefs, while their wives and children were never allowed to leave the Shōgun's capital. In the previous volume,¹ the early history of this *Sankin-Kōtai* was given previous to Iyemitsu's time, it was there pointed out that it had been a custom, from 1635, and from that year onwards it became a duty, regulated by a series of detailed enactments.

In 1664, besides the sixteen great Outside Houses just enumerated, we find 86 or 87 smaller Tozama Daimyō. No more than four of these were assessed at 100,000 *Koku* or over, and the total of their united revenues amounted only to 3,289,000 *Koku*. Thus, the gross assessments of all the non-Tokugawa Daimyō did not reach 10,000,000 *Koku* (9,834,700 *Koku*), which would represent perhaps little more than the third of the superficies of the Empire.

We have now to deal with the collateral branches of the Tokugawa House as they stood at that date. The three Go-san-ke were:—

	<i>Koku.</i>
Tokugawa Mitsutomo (Owari)	619,000
Tokugawa Mitsusada (Kii)	550,000
Tokugawa Mitsukuni (Mito)	280,000

In addition to these, there were four “Renshi”² or Relations:—

	<i>Koku.</i>
Tokugawa Tsunashige (Kofu, Kai)	250,000
Tokugawa Tsunayoshi (Tatebayashi, Kodzuke)	250,000
Matsudaira Tsunanobu (Fukui, Echizen)	470,000
Matsudaira Mitsunaga (Takata, Echigo)	260,000

Another Tokugawa Relative was Hoshina Masayuki, Iyemitsu's half-brother, who had been installed at Aidzu with 230,000 *Koku*. But he was classed as a Fudai, standing second in the class as regards revenue, in point of which he was exceeded by Ii of Hikone with 310,000 *Koku*.

¹ *Vide* Vol. II, pp. 704, 713.—J. H. L.

² Renshi: Families who trace their descent from one common ancestor. Sometimes, but only in the case of nobles, brothers.—J. H. L.

All this may be summed up in a short table :—

	<i>Koku.</i>
The Bakufu held lands assessed at	4,000,000
The Hatamoto (say)	4,500,000
The Fudai Daimyō	6,176,000
Go-san-ke and Renshi	2,679,000
<hr/>	
Tokugawa and Dependents	17,355,000
Outside Feudatories	9,834,700
<hr/>	
	27,189,700

Some of the larger monasteries, although greatly shorn of their possessions, still held considerable patches of arable land, while the Emperor and the Court had a revenue of between 120,000 and 130,000 *Koku* from estates around Kyōto.

From the preceding succinct summary of the position, it should be tolerably apparent that the grip of the Tokugawa upon the Empire was riveted very firmly. Such opposition as might be expected could come only from the great Outside Daimyō, and any combination between two or more of these—much less a league of all the sixteen or even a majority of the sixteen—was utterly impossible. The three greatest among them, Kaga, Satsuma, and Sendai—the Great Kokushu as they were styled—were exceptionally favourably treated as Tokugawa guests on their arrival in the Shōgun's capital, and down to the arrival of Commodore Perry, at least, there was rarely any case of friction between Satsuma or Kaga, and the Bakufu. In 1660, the Sendai chieftain submitted to punishment—the forced execution of public works in Yedo—without a murmur. The only thing in which the vassals of Shimadzu or Mayeda ventured to flout the decrees of the Shōgunate was in the prosecution of contraband trade on a large scale at certain times ; but this led to no open breach of ordinary relations between the clans and the Yedo authorities.

The arm of Yedo was at once longer and stronger than that of Kamakura had ever been. It is true that in the Kwantō and the north of Japan the first Bakufu had wielded all but absolute power. But, in the thirteenth century, the Imperial family still held extensive domains, while the Fujiwara and their fellow courtiers owned even broader acres. Into these estates no Kamakura emissary could dare to make entrance without special invitation from the proprietor to do so. Now the meagre holdings of the

Emperor and his Court were controlled by Tokugawa underlings ; and, even so, their gross produce was only equal to that of the fief of a second-class Fudai Daimyō ! Four or five centuries before, the great monasteries in and around the Home Provinces had been, after the Shōgun, the greatest and wealthiest Feudal powers in the Empire, and in their lands the Hōjō officials could exercise no authority, whether judicial or administrative. Now these great fanes had been all shorn of their wealth and secular power, and the remnants of their landed estates were in the last resort subject to the jurisdiction of the Jisha-Bugyō in Yedo. Again, in the Hōjō days there had still been tracts of country where the population was entirely civilian, and in these justice was administered and dues collected by the agents of the Provincial Governor, a functionary appointed not by Kamakura, but by Kyōto. In the long turmoil of the Ashikaga age these civilian Provincial Governors disappeared, and the districts they administered were swallowed up in greater or smaller fiefs. Lastly, at the date of the Mongol invasions, there were, especially in the west, military men with holdings of their own who acknowledged no special fealty to the Shōgun or the Shikken, but who held their fiefs direct from the Emperor. Some of these were actually greater proprietors than the Hōjō *Shugo*, who, it has been pointed out in the first volume of this work, was in a measure the analogue of an Elizabethan Sheriff—only there were no Shōgun's justices on circuit in Kyūshū. A combination among the *Gōzoku*, or "strong houses" of Kyūshū, would have been infinitely more feasible in the thirteenth century than a federation between the four or five great Feudatories in the island four centuries later on. And it would also perhaps have been much more perilous to Shōgunal authority.

In Kamakura days there were no large fiefs. Even if the head of a house did get removed for "maladministration"—an incident rarely, if ever, noted in the annals—his disenfeoffment could not possibly throw thousands of dependents upon a cold and cheerless world as lordless and landless men. We are told that as many as 3,000 manors were confiscated as the result of Toba II's attempt to overthrow the Bakufu in 1221. Yet it may well be doubted whether all these confiscations were responsible for such wholesale misery and distress as attended the forfeiture of the single great fief of Mogami (570,000 *Koku*) in 1622. The rise of great fiefs had been one of the leading, perhaps the chief characteristic of the Ashikaga age.

For long they had been a source of anarchy, but a strong ruler of genius (Hideyoshi) had been fully equal to the task of converting them into a most serviceable instrument of administration and a bulwark of order. Under the peculiarly astute system devised by Hideyoshi's Tokugawa successors, these great fiefs, so far from proving an impediment to, actually facilitated in no stinted measure the smooth and easy running of the wonderful Bakufu administrative machine installed in Yedo Castle.

CHAPTER I

THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL STRUCTURE

B

The Social Structure Generally

After the preceding survey of the higher administrative machinery of the Empire, we may now venture to descend to more minute details. And first of all we may most profitably address our attention to the seat of the Administration—to Yedo, and especially to the Great Castle of Yedo.

Kaempfer asserts that the Japanese had no walled towns. In the sense that there were no city defences in Japan such as many urban communities in contemporary Germany possessed, this statement is perfectly correct. Even around the greater portion of the Tokugawa Capital, the outer ring inhabited by the mercantile community and the townsmen generally, there was no line of rampart. At its outskirts the city insensibly merged into the open country, and was continually encroaching upon it, and eating up rice fields and sedgy swamps as building sites. But the very centre and core of old Yedo was Yedo Castle; and Yedo Castle was no mere replica of an ordinary mediæval European Keep (such as the Tower of London) which generally covered only a few acres of ground. It was really in itself a strongly fortified city, its outer line of defence having a sweep of more than a dozen English miles.

Although the Bakufu had been careful to provide itself with accurate maps of all the strongholds in the various fiefs,¹ it strictly

¹ This had been done in Iyemitsu's time. In 1644, orders were issued to the Daimyō to draw and present maps of their domains and of their castles to the heads of a temporary Bureau organized for the compilation of a map of Japan (*Nihon-Koku-Gunzu*) and of the Castles in the Empire (*Sho-jōzu*). The Bakufu was quite aware that the feudatories had no officials with the scientific knowledge necessary for the task, and fully anticipated that the Daimyō would request Yedo to send men capable of making the surveys—an anticipation that was fully borne out. In the Bakufu service at this date were a good many surveyors, who had learned the principles of the art from Hayashi and others. These experts, although they professed to have worked out the new system for themselves, had actually learned it from the Dutch. The chiefs of this Bureau were two Ōmetsuke, one of whom was that Inouye who, as Christian Bugyō, we have seen playing the role of a Torquemada in the preceding volume.

forbade the making of any sketches or maps of the interior defences of Yedo Castle. There is, however, a map¹ in which the central portions are reproduced from a bird's-eye view of the Castle, painted on an old screen from the Shōgun's palace in Kyōto, and it may be taken as approximately correct, though to understand it it is advisable to refer to Mr. Milne's sketch² drawn to illustrate the advance of the coast-line at the head of Yedo Bay, for in the early Tokugawa age this advance was greatly accelerated by the deposits of the soil excavated from the heights behind, and on the two sides of the Castle in the course of the construction of the moats. "At the date (1590)," to quote the preceding volume, "Iyeyasu rode in to take possession of his new capital. What is now the most valuable building-ground in Japan, the Nihonbashi district of Tōkyō, was then feet, if not fathoms, below salt water, while along the line of moat near which stands to-day the Mitsui Bank and some of the finest modern structures in Tōkyō, the wavelets of Yedo Bay rippled in upon the shingle or the shells, for then, from Wadagura to Hibiya, was 'a sea-beaten beach with only fishermen's huts thereon'." That portion of the outside moat, which extends from Tameike above the Tora gate to its junction with the Kanda river, just to the west of Suidō-bashi, was not excavated until 1636, indeed it was only in Iyeyasu's days that the ground through which it ultimately led was formed. In 1603, a large portion of the hill now called Suruga Dai was cut away, and the soil used to fill up about four square miles of shallow inlets on the south side of the town. The cutting at the back of Suruga Dai appears to have been first excavated in 1616, and to have been deepened for navigation up to the Ushigome gate in 1659, by Date Tsunamune of Sendai, whose maladministration in his own fief was punished by the Bakufu by saddling him with this heavy expense in Yedo.

It so happens that it was during the period (1651-1715) with which we are now dealing, that Kaempfer made his two visits to Yedo. As the learned Westphalian scientist was a sagacious and accurate observer, and may be safely trusted when he described what passed under his own eyes,³ it will not be unprofitable to

¹ *Vide* Mr. McClatchie's papers on the Castle of Yedo, in the sixth, and on the Feudal Mansions of Yedo in the seventh volumes. *T.S.A.J.*

² *T.A.S.J.*, vol. viii, pt. i, p. 86.

³ It is vastly otherwise with respect to what he was merely told, for, over and over again, we can see that he was seriously misled by his informants—whether

reproduce his account of the old Castle of Yedo as he saw it on his first visit to the Shōgun's Court, early in 1691 :—

The castle and residence of the emperor is seated about the middle of the city. It is of an irregular figure, inclining to the round, and is five Japanese miles in circumference. It consists of two enclosures, or fore-castles, as one may call them, the innermost and third castle, which is properly the residence of the emperor, two other strong, well fortified, but smaller castles at the sides and some large gardens behind the imperial palace. I call all these several divisions castles, because they are separately and every one by itself, enclosed with walls and ditches. The first and outermost castle takes in a large spot of ground, which encompasses the second, and half the imperial residence, and is enclosed itself with walls and ditches, and strong, well-guarded gates. In this outermost castle reside the princes of the empire, with their families, living in commodious and stately palaces, built in streets, with spacious courts shut up by strong, heavy gates. The second castle takes in a much smaller spot of ground ; it fronts the third, and residence of the emperor, and is enclosed by the first, but separated from both by walls, ditches, drawbridges, and strong gates ; the guard of this second castle is much more numerous than that at the first. In it are the stately palaces of some of the most powerful princes of the empire, the counsellors of state, the prime ministers, chief officers of the crown, and such other persons, who must give a more immediate attendance upon the emperor's person. The castle itself, where the emperor resides, is seated somewhat higher than the others, on the top of a hill, which has been purposely flattened for the imperial palace to be built upon it. It is enclosed with a thick, strong wall of freestone, with bastions standing out much after the manner of the European fortifications. A rampart of earth is raised against the inside of this wall, and at the top of it stand, for ornament and defence, several long buildings and square guardhouses built in form of towers several stories high. The structures particularly on that side where the imperial residence is, are of an uncommon strength, all of freestone of an extraordinary size, which are barely laid upon each other, without being fastened either with mortar or braces of iron, which was done, they say, that in case of earthquakes, which frequently happen in this country, the stones yielding to the shock, the wall itself should receive no damage. Within the

intentionally or the reverse it is sometimes hard to say. In fact Charlevoix's estimate of Kaempfer, grudging as its tone may sound, errs on the side of generosity in one particular at least. "On ne peut refuser à l'auteur la justice de convenir que ses mémoires sont remplis de recherches curieuses touchant l'origine des Japonnois, les richesses de leur pays, la forme de leur Gouvernement, la police de leur Villes, d'avoir débrouillé mieux que personne les différents systèmes de leur religion, de nous avoir donné des Fastes chronologiques de cet Empire, des Descriptions qui intéressent, une Histoire Naturelle de ces Isles assez exacte, et d'assez bonnes observations pour la Géographie ; mais il s'en faut bien que tout cela remplisse le titre qu'on a donné à son ouvrage ; où l'on ne voit que des traits détachés de l'Histoire ancienne et moderne, en tres-petit nombre, et la plupart puisés dans des sources fort peu sûres. En un mot, presque tout ce qui manquoit aux Histoires précédentes se trouve ici, mais on n'y voit rien de ce qu'elles contiennent. C'est le Journal d'un Voyageur curieux, habile Homme, sincère, qui s'est un peu trop fondé sur des traditions populaires, mais ce n'est pas une Histoire."

palace a square white tower rises aloft above all other buildings. It is many stories high, adorned with roofs, and other curious ornaments, which make the whole castle look, at a distance, magnificent beyond expression, amazing the beholders, as do also the many other beautiful bended roofs, with gilt dragons at the top and corners, which cover the rest of the buildings, within the castle. The second castle is very small, and more like a citadel, without any outward ornament at all. It has but one door, and there is but one passage to it, out of the emperor's own residence, over a high, long bridge. The third castle lies on the side of this second, and is much of the same structure. Both are enclosed with strong, high walls, which for a still better defence are encompassed with broad, deep ditches, filled by the great river. In these two castles are bred up the imperial princes and princesses, if there be any. Behind the imperial residence there is still a rising ground, beautified, according to the country fashion, with curious and magnificent gardens and orchards, which are terminated by a pleasant wood at the top of a hill, planted with two particular differing and curious kinds of plane-trees, whose starry leaves variegated with green, yellow, and red, are very pleasing to the eye. It is remarkable, what they affirm of these trees, that one kind is in full beauty in the spring, the other towards the autumn. The palace itself has but one story, which, however, is of a fine height. It takes in a large spot of ground, and has several long galleries and spacious rooms, which upon putting on or removing of screens, may be enlarged or brought into a narrower compass, as occasion requires, and are contrived so as to receive at all times a convenient and sufficient light. The chief apartments have each its particular name. Such are, for instance, the waiting-room, where all persons that are to be admitted to an audience, either of the emperor or of his prime ministers of state, wait till they are introduced; the council-chamber where the ministers of state and privy councillors meet upon business; the hall of thousand mats, where the emperor receives the homage and usual presents of the princes of the empire, and ambassadors of foreign powers; several halls of audience; the apartments for the emperor's household, and others. The structure of all these several apartments is exquisitely fine, according to the architecture of the country. The ceilings, beams, and pillars are of cedar, or camphire, or jeseriwood, the grain whereof naturally runs into flowers and other curious figures, and is, therefore, in some apartments covered only with a thin transparent layer of varnish, in others japanned, or curiously carved with birds and branched work neatly gilt. The floor is covered with the finest white mats, bordered with gold fringes or bands; and this is all the furniture to be seen in the palaces of the emperor and princes of the empire. There are also two strong-rooms, wherein are kept the imperial treasures, and these are secured from fire and thieves by strong iron doors and roofs of copper.¹

“A glance at the accompanying map,” remarks Mr. McClatchie, “will show how accurate are Kaempfer's observations, and it is

¹ Kaempfer, vol. iii, chap. xii. In reading this extract it is always to be remembered that the terms “Emperor” and “Imperial” refer solely to the Shōgun.—J. H. L.

a matter of surprise that, with the limited means at his disposal, he should have been able to acquire such correct information. The Shōgun's palace itself was on the rising ground in the Chief Enclosure and what Kaempfer terms the 'Third Castle' was in reality the western enclosure (*Nishi Maru*) on the height just within the Outer Sakurada Gate. What he styles the 'Second Castle' was the enclosure of the Shrine dedicated to Iyeyasu in the clump of trees crowning the Momijiyama, adjoining the western, and immediately behind the Chief Enclosure . . . The western enclosure (*Nishi Maru*) alone was occupied by the heir apparent of the Shōgun. In the Chief Enclosure, just at the back of the palace, was situated the Treasury. This consisted of three large godowns shut in by the Castle rampart at the back, and in the front by a strong stone wall of semi-circular shape projecting into the ground adjoining the Palace. The sole entrance was through a small, low gateway of heavy timbers, and from the wall at the back there was a sheer descent of about sixty feet to the moat below, the position being thus rendered one of the most secure in the whole structure. At the foot of the large five-storied tower, and immediately between it and the northern drawbridge, was an archery ground, and the rest of the enclosure was occupied by the Palace itself, surrounded by small palisades.

"As Kaempfer asserts, the Palace itself was one-storied, but tolerably high. It was divided into four parts called the Front (*On-omote*), the Middle-interior (*Naka-oku*), the Interior (*Oku*), and the Deep-interior (*Ō-oku*). The last was the harem; and now and then it was the actual seat of the Government of the Empire, for the notion that Japanese dames have at all times been destitute of influence on the national destinies is a mistaken one. In the third—the Interior—the Shōgun occupied himself with State affairs; and here he passed the night on anniversary days, when his person was guarded by two of the thirty Samurai enrolled in the Koshō Company. It was in the *Naka-oku* and the *On-omote*, that official functions, such as receptions, were held. The chief *salon* here, the *Ōbiroma*, was said to be laid with a thousand mats, although, strangely enough, Kaempfer, who examined it minutely when he was accorded a private inspection of it, puts the number at a hundred. By removing the sliding-doors between it and the adjoining chambers, it would be easy enough to enlarge it, however. These neighbouring rooms, each with its distinctive name, were used as

Council-chambers, and waiting- and assembly-rooms, for the various classes and grades of the feudatories, whether Go-san-ké, Renshi, Greater Kokushū, Kokokushū, Ordinary Tozama ; Higher, Ordinary, or Lower Fudai.

“ On the 1st, 15th, and 28th days of each month, all the Daimyō repaired to Court to pay their respects to the Shōgun ; and, as a matter of course, they also did so on the occasion of any exceptional event or grand festival. Upon passing through each gate, the nobles had to open the windows of their *norimono* or palanquins, but no salute was given to them by the guards. At the main gates leading to the Chief and the western enclosures were posted notices, requiring all but specially privileged persons¹ to dismount from their horses or litters, and proceed on foot to the entrance of the Palace itself. Upon reaching the Palace; the Daimyō were ushered into the apartments specially assigned to the class to which they might severally belong, and were thence afterwards conducted to the Hall of Audience. On these occasions each noble took with him a numerous following of retainers, who were clad in dresses of ceremony, and bore lances, halberds, staves with tufts of black feathers, large umbrellas, and various other insignia of feudal state. Some of these trains were of great length, and formed an imposing spectacle as they marched along the broad causeways. While the Daimyō was within the Palace, the greater portion of his attendants waited just outside the chief entrance. It would seem as though the outer works of the Castle had been constructed quite as much to favour these displays of pomp and state, as for actual defence—for a display of strength and power as for real military purposes.”²

Reference has just been made to the guards at the gates. Inside of each gate stood a long wooden shed, where bands of men were on duty both night and day. These guard-houses were hung with curtains, changed daily, bearing the badge or cognizance of the

¹ The Abbot of Zōjōji rode in his litter up to the very entrance hall of the Palace. To do so was also the privilege of the Go-san-ke, of the Tairō, and of the members of the Rōjū, and, later on of the Gosankyō. These high personages likewise received a salute from the guards at each gate which was always scrupulously returned, the windows of the litter being kept open.

² This description of the castle at Yedo is founded mainly on the late Mr. McClatchie's paper on “ The Castle of Yedo ”, *T.A.S.J.*, vol. ii, part I. Mr. McClatchie, it may here be stated, was a member of H.M. Consular service in Japan, who unhappily died at an early age, after having given marked evidence of a high degree of Japanese scholarship and of considerable powers of original investigation.
—J. H. L.

Captain of the Guard for the time being. Pikes were planted in the ground immediately in front, and within the shed were kept richly lacquered matchlocks, spears, and bows from the arsenal of the Shōgun himself, more for purposes of show than of defence. The guards varied considerably in number, according to the importance of the position; a few men were posted in the small square enclosure of the gate, while the greater part remained in the guard-house within. In the very centre of the Castle, below the Palace, and at several other guard-houses, the men were always chosen from among the Hatamoto and Gokenin. Between the Ote-san-no-gomon and the last gate leading to the Palace was posted the Hyakunimban or "Guard of one hundred men" (in reality it was one hundred and twenty), while the smaller gates further in were each held by from thirty to seventy men. At the other gates through the Castle, the guards were furnished by the Daimyō, and in some few instances by the Hatamoto according to the assessed revenue of their fiefs—the number varied from ten to thirteen men in each guard, not counting a few inferior soldiers who acted as porters. Such was the ordinary force, but on the occasion of festivals, of the Daimyō proceeding to the Castle, or of the Shōgun leaving the Castle, it was increased considerably, in some cases to triple the ordinary number. The total of the guards usually under arms at the various gates was about 350; on certain special occasions it may have risen to about a thousand.

Then there were the Castle Fire Brigades, all composed of direct vassals of the Shōgun, the chiefs being Hatamoto. Each brigade had its special standard, and a distinguishing mark for the lanterns borne by its members. All these details must be fully mastered in order to comprehend the plans of the leaders in the great Rōnin Conspiracy of 1651.¹

The Tokugawa Capital was peopled by two classes as distinct from each other, as were the Townsmen and Gownsmen in mediæval Oxford or Cambridge. For the control of the Yedo townsmen there were the Machi-Bugyō and the common law; the Samurai were under the direction of their feudal chiefs, and they and chiefs alike were supposed to order their conduct in consonance with the spirit of the fifteen or twenty articles of the Buke Shohatto (Regulations for the Military Class) issued at the beginning of each Shōgun's

¹ *Vide post*, p. 68.

administration and sometimes oftener. Generally speaking, these two different classes occupied different residential quarters. Below and around the Palace the ground was occupied with the *Yashiki*¹ of the feudal chiefs, while *Yashiki* also covered the district of Atagoshita, the ground around the present railway terminus of Shimbashi, and a portion of Fukagawa beyond the Sumida River. Greater feudatories had as many as three *Yashiki*—a chief, in which they ordinarily resided; a middle for their ordinary clansmen, and a lower, which served for the reception of stores and the quarters of lower grade samurai and servants.

“Some of these *yashikis* covered many acres of ground; and the mansions of the Go-san-ke families and the great clans of Satsuma, Kaga, Chōshū, and Chikuzen are known at once upon the map by their immense size and commanding positions. Within their grounds are groves, shrines, cultivated gardens, fish ponds, hillocks, and artificial landscapes of unique and surpassing beauty. The lord of the mansion dwelt in a central building, approached from the great gate by a wide stone path, and a grand portico of Keyaki-wood. Long, wide corridors, laid with soft mats, led to the master’s chamber. All the woodwork, except certain portions, stood in virgin grain like watered silk, except where relieved here and there by a hard gleam of black lacquer-like enamel. The walls, gorgeously papered with gold, silver, or fanciful and coloured designs, characteristic of Japanese art—among which the pine, plum, and cherry tree, the bamboo, lily, the stork, tortoise, and lion, or fans, were the favourites. The sliding doors, or partitions, of which three sides of a Japanese room are composed, were decorated with paintings. Some of the finest specimens of Japanese art I ever saw were in the *yashikis* of Yedo.”²

Besides the great feudatories (*Daimyō*) a host of smaller direct Tokugawa vassals—*Hatamoto* and *Gokenin*—had also to be provided for. To these small patches of ground were assigned, mostly in the district immediately to the north and west of the Central Enclosure. *Banchō* especially was a regular warren of these tiny *yashiki*, each enclosed by its fence of live bamboos. Here the streets were so tortuous, the lanes and wynds so devious, that the result was a tangled labyrinth. As the proverb had it, a person “born in *Banchō* might yet not know (his way about in) *Banchō*”. After the great fire in 1657, matters improved here somewhat, while on the other hand, the newly erected *yashiki* of the great feudatories were generally on a less magnificent scale than before. Before that event:—

¹ For fuller details of the *Yashiki* see Mr. McClatchie’s paper “The Feudal Mansions of Yedo” in *T.A.S.J.*, vol. vii.

² *The Mikado’s Empire* (Griffis), pp. 397–8. See also Kaempfer’s remarks.

“In the neighbourhood of Banchō there was not a single residence on the exterior of which stone foundations were laid, or *nagaya* erected, or that was even coated with white plaster. The boundaries of these *yashiki* were for the most part marked out by clumps of live bamboos, within which were built the dwelling-house and *nagaya*, with thatched roofs—a small gate being also erected. But, at the present time (1728) there is not to be seen a single *yashiki* with outer boundary so marked by live bamboo hedges. Thus, it would appear that while, as I have stated above, the residences of the Daimyō deteriorated, those on the other hand of persons of inferior rank improved.”¹

Between the householders on the tiny plots in the labyrinth of Banchō and elsewhere and the inmates of the *yashiki* of the great feudatories, there was no great measure of love lost. For the poorest Hatamoto, the lowest Gokenin, was a direct vassal of the Shōgun, while the richest even of the outside samurai was a mere retainer of one who was on the same footing as Hatamoto or Gokenin as the Shōgun's man. Furthermore, the Shoimban, the Koshōgumi and the later Shimban were recruited from them, and besides these special corps, the whole body regarded themselves as in a way the Shōgun's bodyguard and under his special protection. They never forgot that Iyeyasu had left instructions to his successors to see to it that no Hatamoto family should become extinct. Though inferior in rank and vastly inferior in income to the Daimyō, they refused to bow their heads to them, for they regarded them as cowards, who rendered fealty and service to the Shōgun not from affection for his family or person but merely from the necessity of preserving their possessions. Hence, the overbearing and arrogant air of the Hatamoto towards the samurai of the clans—an attitude that could not in the constitution of human nature fail to provoke resentment and heartfelt dislike.

All these samurai, whether direct or indirect vassals of the Shōgun, belonged to the great privileged class, whose fortunes and concerns constitute the main staple of the ordinary histories of the Tokugawa age. They are usually spoken of as the “two-sworded privileged class”, but in 1651 this would be misleading, for the series of enactments that deprived townsmen, farmers, and traders of the possession of all firearms and swords were not passed until later on in the century. The privileges of the samurai really lay in exemption from manual labour and taxation (except in the form of presents to the authorities); in the right of travelling on the great highroads at less expense than the ordinary classes, and in the possession of a

¹ From the *Oshiroboshū*, published in 1728.

fief or of a stipend of rice from the lord's granary. Besides, as has just been remarked, in criminal matters they were controlled not by the ordinary law but by special written and unwritten codes applicable only to their class.¹ In spite of their tremendously preponderant influence they formed but a comparatively trifling percentage of the population of the Empire. That percentage has varied not only at various epochs, but in different sections of Japan at the same date. For example, at the fall of the Tokugawa power, while the percentage of samurai throughout the country was not quite six, in Satsuma, every fourth man had the right to carry two swords in his belt. In 1651 the percentage might have been higher than it was in 1868, but samurai could not possibly have formed as much as a tenth of the total population even at that earlier date. In Yedo, however, the general ratio of samurai to commoner seems to have been as one to two; in other words the privileged class constituted about a third of the population of the Tokugawa capital.

¹ The criminal law, not only during the Tokugawa régime but in the first few years of the restored Imperial Government, was very drastic, though perhaps not much more so than that of England during the eighteenth century, and it was ruthlessly exercised, the death penalty being inflicted for very trivial offences and in serious crimes, being extended, as will be seen hereafter, (*vide post*, Chapter II, p. 74) not only to the principal, but to kill his near relatives, even those of very tender years. For commoners, the punishments were imprisonment, flogging, banishment, and death by beheading, with or without subsequent exposure of the head, burning, crucifixion, and sawing to death—the latter being separation of the living body with a bamboo saw. The cruelty of some of these was more apparent than real, at any rate in later years. Though those who read the story of the Christian Persecutions under the first three Tokugawa Shōguns (*vide Story of Old Japan*, chaps. xiii, and xiv) may well doubt any failure in that respect. But charges of gunpowder were usually placed in the fire at the stake; crucifixion was not the horrible prolonged agony of the Jews; the criminal was simply bound to a double cross and lance thrusts speedily did the rest; sawing generally meant one cut only of the saw; bribery of course could always ensure the mitigation of suffering at the hands of the executioners who were invariably of the degraded Eta class. These punishments were all applicable to commoners only. Where commoners were imprisoned, samurai were detained or confined either in their own houses or in that of a relative, and where they were executed, samurai were ordered to commit suicide (*seppuku*, *vide post*, Chap. VI, p. 221) under prescribed forms, unless their offence was of a disgraceful nature, tainting their honour, as samurai, in which cases they were degraded from their status and suffered the same penalties as commoners. Women were, strange to say, when regard is given to their social subjection of the period, very lightly treated. They could be made practically household slaves (they were not very much better at all times), but the principal penalty was shaving of the head, except for arson or murder of a senior male relative, husband, father, or grandfathers, when death was the punishment. Torture was an auxiliary to all trials, both of samurai and commoners, when the evidence against the prisoners left no room for doubt and he refused to confess his guilt, and even witnesses were liable to it. The criminal law of Japan now (1925) errs as much on the side of lenity as it formerly did on that of severity, and there are not many more executions in a year throughout the whole Empire than there were formerly almost each day, in the city of Yedo alone.

It was mainly the exigencies of the *yashiki* and *Sankin Kōtai* system that brought about this concentration of the samurai class in Yedo. The early history of *Sankin Kōtai* has been given in the preceding volume. Here it only remains to be added that it was under Iyemitsu that what had been a custom was reduced to a series of written regulations with the result that, while the system was characterized by a general uniformity, peculiarities and anomalies in it were not unknown. It was under Iyemitsu also that the provisions were most stringent and most strictly observed. Not only had the feudal chiefs themselves to spend alternate terms in the capital, where their wives and minor children had to reside permanently, but the most prominent among their vassals were also detained as hostages. It was mainly to prevent the escape of these and the clandestine flight from Yedo of the wives and children of the Daimyō that the rules and regulations of the barriers established at Hakone and elsewhere were made so strict, and, at first enforced with such an amount of rigour.

At this point, it may prove instructive to pause and compare—or rather contrast—the two great feudal capitals of Japan—old Kamakura and Yedo. The former was really what was unknown in Japan in Kaempfer's time—a fortified city, although the artificial part of the external line of defence was rude and rudimentary. There was, of course, no Castle in Kamakura. In Yedo, as has just been said, there were really two great cities—the Castle, and the outside town, and the Castle itself was more extensive, and contained within its outer line of wall and moat a greater population than that of the whole of Kamakura. Furthermore, there were no great *Yashiki* in Kamakura; the abodes of even the greatest of its leading families—Hōjōs, Miuras, Wadas, Adachis—were not a whit more commodious or magnificent than those of the smaller Hatamoto and Gokenin amongst the live bamboo clumps in the tortuous warren of Banchō behind the great Castle of Yedo. Kamakura was really nothing but the headquarters of the Kwantō gentry, and the gentry in those days were little more than squires, for an estate of 500 acres was then regarded as an unusually extensive holding. As has been insisted on over and over again, there were no great fiefs in the thirteenth century. In 1651, practically the whole superficies was partitioned out into fiefs, and one of these covered not 500 acres, but nearly 5,000 square miles, and another over 3,000 square miles, while there were several others of about 2,000 square miles. Further-

more, some of the *Baishin*, or great vassals of these great vassals, held vastly greater estates than had been owned by any military man in Kamakura. Among the six Kishū Baishin, Andō was the chief, and Andō's assessed revenue was 38,000 *Koku*. Among the ten Owari Baishin, Naruse and one or two others were no less wealthy. Now, inasmuch as there were no such feudatories in the thirteenth century, as there was nothing corresponding to a Sankin-Kōtai system in that epoch, and as it was only a comparatively small proportion of the military land-holders of the Empire that had residences—and these all unpretentious enough—in Kamakura, no great effort of the imagination is necessary to realize the immensity of the difference between the vastness and magnificence of Yedo, and the austere simplicity of Yoritomo's old capital, straggling inland from the shore of Sagami Bay. In the great fire of 1657, when as many as 1,200 streets of the mercantile quarter of Yedo were swept by the flames, 700 Hatamoto residences and more than 500 Daimyō *yashiki* were destroyed. Now, the average Hatamoto residence was probably superior to the best residences in old Kamakura, while the best Hatamoto *yashiki* were inferior to those of the most insignificant of the Daimyō.

One natural and necessary result of this concentration of an abnormal proportion of the military class, drawn from every section of the Empire, around Yedo Castle was the conflux of a great civilian population. The needs and more or less luxurious tastes of something between 300,000 and 500,000 non-producers had to be catered for, and this gave employment to a host of traders and artisans. The former class was perhaps about as numerous, and the latter about half as numerous as the resident samurai; and besides there was a great influx of priests, coolies, beggars, and outcasts and of adventurers, whose chief source of livelihood lay in the exercise of their wits. Of these, two categories were especially difficult to control. The first of these were the Rōnin, who, in consequence of the expropriation of many of the great feudatories under Hidetada and Iyemitsu, were exceedingly numerous in 1651. The other was the constantly increasing body of discharged menials from the *yashiki*. It was customary for the Daimyō to hire their lowest house-servants from among the rustics of the Kwantō. The term of service was usually from spring to spring, so as to prevent the routine of farm work being interrupted by the sudden withdrawal of necessary labour at the busy seasons. On their discharge from

the yashikis these menials were supposed to return to their villages and there resume their functions as producers and tax-payers. But their experience of the comparative ease and freedom of life in the capital as often as not rendered them averse to the drudgery and dreary round of peasant life. Of the many shifts they adopted to escape it, the most common one at first was to become Yamabushi or Shugenja. The headquarters of this fraternity was the shrine of Gongen on Atago-yama above Kyōto, and it became the fashion for rustics discharged from service in the Yedo Yashikis to repair thither, and after a brief course of instruction, which generally went no further than the memorizing of a few spells and incantations, they would be provided with certificates by the temple authorities. Thus fortified they would return to Yedo; and, to aid them in collecting alms would begin to surround themselves with a number of *deshi* or acolytes. At the same time the discharged female servants usually became Kumano Bikuni;¹ and Yamabushi and Bikuni would frequently intermarry. In Iyemitsu's time all this had come to assume the proportions of a scandal and a social menace, until the Bakufu, constrained to take vigorous measures to abate the nuisance, sent instructions to the Shoshidai of Kyōto to deal drastically with the shrine on Mount Atago.

Another recourse of these discharged menials was to pose as Rōnin—a comparatively safe and easy thing to do since there was no enactment against the wearing of swords by commoners at this date. Yet another resource open to these vagrant serving men was to enrol themselves in one or other of the numerous bands of Otokodate that added so much to the picturesqueness as well as the insecurity of life in contemporary Yedo.

¹ Kaempfer devotes much space to descriptions both of the Yamabushi (vol. i, book 3, chap. v, and book 5, chap. v) and of the Bikuni. Both descriptions are of much interest. The term "Yamabushi" means "one who hides in the mountains" and may be translated either a "hermit" or a "mountaineer", but it is usually employed to describe a class of mountain priests, said to have been founded in the reign of the Emperor Jomei (629-41) who made their homes in mountains and forests but wandered all over the country collecting alms. They professed both the Buddhist and Shinto religions. The Bikuni (vol. ii, book 5, chapters 5 and 10) were a religious order of young girls living under the protection of nunneries at Kamakura and Kyoto but wandering and collecting alms like the Yamabushi. "They are much the handsomest girls we saw in Japan, and easily obtain the privilege of begging in the habit of nuns, knowing that beauty is one of the most persuasive inducements for travellers to let them feel the effects of their generosity. They go neatly and well clad, wearing a black silk hood upon their shav'd heads, and a light hat over it. Their behaviour is to all appearances modest and free, neither too bold and loose nor too dejected and mean, but they make nothing of laying their bosoms quite bare to the view of charitable travellers and, for ought I know, may be full as impudent and lascivious as any harlot in a public bawdy house."

Although it was the *Chōnin* or townsmen's associations of Otoko-date (stalwarts) that became most notorious, if not famous, it was really among the Hatamoto that such organizations originated. Their first appearance was indeed merely an incident in the armed truce, the simmering feud between the Shōgun's men and the Daimyō. Among the former the *esprit de corps* was exceedingly strong, and the point of honour excessively keen. At an early date they began to form themselves into bands something analogous to the Studenten-Corps and Burschen-Schaften of the early nineteenth century German Universities. Any wrong or insult, however fanciful, to any individual member of these companies was resented by the whole fraternity, who, with nothing much else to occupy their abundant leisure, would promptly espouse the quarrel and prosecute it to the bitter end. In case of any one member incurring the censure or punishment of the authorities, the others would voluntarily offer themselves for the same penalty. Anything that might be regarded as a serious slight or insult to a member would be construed as affecting not merely the individual or the corps to which he belonged, but the whole Hatamoto order, and then the rabbit warren of tortuous lanes and wynds to the north and west of the Castle, would be as wildly excited as an angry nest of ants whose heap has just been destroyed. Primarily and originally it was against the Daimyō and the Yashiki population that this hostility was directed, but presently the Banchō associations found themselves confronted by yet another enemy.

If the attitude of the Hatamoto towards the outside Samurai was overbearing and provocative, their bearing towards commoners—the ordinary townsmen—was often outrageous. Now and then they would go so far as to cut down inoffensive citizens who had had the ill-luck unwittingly to come between the wind and their nobility.¹

¹ Iyeyasu, in his "Legacy" (clause 45) directed that "a samurai is not to be interfered with in cutting down a fellow who has behaved to him in a rude manner," and "the same line of conduct is equally allowable to them all" no matter to what degree of samurai they may belong. The "fellow" it is to be remembered, is considered to belong to one of the three lower classes who were almost invariably inoffensive, unless under very grave provocation and in crowds, and were always unarmed. It was also the privilege of the samurai to test their swords on dogs and other animals, and that they did not always await offence before testing them on human beings is shown by the following well-known story:—A famous swordsman having obtained a new sword, made by the great smith, Muramasa, took up his place by the *Nihon Bashi* (the central bridge of Yedo, from which all road distances in the Empire were measured) to await a chance of testing it. By and bye, a fat peasant came along, merrily drunk, and the swordsman dealt him the *Nashi wari* (pear splitter) so effectively that he cut him right through from the top of his

This they considered they had the right to do with perfect impunity—it was the Samurai's privilege. Now, in ordinary quarters of the Empire, among submissive peasants and fawning, cringing traders, this might perhaps have been done with no great risk. But in Yedo the case was vastly different. There, the population was a most heterogeneous one, for the Tokugawa capital had early become the Mecca of all the most adventurous spirits in Japan. In Kyōto and Ōsaka, the inhabitants lived mostly by pure trade or the exercise of their hereditary callings; the chief if not the sole source of their livelihood was honest labour and industry. But in Yedo, thanks to the continuous presence of a great host of some 300,000 or 400,000 non-producers, all with assured incomes, a great tide of unearned wealth kept on pouring into the city. If the price of commodities was higher there than elsewhere, so also were wages, while windfalls, which were unknown in the rest of Japan, were here not merely occasional but frequent. And to many, if not indeed to most, the prospect of windfalls was far more alluring than the certainty of steady employment at the most liberal wage. In Yedo, there was comparatively little of that fear of the future, which has indeed the great merit of making for counsels of prudence and perseverance but which on the other hand often numbs high efforts of courage and enterprise and stifles all tendency to self-assertion. So from an early date, the Yedo commoner was as often as not a hot and haughty tempered specimen of humanity, slow to brook wrong or slight, and ready to assert himself and his "rights" with lethal weapons as well as with tongue.¹ Furthermore, Yedo was the great resort of the Rōnin, who were then abnormally numerous. Many of these from stern necessity laid aside their swords, and addressed themselves to mercantile or other civilian pursuits. The merging of a considerable proportion of these desperate and daring men in the general community did much to stiffen its back and heighten its courage.

All this duly considered, it furnishes but scant matter for surprise to find the outrageous truculence of the Hatamoto bands speedily confronted by similar counter-organizations among the commoners

head down to the fork. The peasant continued his way, not knowing that anything had happened to him, till he stumbled against a coolie, and fell in two neatly severed pieces. *Se non è vero è ben trovato*.—J. H. L.

¹ This refers to the commoners as a class, acting together as such. It must have been on very rare occasions that an individual commoner would ever have dared to assert himself against an offending samurai.—J. H. L.

whom the Shōgun's men so rashly affected to regard as mere *canaille* destitute of every spark of manhood, spirit, and human feeling. Able and fearless leaders soon appeared among the wards-men. Under these the more mettlesome of the townsmen mustered in imposing numbers, and the just quarrel of one became the concern of great fraternities whose resentment was not lightly to be incurred. The men in the escorts of the Daimyō to protect the lords from sudden Hatamoto attack were already known as *yakko*¹; and these new anti-hatamoto organizations among the townsmen were presently termed *machi-yakko*.

Yakko and Machi-yakko had to reckon with a common foe; and the sympathy between the men of the *yashiki* and the stalwarts of the wards led to a sort of mutual understanding between them. When a Daimyō needed an army of porters to carry his baggage on the return journey to his fief, or extra labour for any special emergency, it became customary for him to communicate with one or other of the chiefs of the *machi-yakko*, who promptly furnished the needed men from among his followers. This provided the *machi-yakko* heads with the sinews of war, and put them into a position to provide for an increasing body of immediate dependents. Hence the quarters of these *oyakata*, as the *machi-yakko* captains were termed, became a sort of Cave of Adullam, "for every one that was in distress, for everyone that was in debt, for every one that was discontented." With most *oyakata* the rule was that no applicant should be rejected, and that no questions about one's past should be asked. On the other hand, however, the tacit understanding was that the recruit's future conduct was to be, if not above all reproach, at all events in conformity with the spirit of the cardinal articles in the rough and rude but withal chivalrous unwritten code in vogue among the *otokodate*. The chief obligations to be lived up to were to stand manfully by his comrades in weal or woe, regardless of all risks of life, to regard the oppressor as a deadly enemy and to succour the feeble as a father does his child. "If they had money they had to give to those that had none, and their ears were never to be deaf to the appeal of charity." The head of the society, as has just been said, was called the "Father"; such of his proteges as were homeless were housed under his roof and served him, paying him

¹ *Yakko*, a subject or a servant.—J. H. L.

a small fee, in consideration of which they were tended when sick, and assisted when overtaken by misfortune.¹

For two or three generations the machi-yakko with his peculiar style of dress, of queue and of wearing his swords, was a gallant figure in the variegated and picturesque life of the Shōgun's capital. But with lapse of time the institution sadly degenerated, in connexion with it vice only too soon began to pay its wonted tribute to virtue, and hypocrites and worthless scoundrels became plentiful enough in the otokodate bands. By the date of the death of Iyemitsu, the authorities had succeeded in curbing the insolence and repressing the truculence of the Hatamoto swashbucklers, and in the tranquil times of established civil peace under the third and fourth Shōguns, Banchō became comparatively orderly and law-abiding. Although the main *raison d'être* of the machi-yakko had thus disappeared, the machi-yakko fraternities still continued to exist. But long before the end of the century they had as often as not degenerated into confraternities of gamblers, loafers, and unprincipled rowdies.

The farming class, which stood higher in the social scale than the artisans and merchants, formed about eighty per cent. of the total population of the Tokugawa Japan. In Yedo they were of course in a minority. In the suburbs a certain number found a livelihood as market gardeners, but many of those in the city proper abandoned the mattock for menial service in the yashiki, for the coolie's pole, or for a life of adventure.

So far we have taken notice of Daimyō, Shōgun's men, outside Samurai, Rōnin artisans, merchants and farmers. Besides all these, a remaining class—that of the outcasts—here merits a few words.

In the immediately preceding generations, we know from the old missionary letters that these social pariahs had been tolerably numerous, and that at one time they constituted no insignificant fraction of the Christian Church in Japan. What their exact number was at this date it is impossible to say, for no exhaustive census of Tokugawa Japan was taken until the early eighteenth century, and even then outcasts were not generally included. Nay, more, the portions of the highway that ran through Eta villages were

¹ "Otokodate" was a gallant or chivalrous person who was always ready to take the cause of the oppressed weak against the strong oppressor. The description of the city fraternity, who were in some ways not unlike the city apprentices of the time of James I, appears to be founded on Lord Redesdale's story of the "Otokodate of Yedo" and their chief Chōbée of Bandzuin, in the ever charming *Tales of Old Japan*. The chief of Otokodate also appears in others of his *Tales*.—J. H. L.

not reckoned in computing the mileage. So precise figures in connexion with them are nowhere available. However, there seems to be no special reason for believing that they were proportionately less numerous in 1651, than they were in 1871, when they were found to amount to nearly a million souls (982,800, to be precise), about three per cent. of the aggregate population of 33,110,000.

Among these 982,800 outcasts (1871) as many as 287,111 were Eta proper. The probable origin of the Eta has been discussed in the first volume of this work. They were householders in special settled communities of their own, their main avocation being the tanning of leather, the making of shoe-straps, and drum-heads, while they also had to act as scavengers and public executioners. In Yedo the severity of the Tokuwaga penal code gave them plenty of employment in this latter capacity on the execution-grounds of Suzugamori, at the entrance to Shinagawa to the south, and of Kodzu-Kappara to the north of the city. As contact with them was held to be defiling they came into little relation with the general population, and it was only in the very rare cases when they did so that any matter affecting them was taken notice of by the ordinary authorities. The Kwantō Eta were under the dictatorship of their own hereditary chief, Danzayemon, who had the privilege of carrying two swords, and who donned an official dress when he appeared in the Hyōjōsho, or before the magistrates.¹

It is asserted that Danzayemon's jurisdiction extended to the non-settled outcasts, also to the *Hinin* or vagrant beggars, but how far this was really the case is not at all easy to determine. What is clear is that these beggars had a guild, or guilds, of their own.²

¹ For more details, see Messrs. Simmons and Wigmore's paper on *Land Tenure and Local Institutions in Japan* in *T.A.S.J.*, vol. xix, pt. i, pp. 141-8. The hypothesis that the Eta date from Hideyoshi's time will not hold water for a moment, for we meet with notices of them centuries before that time. In the very pages cited the Eta chief, Danzayemon, shows that he was settled in Yedo in Iyeyasu's time, while he claims that his ancestor went from Ikeda-mura in Settsu to Kamakura in Yoritomo's days, or shortly after. As regards the other explanation given by Dr. Simmons to the effect that the Eta were the descendants of early continental emigrants, a perusal of vol. i of this book should be sufficient to show that the facts of history are at complete variance with it. The early immigrants, because necessary, were exceedingly well treated and occupied an exceptionally favourable position. One most regrettable weakness in the average Japanese of our days is his unwillingness to accord foreigners their due need of credit for their undoubted services to the cause of progress and civilization in Japan.

² A romantic, if perhaps somewhat apocryphal story is told of the appointment of an early chief of the Beggars. The Shōgun Hidetada had caused a certain Kuruma Tamba to be put to death, whereupon Tamba's elder brother Zenshichi,

It appears that this Hinin class was recruited from every section of society. It was not at least wholly an hereditary one like the Eta ; in the old tales we meet with many instances of even Samurai being temporarily submerged in its ranks, and quitting them on the return of better days. But for its members the Samurai had exceedingly little regard ; often when he wished to test the edge of a new blade he would as lief make a Hinin the subject of the experiment as he would a stray dog.¹ Actors also are generally included among the outcasts, but there is substantial reason to doubt whether they were so in 1651. In 1624, the first theatre in Yedo was built by one Saruwaka Kanzaburō, and in the Tokugawa Jikki we meet with several notices of Kanzaburō having been summoned to the Castle to divert Iyemitsu, while it was only about the middle of the seventeenth century that actors were forbidden to carry swords.

Having thus passed in rapid review the various classes in the multitudinous and swarming population of the old Tokugawa capital we may now in the interests of clearness cast a brief glance at the special administrative machinery by which they were severally controlled. In the first place we find the outside samurai of the yashiki under the jurisdiction of their lords, while these lords—the Daimyō—in turn were controlled by the senior councillors (Rōjū), whose special agents in the discharge of their particular function were the four or five Great Censors (Ōmetsuke). Similarly through the ordinary Censors (Metsuke), the Junior Council (Wakadoshiyori) had the special task of maintaining order and subordination among the Shōgun's men—the Hatamoto and Gokenin. As for the priests of Yedo, they, in common with the other ecclesiastics

originally in the service of Satake of Akita, found employment as sandal-bearer to the Shōgun. Thrice he had an opportunity of killing the Shōgun and thus avenging his brother, but on each occasion his courage had failed him, and on the third occasion his intention was discovered. Hidetada on inquiring into the case, offered him a full pardon, if he would promise fidelity in future. "How can anyone, who like myself, has made up his mind to kill his enemy, turn round and become the servant of that enemy ? Kill me at once, I beg," was the answer. The Shōgun refused to do so, and told him he might choose any occupation he pleased to support himself. "Then," replied the would-be assassin, "since I must live on as one who hoped to avenge the death of a brother, but was unable to do so, and therefore as one who, having the form of a man, has not the soul of one, I will live among those who are not regarded as human beings—I will become a beggar." "In that case," said the Shōgun, "I will make you head of the Beggar's Guild."

¹ Vide above, p. 40, note. The subject was not necessarily a Hinin. Alcock in the capital of the Tycoon writes strongly on the conduct of the samurai in this respect in his time (1859-65) and I saw a victim lying in the streets in the first year of my residence (1869) in Yedo.—J. H. L.

of the Emperor, had to answer to the Temple Commissioners (Jisha Bugyō) for any delicts or malfeasances of which they might be accused. The outcasts were practically outside the ordinary law, the whole of the Eta and probably certain of the Hinin standing under the protection and at the mercy of Danzayemon, their hereditary chief. As for the Rōnin, they were in an anomalous position ; as the name implies ¹ they were samurai without stipend and without a lord, and yet they were not ordinarily subject to the same jurisdiction as the civilian population of commoners. In certain emergencies, however, we do find the Machi-Bugyō, or Town Magistrates interfering with them and their projects and affairs.

As for the great population of townspeople, or wardsmen (Chōnin)—traders, artisans, labourers, and what not—they and their affairs were the special concern of the two (rarely three) City Magistrates (Machi Bugyō). Of course, in cases of any serious commotion, the Shōgun's men, or the force of some Daimyō would be placed at the disposal of the Acting Magistrate. But in ordinary times the armed force at the disposal of the Town Commissioners was a comparatively insignificant one. It consisted of no more than some 350 men, equally distributed between the two Commissioners, and after the institution of a separate office for each magistrate (one in the north, and the other in the south) in 1719, attached in equal numbers to these respective headquarters. Besides these, it is true, there were the Tsujiban,² or guards stationed at the wickets of the gates that separated the various blocks ; and in early times these warders might indeed have counted for something, for they were

¹ The Rōnin—literally “wave-men”—were homeless and lordless samurai, who had either been dismissed from their fief on account of misconduct or had themselves deserted in order not to bring on their lords any responsibility for deeds which they proposed to commit or for a line of conduct which they proposed and considered it their duty to pursue. Not seldom, debt was the cause of their desertion. Griffis describes them as “villains ready for any deed of blood, the reserve mercenaries from which every conspiracy could recruit a squad” and this was true enough as regards a large section. Yui Shosetsu, Marubashi Chūya, and Bekki Shoemon, the conspirators of 1651 and 1652 (*vide* pp. 68–76) were all three rōnin themselves, and entirely depended on rōnin for their followers, and most of the ruthless assassinations of Europeans, which took place during the first years of the opening of the country and are described in a subsequent chapter (chap. xviii), were committed by rōnin. But Griffis adds, “Occasionally, the rōnin was a virtuous citizen who had left the service of his lord for an honourable purpose.” For “occasionally” the word “frequently” might be substituted, but, at the time when Griffis wrote (in the early seventies) Europeans still lived in Japan, especially in the capital, in daily risk of being themselves victims of assassination. The noblest examples of devoted and self-sacrificing heroism during the Tokugawa epoch were the Forty-seven Rōnin in the Akō vendetta (1701–3) whose story is told in chapter vi of this volume.

² Tsuji-cross-roads, where these guards were usually stationed.

samurai in the full vigour of manhood. But in course of time the office was assigned to old and decrepit warriors, and finally it was assumed by townsmen whose valour and prowess were perhaps fully equal to those of Dogberry and Verges.

Under the instructions of the two Machi-Bugyō were three Machi-toshiyori or City Elders, whose office was hereditary, who received a salary of some 500 or 600 ryō; who had the right of wearing swords; of a family name, and of appearing at the Shōgun's Court. Their special duties were the promulgation of the magistrates' edicts, the reception of reports and petitions from the people for transmission to the Magistrates, and the supervision of the head men of the various wards. These latter officials, who received a small but varying amount of salary and could carry on no trade without special permission, were rather numerous—as many as 265 in 1725.

What greatly facilitated the task of the authorities in preserving order and enforcing the law was a system of grouping analogous to that of the early frank-pledge arrangement in England. All householders throughout the Empire were associated in groups of five (Go-nin-gumi).¹ Each of these groups was made responsible for the good conduct of its members and their dependents, and severely dealt with when it proved unequal to the obligations laid upon it. Its chief was generally elected, but nominated from above in a few fiefs. It appears that some of the old missionaries and Church historians regarded the establishment of this organization as a device to aid in the extirpation of Christianity. No doubt the Christian Bugyō found it a very serviceable engine, but its real *raison d'être* was the vagabondage and brigandage and general social unrest of the time. In a great measure it was aimed at the Rōnin who then swarmed throughout the country at large, though especially numerous in Yedo and the other great cities.

Of these great cities Ōsaka and Kyōto were, of course, the chief. At this date (1651) the latter had greatly fallen in prosperity. In

¹ In certain towns, such as Nagasaki, the groups were formed not of tenants but of house-owners. Generally throughout the country each peasant owned his own house, although the ground he farmed was often rented. Furthermore in some districts we meet with groups not of five but of six, and in one case at least of ten.

A word of caution seems necessary here. I find some modern Japanese historians confounding the Go-nin-gumi with the ordinary *Mukō-sangen*, *ryō-donari* (three houses opposite and one on each side) grouping. This is a merely social and informal institution. When a family settled in a neighbourhood it was (and, indeed, still is) customary to send to its three opposite and two adjacent neighbours from three to five boxes of buckwheat cakes, with a request for friendly intercourse.

Hideyoshi's time there had been 180,000 households in it, but on the occasion of Iyemitsu's famous visit to it in 1634, we find that there were only some 35,000 left to participate in the distribution of his largess. The rise of Yedo, with the establishment of the *de facto* government and the concentration of the military class there, had been, of course, the greatest blow to the fortunes of the old capital. But it had also suffered from the rapid rise of the great commercial city of Ōsaka. The rise of Yedo had naturally attracted many Ōsaka merchants to the Kwantō, and to replace them, the Bakufu had ordered whole streets of shopkeepers to remove from Fushimi (which was really a suburb of Kyōto)¹ and establish themselves in Ōsaka.

As regards the administration of Ōsaka and Ōsaka Castle something has been said already. It only remains here to add that the magistrates had their staffs of *yoriki* and *dōshin*²; that the medium of communication between them and the community was the ten Chief Elders (*Toshiyori*) who had the controlling voice in the appointment of the Ward Elders, supervised the affairs of the Wards as a whole, and superintended the levy of the Government tax. For nearly a score of years after the capture³ of the Castle in 1615, the citizens had paid a land-tax but, on the visit of Iyemitsu in 1634, this was remitted, and henceforth all that the Shōgun received from Ōsaka was a yearly New Year's Day present of 10,000 *momme* of silver. Ōsaka and Sakai (and indeed the whole of the home provinces) had been devoted heart and soul to the House of Hideyoshi, and after the extinction of that House their submission to the Tokugawa sway had been reluctant and sullen. By the politic measure of remitting the land-tax Iyemitsu did much to conciliate them; and in a few short years Ōsaka and Sakai became strongly pro-Tokugawa in spirit.

But indeed, it was not so much to its exemption from the land-tax as to the general policy of the Bakufu that Ōsaka owed its prosperity. One cardinal article in that policy was to keep the great outside clans out of all touch with each other, not only politically but socially and commercially as well. To effect this latter purpose it was necessary for the superfluous commodities of the various fiefs

¹ Fushimi is over six miles distant from Kyōto.—J. H. L.

² *Dōshin* were the lowest grade of officials in the service of the Shōgunate. *Yoriki* were a little above them in degree, but both were practically of the rank of constables, whose duty rather lay indoors than in the streets.—J. H. L.

³ By Iyeyasu, from Hideyori. *Vide* Vol. II, chap. xvii.—J. H. L.

to pass through some common Tokugawa mart ; and Ōsaka from its central geographical position was pre-eminently suited for this purpose. Thus it came to pass that if, for example, a Kumamoto merchant wished to purchase Satsuma sugar, his agent was sent not to Kagoshima but to Ōsaka to procure it. The commodity in question would be forwarded by the Satsuma clan officials to Ōsaka, consigned to some member of the Wholesalers' (*toi-ya*) Guild there, by whom it was auctioned off in parcels to the brokers. These latter might have their clients in the persons of traders from Kumamoto, Saga, Hiroshima, Tottori, Kanazawa, or Nagoya, or some other Castle-town. As on almost every transaction of this nature at least two commissions or profits, and sometimes more, remained in Ōsaka, it is easy to understand how its merchants tended to become to the Daimyō what the great commercial houses of Florence had been to the potentates of Europe in the fourteenth century. However, as rice was the great staple of food in Japan, and as the taxes of the various fiefs were to a great extent collected in kind, it was the rice trade that was the chief source of Ōsaka prosperity. In the great emporium at the mouth of the Yodo river, all the western Daimyō had yashiki, some of them capable of accommodating hundreds of retainers. But except on the occasions of the annual progresses of the lords to or from Yedo—when, by the way, they could pass no more than one night in Ōsaka—these great barracks were tenanted by perhaps only half a score of samurai. At first the duty of these officials was mainly to superintend the sale of the tax rice from their native fiefs. But soon they were relieved of this duty, and the business of the Kura-yashiki (store mansions) was entrusted to *Takeya* (agents) selected from among the most considerable and reputable of the great local merchants. In the natural course of affairs immense sums of money had to be remitted to the Daimyō by these agents, and on all transactions a moderate percentage (two to four per cent.) remained in their hands. Many of these men amassed large fortunes and founded commercial houses of high repute which are still (1924) in existence.

Ōsaka was thus the great distributing, as Yedo was the great consuming, centre of the Empire, while at this time Kyōto, fallen on evil days, drew such wealth as it possessed from the revenues of its temples and from the industrious ingenuity of its artists and artisans. In matters of taste, refinement, and fashion, Kyōto was

even then the Paris of Japan. As for Sakai it was now practically a suburb of Ōsaka, although still reckoned as one of the five great Shōgunal towns.

The last of the five was Nagasaki. Comparatively insignificant as it was in size and population, it yet contributed twice as much as Yedo to the Shōgun's treasury. This contribution was the product of what was the equivalent of custom-dues on the foreign trade of the Empire, which was now entirely confined to this one port. As regards the administration of Nagasaki, which differed in some particulars from that of the other Shōgunal towns, something may be said in a further chapter, while a full and accurate account of the municipal life of the community is to be found in Kaempfer.

After this brief glance at the Shōgun's towns, let us now devote a few moments' attention to his rural domains. These constituted one great fief, the greatest in Japan—which, while resembling the other fiefs in most particulars, differed from them in one marked respect. At the beginning of the Feudal System, the manors of great landowners were often scattered over the face of the Empire in widely separated provinces. In Tokugawa times this was no longer the case; only in some very rare cases were the domains of any feudal lord discontinuous. At all events the only important exception was the case of the Shōgun's own territories. As has been said they lay mainly in Suruga, Kai, and the Kwantō but they were also scattered in enclaves from Ōshū in the north to Kyūshū in the south-west. In nearly all instances they were administered in a similar manner, although the title of the chief responsible official varied. In some cases we meet with a Bugyō, in others a Gundai,¹ but the most usual local representative of the Shōgunal power was a Daikwan. It is to be noted that the Tokugawa Daikwan was a vastly less considerable official than was the Daikwan of Kamakura times, who as the Shōgun's representative in his absence was the military commander in the whole province. In some instances, the Daikwan was the subordinate of a Gundai, or of some neighbouring Bugyō, but generally, it appears, he received his instructions from Yedo direct. Yet low as his position was in the administrative hierarchy, to the 50,000 or more peasants under

¹ Gundai, the chief magistrate of a gun, a rural division or district of varying size. Daikwan—the governor of a smaller domain than a gun. He was considered to be the deputy of the Kanjo Bugyo, financial administrator, of Yedo.—J. H. L.

his supervision, the Daikwan was a very formidable personage indeed. These peasants may have "heard that there were such persons as a Mikado, a Shōgun, a Daimyō, but to them the Daikwan, whose family had in many cases been the governors of their ancestors for generations, became to their limited view, *the Government*".

The functions of a Daikwan closely resembled those of a collector-magistrate or deputy-commissioner in charge of a district in British India. He was at once a judicial and a revenue official. In the former capacity his duties were not so much to decide as to prevent and compose all cases of civil litigation, while in criminal matters he had competency to deal with all minor offences. Important cases, whether civil or criminal, had to be referred to the nearest Machi-Bugyō. As Government Revenue officer his duties were multifarious, and by no means began or ended with the reception and dispatch to Yedo of the annual taxes.

"He had to adjust the boundaries of Mura (villages) and of individual holdings, to assist in the management of the irrigation system, and of the repairing of dykes and embankments; to inquire into and adjust the causes of failure of crops from flood, winds, insects, or drought, and to make a just reassessment of taxes on such land; to see to it that the village officials advised with the farmers about the kind and quality of seed, about improvements in methods of cultivation, about tilling and manuring, and about everything pertaining to the best method of agriculture. Especial attention was recommended to the adjustment of the regular assessment on land of all kinds according to its productive power, quality of soil, favourable exposure or the reverse—in short to everything that could affect the quantity and quality of the products of the soil—the official thus shielding the farmer from unjust assessments, and at the same time securing to the lord the just return in taxes.

"In the administration of affairs by the Daikwan, their instructions were based on high moral and philosophical principles. In the books used as their guides Confucian maxims are plentifully introduced. Equality and justice seem to be aimed at in all cases . . . However skilful officials may be in applying the technicalities of legal administration, if they have not sufficient regard for justice, if they neglect to take into careful consideration all extenuating circumstances, if they are unnecessarily strict, they will not have done their duty. Even if people seem to be prosperous, technicalities should not be in all cases insisted on as if it were praiseworthy to do so. The spirit of all administration of land revenue is to give the farmer the benefit of all doubts and not to insist on technicalities. His prosperity should excite the satisfaction rather than the cupidity of his lord."

A Tokugawa Daikwan might have anything between forty or fifty and a hundred mura under his supervision. This word *mura* is usually translated village, but to English readers, whose notion

of a village is a cluster of houses around a church and an ale-house, the term is misleading. Sometimes indeed the Japanese village is exactly like a North German *dorf* with all its houses grouped together in a single clump; but in other cases it is a stretch of country, covering perhaps a few square miles, with the houses either isolated or dotted about in small clusters here and there like ganglia in the human frame.

The *mura* was the administrative and social unit with which the Daikwan had to deal. As a rule each *mura* had its own set of officials—a *nanushi* or mayor, *kumigashira*, or company chiefs, who were practically vice-nanushi—and a *toshiyori*, or elder, who was merely an advisory officer always elected by the people, the office of the chiefs being in general hereditary while the appointment of vice-chiefs was determined in various ways. Mayors and company-chiefs were salaried officers; on the Tokugawa domains the *Toshiyori* received no official emoluments.

Among the farmers there were social grades, which depended not merely on wealth, but on length of residence in the locality and various other considerations. Not a few of course owned no land of their own (except perhaps their house plots) and either rented land or worked as labourers on the holdings of others. But the great majority had lands of their own, varying in extent from an acre or less up to ten or a dozen acres, generally scattered about in small patches here and there all over the *mura*, a plan of which generally showed as many enclaves as the map of mediæval Germany. The great feature which distinguished the Tokugawa farmer from the free peasant in contemporary Europe, in Scotland for example, was his comparative security of tenure. On the other hand this fixity of tenure was not unattended with certain disadvantages.

In the Kamakura age, as appears from the *Joei-Shikimoku*—the Great Legal Code of the Kwantō¹—the peasant was not merely entitled to sell such lands as he owned and to purchase others. He could, on the discharge of his just obligations and the compliance with certain legal formalities, freely remove with all his personal belongings from a domain where he found the treatment accorded him by his lord oppressive or even unsatisfactory. Even in very

¹ The legal code of the period of Jōei (1232–3), prepared under the direction of Hōjō Yasutoki, the third of the Hōjō Regents. A full, annotated translation by the late Mr. J. C. Hall, H.M. Consul General at Yokohama, appears in *T.A.S.J.*, vol. xxxiv, part i, and an equally excellent summary of Mr. Hall's translation is given in vol. i, pp. 463 of this work.—J. H. L.

early Tokugawa times we meet with evidence and incidents pointing to a high degree of liberty of movement among the rural population at large. Shortly after Sekigahara, for example, we find Katō Kiyomasa exerting himself to attract cultivators to settle in his fief by the tender of liberal inducements ; and Katō's case is by no means the only one on record. This, of course, implies that farmers then could legally remove from one fief to another, while the natural presumption is that they were free to dispose of their original landed property before so removing.

However, this state of things was put an end to by a statute of 1643, which forbade the sale of farm lands, and thus practically put an end to the migration of the cultivator.

“ If farmers are permitted to sell their land, a rōnin, samurai, merchant, rich farmer, or other person might become the owner of a whole mura or kōri, and thus be able to defy the superior authorities and sow the seeds of disturbance. Again, poor and indolent men for trivial reasons might be tempted to sell their land, and thus lose their homes and positions as cultivators of the soil, and become the dependents of rich men. Such would be a great misfortune.”

Henceforth sellers of their lands were to be imprisoned or banished, while the purchaser was to be fined and his land confiscated, the son in each case atoning for the delict in the case of the death of the father. Witnesses to the transaction were to be fined, while the *nanushi* of the village where the incident took place was to be deprived of his office.

One point to be noted is that during the first two or three generations of the Tokugawa régime, the line of demarcation between samurai and farmer was by no means so strictly drawn as it was found to be in 1853. Apart from the significant fact that the farmer was not prohibited from possessing swords or other lethal weapons, we have the incidental evidence of many popular tales. There is indeed no satisfactory evidence for any single historical event, but it is different when the bearing of events on custom and institutions have to be considered. For instance, in the tale of the famous Akahori-Ishii vendetta, we read : “ Now the wife of Inugai Seibei, a farmer of Murahara in Mino, was the aunt of the two samurai brothers,” and this is only one case out of many where we meet with some members of one family as farmers, and others as samurai. This is frequently confirmed by authentic biographies, and trustworthy private records. The renowned Nakae Tōju was a farmer's

son, but he was adopted by his grandfather, a samurai in the service of Katō of Matsuyama. In Arai Hakuseki's autobiography we meet with reference to some analogous cases.

A partial explanation of this is to be found in the fact that in epochs of real strife it was comparatively easy for a stout and sturdy peasant to change his status. When there was any real lack of fighting-men the farmer readily found military employment, but during the centuries of profound peace, the tenure of fiefs by military service became little better than a farce. In 1861, a samurai with an income of 500 *koku* had to bring no more than one man with him to the field. In Iyemitsu's time such a knight had to appear with eleven armed followers, while one of 200 *koku* had then to furnish as many as eight. At that date a domain of 50,000 *koku* was supposed to keep a thousand men on a military footing; by 1861 this number had sunk to 163. Towards the end of the Tokugawa régime, we are told that a samurai had the right of bestowing two swords upon such as he took into his service. Two centuries before, the correct statement would be that the samurai had the duty of supporting a certain quota of armed followers, for as has been said, the mere wearing of swords was no distinctive privilege of the samurai at that date.

Here a word or two about the general relations between samurai and peasant on the Tokugawa lands may be of service. The peasant had, of course, to support the samurai, who invariably drew his income from the taxes levied on the cultivator. On the Tokugawa lands these taxes amounted to from four-tenths to a half of the annual produce of the fields. Rice-lands were assessed in terms of rice and paid in kind. Even lands not bearing rice crops were also assessed in the same terms, but the tax levied on them was generally paid in money. It is to be noted that rice-lands from August to May usually carried a secondary crop of some other cereal, or of beans, or vegetables; that within the Kwantō at least an accurate land survey had never been made, and that the real extent of holdings was generally greater than that actually assessed. Furthermore on the Bakufu domains no taxes were levied on tea, mulberry-trees, paper, and sundry other minor staples. In fact, in the Shōgunal lands the position of the cultivator was exceptionally favourable, and the peasant there generally dreaded the transference of his mura to any other lord.

Most of the Tokugawa samurai never came into any direct

contact with the peasants at all, for the lower ranks among these samurai drew their stipends of rice from the Shōgunal granaries. Others received the tax-revenue of a mura, or portion of a mura, which was paid to them direct, without being sent to the official granaries. But over the peasants in these mura they had no administrative rights, these being exercised by the Daikwan. In other cases, especially among the Hatamoto, the peasants might be entirely under the control of the samurai to whom their taxes went. Not a few of these Hatamoto were as absolute in their domains as the Daimyō were in theirs ; and it was often upon such Hatamoto lands that the position of the peasant was the very worst in Japan.

In the fiefs of the Fudai Daimyō, the administration was patterned on that of the Shōgunal domains, with, of course, modifications arising from local or other peculiarities and necessities. As any gross maladministration would, in the early generations of the Tokugawa epoch at least, involve the prompt removal of the lord to an inferior fief, or perhaps his retirement into private life and the condign punishment of his councillors and ministers, the Fudai, as a rule, were careful to conform to the general outlines of their model. But with the great outside feudatories—the Kokushū—the case was different. Apart from the restrictions alluded to in the preceding section of this chapter, the authorities in the great clans came to be practically absolute within their own boundaries, and ultimately developed features of administration considerably different from that of the Tokugawa domains. This was not markedly the case until near the end of Iyetsuna's rule, for under the three first Shōguns a very tight rein had, as already shown, been maintained over even the great Tozama. Hence down to as late as 1660, or 1670, we find the outside lords inclined to render the Tokugawa system of internal fief administration the sincerest form of flattery by adopting a more or less close imitation of it in their own fiefs.

A rough sketch of the general position of affairs in one of the great outside fiefs may prove instructive. Sendai was one of the best-administered of these, but in Sendai the system did not differ at all considerably from that on the Shōgun's own lands. The greatest difference would be found perhaps in Kyūshū, but we shall select Tosa in Shikoku as our example.

In A.D. 1600, Tosa had been the domain of the Chōsokabe family,

but as the Chōsokabe chieftain had been on the losing side at Sekigahara he was stripped of his position, while most of his retainers were thrown upon the world as Rōnin. Tosa was then bestowed upon Yamanouchi Kazutoyo, who had hitherto been lord of Kakegawa in Tōtōmi—a 50,000 *koku* fief. When he removed he, as was usual, took all his own samurai with him ; but as Tosa was rated at 202,600 *koku* he had to take a great many outsiders into his service, some of whom were selected, or “ recommended ” to Yamanouchi, by Iyeyasu, who had good reasons of his own for doing so. Among these were certain of the eleven Karō. These did not, however, constitute the clan Cabinet. This was composed of three Bugyō, who were not usually taken from the Karō, for these Karō bore nearly the same relation to Yamanouchi that the Tozama Daimyō did to the Shōgun. They had domains of their own of from 2,000 *koku* to 10,000 *koku* in assessed value, and over these they exercised administrative as well as proprietary rights. The taxes on these lands were not paid to Yamanouchi, but to the Karō, or to the samurai whom they had enfeoffed. The only claim Yamanouchi had over them was for a due quota of fighting men when the forces of the clan were summoned into the field. In a manner, Yamanouchi was responsible to the Bakufu for their good administration, a circumstance that no doubt put him into a somewhat difficult position, for any attempt to coerce them might provoke a quarrel, which, in the early days, at least, might very well have disastrous results.¹ Eight of these Karō lived in the Castle town of Kōchi, although their estates were scattered about in various sections of the Province. The other three lived in castles of their own in the country, at Nakamura, Aki, and Sakawa respectively. It will thus be seen that although Yamanouchi’s fief of 2,700 square miles—a tract larger than Devon, and nearly as extensive as Cork—was assessed at 202,600 *koku*, a large portion of the taxation-revenue was entirely withdrawn from his control. As regards what remained, the greater part was assigned for the support of the samurai who were the direct vassals of the Daimyō. The more considerable among these received their emoluments in the shape of land, the taxes of which were paid over to them and not deposited in the clan granaries. The inferior samurai received a fixed stipend of rice from these granaries, and

¹ It was an internal dispute of this nature that led to the disenfeoffment of the great Katō family (400,000 *koku*) in Aidzu in 1643.

to these store houses the bulk of the clan tax-rice was annually forwarded.

The Daimyō's lands were tilled by tenant farmers, who were sometimes evicted, it would seem, for failure to pay their due amount of tax or for other good and reasonable cause. On the other hand these tenants might lawfully transfer their leases and remove elsewhere, in this respect being freer than their fellow-peasants on the Shōgunal estates after 1643. Furthermore, there were some kinds of land in Tosa that could at all times be freely bought and sold whether by farmers or others.

The province, although exceedingly mountainous and densely wooded, is blest with a very mild climate, while the soil in many originally uncultivated places was exceedingly fertile. Reclaiming waste lands was usually a profitable undertaking; only in certain cases there were formidable engineering difficulties to be overcome before such ventures could be prosecuted on an extensive scale.¹ However, in the person of the famous Nonaka Kenzan (1619-64) Yamanouchi Tadatoyo had an engineer of first-rate ability; and among the many great works of public utility planned and executed by this distinguished man the excavation of the Shinkawa (New River) was perhaps the most important. This enterprise added greatly to the extent of rice land in Tosa. This special tract of Shinden, or New Land was, it is true, put on the same footing as the original Daimyō lands. But there was another kind of so-called Shinden which was treated very differently. Sometimes a samurai would receive as a gift or purchase from the Daimyō a tract of wild mountain land; and on reclaiming this land it became his own tax-free property alienable at will. Even the more enterprising farmers seem to have acquired estates of this nature. But the individual enterprises of this description were usually undertaken by the *Gōshi*, the "bonnet-lairds" of Japan.²

¹ It was as the result of this reclamation of waste lands that the assessed revenue of the Tosa fief was raised by the Yedo Ōmetsuke, whose duty it was to compile and revise the *Bukan*. In 1614, we find the Tosa assessment given at 202,600 *koku*, in the *Bukan* of 1688 at 222,000 *koku*, and in 1735 at 242,000 *koku*. This so far from being any positive advantage to the Yamanouchi house imposed upon it the burden of an increased military levy in case of war. It may, however, have somewhat added to the sense of self-importance in the family and its retainers.

² The Lord Redesdale in the preface to *Tales of Old Japan*, states that "there are only two classes in the Empire, with regard to whom he could find no story in which they played a conspicuous part. The first are the "Emperor and his Court"—too sacred, possibly, to be made the subject of any story, unless in the two Shinto bibles, the *Kojiki* and *Nihongi*—and the second, the *Gōshi*, a kind of yeoman or bonnet lairds living on their own land and owing no allegiance to any feudal

These *Gōshi* or "Village Warriors" of the Tokugawa age were merely a handful of survivors of what had for long been a very numerous and exceedingly powerful class in the rural districts of the Empire. Their history goes back to the embryonic stages of Japanese feudalism. Kwammu Tenno's famous Bandō Brigade for service in Ainuland had been almost entirely recruited from *Gōshi* households. On the expiry of their term of military service, the stalwarts returned to their homes, and there resumed the direction of tillage operations, sharing perhaps in the most arduous physical labour of the farm in order to stimulate the vigour of their thralls. The great warrior chiefs of the tenth and subsequent centuries were as often as not nothing but *Gōshi*, and in Kamakura days the class was exceedingly numerous. The turmoil of the Ashikaga age saw the beginning of the system of great fiefs, and this did much to reduce the importance of the "Village Warriors" who ultimately aspired to nothing more ambitious than the preservation of their independence as "bonnet-lairds". In the great scramble for power some of the class developed into Daimyō, and founded great feudal houses, while a still greater number surrendered their lands to neighbouring Daimyō, and received them back as vassals of these great potentates. The Tokugawa family itself, although like all the branches of the Minamoto, of remote Imperial descent, had *Gōshi* in its genealogical chart, for Iyeyasu was the eighth in line of an adopted son of Matsudaira Tarōzaemon, a *Gōshi* of Mikawa. With the spread of the final phase of feudalism and the consolidation of vast stretches of contiguous country into great fiefs, the natural tendency was for the *Gōshi* to dwindle in numbers. But the class was saved from extinction by what may be called a return movement. For example, when on the fall of the Takeda family, the province of Kai passed into Iyeyasu's hands, the Takeda samurai were neither stripped of their lands, nor compelled to become Tokugawa Hatamoto or Gokenin against their will. They were permitted to retain and farm their holdings on condition of paying

lord, holding a middle place between the samurai and the peasantry, wearing, like the samurai, two swords, in many cases prosperous and wealthy men, claiming a descent more ancient than that of the feudal princes." They are fully described in the paper on "Land Tenure and Local Institutions in Old Japan" by Simmons and Wigmore (*T.A.S.J.*, vol. xix, p. 79). They were the original foundations on which the great edifice of feudalism was erected. Some of them held estates of 100,000 *koku*, and enjoyed most of the privileges with few of the restraints or obligations of the territorial nobles; and at the general nationalization of land throughout the Empire in 1869, when the feudal nobles lost both land and titles, the *gōshi* were permitted to retain their land, but not their titles.—J. H. L.

a tax and of appearing in the field personally for the defence of the province. The ordinary farmer was not under this latter obligation, and hence there was no good reason for his possessing weapons. But in the case of the *Gōshi*, the possession of weapons was a necessity, and when he was exempted from the scope of the edicts depriving the agricultural class of swords and fire-arms, this necessity began mistakenly to be spoken of as a privilege. The original privilege which marked them off from the common peasant was the right of being addressed in public by a family name. In Mino and Ōmi the former Karō of the Sasaki family were made *Gōshi* after Sekigahara, as were also the descendants of some of Daigō II's partisans in Yoshino in Yamato. All these, as well as many of the Kai *Gōshi* paid no taxes, as they held their lands under the *goshuin* or great-red seal of the Shōgun, which exempted all grants to which it was affixed from the attentions of the revenue officer.

In Musashi, Shimōsa, Sagami, and Echigo, several *Gōshi* held very broad acres. But none of these equalled Homma in Dewa who had an income of over 100,000 *Koku*—more than his feudal lord. In these cases, however, taxes had usually to be paid—at least in course of time—for many of these great fortunes had been acquired by the reclamation of land, and newly reclaimed land generally remained tax-free for a term of years only.

It is in Tosa however, that we have the fullest and most authentic information about the *Gōshi*, as they survived under the Tokugawa régime. In mediæval Tosa, the *Gōshi* had been proportionately as numerous as in most other quarters of the Empire; but with the rise of the Chōsokabe to power, the original *Gōshi* had almost all been compelled, for prudential reasons, if for no other, to become vassals of the great fief that finally swallowed them up. The story of the rise of this Chōsokabe family is very instructive, for it is a very fair sample of the various steps in the development of the Japanese feudal system. It was of Chinese origin—of that Hada stock of which we hear a good deal in the Nihongi. One of its members, Hada Yoshitoshi, had been sent to Tosa as Provincial Governor in the palmy days of the Fujiwara sway. On the expiry of his term of office, he did not return to the capital, but settled down in the village of Sogabe as a country squire—as a *Gōshi* in fact; and in subsequent generations successive chiefs of the house continued to pass their lives in tilling their lands, and fighting with their neighbours. Before the middle of the sixteenth century, the

Chōsokabe of the time (Kunichika) had begun to absorb the smaller men around him; and his son Motochika not only subdued the whole of Tosa, but had overrun all but a fraction of the whole island of Shikoku, when Hideyoshi interfered and restricted him to his native province. Here we have a case of a civilian Provincial Governor becoming a *Gōshi*, and of the descendants of this *Gōshi* blossoming out into a Daimyō, and eating up all the other *Gōshi* in the province. The case is a typical one; if it is exceptional in any respect, it is in the circumstance that it was usually the District Governor and not the Provincial Governor that was the ancestor in the future great feudal house.

As the result of being on the wrong side in the Sekigahara campaign Chōsokabe Morichika lost his fief, and after becoming a priest reappeared at the head of many of his old retainers against the Tokugawa at the great siege of Ōsaka (1614–15), when they nearly all perished. In 1600, most of Chōsokabe's vassals were evicted from their lands and became Rōnin; but a certain number of them—probably original *Gōshi*—made their peace with the new Daimyō, Yamanouchi. Yamanouchi left them in undisturbed possession of their estates, on which a tax was levied. On new land (Ryochi) which they broke in they paid no tax, and this land could at all times be freely bought and sold. At first the number of the *Gōshi* was restricted to a hundred; but later on it was expanded to eight times the original figure. Among the *Gōshi*, the eldest son inherited the family land, while his younger brother sank to the status of ordinary commoners. With the permission of the Daimyō, a *Gōshi* could sell his family name, position, and lands to anyone—even to a farmer—the purchaser obtaining all the privileges attached to the estate he bought. It was possible, however, for a *Gōshi* to sell only part of his (tax-paying) land, in which case his status was not affected, although, of course, if he disposed of the whole of his holding, he *ipso facto* became a mere commoner. He resembled a samurai in as far as he could carry two swords; he could ride on horseback, in a period when commoners were forbidden to do so, and he had to appear for military service at the Daimyō's summons. But, on the other hand, he had to bring no armed following with him to the muster of the feudal levy, and while the samurai was supposed to engage in no manual occupation, the *Gōshi* might put his own hand to the plough without any derogation from his social status. Furthermore, in criminal matters, the samurai was exempt from the penalties

of the ordinary law, and subject to a code of his own ; but such was not the case with the *Gōshi*. From time to time the *Gōshi* were a powerful class in Tosa ; and at, and after, the Revolution in 1868, some of them played far from unimportant parts in the great national drama.

With so much of a preliminary framework, we shall now enter upon the chronological sequence of events after the death of Iyemitsu in 1651.

CHAPTER II

IYETSUNA'S MINORITY (1651-63)

THE somewhat sudden and unexpected death of Iyemitsu, at the age of forty-eight, in 1651, left the Bakufu in a very anxious position. With his lawful spouse, Iyemitsu had always been on unsatisfactory terms, and by her he left no issue. But by secondary consorts he had three sons and the eldest of these, a boy of eleven, was designated his heir and successor. Thus, for the first time in the history of the Tokugawa Shōgunate, a minority had to be faced : and the responsibilities of the Rōjū became unusually onerous. It was true that the great outside feudatories had been so thoroughly mastered by the first three Shōguns, and more especially by Iyemitsu himself, that there was no great probability of any combined or concerted attempt on their part to challenge the actual order of things. But others besides the feudatories had to be reckoned with. Fourteen years before Iyemitsu had been seriously ill, and rumours of his death had been propagated ; and on that occasion the Bakufu had suddenly found itself confronted with what looked like a great national crisis. Not one single feudatory had been involved in the Shimabara revolt ; yet it had taken an army of over 100,000 men more than four months to repress it. Now that Iyemitsu was actually dead, it was not so much the possibility as the likelihood of a repetition of the Shimabara explosion on a greater scale that was to be dreaded by the Great Council of Yedo.

Just before the death of Iyemitsu, the Grand Council had been composed of two *Tairō* and three ordinary members. One of the *Tairō*, Sakai Tadakatsu, was an old man of sixty-four who owed his position to the prestige of his house—which, as has been said, was of the same stock as the Tokugawas—to his intimate connexion with the Lady Kasuga, Iyemitsu's nurse, and to the personal regard of Iyemitsu himself. Sakai Tadakatsu was not destitute of a certain measure of ability, but there is nothing to indicate that he was exceptionally gifted with political capacity. The other *Tairō*, Hotta Masamori, was a much younger man, three years junior to Iyemitsu, and so no more than forty-five years of age at the death

of the latter in 1651. About Hotta's rapid rise to power and fortune enough has been said in the opening chapter. About his real capacity as a statesman we know very little, for his term of service was under Iyemitsu exclusively, and under Iyemitsu there was no great scope for the display of any independent initiative. What is probable is that Hotta was a man of no inconsiderable tact, for he seems to have enjoyed an extraordinary measure of popularity with all classes.

The three ordinary councillors were Matsudaira Nobutsuna and the two Abés—Abé Tadaaki, and Abé Shigetsugu. However, as Hotta and Abé Shigetsugu were among the half-score of companions Iyemitsu had selected to follow him to the "Yellow Streams", the membership of the Great Council was suddenly reduced from five to three. Iyeyasu had set his face against the barbarous custom of *junshi*, that is, of retainers disembowelling themselves in order to accompany their lord to the other world; and it is indeed strangely disappointing to find Iyemitsu resuscitating this hideous relic of primitive savagery. Yet, in many quarters, his action was far from offending the moral sense of the time. When Hotta committed the "happy dispatch", four of his own immediate retainers imitated his example, and this elicited loud expressions of approbation from the Yedo public, who twitted the vassals of Abé Shigetsugu with their lack of similar devotion to their lord. At the same time Matsudaira Nobutsuna was mercilessly lampooned for not emulating the example of Hotta, in verselets whose cunning word-play, driving the point home with venomous ingenuity, baffles all attempts at an adequate translation.

It was exceedingly fortunate for the Bakufu, that Nobutsuna had the moral courage to defy his critics and to dare to live on. For years he had enjoyed the reputation of being the ablest man in the Great Council; his intellect was always cool and keenly alert; the rapidity with which he could seize upon the cardinal point or points in a complicated problem and his fertility in improvising expedients to meet unexpected and embarrassing exigencies were already proverbial. No doubt all this had not a little to do with the sudden rise of an obscure man to one of the highest positions in the administration; but it remains questionable whether the adroit exercise of the ingratiating arts of the supple and pliant courtier did not count as a still more important factor in the making of the fortunes of this clever statesman. On being compli-

mented upon his unfailing ingenuity he would turn the occasion to good account:—

“I have to thank the great men who have preceded me,” he would remark. “I am a man as you are men; pray do not try to make out that there is anything supernatural about me. Just look at the skin over my ankle-bone and mark how stiff and hard it has become. This is owing to the long hours I’ve spent sitting at the feet of the wise and well-informed from whom I have learned all that I know. My father and grandfather both served Iyeyasu and his successor Hidetada, and so obtained a store of precious knowledge which they handed on to me. Then, from my earliest days, I have been constantly in the presence of Iyemitsu, from whom I have learned all manner of things. The knowledge I have thus obtained, I have utilized; drawing inferences from it and applying it to all kinds of situations. But I show no such wonderful genius as you represent . . . If people are prepared to persevere in sitting at the feet of the wise, even to the extent of getting blisters on their ankles, as I have done, then there is no difficulty about their becoming intelligent.”

In making such remarks as these, Nobutsuna was doubtless pretty well assured that they would be duly repeated to the imperious and vainglorious Iyemitsu, from whom he “had learned all manner of things”, in spite of the fact that the humble pupil was the senior of the august preceptor by fully seven years.

The remaining member of the Great Council was a man of a very different stamp. If Matsudaira Nobutsuna deemed a politic sycophancy no cause for shame, it was vastly otherwise with Abé Tadaaki, Bungo no Kami. In 1630, Iyemitsu, after vanquishing half a dozen opponents in the fencing ring (who, of course, were careful not to forget that they were fencing with the Shōgun) challenged this Abé to have a bout with him. Abé respectfully begged to be excused, and, on being pressed for his reasons, bluntly alleged that the Shōgun was being befooled; that if he (Abé) had to enter the ring against him he would certainly do his best, and that His Highness might then come by some measure of bodily hurt, a thing much to be regretted. As Iyemitsu would take no denial, Abé complied with his orders. The result was that the Shōgun found his ribs battered as he had never done before, and after being knocked down twice or thrice, he finally threw the fencing stick aside in disgust. For more than a year Abé was very much in the young Shōgun’s black books in consequence of the ill-mannered lesson he had thus administered; but a gallant feat of derring do presently restored him to high favour.¹

¹ The episode is recounted in Mr. Walter Dening’s *Wounded Pride and how it was Healed*.

It was by high ability and rigid devotion to duty that Abé made his way ; in an age of truckling flatterers his fortunes owed nothing to flattery. As a councillor he could take enlightened and comprehensive views of policy, while his sympathies were remarkable both in their sincerity and their extent. But his supreme distinction was that he always endeavoured to subordinate mere expediency and " reasons of State " to the claims of high principle and justice. To be so weighted with scruples of conscience is doubtless a serious handicap to anyone who aspires to the reputation of a great statesman ; and a great statesman perhaps Abé Tadaaki was not. But an honest and capable minister he undoubtedly was, and from 1651 onwards, honest and efficient administration was all that was needed in Japan. For efforts of constructive statesmanship there was, henceforth, but little room. The great essentials of the Bakufu system had been established by Iyeyasu ; to modify these where experience had shown that modifications were necessary, and to elaborate details had been the work of Iyemitsu and his advisers, and their work in that respect had been most successfully accomplished. But withal, the situation of the councillors at Iyetsuna's accession was no easy one. Under the shield of the dominating personality of the imperious Iyemitsu, the position of the " new men " in the Great Council of State had been as impregnable as that of Colbert and his coadjutors or rivals was to become under Louis XIV a generation later on. The fathers of these " new men " had found it solid ground for satisfaction and complacency to be favoured with a casual condescending remark from any of the great Fudai ; now the great Fudai vied with each other and with the great Outside Daimyō in the ostentatious court they paid to these low-born, but exceedingly powerful, favourites of the Shōgun. But, with the death of Iyemitsu, the councillors quickly found criticism taking the place of adulation, and the aristocrats began to say publicly and without reserve what they had only thought before, or had at most only ventured to express in the rare nooks and corners immune from the prying and ubiquitous secret service of the State. The subtle and wily Matsudaira Nobutsuna was swift to appreciate the dangers of the situation and, to parry them, a place in the Great Council was promptly found for one of the Great Fudai—Matsudaira Norinaga, the Lord of Idzumi.

Personally this Matsudaira does not seem to have been of any great consequence ; but his admission to the Rōjū did not a little to

conciliate his fellow Fudai of ancient stock. His tenure of office was brief, for he died in 1654. Eight months before his death, however, the Ministry had further strengthened itself by the co-optation of yet another great Fudai. This was Sakai Tadakiyo, Uta no Kami; and this Sakai was destined to remain in office down to the death of Iyetsuna in 1680, and for a decade or so to be the real ruler of Japan.

What chiefly contributed, however, to save the Ministry was the powerful support of the heads of the collateral *Go-san-ke* houses, and of the two chief Fudai. The first Lord of the Owari branch of the Tokugawa family was Yoshinao, Iyeyasu's seventh son. He died towards the close of 1650, and his successor, Mitsutomo, was still too young and inexperienced to be of much service as a counsellor in matters of high policy. But Iyeyasu's eighth and ninth sons were still alive, and in the full vigour of their powers. They were by no means insignificant; for both seem to have inherited something of their illustrious father's ability. Yorinobu of Kii was now forty-eight years of age, while Yorifusa of Mito was a year younger. Although, for one brief moment, Yorinobu seemed to be seriously implicated in a daring intrigue to subvert the government, the Bakufu of this time felt that it could always rely upon the staunch fidelity and support of the two great houses of Kii and Mito. Yorinobu and Yorifusa were always consulted in emergencies; and on more than one occasion we find questions of the gravest import settled in accordance with the views they expressed.

Another tower of strength was found in the person of the Lord of Hikone, Ii Naotaka (1590-1659). The house of Ii occupied the proud position of head of all the Fudai. It was the first Ii chieftain, Naomasa, who led the attack in the great battle of Sekigahara; and the distinguished services rendered by his second son—this Naotaka, now head of the great house—in the Ōsaka campaign of 1615, have been recorded in the preceding volume of this history.¹ Under Iyemitsu, Ii Naotaka had found no seat in the Council of State. Notwithstanding this, he had occupied a non-official position of great influence. That he enjoyed the confidence of the third Shōgun is abundantly plain from a multitude of circumstances. Among the innovations of Iyemitsu, was the requirement that every official of the government should present a written oath

¹ Chap. xvii, p. 507.

of fidelity, signed and sealed with the *Keppan*¹ (blood-seal) in which he undertook to obey all instructions to the letter, no matter what they might be. In plain language, in the case of official orders, there was thenceforth to be no question of the individual conscience; the orders of one's immediate superior were to justify the most flagrant lying and duplicity and any other moral foulness whatsoever. The first general presentation (1634) of these very innocent-looking, but truly abominable, documents was the occasion of a great ceremony or rather solemnity; and it was Ii Naotaka who had the honour of presiding at it. Implicit and unswerving fidelity to the (supposed) interests of the House of Tokugawa was undoubtedly the cardinal article in such code of morality as Ii Naotaka acknowledged.

At the present critical juncture such a man might well have been deemed eminently fitted for the onerous position of Regent. But Sakai Tadakatsu, who had been joint Tairō under the most masterful of all the Shōguns, and who was now sole Tairō, continued to occupy that position down to his retirement from official life in 1656.

Ii Naotaka was not even guardian of the youthful Shōgun, for Iyemitsu had nominated Hoshina Masayuki, the second on the list of the Fudai Daimyō, to this important charge. The reason doubtless was that this second Fudai was really of Tokugawa stock, for he was Iyemitsu's own half-brother. In 1644, he had been installed as Daimyō of Aidzu, a fief of 230,000 *koku*. Here he soon earned the reputation of being one of the three most remarkable local administrators of his age. He was undoubtedly a man of solid parts, and of great force of character, while his intellectual culture was probably more thorough and comprehensive than that of any other feudal chieftain of his time. Down to his death in 1672, he seems to have wielded as much real influence in matters of high policy as any one of his contemporaries that could be named. But, as regards the workaday running of the Bakufu machine proper, the brain continued to be furnished by Matsudaira Nobutsuna, while Abé Tadaaki counted as its great moral asset.

The Tairō, old Sakai Tadakatsu, was by nature cautious even to

¹ *Vide* Vol. II, p. 537, footnote. In this note it is stated on the authority of Mr. Masujima, the leading member of the legal profession in Tokio at the present time (1924), that the blood is taken from the finger. A still more solemn way was to take it from the gums. When Iyeyasu swore to Hideyoshi on his death-bed to protect the interests of his infant son, he drew the blood from behind his ear, and so considered the oath informal and himself free.—J. H. L.

the verge of timidity ; and even under Iyemitsu, although he had kept objections to himself, innovations had not been greatly to his liking. Now that he was ostensibly responsible for the supreme conduct of affairs he looked upon innovations with the greatest dread. Matsudaira Nobutsuna, with his usual astuteness, was quick to perceive that in the circumstances it was a great advantage to have this timid administrator nominally at the head of affairs, for any new projects would have been promptly utilized as a handle for criticism by the captious and the disaffected. For the time being the great hope of safety lay in a policy of masterly inactivity. Henceforth, accordingly, the great aim was to preserve the fabric of administration as it was at the death of Iyemitsu.

Yet, it soon became apparent that even this ultra-conservative policy was not without its difficulties and dangers. There were still bold and adventurous spirits in the empire, and some of them presently began to chafe under what they scornfully declared to be "government by the Abacus". A grandson of Iyeyasu's mother. Hisamitsu Sadamasa, Daimyō of Kariya in Mikawa, sent in a bitterly worded protest against this policy of drift and stagnation. He followed up this bold act by withdrawing to the sanctuary of the temple of the mausoleum of the Tokugawa at Uyenō, and taking the tonsure entered religion. This was on 24th August, 1651, and a fortnight later, just when a settlement of this incident was in view, the authorities suddenly discovered that they stood on the very brink of a formidable crisis.

On the evening of 7th September, 1651, Matsudaira Nobutsuna was requested to accord an audience to a visitor who had matter of grave public import to communicate. Strangely enough, almost at the very same moment, one of the City Magistrates was the recipient of a similar request from one Tōjirō, a bow-maker, employed by the Bakufu. On hearing what this bow-maker had to say, the magistrate hurried off to Matsudaira's mansion with the astounding intelligence just communicated to him, and the magistrate and the Great Councillor then found that the reports they had just severally received tallied in all essential respects. A great *Rōnin* conspiracy had been in train for years, and the night of the following tenth, if windy, or the first windy night thereafter, had at last been fixed as the date for decisive action by the conspirators. That several daring men could for years, and hundreds of them could for months, have kept their own counsel and eluded the attentions of the lynx-

eyed ubiquitous Bakufu spies until a short two-and-seventy hours before the moment appointed for putting the attempt to the hazard of the die, is surely one of the strangest things in the annals of feudal Japan. The ringleaders in this long-conceived and daring project were Yui no Shōsetsu and Marubashi Chūya. Both were remarkable men, but intellectually they stood on very different planes.¹

Marubashi Chūya alleged that he was a son of that Chōsokabe Motochika, the dispossessed Daimyō of Tosa, who had fought in the great siege of Ōsaka in 1615.² He had been captured, and his head exposed on the public pillory. Marubashi Chūya's great purpose in life was to avenge his father, and deal a deadly blow to the Tokugawas and their minions. Marubashi had been reared in the northern wilds of Dewa, where he had done everything to perfect himself in the warlike accomplishments of the Samurai. His bodily strength was immense, his courage indomitable; when he at last made his way to Yedo, he soon established a great reputation, and became popular as an instructor in the use of the halbert. His fame penetrated to the Castle itself, and Matsudaira Nobutsuna thought it advisable to place him under surveillance. But Marubashi, although no fool, was only dangerous when acting under the direction of an abler intellect than his own. As a matter of fact, he was doing so; for he was at the beck and call of a man who had early taken Hideyoshi as his model, who had been sternly schooling himself for the accomplishment of exploits and the execution of projects as vast as those of the Taikō, and who in intellectual scope, in foresight, in daring tempered with prudence, and in general force of character, might very well have proved as formidable a rival to the great peasant ruler as any of the many able men Hideyoshi had to encounter and overpower. It was in Yui no Shōsetsu that Marubashi found his mentor and chief; and, like Hideyoshi, Yui was a mere man of the people. His father, a dyer of the village of Yui in Suruga, had

¹ The popular account of this episode will be found in book v, pp. 200-38 of the series of "English Readers" compiled for the Education Department by Mr. Denning in 1887. The original is a *Jitsu rokumono*—literally a "volume of authentic records", however, where the writer often goes to his imagination for his details. The narrative has, at the same time, a solid kernel of fact—besides, it sheds considerable light upon the social conditions of the time. A reference to this great conspiracy is to be found in Valentyn's *Deshima Diary*, p. 91. Titsingh got a MS. account of it during his stay in Japan, but it is scrappy and not very trustworthy.

² *Vide* Vol. II, p. 525 et seq.

intended his son for the priesthood and had got him placed in a neighbouring monastery where his extraordinary powers not merely of retentiveness but of reasoning astounded the priests. The young acolyte, however, presently made friends with a *rōnin* of some culture living near by, and from him he learned to read the standard Chinese military treatises, and heard tales of the stirring times of Nobunaga and Hideyoshi. The marvellous story of the great Hideyoshi made an indelible impression upon the youth; what one man of the people had done another might hope to emulate. This was the turning point in Yui's career. Some years later he was traversing Japan as a "Warrior-pilgrim" or knight errant. The popular account of this five years' pilgrimage is a thrilling tale indeed. What strikes one most in it, perhaps, is the marvellous foresight with which the young man is represented as providing for possible future contingencies. One result was that he acquired such an ascendancy over individual desperadoes, and even over bands of desperadoes in widely separated quarters of the empire, that he was in a position to summon hundreds of devoted followers to join him in Yedo as soon as he could devise means of maintaining them there.

This he was no long time in accomplishing. The military lecturer, or professor, played a considerable rôle in the social life of Yedo in those days, and Yui succeeded in attaching himself to the household of one of the fraternity who had hundreds of pupils—great Daimyō and high officials among them. He soon found himself the professor's right-hand man, and presently began to overshadow his master in reputation. After a few years' service, he contrived to effect the destruction of his master with his prospective son-in-law by the exercise of a fiendish piece of ingenuity. The real motive was neither envy, malice, nor revenge; it was simply because Yui deemed the untrammelled control of the resources of the establishment necessary for the accomplishment of his ulterior designs. He was at once chosen to succeed his victim, and thereupon he summoned his adherents in the provinces to the capital. He easily succeeded in getting positions for the leaders as military instructors in the various *yashiki*, while he now set up an iron-works and armourer's establishment where the others found employment. To avert suspicion he opened a number of small shops for the disposal of the products, which found a ready sale, thanks to their excellence and to Yui's extensive connexions with the Daimyō and their retainers. All this tallies tolerably well with the official statement

that when the Bakufu decreed the expulsion of all *rōnin* from Yedo who could not furnish sureties for their behaviour, Yui's establishment became the resort of hundreds of lordless men for whom he became answerable.

Among others who appealed to Yui had been Marubashi Chūya when he came to the capital from Dewa. In course of time Marubashi frankly opened his mind to his protector, and the latter by-and-by came to the conclusion that Marubashi might be equal to the responsibilities of a lieutenant in the execution of his own daring project. At what exact date this project was first communicated to his confederates by Yui does not appear; it was certainly under Iyemitsu, and probably some time between 1645 and 1648. For one reason or another, however, its execution was deferred; but now that the dreaded Iyemitsu was no more the auspices for a successful issue to the enterprise seemed to be propitious at last.

The general outline of the plot was this: Barrels of gunpowder were stored in houses in various quarters of Yedo with trains laid ready to be fired at a given signal. This signal was to be the explosion of the Government powder-magazine at Koishikawa, the caretakers of which had been inveigled into the conspiracy. A stormy night was to be selected for the outbreak. As most of Yedo was then roofed with thatch or shingles, the whole city would be one great raging sea of wildly leaping flame-billows in a few brief minutes. The members of the Council would at once hurry to the Castle, and they were to be mercilessly shot down or cut to pieces by squads detailed for that special purpose. Meanwhile Marubashi at the head of 300 men, furnished with lanterns bearing the Tokugawa crest, was to dash into the Castle, loudly calling out that it was the Lord of Kishū that was coming, find his way to the Shōgun, and kill him. Previous to this, one band of conspirators had been dispatched to Ōsaka and another to Kyōto; and as soon as ever the latter learned that Yedo was in flames they were to seize the Emperor, hurry him up Hiyeizan, and extort from him a receipt for the chastisement of the Tokugawas. Meanwhile, about 1,000 men were to be dribbled down in twos and threes to rendezvous at Sumpu (Shizuoka),¹ and these were to seize the castle, rifle Kunōzan

¹ The family estate and country residence of the Tokugawa. Kunō is the name of the temple near Shizuoka in which Iyeyasu was first buried prior to the erection of the great mausoleum at Nikko, in which many people say his remains still rest, only a part of his head having been removed to Nikko. Its distance from Yedo by the Tokaido, the great high road of the eastern coast, is 114 miles, and from Kyōto 209 miles.—J. H. L.

of its treasures for the sinews of war, and then march either upon Yedo or Kyōto as the exigencies of the situation might demand. It was Yui himself who was to assume command of this special body. At this date there were tens of thousands of *rōnin* in Japan—possibly nearly as many as there had been in 1615—and it was tolerably safe for the conspirators to count upon the majority of these making common cause with them. Then, with the slaughter of the Shōgun and all the Councillors, the administration would be paralysed, and some of the great Outside Daimyō might confidently be expected to seize the golden opportunity to emancipate themselves from the thralldom of the Bakufu. The whole empire would then revert to its condition in the *Sengoku Jidai* (the epoch of the warring country), and the *rōnin* of to-day might cherish the hope of being the Daimyō of the morrow. The *coup*, of course, was really a desperate one ; but if it succeeded in its initial stage, Yui had no mean prospects of making his fortunes.

Iyemitsu had died on 4th June, and, as has been stated, the plot was not discovered until 7th September, three nights before the date appointed for action. There was then an interval of 98 days between the two events. The question naturally arises : Why did the conspirators defer the *coup* so long ? Were they not losing a golden opportunity in not availing themselves of the confusion Iyemitsu's sudden death had occasioned ? As a matter of fact, the ringleaders had met in council and concerted what they then fancied to be their final measures on the night of 5th–6th June. The Ōsaka and Kyōto emissaries had been dispatched, and intelligence of their arrival alone was awaited. Just then, however, Marubashi was seized with a dangerous fever, and in his delirium he shouted out some terribly compromising things. While his recovery was being awaited, the Kyōto emissary, who was a notorious rake, gave way to debauchery and spent all his funds on wine-bibbing and harlotry, and on coming to his senses he felt so ashamed that he disappeared. It was these misadventures that occasioned the delay, and so perhaps wrecked the scheme.

It was not till 2nd September that everything was again got into proper train. Three days later Yui actually set out for Shizuoka, where a thousand men were presently to be drafted in driblets. It was all through the indiscretion of Marubashi that the plot now got disclosed. He had received 5,000 *ryō* from Yui in June ; but he was at once personally profligate and reckless in the handling

of funds, and as a consequence he soon found it necessary to borrow. Before his attack of fever he had got 200 *ryō* from Tōjirō, the bow-maker, promising to repay the sum on 28th August. He failed to do so, and the excuses he tendered when repeatedly dunned excited Tōjirō's suspicions. Marubashi had also appealed to one Matabei, a merchant, for 500 *ryō*, and when refused, told him of the plot and promised to give him 5,000 *ryō* in a few days. The merchant at once informed a friend of his, a certain Okumura, of the matter. Now, Okumura's elder brother was in the service of Matsudaira Nobutsuna, and when the younger Okumura mentioned the affair to him, the two of them at once hurried the merchant Matabei off to Matsudaira's mansion. Meanwhile, the bow-maker had been unbosoming himself to the City Magistrate, and before Matabei's tale was well ended, the City Magistrate appeared. The conspirators were lost !

A strong body of constabulary was at once sent out to arrest Marubashi ; orders were issued for all the wickets at the entrances to the various blocks to be closed and a strict watch to be set at all the exits from Yedo, while officers were dispatched to the Warden of Sumpu Keep, and hot-foot relay couriers to the Shoshidai of Kyōto and the Commandant of Ōsaka Castle. Marubashi was duly captured, and by next day 370 *rōnin* had been put under arrest in Yedo. Yui had meanwhile reached Shizuoka where, giving himself out to be an official in the service of the Lord of Kishū, he took up his quarters with eight of his band in the leading inn of the town. Here, on the night of 9th September, the conspirators suddenly found themselves beset by a strong posse of police. Thereupon all of them promptly disembowelled themselves, and when the officers of the law at last broke in they found life extinct in all the nine except the priest who accompanied Yui as his "tea-maker". Yui had left a hurriedly traced note behind him in which he protested that he cherished no thoughts of treason or of overthrowing the Shōgunate, and that his sole purpose had merely been to call forcible attention to the patent shortcomings of the administration. In old Japan, where mendacity was a fine art, and where, in accordance with the tenets of Chinese military science, trickery and treachery were always legitimate expedients in war, the authorities knew better than to expect absolute veracity in any death-bed confession ; and this death-bed avowal of Yui was plainly a lie. In it, he cited the episode of the Daimyō of Kariya as a reason for his action, and

this episode was scarcely a fortnight old. That such a wide-ramifying project as Yui had set on foot could be concerted and brought so near completion in two brief quarters of a single moon was, on the face of it, utterly absurd to suppose. His motives in making this deposition can only be surmised. In the first place, failure in any enterprise of consequence was always regarded by Samurai as exposing them to ridicule and disgrace; and if Yui's object had been no more than to call attention to Bakufu mal-administration, he could not be flouted as having come short of his purpose. Secondly, he thought of his relatives, for treason on his part would involve every one of them in his doom. Of course, Yui's avowal was unavailing to save them. On 1st November his corpse was taken to the banks of the Abegawa¹ and there exposed on the cross, while his old *inkyō* father, his father's wife, his own spouse and fifteen of his other relatives were crucified beside it.

In Yedo, meanwhile, in order to extort a full avowal of all the details of the plot, Marubashi and some of his comrades were subjected to all the horrors sanctioned by the barbarous Tokugawa jurisprudence in such a case as theirs—torture by fire, stone, and water.² But the victims quailed not. On 24th September, Marubashi and some thirty of his accomplices were paraded through Yedo and finally taken to Shinagawa and there crucified, while Marubashi's two young sons, his wife, and the wives and mothers of some of the others were decapitated.³

¹ Abegawa, a small river near Shizuoka. The bed is about three-quarters of a mile in width, and it was rather on the bed than on the banks of the river that the exposure took place, following the practice at Kyōto, where the heads of political offenders were always exposed on the bed of the River Kamo.—J. H. L.

² Titsingh's account gives some details: "Matsudaira Nobutsuna ordered the executioner to put them to the *Kama-boko-zeme*, which consists in extending the body of the criminal, plastered with clay, upon hot ashes, till the heat dries the clay and bursts the flesh all over . . . As the *Kama-boko-zeme* could not subdue the fortitude of these intrepid men, recourse was then had to the *neto-zeme*, as follows:—The back was laid open for the space of eight inches, and melted copper poured into the incision. It was left there to cool, and then removed by means of a spade with such violence that the flesh in contact with the metal was torn out along with it. The spectators shuddered with horror; the sufferers alone neither uttered a murmur nor betrayed the least sign of pain . . . Matsudaira, tired of these tortures which excited the indignation of the spectators without producing the intended result, ordered the executioner to suspend them, and remanded the culprits to prison."

³ "In passing Nihon-bashi, Marubashi heard a man about forty years of age say to another that it was a highly criminal and extravagant enterprise to conspire against the Shōgun. 'Well it befits thee, miserable sparrow,' cried Marubashi with a look of indignation, 'to compare thyself with the eagle or the crane.' The man reddened with shame and buried himself among the crowd. The two boys excited universal compassion. One said to the other, 'We are going to the abode of the gods,' and he began to pray, repeating, 'Namu Amida Butsu.' There was not one whom such a spectacle did not melt into tears." Titsingh's *Illustrations of Japan*.

That old, decrepit bedridden mothers, helpless and harmless wives and mere children should have been thus ruthlessly and remorselessly done to a death of ignominy for an offence of which they were not only guiltless, but of whose conception even they had not the slightest knowledge, strikes one as something not merely barbarous but as abominable and revolting beyond the power of expression. Reasons of State, again ! In old Japan, ever since the very pious, but the not very chaste, Empress Kōken had ordered that the Chinese classic of Filial Piety should be scattered broadcast over the Empire in the eighth century, regard for parents had come to be considered as the weightiest of the Cardinal Virtues. Thus, the reflection that treason on his part would infallibly involve his parents and all his relatives in death and ignominy must have tended to make even the boldest and most reckless pause and ponder before committing himself to the perilous path of sedition. Furthermore, it must ever be borne in mind that in Japan the social unit was not the individual, but the family, that among the commoners and lower samurai at this date the family was a unit in the five-men groups, and that among the Daimyō and upper samurai any serious offence against the State on the part of the head of the house might very easily involve the ruin of all depending upon him. It will thus be readily grasped that this atrocious feature in the Tokugawa jurisprudence was devised with fiendish ingenuity.

In connexion with this episode there was one development which occasioned the authorities the gravest concern for a short time. From June to September Yui must have had some 3,000 men or more to maintain. The unexpected delay in the execution of his project laid him under the necessity of finding additional funds, and to raise these he counterfeited the seal of the Lord of Kishū, and appended it to the bonds he gave his creditors. The imitation was not exact ; the counterfeit was purposely made different from the original in one or two minute particulars, but this could only be detected by a close and careful scrutiny. In the document Yui left behind him this fact was alluded to and the Lord of Kishū exonerated from all knowledge of, or participation in, the plot. But Yui's confession was plainly at variance with the truth in other particulars ; and hence the Lord of Kishū came under very grave suspicion. After a consultation with the two other *Go-san-ke*, with Ii, and with Hoshina, the Councillors summoned the Lord of Kishū to the Castle. Men-at-arms were placed in concealment ready to put him

under arrest, if need be. The Councillors, however, professed to be satisfied with his demeanour and his remarks. A quarrel with the head of one of the august collateral Tokugawa houses would have been a serious matter for the *novi homines* in the Great Council at this most critical juncture ; and even if convinced of his implication in the plot the Councillors must have been eager for a pretext which would publicly justify them in abandoning any further formal proceedings. Whether Yorinobu was really in any way implicated in the affair it is hard to say ; only it is not easy to discern how his interests could have benefited by the success of the plot.¹

At his death, Yui was in his forty-sixth year—just the age of Hideyoshi in 1582, when the death of Nobunaga allowed him full scope for the independent exercise of his powers. Hideyoshi's great work—the reunification and reorganization of Japan—was accomplished in the brief space between his forty-sixth and his fifty-fourth year. It is vain, perhaps, to indulge in any speculations as to what Yui might have accomplished between 1651 and 1659. But it is not uninteresting to consider his opportunities. As has been said, Yui had taken the Taikō for his model in his boyhood.²

But the circumstances of the time absolutely precluded any servile copying of the details of Hideyoshi's career. To force himself into the service of some petty baron, and to lay a foundation for his fortunes by aiding his master to eat up, first his own insignificant neighbours, and, ultimately, whole provinces of the empire, was no longer a feasible course. The very work accomplished by the Taikō himself had rendered that thenceforth impossible. So Yui was constrained to find some other route. His best, perhaps his

¹ "Owing to the presence of mind of Marubashi's wife in burning the papers which might have compromised the conspirators (at the time of her husband's arrest), and to the fortitude displayed by the condemned persons while undergoing their tortures, the principal accomplices remained undiscovered. Yorinobu (Lord of Kishū), however, was suspected, and his mansion was searched ; but his secretary, Kannō, took everything upon himself, protesting that he alone was acquainted with the plot and had kept it a profound secret from his master. He then ripped up his belly, and by his firmness saved Yorinobu. When Yoshimune, Yorinobu's grandson, became Shōgun (1716), he rewarded the fidelity of this secretary in the persons of his posterity, on whom he conferred the most honourable posts. One of them, Kannō, Totōmi no Kami, is at present (1784) extraordinary counsellor of State." Titsingh's *Illustrations of Japan*.

² The first *Taikō-ki* was not published until 1625 when Yui was in his twentieth year. Doubtless he must have devoured the book ; but it was not from it, but from his *rōnin* friend's accounts that he drew his original inspiration.

The Taikō-ki alluded to in this note is a very lengthy biography of Hideyoshi, by an unknown author, more in the nature of a historical novel than of real history. Another work of the same nature and on the same subject was published late in the eighteenth century.—J. H. L.

only chance, lay among the outcast and the disinherited ; but to obtain such an ascendancy over these as would permit him to weld them into a serviceable instrument for his purpose, might well seem a hopeless task. The Bakufu had its emissaries everywhere ; every fourth man, perhaps every third man, was a secret spy upon all the goings and comings of his neighbours. And yet, in spite of all this, Yui opened, and for years maintained, a veritable Cave of Adullam under the very eyes of the Bakufu Councillors, the vulpine Matsudaira Nobutsuna among them. We are told that in a few years he accumulated a fortune of 30,000 *ryō* from his workshops—an immense sum in those days—and when we take into account the great amounts he must have yearly expended in the relief of the hundreds of destitute outcast two-sworded men that thronged to his roof, we must, perforce, concede him the possession of a business capacity of the very highest order. Then, in those days of general suspicion and mistrust, he seems to have been implicitly trusted by all who came in contact with him—great Daimyō and the high Tokugawa authorities included. The last never entertained the faintest suspicion of his towering ambition. To succeed in so masking his mind and purpose for a long series of years, all the while pushing resolutely on towards the accomplishment of his daring projects, must surely be regarded as no common feat.

Then, to handle his followers as he did argues him to have been a born leader of men. Not a single one of his associates or *protégés* ever compromised him, much less thought of betraying him. Their devotion to him was at once thorough and implicit. It may be urged that his choice of Marubashi and the Kyōto emissary, Kumagai, for such responsible *rôles*, indicated a certain infirmity of judgment on his part. But, closely examined, it does nothing of the sort. Marubashi's attack of fever could not possibly have been foreseen. It was that that delayed action ; and if action had been immediate, as intended, Marubashi would have had no need or opportunity to borrow money, and Kumagai no time to fall into dissolute courses in Kyōto. It is not too much to say that Marubashi's fever was a determining factor in the historical developments of the age. It certainly saved Yedo from destruction, and almost certainly saved the Shōgun and the Councillors from assassination. And it probably saved the empire from all the horror of a long protracted anarchy. That Yui's daring plot miscarried is certainly no subject for regret. It is impossible to sympathize with his motives, for they were

purely personal and selfish. But that does not preclude a hearty meed of admiration for the superb intellectual endowments and practical ability of this son of the people, born either half a century too late, or more than two centuries too early. As an active rival in Hideyoshi's own days he would have been capable of putting that great satrap upon his mettle ; if born just a score of years before the appearance of the " Black Ships " at Uruga in 1853, he would probably have overshadowed every one of the great figures that contributed to the overthrow of the Tokugawa might, and the subsequent making of modern Japan.

That the son of a mere plebeian dyer should have been able to go so far may well strike us as being something remarkable. But, as alleged in a preceding chapter, the demarcation between commoner and samurai was by no means so strictly defined in the first half of the seventeenth century as it afterwards came to be. In fact, it was only under Iyemitsu that the samurai caste system began to stiffen into the rigidity which characterized it at the date Europeans renewed their acquaintance with Japan. One fundamental maxim of the Tokugawa administration was the trite old adage that " prevention is better than cure ". The Yedo Councillors were tireless in their efforts to devise ways and means of turning the current of public intellectual interest into channels where men's minds could be exercised if not profitably, at all events harmlessly, so far as the peace of the rulers and of the empire was concerned. About some of the devices it had resort to for this purpose more will, perhaps, be said further on ; the one thing that is of special interest in the present connexion is the great heraldic enterprise of Iyemitsu's later period. In 1641 a Bureau, with the Junior Councillor, Oda Sukemune, as its titular head, was established for the compilation of an official record of the genealogies of the military men of the empire. The work was really done by Hayashi Dōshun, the Government Chinese scholar (*Jusha*), who was assisted by the priests of the five great Zen monasteries and of Kōyasan, and a staff of subordinate clerks. From 1641 to 1644 they were all busily employed on the redaction of the *Kwanyei Shoké Keizu den*,¹ a stupendous work that ran to no fewer than 372 volumes. Not a few of the elder samurai of that date had begun the world with a coolie's baggage-pole as chief, if not sole, equipment, the swords of yet others had been won

¹ The records of the genealogies of all the noble in the period of Kwanyei (1624-44).—J. H. L.

for them by their own fathers, while perhaps not fifty per cent. of the whole body of the privileged class could boast of five generations of gentle descent. In truth, the number of Daimyō and great vassals whose pretensions to a long line of aristocratic ancestry were undoubtedly genuine was exceedingly limited. Accordingly, when every territorial magnate, every hatamoto, every retainer, who enjoyed a hereditary revenue or drew rations from his Lord's granary, was requested to send in a family chart to this heraldic compilation bureau, there must have been much head-scratching and much meditative knocking-out of tobacco-pipes on the rim of many a family *hibachi* (fire-box) throughout the length and the breadth of the land. Here was a perplexing business, indeed ; the consideration of the problem was sufficient to keep samurai heads employed and samurai hands out of mischief for one summer season at least. There was a sudden general demand for the services of historians and genealogical experts ; and presently crowds of needy charlatans found themselves blessed with ample and lucrative employment. An army of erstwhile clodhoppers and village varlets had to be promptly supplied with Fujiwara, or Minamoto, or Taira, or Tachibana pedigrees ; and besides all this there were the correct and appropriate *mon* or family crests to be seen to. These *mon* had originally been impressed on nothing but the curtain round the commander's headquarters or on his standard ; now they were to be seen on armour, household utensils, and on the wearing apparel both of the head of the family and all his dependents, both relatives and servants of every degree. A busy time indeed it must have been for the Japanese Burkes and Debretts of the years 1641 to 1644. Naturally enough the publication of the Brobdingnagian *Kwanyei Shoké Keizu den* must have been a marked step towards the stricter demarcation of the line between the samurai and the plebeian class from which so many of the former had only recently emerged. Then, in 1661, farmers were forbidden the possession of fire-arms, and in 1668, merchants and traders were prohibited from wearing swords. Even as a mere boy Yui had perceived that plebeian extraction would prove a far greater obstacle to his advancement than it had been to Hideyoshi a generation before. His *rōnin* friend had informed him that Kusunoki Masashige was the finest warrior that Japan had ever produced. Now, Kusunoki was of Tachibana stock ; and Yui ultimately assumed the high-sounding name of Yui Tachibana Shōsetsu, Mimbu-no-suké. In the course of

his five years' "Warrior-pilgrimage" he had gone to the shrine of Hachiman at Tsuboi in Kawachi, and placing a banner like the one Kusunoki had used, together with a family tree of the warrior which he himself had made out, in a strong box, he buried them at the foot of the old pine-tree there. A dozen years later on he casually told a crowd of his pupils that he had had a dream the preceding night in which a warrior in court-dress had appeared to him and said: "You are my lineal descendant, and if you need a proof of this, dig at the root of the great pine-tree behind the shrine of Hachiman at Tsuboi in Kawachi." He laughingly added that although the vision had been exceedingly vivid, he looked upon dreams as senseless things. Of course he knew that his pupils would insist on going and probing the matter—as they did. Furthermore, the master he had caused to be so foully murdered was a descendant of Kusunoki, and one of Yui's motives in compassing that dastardly crime had been to obtain possession of his benefactor's family tree. By Yui's day then, an ancient name was again coming to be of great consequence; in Hideyoshi's youth it had been of little practical importance.¹

The *rōnin* question had for long been a standing anxiety to the Bakufu, and the great conspiracy now convinced the authorities that they had not been exaggerating the danger. Early in 1652 a special council was convoked to consider this particular question. Sakai, the Tairō, then urged that all *rōnin* should be forthwith expelled from Yedo and no more allowed to enter the city; and in this view he was supported by Matsudaira Nobutsuna and the Shōgun's guardian, Hoshina of Aidzu. Abé Tadaaki, however, quickly exposed the impolicy of such a course. It would be construed as an indication of the weakness and nervousness of the administration, and the *rōnin*, deprived of all prospect of finding a livelihood in the metropolis, would infallibly be driven to take to brigandage in the provinces. In this contention he was followed by Ii Naotaka of Hikone, who furthermore pointed out that arrests could be more easily effected in the city than in the country. Sakai's proposal was accordingly negatived. Here it may be observed that on this important occasion the Great Council did not venture to decide the question alone; and on yet another occasion, when

¹ Kusunoki himself had once had resort to a fraud of the nature perpetrated by Yui: the latter had no doubt come across some mention of it in the course of his reading.

matters of High Policy were to be discussed and settled, we find not only Ii and Hoshina but some, or all, of the heads of the *Go-san-ke* present at the session.

During the year 1652, another plot was formed, an imitation of Yui's enterprise, though on a much smaller scale. On the 20th October a High Mass for Hidetada's consort was to be celebrated in the great temple of Zōjōji in Shiba; and on the 18th Abé Tadaaki, who was superintending the arrangements for it, was informed that a certain Bekké Shoemon and several other *rōnin* had conspired to set fire to the temple and various parts of the city on that occasion and in the resulting confusion to murder Ii Naotaka, his colleagues in the ministry, and other prominent men. The plotters were arrested after a desperate struggle, and after being "examined" (i.e. subjected to torture) they were crucified at Shinagawa a week later on. As usual in such cases, their wives, children and other relatives were made to share their doom. The general supposition was that these desperadoes had been members of Yui's band, and that the holocaust they contemplated was intended as a celebration of the (approximate) anniversary of his death.

Although this small plot could not possibly have subverted the Tokugawa régime it might probably have involved the whole of Yedo in disaster. At that date the means for coping with conflagrations were sadly inadequate. The famous fire-brigades of Yedo were only organized in 1728; and it was only in 1727 that roofs of thatch were absolutely prohibited in the city. In the year of Iyemitsu's death (1651), some dozen Daimyō had been instructed to furnish each thirty men for every 10,000 *koku* of their revenues for the purpose of fighting fires in the town, but in 1657 it was to be amply demonstrated how ludicrously insufficient this provision was in a really serious emergency. In 1652, the city was but ill supplied with water, the Kanda aqueduct, as it was called, being the sole outside source of the water necessary for household purposes. In the year after Bekké's attempt, however, there was a vast improvement in this matter. The inhabitants of Kojimachi and Shibaguchi petitioned the authorities for permission to take the head-waters of the river Tama and conduct them into the southern wards of the city. One of the City Magistrates was appointed to superintend the undertaking, and a government subsidy of 7,500 *ryō* was assigned for its prosecution. This sum, with an extra 3,000 *ryō*

from the citizens, proved sufficient to cover all the expenditure. In eighteen months the aqueduct, 30 miles in length, was completed and opened. The engineering difficulties to be surmounted were not inconsiderable ; and some 240 years later the Scotsman ¹ who planned the water-supply system of the modern city of Tōkyō was unstinted in the expression of his admiration for the substantial work of the old Bakufu engineers. The remarkable thing is that the two engineers who planned and carried out the work were mere peasants, who, of course, had neither scientific training nor family names. As a reward for their services they both received on the completion of the work, the name of Tamagawa, a sum of money, and appointments as commissioners of the aqueduct, with a salary equal to 200 *koku* of rice. This, by the way, is only one of numerous instances indicating that the samurai caste could scarcely boast of a monopoly of the ability and intellect of the empire.

Yet this fine fresh supply of water proved of but little service in the great calamity of 1657. All through the February of that year the sky had been unclouded ; scarcely a drop of rain had fallen for weeks. The drought had at last become so intense that most of the wells ran dry, while the thatch and shingles of the roofs began to crackle up into dust. Then, on 2nd March a fierce hurricane came sweeping down from Tsukuba San and the mountains of Nikkō. By the afternoon it was blowing with terrific force. And while the gale was at its height the great hall of the Hommyōji fane in Hongō suddenly burst into flames.²

In a few minutes the whole immediate neighbourhood to the leeward was a sea of wildly tossing flame and dense whirling smoke-

¹ The modern water works of the city of Tōkyō were designed by the late General Palmer, R.E., who was not a Scotsman.—J. H. L.

² A strange legend about the origin of the Hommyōji fire soon became current. "As a young daughter of a noble family was returning from a trip with her parents one spring day when the cherry-trees were in full blossom, she caught sight of a temple page with whom she fell in love on the spot. Thinking of him all day, she languished, and her mother placed at her sick-bed a long-sleeved garment of the same pattern as the page wore. The young girl, who never ceased to gaze at it, grew weaker every day, and at length died. The long-sleeved garment was laid on her coffin which was taken to the family temple of Hommyōji. The priests sold the dress to an old-clothes dealer, and as it hung in the shop, it caught the fancy of a young girl who bought it. Six months later the girl died, and the garment was laid on her coffin which was taken to the same temple. The priests again sold the garment, and half-a-year later it was yet again brought to the temple on the coffin of a third young girl. The priests were now struck with fear and amazement, and resolved to burn the fatal garment. And so they lit a bonfire into which they threw it ; and as the flames flew up, a sudden wind arose and carried the burning garment aloft against the main hall of the temple, which instantly caught fire. The flames spread over the whole temple and thence into the street." Inouye, *Sketches of Tōkyō Life*.

billows, while the sparks and blazing débris, borne afar on the wings of the tornado, set the crumbling thatch alight in the districts down towards the centre of the city. Hongō and Kanda were presently one great fiery furnace. Just as darkness would have fallen in ordinary circumstances at that season, the storm suddenly veered round to the west, and great walls of fire advanced upon the Nihonbashi and Asakusa districts. Then, a most unfortunate misunderstanding intensified the horrors of the calamity. The Bakufu prison was in Temma-Chō, and when it became only too plain that it was doomed, the governor hastened to open the gates and told the prisoners to save themselves. They rushed into the street, and poured in a great crowd towards Asakusa. Some of the street-warders jumped to the conclusion that there must have been an *émeute* in the prison, and so they at once shut the wickets and slammed to the gates, and others further on imitated the example. Thus, not only the liberated prisoners, but the inhabitants of all that particular quarter were caught in a death-trap. Even with free egress, escape would have been difficult, for the onswamp of the advancing sea of fire was terrific in its speed. Of course, the closure of the street wickets and barriers doomed almost everything shut up behind them to destruction. Thousands perished in the flames, or in the moats, or in the icy waters of the Sumida, into which they precipitated themselves from the Asakusa wall in the vain hope of finding an escape.¹ Far into the night that great hurricane-driven fiery furnace continued to rage and roar; the flames only subsided when there was nothing more for them to consume. When morning dawned it was found that the whole space from Yanagiwara in the north to Kyōbashi in the south and from thence on to the Sumida had been swept clean. The fire had also leaped the river, and the straggling suburb of Fukagawa on the further bank had disappeared.

But all this was only a foretaste of what was still in store. On the following day the hurricane still continued to rage with unabated force. Towards noon a house in Koishikawa caught fire, and the flames ran furiously before the wind. Before evening, a wide swathe from Komagome in the north to the southern suburbs had been utterly devastated. Then, in the evening, the blast suddenly swept round and drove the fiery sea back upon the very centre of Yedo. That night nearly all the stately mansions of the Daimyō

¹ At that date, there were as yet no bridges across the river Sumida, while the narrow and tortuous streets intensified the difficulties of escape.—J. H. L.

were reduced to ashes, while the great bridges—Nihonbashi, Kyōbashi, Shimbashi—with, of course, all the smaller ones were consumed. All avenues of escape from the burning districts were thus cut off, and huge crowds were literally buried in the flames. Here again the mortality was terrible. That afternoon the fire went down only when it reached the shore.

More calamities were still in reserve. On that evening a merchant's house in Kojimachi caught fire and the hitherto intact spaces behind the castle were swept. Then suddenly the capricious blast changed its course once more, and the conflagration rushed on towards the Castle. All night long the Great Keep continued to roar and crackle, and by morning's dawn the Shōgun's palace and all the stately structures of the first and third citadels had disappeared, while, outside the moats, Atagoshita and the whole of Shiba had been reduced to wreck and ruin. The whole city of Yedo which, it is to be remembered was then one of the largest and most populous cities in the world, was now nothing but an ash-heap. In these three awful days, the Castle, 500 great Daimyō mansions, 300 great temples and shrines, 60 bridges, 800 blocks, and 9,000 so-called fire-proof warehouses had been destroyed. And the loss of life had been terrible. The lowest estimate puts it at 28,000, while the commonly accepted account raises the tale to the almost, if not absolutely, incredible figure of 107,046.¹

One of the greatest tribulations of the historian of the Tokugawa age is that he is generally constrained to rely on Japanese records alone. Now, in only too many instances, it is only too clear that it would be unwise to repose any great measure of faith in their accuracy. As a remedy for this nothing could possibly have been better than the continuous presence in the land of a succession of Jesuit letter-writers of the calibre of old Father Froez. But Jesuits and their creed were now anathema. The sole and only foreign check we have upon the Japanese annals of the time is to be found in the meagre data furnished by an occasionally intelligent man among the handful of Dutch merchants in Deshima. Often, these

¹ The casualties to life in the great earthquake of 1923, and in the widespread conflagration which followed it were, in Tokyo: killed 67,106, missing 34,236, total 101,342; in Yokohama and other districts: killed 10,391, missing, 26,623, total 37,014. The missing were assumed to be dead, and the total number of persons injured many of whom subsequently died, was, in all places, nearly 85,000. In view of these numbers the largest figure in the text does not seem incredible, even when every allowance is made for the difference in population between 1657 and 1923. The difference in building at the two periods renders any comparison of the losses in property useless.—J. H. L.

data amount to but little indeed ; but in the day of small mercies the heart is thankful for scraps. Now, in connexion with this conflagration we have one of these scraps ; and it is of some considerable value.

Zacharias Waegenæer was at the head of the annual Dutch mission to the Shōgun's court in this year of 1657 ; and he and his company had arrived in Yedo on 6th February. Three weeks later, on 27th February, he had his audience with the Shōgun, and on the following days he paid his visits and made his presents to the various dignitaries.

“ Chikugo no Kami was the highest in his praises of the presents, publishing everywhere that there could be nothing finer than those he had received, and saying the most obliging things in favour of the Dutch nation, so that the envoy felt entranced to have succeeded so well with him. It was customary for him always to entertain the envoy in a villa which he had outside Yedo. But he was prevented doing so by *the intense cold that then prevailed*, and on this occasion it was in his palace that he entertained St. de Waegenæer. As the latter had brought his surgeon with him, Chikugo no Kami, before sitting down to table, begged this surgeon to show him how he prepared his medicines. Scarcely had a beginning been made when he heard the cry of ‘ Fire ! ’ outside shouted in such a pitiable and terror-stricken tone that it showed the whole city was either afire, or that it was to be so that day. Chikugo no Kami opening the sliding-doors at this uproar saw that everyone was in a panic, and that people were running from the direction where the fire was. A very strong gale was blowing from the north, and it was greatly feared that the conflagration would gather strength and that the whole city would be reduced to ashes, for frightful torrents of flame were visible which made stronger and stronger inroads upon the city. Chikugo no Kami, thereupon, gave the envoy to understand that it was his special duty to hurry to the scene, and begged to be excused if he could not keep company with him any longer, begging him to remain till he had given the necessary orders to remedy the calamity. But the envoy, who perceived that the peril was general, and that he ought to look after his own affairs as well as other people, begged Chikugo no Kami to allow him to retire to his quarters where his people might need his presence. So mounting his horse, he galloped towards his lodgings . . . From the gate of the hotel he found it almost impossible to escape with his people ; one could see nothing but furniture, baggage, and vehicles which were dragged through the streets with an infinity of people that embarrassed each other. Nothing was heard but cries, lamentation and despair on all sides. The most eager to escape were suffocated in the crowd ; those caused others to fall who presently met the same fate, so that in two or three hours the streets were filled with dead and dying. What augmented the desolation was that the smoke was so thick and universal that it suffocated and blinded people wherever they went ; thus the daylight served no purpose ; if one advanced a little it was only *par reprises* and by the glare of the fire, from which the wind detached mountains of flame

which often covered the whole city. Death seemed inevitable wherever one turned ; for if one escaped the flames, the crowd, and the smoke, it was scarcely possible to avoid being overwhelmed under the ruins of the houses."

On 4th March, the envoy " begged the Captain of the Imperial Guards to furnish him with some soldiers to search the ashes of his hotel and of the fire-proof warehouse for melted silver. He passed over the ruins of Yedo, which presented an appalling landscape, where the eye lighted on nothing but mournful and horror-inspiring objects, whether for the ruins of a great number of magnificent palaces, or for the infinite number of half-burned corpses of those who had been smothered in the smoke, and others which were being extricated from the débris ; so that without counting the prisoners, who had all perished miserably in the flames, it was reckoned that more than 100,000 souls had perished in this cruel conflagration ".

As soon as they stirred the ashes of the warehouse the heat drove them off. After telling us that he lost 3,643 gulden in money, all his silver, and the presents not yet handed over, Waegenauer records that he disconsolately returned to Joffe sama's mansion.

" This lord caused us to be furnished with a small building where we found ourselves in much better case than in the farmer's house where we had passed the previous night. But we found no less difficulty in obtaining provisions, which were so dear that half of the people were dying of hunger ; and one was in momentary risk of being assaulted and bludgeoned to death, if one did not comply with the insistent demand for ' something to eat ', preferred by thousands on all sides, who ran about in a frenzy not knowing what to betake themselves to."

With all the bridges burned, exit from Yedo by the ordinary route was impossible, so the envoy made a detour. It took him an hour to traverse the débris of the Shōgun's palace, and a full day to negotiate the ruins of the suburbs before he could reach the Tōkaidō. So much has been made of this rather prosaic foreign account of the great disaster of 1657, just because it *is* a foreign account. There is nothing in it at all inconsistent with what we find in the Japanese annals ; indeed it corroborates them in not a few particulars.

This great conflagration was perhaps the most extensive and the most disastrous of all the thousands of fires recorded in the annals of Japan ; and it may be well questioned whether any similar calamity recorded in modern times has exceeded it in magnitude. The great fire of London, which occurred nine years later on, was a small matter compared to this utter destruction of Yedo.¹

¹ The " Great Fire " of London (September 2-6, 1666) began in a wooden house in Pudding Lane, and burned for three days, consuming the buildings on 436 acres—some 13,200 private houses and all the public edifices. Only six persons were killed. The total loss of property was estimated at the time to be £10,730,500.

In connexion with it, let us recall the projected details in the execution of the Great Rōnin Conspiracy of 1651. Favoured with a hurricane such as that of 2nd to 4th March, 1657, Yui and his associates might very readily have carried their daring venture to a successful issue.

By the evening of 4th March the three days' tornado had spent its force. But no sooner had the wind lulled than the snow began to fall thickly, while the cold became more intense than ever. Thus, the homeless, starving, and in many cases, maimed and burned survivors of the conflagration found themselves confronted with a fresh complication of miseries. Thousands perished wretchedly on that awful night of 4-5th March, 1657. The only source of hope lay in the Government, and it is a pleasure to be able to record that a paternal administration for once rose grandly to the dreadful exigencies of the situation. Most fortunately the thick mud walls of the Bakufu granaries had withstood the flames; and from these magazines thousands of bales of rice were conveyed daily to the six relief depôts established in as many districts of what had been the city, and there converted into gruel. The price of rice was fixed at an abnormally low figure, seven-tenths of a *koku* for one *ryō*—and huge sums of money were advanced to the citizens for the re-erection of their dwellings.¹

In one way it was fortunate that it was the cold season, for the heat of summer would almost inevitably have engendered a pestilence from the tens of thousands of putrifying corpses that had now to be disposed of. These were speedily collected, conveyed beyond the Sumida stream and hastily bestowed in huge pits excavated for their reception in the suburb of Honjō. This task was assigned to Danzaemon, the chief of the Eta in the Kwantō. When the mournful work was at an end, priests from all the different Buddhist sects were assembled to recite for seven days a thousand rolls of the sacred books for the benefit of the souls of the victims. The cemetery was styled the Mu-en-zuka—the Mound of Destitution—while the fane that was presently reared beside it became generally known as the Mu-en-ji, or the Temple of Helplessness. The E-kō-in—to give it its official name—on account of its peculiar origin was without the usual means of support derived from the

¹ So much money came into the hands of the people in this way, that even the Dutch in distant Deshima were favourably affected, the immediate demand for their wares being greatly enhanced. Their gross profits for the preceding year had been about £42,000; they now rose at a bound to nearly £87,000.

relations of the dead, and so had to cast about for other sources of revenue. Sacred images were brought from the provinces to be worshipped for a time by the citizens of Yedo, while the grounds were let for public spectacles or performances. Early in the nineteenth century, the grounds of the E-kō-in were chosen as the permanent arena for the great annual wrestling tournaments, which are still held there for ten days in the months of January and May.¹

The Daimyō who were then in residence in Yedo were dismissed to their fiefs while those whose duty it was presently to come up to the capital were directed to stay at home till further orders. Shortly afterwards the feudatories were informed that there would be a reduction in the value of the "presents" they were supposed to tender the Shōgun, while all private giving or receiving of gifts was interdicted. Later on, vast sums of money were loaned to the nobles to enable them to re-erect their mansions in the metropolis. These amounts were to be repaid in instalments spread over a term of ten years; but the money furnished to the *Hatamoto* was in most cases an absolute gift.

It was, however, in the restoration of the mercantile portion of the devastated city that the Bakufu authorities concentrated their immediate efforts. The great Daimyō *yashiki* could well afford to wait, for their former inmates could meanwhile find comfortable quarters in their native provinces. Even the Shōgun's palace itself was of less urgent consequence than the housing of the citizens who purveyed to the needs of the aristocracy. Matsudaira Nobutsuna took the lead in the direction of the work of restoration; under him everything was pushed on with the utmost energy and dispatch. The streets were widened and straightened in all the important localities. It was at this date that the greater part of what is now the Kyōbashi, district including Tsuki-ji, Teppōzu, and Hama-goten, was reclaimed, while across the Sumida, the marshes in Honjō and Fukagawa were filled in, and the waters confined to the plexus of canals now formed in these two transpontine suburbs, for such they now became. Previously, for strategical reasons, there had been no bridge over the Sumida, but the terrible experience of the great fire had shown that an eastern exit from Asakusa was

¹ For a fuller description of this famous Buddhist temple, *vide* Murray's *Handbook of Japan*, on which the text is substantially based. The literal meaning of *muyen* is "friendless" or "without kindred".—J. H. L.

indispensable. Accordingly the Ryōgoku-bashi (Two Provinces' Bridge) was now thrown across the stream at this point, connecting Asakusa in Musashi with Honjō in Shimōsa, while lower down the Ō-hashī (Great Bridge) was constructed in 1693, to be followed by the Eitai-bashi in 1695.

It was at this time that the cutting at the back of Suruga-dai was deepened for navigation up to the Ushigome gate. This was a corvée imposed upon Daté Tsunamune of Sendai, ostensibly as a punishment for his dissolute behaviour and maladministration. But as the local administration of the Sendai fief was one of the best and most efficient in the empire, it is not unlikely the Bakufu councillors were beginning to perceive a possible menace in its great and rapidly accumulating resources, and merely seized upon Daté's sexual excesses as an excuse for crippling the great northern clan.

It was not till fully two years after the great conflagration that the re-erection of the Shōgun's palace and the other castle buildings was taken in hand. But, when once taken in hand, the progress of the work was exceedingly rapid. All the Daimyō had meanwhile been requisitioned for contributions of building materials, furnishings, and other necessities, and when in March, 1659, the work was actually begun, less than six months sufficed for its completion. It was finished by October, and a month later the Shōgun with his court was installed in the new structure with an august ceremonial. About this time the regulations as to what rooms were to be severally occupied by the various classes of Daimyō and officials on State and ceremonial occasions, received their final and permanent form. In the former castle the Tenshu, a five-storied tower rising far above the other buildings had been a conspicuous landmark for fishers and junk-men far out on the bosom of Yedo Bay. When it was now proposed to re-erect it, Hoshina of Aidzu urged that it should be postponed till the more pressing exigencies had been met. Ever since Nobunaga opened the era of castle-building, with his great stronghold of Azuchi on Biwa strand, a Tenshu had been deemed an essential feature in a feudal keep. As a matter of fact it was really more ornamental than useful; its only utility was as a look-out, and in Yedo Castle that was not an urgent necessity. Hoshina's view recommended itself; and the re-erection of the Tenshu was deferred till a more convenient season.

Advantage was now also taken of the clean sweep made by the

great conflagration in the military quarter to effect certain changes, if not improvements. Down to this date, the residences of the *Go-san-ke*—Kishū, Owari, and Mito—had been adjacent to the interior enceinte. They were now removed to Kojimachi, Asakusa, and Koishikawa respectively. As for the other *yashiki* they were generally re-erected on a much less sumptuous scale than before, and detailed regulations regarding gates, the blazoning of crests, provisions, and penalties in case of fire and what not were imposed upon their occupants.

Unfortunately, however, little was done to augment the efficiency of the means of coping with future conflagrations. The number of Daimyō charged with the onus of furnishing firemen was indeed increased ; but so far no one seems to have thought of organizing fire brigades among the citizens. Probably the Bakufu dreaded a possible menace in any such popular organizations as this measure would involve. Thus, Yedo continued to be ravaged by the flames, not only year after year, but week after week, and the Flowers of Yedo passed into, and for a full two centuries remained current as, a proverb. Even while Matsudaira Nobutsuna was vigorously pushing on the reconstruction of the city, a conflagration swept all the new structures fringing the head of Yedo Bay, while ten years after (1668) two fierce outbreaks laid great portions of the restored metropolis in ruins. In spite of the dire penalty for arson—not so much burning at the stake as being slowly broiled to death—incendiarism continued to be rampant.

CHAPTER III

CHINESE PHILOSOPHY AS AN INSTRUMENT OF GOVERNMENT

THE Great Rōnin conspiracy of 1651, and its less significant sequel in the following year served the purpose of enabling the Bakufu to come to a final decision about a point of policy on which it had evinced much vacillation during the preceding twenty years.

All through the four or five centuries of civil war from the eleventh century onwards, every Daimyō or territorial magnate had firmly believed that his chief hope of salvation and prosperity lay in fostering a warlike and even a truculent spirit among his followers. So much is plain from the Minamoto and Taira House-laws of the twelfth century. Then, as regards the ethos inculcated by feudal chiefs towards the end of the sixteenth century, let us cast a glance at the instructions of one of Hideyoshi's great captains to his retainers—those of Katō Kiyomasa who reared the great Keep of Kumamoto :—

“The following regulations are to be observed by samurai of every rank, the highest and the lowest alike :—

1. The routine of service must be strictly observed. From 6 a.m. military exercises must be practised. Archery, musketry, and horsemanship must not be neglected. If any man shows greater proficiency than his comrades in the way of the Bushi, he shall receive extra rations.

2. If recreation is desired, there are hawking, hunting, and wrestling.

3. Cotton or pongee garments are to be worn. Whoever incurs debt by reason of extravagance in dress or living is to be deemed a law-breaker. If, however, being zealous in the practice of the military arts suitable to his rank, a man desires to hire instructors, an allowance for that purpose may be granted.

4. The staple food to be unhulled rice. At entertainments, one guest for one host is the proper limit. Only when men are mustered for military exercises should many dine together.

5. Every samurai to master the principles of his profession. Extravagant displays of adornments in the field are forbidden.

6. Dancing or organizing dances is unlawful; it is likely to lead to brawls. Whatever a man does should be done with his whole soul. Therefore, for the soldier, military amusements alone are suitable. The penalty for violating this article is disembowelment.

7. Learning should be encouraged. Military books must be read. The spirit of loyalty and filial piety must be developed before all things. Poem-composing pastimes are not to be indulged in by samurai.

To be addicted to such pastimes is to be like a woman. A man born a samurai should live and die sword in hand. Unless he be thus trained in time of peace, he will be useless in the hour of need. To be brave and warlike must be his invariable condition.

Whoever finds these rules too severe, shall retire from my service. If it appears that anyone is so unfortunate as to be deficient in manly qualities, he shall be singled out and forthwith dismissed. The imperative character of these instructions must not be doubted."

Here we have the spirit of Sparta rooted in Japanese soil. Of course, the organization of Katō's fief was vastly different from that of ancient Lacedæmon; and consequently the institutions in which the spirit was embodied and the machinery through which it was manifested presented few concrete points of analogy with those traditionally referred to Lycurgus. Yet the spirit itself was fundamentally the same. In Kumamoto, as in Sparta, we find everything subordinated to the art of war; in Kumamoto, as in Sparta, we perceive that the supreme end is to fashion invincible warriors. The whole duty of man, and the highest ideal of life were contained for a Spartan in the laws of the State. For a Kumamoto samurai were they found in the "Instructions of his Lord". Sparta was no place for thinkers or theorists. Neither was Kumamoto. It is true that the last of Katō's seven regulations opens with the promising behest that "Learning should be encouraged", but the rest of the paragraph promptly serves to undeceive us in any pleasing expectations we may have rashly formed. "Learning" is merely an ability to spell out military treatises, and ancient tales of gallantry and loyal devotedness. Katō's mental horizon was strictly bounded by the claims of war, of administration, and the statecraft these involved. Now Katō was a typical figure not only of his own day but of long generations before him as well. "Whatever a man does, should be done with his whole soul." For two or three centuries the best intellect of the Empire was exerted on problems of warfare and administration, and it was in Katō's own age that the military spirit and capacity of the empire, judged by the standards of the times, attained their fullest efflorescence, for during no period in her history has Japan been more prolific in men of talent than she was during the latter half of the sixteenth, and the opening years of the seventeenth, century. In the earlier decades of that period the leading places are held by Mōri Motonari, Takeda Shingen, Uyesugi Kenshin, and Oda Nobunaga, great captains all of them and one of them at least (Takeda) a statesman of undoubted administrative genius. Later on, the stage is occupied by Hideyoshi

and his brilliant captains. Last of all comes Iyeyasu, with Ii, Doi, Honda, and other Achitophels of councillors. In the matter of political and military ability, the Japanese of those days compared more than favourably with the statesmen and soldiers of contemporary Europe. The reunification of the Empire under a strong and stable government was a problem of greater difficulty than any that received its permanent solution from Christian statesmen of the same period. And the fact must not be overlooked that the Japanese military operations of the age were on a much vaster scale than those of any Western State or combination of States. Between A.D. 1550 and 1650, no European commander had ever to direct a force of more than 60,000 men in the field. In the Satsuma campaign of 1587, it is stated that Hideyoshi's armies amounted to 230,000 men, while three years later (1590) he is said to have moved a force nearly 200,000 strong against Hōjō in Odawara. Doubtless these figures are exaggerations, but it is, at all events, certain that in each case they greatly exceed the tale of 60,000 men. At Sekigahara, although the contending armies amounted to almost exactly the numbers that fought at Waterloo (149,000), and although no more than 110,000 men actually came into action, yet the forces afoot in the campaign (apart from those fighting in Kyūshū and Tango) reached fully 300,000 men, and of that number Iyeyasu directed the strategy of some 150,000 men. Competent authorities have not hesitated to declare the Tokugawa strategy on this occasion to have been excellent. In each of the great Ōsaka campaigns of 1614 and 1615, close on 300,000, if not actually more, were engaged. At one period, in 1592-3, there were as many as 250,000 Japanese troops serving in Korea, besides a very considerable reserve held in readiness in Kyūshū to reinforce them. Down to A.D. 1900, when Great Britain had to take the South African war seriously, this Korean army of Hideyoshi remained the largest force ever dispatched by any nation for service oversea. In the handling of huge hosts of these proportions, something more than proficiency in mere tactics and tactical manœuvres was required. Altogether, in the camp and at the council-board, it is tolerably safe to assert that in Japan men of genius were then fully as plentiful as they were in Europe, while in the administration of their fiefs even men of second-rate ability, such as Katō Kiyomasa, Daté, and Uyesugi, might advantageously have served as models to the majority of Western princelets. Apart from Hideyoshi or

Iyeyasu, either of whom was superior in achievement to any Western contemporary, there are perhaps a dozen Japanese who must be accorded very high rank among the world's men of action of the later sixteenth century.

When we leave the fields of war, of statecraft, and of administration, in which the Japanese genius seems then to have reached its highest development, and pass to those of art and science and literature, we discover that Japan had but little reason to boast. Painting and the glyptic arts were indeed prosecuted with no mean measure of success, while from 1576 onwards the epoch of castle-building set in. There were some notable efforts in temple-building—the *Hongwanji* at Kyōto, the Taikō's shrine of *Hōkoku* and his fane of the *Hōkōji* to shelter his colossal *Daibutsu*, the Tokugawa shrines at Nikkō, to say nothing of other similar efforts. With all these great triumphs of engineering, architectural, and artistic skill, the greatest enthusiast of Japanese art will hardly venture to maintain that the accomplishment of the painters, the sculptors, or the architects of this time is on a level with, or even approaches, the highest achievement of contemporary Europe.

In the cultivation and development of science Japan, at this epoch, makes but a poor showing in comparison with the Europe of Vesalius, of Gesner, of Caesalpino, of Bacon, and of the earlier years of Harvey and of Galileo. Perhaps the most distinguished scientific man in Japan was Manase Dōsan, the court physician in Kyōto, whose conversion to Christianity, followed by that of his whole school of eight hundred pupils, constituted a nine days' wonder to the courtiers of Hideyoshi shortly after he had assumed the reins of government. The missionaries assure us that this convert of theirs was then the most learned man in all Japan; and such Japanese records as are available seem to bear them out in their assertion. Dōsan, the Jesuits tell us, in his youth had visited all the great universities of China and of Japan—a proceeding easy of accomplishment so far as Japan was concerned, for at that date in the whole Empire there was no more than one institution worthy of this dignified title. This was the school of Ashikaga, which the Jesuits referred to as the University of Bandoue.¹ It seems to have

¹ It will be remembered that Father de Torres, the first Superior of the Jesuit mission, kept up a correspondence with certain members of the Faculty of the "University of Bandoue" and that Vilela, on his second expulsion from Kyōto in 1565, was invited to occupy a chair in it.

been originally founded as one of the numerous provincial schools established in Japan about the age of Charlemagne in Europe ; by the middle of the fifteenth century it had become the sole survivor of all these establishments. In the course of that century three successive heads of the Uyesugi family contributed to its funds and to its library, and under the patronage of this powerful house it soon attained a national importance. About 1460, the priest Kaigen became its rector, and from that time onwards it remained under control of ecclesiastics of the Zen sect. At the date of the arrival of the Jesuits, education, such as it was, was entirely in priestly hands, and, inasmuch as the priests devoted the best of their attention to war and political intrigue, such instruction as they did find leisure to impart was by no means remarkable for either depth, extent or thoroughness. Chinese was then in Japan (as well as in Korea) what Latin was in Europe even then and what it had been to a still greater degree in the middle ages—the language of the learned ; and yet in Japan there were perhaps only a few score of men who could compose a faultless Chinese sentence. A knowledge of the Chinese ideographs was indeed preserved. An examination of documents penned by Hideyoshi that have come down to us serves to indicate that he was acquainted with some eight hundred or a thousand, while Katō Kiyomasa (emphatically a “ good correspondent ” in the sense of keeping his friends who were at a distance apprised of how it fared with him) was acquainted with a still greater number. But both Hideyoshi and Katō made use of the ideographs merely to express the colloquial Japanese of the time ; and such, indeed, was the general contemporary practice. When Katō went to Korea he selected two priests especially noted for their knowledge of Chinese composition to accompany him as a medium of intercourse with the Koreans, but it turned out that most of what they wrote was utterly meaningless to the scholars of the Peninsula ! Again, Hideyoshi himself had the greatest difficulty in finding scholars competent to conduct his negotiations with China and Korea ; the Jesuits dwell with malicious pleasantry upon the scant accomplishments of the *bonzes* he attached to his court at Nagoya in Hizen (in 1593) to serve as foreign secretaries. One of the best of these was Ankokuji Yekei, who was made a Daimyō with 60,000 *koku*, and was afterwards executed (together with Ishida and Konishi) by Iyeyasu for having penned the manifestos of the allies before Sekigahara (A.D. 1600). Ankokuji's

efforts in Chinese syntax were so far from faultless that a modern Japanese has remarked that a scholar who wrote such an abominable style richly deserved to be executed. According to Rodriguez, Iyeyasu, who was then (1593) in camp at Nagoya, took a wicked delight in bewildering these poor priests with tolerably simple questions, and luring them on to make a mirth-provoking display of their crass and colossal ignorance.

Such being the general state of education in Japan, it is of course hopeless to expect to find any large measure of accomplishment in the field of literature. As a matter of fact there was absolutely none. It is true that, in spite of Katō's outspoken contempt for "poem-composition pastimes", some Japanese of these days found pleasure in composing "poetry", though their poems consisted merely of *Tanka*—short stanzas each of five lines altogether consisting of only thirty-one syllables, just about the length of a Latin elegiac couplet. The Japanese muse at all times has been a very short-winded one; in a single flight she cannot get beyond the compass of two detached lines of Ovid, and so while she may have numberless votaries, she will not profit greatly by their cumulated oblations. The height of achievement attained in this thirty-one-syllable versifying, which is to poetry pretty much what carving cherry-stones is to sculpture, was far from remarkable. Beyond that versifying, in Japan of the times of Shakespeare and the other Elizabethan giants, of Montaigne, of Cervantes, of Camoens, of Tasso, there was nothing of literature whatsoever. The latter half of the sixteenth century was the golden age of the man of action, and the very darkest age of literature in Japan.

Under the Tokugawa Shōgunate there was an almost complete reversal of this condition of affairs. The long ages of weltering turmoil, which had afforded illiterate swashbucklers ample opportunities for carving out fiefs and broad domains by their own good swords and the exercise of their wits, had at last passed, to all seeming never to return. Even in the central administration there was no imperative demand for statesmanship of the highest order; while in the outside fiefs there was little scope for proficiency in the statecraft by which many who were born simple samurai and even peasants, raised themselves to greatness in the sixteenth and the preceding centuries. In the piping times of peace there was not the smallest opportunity for political adventure; even the ablest men could hope for nothing beyond local fame as a promoter of

public works, a developer of the material resources of the fief, a skilful handler of its finances, or a reformer of social and administrative abuses. The limits of the possible advance to distinction along this special route were attained by Nonaka in Tosa, and Kumazawa in Okayama about the middle of the seventeenth century, but their achievements, highly meritorious as they were in a circumscribed field, have not sufficed to provide them with any very prominent place in the Japanese Temple of Fame. And in the case of the latter, at all events, the reputation, such as it is, reposes more upon attainments in philosophy and scholarship than upon the practical work achieved.

In truth, long before Kumazawa's death in 1691, the regulations issued by Katō Kiyomasa to his fierce retainers would have been sadly anachronistic, for the change that had come over the national ethos in less than three generations is indeed remarkable. This point is of such transcendent importance that it may be excusable to attempt to drive it home by the citation of a few clauses from a somewhat lengthy document, the set of instructions addressed to his retainers by Mitsukuni, the second Tokugawa Lord of Mito who was the lord of the fief from 1661 to 1690. Katō was able to say all that he wished in little more than three hundred words. Mitsukuni finds it needful to use about twenty times as many.

"All my retainers high or low should pay due attention to learning, which is nothing else than the way men should walk. It is needless to say that we must consider learning absolutely necessary above all things; but to my great regret, some regard it as of secondary importance and are apt to neglect it.

"Be always ready to discharge your filial duties to your beloved parents, to love your brothers and sisters, and be kind to your relatives, however remote. To friends be a true companion, not keeping in your heart the least deception, and to servants ever be a benevolent master. . . . You know that these *duties are minutely taught in the books of the sages*, therefore, I hardly think it necessary to say much about them.

"While at the hour of death he must not retreat one step, but must prize *giri* (duty and justice) and his heart must be as firm as iron and stone, yet he *must also be a man of gentleness and mercy*. Such we call a samurai of fidelity. But if anyone spends his time without self-culture in this line, his life, as an ancient writer has said, is one of intoxication and dreams.

"None of my retainers should ever forget politeness and humility . . . To make light of others by availing yourself of your own honourable position is utterly offensive.

"If you peruse the pages of Japanese or of Chinese history, you are sure not to find a single example of self-conceited conduct on the part of those who are well-acquainted with 'humanity'. I am informed,

to my great disappointment, that in social meetings, retainers, both hosts and guests are generally very rough from the point of view of etiquette, by laughing loud at nonsense, chattering too much with one another, or reproaching others without any satisfactory reason. Some, I am told, become violently intoxicated, indulge in lewd talk, or are tempted to send for a samisen that they may sing lewd songs. This is exactly like a meeting of servants or coolies. The social intercourse of samurai should be conducted in strict accordance with etiquette. We may, of course, cheerfully talk with one another in such a social gathering; but the subjects should be instructive, *such as have reference to the ancients*.

"You should not neglect military preparations . . . However, I do not mean to have you devote yourselves to these arts to the neglect of other things. On the contrary, in my opinion, *ordinary attention and practical skill to a moderate degree are serviceable enough, and no more is necessary*.

"To meet death with mere physical courage is an easy thing often performed by men of the lowest class. To die, therefore, in this way is not suitable for a samurai.

"I do hope that all my retainers may be unselfish and manly. And, when I bear in mind your ample yearly allowance of rice, this hope on my part seems not unreasonable. I cannot at all understand why some samurai, in spite of their being gentlemen of the exalted class, give up study and break their bows and arrows in order to take part, even without scales and other necessary appliances, in mercantile business.

"With reference to the question of right (*giri*) our sages have already delivered long disquisitions for your instruction. The *perusal of their worthy books* and your persevering efforts to act in strict compliance with them, I earnestly request of you all."¹

In Katō's instructions the predominant note is the sharp stern ring of the word of command on the parade ground. Less than a century afterwards the Lord of Mito addresses his vassals in the guise of a Philosopher King. In Mitsukuni we find a Japanese Marcus Aurelius, only perhaps a trifle more verbose than was the Imperial author of the famous *Meditations*. In Mitsukuni's disquisition we discern something of the exquisite accent of infinite tenderness that is so characteristic of the Stoic Emperor's immortal treatise. Katō of Kumamoto was "a centurion saying to this man 'Go' and he goeth, to another 'Come' and he cometh, and to his servant 'do this' and he doeth it". With him, figuratively speaking, the great instrument of moral suasion was the vine-stick or its Japanese equivalent. Mitsukuni entreats and pleads with all the affection of a parent, with an *epicikeia*, a sweet reasonableness,

¹ The quotation is taken from Mr. Clement's translation in *T.A.S.J.*, vol. xxvi. The translation runs to as many as twenty-two printed pages, so that the above forms only a very short excerpt, and the whole is a striking contrast to Kiyomasa's pithy instructions.

which seems to aim rather at carrying conviction than imposing a command. A hundred years before, such an appeal would unquestionably have fallen on deaf ears, and any feudal lord resorting to it then would have been infinitely ridiculed and mocked. In all probability his leading vassals would have taken prompt steps to get him to "enter religion", and to have him replaced by a master of sterner mould and of less delicate fibre. The sixteenth century, as has just been said, was the golden age of the man of action; in it there was no room for idealogues. Now, in the latter half of the seventeenth century, so far was the sermonizing tone of the Mito instructions from being flouted or scouted by those to whom they were addressed that they were received with high approbation and admiration not only by the Mito vassals but by feudal Japan at large. How are we to account for the wonderful change that had thus meanwhile come over the spirit of the age?

To make that plain, no small amount of exposition will be necessary. To clear the ground it may be well to reproduce the following passage from Sir E. Satow's account of *The Revival of Pure Shintō* :—

"The fruits of these efforts (of Nobunaga and of Hideyoshi) were reaped by Iyeyasu, whose power was virtually rendered absolute by the victory of Sekigahara, and who became Shōgun in 1603. During the remainder of his life, with the exception of two short campaigns against Hideyori's partisans in 1614 and 1615, he lived tranquilly at Sumpu in Suruga, the modern Shidzuoka. His chief pursuit seems to have been the collection of old manuscripts, and it is chiefly owing to his exertions that what remains of the ancient literature has been preserved. The *Sumpuki* quoted by Hirata, mentioned a large number of works brought to him from various parts of the country, some from Kyōto and others from Kamakura, and a few from the monastery of Minobu San in Kōshiu. Before his death he gave directions that the library of Japanese and Chinese books which he had formed at Sumpu should be divided between his eighth son, the Prince of Owari, and his ninth son, the Prince of Kishiu. The former received the great part of the Japanese books, the latter the Chinese books. Under the direction of the Prince of Owari were composed the *Jin-si-hōten* and the *Riūjiū Nihongi*. One of Iyeyasu's grandsons, the famous second Prince of Mito (1628–1700) ¹ known variously as Mito-no-Kōmon Sama, and Mito-no-Gikō (Mitsukuni was his *nanori*), also collected a vast

¹ Mitsukuni was born in 1628, and succeeded to the Government of the Mito fief in 1661. He became Inkyō (retired in 1690 and died in 1700). Kōmon refers to his office of Chunagon (the terms are synonymous) and Gikō (upright Lord) was a complimentary epithet given to him in view of his beneficent administration of his own fief. He had inherited the best qualities of his great grandson as they were exemplified in peace and was not only a great patron of literature and art but himself a scholar, a writer and an expert judge of works of art.—J. H. L.

library by purchasing old books from Shintō and Buddhist temples and from the people. With the aid of a number of scholars, among whom tradition says were several learned Chinese who had fled to Japan to escape the tyranny of the Manchu conquerors, he composed the *Dai Nihonshi* or *History of Great Japan* in two hundred and fifty books. This book is the standard history of Japan to this day, and all subsequent writers on the same subject have taken it as their guide.¹ He also compiled a work on the ceremonies of the Imperial Court, consisting of more than five hundred volumes, to which the Mikado condescended to give the title of *Rei-gi Rui-ten*. To defray the cost of producing these magnificent works, the Prince of Mito set aside at least 30,000 *koku* of rice per annum (some accounts say 50,000, others 70,000 *koku*).²

This passage, or the gist of this passage, has been frequently reproduced, and it is partly for that reason, and because its general substantial correctness is marred by one or two slight errors of detail, that it is here quoted in full. Apart from the misconception of the relative importance of Sekigahara and the great Ōsaka struggle of 1614–15, the statement that Iyeyasu passed the remainder of his life after 1600 or 1603 at Sumpu, chiefly occupied in book-hunting, is not a little misleading. After Sekigahara he remained in the west—at Ōsaka, Fushimi, Kyōto—down to the end of 1603. For the next four years he was mostly in Yedo; and it was only in 1607 that he made Sumpu (or Shidzuoka) his residence. During the odd eight years he resided there he was occupied with administration and the solution of administrative problems, in devising the general structure of the governmental machinery that his descendants manipulated for two centuries and a half, in developing mines, in organizing his mints, in a constant endeavour to attract European merchants to Yedo and the Kwantō, and in establishing a Tokugawa mercantile marine. From 1611 onwards, when he proceeded to Kyōto and met Hideyori, his best attention was devoted to dealing with the Ōsaka menace and with Christianity. At the same time, while grappling strenuously with all these pressing practical problems, calling insistently for speedy solution, it is perfectly true that the “terrible old man” was assiduous in his efforts to furnish and trim the lamp of learning and to set it a-burning in Japan once again.

As has been said, education for generations was solely in the hands of the Buddhist priests, and although, if we are to believe

¹ It comes down to A.D. 1413 only.

² *Vide T.A.S.J.*, Vol. III, Appendix, The Revival of pure Shinto, by Sir E. Satow.

the Jesuits, Iyeyasu had but scant respect for the general level of their attainments, it was upon the priests that he was at first inclined to put his chief reliance in his endeavour to revive and diffuse literary culture and scholarship. With the exception of a very few men of ability, like Tenkai and Takuan, the clergy were indeed ignorant ; yet ignorant as they were, they were less so than the laity. Besides, confirming them in their monopoly of teaching was quite consonant with Iyeyasu's great maxim of policy—to change things as little as possible. He wished to attach the priesthood to his interests ; and any attempt by laymen to trench upon their occupation as instructors he knew would be resented by them. Of this there was indeed a striking instance in 1614, two years before Iyeyasu's death. In that year Seigwa, the pioneer in the revival of the study of Chinese philosophy in Japan, began to give lectures in Kyōto, and thereupon the “priests of Gosan” (the five Great Zen Monasteries of Kyōto) at once rose in opposition to him, urging that, in accordance with the custom established since the Ashikaga dynasty of Shōguns, no one could collect students and deliver lectures to them except their order alone ! Under the early Tokugawa, Chinese philosophy was expounded and studied with brilliant success ; but the priesthood proper contributed little to the results. Teachers and students were really laymen ; yet teachers and students alike, although discharging no priestly office, had to accept the tonsure. This practice continued for three generations ; in fact, it ended only in 1690, the year Kaempfer arrived in Japan. Hayashi Atsunobu, the head of the great Confucian school in Yedo, then :—

“Complained of the injustice he suffered from this custom, urging that, as Confucianism was the code of principles to be observed by all men, it was unreasonable that he, whose profession it was to teach and inculcate these principles, should not be equal to those who were taught ! The Shōgun, Tsunayoshi, acknowledged the justness of that argument, and accordingly ordered that he should no longer be obliged to shave his head, conferred on him the secular title of the fifth rank, and made him president of the college. Upon this, his disciples who had also shaved their heads, now, following in their master's footsteps, allowed their hair to grow. And all the scholars throughout the Empire copied this change of custom. The professors of Confucianism, who served the Shōgun's Government at this time had all received their education from Atsunobu. The Shōgun Tsunayoshi, thus showing his liking for men of letters, incited all the Daimyō to vie with each other in inviting Confucian scholars to their dominions. Literature had never since ancient times been in so flourishing a condition.”

It is to be observed that the use of the terms "Confucianism" and "Confucian scholars" in this extract is somewhat misleading, for the Chinese learning that was cultivated in Japan by the official teachers was not mere Confucianism but Confucianism and a very great deal more. What was expounded and inculcated by the Hayashis and their assistants in Yedo under the early Tokugawa Shōguns was the "Teishu" philosophy—a system formulated in China in the latter half of the eleventh and in the twelfth century by men contemporary with Anselm, Roscelin, William of Champeaux, and Abelard in Europe. And it is not incorrect to say that between the relation of the Teishu philosophers to Confucius and the relation of the schoolmen to Christianity and the Bible, there is something more than a rough analogy. Any exposition of the course of Chinese thought or of the special tenets of the Teishu school, except in so far as they bear upon the intellectual, the social and political development of Japan, is, of course, alien to the purpose of this volume. But inasmuch as the influence of the Teishu philosophy upon feudal Japan was the reverse of insignificant, and inasmuch as that philosophy cannot be appreciated unless brought into connexion with its origins, it becomes absolutely necessary to devote some space to the dominant intellectual and ethical factors at work from time to time in the Middle Kingdom since the days of Confucius.

As every one knows, or is supposed to know, Confucius died at three-score-and-twelve in 478 B.C.—some two years after Thermopylae and the battle of Salamis, and some three decades after the institution of the Roman Republic. In the West those were the days when the world was young; but even then China was hoary with years and venerable in age, dwelling, as Nestors are wont to dwell, upon the glories of her past. Her feudal system, which had subsisted for some fifteen centuries, was threatened with dissolution, and the country "was drifting from her ancient moorings, drifting on a sea of storms, to hideous ruin and combustion". Confucius' expedient to save the situation was to gather up and preserve the records of antiquity, illustrating and commending them by his own teachings. The outcome was in no sense either a religion or a system of philosophy; the sage abstained from all devotional ecstasies and all metaphysical flights. He confined himself to practical details of morals and government, insisting especially upon the virtue that lay in the due observance of

duties of the five social relations—those of ruler and subject, husband and wife, father and son, elder brothers and younger, and friends. There was rule on the one side in the first four, and submission on the other; the rule should be in righteousness and benevolence, the submission in righteousness and sincerity. In the ethics of feudal Japan the great test of virtue and vice was the due observance of, or the failure to observe, the duties of these relationships—especially of the first, on the part of the vassal. In this single but all-important matter, indeed, pure, simple, unmodified Confucianism exercised the most powerful of influences upon the upper classes of Japan throughout all the long years of the Tokugawa supremacy. Confucianism, however, cannot be described as a philosophy; it has been summed up as “a set of moral truths (some would say truisms) of a very narrow scope, and of dry ceremonial observances, political rather than personal”, and this summing-up does it no very serious injustice. It has been asserted that these early teachings have continued to satisfy the intellectual and the religious needs of the Far Easterns of China and Japan; but this assertion holds true neither of the one country nor of the other. Indeed, at no time did pure simple Confucianism—Confucianism as expounded by Confucius—command the undivided allegiance of the entire population of the Middle Kingdom.

In his own day Confucius had many rivals, for he was merely a product of his age. Long before his birth the central authority of the Chow dynasty had become merely nominal, the real power in the land being exercised by some score of feudal potentates, who had the choice between devouring their neighbours or being devoured by them. In several generations intrigues, assassinations, open wars, were incessant until in Confucius' youth only about a dozen of these feudal principalities survived. Then, in his day, these States were entangled in alternate wars and alliances with bewildering changes of fortune. By the competing princes, men of ability and sagacity were highly prized without regard to their origin or birth. Philosophers with systems and politicians with schemes in their heads traversed the country, making tender of their wits and their services at courts where they fancied there was hope of employment and of a career. From the sixth to the third century B.C. the itinerant *Yūzeika*,¹ or

¹ *Yūzeika*, literally “one who goes round to persuade people”, i.e. a propagandist or a lecturer.—J. H. L.

expounder of political philosophy and statecraft, the Machiavelli of his age, continued to play a prominent part on the stormy stage of Chinese history. It was from these that the various schools of ethical and political philosophy arose. These schools were numerous, and Confucianism was merely one among them. It is true that in the march of events it proved to be the fittest for the peculiar environment ; but even in the time of Mencius (d. 289 B.C.), who expounded and developed it, we find that it had to struggle vigorously to maintain itself.

In his lifetime the sage had a rival in his slightly older contemporary, Lao-tsze—that gentle, quiet, humble apostle of pity, compassion, and economy ; never presuming on worldly rank and, unlike Confucius, always scorning to figure in the rôle of a *yūzeika*. While Confucius expatiates upon the “superior man” and his characteristics, and aims at developing a robust and active virtue, Lao-tsze’s veneration is :—

For “the simplicity of spontaneity, action (which might be called non-action) without motive, free from all selfish purpose, resting in nothing but its own accomplishment”. “All things spring up without a word spoken, and grow without a claim for their production. They go through their processes without any display of pride in them ; and the results are realized without any assumption of ownership. It is owing to the absence of such assumption that their results and these processes do not disappear”.

Although there is neither superstition nor religion in the *Tao Teh King*, it is not difficult to perceive that in many points the follower of Lao-tsze is prepared to sympathize with the teachings of Buddha. And when, in lapse of time, grotesque superstitions became grafted upon Lao-tsze’s cult, when, three hundred years after his death, we meet with a Taoism in the shape of a search for the fairy islands of the Eastern sea where the herb of immortality might be culled, and when yet three centuries later we hear of the chief professor and controller of Taoism, supreme over all spirits, preparing in retirement the pill which renewed his youth, and destroying millions of demons by a stroke of his pencil, we do not feel surprised at learning that on the introduction of Buddhism into China it “was received by this Taoism with open arms”. Even before this amalgamation, Taoism had been quite as powerful as Confucianism.¹

¹ One might not altogether unreasonably suspect that the policy of the Tokugawa towards the non-*samurai*, or non-privileged classes which constituted 95 per cent.

In many of Lao-tsze's sayings the philosopher and the ruler are identified with each other. This distinctly political feature in his treatise was much obscured by his expounder, Chwang-Tsze (fourth century B.C.), who held it as an intolerable burden that a sage should be called upon to rule a country. By others the feature in question was thrust prominently into the foreground—notably so by Han Fe-tsze (d. 233 B.C.) the primary object of whose teachings was in a measure the same as that of Machiavelli's Prince—to set forth how the position of a lord-king might be attained and maintained.

“The point in Han's doctrine which is at once the most original and has had the most profound influence on Chinese history is its notion of law . . . Impersonality and inviolability of law, and equality before it, were thus launched in China during one of the darkest periods of her history, by a philosopher whose primary concern was to make the prince all-powerful; nor was this the dream of a visionary, for it went into active politics through Han himself, Shan Pu-Hai, Shang Yan, Li Tz' and many other statesmen of the fourth and third century B.C. It was most vigorously enforced in Ts'in, which to a large extent owed its greatness to this doctrine. This fundamental notion of the Lao-Han philosophy has since been in continuous practice, though not with continuous success, through all succeeding dynasties.”¹

Taoism was also in some degree influential through its alliance or amalgamation with Buddhism. The Indian cult was publicly recognized in 65 B.C., though indeed it did not obtain an absolutely

of the population of Japan, was based upon certain passages of the *Tao Keh King*. “A Government conducted by sages would free the hearts of the people from inordinate desires, fill their bellies, keep their ambitions feeble, and strengthen their bones. They would constantly keep the people without knowledge, and free from desires; and where there were those who had knowledge, they would have them so that they would not dare to put it in practice . . . Those who anciently were skilful in practising the *Tao* did not use it to enlighten the people; their object rather was to keep them simple. The difficulty in governing the people arises from their having too much knowledge, and therefore he who tries to govern a state by wisdom is a scourge to it, while he who does not try to govern thereby is a blessing . . . In a small State with a few inhabitants I would so order it that the people, though supplied with all kinds of implements, would not (care to) use them; I would give them cause to look on death as a most grievous thing, while yet they would not go away to a distance to escape it. Though they had boats and carriages, they should have no occasion to ride in them. Though they had buff-coats and sharp weapons, they should not don or use them. I would make them return to knotted cords (instead of written characters). They should think their coarse food sweet, their plain clothing beautiful, their poor houses places of rest, and their common simple ways sources of enjoyment. There should be a neighbouring State within sight, and the sound of the fowls and dogs should be heard from it to us without interruption, *but I would make the people to old age, even to death, have no intercourse with it.*”

¹ Asakawa's *Early Institutional Life of Japan*, p. 171. Asakawa's lucid and vigorous resumé of the clash between the Con-Men and the Lao-Han Schools clearly demonstrates that Confucianism as a system has not always been paramount in the Middle Kingdom.

free course in the country until some two centuries later. Then we learn that under Eastern Tsin dynasty (which came to an end in 419, after lasting over one century) Buddhism was the chief religion, "while the doctrines of Confucius were much esteemed." Again, of Wuti of the Liang dynasty in the sixth century, we are told that "he did much to restore literature and the study of Confucius . . . In his latter days he was so great a devotee of Buddhism that he retired to a monastery like Charles V." It will be remarked that there was no hostility between Buddhism and Confucianism in China at this time, and the harmony between the cults continued with little to disturb it except the iconoclastic policy of Woo-tsung (841-7) until the days of the Sung (970-1127, or including the Southern Sung, to 1277). It was during the sixth, seventh, and eighth centuries that Buddhism was introduced into, and became the established religion in, Japan; and along with it was brought Chinese learning, from which Japanese Buddhism made no effort to disentangle itself. However, after a period of decay in the thirteenth century, there was a great and far-spreading religious revival in Japan (of which Hōnen, Shinran, and Nichiren were the moving spirits), coeval with the temporary reawakening of the conscience of Europe by the eloquence of the monks of Dominic and the self-sacrificing zeal of the followers of Francis of Assisi. This involved a swamping of such slender influence as Confucianism had continued to exercise in the country. A knowledge of Chinese was not indeed lost; but the Chinese that was known in Japan was acquired from the Chinese translations of certain of the sutras in the Buddhist canon, rather than from the texts of Confucius or of Mencius. And when at last, at the beginning of the seventeenth century, the Japanese once more turned their best attention to the secular literature of the Middle Kingdom, they found that, while they had been sleeping, the intellect of China had been awake and vigorously engaged in great constructive work.

Of the circumstances which prompted this effort in Chinese thought, Dr. Williams gives us the following succinct account:—

During the reigns of Jin-tsung (1023-64) and his son, Ying-tsung, "a violent controversy arose among the literati and officials as to the best mode of conducting the government. Some of them, such as Sz'ma Kwang, the historian, contended for the maintenance of the old principles of the sages. Others, of whom Wang N'gan'shi was the distinguished leader, advocated reform and change, tending to the entire overthrow of existing institutions. For the first time in the history

of China, two political parties peacefully struggled for supremacy, each content to depend on argument and truth for victory. The contest soon grew too bitter, however, and the accession of a new monarch, Shin-tsung (1068-85) enabled Wang to dispossess his opponents and to manage state affairs as he pleased. After a trial of eight or ten years the voice of the nation restored the conservatives to power, and the radicals were banished beyond the frontier. A discussion like this, involving all the cherished ideas of the Chinese, brought out deep and acute inquiry into the nature and uses of things generally, and the writers of this dynasty, at the head of whom was Chu-Hi, made a lasting impression on the national mind."

The result of this was the elaboration of what simple Confucianism cannot claim to be—a system of philosophy. The principal thinkers who contributed to, and accomplished, this work were Chow Tun-i (1017-73), the brothers Ch'eng (1032-85 and 1033-1107), and Chu-Hi (1130-1200). Of these the elder Ch'eng (1032-85) and Chu-Hi (in Japanese Shushi) have the greatest reputation. Of the former we are told that his criticisms on the classics opened a new era in Chinese philosophy; and these criticisms were reverently adopted by his great successor Chu-Hi. Consequently the names of Ch'eng (Tei in Japanese) and Chu (Japanese Shu) are associated together, and the system of philosophy elaborated in the Sung period is called by their names—in the Japanese pronunciation *Tei-shu*.¹ Says Dr. Knox:—

"These philosophers may be compared to the schoolmen of Europe. They were no longer satisfied with the earlier unsystematic expositions of the Confucian ethics, but called metaphysics to their aid, and transformed the groups of aphorisms and precepts into an ontological philosophy. As the schoolmen mingled with the teachings of the prophets and apostles elements drawn from Grecian and Eastern philosophy, so did these Chinese schoolmen mingle elements drawn from Buddhism and Tâoism in their system based ostensibly on the classics. Their indebtedness to these two religions was none the less real because of their vehement rejection of both as heretical. And as the teachings of the schoolmen ruled European thought for centuries, and were the medium through which the words of Christ were studied, so were the teachings of the Tei-shu school supreme in the East, and the medium

¹ To the general British or American reader the bare citation of a date in Chinese history—or it may even be said in Japanese history—conveys but little. It may clear up things somewhat if it is pointed out that Chow-Tun-i and the Ch'engs were doing the pioneer work in the elaboration of this Tei-shu philosophy just at the time William the Norman was conquering England, and that Chu-Hi, who built upon their labours and gave the system its full and finished development, died, at the age of three-score and ten, fifteen years before the Magna Charta was signed, and a year or so after the death of Richard Cour-de-Lion. The Tei-shu philosophers are thus, as has been said, the exact contemporaries of the great names in the earlier period of European Scholasticism, the period that lasted from Berengarius of Tours to John of Salisbury.

through which China and Japan studied and accepted the words of the sages. To disregard their philosophy and suppose that the earlier and simpler teaching had remained supreme is as if we should disregard the whole historical development of theology, and state that the Synoptic Gospels have contented Europe for eighteen centuries . . . Shushi's (Chu-Hi's) system has remained the standard in China, and no deviation from his teaching has been permitted in the examinations. His commentary is the orthodox exposition, and his philosophy the accepted metaphysic."¹

In short, although professedly an exposition of the doctrines of Confucius and Mencius, the Sung (or Tei-shu) philosophy is in reality an essentially modern system of ontology, natural philosophy, ethics, and principles of government. The ontology, although confusedly expressed, is interesting. According to Chu-Hi (Shushi) the origin and cause of all things is Tai-khi (*Tai-kyoku* in Japanese) or the "Great Absolute". The energy evolved by its movement produced the *Yang* (*Yō* in Japanese), and, when it came to rest, the *Yin* (*In* in Japanese) was the result. The *Yang* (*Yō*) is the active, positive, productive, male principle of nature, while the *Yin* (*In*) is regarded as passive or receptive, negative and female. By the mutual actions of these two principles, the Kosmos was formed out of chaos, the *Yin* (*In*) manifesting itself in the settling down of the impure sediment as earth, while the lighter and purer part, representing the *Yang* ascended and formed heaven. The *Yin* (*In*) and *Yang* (*Yō*) are also the source of the five elements—water, fire, earth, metal, and wood. Each of these has its proper function, on the right discharge of which depend the regular sequence of the four seasons and phenomena generally. These processes go on eternally. There is no such thing as a creation in this system.²

¹ Any one who is acquainted with the history of Scholasticism will readily infer from this account that although the Tei-shu philosophers were the contemporaries of the earlier schoolmen, their work had much more in common with the scholastics of the second period—of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries—than with that of the doctors who taught before the whole of Aristotle's works became available in a Latin translation.

² Shokosetsu in the Sung dynasty maintained that the world must undergo a radical change in every 129,600 years, and become chaos once more, but after the same length of time it would be set in order again, so that it would change in an eternal round, like day and night.

The following extracts from Mr. Haga are worthy of attention: ". . . Buddhism, which does not recognize any true Creator, was accepted by the multitude in Shushi's time . . . The world is destroyed periodically after a certain great number of years, when men become hopelessly wicked, and then a new world begins again; but Shushi is not clear whether each world begins spontaneously or whether worlds succeed each other, the first having been started by some cause. In this matter the Tei-shu school strongly resemble the Buddhists, who teach that the world is periodically destroyed by water, fire, or wind, and a new world begins again. Yet it is not strictly a new world, for the beings in the new world are a kind of continuation of those who lived in the preceding world."

The energy which produces all these results is called in Chinese *K'ee*, in Japanese *Ki* (breath). It follows fixed laws called *Li* (*Ri* in Japanese). The precise nature of these two last conceptions has been elucidated (or obscured) by many volumes of dissertations both in China and Japan.¹ In fact the nature and functions of *Ki* and *Ri* and their relations to each other and to the universe have given rise to as much discussion and loss of temper among the philosophers of the Far East as the nature of universals, the problem of individuation, and nominalism and realism among those of mediæval Europe. Besides all this we have *Ten* (Heaven), which Shushi says repeatedly is but *Ri*, although he makes statements which cannot be understood without postulating the existence of a Supreme Being.² Possibly, the average reader will be inclined to dismiss Shushi's cosmology as a wild medley of what Spencer terms "illegitimate symbolic conceptions";³ and, indeed, dismissing it as such was just what the gist of the swinging attack levelled against it by the eighteenth-century Japanese Shintoists amounted to. But then it must be borne in mind that Spencer, among other reasons, rejects the special Creation hypothesis on the very ground of its being a glaring example of these illegitimate symbolic conceptions, while in the Tei-shu philosophy "there is no such thing as a creation".

The so-called Natural Philosophy—of which we are told that he who would know the truth about Heaven and Man without its aid is like a boat without a rudder—is largely occupied with the exposition of these most nebulous concepts—*Ki*, *Ri*, and *Ten*. In this way it comes to pass that ethics in Shushi's system becomes a branch of it. Corresponding to the regular changes of the seasons in nature is right action in Man (who is the crown of nature) in the relations of lord and subject and of the other four relationships, on the due observance of which Confucius laid so much stress. In practical ethics, indeed, Shushi makes no great innovations; for just as the herculean efforts of Albertus Magnus and Aquinas, while providing

¹ *Vide* Aston's *Japanese Literature*, pp. 226-7, from which much of this and of the succeeding passages in the text is taken almost verbatim.—J. H. L.

² The general reader, anxious to make some more intimate acquaintance with the subject, may be referred to de Harlez's *École Philosophique de la Chine*, and to papers by Dr. Knox and by Mr. Haga in vol. xx, pt. i, of the *Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan*. The leading living Japanese authority in Japan is Dr. Inouye of the Imperial University of Tōkyō, but the best succinct expositions I have so far met with is *Le Philosophe Tchou-Hi, Sa doctrine son influence*, par Le Père Stanislas Le Gall (Shanghai).

³ *First Principles*, § 9.

the Church with a system of philosophy tended in no way to abrogate a single item of the decalogue, the moral precepts of the Tei-shu school in no way superseded or supplemented those of the ancient sages. To his sovereign lord one was still bound to be loyal and faithful, to his parents dutiful, and to his elder brother respectful. Affection was still to characterize the relations of husband and wife, and trust that of friend with friend. A man was also to display in his conduct the five virtues of Goodness, Righteousness, Propriety, Enlightenment, and Good Faith—a classification of the virtues, by the way, that outrages the canons of logical division in a fashion transcending the Justice, Prudence, Courage, and Temperance of Plato's *Republic*. Nor do the principles of government expounded by Shushi differ at all materially from those enunciated by Confucius. Neither to this philosophy of Shushi—nor indeed to that of Ōyōmei, Shushi's great rival, nor to any of the systems of Chinese philosophers whose works have become known in Japan, did the Japanese of the Tokugawa age add anything of consequence. As Aston says: "It is in the application (of the various systems) that the national genius reveals itself, and more especially in the relative importance attached by them to the various moral obligations incumbent on man." The writer in question has developed this thesis so clearly, and yet so succinctly, that his exposition cannot possibly be bettered. "It is here," he goes on, "that we must look for an answer to a question which will occur to all who take the smallest interest in the Japanese, namely, 'In what respect does their national character differ from that of European nations?'"

"The vices and virtues are, on the whole, the same with them as with ourselves. It is in their 'Table of Moral Precedence' as it were, that we discover some striking differences. The most noteworthy instance of this is the commanding position assigned to loyalty, which in the moral ideas of this period overshadows and dwarfs all other moral obligations. It means not so much the reverent submission due by all his subjects to the Mikado, although this in theory was not lost sight of, as of the Daimyōs to the Shōgun, and, in a still higher degree, of men of the two-sworded class to their immediate chiefs. Implicit obedience and unfaltering devotion to his feudal lord was the *Samurai's* most sacred duty. For his lord's sake, the retainer was bound not only to lay down his life cheerfully, but to sacrifice the lives and honour of those nearest and dearest to him. Japanese history and literature teem with instances which show the extreme length to which this virtue was carried, not only in theory, but in practice. It was responsible for many acts of barbarity, such as that of Nakamitsu, a favourite hero of Japanese

drama and story, who slew his own innocent son and substituted his head for that of his lord's heir, who had been guilty of a capital offence. But there was also associated with it unshrinking courage, loyal service, and disinterested self-sacrifice to a degree of which we must go to ancient Rome to find a parallel. The political system of which this virtue was the vital support, is now a thing of the past. Daimyōs and Shōguns exist no longer. But those who know the Japan of the present day will readily recognize the same quality in the spirit of national patriotism and zeal in the discharge of public duty which honourably distinguish the descendants of the former *Samurai*."

It is perhaps not so very difficult to understand how under the Tokugawa system so very much stress was laid upon this virtue of loyalty. In the centuries immediately preceding the establishment of the Yedo administration the record of treachery on the part of vassals towards their lords was at once a long and a black one. The murders of Ōuchi of Yamauchi by Suye Harukata (1552), of the Shōgun Yoshiteru by Miyoshi and Matsunaga (1565), and of Nobunaga by Akechi (1582) were far from standing alone in the history even of the last half of the sixteenth century. In the preceding three or four generations there were scores of similar episodes, some of them hideously atrocious. Besides, desertion was an every-day offence. It was to grapple with this evil that Hideyoshi made it a law that no *Samurai* who had withdrawn himself from his allegiance could find service with another lord unless with the express permission of his former suzerain. In short, disloyalty was one of the chief disintegrating forces of ante-Tokugawa Japan; and Iyeyasu and his Councillors, fully aware of the fact, were unsparing in their efforts to impress a full sense of the enormity of the vice upon two-sword men, and in speech and writing and practice it was branded as the most heinous sin under high heaven. In the so-called "Legacy of Iyeyasu" which, although penned by some Chinese scholar years after Iyeyasu had been gathered to his fathers, yet substantially reproduces the spirit of his policy, we meet with the following article:—

"If a servant (*samurai*) kills his master, he is to be considered the same as the sovereign's enemy, and his relations are all likewise to be considered in the same light, and must be extirpated root and branch . . . If a servant (*samurai*) has made the attempt, even if unsuccessful, the family is to be so extirpated."

And just as disloyalty was denounced and execrated, so was loyalty extolled; and hence it came to pass that this virtue presently bulked so large in the vision of the two-sworded class, that its

occasional practice on an heroic scale often served to redeem the most damaged and the most unsavoury of reputations.

Such was the cardinal point in the practical ethical code of that philosophy, which was being authorized and adopted by the rulers of Japan as the official system. Although they evidently had taken certain practical hints from the *Tao Teh King* of Lao-tsze (*Rōshi* in Japanese) it is plain that they had not much trust in the policy of "recompensing injury with kindness", advocated by the gentle philosopher of China. Nor in Buddhism could any warrant be found for that fierce and ultra-Judaistic vindictiveness, which the authorities not merely sanctioned but actually encouraged as a prop to that virtue of loyalty which it was their chief aim to develop and diffuse in every possible way. And yet Buddhism was to all intents the State Religion, so far at least as there was a State Religion in early Tokugawa Japan. Buddhism, with its homilies on the instability of human things, the vanity of wealth and power, the detestableness of violence and cruelty, the duty of abstinence from the grosser pleasures and the beauty of a life of seclusion and pious meditation, had indeed its political uses. Its priests might be trusted to overawe the wardsmen and farmers with the fear of Hell (or rather of one hundred and twenty-eight hells) and, in addition to acting as a fairly efficient moral police, to aid the authorities in the maintenance of order by means of the compulsory temple-registration of all the members of the lower classes. But the "girded sword was the soul of the *Samurai*"; and to keep the *Samurai* out of mischief something, vastly different from Buddhistic homilies on the vanity and instability of all human things and the beauty of a life of seclusion and pious meditation, was necessary. The Tokugawa rulers of Japan knew very well that if the high-mettled two-sworded men were to be kept in hand, they (the rulers) would do well to appeal to something else than the "fugitive and cloistered virtue" on which the followers of Gautama set such store. And so they at first endeavoured to make a cuckold of Buddhism. The Hayashis and the other earlier exponents of the militant and mundane Chinese ethics, so contrary to all Buddhist spirit, had indeed to assume the tonsure and the sacerdotal robe. But they had no priestly functions to discharge, and much of what they expounded as truth was the very antithesis of what was inculcated in the Sutras.

It is generally stated that this Chinese Philosophy began to be

known in Japan somewhere between the date of Hideyoshi's conquest of Kyushu (1587) and his launching of the first armament against Korea (1592). But, it would be exceedingly strange if the Japanese priests who superintended the trade that went on with China during the greater part of the Ashikaga rule had not had their attention directed to the Sung philosophy. We now have ample evidence to show that some at least of these commercial ecclesiastics did get interested in it so far as to endeavour to diffuse a knowledge of it among their countrymen, though in those days of turmoil, few had either inclination or leisure for the study of metaphysics. The average *Samurai* had other things to do than to puzzle his brains over the abstractions of the Sung Philosophy. Even so Keian (1426-1508) began to expound the system in Yamaguchi; while he afterwards found disciples in Higo (1473-8) and in Satsuma (1478-1508) of all places in Japan. With Keian's death, such slight interest as there had been among the Japanese in the Sung Philosophy evaporated; and it remained for Fujiwara Seigwa to become the first effective expounder of the Teishu System in Japan. Born in 1560, this Fujiwara Seigwa had what was exceedingly rare in those days of the mailed fist, a real enthusiasm for learning, and after entering the priesthood and discovering that but little was to be acquired from the ill-stored interiors of the tonsured pates of the monks, he directed all his efforts to the study of the ancient literature of China. However, neither teachers nor text-books were available in Japan; so at last he made up his mind to find his way to the Middle Kingdom. As things then stood, it was not easy to execute his resolve, for on the murder of Ōuchi in 1552, the patent, in virtue of which trade had been carried on between the Yamaguchi fief and China, was lost, and all authorized intercourse between Japan and the Middle Kingdom was brought to a cessation. It appears, however, that stray vessels did now and then make the forbidden trip, and some Satsuma haven was usually their point of departure on the voyage. To Satsuma accordingly Seigwa betook himself, and while there, waiting in an inn at Yamagawa for the sailing of the smuggler, he overheard a Japanese student reading aloud (*more Japonico*) from a Chinese book which was unfamiliar to him.

“Upon inquiry it proved to be a commentary by Chu-Hi on the ‘Great Learning’ of Confucius. A brief examination showed him its importance. Equally delighted and astonished, Seigwa exclaimed:

‘ This is what I have so long been in want of.’ Eventually he discovered a complete set of the philosophical works of Ching Hao (1032-85), Cheng I (1033-1107), and Chu-Hi (1130-1200). He was so strongly impressed by their perusal that he resolved to abandon his intention of proceeding to China, and to devote himself entirely to their study at home. Seigwa subsequently made the acquaintance of Iyeyasu at the camp of Nagoya (in Hizen), where Hideyoshi was then preparing his famous invasion of Korea. Iyeyasu recognized his merit, and sent for him repeatedly to expound the classics; but Seigwa, taking offence at being confounded with the rabble of ordinary monks, pretended illness, and, having introduced as his substitute his pupil, Hayashi Razan, retired to a quiet village near Kyōtō. Here pupils flocked to him in great numbers, many of them the sons of Court Nobles or Daimyō; and he also received flattering offerings of appointments, all of which he declined. In 1614 he was offered a post as teacher in connexion with a project of Iyeyasu’s for establishing a school at Kyōtō. This proposal he accepted, but some civil disorders which broke out soon after rendered this scheme abortive. Seigwa died in 1619, in his fifty-ninth year. He left nothing which deserves notice as literature; but it is hardly possible to estimate too highly the service he performed by making known to his countrymen the philosophical literature of the Sung Schoolmen.”

In this extract from Mr. Aston there are some points which call, if not for correction, at all events for comment. We know from the missionaries that Iyeyasu spent most of the year 1593 at Nagoya in Hizen, where Rodriguez, subsequently the author of a Japanese Grammar, made his acquaintance and was pitted against the scholars in his Court. From what Aston writes it might be inferred that it was in this year of 1593 that Hayashi Razan was introduced to Iyeyasu by Seigwa.¹ But as Hayashi, born in 1583, was then only in his tenth year, his precocity must have been portentous indeed, if Seigwa then deemed him a worthy substitute for himself. Seigwa, it appears, received and accepted an invitation from Iyeyasu to proceed to Yedo to lecture on the “*Jōgwan Seiyō*” or “Book of Political Science”, and he then remained in the Tokugawa metropolis for some considerable time. The project of the school in Kyōto was Seigwa’s, not Iyeyasu’s; we are told “it was Seigwa’s desire to build halls for the use of students, which he proposed to get endowed with land, and also to assemble all the illustrious and wise men of his time, so that he might consult them on matters of school administration”. The “civil disorders” of

¹ The “inference” suggested may certainly be drawn from Dr. Aston’s description, but that its possibility was not present to his own mind is shown a few pages further on in his most excellent *Handbook on Japanese Literature*, where the correct date of Hayashi’s birth is given.—J. H. L.

1614, alluded to by Mr. Aston, can only refer to the great Ōsaka siege, an episode in the history of the Tokugawa house and also of Japan whose importance has been seriously underestimated by most foreign historians.

As regards Hayashi Razan, or Dōshun (1583–1657) who indeed became Seigwa's pupil later on, it was not till 1603 that he came into notice. In that year, while still in his minority, he began to assemble students and to deliver lectures on Chinese philosophy in Kyōto. This at once gave rise to a serious commotion, for vested interests and orthodoxy alike felt themselves to be menaced by the upstart beardless innovator. One of the court nobles, a certain Kiyowara-no-Hidekata, denounced Hayashi violently and petitioned for his punishment on the grounds that, being a private individual, he had, without being in a position which entitled him to do so, delivered lectures on the Chinese classics; and that, furthermore, he had done so without adhering to the ancient commentaries. Iyeyasu, it will be remembered was then in the west; and it was to him that the bigoted old conservative presented his petition. So far from adopting it, the Shōgun actually commended Hayashi's zeal in the cause of learning. In 1605, he was formally admitted among Seigwa's pupils, and like his master and his fellow-scholars, he had to accept the tonsure and don the priestly robes. It was in 1608¹ that Seigwa gave up his connexion with the Tokugawa court, and it was then that Hayashi was installed in its service. All his biographers maintain that henceforth there was not a single line in the laws or edicts of the first Tokugawa Shōguns that was not drafted by him.

In the preceding volume it has been more than once pointed out that Iyeyasu possessed an unusually keen sense of the potentialities of wealth as a governing power, and several pages in that volume are occupied with an account of his unwearying efforts to develop the resources of the empire in general and of the Tokugawa domains in particular. The "terrible old man" was at the same time perfectly well aware that the economic problem was far from being the only one that pressed for a solution. Now that his swarming tens of thousands of vassals were modestly, yet sufficiently, provided for as regards permanency and security of revenue and rations, the

¹ It may be assumed here that Seigwa had no further active association with Iyeyasu or his Court, but in 1914, he was offered a post as teacher in the great school that Iyeyasu proposed to erect in Ōsaka.—J. H. L.

great question came to be how to keep the minds of the Hatamoto and the Go-Kenin properly and profitably employed. With the capture of Ōsaka and the summary dismissal of more than 100,000 Rōnin to the "Yellow Streams", the last menace to Tokugawa power and prestige and to the peace of the empire disappeared, and thenceforth there would be slight occasion for Tokugawa blades to be drawn for real red-handed war. With the altered social prospect it was felt that the drafting of the regulations for the military class would have to be modified. The strenuous ferocity of Kato's "Instructions", for instance, was now somewhat out of place. "A man born a samurai should live and die sword in hand"—such was doubtless an excellent maxim in the three long centuries of internal turmoil, when the "good old rule" was all-sufficing.

. . . The simple plan
That they should take who have the power
And they should keep who can.

But that age had suddenly and most summarily been brought to a close, and under the *pax Tokugawana*, even the very greatest of the now subject feudatories durst no longer move a single troop or company, nay, even a single man, beyond the frontier line of his domains without the express permission, or rather orders, of the central authorities in Yedo. Half a century before, any fief in Japan might be thrown into panic and commotion by a foray, or even by a totally unfounded rumour of such a foray, at any moment. In those tumultuous and thrilling times of sensational emergencies, there was only too much reason for "living sword in hand". Now, there was no longer any such reason; the sword was still the "soul of the samurai", but its normal place henceforth was to be the scabbard.

Consequently in the very first article of the *Buké Shohatto*, or Regulations for the Military Class, not of any particular fief, but for the whole of Japan, we find the study of literature placed in the very forefront; and literature was henceforth to be far from synonymous with military treatises merely; it was to be all kinds of literature generally, but it was Chinese philosophy in particular that was to be the chief focus of attention. Iyeyasu, of course, never attained to any intimate or profound acquaintance with the subtleties and technicalities of the Teishu body of doctrine but, from what he had learned of it from Seigwa, and later on from Hayashi, he was satisfied that it would serve as an excellent instrument of

intellectual and—what was of vastly more importance—of moral discipline for the two-sworded class.

Iyeyasu was a devout Buddhist; and he had no intention of breaking with Buddhism, but it was well that it should not have the intellectual and moral field entirely to itself; and the Teishu system might prove valuable either as a supplement, or as a corrective, or as a rival to what had been the dominant creed for centuries. As a matter of fact, apart from his regular secular councillors, Honda, Sakakibara, Ōkubo, Sakai, Ii, and others, Iyeyasu constantly had recourse to the astute wits of the Abbots Den Chōrō and Tenkai for political as well as for ghostly advice. Indeed, Tenkai possibly enjoyed a fuller measure of the first Shōgun's confidence than any other single man. This caused Hayashi profound dissatisfaction and he ultimately went so far as to present a memorial urging the impropriety of *religieux* being consulted in temporal matters. So far from acting upon the memorial, Iyeyasu showed the document to Tenkai; and the latter at once proposed that he and Hayashi should thrash the matter out in Iyeyasu's presence. In the debate Hayashi was hopelessly overmatched by the wily old abbot. Before this he had cherished no great goodwill for the priests. In his boyhood he studied in one of the five great Zen monasteries of Kyōto, and he had strongly resented the insidious attempts then made to induce him to become a monk. Furthermore, Chu-Hi had assailed Buddhism in his day, and urged that as a foe to the true doctrine it should always be attacked. Now, this rebuff at the hands of Tenkai did much to intensify Hayashi's dislike for that Indian cult and its hierophants. So long as Iyeyasu lived he had to repress all serious signs of this, and as Tenkai continued to be exceedingly influential at the Tokugawo court down to the end of his long life in 1643, Hayashi had still to observe a measure of moderation in what he said of Buddhism. When he did at last speak out, he did not mince his words:—

“ You priests, you maintain that this world is impermanent and ephemeral. By your enchantments, you cause people to forget the social relations; you make an end of all the duties and all the proprieties. Then you proclaim: ‘ Man's path is full of sins; leave father and mother, leave your master; leave your children, and seek for salvation.’ Now I tell you that I have studied much; but I have nowhere found that there was for a man a (moral) path apart from loyalty towards one's Lord, and of filial piety towards one's parents.”

Elsewhere, comparing, or rather contrasting Confucianism with Buddhism, he delivers himself in truly pontifical style :—

“ Confucianism is true (that is to say, in perfect conformity with the order of the universe) ; but Buddhism is false. Who is there, who, able to discern the true from the false, will choose the latter to reject the former ? Formerly, there was a great Confucianist named Chōkō Senjo. At first, he passed many years in the study of the Buddhist Scriptures ; but he never succeeded in understanding them. Then, putting them aside, he took up the five (Chinese) canonical books, and forthwith he was satisfied, crying out ‘ I have found my path ’. How fortunate this Chōkō to bethink himself in time ! To understand what is to be thought of Buddhism, let us listen to the brothers Cheng : ‘ The Buddhist books are lascivious music ; an immodest face ; people allow themselves to be entrapped there easily.’ And Chu-Hi : ‘ The Buddhist theory of death seems profound, but it is false.’ Buddhism teaches a (moral) path, but it is not the true one. I maintain this—there is the path and the no-path, the true and the false, and there is no middle course.”¹

In spite of deliverances like those, Hayashi took the tonsure, and wore the robes of a Buddhist priest. In 1629, the honorary title of Hōin (Seal of the Law) was conferred on him by Iyemitsu, who at, or about the same time, procured for him the Kyōto Court title of Mimbukyō,² or Minister of Home Affairs. In the good graces of Iyemitsu he continued to stand as high as he had done in those of Iyeyasu and Hidetada ; his appointment as Jusha to the Tokugawa High Court of Justice (Hyōjōsho) has been referred to in the first chapter of this volume. Long before this he had removed from Shizuoka to Yedo (1616) ; and in 1630, the Shōgun assigned to him a site for a mansion at Shinobazu near the Uyeno temple, where he installed a library (Kōbun-in) and occupied himself with prelections on Chinese philosophy. Iyemitsu himself set the fashion by attending one of these in 1630, and it soon became customary

¹ This extract may serve as a sample of the ordinary controversial methods of the Chinese philosophers in Tokugawa Japan. Says Père Le Gall : “ La méthode suivie dans ce genre de Polémique par les philosophes chinois n’est pas du tout celle de la logique occidentale ; leur Aristote n’a pas encore paru. Ils se contentent généralement de saisir dans l’argument du leur adversaire quelque point du détail, dont ils montreront facilement l’absurdité en citant à l’appui des textes, dont l’interprétation elle-même entraînera la discussion sur un autre terrain.” But sometimes indeed sheer loud domineering categorical assertions constitute a chief element in their polemics.” Of John Stuart Mill we are told that he encountered opponents with a generosity and a courtesy worthy of any *preux chevalier* of mediæval romance, while he was not inferior to that ideal in the vigour of his blows against injustice ! But Hayashi did not come of any such breed.

² The Mimbusho was the fourth of the “ eight Boards of the Government ” so long as the actual power remained with the Imperial Court. The Mimbukyō was the chief of the Department which was, of course, shorn of all power under the successive Shōgunates. The title, however, always continued to be one of high honour, and was eagerly sought by the territorial nobles.—J. H. L.

for great Daimyō like Daté of Sendai to repair with their trains to Hayashi's rooms for a morning's instruction or entertainment. In 1632, the Lord of Owari, Tokugawa Yoshinao, reared a shrine to Confucius in the immediate neighbourhood ; and here the tablets of the sage and his three chief followers were henceforth venerated twice a year. It was by Hayashi that the new cult was inaugurated in the Senseiden, as the new structure was called.¹ Originality was not Hayashi's forte, and here he could do nothing better than imitate or borrow from the ritual of the monks he so greatly detested. Buddha here was merely replaced by Confucius.

But in the Kōbun-in Hayashi's chief duty was the instruction of the sons of the Bakufu officials and of the Hatamoto. Under Iyemitsu the military arts were not neglected ; in fact the third Shōgun did much to foster and encourage them. Unusual proficiency at any of the great tournaments or reviews was often rewarded with a place in the ranks of some one or other of the three companies of Life-guards or military pages ; and this did much to keep the young Samurai upon their mettle. But, just at this time, it was enacted that, in addition to the ordinary accomplishments, an ability to expound texts from the Chinese classics was necessary before this coveted position could be attained ; and this did something to save Hayashi from having to lecture to bare mats, for truth to tell, the young bloods of Yedo at this date were infected with no great national craze for learning.

Among the many reforms of 1634, a strong effort was made to curb the unruly spirit and soften the manners of the turbulent young Hatamoto who were eternally engaged in brawls that not infrequently ended in death for the slightest of reasons and often for no reason at all. The etiquette of the Tokugawa court was henceforth to be that of a palace, and not of a mere Daimyō's *yashiki* or barrack-yard ; and for four or five years, more and more stress continued to be laid upon learning and polite accomplishments. Then, just when the reign of milder manners seemed on the point of being successfully established, came the sensational Shimabara rebellion (1637-8) like a veritable bolt from the blue.

In the four or five months of desperate fighting that followed its outbreak, it became only too plain that the twenty years of peace had sapped the stamina of the samurai ; in fact not a few of them

¹ It was not the first time that these or similar ceremonies were celebrated in Japan. See vol. i, p. 203.

displayed anything but the courage of old Japan. On the other hand, the courage of the Rōnin was conspicuous and splendid. On the suppression of the revolt the central authorities began to ask themselves whether, during the preceding four or five years, they had not made a cardinal mistake in laying such an emphasis as they had done on mere learning and civil accomplishments. At all events they now did nothing to interfere with the great and sudden recrudescence of military fervour in Yedo that marked the ensuing years. These were famous days for the professional lecturer on military science, for instructors in the numerous styles of fencing, spear exercises, and musketry. The science of fortification and siege-warfare became all-important subjects of study; not a few experts in these departments now reaped great credit for the originality of the lore they expounded, which as a sober matter of fact had been mostly acquired by picking the brains of the Dutchmen in Hirado. On account of Rōnin gallantry at Shimabara, Rōnin, with anything of a distinguished personal record, were in particular request, a fact that helps to explain the rise of such men as Yui no Shōsetsu to wealth and fame. All this went on for three or four years; and then once more the Bakufu began to entertain apprehensions as to the possible outcome of this all-engrossing martial fever. At first, however, it did not interfere with the Rōnin; it was not till 1645, that the Great Council forbade the city to such lordless men as could not furnish securities for their good behaviour. In the intervening years all that the authorities did was to attempt to change the focus of popular attention; and among other devices adopted by them was the issue of orders for every two-sworded man to send in his genealogical record. The result was the compilation of the 372 volumes of the *Kwanyei Shoke Keizuden*, an account of which has been given in the previous chapter. In consequence of this attitude of the Bakufu, the military lecturer and his fellows presently lost much of their popularity, and the amateur herald then had his hour. Before the death of Iyemitsu, the military fever had almost entirely subsided; and the Rōnin, having lost all his temporary importance, found it almost impossible to get employment or to make a living. In these circumstances, Yui no Shōsetsu began to find the appeals to his purse and the claims on his hospitality a greater strain than his resources could bear for long. Accordingly something had to be done.

The detection of Yui's conspiracy in 1651, and of its sequel in 1652, served to confirm the Bakufu in the conviction that wisdom lay in adhering to its policy of the preceding years. The samurai mind was to be weaned from all troublesome thoughts of military enterprise and adventure, and allured to occupy itself with peaceful interest. At the same time, for the next ten or a dozen years, we find the statesman, Hoshina, in particular, paying heed to all phases of popular opinion, and eagerly seeking for channels into which the energies of the national intellect might be deflected with prospects favourable to the peace of the government. Naturally on such questions Hayashi, or his son, was frequently consulted. Hayashi himself fell ill in 1644, and in 1646, his third son, Shunsai, formally succeeded him as head of the Kōbun-in, and preceptor of the young Hatamoto, though the old man continued to be far from inactive. He still retained his office of secretary and adviser to the Bakufu, while his ink-brush kept the Yedo printers very busy indeed. It was not till 1657 that he passed away; and his life might have even been longer had there been no Great Fire of Yedo in that year. The day before the outbreak of that terrible conflagration he returned from a visit to the tombs of Iyeyasu and Iyemitsu at Nikkō, seriously fatigued with the journey. On the first day of the fire, Hayashi Shunsai's house was burned; on the following day, his father's was threatened. His disciples hastened to warn the father of the danger; they found him absorbed in his reading, a slight motion of the head alone indicating that he had understood. Soon the flames were so near that flight was imperative. He got into a palanquin, book in hand, scarcely ever lifting his eye from the page. That night he, like tens of thousands of others, had nothing but the clustering stars for a ceiling; he caught cold, various complications followed, and three days after he died.

Hayashi was no commanding personality. In the one hundred and fifty volumes he left behind, the reader searches in vain for any trace of original genius. His work was in no sense constructive; at the best, it was merely reproductive; at the worst it was bludgeon like, polemic, coarse, and vulgar in its venomous malignity, and disgraceful in the disingenuousness of its methods.¹ In sheer

¹ For instance, in his *Down with Christianity*, a work in three volumes, herecounts the discussion he had with Father Froez, in which the grand old Jesuit was put to silence and shame. Towards the end of it, Hayashi's young brother, who was present, is represented as having exploded with indignation at some remarks of the Christian interlocutor. Thereupon Hayashi checked his impetuosity, reminding

intellectual ability he was greatly the inferior of such a man as Matsudaira Nobutsuna ; while in moral character he makes a poor showing in comparison with Abe, Tadaaki, and Bungo no Kami.

To have devoted so much space to such a seeming mediocrity as Hayashi Doshun may well appear to argue a serious lack of the sense of proportion on the part of the historian. But in truth it does nothing of the kind. What history should be mainly occupied with are the forces that go to make society, to trace their origin, to estimate their relative strength and variations, to mark and appraise the results that arise from their interplay. From this point of view historical personages are important mainly as embodiments or controllers and directors of moral, intellectual, or material forces, which of course have to be exerted before they can be computed as determining factors in social developments. Now undoubtedly one of the greatest intellectual and moral forces operative in Tokugawa Japan was Chinese philosophy—the Teishu philosophy more especially. In the introduction of this philosophy into Japan the pioneer was not Hayashi, but Fujiwara Seigwa. So much is true indeed ; but in the establishment and diffusion of the cult or doctrine, it was Hayashi who was its apostle. For two centuries and a half, for at least eight generations, it was upon the neo-Confucianism of the Sung schoolmen that the national intellect of Japan continued mainly to focus its attention. In the accomplishment of this result Hayashi must be regarded as the greatest¹ of the determining living forces ; and so in spite of the mediocrity of his intellect and the perversity of his unlovely moral twists, the first official *Jusha* of the Bakufu cannot be dismissed as a mere nonentity by any historian with an adequate sense of the value of relations. His influence was largely posthumous—yet in his own day and

him how the Confucianist should ever retain command of himself. “ To say what seems to be just is profitable to us, even if our adversary draws no profit therefrom. But if one wishes to argue for the mere purpose of getting the best of it, then wrath and jealousy mar the countenance. That does great hurt to the art of governing the soul. Calm yourself ! Contain yourself ! ” This sounds very fine indeed. But let us look at dates a little. Hayashi was born in 1583, and his younger brother later on of course. Father Froez died in 1597, and the last five years of his life were spent at Macao. Therefore at the time of this discussion Hayashi cannot have been more than nine years of age, and his younger brother no more than seven or eight. From this we may infer the measure of value set upon veracity by this Coryphaeus of Confucian morality. (May this discussion not have been ostensibly an imaginary one, such as those of which we have manifold examples in Western literature from Plato downwards ?—J. H. L.)

¹ Hayashi was one of the greatest and most productive students that ever lived, and his influence in his own country, both during his life and for long years afterwards, emphatically shows that “ mediocrity ” cannot be described to his intellect with any justice.—J. H. L.

generation he had to be very seriously reckoned with. In the suppression of Christianity and the closing of the Empire his rôle was not confined to the mere drafting of the ordinances in which the Bakufu gave expression to its will in these matters, for many indications lend support to the presumption that he had not a little to do with the conception of the policy itself.¹ These problems, or rather these two phases of a single problem, counted as the most momentous questions of his age.

To what an extent the Bakufu Councillors allowed their repose to be disturbed by the spectre of Christianity became evident towards the end of 1651. At first, they were firmly convinced that Yui's daring attempt was simply an aftermath of Shimabara, and that the great plot was really the work of "Christian scum" that had so far escaped detection. Accordingly the captured Rōnin were first of all severely put to the question on this point. They one and all vehemently repudiated the imputation; and the Bakufu Ministers no doubt heaved a great sigh of relief when they became

¹ Against Christianity Hayashi continued to breathe out threatenings and slaughter in the style of Saul before he was stricken to the earth on the road to Damascus. "Christianity is a false doctrine. It resembles foxes and badgers that devour young women, and then assume their forms. How horrible! Will not some hero arise to smite this monster and take its head? People fear foxes because they deceive them, but Christianity is a kind of fox greatly to be feared. . . . Christianity renders children thieves and subjects rebels. Is there no one with pluck enough to stifle its voice and arrest its progress? . . . Among the women, even those of the lower classes, jealousy reigns. To seduce the minds of women, what does Christianity teach? Men ought neither to keep concubines, nor to commit adultery, fornication nor rape. It is for this reason that women embrace this religion in such numbers. Just see the perversity of the doctrine that is seeking to insinuate itself into the households of the Great! These Christians hate the open day and love the dark. Recently it has been disclosed to me under the seal of secrecy, that in public they put a restraint upon themselves, but in secret they do no such thing. They preach avarice to men to restrain them from keeping several women, and they entice women by teaching them that concubines are forbidden to men. It is thus that this miserable Christianity cajoles the women." For a description of the fox superstition, *vide* the article "Demoniacal Possession" in Professor Chamberlain's *Things Japanese*, where he quotes Dr. Baelz, a distinguished German physician who was long in Japan and who made an exhaustive study of both the mental and physical characteristics of the people of all classes. Baelz describes "possession by foxes" (*Kitsune kuki*) as a nervous delusion that the fox enters into the body of a human being and there lives a life of its own, with the result that a double entity takes place, the person possessed hearing and understanding everything that the fox inside says or thinks, and the two often engaging in loud and violent disputes, in which two distinct voices are heard, one of the possessed and one of the fox." The sufferers are almost exclusively women of the lower classes and priestly ministrations are required to exorcise the evil. Hayashi's denunciations of Christianity were repeated a hundred years later by a Bizen scholar, who declared that "its fundamental principles are based upon deceit, immorality, and imposition, and that it seduces the common ignorant crowd with a cunning like that of foxes". It was not long afterwards, however, before the liberality which, by that time, had resigned the nation to the recognition of the existence of foreigners had extended to the toleration of the foreigners' religion.—J. H. L.

thoroughly convinced that this specially disquieting suspicion of theirs was baseless. The prisoners were perfectly frank in the avowal of the special religious or ethical tenets they happened individually to hold ; and it soon became apparent that the bond that had knit them together in their attempt had nothing to do with cult or creed. Only one thing appeared a little remarkable ; not a few of the leaders expressed their unqualified approval of the doctrines of Kumazawa Banzan. Some years afterwards this circumstance was recalled when Kumazawa actually became obnoxious to the Bakufu ; but at the time, in 1651, it attracted no special attention to itself. At that date Kumazawa was well known to Matsudaira Nobutsuna, who in the previous year had joined in “ lionizing ” the philosopher-statesman of Okayama when he had appeared in the aristocratic *salons* of Yedo and was rapidly earning a great reputation as an administrator, loyal to the constituted authorities and thoroughly “ safe ” in the all-important matter of Christianity. But his name brings us to a brief consideration of the second system of Chinese mediæval philosophy which found a first reception on Japanese soil some six or seven years before the date of the Great Rōnin conspiracy. To understand exactly what this was, it becomes necessary to recross the sea to China, and to follow the course of events there since Chu-Hi developed the aphorisms of Confucius into a system of philosophy.

Chu-Hi (Shushi) endeavoured to reconcile and co-ordinate the different schools of Chinese thought, and so far he was an eclectic. He was also strongly conservative and held fast to the past, following the example of Confucius in writing history (or rather in re-writing a history) in order to exemplify and enforce his ethical principles. In his own lifetime, he and his doctrines met with a good deal of opposition, but within forty years from his death (he was admitted to the Temple of Confucius in 1241) his system of philosophy had found general acceptance all over the Empire, where its influence has remained almost unshaken down to modern days. The first to dispute its supremacy with any effect was the soldier, administrator and poet, Wang Yang-ming (1472–1529) known to Japanese as Ōyōmei. From the trammels of tradition Ōyōmei cut himself loose in very summary fashion, going so far even as to maintain that all reading might be dispensed with. To him, also, the scientific investigation of the outer world was of little or no importance, for the source of all man’s knowledge was in man’s own minds, outside

of which there was no real existence. This thorough-paced and absolute trust in pure intuitionism brought Ōyōmei into sharp conflict with the followers of Sung Schoolmen, whose equanimity must have been sadly ruffled by his contemptuous flouting of the wisdom and the sages of the hoary past, to say nothing of their own wondrous and dearly-prized ontology and natural philosophy.¹ However, it was not till a century after the death of Ōyōmei and about half a century after Fujiwara Seigwa's discovery of Chu-Hi's commentaries, that Ōyōmei's doctrines began to make any headway in Japan. Indeed, down to 1645, no copy of his works seems to have entered the Island Empire; for that appears to be a legitimate construction to place upon certain statements of the pioneer of this new system in Japan. The pioneer in question, although one of the most interesting men of his day, was a mere village school-master, Nakae Tōju (1608-48) by name.

The accounts we have of the family to which Nakae belonged are interesting, as they throw a valuable light upon certain of the ordinary social conditions of early Tokugawa Japan. Among other things they indicate that change of status was a matter that called for little comment at least in country districts in those days, and that the line of demarcation between the Samurai and the peasant could then be much more easily crossed than was possible a few generations later. Nakae's father was a mere peasant in an Ōmi hamlet; but his grandfather was a two-sworded man in the service of Katō, the Lord of Ōsu in Iyo. In 1617, at the age of nine, the peasant lad was adopted by his grandfather, and so became a samurai. His Lord soon took the boy into active service, and he continued to bear the two swords of the samurai in his belt down to 1634. His grandfather died in 1624, and his father in 1625; and

¹ The chief points at issue in the rival "philosophies" have been summarized:— (1) Chu-Hi held that it is necessary to investigate the world and physical laws before attempting to determine what is the moral law. Ōyōmei maintained that such a course is *not* necessary, and that man's knowledge of himself is the highest kind of learning. (2) According to Chu-Hi all nature owed its existence to the *ri* and *ki*, the determining principle and the primordial aura that produces and modifies motion. Ōyōmei held that *ri* and *ki* were inseparable. The cosmogony of Chu-Hi was dualistic, that of Chu-Hi monistic. (3) Chu-Hi asserted that the primary principle *ri* and the mind of man were distinct, and that the latter was attached to the *ri*. Ōyōmei denied this, and taught that no study of external nature was needed in order to know nature's laws. To discover these man had only to look within his own heart. Whoever understands his own heart understands nature. (4) According to Chu-Hi experience is necessary in order to understand the laws of the universe. This also Ōyōmei denied. (5) Chu-Hi laid it down that knowledge must come first and right conduct after. According to Ōyōmei the two were inseparable. With Chu-Hi theories and principles were important. Ōyōmei laid stress on practice.

nine years later he determined to sacrifice all prospects of future advancement in order to return to Ogawa in Ōmi to tend his decrepit peasant mother. In his native village he recommenced life by disposing of his sword, "the girded soul of the Samurai," for a little money; and he contrived to eke out a livelihood by lending this out at interest, and peddling some small wares. In time he acquired sufficient money to enable him to open a school in his own humble cottage and before his death in 1648, this cottage had become the most famous school of its day in Western Japan. Not that it was ever over-crowded with pupils, thirty to forty being perhaps the largest number ever borne upon its rolls at one time.

From Nakae's biography we get something more than a mere inkling of the state of culture that prevailed among the samurai of the outside clans during the two decades of peace between the siege of Ōsaka and the Shimabara revolt. The lad had the greatest difficulty in procuring books; his grandfather had given him a copy of *The Great Learning*, and for years this continued to be the sole serious item in his library. As regards teachers, there were none. At last, in 1624, a Zen priest was invited to the fief to lecture on the "Analects" of Confucius. A few samurai went to hear him at first, out of mere curiosity most likely, but they soon dropped off and Nakae remained the sole regular attendant. Some time after the priest left, Nakae was at last able to procure a complete set of the "Four Books", but such was the general contempt for learning around him that he was compelled to keep his studies as secret as possible. One day a comrade derisively addressed him as "Confucius" in the presence of a good many others. "You ignoramus!" burst out Nakae, "Revered Confucius has been dead now for two thousand years. Mean you by that epithet to blaspheme the Sage's name, or to deride me for my love of knowledge? Poor fellow! War alone is not the Samurai's profession. An unlettered Samurai is a chattel, a slave. Are you content to be a slave?" Among all the samurai of a fief of 60,000 *koku*, Nakae thus appears to have been the only one who had any fondness for learning; and the state of things on Lord Katō's domain was nothing exceptional at this time. Not only was the ignorance among the provincial samurai profound and universal—they actually prided themselves upon it in the style of Archibald Bell-the-cat.

Thus Nakae, perforce, was a self-taught man. His text-books

were ultimately Chu-Hi's commentaries but he also developed a certain measure of the power of thinking for himself, and unlike Hayashi, he could not rest content with merely swallowing the Sung Schoolmen holus-bolus. Down to 1641, the very year in which the Dutchmen were penned up in Deshima, the Teishu system was the only one with which he was acquainted, perhaps the only one he had ever so far heard of. In the year in question a compendium of Ōyōmei, written by a disciple, fell into his hands, and four years later (1645) Nakae acquired a complete set of Ōyōmei's works.¹

Now, inasmuch as Nakae died in 1648, it will be at once apparent that only the very latest of his own works could have been penned under Ōyōmei's influence. His best-known production is the *Okina Mondō*, and all the five volumes of this were composed before 1641. To the last volume of it, it is true, an exposition of the Ōyōmei doctrine of *ryōchi* was appended. The fact is that Nakae never became an out-and-out partisan of Ōyōmei, nor of anyone or anything but what he sincerely believed to be the Truth.

“Shushi” (Chu-hi) was a great Confucianist and a wise man. Ōyōmei was a knightly scholar and likewise a wise man. But “Shushi” was too broad; he leaned towards natural science, and got far from the laws of the heart. Ōyōmei was too concise; he was tolerant and generous and leaned towards the heresies of Buddhism. Both were wise enough to make heavenly reason the heart of their teaching, eschewing lower motives. Both alike would have rejected the lordship of the world if its acceptance were to cost the life of a single innocent person . . . I follow Ōyōmei in the old manuscripts (of the Confucian and Canonical Works) but adhere to Shushi in the selection of the latter Commentators. This indicates that I am not a partisan.”

Nakae was held as a great inspiring moral force, not merely in his own neighbourhood in his own day, but also in the subsequent cultural development of Tokugawa Japan at large. According to him, of all possessions, that of a pure and enlightened conscience was by far the most precious and priceless. This was primal and fundamental but in itself it was not enough. It was of equal importance that every individual action, the whole round of conduct, should be ordered in perfect conformity with the dictates of this pure and enlightened inward mentor.

¹ “I had for many years been a devout believer in Shushi (Chu-hi) when by the mercy of Heaven, the collected works of Ōyōmei were brought for the first time to Japan, I bought and devoured them. Had it not been for the aid of their teaching, my life would have been empty and barren.”

"What the people of the age admire is done ; and what they disapprove of is not done, without considering whether it is right or wrong in itself. Such conformists are small men, mean-souled creatures. Praise elates and condemnation worries them, they are anxious about the outward form, but know not the heart of the way."

He strongly held that right should be done, not from the hope or desire of reward—right was to be done merely because it was right. Again, with Nakae, by far the most important of all duties was not loyalty to one's lord, but piety towards one's parents, loyalty being merely a derivative form or a natural outcome of the fundamental virtue.

The most simple and unlettered village hind could readily grasp all these doctrines, and provided these and similar doctrines were thoroughly driven home the precise meaning to be attached to the scholastic stock-in-trade of illicit symbolic conceptions, *ki*, *ri*, *yō*, *in*, and the rest of them, mattered very little indeed.¹ It is, accordingly, not so strange, after all, that this unpretentious village school-master should soon be found wielding an almost absolutely unquestioned moral ascendancy in his own neighbourhood and for miles around. The people of Ōmi had a proverbially unsavoury reputation ; for ages the Japanese adage had linked " Ōmi thieves " with " Isé beggars ", as the special products of these provinces respectively. As Ōmi was intersected by several of the great highways of Japan, hotel-keeping was a great source of income ; and before Nakae's time the inn-keepers were notorious for their rascality. Yet in the *Lives of Old Masters*, compiled more than a century after Nakae's death, it is stated, that in Ogawa mura and its

¹ Nakae always practised as he preached ; and to him what his aged mother said was always law. Once only did he thwart her. In practice he was a strict monogamist, rigidly faithful to his not very good-looking spouse. His mother urged him to replace her with someone with greater personal attractions to recommend her ; but Nakae stood firm in his refusal to do so. And yet he was not opposed to polygamy in theory. " Not to commit adultery," he writes, " and propriety " look somewhat alike ; but propriety includes the duty of reverence and consideration for others, from the Emperor to the lowest of men, with the duty of kindly intercourse, and all the ceremonies of life and death. To compare the two is to put a gill of water against the great ocean. The command not to commit adultery is against nature, for it forbids the possession of more than one wife, a command adapted to the common people ; but as we consider the importance of offspring, we see that it is proper for the higher ranks to have more than one, and this according to rank, the Emperor having most. And what disgraceful brutish evils result from denying a wife to the priests."

This special doctrine would, of course, have brought Nakae into direct conflict with the old Christian missionaries. On other grounds, Dr. Inouye maintains that Nakae would have had nothing to do with Christianity, *if he had ever chanced to hear of it*. Ever chanced to hear of it ! What intelligent Japanese living at the date of the Shimabara revolt could possibly fail to hear of it ?

neighbourhood, the merchants even then were not slaves to self-interest and that the hotels kept forgotten tobacco-pipes until their owners happened to pass that way again when they were returned to them. Many anecdotes illustrating Nakae's personal influence in his own day are to be met with; the best-known of which perhaps is the account of how Kumazawa Banzan came to attach himself to Nakae as a pupil.¹

The story of Kumazawa's early days is also valuable from the standpoint of contemporary cultural history. Born at Kyōtō in 1619, the son of a *Rōnin* named Nogiri, he was adopted in 1626 by his maternal grandfather, a samurai of the Mitō fief. On the occasion of Iyemitsu's famous visit to Kyōtō at the head of 307,000 armed men in 1634, Kumazawa was taken into the service of Ikeda Mitsumasa, the Daimyō of Okayama in Bizen. As Kumazawa was only sixteen years old at the time, and as he was without any powerful family influence, accomplished neither in the military arts of the age nor in letters, it is somewhat strange to find him invested with a revenue of 700 *koku* per annum, something between £700 and £1,000. After four years the youth resigned this highly remunerated post, and retired to lead a life of poverty in the village of Kiri-hara in Ōmi. Here he was presently joined by his real father, the former *Rōnin*, who had meanwhile found service in the Shimabara campaign, in which he had been wounded. It was only now (1639) that Kumazawa seems to have begun to learn to read, with his father for a teacher, and a primer on the art of war for a text-book. During his four years' enjoyment of a revenue of 700 *koku* per annum, he would thus seem to have learned nothing, a circumstance that provokes a measure of curiosity about the intellectual and moral

¹ The story is as follows: Kumazawa happened to be staying in a country inn when he overheard two samurai conversing in the adjoining room, separated from his own by the usual thin paper partition. One told the other how he had left a large sum of money belonging to his Lord in a bag, tied to the saddle of a hired pack-horse, and only realized what he had done some hours after he had discharged and paid the groom, of whose name and address he was ignorant. Nothing but *hara-kiri* faced him, as he could not survive the shame of such a failure of trust, when in the height of his misery, the groom suddenly reappeared and not only restored the bag of money intact, but absolutely refused to take any greater reward than the cost of a new pair of straw sandals to replace those he had worn out in walking the ten miles that were necessary to enable him to restore the bag. "What makes you so honest and unselfish," he was asked by the grateful trustee, whose life and honour he had saved. "There lives in our village," was the reply, "a man named Nakae Tōju, who teaches that not gain, but honesty, righteousness, and benevolence are the real aims of life, and we all walk by his teaching."

The story is told in Mr. Galen M. Fisher's paper on "Nakae Tōju, the Sage of Ōmi" (*T.A.S.J.*, vol. xxxvi, part i), on which the material in the text is largely based.—J. H. L.

tone prevalent in the feudal court of Bizen at the time. Presently the student ventured to attack a commentary on the "Four Books". The little he could spell out was a revelation to him, and he determined to find some teacher to help him, but on proceeding to Kyōtō and searching the city from end to end, he could find none. Then one night he happened to overhear an anecdote about Nakae Tōju, and he forthwith made up his mind to appeal to him. His first application, made in 1641, was rejected, as was a second one in the autumn of 1642. His third appeal was listened to more favourably; and he was under Nakae's personal instruction for between six or seven months in 1642-3. Thereafter such guidance as was furnished to the younger by the elder man was imparted by letter. It was Nakae's custom to maintain a correspondence with his former pupils, and some of his very best work is to be found in his letters. It was not till 1645, as has been said, that he became acquainted with Ōyōmei's system, and after eagerly assimilating the doctrine of the new philosopher, he passed on the precious books to Kumazawa.

It was in this year of 1645, that Kumazawa found his way back into Lord Ikeda's service. The strange thing is that on entering this second service, his income was not 700, but only 300 *koku*. Promotion was rapid, however; three years later we find him appointed Taifu, or first-minister of the fief, with a revenue of 7,000 *koku*, and the privilege of appearing before the Shōgun in Yedo.

On his return to Okayama, Kumazawa began to expound philosophy and the doctrines of Ōyōmei in particular. Followers soon attached themselves to him but bitter opponents were not wanting, and the fief was presently thrown into a strange and unwonted ferment. Some of the functionaries denounced the innovators to the Daimyō; and at last his lordship ordered the matter to be thrashed out before him. For three days Kumazawa kept pouring out a flood of eloquence; and it was to this effort that he owed his meteoric promotion to the post of Taifu.¹ In 1651, just a few months before the death of Iyemitsu, Kumazawa accompanied his Daimyō to the Tokugawa capital, and during his stay there, as many as 3,000 pupils are said to have frequented his

¹ There are various accounts of this incident. One biographer makes Kumazawa go to Yedo with Lord Ikeda in 1649, and alleges that it was then that he excited much interest among the resident Daimyō by his doctrines. This biographer further alleges that it was in the summer of 1650 that he was appointed one of the Cabinet Ministers of the Bizen fief with a revenue of 3,000 *koku*.

quarters for instruction. He was invited to lecture to Matsudaira Nobutsuna, and the Lord of Kishū in their mansions, and the Shōgun himself expressed a wish to hear this fervent apostle of Ōyōmei's doctrine just before he was seized with his fatal illness.

Meanwhile Nakae's three sons and several of his pupils had either been or were soon to be taken into Lord Ikeda's service. Nakae, himself, was, some time before his death, induced to open an institution in Kyōtō, and he had actually been engaged to proceed to Okayama when he fell ill and died. The Bizen fief now became the great seminary for the Ōyōmei doctrines in Japan, and continued to be so for some decades at least. The Institute in Kyōtō, which had been temporarily closed, was afterwards reopened by some of Nakae's sons and maintained by his descendants for over a century but none of its successive heads seem to have risen above mediocrity. Indeed it was not so much in the lucubrations of the study as in the arena of strenuous practical life that the exponents of Ōyōmei's system in Japan distinguished themselves after the death of its first apostle.

Kumazawa's permanent residence was not in the castle town of Okayama, but in the remote and lonely district of Wake.¹ Hither several hundred Samurai followed him. Besides organizing themselves as a defence corps, they also engaged in the practical work of reclaiming and developing the neighbourhood. Kumazawa held it to be shameful to draw a revenue and make no return for it, and in his later years, he is said to have roundly denounced the degenerate Samurai of the age as robbers. That term may have been not altogether appropriate; but it is only too true that many of the class became little better than high-class loafers. It was to the furtherance of the welfare of the common people that Kumazawa chiefly directed his efforts. Competent men were engaged and an accurate survey of the fief carried out, and on the basis of this all taxes were fairly and economically levied. At various places boxes were placed for the reception of petitions and complaints from the farmers, and all such documents as were placed in these boxes received careful consideration. In 1654, the fief was devastated by terrible floods, and nearly all the crops were destroyed. The natural consequence was famine, and as many as 80,000 victims are said to have perished. Kumazawa had all the clan store-houses opened, and their contents distributed, while he proceeded to Yedo

¹ Waké, a small village in Bizen with a population of less than 1,000.—J. H. L.

and obtained a loan of 40,000 *ryō* from the Bakufu for the purchase of rice in Ōsaka and elsewhere. Immediately after this, he grappled with the problem of future inundations. The chief rivers were dredged and bridled in their courses, while the hills at their headwaters were planted with trees, as were all the open and unproductive waste-lands in the fief. To superintend all this Kumazawa was constantly in the saddle from dawn to dark. His own income was princely, but it was all spent in the public interest and he himself lived like the simplest of Spartans. It is thus no great matter for surprise that, thanks mainly to him, the Okayama domain presently came to enjoy the enviable reputation of being one of the best and most efficiently administered fiefs in the Empire.

Kumazawa, however, was not without opponents and jealous rivals. Among these the chief was a certain Tsuda who had formerly been an intimate friend, but who, being a man of ability with ideas of his own, was not satisfied to see everything decided by the mere fiat of the upstart Taifu. At last, the two came to an open quarrel over the question of some very extensive works which Tsuda advocated but which Kumazawa opposed. In this matter the Daimyō finally approved of Tsuda's projects. The latter had also shown himself more in sympathy with Lord Ikeda's drastic treatment of the Buddhist priests within the fief than Kumazawa had done. Lord Ikeda was no friend of the "bonzes", whose "immortality" excited his righteous indignation. The term "immoral" in Japan has often had a rather peculiar meaning attached to it. Paidaerasty and other carnal vices are said to have been rife in the monasteries then as they had been in Xavier's time and for centuries before; but it was not these enormities or any such enormities that specially roused the Daimyō's wrath against the priests. Their "immorality" chiefly lay in defying or obstructing the civil authorities, in intriguing, in their arrogance, their injustice, their avarice and extortion. One incident in the suppression of Christianity placed them in an ideal position for squeezing and bleeding not merely their own special parishioners but the whole laity at large. The enactment of 1635 ordained that all commoners and the lower samurai should have a temple register, and that everyone should obtain an annual certificate from the priests of the family temple certifying that the bearer thereof was free from all taint or suspicion of Christianity or of anything connected therewith. It often proved a very troublesome matter to procure this

document; in fact the enactment put it into the power of the priests to rob, and now and then to ruin, people who were either worth robbing or who had in any way incurred ecclesiastical ill-will. Before a score of years had run their course, the civil authorities had become alive to the evil, and in 1665 the Bakufu resorted to legislation to curb the insolence of Buddhism. They did not think of suppressing it but they aimed at keeping it in its place. They felt that some counterpoise to it was needed; and hence, partly, the eagerness with which they looked about for other doctrines to pit against it. Shinto of course was thought of, but then in most cases Shinto Shrines had fallen into Buddhist hands. In Bizen, however, Lord Ikeda did transfer the annual Christian inspection (*aratame*) from the temples to the *Kannushi*, or Guardians of the Shinto Shrines within his fief. He wished to go much further and ultimately he reduced the number of fanes in his domains from 1,414 to about 750. This was later on—after Kumazawa had withdrawn from his service.

In the treatment of the Buddhist question, Kumazawa wished to go to the root of the matter by a slower but, in the end, a much more effective way. He held that this question was at bottom not a religious but an economic problem.¹ What he proposed to do was to find *métiers* for those who had difficulty in earning their rice; and so to lessen the swarm of shiftless and indigent who flocked to the cloister to find an easy and comfortable livelihood. When the project of razing the fanes was broached, he objected strongly.² A little later on, Kumazawa appeared in the streets of the castle-town in broad daylight with a lighted lantern in his hand. When this Japanese Diogenes was invited to explain the reason of this strange conduct he told people that the Daimyō was in the dark, and that he was trying to enlighten his Lordship. Shortly afterwards he had a fall from his horse, when his right leg and arm were broken. Active supervision of his district was henceforth impossible so he sent in his resignation. When it was not accepted, he sent

¹ "Among a thousand *bonzes*," he asserted, "there is scarcely one who enters the priesthood from the motive of obtaining salvation. People become *bonzes* to relieve their families of a burden, or more frequently to be able to live without working. The *bonzes* under the colour of giving the certificate for non-Christianity extort the property of those who apply for it."

² "To destroy Buddhism in a single province is an easy matter; but how is it to be destroyed in the whole of Japan? Now, if it continues to flourish in the rest of the Empire, it will come back to the province it has been driven from, and will then work ten times as much evil as before. Such is my opinion, but the Daimyō will not listen to me."

it in again, and this time he was allowed to retire, and for the next three years (1656-9) he lived in a secluded district of the fief. He then proceeded to Kyōtō where he took up his residence and passed the next seven years.

In some respects the city had changed greatly since 1641. In that year Kumazawa could not find a single competent teacher within its bounds; now it contained many professors, some of them not undistinguished. Chinese philosophy had meanwhile become a fashionable craze, and many of the fierce samurai that had scorned its pursuit as something effeminate and worse than useless, were now eager to acquire some knowledge of its elements. The Court Nobles also evinced revived interest in it, while even among the despised mercantile class, there were a few individuals who devoted their leisure to a study of Shushi. Nakamura Tekisai (1629-1702), for example, one of the lights of the Teishu school, was a mere Kyōtō trader. Kyōtō teachers now found no lack of pupils. In Yedo, the Hayashi were supreme; there, no one not a pupil or at least a protégé of the school had any great chance of finding an audience. Accordingly those who were not inclined to bow the head to Hayashi or to follow the Teishu system undiluted and unmodified, naturally tended to drift either to Kyōtō or to the Kyōtō district. In the Kamigata, as this section of the Empire was called, there was some room for the free expression of opinion, and freshness of thought was appreciated.

So long as discussion continued to be centred upon the ontological and other abstract concepts of Chinese philosophy, the authorities in the Castle of Nijō had no reason to give themselves any concern. But when ethical and political speculation tended to occupy the place of prominence, it became a different matter; and we find Itakura, the Shoshidai of Kyōtō, on one of his visits to Yedo consulting with Hoshina of Aizu as to what, if any, steps should be taken to deal with this development. Nothing seems to have been done at the time (about 1654) and no active steps for the repression of opinion in Kyōtō were taken until 1666. Then Kumazawa was the first to suffer.

He had opened a school in which, naturally, he expounded the doctrines of Ōyōmei, and the reputation of the Professor quickly brought him crowds of students. Among these were some of the most intelligent of the Court Nobles; and this, in itself, might have caused the Shoshidai, Makino, to intersperse a batch of spies among

Kumazawa's auditors. Even so, if he had refrained from all political and sociological discourse, no official interference might have been expected. The criticism of the actual state of society from the standpoint of his doctrines was, however, as important to Kumazawa as the doctrines themselves, and many of his lectures bore heavily upon the evils of the military régime. Loyalty was, indeed, an all-important virtue—but loyalty to *whom*? He certainly did not keep to himself his opinions about the injustice of a privileged non-productive class. His admiration for the Hayashi school of Yedo was not particularly strong; in truth he was both frequent and free in his sarcasms at the expense of the over-weening pretensions, the shallowness and the pedantry of the philosophical pontiffs of the Tokugawa capital. For seven years all this went on unchecked, but, sooner or later, things were bound to come to a head—and in 1666, Kumazawa was warned by some in the secret that he was presently to be placed under arrest. That night he made his escape, and a day or two afterwards he was safe from immediate pursuit in the mountainous wilds of Yoshino in Yamato. Now, among the crowd of friends Kumazawa had made in Yedo in 1651, was Matsudaira Nobuyuki of Akashi, who succeeded in so arranging matters with the Bakufu that he was authorized to offer Kumazawa a retreat in his own domain. As a matter of fact nearly all the rest of the philosopher-statesman's life was spent under the charge of this friendly warder, who managed to keep him out of all mischief until four or five years before his death in 1691.

Kumazawa left the Bizen cabinet in 1656, but he was destined to render still one more great service to the fief even in the days of his captivity. This was the organization of the curriculum of studies in what was really the first Public School established in Tokugawa Japan. Down to 1666, there was nothing of the sort in the Empire.¹ Even in Yedo, Hayashi's Kōbun-in was supported not by public funds but out of Hayashi's own private revenue. In the year of the Great Fire of London (1666), Lord Ikeda of Bizen, erected a college for the instruction of the sons of his retainers, and placed a younger brother of Kumazawa at its head. Three years later the institution was transferred to Shizutani and greatly enlarged, and Kumazawa himself was invited to preside at the opening

¹ The first public school established by a Daimyō for his retainers was that of Kobayagawa Takakage in Chikuzen, founded in 1580, but it did not remain open long. The history of that of Uyesugi Kagekatsu in Echigo, founded in 1596, was not continuous.

ceremony. On this occasion, he spent the best part of a year amidst his old surroundings, actively employed in settling the curriculum of the new college. The sons of samurai entered it in their eighth or ninth year, and were first instructed in writing and manners. Three years later they began the study of the "Four Books", and in their fourteenth year they became occupied with the more recondite intricacies of etiquette and ceremony. Music they had been taught all along. About fifteen they began to practise archery and riding, and were introduced to mathematics. At sixteen they commenced to appear in public and read their compositions and expound theses before the whole school. After their twentieth year they ceased to attend any regular class or course, but they continued their studies in private, repairing to the Professors from time to time for explanations of any difficulties they encountered. Thus the youths of the fief were under the hands of the college authorities from their eighth to about their thirtieth year. Except Hayashi's school, which was to become a government institution only in 1690, this Okayama College remained the sole great Public School in the Empire for nearly half-a-century.¹

It is now the fashion for modern Japanese historians to stigmatize the somewhat abrupt quietus administered to Kumazawa's professional eloquence as persecution. If we recall the tragic story of Christianity in Japan and the heroic constancy shown by not a few of its adherents, we must perforce admit that the measure of persecution in Kumazawa's case was comparatively mild, and that such crown of martyrdom as his admirers would force upon his

¹ The dates of the establishment of the chief of the other great schools are as follows :—

1. At Wakayama (Kishū), the *Gaku-shu-kwan*, 1713.
2. At Hagi (Chōshū), the *Meirin-kwan*, 1718.
3. At Sendai, the *Yōken-do*, 1736.
4. At Nagoya (Owari), the *Meirin-do*, 1748.
5. At Kumamoto (Higo), the *Jishū-kwan*, 1752.
6. At Kōchi (Tosa), the *Kyōju-kwan*, 1760.
7. At Kagoshima, the *Zōshi-kwan*, 1773.
8. At Wakamatsu (Aidzu), the *Nieshin-kwan*, 1788.
9. At Kanazawa (Kaga), the *Meirindō*, 1792.
10. At Yonezawa, the *Kōjō-kwan*, 1827.
11. At Mito, the *Kōdō-kwan*, 1838.

In most respects the curriculum in these institutions was similar to that of the Okayama seminary organized by Kumazawa. In some of them Dutch came eventually to be taught, while several of them had medical as well as military departments.

Some private schools became quite extensive concerns—that of Itō Jinsai in Kyōtō (1680) for example, and of Nakai Shūan, in Ōsaka (1720). The largest private school in Japan in the nineteenth century was that of Nakai Sekizen in Ōsaka (founded between 1801 and 1817).

brows does not sparkle with any extraordinary lustre. A lingering death in the *fosse* or at the stake is something very different indeed to a quarter of a century of *otium cum dignitate*. It is to be observed that there was as yet no repression of philosophical opinions as such. That was not to come until 1790. It was Kumazawa's political and sociological doctrines and his own biting bitter tongue that served to bring him into trouble. The other expounders of the Ōyōmei philosophy, Nakae's own descendants, lived on quietly and safely in Kyōtō without any interference on the part of the Shoshidai and his minions. Kumazawa was not alone in his misfortunes, such as they were, for at the very moment he was taken in charge by his friend and warder, the Daimyō of Akashi, there was a similar "prisoner at large" in the Castle-town of Akō, scarcely a day's journey distant. This was Yamaga Sokō, one of the most remarkable men of his time.

Yamaga Sokō was a north-countryman, a native of Aidzu, where he was born in 1622. Proceeding to Yedo he attended Hayashi's Kōbunin, and at the same time he studied strategy and tactics under Hōjō Ujinaga, who had a semi-official connexion with the Bakufu. After the rage for *Rōnin* had died down, it became customary for the Daimyō to select instructors for their retainers from among Hōjō's pupils, while at the same time it was usual for Hayashi to find positions for his best men as lecturers on Chinese philosophy in the various Castle-towns. In 1652, the Daimyō of Akō in Harima desired to employ a man in the dual capacity of lecturer on Chinese and instructor in military science, and Yamaga was recommended for, and received, the appointment. He remained in Akō for eight years, and towards the end of the term he seems to have committed the crime of actually beginning to think for himself. At all events, in 1666, six years after his return to Yedo, he burned all his previous writings and published a treatise in which he vehemently assailed what he considered to be the errors and shortcomings of the Teishu system. This terrible lapse into heresy on the part of one of the most favoured of his protégés must have ruffled Hayashi's peace of mind rather seriously, and this circumstance alone might have damaged Yamaga's position in Yedo. But he had also come into conflict with the views of the officially recognized authority (Hōjō) on strategy and tactics. In this field also, Yamaga appeared as an innovator. There were numberless schools of military science in Japan, but most of them were mere variants of the old Chinese

schools or of the school of Nanko, that is of Kusunoki Masashige, who was regarded as a sort of mediæval Japanese Turenne. In all these schools the sword and the spear were regarded as the chief arms. Some changes had indeed taken place in the middle of the sixteenth century,¹ but they appear to have been mainly local and merely temporary. Sekigahara, for instance, was almost entirely fought with spear and sword ; we hear almost nothing of artillery or cavalry, and very little of musketry in that great battle. In truth, the ordinary *samurai* soon came to conceive a dislike for the musket—the sword, he always held, was the proper weapon for gentlemen. On the other hand, the *Rōnin* in Ōsaka relied greatly on rapid rolling musketry fire, and with that they played great havoc in the ranks of the Tokugawa levies. Twelve years later, it was by reliance on small fire-arms that the peasants and *Rōnin* of Shimabara were able to punish the orthodox clan *samurai* so severely as they did. The distinctive features in Yamaga's "school" or system was the great importance attached to the full and advantageous employment of artillery and fire-arms and the strict subordination of tactical units to the general order of battle. It is needless to say that Yamaga's manual, although often thumbed, was never put to practical use until 1865. All that it effected at the time was to help Hōjō and Hayashi in their endeavour to persuade Hoshina that Yamaga should be put in ward as a dangerous person. Accordingly he was entrusted to the keeping of his old lord, the Daimyō of Akō. Like Kumazawa in Akashi, he was neither an official nor a *samurai* in service, nor a *Rōnin*. He was in fact a state prisoner on parole—a prisoner who was not treated as a culprit, but as an honoured guest.

¹ Says Rai Sanyō : " The generalship of Takeda of Kai and Uyesugi of Echigo (after 1550) was something quite new. Before them little attention had been paid to the manœuvring of troops. In conflicts, victory till then depended largely upon the personal prowess of the units. These two Daimyō made a speciality of strategy and tactics, and presently came to be regarded as authorities in this field. As regards cavalry, the Kamakura men and the early Ashikaga did not move away from Kyōto, and most of the wars involving no very long marches relied almost solely upon infantry. Both Uyesugi and Takeda had plenty of horses, but owing to the mountainous nature of their usual seat of war, they set no special store upon the employment of cavalry, and almost invariably used horses merely for the rapid movement of their troops from one spot to another. When it came to action, the men dismounted and fought on foot. So that at this time the use of cavalry had been practically abandoned. Bows and arrows were of course superseded when fire-arms came into use." (This is not correct.) "At this date the musket and the long spear were the chief weapons relied on."

"Though peasants did not rank as soldiers, their services were utilized in war-time in various ways. They were trained in the handling of the musket and the bow in hunting expeditions, and so in case of need could render considerable help in defensive warfare. Bandits were often employed as spies or scouts, the practice being sanctioned by both Takeda and Uyesugi."

During the decade he remained with Lord Asano on this footing, he succeeded in deeply impressing the young *samurai* of the clan with his personality if not with his speculations on cosmogony. Among his pupils was that Ōishi Kuranosuke who was destined to find for himself an immortality in Japan, and a measure of notoriety, if not of reputation, even among occidentals as the leader of the Forty-Seven Rōnin in the famous vendetta of Akō (1703). When Yamaga finally withdrew from Akō in 1676, Ōishi was only seventeen years of age, but, even so, the teachings of the exiled philosopher are said to have made a permanent impression upon his youthful mind. One of his associates in the vendetta, Onodera, was sixty years of age at the time, and so between 1666 and 1676, he must have been in the full vigour of manhood. This Onodera was known as one of the most zealous of Yamaga's followers; and through him the young *samurai* of the clan must have been kept under the influence of Yamaga, even after he had made his peace with the Bakufu (1676) and returned to Yedo.

One of Yamaga's titles to distinction is that, like Itō Jinsai (1627–1705) and Butsu Sorai (1666–1723), he began life as a Shushi adherent, and had sufficient independence of mind to emancipate himself from the trammels of the Teishu system and strike out a path for himself. All these three resembled each other in the cardinal point of rejecting the Sung schoolmen as masters, and resorting to the original Confucian texts for their inspiration. In a way, they might be called the Protestants of Confucianism in Japan. Yamaga thus counts as one of the three founders of the *Kogaku-ha* or old School of Learning. In their interpretation of the original texts the members of this school were often far from being in agreement with each other; in truth, there is as much divergence between their views as there is between those of the Divines of the various Protestant sects in their interpretation of the more cryptic passages in Holy Writ.¹ Into any discussion of these, of course, it would be futile to enter, for working with mere, vague, illegitimate symbolic conceptions as basic principles, it is not to be expected that the results at which these worthy old philosophers arrived

¹ In addition to the material in Dr. Knox's papers already alluded to, liberal use has been made in the preparation of this chapter of that in the following very scholarly monographs, all of which eminently deserve the student's attention: *Galen Fisher on Nakae Tōju*, *T.A.S.J.*, vol. xxxvi, pt. i. Rev. Arthur Lloyd, *Historical Development of Shushi Philosophy in Japan*, *T.A.S.J.*, vol. xxxiv, pt. iv, and Walter Dening, *Confucian Philosophy in Japan*, *T.A.S.J.*, vol. xxxvi, pt. ii.

could be of any transcendent value in the history of thought. Two points have to be adverted to, if not emphasized. In the first place, the rise of these strong and vigorous heterodox schools were of inestimable value, inasmuch as the clash of opinion they naturally provoked did much to save the national intellect from falling into the stagnation which mere unreflecting, passive adherence to any one single dominant school or set of ideas is bound to occasion. Now, the influence of these *Kogaku-ha* independents was at one time powerful and widespread. In his private school in Kyōto, Itō Jinsai is said to have trained more than 3,000 "philosophers", his pupils coming from every province of the Empire except Hida and the islets of Oki and Iki. In the second place, it is to be noted that heretics were *not* persecuted by the authorities as is so commonly asserted. Yamaga did get into difficulties it is true but it was his innovations in military science and the offensive way in which they were set forth, rather than his philosophy, that he had to thank for that. As for Itō Jinsai, he was never once interfered with—although Sorai was indeed once summoned by Hayashi and subjected to a reprimand. Sorai had, however, been Hayashi's pupil, and it was rather in the quality of a teacher remonstrating with an erring disciple than as a government official that Hayashi presumed to take the heretic to task.

It will be gathered from the foregoing account that the study of Chinese philosophy, so despised and scorned as something effeminate by the two-sworded class at the beginning of the seventeenth century, had been making considerable headway. In fact it had now assumed the appearance of an all-pervading national craze. Naturally its great seats were Yedo and Kyōto, but Bizen and Akō were by no means the only remote country fiefs into which it had found a ready entrance. In 1660, Nakagawa, the Lord of a domain of 70,000 *koku* at Oka in Bungo, invited Kumazawa to visit him, made several days' journey to meet his guest, and entertained him most royally during the six weeks he stayed and lectured to the samurai of the fief. Over in Chikugū, in Tachibana's domain of Yanagawa (119,000 *koku*), Andō Seian was expounding Shushi's doctrines with great acceptance, while in Kuroda's great fief of Chikuzen (520,000 *koku*) Kaibara Ekken (1630–1714) began to lecture and compose in the simple yet elegant style that has given him such a high place in the history of Japanese literature.¹

¹ In Professor Chamberlain's *Things Japanese* (Article, Woman, Status of)

It was in the remote and mountainous province of Tosa, in Shikoku, that modern Confucianism made its fullest development outside of the two capital cities and the fief of Bizen. And the strange thing is that this development was autochthonous in a way, owing nothing to any of the metropolitan savants. A certain Tani Jichū (1598-1649), at the time a turbulent monk, happened to obtain a copy of Shushi's works, and on perusing the books he promptly abandoned the monastery and devoted himself to expounding the "real" truth, meanwhile finding a means of livelihood in the practice of medicine. It was upon the ethical or practical side of Shushi's system that Tani laid most stress, emphasizing the need of active interest in the affairs of society. This teaching met with much local appreciation, and disciples flocked to Tani's dispensary, not so much for drugs as for doctrine. Among others, Ogura Sansei and Nonaka Kenzan drew inspiration from the learned apothecary—later on both these men were taken into the public service of the fief and became great social forces in Tosa for a season. It was they, and more especially Nonaka, who inaugurated the great system of canalization and irrigation that brought a huge stretch of the most fertile soil in the province under the farmer's mattock. Ogura and Nonaka were firm friends, albeit very dissimilar in temperament. In certain respects the differences between them almost amounted to a contrast but, very fortunately, their qualities proved in actual work to be not so much antagonistic as complimentary. Ogura was mild and tactful by nature, while Nonaka was exceedingly masterful, a man who did not tolerate fools gladly. Reformers are often regarded as very unpleasant people by the self-satisfied mediocrities around them, and Nonaka's strenuous methods and ambitious projects were not generally popular in Tosa. So long as Ogura stood beside him, with his tact and his skill in giving the soft answer that turneth away wrath, all opposition was easily surmounted. Ogura, however, died in 1654, and Nonaka then gradually fell into disrepute, both with his lord and with his fellow-officers and subjects. In 1663, he committed the "happy dispatch", whether voluntarily or in accordance with orders is still a matter of dispute. Like

will be found an excellent translation from the *Onna Daigaku*, a work generally attributed to Kaibara. It seems to be really from the pen of Kaibara's wife, who shared in his studies, and who was an accomplished woman. Much fuller particulars of his life and writings will be found in Dr. Aston's *History of Japanese Literature*, the extracts given in which are interesting from the similarities they display in human nature in Japan in the early eighteenth century, and it may be said, in England to-day.—J. H. L.

Kumazawa in Bizen, Nonaka found that the reformer's life was not a particularly happy one, but every Tosa man reveres him as a great national hero, while not a few Japanese historians are prepared to admit that Nonaka, so misunderstood in his day and so scurvily rewarded, is not without some claims to the proud distinction.

Perhaps the most famous and influential among the Tosa or Southern School of Shushi philosophers was an immigrant. Yamazaki Anzai (1618-82)—like Fujiwara Seigwa, Hayashi Dōshun, and several others among the great early lights of Confucianism in Japan—began life in a Kyōto monastery. Here he promised to develop into a most unclerical cleric. His pranks were nearly as mischievous as those of Yoshitsune, Hideyoshi, or Yui no Shosetsu when in a similar position. As a last resort he was transferred to a branch temple in Tosa. Here he met with Ogura and Nonaka, and the result was that Buddha and the Sutras got thrown overboard, while the Shushi philosophy gained one of its sincere adherents and ablest exponents. Unless taken into the service of some feudal lord, or unless they happened to have some private means of their own, the Japanese Confucianists of those days were frequently as poor as the wandering scholar of mediæval Europe, and Yamazaki was poor enough even for an early Franciscan. His poverty did not prevent him being as proud as Lucifer. In Yedo, whither he proceeded later on, it is told that a great feudal lord once condescended to invite the impecunious philosopher to proceed to his *yashiki* to lecture before himself. Yamazaki refused to be held so cheaply. "It is not for the teacher to go to the disciple," he made answer, and the Daimyō had to knock humbly at the Confucianist's door. Think of such an incident in the days of Katō Kiyomasa! This alone might suffice as an indication of how fast and how far change in the realm of intellectual and moral values had proceeded since the close of the castle-building epoch in Japan.

Towards the very highest in the land Yamazaki was equally fearless in his bearing, and outspoken in his remarks. When Hoshina of Aidzu (the Shōgun's uncle and guardian) became acquainted with him, he appreciated him highly, and treated him with marked respect. "What are your chief gratifications in life?" queried Hoshina one day. "They are three," was the answer, "in the first place, I am thankful that I was born a man. In the second, I am thankful that I was born in a time of peace, when I can carry on my studies without distraction—keeping company with the wise of all

ages and hearing what they have to say." Here the speaker came to a pause. "And the third?" at last asked Hoshina. "In the third place," replied Yamazaki, very slowly and deliberately, "I rejoice that I was born the son of a poor man and *not the son of a rich lord*, for the sons of Daimyō too often grow up ignorant and helpless. I rejoice in the pleasure of poverty, with its *consequent immunity from flattery and deceit*." And yet, in the face of such an incident, we are often assured that such a thing as freedom of speech was totally unknown in Tokugawa Japan. Yamazaki was ultimately taken into Hoshina's service as lecturer and tutor. On Hoshina's death in 1672, he retired to Kyōto, and there spent the last decade of his life. Some surprise has been expressed at Hoshina's marked encouragement of Yamazaki's efforts to rehabilitate Shintō as a practical rule of life, for Shintō has often been summed up in the formula: "Follow the impulses of your nature and obey the Emperor." Now it was a cardinal article in the House of Tokugawa of which Hoshina was the main prop, that the Emperor should have no authority whatsoever and that he should have no contact with any of his subjects outside the walls of his Palace. To speak of obedience to him as furnishing a rule of life would in these circumstances be absurd. But Yamazaki's adherence to the old autochthonous cult was on religious and not on political grounds, for with politics Yamazaki persistently refused to meddle. Yamazaki's Shintō was not based upon the legends of the *Kojiki*; it was an eclectic system which took the best in Shintō, and strove to give it expression by means of a stately and dignified ritual. "The Sun and Moon whose light is universal" he took as the symbols of his purified Shintō, which was mainly a worship of Nature; and "the Way along which man should walk in order to please God was that which was from the beginning. Man, born with an innate desire after holiness, naturally tended to walk along that way except when hindered by disturbing influences. The Way has always been known in Japan, where it needed neither foreign nor Japanese books (neither Sutras nor the *Kojiki*) to illustrate or enforce it; it was suited for high and low alike, and all that walk by its precepts would attain to perfection".

Modern Japanese writers often point to Yamazaki as having been very largely instrumental in originating the loyalist movement that led to the Revolution in 1868. If he was an instrument in

originating this movement, he was an entirely unconscious instrument. Any possible subversal of the Tokugawa rule never seems to have entered into his mind. His services were limited to exciting or re-exciting an intelligent interest in Shintō; he thus led his disciples and others to investigate the grounds of the native cult, and as a result of the study of the *Kojiki* and other ancient documents, conclusions were reached which were no doubt likely to be fraught with very grave consequences to the usurpation of power by the military class. The eighteenth century was to be marked by a long-sustained and bitter conflict between the leaders in the revival of the Shintō movement and the Confucianists, against whose hitherto unquestioned supremacy in the field of intellect, ardent patriots like Mabuchi and Motoori revolted. Down to this date (A.D. 1700) there had been no conflict. Hayashi Dōshun, Nakae Tōju, Kumazawa Banzan, had all alike expressed a high regard for the old native "Way of the Gods". Such conflict as that in which the Confucianists had hitherto engaged had been with the followers of Shaka. Here indeed the polemic was violent and virulent, in outward seeming at all events. But the seeming seriousness of these encounters has to be discounted by the fact that we find Nakae and Kumazawa and even the Hayashi maintaining the most amicable relations with the several priests they counted among their personal acquaintances. In truth, we may not be so very far astray if we regard many of these Confucianist assaults in the light of mere literary exercises in declamation and style.

It is at the same time true that some of Yamazaki's pupils and their successors must be counted among the pioneers of the great movement that came to a successful practical issue in 1868. His immediate followers split up into a Shintō and three Confucianist schools, and certain of these considered themselves by no means bound by any self-denying ordinance to eschew everything that had a political or sociological bearing.¹ Yamazaki's appeal to

¹ For instance, of Asami Keisai (1652-1711), one of Yamazaki's most prominent disciples, we are told: "Asami's doctrine of reverence and righteousness and his recognition of filial piety and loyalty as the bases of all human duty led him to an outspoken condemnation of many things of which the Japan of his day officially approved. Mencius had justified rebellion against a sovereign as being at times permissible; Asami was as thorough-going a 'Divine right' or 'King's man' as any of his English contemporaries. As a consequence he defended the action of the forty-seven Rōnin, praised Kusunoki Masashige as a model of heroism and proclaimed Ashikaga as an arch-rebel. It required courage to say such things under

religion, and to loyalty through religion, became the kernel of the teaching of the third and subsequent generations of his disciples ; and it is not strange to find that an abnormal development of this special feature of his system should have caused a high degree of respect for his memory among the court nobles of Kyōto. In the middle of the eighteenth century (1758), we shall find one of Yamazaki's successors, Takenouchi Shikibu, creating quite a sensation in Kyōto and provoking the Bakufu to drastic measures of repression.

It was Mito in the north that became the headquarters of the Southern School of Shushi's philosophy. In that fief, Kuriyama (1671-1706), Azaka (1656-1737) and Miyake (1675-1712) all found employment, at one time or another, in assisting Tokugawa Mitsukuni (1628-1700) in the compilation of his great work, the *Dai Nihonshi*, or "History of Japan". Mitsukuni himself, although his literary fame rests mainly on his great historical undertaking, is also to be reckoned among the Shushi philosophers. But his temperament was essentially eclectic. He asserts in his self-composed epitaph: "Although he venerated Shintō and Confucianism yet he was wont to criticize them ; and although he was an intelligent student of Buddhism and Taoism, he often attacked them."

Now, this second Tokugawa Lord of Mitō, Mitsukuni, enjoyed the enviable, but thoroughly well-merited, reputation of being one of the three ablest local administrators of his age. In the prudent control of their vassals and in the intelligent development and utilization of the resources of their fiefs, Hoshina of Aidzu and Ikeda of Bizen were perhaps his equals. These three great feudal administrators stood in a special class of their own, even the best of their contemporaries being rather their imitators than their rivals. All these three great men were something more than merely successful administrators. They were all men of wide and extensive culture, of alert and receptive minds, of great driving power, with the ability to impress their contemporaries with a sense of their personality. Accordingly, in any set of instructions for their samurai issued by them, we may not unnaturally expect to find an expression of the spirit of the age at its best. Such

the iron rule of the Tokugawas ; the popularity of Asami's book (*The Seigen Igen*) shows that there were many who sat very restlessly under that tyranny." Rev. A. Lloyd in *T.A.S.J.*, vol. xxxiv, pt. iv, p. 44.

a document would be likely to be well conned by other feudal magnates, and we know that some of them evidently paid to it the homage of the sincerest form of flattery—imitation, to wit.

It was these, among other considerations, that prompted the citation of a few extracts from Mitsukuni's "Instructions to his Vassals", at the beginning of this chapter. As was there insisted on, a perusal of them alongside or just after those of Katō Kiyomasa, a great and gallant captain, an able administrator, and a most bigoted Buddhist, but a man of few and very simple intense ideas, should suffice to indicate how the samurai ferocity had been tamed and the intellectual horizon widened in the course of less than three generations. The preceding pages have been occupied with an attempt to trace the origins and the course of the currents of influence that accomplished this startling change which, remarkable as it is in itself, is merely one episode in a long development.

In Vol. I of this work much attention had to be devoted to the Sinicisation of Japanese institutions and culture in the seventh, eighth, and ninth centuries. It was there strongly insisted upon that one of the prime aims of the Reformers of 645 was to prevent the rise of anything like Feudalism or of any special military class. The Chinese classification of society into gentlemen, agriculturists, artisans, and traders was then introduced into Japan. It was the Chinese conception of the "gentleman" that was adopted, and "the gentlemen were those who studied letters and arms". The emphasis was placed on letters, so much so that the sword, if worn at all, was regarded pretty much in the same light as a bracelet or a hairpin, a mere item of personal adornment. In truth, in China, the "Gentleman" has nearly always been a civilian, the mere soldier being condemned as something little better than a brutal barbarian. In Reformed Japan, it was this view that prevailed for centuries; among the court nobles, indeed, it is the view that has always prevailed till recent times. When, at last, a warrior class did begin to establish itself, its greatest chieftains were only too pleased to have an opportunity of attaching themselves to the households of certain of the great court nobles, where they were treated pretty much on the footing of modern policemen hired by wealthy private individuals as watchmen to protect their premises. The rapid rise of that warrior class in the eleventh and twelfth centuries has been recounted; how they gradually became possessed of the supreme political power and instituted a jurisprudence of

their own, a jurisprudence which, in some of its essential features, was in direct conflict with the old national codes which it superseded. Needless to say that, meanwhile, an ethos developed among the samurai which was still more in conflict with that which prevailed at the court for centuries. Of Katō Kiyomasa's "Instructions" it has been well remarked that obviously their paramount purpose was to draw a sharp line of demarcation between the Samurai and the courtiers living in Kyōto. The dancing and couplet-composing, the sumptuous living, and the fine costumes of officials frequenting the Imperial capital, were interdicted by the feudatories, and the veto in Katō's code was couched in language that must have sounded particularly offensive in the ears of the ancient nobility of Kyōto. Such language was indeed most strongly resented in court circles and the expression of this resentment was one of the considerations that prompted Iyemitsu's famous progress to the Imperial court at the head of 307,000 armed men in 1634.

On his return to Yedo, Iyemitsu instituted (1634) a great reform in the etiquette of the Shōgunal court, and one incident in connexion with this reform indicates how great the divergence between Buké and Kugé ceremonial had become. Envoys from the Kyōto court occasionally repaired to Yedo; and in order that these might be suitably received, Iyemitsu found it necessary to dispatch two of his dependents to Kyōto to undergo a special course of instruction in Kugé ceremonial. The lore thus acquired by these two men (Ōsawa and Kira) became hereditary in their houses, as was also the duty of supervising the details of the reception of future court envoys to the Kwantō.

In Katō Kiyomasa's day the social conditions of Japan were approximately as follows:—The Kyōto civilian courtiers counted for almost nothing, and, of course, the outcast classes were regarded as beneath contempt. The rest of the population of the Empire was still classified into (1) Gentry, (2) Peasants, (3) Artisans, (4) Traders. The "gentleman" was now a soldier, almost purely and entirely a man of war. In fact, as appeared in the account of Nakae's early days, book-learning was still regarded with contempt by the average samurai of A.D. 1620 to 1630. Fifty or sixty years later, in Mitsukuni's time, the conception of the "gentleman" had reverted to what it was theoretically in ancient China. However, it must not be overlooked that, among the samurai at large, certain of Mitsukuni's instructions could only be regarded in the light of so

many counsels of perfection. Even as late as 1868, many of the two-sworded men, at least in the outlying fiefs, were the reverse of proficient in book-learning, some of them, indeed, being unable either to write or to read an ordinary letter.

One last point demands some consideration. The original introduction of Chinese culture into Japan in the sixth and subsequent centuries was the outcome of direct personal intercourse between Japanese and Continentals, Koreans in the first place, and, later on, Chinese. In that early period, there really were great successive waves of Continental immigration into Japan, and these immigrants were the great operative force in the diffusion of Chinese culture in the Island Empire. In addition to this, there was a constant succession of Japanese returning from long terms of study at the Chinese court or in Chinese monasteries. How far was this renaissance of Chinese culture in Japan in the seventeenth century furthered by direct intercourse between Chinese and Japanese?

It must be remembered that, in consequence of the depredations of Japanese pirates, the Chinese government prohibited all intercourse with Japan shortly after the middle of the sixteenth century. On the other hand, no Japanese could leave Japan after 1635. On the fall of the Ming dynasty in 1644, the prohibition against intercourse with the Island Empire was removed, but the Japanese were careful to insure that such Chinese traders as then came should be confined to Nagasaki and that they should return as soon as their wares were sold. No Chinaman, whether a scholar or not, could be received in any fief without a written authorization from the Bakufu, and the Bakufu was very chary indeed about issuing such documents. So much appears from the details of the accounts we have of the settlement of the three Chinamen in Mito (or Yedo) who were taken into Mitsukuni's service. One of the three was a mere unlettered menial; of the other two, Shu Shunsui (1606-83) passed the last eighteen years of his life under Mitsukuni's protection, and was much in his company. "Sometimes he discussed history, sometimes philosophy with the Prince; one day poetry, and another day, politics," but beyond textual corrections of the Chinese into which the original Japanese was rendered, he seems to have had little share in the work on the *Dai Nihonshi*. The other refugee, the priest Shinyetsu, first met Mitsukuni in 1681, when he was assigned a home in the third yashiki of the Mito clan in Yedo. After the death of Shu Shunsui in 1683, Shinyetsu removed to Mitō and

died there in 1694. Mitsukuni is said to have invited yet another Chinaman to reside with him, and sent a messenger to fetch him from Nagasaki, but the Bakufu *objected on the ground that there should not be two Chinamen in one fief at the same time*. What makes this latter assertion probable is that when a grandson of Shu Shunsui arrived at Nagasaki on his way to see his grandfather, he was "prevented by law" from proceeding any further.

Altogether it is to be feared that, in connexion with the influence of Chinese refugees from Manchu tyranny on the diffusion of Chinese culture in Japan, there has been some loose writing. "These men from the West brought not only ethics but philosophy, and the fertilizing influence of these scholars of the dispersion may be likened to the exodus of Constantinople by the Turks." Such a view is sadly mistaken, for as a sober matter of fact it appears that the refugees who then settled in the various fiefs of Japan could readily be counted on the ten fingers of one's hands. Besides the three already mentioned, we hear of a celebrated Chinese physician who was patronized in Yedo, while in 1659, the Ōbaku monastery was established at Uji by the Chinese priest, Ingen, who came to Japan in 1653. And, oddly enough, what the Japanese did learn from this very exiguous immigration appears to have been not so much either philosophy or ethics as *jūjutsu* of all things in the world, a thing that is now supposed to be wholly Japanese! ¹ Even if these half-score or so of Chinese refugees exerted themselves ever so strenuously their presence in the Empire would have contributed no more than

¹ From certain accounts it would appear that *jūjutsu* was introduced into Japan by the Chinese, Chin Gem Bin, who settled in Owari and died there in 1671. According to the *Owari Meisho Dzuyé* he had been cordially welcomed by the Lord of Owari when he fled from his own country. In the same book a passage is quoted from the *Kempōhisho* which states that when Chin Gem Bin lived in Azabu in Yedo he told three Rōnin that in China there was an art of seizing a man and he had seen it, that it was of such and such a nature. The three Rōnin after hearing this, investigated the art, and as a result the "school" of the art called *Kitōryū* was founded. It is to be noted, however, that some ultra-patriotic writers deny that Chin Gem Bin introduced *jūjutsu* into Japan on the ground that "it is a shame to our country to ascribe the origin of *jūjutsu* to China!" The *Owari Meisho Dzuyé* in the *Illustrated Guide to the Celebrated Places in (the province of) Owari*, one of the national series of illustrated guide books to the principal cities, high roads, and provinces of the Empire, published in the first half of the nineteenth century, and recognized as one of the most complete and interesting series of guide books existing in any language. All the volumes are very fully illustrated with engravings of the localities to which they refer. A full description of both the history and practice of *jūjutsu* is given in a paper by the Rev. T. Lindsay and J. Kano, *T.A.S.J.*, vol. xvi, part ii, where it is termed "The Old Samurai art of Fighting without weapons".—J. H. L.

the merest dribble to the stream of Chinese influence that had been and was then carrying all before it and profoundly modifying everything in ethical and intellectual Japan. Whatever may have been the influence of the fall of the Eastern Empire upon the culture of Europe, that exercised on the spread of Chinese learning in Japan by the overthrow of the Ming dynasty, seems to have been virtually nil.

CHAPTER IV

IYETSUNA (1663-80)

IN Iyetsuna's time the Ainu made one more desperate effort to assert their independence. Some seven or eight centuries before a long and, at times, a not unequal contest was waged between the hairy aboriginals and the southern invaders in Mutsu and Dewa. It is certain that there is a strong strain of Ainu blood in the population of the northern provinces of the main island of Japan, for there in the ninth and subsequent centuries the great bulk of the conquered race settled down to an agricultural life under Japanese rule. Such of the Emishi as were too stout and stiff-necked to submit had perforce to cross the Straits of Tsugaru, and find homes for themselves among their kinsmen in the great island of Yezo. Under the Kamakura Bakufu, an official was installed at Tsugaru, specially charged with the superintendence of the Emishi in Mutsu and Dewa and with the duty of keeping a vigilant eye upon the doings of their kindred across the straits. Later on, the Japanese established a footing in Yezo itself; and in 1442 we hear of a certain Takeda Nobuhiro installing himself in the island, "where he aided the Governor, Kakizaki, to repress the Emishi." This Takeda married the Governor's daughter, and assumed the name of Kakizaki. His grandson, Kakizaki Suehiro, acquired a great ascendancy over the aborigines in his vicinity, induced them or forced them to submit to his regulations, and did much to develop a profitable commerce between the two sides of the Straits of Tsugaru. In his day and generation, Kakizaki Suehiro was practically an independent kinglet. Meanwhile, however, the reunification of Japan was proceeding apace; and on the fall of the Hōjō of Odawara (1590), Hideyoshi summoned all the chieftains in the north of that stronghold to acknowledge his sway. Among the others, Kakizaki's son and successor, Yoshihiro, had now to bow to the inevitable and receive confirmation of his title to his Yezo domains. Some time afterwards, he built the new castle of Fukuyama in the Matsumae district, and changed his family name of Kakizaki into Matsumae.

Yoshihiro, who appears to have been a man of enterprise and vigour, was untiring in his efforts to attract settlers from the Main Island, and to convert southern Yezo into a "Plantation" analogous to those then being established in Ireland, and on the Western Atlantic sea-board. For two generations this process went on without provoking any special conflict with the natives, but by Iyetsuna's time the former peaceable relations between the two races seems to have undergone a change. At all events, in 1669, there was a sudden explosion.

The Ainu organized themselves for a great effort, rose in desperate revolt and massacred as many as 700 of the settlers. Even in their old wars, the Emishi had generally failed because their cohesion was defective; in truth, in this respect they were not a whit superior to the clans of the Scottish Highlands. On the present occasion, they did hold together for some little time; but, as of old, they presently began to scatter to their villages, and next summer the Lord of Matsumae had no difficulty in taking them in detail and stamping out the "rebellion" in fire and blood. Henceforth the erstwhile fierce and untameable Emishi, once among the very best fighting men in the Japanese archipelago, appear as a meek, submissive and spirit-broken race.

This so-called "Great Ainu Revolt" of 1669-70 was in itself a trivial matter, of no more intrinsic importance than one of England's little wars on the Afghan or Kashmir frontier. Meanwhile however, the old seats of the Emishi, the wide lands of Mutsu and Dewa, assumed a position of high consequence in the economic development of the Empire. One great matter of concern to the Bakufu was the adequate provisioning of the metropolis with its thronging population of over 1,000,000 souls—a population, too, that at that epoch was continually on the increase.

Yedo was originally destined for the local capital of the Kwantō; and during the first decade of its existence in Iyeyasu's hands, it was that and nothing more.¹ Now, the eight provinces of the Kwantō were fertile, indeed; and in ordinary years they could furnish a great surplus of farm produce for sale. But it must be remembered that land transport was very costly. The roads, it is

¹ It was in the year 1590, that the city of Yedo was founded, when Iyeyasu was enfeoffed by Hideyoshi with the eight eastern provinces, the capital of which was of course Yedo. When Iyeyasu became Shōgun in 1600, Yedo naturally became the administrative capital of the Empire, which, under the name of Tokio, it continues to be to this day.—J. H. L.

true, were no worse than they were in contemporary Europe ; indeed the great main highways were then far better in Japan than they were in the most advanced countries of the West. But the methods of transportation were crude and primitive. Horses were never put between the shafts of a vehicle for any purpose ; such clumsy solid-wheeled vehicles as there were were drawn by bullocks or by men. The most common means of land-transport was the pack-horse or rather pack-pony, whose load amounted to no more than some 350 pounds.¹ The consequence of this was that it did not pay the farmer in the outlying districts of the Kwantō to send his surplus produce to Yedo ; and so the city had to look to the country more immediately adjacent to it for its support. The Kwantō might have proved adequate to support a capital such as Kamakura with 200,000 or 250,000 inhabitants had been, especially when we remember that the Japanese are great fish-eaters, and that Yedo Bay and the adjacent waters of the ocean swarmed with many varieties of fish of the very best species and quality.

Soon after Sekigahara (1600) it became plain that Yedo was destined to be the metropolis not merely of the Kwantō, but of the whole empire of Japan. The system of political hostages, instituted by Iyeyasu and finally regulated by Iyemitsu, concentrated a population of several hundred thousands of the military class around the castle. In the *Yashiki* of the feudal nobles there was a great throng of menials, mostly from the surrounding country districts, and the presence of this wealthy consuming class of nobles and their dependents made the speedy increase of a great civilian population of traders and artisans inevitable. What this civilian population amounted to in Iyetsuna's day we do not know exactly. In 1725 it was found to be about 750,000, and in little more than half-a-century later (1787) it had increased to 1,367,000 souls. In the maintenance of this huge swarming human hive, the resources of the Kwantō, even in the best of years, would prove sadly insufficient. Apart from the civilian, the *yashiki* population had to be catered for, for although some of the Daimyō brought the main staple of diet—rice—from their own fiefs, the geographical position of the domains of most of them rendered that course impossible, and all had to depend for such items as vegetables on the Yedo market. The great extent of soil thus necessarily devoted to market-gardening

¹ In the early Tokugawa days, the load of a "horse" on the great highways was fixed at 375 pounds. This was afterwards reduced to 329 pounds.

diminished the amount of rice-land in the Kwantō. Thus rice had to be obtained in regions beyond the Kwantō mountain-ring or to be fetched by sea from far distant provinces.

In these circumstances, the former seats of the Ainu, Ōshū and Dewa, with the contiguous province of Echigo, became to Yedo much what Eubœa and Thrace were to Athens, or Sicily or Egypt or the Province of Africa to Rome. In each of these three great northern provinces, the Bakufu held vast expanses of extremely fertile soil under its direct administration. In Ōshū its interests were guarded by four, in Dewa two, and in Echigo, by six *Daikwan*, each supervising a domain of some 50,000 *koku* at least. About forty per cent. of the yield of these demesnes was tax-rice; and to get this to Yedo eventually proved to be a much more practicable task than it was for the city to tap the outlying fringe of the Kwantō for supplies. It was at this epoch that the rice-transport system from the extreme north-east of Japan to the Tokugawa capital was organized. And once more—as in the case of the Tamagawa aqueduct—the work was done by a mere man of the people—a certain Kawamura Yoshiharu.

This man, born at Yedo in 1618, began life as a mere cart-coolie. In course of time he drifted into employment in the post-service on the highroads; and here his intelligence presently procured him promotion from the shafts of the cart to the manager's office in one of the post-stations. His business capacity enabled him to amass a little money, and so, when the conflagration of Yedo presented him with his opportunity for a *coup*, he was in a position to avail himself of it. While the flames were still raging, he posted off to the upper reaches of the Kiso-gawa, bought all the felled timber and acres upon acres of the standing trees in the magnificent forests that clothed the steep mountain slopes, converted these trees into lumber, floated them down to the embouchure of the river and thence navigated them in rafts round to Yedo.¹ The Bakufu set

¹ The River Kiso rises in the Shinshiu mountains and after flowing through part of the province of Mino enters the sea near Kuwana on the border of Ise. Its surrounding scenery makes it one of the most beautiful in Japan, rapidly flowing as it does, through forest-clad hills and picturesque tortuous gorges, but it is not suited for navigation, and the difficulties of floating timber down its reaches would be intensified by the fact that it divides into several branches near its mouth. These difficulties would be nothing as compared with those of navigating timber rafts from the mouth to Yedo, a distance of fully 150 sea miles, in open ocean, where storms are frequent and seas often mountainous. The story in the text is interesting but it may be well to accept it with some reservation, although this method of transport is described in Mr. Wigmore's paper referred to below as taking place

a maximum upon the price of lumber as well as of rice, other commodities and labour ; and so the enterprising Kawamura could not reap as much from his venture as he would have done in an age of free trade and open competition. Yet even so, the immediate result of his *coup* was to make him a rich man. And more important still—perhaps—the astuteness and energy he displayed attracted the favourable attention of the authorities who came to the conclusion that they might advantageously utilize his abilities to organize the rice-transport service from the north of Japan to Yedo.

In 1635–6, the rapidly growing Japanese mercantile marine was purposely legislated off the face of the high seas. No vessel of over 500 *koku* capacity could thenceforward be constructed ; and even such hulls as were put upon the stocks had to be built strictly in accordance with regulations which made them crazy and unseaworthy—utterly incapable of contending with the great billows of the Sea of Japan or of the open Pacific. Certain details of this drastic legislation of the preceding generation were now modified. Freighters of 1,000 *koku* or more were built ; and built too, not only for fair, but for the hap of foul weather as well. One fleet of these new and substantial vessels was assigned to the Yedo-Sendai service, to bring the tax-rice of the Tokugawa domains in Ōshū to the granaries on the banks of the River Sumida in Asakusa and Honjō. This was a short and comparatively easy voyage. The transport of the annual tax-product of Dewa and Echigo was a much more serious undertaking. The rice was collected at the port of Niigata and there loaded on the new freighters. These started late in spring, and made their way down the coast to Shimonoseki at the entrance to the Inland Sea, where they received instructions either to wait till the quotations for rice became more favourable in Ōsaka or to proceed thither at once. Usually they arrived at Ōsaka late in summer or early in autumn, and then lay up for the winter in the River Yodo, setting out on their return voyage early in spring. Thus, the round-trip from Niigata on the west coast to Ōsaka on the eastern verge of the Inland Sea and back occupied the best part of a year—generally, indeed, a full year.

Between Ōsaka and Yedo special lines were established. One of these was known as the *Taru-bune* or “cask-vessels”, because

not only from Owari but from Tosa. The Shinshiu and Mino hills are thickly timbered to this day, but the difficulties and expense of transport have compelled the Japanese to obtain from America a large portion of the lumber they required after the last great earthquake (1923).

they were specially used for the transport of *saké*. They were of lighter capacity and greater speed than the others, which ultimately undertook the transport of all kinds of freight. From first to last, however, the great staple continued to be rice, in which the Bakufu tax-rice from Dewa and Echigo continued to be the most considerable item. Rice from Kyūshū also reached Yedo, but it formed only a small fraction of the total quantity entering the city ; and even the Tokugawa tax-rice from Kyūshū was but a fraction of this fraction, for the Bakufu holdings in the great Southern island were not extensive. (In fact they comprised no more than Nagasaki and the district around it, the island of Amakusa, small districts in Buzen and in Bungo, and a considerable tract in central Hyūga.)

This Tokugawa tax-rice was, of course, not primarily destined for the support of the civilian population of the capital. It was specially and immediately intended for the payment of the stipends of those among the Bakufu functionaries and Tokugawa vassals, resident in Yedo, who did not hold landed fiefs of their own. These subordinate functionaries were paid partly in rice and partly in money, as a general rule, though the regulations varied from time to time. In one special year, for example, we find 801,117 bales (*hyō*) of rice, and 325,317 *ryō* disbursed as stipends, the rice being reckoned at 40 *ryō* per 100 bales, and the *ryō* being equal to something between £1 and 30s. Of this rice more than half would be sold by its recipients, and from this source perhaps as much as 450,000 bales would thus become available for the support of the civilian population. The huge *Yashiki* population of about half a million had also to be provided for. It will thus become apparent that the Tokugawa tax-rice really played a subordinate part in the provisioning of the city at large. For Iyetsuna's time details of the exact provenance of the Yedo rice-supply are not available, but the ratio cannot have changed very much during the succeeding years, and the figures for the last period of the Shōgunate are therefore not without their value in this connexion. About 1860, as much as 2,167,000 bales of rice were sold in Yedo. Of this no more than 490,000 bales came from the Tokugawa granaries, this amount being surplus rice disposed of by officials and others drawing stipends from the Bakufu. More than twice as much, 1,046,000 bales, came from the farmers in the Kwantō and the north ; and 532,000 bales from the Lords of Sendai, Nambu, and others in the extreme north of Japan. Only 99,000 bales came from the west,

and among this was the Kyūshū rice. Of course, much more rice from Kyūshū than these figures indicate was consumed in Yedo, for the great *yashiki* of Satsuma, Higo Saga, Chikuzen, and Kurume, would all be supported by the produce of their own fiefs.

It will thus be readily seen that, apart from the supplies brought down the Sumida, Yedo was almost entirely dependent upon the sea-routes for its support, and that Siebold scarcely exaggerates when he asserts that a week's interruption of its maritime communications would reduce the great city to starvation. Of this fact the Bakufu councillors were unpleasantly conscious when Perry with his "Black Ships" appeared in Yedo Gulf and persisted in remaining there. Without firing a shot the American commander might well have cowed the government into abject submission to his demands, merely by throttling the rice-junk traffic for a few months, and, at the same time, clearing Yedo Bay of the thousands of fishing craft which constantly crowded its waters.

Next to rice the great staple of Japanese diet was fish. Among the outsiders who presently swarmed to Yedo soon after its foundation were some fishermen from the Ōsaka and Hyōgo neighbourhood, who were accorded the privilege of plying their vocation in Yedo Gulf by Iyeyasu, on condition that they sold the best of their catches to the Castle. The rest they sold to the citizens at Nihonbashi. Later on, two other fish markets were established, but they never attained the importance of the original mart at the Bridge of Japan. Early in the seventeenth century, a certain native of Yamato, Sukegorō by name, arrived in Yedo and energetically began to organize the fishmongers into a guild. Yamatoya's¹ great purpose was to get all the fishermen into his hands and under his control, and to prevent them having any direct dealings with the consumer. He contracted for the purchase of all the fish caught, advanced money to the fishermen on the security of their catches, their boats, and fishing-gear, constructed preserves for keeping the fish alive until they were exposed for sale, and enrolled all the fishmongers in a great confederation which ultimately consisted of 396 wholesale merchants and 246 brokers. This organization, or trust, was governed by very strict private regulations of its own making and was at first a sort of economic *imperium in imperio*, something in the industrial field that presents analogies to the House Laws of

¹ Sukegorō, as was the custom of Japanese traders, assumed the name of his province of origin as his own trade-name.

the early Taira and Minamoto in the nascent stage of feudalism. Later on, the Fishmongers' Guild, in common with all kindred organizations, received official recognition and had henceforth to submit any proposed change in its articles of association for government approval. As a matter of fact, the authorities were always very chary about interfering over-much with the fishmongers, for they bore the reputation of being the most turbulent and determined among the not very submissive citizens of the capital. What is of some incidental consequence is that in the case of Yamatoya, we have yet another instance of the high capacity for practical work and organization displayed by such mere commoners as Yui no Shōsetsu, the engineers of the Tamagawa aqueduct, and Kawamura Yasuharu.

Kawamura was rewarded for his services to the State in the usual way, by a money gift and permission to assume a family name. He had still further work to do. At Ōsaka, floods frequently caused serious trouble, and they were occasionally terribly disastrous. Kawamura was entrusted with the task of finding a remedy, and for some time he was fully occupied with a vast scheme of river engineering around the city. The opening of the Aji-Kawa channel conveying a large volume of the waters directly to the sea was among the enterprises he successfully carried through at this time.¹ Besides this he took in hand the problem of dealing with the unmanageable Kisogawa in Owari and Mino, and with the Nagara and others of its unruly affluents, no doubt with the immediate object of simplifying the transport of logs from the forests of Shinano to the Sea.²

Under Iyetsuna we meet with several indications of a sustained and steady effort to tone down the barbarous ferocity that was the natural legacy of generations of wild and weltering intestine strife. Among other social reforms effected during this epoch, the suppression of the practice of *Junshi* is especially worthy of record. Iyeyasu set his face strongly against this horrible custom, yet it

¹ Kawamura Yasuharu is sometimes called Kawamura Zuiken, and the earth excavated to form the channel for the Aji-Kawa was piled up into the mound subsequently known as Zui-Ken Yama.

² For some information about the lumber trade, see Supplement to vol. xx, *T.A.S.J.*, pt. i, p. 138 and p. 163. The whole of this bulky Supplement of some 1,100 pages is the work of Mr. Wigmore, and is among the most important of the material available in any European language for the economic history of Tokugawa Japan. The Introduction Sketch (pt. i) is, as the author frankly asserts, a sketch made to serve his own special purpose merely, and so is far from exhaustive. It contains some misconceptions and statements which call for correction.

had continued, even among his own immediate vassals and those of his sons. In 1607, when Hideyasu of Echizen died, eight of his retainers solemnly disembowelled themselves in broad daylight and in the presence of a huge concourse of sympathetic spectators in Yedo. In the same year, Iyeyasu's fourth son died in Owari, and at the castle-town of Kiyosu, six of his chief vassals had insisted on bearing him company to the "Yellow Streams", and "opened their bellies" to the great edification and admiration of their fellows. The third Shōgun, Iyemitsu, just before his death in 1651, actually ordered two members of the Great Council and several of his personal attendants "to accompany him on the dark path", and not only did all those thus "honoured" sacrifice themselves unhesitatingly but, in one or two cases at least, some of their own immediate retainers insisted on dying with them.

When the very highest in power and place set such an example it is small wonder that a practice, which had hitherto been sporadic, should presently threaten to establish itself as a general and orthodox institution. There was a keen spirit of rivalry between the clans at all times, every one of them eagerly snatching at anything that might be seized as a mark of distinction entitling it to claim superiority over its fellows. In France, the supreme distinction of life is said to lie in having a "fine funeral"; in Japan, at this date, the measure of worth to be assigned to a deceased feudal chief was rapidly coming to be the proportions of the retinue of disembowelled retainers that escorted him to the shades. The wanton sacrifice of life thus being engendered began to occasion the gravest concern to the authorities, and they seem to have pondered long and deeply in endeavouring to devise an effective means of grappling with an evil which was well on the way to being regarded as the acme and the supreme test of virtue and valour. At last, in 1663, Hoshina fancied the opportunity for doing so had come. In that year, he ostensibly retired from his office of guardian to the Shōgun, Iyetsuna then being declared of age and formally invested with the Shōgun's prerogatives. In accordance with traditional practice, a new set of *Buké Shohatto* had to be issued. Hoshina now proposed that a new article should be incorporated in these regulations absolutely forbidding the practice of *Junshi*, and denouncing the severest pains and penalties against any family in which it should henceforth be practised. His proposal would probably have been adopted, but while under consideration it happened to reach the ears of the

second Tokugawa Lord of Mito, Mitsukuni, who had succeeded to the headship of the fief two years before (1661). Even in this short space of time the vigour of character he displayed was sufficient to convince the Bakufu councillors that his capacity as a moulder of public opinion had to be very seriously reckoned with. Accordingly, when he insisted that the *Buké Shohatto* should be published just as they had been drafted in 1634, and that special instructions about *Junshi* should be issued to the Daimyō class alone, and that this class should be held strictly to account for any infraction of these instructions, his view was adopted. Mitsukuni personally exerted himself to stamp out the custom in his own fief, and in this he was imitated by the Lords of Aidzu, Hikone, Kishū, Bizen, and by some others of the more enlightened feudatories of the time. In several other quarters the practice continued, and the Bakufu felt that a drastic example was necessary. In 1668, the wished-for opportunity of dealing the custom its *coup-de-grâce* presented itself.

Among the Tokugawa Fudai, the great house of Okudaira held a prominent place. Its founder, Nobumasa, rendered Iyeyasu essential service when the latter was laying the foundations of his greatness; and in his contest with Takeda of Kai, Iyeyasu owed much to Okudaira, who was rewarded with the hand of Iyeyasu's daughter. He afterwards served as the first Shoshidai of Kyōto (1600), and was ultimately enfeoffed with a domain of 100,000 *koku* at Kanō in Mino. Nobumasa died in 1615, and his son Iyemasa, after several changes of fief, all in the nature of a betterment of fortunes, was installed at Utsunomiya in 1622. His son Tadamasa duly succeeded him; and down to his death he continued to be treated with great consideration by the Yedo authorities. He, in his turn, also died in 1668, and three of his vassals committed *Junshi* in utter defiance of the Bakufu instructions just alluded to. The result was the prompt transference of Tadamasa's son and successor, Masayoshi, from Utsunomiya to Yamagata in Dewa, with a greatly diminished revenue. This had the effect of making the feudatories pause and consider. If one of the most influential of the great Fudai families was treated in this drastic fashion, what were Daimyō in less favoured situations to expect if their retainers persisted in the good old custom? The example made in the case of Okudaira proved sufficient to give the practice of *Junshi* its quietus.

Another measure that the Lord of Mitō successfully pressed

upon the Bakufu was a mitigation in the atrocity of the penalties of the Tokugawa Criminal Code. According to the law, as it then stood, the complicity of the head of the household in any serious offence involved all the members of the family in his guilt and brought upon them the same punishment as that inflicted upon him. Henceforth, it was now enacted, in cases of crime on the part of a father, the penalty incurred by the offender's son should be mitigated one degree. For example, when the father was sentenced to death the son was to be exiled to an island ; when the father was exiled to an island the son was to be banished from the fief or the city. Furthermore, in the case of an offence on the part of a son, the father, if guiltless of any knowledge of it, was no longer to be held accountable, nor were any of the offender's relatives, unless they were previously aware of his intention. Patricide, the murder of a lord by a vassal, and arson, however, and, still more so, treason were held to be crimes of such a heinous and flagitious nature that there could be no room for any indulgence towards their perpetrators, and for the two first of these four, the old penalty of decapitation by a bamboo saw was still to be inflicted.¹

Another reform, trivial in itself, is perhaps worthy of record. The usual mission from Korea to congratulate the Shōgun upon his succession duly arrived. To impress the visitors with an adequate notion of the power of the government and the rigour of its laws, it was the custom to effect a great gaol-delivery in Yedo immediately before the appearance of the embassy and to crucify as many malefactors as were available at the southern entrance to the suburb of Shinagawa. On this special occasion there was a great dearth of condemned criminals, and the officials were at their wits' end to devise means of rising to the occasion. Their anxious deliberations were abruptly brought to an end by Hoshina roundly denouncing the custom as being at once silly and barbarous, and strongly insisting that it should be discontinued.

As has been said, Iyetsuna was released from the wardship of his uncle, Hoshina, and was supposed to assume the responsibility

¹ In most cases death was not actually inflicted with the bamboo saw. The criminal condemned to this punishment was first promenaded on horseback through the city for a day, preceded by a man bearing aloft a board on which the particulars of the crime were set forth. Then he was exposed for two days at Nihonbashi, with a bamboo saw smeared with blood placed beside him. A cut was made on his shoulder to indicate where anyone who chose to do so might use the saw. As a matter of fact very few, if any, availed themselves of this permission, and after two days of this exposure the criminal was crucified.

of personal rule in 1663. His formal entry on the political stage had but little influence on the destinies of the empire. Iyeyasu, in devising the general scheme of polity and administration to be followed by his descendants, foresaw the possibility of *fainéants* among his successors, and in Iyeyasu's great-grandson, the fourth Shōgun, Iyetsuna, we meet with the first of them. He served his purpose as a figure-head, but in the actual work of administration he was a cypher from first to last. The question then occurs: "who really ruled the Empire between 1663 and 1680?" As regards the chief figures in the national councils between 1651 and 1663, sufficient has been said in the preceding chapter. Two of these had already passed away. Matsudaira Nobutsuna, perhaps the ablest but also one of the most unscrupulous men of his day, died in 1662. Three years before his death Ii Naotaka, the Lord of Hikone, had also been removed from the scene. In the year before he died (1658)—that is exactly two centuries before his thirteenth successor in the Lordship of Hikone (Ii Naosuke) assumed the responsibility of concluding the famous Treaty of Kanagawa with the United States—Ii Naotaka succeeded in wrecking a project that would probably have liberated Japan from the shackles of isolation imposed upon her by the statesmen of the previous generation. In 1644, the last (Tartar) dynasty of Chinese sovereigns replaced the Mings on the throne, but China is a vast country, and the mere occupation of the capital was by no means synonymous with the reduction of the whole empire. For years, the southern Chinese carried on a vigorous war against the new dynasty, the leaders being first the ex-tailor, Tei Shiryō, and later on his son the famous Koxinga. Their strength was largely maritime; on the Chinese sea their huge fleet was supreme, and along the sea-board they could go where they chose and do what they pleased, but stronger land forces were necessary for any effective efforts in the interior. Koxinga was half Japanese, for he was born in Japan (1624) of a Japanese mother. Accordingly in 1658, he appealed to Japan for help.

The appeal was made to the Governor of Nagasaki, and by him it was transmitted to the Bakufu. The Great Council did not venture to give an answer on its own responsibility. Hoshina, the three *Go-san-ke*, and Ii Naotaka were all consulted. The *Go-san-ke* pronounced themselves strongly in favour of responding to Koxinga's appeal by the dispatch of a strong and powerfully equipped expedition. But Ii Naotaka held different views, and as the great aim of

Matsudaira Nobutsuna was to keep things as they were, as far as he could, it was Ii Naotaka's arguments that prevailed at the momentous meeting of the Council when the matter was finally settled. There can be no doubt that such an over-sea expedition would have been highly popular in many quarters in Japan at the time. Many of the *Hatamoto* were profoundly dissatisfied with the inactivity to which it seemed to be the settled policy of the government to condemn them. The samurai of the clans discerned in such a venture the prospects of fame and wealth, while it would have been welcomed as a veritable godsend by the tens of thousands of hunger-pinched *rōnin* then swarming in Yedo, or lurking in obscure corners all over the empire. If successful, as it very possibly might have been, the services of a Japanese army would have had to be suitably rewarded by the Chinese, and Japan might very well then have obtained a permanent foothold upon the continent. At all events the prohibition against building ships-of-war and large sea-going vessels would have had to be cancelled, and the edicts which practically imprisoned all Japanese within the circuit of their own seas revoked. But such an expedition is one of the might-have-beens of history which it is bootless to discuss. Only so much is plain: if the Bakufu had really adopted the views of the *Go-san-ke* in 1658 the subsequent history of the empire would have been profoundly modified. Probably, there would have been no need or occasion for the Kanagawa Treaty of 1858.

Although Hoshina of Aidzu was relieved from his office of Guardian in 1663, he continued to wield great authority down to his death in 1672. In the year before his death, Abé Tadaaki retired from the Great Council after thirty-eight years of service, and with his retirement all the great political figures of 1651 disappeared from the stage. They had, of course, been gradually replaced by younger, but certainly not by abler men. Of these perhaps, the only one known to foreigners is Inaba, Mino no Kami, and he owes such measure of fame or notoriety as he has attained to Kaempfer, who accuses him of having vented his spleen upon the Dutch and caused their trade to be placed under new and exceedingly vexatious restrictions. Inaba, who Kaempfer says "was the Prime Minister, and favourite of the pacific Emperor then reigning" and "who was specially entrusted with the direction of foreign affairs", was given a seat in the Great Council in 1657 (the year of the Great Fire of Yedo), and this he retained down to the accession of the next

Shōgun (1680)—that is for a term of twenty-four years. During this long period, there were but few changes in the personnel of the Rōjū. Kuze, Yamato no Kami, was a member for sixteen years (1663–79); Tsuchiya, Tajima no Kami, for fourteen years (1665–79); Itakura Shigenori for eight years (1665–73); and Abé, Harima no Kami, for three years (1673–6). These were all mediocrities, destitute of the force of character needful for putting a curb upon the over-weening self-will of the man who was then really governing, or rather misgoverning, the empire.

This man was Sakai Tadakiyo, Uta no Kami, the grandson of that Sakai Tadayo who incurred Iyemitsu's wrath by leaving the Castle to burn down and seeking a refuge in the Uyeno Temples in 1634. As has been said it was the policy of the able "new men", who governed Japan between 1651 and 1660, to strengthen their position by conciliating the great Fudai Daimyō. It was in pursuance of this policy that they assigned a seat at the Council Board to Sakai Tadakiyo in 1653, although he was then a young man of twenty-seven with no political experience whatsoever. Thirteen years later he was actually advanced to the great office of Tairō. On the retirement of Abé in 1671, and the death of Hoshina in 1672, he found himself free and unfettered from all restraint. Iyetsuna was a *fainéant* at best but, in 1675, he became chronically ill and thenceforth, down to his death in 1680, he took no part in the administration. It is asserted that at this time, Sakai issued an order forbidding all access to the court ladies except by ministerial permit. Under his rule, it was very quickly recognized that the surest—nay, the only—way of either retaining office or of securing promotion was to flatter his inordinate vanity. The great object of study among the castle functionaries was no longer the Chinese classics or the Teishu philosophy; what now counted was an intimate knowledge of the peculiarities of Sakai's weather-cock, self-opinionated temperament. Never in the history of the House of Tokugawa, not even in early days of Iyemitsu, had the accomplishments of the astute and cunning flatterer gone so far as they did now. Sakai's fellows, or rather minions, of the Great Council, were convinced that their position depended entirely upon his favour and goodwill; at all events they conformed to much and submitted to not a little that was at once derogatory to the dignity of their exalted office and the good of the public service. For the flimsiest of reasons, or even for no reason at all beyond the itch to impress others with a due sense

of his importance, Sakai would reopen questions that had been fully settled by the Councillors or the Hyōjōsho, revoke the arrangements that had been made, and reverse the decisions that had been given after days of arduous and patient investigation. Although much of this sort of thing was contrary both to plain common sense and to legality and precedent, the Councillors held that wisdom lay in submitting with a good grace. If any of them had the hardihood to murmur, the murmuring was done in the privacy of his own abode. On several occasions the wanton reopening of cases that had been duly sifted and decided by the proper authorities resulted in scandalous miscarriages of justice. In 1671, some internal disorders in the powerful Sendai fief attracted the attention of the Bakufu, and one of the great Councillors, Tsuchiya, was given full powers to deal with the matter. His finding was that a certain Harada was to blame, and that Harada should be punished. Sakai ordered the case to be reopened, and argued before him and in his own *yashiki*. Tsuchiya's judgment was reversed, and Harada declared to be blameless. The result was a fresh commotion in the Sendai fief, in which several lives were quite unnecessarily sacrificed. In 1679, there were serious complications in the fief of Takata (260,000 *koku*) in Echigo, and the Bakufu saw fit to interfere. Here, again, Sakai was responsible for a notorious and flagrant miscarriage of justice. One of the Councillors—Kaempfer's Inaba Mino-Sama—was Sakai's colleague or subordinate for more than twenty years and being well accustomed to the Tairō's ways, took this quietly and as a matter of course. Of the other three Councillors one—Ōkubo of Odawara—was installed in 1677; and he knew better than to make any protest. Nor did Doi, who had just been appointed, venture to say anything. The third and lowest in rank turned out to be a man of a very different fibre, and the Tairō was presently to discover that he had made a great error of judgment in not blocking the promotion of Hotta Masatoshi. Hotta was second son of the Hotta who committed *Junshi* at the death of Iyemitsu. In 1670, he was made one of the two Junior Councillors—under Iyetsuna there were never more than two *Wakadoshiyori* at the same time—and in this post he gained an acquaintance with practical administration in which his colleagues Doi and Ōkubo were wanting. It very soon became plain that Hotta cherished more respect for the dictates of conscience than for the whims of the Regent, who got terribly ruffled when he discovered that a determined attempt was being

made to treat men and to decide questions on their naked merits. Sooner or later, a serious collision between Sakai and Hotta was inevitable.

It came very soon. In the early summer of 1680, some eight or nine months after Hotta's promotion to the Rōjū, it became plain that Iyetsuna's days were numbered. On 4th June, 1680, the Shōgun died at the age of forty-one—childless. The Tairō concealed the Shōgun's death for some time, and actually gave puppet-shows in the Palace professedly to amuse His Highness. In this he was abetted by Inaba and Ōkubo. As a reward their revenues were increased by 10,000 *koku* each, while at the same time the Tairō augmented his own estates by 20,000 *koku*, and instituted a new fief of 20,000 *koku* for his second brother, Tadayoshi. But all this was a small matter compared with what was presently purposed. At a meeting of the Rōjū, convened to deal with the succession question, the Tairō actually proposed that the old custom of the Kamakura régime should be revived, and that the Emperor should be requested to send a Prince of the Blood to fill the Shōgun's seat in Yedo! Sakai, of course, was to figure in the rôle of an omnipotent Hōjō *shikken*!

The Tairō soon found that in permitting his over-weening assurance to make such a proposal he had indulged in the most costly luxury of his life. It was received with silence or murmurs of approval by three of his colleagues, who doubtless had been duly prepared for it. But from Hotta it at once provoked a great explosion of wrath—the first perhaps there had been at the Council Board for a dozen years or more.

“The proposal was monstrous! If the Tairō was merely jesting, the matter might be passed over. But every one knew that the legitimate and only successor to Iyetsuna was Tsunayoshi, the Lord of Tatebayashi, Iyemitsu's fourth son.”

As he said this Hotta glared upon Sakai with stern defiance. Utterly cowed, the Tairō rose and hurriedly withdrew from the Council Chamber. Thereupon Hotta dispatched a messenger to Tsunayoshi requesting him to appear at the Castle at once. When Tsunayoshi arrived, Hotta met him, ushered him into Iyetsuna's bed-chamber, and there, it was given out, Tsunayoshi was designated as his successor by the moribund Shōgun. As a matter of fact, Iyetsuna had been dead for some time, but he seems to have informed Hotta of his wishes regarding the succession some time

before his death. Tsunayoshi presently returned to his own *yashiki*; and on the following day he repaired to the Castle in state, and there installed himself as the fifth Tokugawa Shōgun.

Almost at the same time as Iyetsuna the ex-Emperor Mizu-no-o II was gathered to his fathers at the ripe age of four score and four—the greatest age attained by any of the historical sovereigns of Japan. For seventeen years (1612–29) he had been titular Emperor, and for the remaining half-century of his life he really ruled the Court of Kyōto, for the Tokugawas had professedly restored the *Insei*—or system of rule by abdicated sovereigns. During this half-century Mizu-no-o II saw his daughter and three of his sons upon the throne. At his death, the last of these, Reigen, had occupied the imperial seat for seventeen years. For the next six years there was no ex-Emperor; but when Reigen abdicated in 1686 he still continued to hold the reins of administration in the Court. Reigen was also a long-lived sovereign; he died in 1732, at the age of seventy-eight. Thus, although between 1612 and 1732, there were as many as seven successive occupants of the throne, the scanty remnants of Imperial authority, such as they were, were exercised by no more than two rulers during their long term of 120 years. Of these seven sovereigns Kōmyō II (1643–54) is perhaps the most interesting personality. He is said to have been an ardent student of the Teishu philosophy, sparing no effort to propagate a knowledge of it among the court nobles. His father, the ex-Emperor, once found fault with him for making no efforts to attain proficiency in what had been one of the chief court accomplishments for long ages. The same night, His Majesty dashed off a set of a “hundred poems”, and sent them to his amazed and admiring father next morning. Having thus duly liquidated his obligations to the Japanese muse, he paid her no further court, throwing himself into weightier studies, old Japanese history particularly. Later ages credited him with the ambition to free himself from the Bakufu tutelage, and it is credible enough that the Yedo councillors began to watch him with a good deal of anxiety. However, his death at the age of twenty-one freed them from all immediate apprehension.

During the previous eight and a half centuries the deceased sovereigns were cremated, but inasmuch as Kōmyō II expressed a strong dislike to cremation, the practice was thenceforth abandoned. The story that its abandonment was owing to the efforts of a Kyōto

fishmonger, Hachirōbei by name, who went the round of the leading officials protesting against the sovereign's corpse being cremated, is supported by no contemporary evidence. It first appears in the *Shōsetsu* of Muro Kyusō, the official *Jusha* or Chinese scholar in the time of the eighth Shōgun, Yoshimune. This Muro Kyusō was born in 1658, four years after the death of Kōmyō II. Muro passed his youth in the old capital; and it is possible that this fishmonger tale was current there at the time. Three or four works treating of Kōmyō II or his times were composed in the Hōreki period (1751-3); but all these seem to use Muro's notes as one of their chief sources. One strange story is that the Bakufu sent a physician from Yedo to prescribe for His Majesty; that the *Shoshidai* accompanied him to the Palace, and forced his drugs upon the Emperor who expired soon after, the implication of course being that the sovereign was poisoned. There is, however, no authentic evidence of any physician having been sent from Yedo.

In the early feudal period we meet with scarcely any notice of poisoning cases, and it was not till after the ceremonies of the *Chano-yu* became a craze and a cult that instances of suspected poisoning began to occur. Hideyoshi is accused of having got rid of Gamō, and Iyeyasu of Katō Kiyomasa by this means. Arsenic was the common poison. It was not till 1651 that legal restrictions were placed upon the sale of arsenious acid, quantities of which were imported from China, although it was also produced in Japan. In 1654 there was an epidemic of small-pox in Kyōto, and Kōmyō II was one of its victims. The common assertion that Kōmei Tennō, who died in 1867, was the first Emperor ever attacked by this disease would therefore seem to be incorrect. However, the removal from the scene of this young and able sovereign, did not serve to allay the anxiety of the Bakufu about the state of affairs in Kyōto. The old capital was all the time rapidly recovering its prosperity. In 1634, on the occasion of Iyemitsu's famous visit, it numbered only a little over 34,000 households. This would mean a population of but little, if anything, over 200,000 souls. In 1681, it had grown to 507,400, and in 1691, the year of Kaempfer's first visit to it, 529,726. These figures include as many as 52,169 ecclesiastics, but deducting these we find a citizen population of 477,557. Thus, within half a century, the town-folk had more than doubled. How is this remarkable increase to be explained? In the first place, it must not be overlooked that, although among the

upper classes Buddhism was being discarded for rationalistic Chinese philosophy, it was still the creed of the nation at large. It is true that the days had passed when the monasteries ranked not only among the greatest landholders but among the most considerable feudal powers in the Empire. Not a few of the fanes nevertheless still continued to be proprietors of wide acres, some of them indeed being on the footing of the Daimyō as far as administrative rights were concerned. Besides this source of wealth, another, and generally a greater, was found in the piety of the believers who poured a continual flood of offerings into the priestly coffers. Now as of old, Kyōto remained the ecclesiastical capital of Japan, where most of the sects had their headquarters, and to these the branch temples in the provinces had to contribute revenue in some guise or other—whether for the appointment of their priests, or for their promotion in the hierarchy, or for similar or other reasons. Throughout the empire there were fourteen great fanes and twenty-four convents in which the position of Abbot or Abbess was reserved for members of the Imperial family or some of the Fujiwara Houses; and most of these were in Kyōto or the vicinity. The toll that these specially favoured establishments levied upon their branch houses in the country districts and from such as sought their favours was an unusually weighty one. Then, besides 37,093 regular Buddhist *religieux*, there were 6,073 Yamabushi and 9,003 Negi, or Shintō priests in Kyōto in 1691. Of the former, the begging, strolling ascetics, Kaempfer has a good deal to say, and something has been said about them in a previous chapter of this volume.¹ The Yamabushi were obliged to receive instruction and obtain their licences from the Shrine on Atago-yama behind the city, and were furthermore called upon to pay annual tribute into its coffers. These levies should have provided amply for one of the families of Court Nobles that furnished its hereditary head. Similarly, the Shintō priests throughout the empire were under the control of the Kugé house of Yoshida, the chief of which was confirmed in the hereditary exercise of the functions of vice-Minister of Cults by the Tokugawa authorities. Fees for diplomas alone should have sufficed to make the Yoshida family wealthy. In addition to all this, wealth kept flowing into Kyōto from several other sources. The court, it is true, was but poorly provided for as regards a fixed

¹ *Vide* p. 39.

revenue from landed property. As has been said before, the combined incomes of the Imperial family and of all the Kugé houses amounted to but little over 120,000 *koku* per annum.

“ Thus it resulted that the Kugé had to struggle constantly against straitened circumstances which contrasted sharply with the pomp and luxury of their lives in ante-feudal days. Many of them were obliged to eke out their scanty incomes by practising some domestic industry, such as the making of pictorial playing cards, of umbrellas, of toothpicks, or chopsticks.” (Brinkley’s *Japan*, vol. iv, p. 6.)

At times, indeed, some Kugé houses may have been reduced to such makeshifts for a livelihood, although even then the situation was by no means so desperate as might be inferred by readers unacquainted with the peculiar circumstances of the age.

In Japan, as in China, etiquette—“ good form,” the proper way of doing anything and everything—has always been a matter of transcendent importance. Furthermore, in the field of etiquette and ceremonial, the supreme arbiter has been tradition, the very word for “ study ” in Japanese, as in Chinese, being expressed by ideographs which signify “ storing or conning the ancient ”. Now, in Japan, where the family, and not the individual, has always been the social unit, there has ever been a strong tendency for special accomplishments and special knowledge as well as special arts and crafts and trades to become hereditary in certain houses. In the wide field of court etiquette, ceremonial deportment and accomplishments, there was abundant scope for such specialization, and thus by this date almost every Kugé household had become the exclusive repository of esoteric lore of some kind or other, lore that was often not committed to writing but transmitted orally from father to son, or from the head of the house to his successor. Among the Japanese, there is no craving stronger or more imperious than the craving for distinction. In the long weltering chaos of the preceding centuries, it was mainly on the battlefield that distinction was sought. Peace now reigned once more—a peace such as the empire had not known for a score of generations and henceforth, it seemed that swords would be worn mainly for ornaments. Whoever wished to get his name handed down to posterity must now reap fame in the realm of letters or polite accomplishments. In these greatly altered circumstances, among the shortest and easiest roads to distinction would be the acquisition of recondite and esoteric lore such as was possessed by the Court nobles who found themselves in the position of Signor Ligeró, the dancing-master in *Gil Blas*—they

had no occasion to canvass for scholars. Crowds of wealthy men curried favour with Kugé house-stewards to get these worthies to induce their masters to condescend to impart instruction in Japanese classical literature, in Divination, in Astronomy, in Flower-arrangement, in Gardening, in the fashion of robes and how to wear them, in the art of entering and quitting a room, in the demeanour to be observed on meeting a Kugé in public, and in football. “Shijō taught the art of dressing dinners and cooking, which was considered the occupation of a gentleman. When an artist prepared a dinner and laid it out, it was common for the public to repair to admire it as a work of art”—an admission-fee having generally to be paid. Umbrellas, toothpicks, and chopsticks, were not very difficult to make perhaps, but they might very well be made in several different ways, but all these various ways were improper except one—and it was the monopoly of the knowledge of what this proper way was that conferred the cachet of distinction upon the wares produced in the household of a court noble, not necessarily by himself, but by his dependents under his supervision.

Thus it is not strange to find that in the all-important matter of fashion, not merely in dress, but in household furnishings and everything else, Kyōto once more gave the law to the rest of the empire, as it had done for the three or four centuries following the date of its foundation. In Kaempfer’s time it plainly appears that the old capital was to Japan pretty much what Paris is to modern Europe. The worthy old Westphalian passed the first two days of March in Kyōto in 1691, and on that occasion he puts his impressions on record as follows :—

“Miaco (i.e. Kyōto) is the great magazine of all Japanese manufactures and commodities, and the chief mercantile town in the Empire. There is scarce a house in this large capital where there is not something made or sold. Here they refine copper, coin money, print books, weave the richest stuffs with gold and silver flowers. The best and scarcest dyes, the most artful carvings, all sorts of musical instruments, pictures, japan’d cabinets, all sorts of things wrought in gold and other metals, particularly in steel, as the best temper’d blades and other arms are made here in the utmost perfection, as are also the richest dresses, and after the best fashion, all sorts of toys, puppets, moving their heads of themselves, and numberless other things, too numerous to be mentioned here. In short, there is nothing that can be thought of, but what may be found at Miaco, and nothing, tho’ never so neatly wrought, can be imported from abroad but what some other artist or other in this capital will undertake to imitate. Considering this, it is no wonder, that the manufactures of Miaco are become so famous throughout the

Empire, as to be easily preferr'd to all others, tho' perhaps inferior in some particulars only because they have the name of being made at Kyōto. There are but few houses in all the chief streets, where there is not something to be sold, and for my part, I could not help admiring, whence they can have customers enough for such an immense quantity of goods. 'Tis true indeed, there is scarce anybody passes through Miaco but what buys something or other of the manufactures of this city either for his own use, or for presents to be made to his friends and their relations." ¹

It is perhaps no matter for surprise that the Bakufu witnessed this renaissance of the splendour and prosperity of the old capital with a good deal of jealousy and mistrust. In 1665, it installed an additional City Magistrate (*Machi-Bugyō*) to repress the growing luxury among the citizens and also to keep a closer watch upon the moulders or exponents of public opinion. It will be recalled that it was in the following year that Kumazawa Banzan had to save himself from arrest in Kyōto, by a hasty "moonlight flitting" to the mountainous wilds of Yoshino. In 1667, the Rōjū deemed it advisable to depute one of their own number to act as *Shoshidai* in Nijō Castle—an exceptional step that indicates the rapid increase of their nervousness about the state of affairs in Kyōto. Itakura Shigenori (Rōjū from 1665–73) was the man selected, and during his three years as *Shoshidai* he exerted himself strenuously to curb the growing pride and extravagance in the old capital. At the same time, the measure of caution with which he acted leads to the inference that the Yedo Council was convinced that the Court and the Court nobles were once more to be reckoned with, and that it was not altogether well to offend them lightly.

¹ Kaempfer, vol. iii, p. 21.

CHAPTER V

TSUNAYOSHI (1680-1709)

THE new Shōgun, Tsunayoshi, inaugurated his administration with a great display of vigour. Sakai was forthwith dismissed, and together with his eldest son was ordered to remain at home with closed doors until further notice. At the same time his great mansion outside the Ōte gate was confiscated. A little later it was bestowed on Hotta Masatoshi, who was at once promoted from the lowest to the highest seat in the Rōjū. Presently he was appointed Tairō, and although things were different from what they had been in Sakai's time in so far as the Shōgun had now really to be reckoned with, the new Tairō was speedily recognized as the power behind the throne. His family participated in his rise; his next brother, Masahide, entered the Junior Council (henceforth it was to consist of three members), while his youngest brother became a Sobayōnin, or personal attendant upon the Shōgun. Inaba—Kaempfer's great aversion—and Doi were soon dismissed from the Great Council and Toda, the Shoshidai of Kyōto, appointed to it. During Tsunayoshi's régime the personnel of the Rōjū always stood at four or fewer. As we shall see presently, the Great Council was about to sink temporarily to a position of comparative insignificance. At the time, Sakai's decision in the matter of the Takata fief complication was the subject of much adverse secret criticism; now that the Tairō had fallen the critics had no longer any need to set a curb upon their tongues in public. So much was being said of this affair that Tsunayoshi determined to reopen the case, and to sift the rights and wrongs of it thoroughly.

Takata in Echigo formed part of the wide domains of Uyesugi Kagekatsu before his transfer to Aidzu in 1598. In 1610, Iyeyasu's sixth son, Tadateru, was installed as Daimyō with a revenue of 450,000 *koku*. In 1616 he was stripped of his fief for misconduct in the Ōsaka campaign, and other offences,¹ Sakai Iyetsugu receiving

¹ One of these offences was his failure to accompany the Shōgun on the occasion of his visit to Kyōto on the excuse of illness when, in fact, he was not only in full health, but absent on a hunting excursion.—J. H. L.

the Castle-town with the surrounding domain of 100,000 *koku*. In 1623 there was another change—Matsudaira Mitsunaga, the grandson of Iyeyasu's second son, Hideyasu, Lord of Echizen, being then removed from Fukui, and enfeoffed with 260,000 *koku* at Takata. At his removal he was a boy of eight, and, of course, for years, he could have been nothing better than a figurehead. During the virile rule of the third Shōgun, Iyemitsu, any shortcomings in the administration of the fiefs were very drastically dealt with, the confiscated territory under Iyemitsu being actually as much as 5,000,000 *koku*. Daimyō then felt that it was highly advisable to procure the best and ablest men to be found as councillors and officials, and hence we find men like Kumazawa in Bizen and Nonaka in Tosa rapidly rising to the highest posts by sheer merit and force of character. During the minority of Iyetsuna (1651–63) this happy state of things still continued in many quarters, but during the seventeen years of the fourth Shōgun's (nominal) personal rule a deplorable change set in. Thanks to the efforts of the preceding generation of able clan ministers, the administrative machinery was so thoroughly organized that it needed no special talents to manipulate it fairly satisfactorily. In fact, everywhere, from the Bakufu itself downwards, this machinery had become practically automatic. The consequence of this might naturally be expected. As it did not matter so very much now what stamp or calibre of men occupied the various posts, it became the tendency for Daimyō to find their Karō among their own special favourites; and for these in their turn to select their subordinates from among those that paid them the most skilful and assiduous court. The state of things prevalent in the central Yedo administration under the Tairō, Sakai, was rapidly becoming common in the fiefs. Again, the training of the sons of Daimyō, especially of prospective heirs, tended to become more and more unsatisfactory, and in a generation or two we find Daimyō and “Fool” often regarded as synonymous terms. The condition of affairs disclosed by the retrial of the Takata fief complication was really now not uncommon throughout the whole empire.

Matsudaira Mitsunaga was, if not a downright degenerate, at all events a weak and silly man, extremely susceptible to flattery. His chief Karō was a certain Oguri, who had married his sister, and this Oguri dominated his Lord and brother-in-law utterly and completely. At the same time, Oguri was careful to pay

obsequious court to the Tairō Sakai, and succeeded in establishing himself firmly in the esteem of the "Dismounted Shōgun", as Sakai was called. A pitiful sycophant towards his superiors, Oguri was extremely exigent in his demands for the incense of flattery—fortified, of course, by presents—from his inferiors. The natural result was that the administrative machine in the Takata fief was ultimately manipulated by a legion of venal toadies, and that abuses became crying and rampant. The Daimyō's younger brother and another councillor at last ventured to remonstrate to the Daimyō about the deplorable state of affairs, but all that his Lordship did was to inform Oguri that he was being slandered. Oguri at once began to make things very uncomfortable for his critics, and these at last, having no other resource, sent in a petition to the Bakufu. In Yedo, one of the Great Censors, Watanabe, was charged with the investigation of the allegations, but the Tairō stepped in and promptly burked the petition. "It was natural that those at the head of the administration, like himself, should be maligned. Oguri was merely being made a target of by jealous and malicious enemies." This consideration alone made it unnecessary to go into the details of the case, in Sakai's opinion. Accordingly, Oguri's critics were deprived of their revenues and consigned to the ward of various Daimyō.

Suddenly in the summer of 1681, orders arrived for the instant conveyance of the prisoners to Yedo, whither Oguri had meanwhile been summoned from Takata. The three men were confronted with each other before a special tribunal assembled in the Great Hall of the Castle. From the *Go-san-ke* downwards, all the Daimyō in Yedo were in their places in the Hall, together with the high officers of the Bakufu. It was the Tairō Hotta who conducted the proceedings, while the Shōgun himself sat in his own place and occasionally instructed Hotta as to the interrogatories to be put. At the end of the sitting Tsunayoshi loudly and sternly expressed his indignation, and ordered judgment to be pronounced on the morrow. Next day Oguri was commanded to disembowel himself, his partisans were banished to various islands, as were a great number of lesser men who were compromised in the affair, while the Daimyō himself was stripped of his fief, which was partitioned, the greater part of it being converted into Bakufu domain-land. For having allowed himself to be over-ridden by Sakai and so connived at a notorious miscarriage of justice, the Great Censor was sentenced to deportation

to an island, while his son and heir was placed in the custody of Sōma, the Daimyō of Nakamura in Mutsu. To Sakai, who had fallen ill in his seclusion, this must have been bitter medicine indeed. But just then, on the top of this, his relatives were stripped of the spoils they acquired at the time of Iyetsuna's death. All these mortifications proved too much for the ex-Tairō, and he died within the year—according to some reports by his own hand. On the day of his funeral a Bakufu coroner, by Tsunayoshi's orders, insisted on the coffin being reopened before it was committed to the earth, for the strict legal formalities had not been complied with. Shortly afterwards the Sakai family was degraded from the assembly room it had hitherto frequented in the Castle to a lower one. The stern and drastic measure thus meted out to two of the great feudatories made a profound impression; it seemed as if the days of Iyemitsu had returned. Even among the townsmen of Yedo, we are told, the dread became so great that none ventured to pick up articles dropped in the street.

These indications of a stern and rigorous régime were followed by others of a more pleasant nature. It was apparent that the stipends of the Castle officials in general were on none too generous a scale. They were now considerably augmented all round. At the same time an incident rather trifling in itself did much to conciliate the goodwill of the lower classes.

Under the Kamakura Bakufu there was an efficient Provincial Inspectorate. Among other officers the *Junkenshi* were "sent out annually at a fixed date to traverse a circuit, to take note of the economic and social condition of the people, to listen to complaints, and compose disputes". The thirteenth century was an age not of great fiefs, but of manors of a few hundred acres or less. Although there were Lords of Manors who exercised administrative as well as proprietary rights over their domains, such cases were exceptional in those days. As a rule, justice was dispensed by a service of resident officials appointed by the Bakufu. To keep these to a faithful discharge of their duties was an all important matter; and hence at least one visit per annum by the regular inspectors from Kamakura was felt to be necessary. Now, under the Yedo Bakufu, the situation had changed in one very salient respect at least. In addition to the Bakufu demesnes—which really constituted the greatest fief in Japan—the empire was now portioned out into 240 or 250 fiefs, some of them spreading over a whole province, and in a few cases

over several provinces. Over these fiefs the Lords everywhere wielded administrative rights. Although, in serious and flagrant cases of maladministration, the Tokugawa Shōgunate would promptly interfere, there was now no need to exercise the rigorous and minute control over local administration that was deemed necessary under the Kamakura régime. A good many features of this régime were adopted, or rather adapted, to meet the exigencies of the altered situation by the early Tokugawas, and it is on record that Hayashi Dōshun read through or summarized the "*Azuma*¹ *Kagami*" for Iyeyasu. However, this feature of the dispatch of an annual inspection commission was not among the measures adopted by Iyeyasu. In Iyemitsu's time (1633) it was at last imitated, but in a modified form. The Commission was sent out not annually, but on a single occasion only under each successive Shōgun. The first batch of commissioners (1633) were dispatched with minute and detailed instructions, and these instructions were rigorously followed. In Iyetsuna's time the inspectors acted much as if they were on a pleasure excursion. Now, on sending out these officers, Tsunayoshi gave them plainly to understand that they were to take their duties seriously—that their reports must be exhaustive and fair; and that good points, if specially noteworthy, were to be reported and not defects and shortcomings only. In the report handed in by the Tokaidō commission there were several paragraphs dealing with the exemplary filial piety and philanthropy of a certain peasant in Suruga. This so pleased the Shōgun that he ordered a small estate of 90 *koku*, free from all imposts, to be granted to the farmer, while a special account of the matter written by Hayashi Nobuatsu, the official Chinese scholar, was printed and circulated all over the Empire. This may well seem to be a trivial matter unworthy of record, but it is safe to assume that it made a deep impression upon the country population.

¹ The *Azuma Kagami*, *Mirror of the Eastern Provinces* (*Azuma* is practically synonymous with Kwantō) is a contemporaneous History of Japan under the Minamoto Shōguns and the first seven of the Hōjō Regents, more in the form of a continuing record of events as they occurred than of anything entitled to the name of history. The exact period it comprises is from 1180 to 1266, and it is accepted as a trustworthy record for those years. It is referred to in Vol. I of this work as, "on the whole a sober, unimagined, and well-informed record" (p. 396) and again as written in "dog-Chinese" which it is a drudgery to read (p. 418). "*Azuma*" is a poetical term, derived from the sighs uttered by the national hero, Yamatodake, when he lamented the loss of his wife, as he gazed over the Eastern provinces from the summit of the Usui Pass. "*Ayatsuna*"—"alas my wife"—the wife who had sacrificed her life to save his when in danger amidst the storm-tossed waves of Sagami, which were within his view, as he sighed.—J. H. L.

During the first three or four years of Tsunayoshi's rule, everything seemed to augur well for the future, and all classes might reasonably fancy that they could look forward to a long and vigorous yet beneficent administration. It is not likely that many paused to consider how far the Shōgun himself was really responsible for all the measures that met with such general approbation at this time. It is, of course, not impossible that he was what he seemed to be, the real author of reforms and the actual director of the national administration, but the subsequent course of events goes far to affirm the presumption that it was not so much Tsunayoshi himself, as his first Minister, the Tairō, Hotta Masayoshi, that Japan had to thank for the season of good order and content that prevailed between 1680 and 1684, and that the death of Hotta in the latter year did not fall short of a national calamity. His assassination must rank as one of the most sensational incidents that ever took place in the Shōgun's palace. Tsunayoshi was to give audience to the assembled Daimyō on 7th October, 1684, which was a full court day. Everything was in readiness for his appearance; the Daimyō were all in their appointed places, and the Rōjū were waiting in the Gobeya. Just then, Hotta's cousin, Inaba Masayasu, of the Junior Council, appeared and whispered to the Tairō that he had urgent business to communicate to him. As soon as Hotta rose and came within reach of Inaba, he was stabbed to death by the latter. At once the other councillors threw themselves upon the murderer and cut him down. What the reason for the crime was must perhaps continue to be numbered among the many mysteries of the Tokugawa court. Such evidence as we possess is unsatisfactory and conflicting. Arai Hakuseki was then in Hotta's service, having entered it in the previous year. All that he has to say in his Autobiography about this incident is: "In my twenty-eighth year Hotta was killed having been charged with plotting against the Emperor, though there was no proof of his guilt. His son was very unfortunate, and cut down the allowances of his samurai, so that many left his service."¹ Hotta's son, who was present, was terribly unnerved by the tragedy; his conduct on this occasion is said to have lost him the Shōgun's favour. He was presently transferred from Koga to a much poorer fief in the far north; and it was simply lack of means that led to the curtailment of his vassals' stipends.

¹ *Autobiography of Arai Hakuseki*, translated by Dr. G. W. Knox. The full name and title of Hotta is given as Ki no Masatoshi Asson, Hotta Chikuzen no Kami. *T.A.S.J.*, vol. xxix, p. 115.—J. H. L.

Whether Hotta deserves his reputation as a great statesman may perhaps be questioned. He is credited with giving his hearty adherence to the doctrine that the people are the basis of the nation and with an endeavour to propagate the tenets of a high morality among plebeians and samurai alike. But his tenure of office was too brief for the accomplishment of any permanent result. What, however, must be frankly admitted is that so long as he stood behind the fifth Shōgun the administration was excellent: in striking contrast to the miserable and deplorable chaos that began to reign a few short years after his untimely removal from the scene.

With the death of Hotta began the effacement of the Rōjū. No Tairō was appointed, and the old practice of each of the members acting as President for a month was resumed. Through this President the Shōgun's instructions to the Daimyō were supposed to pass, but, as a matter of fact, neither the President nor his colleagues found themselves pressed with any great burden of work, for Tsunayoshi presently began to act through a special medium of his own. Like his predecessors he had, of course, his Sobayōnin. The special duties of these were to determine the days of audience for the Daimyō and Hatamoto, and some of them had also to read the reports of the Rōjū to the Shōgun, and to inscribe his remarks upon the margins of these papers. Thus, in a way, they combined the functions of Masters of Ceremony and of Private Secretaries. It was through this body that Japan was really governed for the next quarter of a century. In 1684, the chief of the Sobayōnin was Makino, Bingo no Kami, whom Kaempfer mistakenly puts at the head of the Rōjū, and who acted as Master of the Ceremonies at the degrading exhibition of antics the Dutchmen were compelled to provide for the amusement of Tsunayoshi and his court in 1691 and 1692. Makino was Tsunayoshi's seneschal, while the latter was Daimyō of Tatebayashi. When Tsunayoshi became Shōgun, Makino was made Lord of Sekiyado in Shimōsa (73,000 *koku*), and chief of the Sobayōnin. Now, in 1684 or 1685, the number of the Sobayōnin was increased to five; that is to one more than the membership of the Great Council at this time. It was through these five Sobayōnin that all important orders of the Shōgun were issued and executed, the Rōjū being confined to duties of mere mechanical routine. The Shōgun, we are told, seldom met it oftener than twice or thrice a month—indeed, during the last few years of his life he never met the Rōjū at all. One of these Sobayōnin, Kitami, had to

be stripped of his fief and degraded for abuse of authority in 1688, but apart from this case the original batch of back-stairs councillors would appear to have been comparatively harmless. As they died or retired, some of the new men that replaced them were not long in earning the most unsavoury reputations for themselves. The most notorious of these was a certain Yanagisawa. Yanagisawa's father was a mere samurai of 150 *koku* revenue when he became a chamberlain to the Daimyō of Tatebayashi about 1661. Now, Tsunayoshi was an ardent student and a prodigy of learning, and, like the clerk of Oxenford, he was as ready to teach as he was to learn—a fact which his vassals were destined to appreciate by dour and doleful experience. Yanagisawa had a son a dozen years younger than Tsunayoshi, and Tsunayoshi presently took a great liking for the son, who showed no reluctance to figure as the *corpus vile* for his Lord's experiments as a pedagogue. Young Yanagisawa was exceedingly precocious, and at the same time sly, supple, and cunning. With, no doubt, the aid of a little judicious parental schooling, he succeeded in so thoroughly adapting himself to the whims and humours of his learned Lord that the latter soon came to regard his pupil as his *alter ego*. Unnatural vice was not uncommon in Japan at this date,¹ and Tsunayoshi, at all events in his later years, was notoriously addicted to it. What his exact relations to young Yanagisawa were in this respect it is difficult to say, but they were certainly open to suspicion. With Tsunayoshi's accession to the Shōgunate, a brilliant career lay before Yanagisawa, then twenty-two years of age. In 1691, Kaempfer places him among the Junior Councillors, but in the official lists his name does not appear as such. Notwithstanding this, he was then very powerful at the Shōgun's court; on the retirement of Makino from old age, Yanagisawa replaced him as Sobayōnin, and as all the original batch of Sobayōnin disappeared from the scene, Yanagisawa became supreme. Two of his own sons-in-law, Kuroda and Matsudaira Terusada, were soon associated with him, and the latter was Yanagisawa's right-hand man in the onerous and responsible task of purveying for the Shōgun's lusts. It is small wonder that under such a régime a deplorable reign of moral, economic, and financial chaos should set in in Yedo.

¹ Kaempfer refers to it more than once. "On the chief street of this town through which we passed, were built nine or ten neat houses, before each of which sat one, two, or three young boys of ten to twelve years of age, well dressed, with their faces painted and feminine gestures, kept by their bad and cruel masters for the secret pleasure of rich travellers, the Japanese being very much addicted to vice." Vol. iii. p. 53.—J. H. L.

Even in Hotta's time it may be questioned whether the Shōgun's attention was concentrated upon the prosaic work-a-day task of administration, for the extraordinary activity he displayed in other fields argues that his interests in the projects of the Tairō cannot possibly have been engrossing. In truth, it really looks as if it was not so much in the legitimate rôle of the Shōgun as in the capacity of his own court-preacher that Tsunayoshi ultimately aspired to distinction. The study of Chinese philosophy developed into something like a mania in Japan half a century or so after its introduction into the Empire. The Daimyō class were attacked by the craze quite as severely as their retainers. Every feudatory required his court-lecturer; and Hayashi could scarcely furnish men to fill all the numerous posts he was constantly requested to provide for. In most cases, of course, the lecturer's endeavours were as good as wasted so far as the Daimyō themselves were concerned, for among the 241 feudal lords of the time addled brains were common enough. Still it was the fashion to have a court-lecturer, and the dictates of fashion were no less imperious than those of the Shōgun. On the other hand, some of the Daimyō proved really apt pupils, and among these the rivalry was exceedingly keen. Such was the state of affairs in Tsunayoshi's youth, and the young Lord of Tatebayashi seems to have early determined that he was not to be outdone in reputation for scholarship by either his uncle, Hoshina of Aidzu, or his relative, Mitsukuni of Mito, or by any other fellow-lord in Japan. On his accession to the Shōgunate, he was not long in making it plain that the interests of learning were not to be neglected. On the very first New Year's day of his rule there was a striking innovation. All the officials, from the Rōjū downwards, were assembled in the Great Hall and treated to an exposition of the three chief points in the Great Learning, the lecturer being Yanagisawa, the Shōgun's "earliest pupil" and favourite. Under Tsunayoshi this continued to be a great solemn annual function. Immediately after his investiture, the Shōgun directed the official scholar, Hayashi Nobuatsu, to deliver a set of lectures—three a month—on the Chinese classics, and for several years the whole crowd of much-afflicted officials had to attend till the bitter end of the whole course was reached. Hayashi was furthermore instructed to prepare an annotated edition of the classics, which was printed and distributed all over the empire, so that scholars were no longer in the position of Nakae Tōju, sixty years before, when "neither teachers nor books were to be found".

Tsunayoshi further resolved that the charges of the highest instruction in Chinese classics and philosophy should be assumed by the Government, and in 1688 he summoned all the officials to the celebration of the semi-annual festivals in honour of Confucius in the Ko-bun-in. He then saw that Hayashi's private school could not afford accommodation for the crowds who wished to study, and so orders were given for the erection of new buildings at Yushima in the Hongo ward, Hachisuka, the Daimyō of Awa in Shikoku having to defray most of the expenses, while one of the Sobayōnin was charged with the superintendence of the work of construction. When the new structure was completed, the statues of Confucius and his disciples, and all the other paraphernalia of Hayashi's school, were brought over and installed in it. At the first of the festivals in honour of Confucius, Tsunayoshi attended in state, and on that occasion declared that it was his good pleasure that the institution should henceforth enjoy an endowment of 1,000 *koku* per annum. At or about the same time, the enforced connexion between the Confucianists and the Buddhist priesthood was severed. Scholars were relieved from the necessity of taking the tonsure and of assuming the titles of the priestly hierarchy, and when they walked abroad were authorized to gird themselves with the two swords of the samurai. As for Hayashi in person, he received the fifth class of Court rank and the title of *Daigaku no Kami* (Lord of Learning)—a title that was to remain hereditary in the family down to the fall of feudalism. As has been said, Hayashi's school was originally intended for the sons of the Hatamoto and the Castle functionaries, but men from the clans were sometimes admitted. For example, we find that Arai Hakuseki was urged to enrol himself among Hayashi's pupils for the purpose of ultimately obtaining a lecturer's posit, and as it was the Shōgun's purpose to diffuse learning to the remotest districts of the empire, it was ordained that not merely Bakufu vassals but promising outsiders should be admitted to the new Seidō University. However, these latter stood on an inferior footing to the Tokugawa Hatamoto, who were treated pretty much as gentlemen-commoners were in contemporary Oxford and Cambridge. They were allowed to bring their own servants to wait upon them, and they were exempted from examinations. Examinations were held at stated periods in the five years' curriculum, and were very serious and solemn functions indeed. First of all the examiners had to append the

blood seal to a document in which they were pledged to the strictest impartiality. The questions were prepared by the collective faculty, and then submitted by the Rector to the Shōgun, who selected a certain number of them to be set. To some of his successors this must have been a dreadfully boring piece of work, but to Tsunayoshi the task was as congenial as it would have been to that British Solomon, the first of the Stuart kings.

It was about this time that His Highness began to appear as his own Court Preacher. We hear of him collecting the Daimyō from the Go-san-ke downwards, and treating them to his expositions of the hardest passages in the classics. At first this was once a month, but soon the lectures were doubled, then trebled in number. Then came the turn of the Castle functionaries, and at last even the physicians were similarly honoured. Whenever the annual court envoy or any other grandee arrived from Kyōto, a Shōgunal dissertation formed an invariable item in the programme provided for his entertainment. During all this time, the Shōgun met his Great Council perhaps once a month, and on those occasions the most important subject discussed may have been the weather and its effects upon the health of the canine population of Yedo!

His interest in learning was not confined to Chinese philosophy alone. In Tsunayoshi's early manhood, Hoshina Masayuki encouraged Yamazaki Anzai in his Shintō researches, and thus set a fashion which his nephew was not slow to follow. The classical literature and antiquarian lore of Japan now found a great patron in the person of the Shōgun. It has been contended that Tsunayoshi evinced no great perspicacity in all this, especially in favouring the Shintō cult, which was based on the divinity of the Imperial line and therefore irreconcilable with the Tokugawa claims to administrative supremacy, but, as has been said, no special emphasis was laid upon this feature of Shintō by Yamazaki himself, nor by any other savant among the pioneer antiquarians of the Tokugawa age. Besides, at this time, the mutual distrust that had hitherto prevailed between Yedo and Kyōto was obliterated. From first to last the concord between the Emperor Reigen and Tsunayoshi continued unruffled and complete. In truth, it has to be admitted that the fifth Shōgun did not a little to restore the prestige of the Imperial Court.

In 531, the Emperor Keitai designated his successor by an

Imperial decree ;¹ and although this precedent had by no means been invariably followed, it had often been observed by succeeding sovereigns. During the long civil wars it was entirely disregarded, but it was now revived ; and one of Reigen's sons was installed as Crown Prince, all the proper ceremonial being duly observed.²

The most solemn of all the Shintō festivals was the Daijō-e, which each successive sovereign celebrated once, and once only, in his reign, shortly after his coronation, in honour of his ancestors, the *tenjin* and the *chijin*. Since the time of Kashiwabara II, that is, for nine reigns—this great ceremony had been totally neglected. On the initiative of Tsunayoshi it was now revived. One of the most important annual fêtes in the Shintō calendar was the Kamo-sai, celebrated by the Kamo shrine to the north of Kyōto. From the foundation of the city by the emperor Kwammu, it was the chief event of the year for the citizens of the gay capital, and through long ages the sovereign was always supposed to favour it with his attendance, but ever since the outbreak of the wars of Onin (1467) it had fallen into neglect. Tsunayoshi reinstituted it, and furthermore endowed the Kamo shrine with a substantial permanent revenue. In the hey-day of the Kyōto rule, the care of the sepulchral mounds of the Imperial ancestors were held to be a matter of vast importance, but in the course of the interminable civil wars, contending hosts now and then profaned these sacred places by converting them into camps and entrenchments, while thieves made no scruple about rifling them of their treasures. At the date of Tsunayoshi's accession to the Shōgunate, such of them as were not being used as arable land had disappeared under masses of dense brushwood and tangled vegetation. A Shōgunal commission was appointed to remedy all that so far as possible, and Tsunayoshi saw to it that its work was thoroughly done.

¹ It may be doubted if this statement is quite correct, as the succession to the throne was in abeyance for three years after Keitai's death in A.D. 531. His only son by the Empress was too young to follow him at once, and two sons by a concubine (Ankan and Kion) successively resigned before the Emperor's son, Kimmei came to the throne in 539. *He did* nominate his successor.—J. H. L.

² This incident is interesting. The Empress was childless, but there were four sons by secondary consorts. The eldest of these was entrusted to the care of his maternal relatives, and they, and indeed most of the courtiers, expected that this son would be made Crown Prince. The Empress's favourite was, however, the youngest of the Emperor's four children, and Her Majesty insisted that this son should be declared Heir Apparent. One pretext for setting aside the eldest was that he was born on the day of a solar eclipse. The Bakufu finally settled matters as the Empress desired ; the fourth son (later on, the Emperor Higashi-Yama) was made Prince Imperial, while the eldest son had to enter the priesthood. His maternal grandfather fought stoutly on behalf of his grandson's rights, and for doing so he was deported to the island of Sado.

If action be taken as the real criterion of belief, it will readily appear from all this that the fifth Shōgun was convinced that there was no irreconcilability of interest either between Yedo and Kyōto or between the old national cult of Japan and the teachings of the Chinese sages. The constant burden of his own homilies was the excellence of loyalty and filial piety, and in his attentions to the sovereign he was no doubt convinced that the feudatories would find an object lesson of what their conduct towards their superior, the Shōgun, was expected to be. With such a perfect understanding established with the Imperial Court and courtiers, the Shōgun found it an easy matter to enlist the services of some of the ablest proficients in the esoteric lore of the various Kugé houses. In the person of Kitamura Kigin (1618-1705) he secured Naka no In's best pupil, and the profoundest antiquarian of the age, and in other branches of what was the traditional secret lore of various noble houses he was able to obtain experts and competent instructors. A generation later, the several Kugé households found that they had abundant reason to repent of their good-nature at this time, for the monopoly of special knowledge they had held for ages seemed to be irretrievably gone to the serious detriment of their importance no less than of their incomes. In some fields indeed, the Kwantō presently outstripped Kyōto in scientific and scholarly talent. This was clearly demonstrated in the solid and substantial measure of astronomical knowledge displayed by a certain Yasui Santetsu. To lay down or expound the law in astronomy and in everything connected with the almanac had been the traditional prerogative of the Kugé house of Tsuchi-Mikado for ages. There had been no change in the Calendar since 862, and a reform, of course, had long been necessary. Now it was at last effected, but the reform was the work not of the Kyōto court astronomer but of an obscure citizen of Yedo. A certain checker-player called Yasui had a son whose addiction to unremunerative mathematical calculations gave him great concern. In his despair Yasui laid the case before Hoshina of Aidzu, but the Regent, so far from sympathizing with his woes, strongly advised him to encourage the young man in his hobby. In course of time this self-taught mathematician attained such a measure of proficiency in astronomy that he was able to do what no one in Kyōto could accomplish, to supply the needed corrections for the almanac. This new Calendar, known as the Jōkyō Almanac, was adopted in 1684; and its author (afterwards known as Shibukawa

Shunkai) was taken into the Shōgun's service as official astronomer.

Early in the seventeenth century the chief branches of the Kanō family of painters were induced to settle in Yedo under Tokugawa patronage. From one of these Kanō artists (Dō-un) Tsunayoshi received instruction in the use of the brush, and acquired a considerable measure of skill. The claims of fine art were not neglected by him after he became Shōgun. Some of the best of the Tosa school of painters were brought by him from Kyōto and put upon the pay-rolls of the Bakufu.

So far all that has been told of the administration of the Shōgunate by Tsunayoshi entitles him to the character of an enlightened, industrious, upright, and cultivated sovereign. One element in his conduct that has been mentioned (p. 180) does not redound to the credit of his moral conduct, but that is the only exception. The loss of his great minister, Hotta Masayoshi, proved, however, a misfortune not only to the Empire, but to its *de facto* ruler, and there are many sad stories to be told of Tsunayoshi's degeneration, under the influence of evil advisers, which go far to cloud the reputation he might have had in history had it not been for them.

Although Tsunayoshi emancipated the professional Chinese scholars from their enforced connexion with the Buddhist hierarchy, and although he himself was an ardent disciple of the rationalistic sages of China, he was unable to free himself from the thralldom of Buddhistic superstition. This was perhaps the result of his early training by his mother, who continued to exercise a potent influence over him as long as she lived. This lady was a daughter of a retainer of Nijō, the Kwambaku, and accompanied her mistress to Yedo. One day she went to the Ninnaji fane, and was there assured by one of the priests that there was a great future in store for her. When, in the course of time, she attracted the attentions of Iyemitsu and (1646) bore him a son, Tsunayoshi, she did not forget the priest whose predictions were thus being fulfilled, and when Tsunayoshi was invested with the fief of Tatebayashi in 1661, Ryōken, as this Shingon priest was called, was sent for and installed as incumbent of the Usui Hachiman temple. On her son's succession to the Shōgunate, Keishō-in, as the lady was named, surrendered herself entirely to the influence of her ghostly counsellor. A new temple, the Gokoku-ji, was expressly built for him in Yedo and was made the

metropolitan fane of the Shingon sect in the Kwantō. Not long afterwards an intimate friend of Ryōken was brought from Hasé in Yamato to fill a vacancy in the incumbency of another Shingon temple in Yedo. This latter priest, Ryūkō by name, had a great reputation for sanctity and profundity in the lore of his sect, and he soon succeeded in establishing a great personal ascendancy over the Shōgun. His Highness had only two children—a boy and a girl—and the former had just died (1683) at the age of four. Thus left without an heir the Shōgun's desire for male progeny became intense and overmastering. In such a matter, Chinese philosophy could be of but little material service; on the other hand, the Buddhist priesthood claimed to have abundant influence in such cases, and so Tsunayoshi had to fall back upon such ghostly aid as Ryōken and Ryūkō could furnish. In spite of prayers, and austerities and high masses, their efforts remained unavailing. A great doctor of the sect was brought down from the Kyōto district to instruct them in the deepest esoteric mysteries, but even so, all their ceremonies continued without result. Among other things, two or three magnificent new fanes were built in Yedo and richly furnished and endowed, but all in vain so far as any fertility in the harem was apparent. One of these temples, in regard to which orders had been that it should be constructed on a no less sumptuous scale than the great shrine of Tōeizan in Uyeno, occasioned the banishment of a Junior Councillor and several Bugyō who failed to see that this order was properly executed.

The priests, of course, were required to furnish some explanation of the scanty results of all these exceedingly costly efforts. This was not very difficult to do. In some previous existence, the Shōgun must have been responsible for much sacrifice of life—a perfectly credible proposition inasmuch as the Minamoto stock of which he came was the most warlike and blood-bolstered family in Japan. If this was the real explanation of the futility of masses, solemn services and austerities, the only possible remedy lay in the exercise and exhibition of a deep feeling of tenderness for the sanctity of animal life.

At this date the Fuki-age grounds in the palace enclosure were still infested with foxes and badgers and other troublesome four-footed tenants, and to keep them at a proper distance a great many dogs had been allowed to run about. One day at the sight of these dogs, a bright idea suddenly flashed across the mind of Ryūkō.

The Shōgun was born in the year of the Dog ; let His Augustness decree that henceforth everything canine should be held sacred and sacrosanct ! Utterly absurd and ridiculous as the suggestion might be supposed to have sounded, it was at once eagerly adopted !

It was in 1687 that the first of the decrees denouncing pains and penalties against the taking of animal life was issued. From this date to the end of Tsunayoshi's administration there is scarcely a year in which ordinances were not published either reaffirming or extending the scope of the early legislation on the subject. Everything feathered or four-footed ultimately came within the purview of these drastic provisions for the prevention of cruelty to animals, from horses down to sparrows, while even the keeping of fish in tanks and ponds for sale was prohibited. But it was the dog that was especially to be treated not so much as King of the Beasts as Lord of Creation. An accurate and exhaustive census of all the curs that could bark was instituted, first in Yedo, and then throughout the empire at large. Thenceforth the accouchement of a lady canine was to be treated as a very serious matter indeed. In truth it was accorded all the dignity of a function. When puppies appeared, the number in the litter, the sex and colour-marking of each individual in it, the breed, if it could be described, had all to be set forth, together with any other particulars worthy of note, and the document had to be at once sealed and signed and transmitted to the proper authorities. Ownerless mongrels were not to be stoned or driven off when they penetrated into private yards ; on the contrary they were to be fed and otherwise treated with politeness. Dogs fighting were not to be separated by blows—cold water only was to be used in such a case. When a dog died, a report was to be sent to the coroner, and the funeral properly seen to. “ To be buried like a dog ” was no longer an indignity nor a hardship. As time went on, all this was found to be insufficient. In 1694, the year of the Dog came round in the calendar, and it was felt that a special effort should then be put forth to mark the auspicious occasion. It was accordingly solemnly decreed that suitable buildings should be forthwith erected and properly furnished, and that henceforth all the stray dogs in Yedo should be collected and there honourably maintained at the public expense. At Ōkubo, on the outskirts of Yedo, a *yashiki* covering some twenty acres of ground was selected as the site of this Prytaneum for vagrant mongrels, and Mayeda Toshinao, Daimyō of Toyama in Etchū

(100,000 *koku*), was honoured with the commission to defray the cost of the sumptuous kennels that were to be erected. One of the Sobayōnin, Yonekura, was made superintendent of the work. On its completion, two high officers were appointed to make a thorough search of Yedo from end to end for tenants for the grand new dog *yashiki*. In a short space of time as many as 10,000 mangy curs made the night hideous with their yelping, and soon it could accommodate no more. Accordingly, an additional patch of eight acres of ground was appropriated at Nakano; and here Mori of Tsuyama (186,000 *koku*) and Kyōgoku of Tadotsu (10,000 *koku*) were instructed to erect another set of kennels. As before, Yonekura acted as superintendent of the work; and for the zeal and assiduity he displayed in the direction of these two great enterprises he was raised to Daimyō rank, made a Junior Councillor, and entrusted with the honourable but onerous post of Grand-Master of the Kennels. Four Bugyō served under him, each one with a following of fifteen constables. Furthermore, as the dogs sometimes took ill and died, medical aid was deemed to be absolutely indispensable. So a quest for expert dog-doctors was instituted throughout the empire, and at last two great leeches for ailing canines were discovered and attached to the kennels with handsome stipends as Physicians in Ordinary. In sober truth it was solemnly enacted that these veterinary hacks were to receive the honours accorded to the Shōgun's own physician. When they went abroad they were accompanied by six attendants to assist them in feeling the pulse of their four-legged patients and in administering physic. Whenever they proceeded through the city on their mission the streets had to be cleaned for their passage. From the official accounts of January, 1696, we learn that the daily consumption of these kennels amounted to 330 $\frac{6}{10}$ *koku* of rice, 10 barrels of *miso*, 10 bales of dried sardines, 56 bundles of firewood, and a long list of sundry minor items. All this, of course, savours of comedy, and we might well expect to hear of the Empire being convulsed with one huge roar of Olympian laughter from Satsuma to Yezo. But there was nothing of the kind, for the lieges had long learned to their dire cost that it was anything but a laughing matter. How serious the affair really was may be inferred from the following sample of government placards that stared the citizens of Yedo in the face at every street corner:—

“Mark well! Honjō, Aoichō, Sanchōme, Ichibei, apprentice of the carpenter Zenjirō, murderer of a dog, by cutting it!

"The young daughter, Shimo, of the plasterer Kabeya of Honjō, Aoichō, Nichōme, has informed concerning the above, and as the facts are as stated, she is given fifty gold *ryō* (£70) as a reward."

The apprentice, of course, was put to death. We are told that so many shared the same fate for similar offences that the heads soon filled thirty barrels! Whoever even struck or injured a dog was at once seized and put in prison, where he might pass long years before being brought to trial. Deportation to a distant island was a common enough penalty inflicted not only upon such as may have unintentionally hurt stray curs, but also on the guiltless relatives of such as may have been executed for "crimes" like that of the apprentice Ichibei. After the death of Tsunayoshi in 1709, there was a general amnesty for these miserable unfortunates, and as many as 6,737 were liberated from the gaols of Yedo alone. In the Bakufu domains throughout the Empire, 8,634 victims were restored to their families.

All this sounds so absurd that it is difficult to credit the Japanese accounts of it that have come down to us. It is fully corroborated by such foreign contemporary testimony as we have. Kaempfer made his second visit to Yedo in 1692. On the first of April, he tells us the Hollanders' domestics brought him a Nagasaki man, formerly in the service of the factory, to be cured.

"As he was walking in the streets, a big dog had bitten him badly in the calf of the leg. When asked whether he had taken revenge on the brute, he replied that he wasn't such a fool as to put his life in danger by any such action. For, he assured the Dutchmen, it was forbidden under the most rigorous pains and penalties to kill a cock, a chicken, or any dog. The 'Emperor' has such regard for these animals that it is a capital crime to kill one of them. When a dog comes to die, the head of the family must inform the Ottona or headman of the ward, just as when a servant dies."

It becomes abundantly clear from what Kaempfer tells us he saw at Kurume on his way back to Nagasaki that these laws were strictly enforced not merely in the Bakufu lands, but in the fiefs of the great Outside Daimyō as well. Kurume was the castle-town of Arima Yorimoto (208,000 *koku*), one of the five great *Kokushū* Daimyō of Kyūshū, who were supposed to exercise all but sovereign rights within their territories. In this castle-town, the Dutchmen passed the stand where public instructions and proclamations were posted. There they saw a new proclamation that had just been issued and 20 *schuits* of silver nailed to a pillar. These were offered

as a reward to anyone that could disclose the accomplices in a murder lately committed on a dog!

"More than one unfortunate," proceeds Kaempfer, "has been punished severely in the country during the reign of the present Emperor, solely on account of his affection for dogs." On reaching Deshima, the first thing the Dutch were told was that ten days before orders had come from Yedo forbidding the killing of any animal, unless for the Dutch or Chinese, and the selling of any cattle or poultry. "We noticed also in traversing the town that all poultry-shops were closed, although the poulterers made no difficulty about selling fowls privately in their own houses." However, we may safely take it that these worthy poulterers pretty soon discovered that this clandestine prosecution of their trade was more than risky, and that they would do well to try something else as a means of livelihood.

The economic results of this legislation, relentlessly enforced for a score of years, were terribly disastrous to many. Hunters, trappers, and tanners, all, of course, lost their occupations in common with the poulterers. And the peasants suffered frightfully. In thousands of cases they had to abandon cultivation on account of the ravages of the birds and the wild beasts they could only venture to drive away at the risk of their lives. As the use of pack-horses was now frowned upon, there was an increased opening for service as baggage-coolies, while in Yedo riding on horseback became so uncommon that palanquin and *kago*-bearers found abundant employment. As for the samurai, although their livelihood was not actually threatened as was the case with the peasants, they were profoundly affected by these Draconian laws for the prevention of cruelty to animals. In the *Buké Shohatto* issued by Tsunayoshi in 1683, it was indeed, as usual, inculcated in the first of the fifteen articles that "civil and military arts, especially archery and horsemanship, must be diligently studied and practised". A few years later on, the earliest of the animal life protection edicts was issued, and it soon became abundantly plain that, in the practice of archery, zeal had to be tempered with discretion, at least in the bowman's selection of a mark for his shafts. In 1691, a sparrow was accidentally brought down by two castle-pages who were playing with a blow-pipe. Akita, their superior, only escaped punishment by reporting the "murder" at once. One of these pages was decapitated, while the other, a boy of thirteen, was mercifully let off with deportation to an island. Archers were forbidden to have recourse to the goose or his kindred for feathers for their arrows—paper was henceforth to be used. Hawking had for ages been a favourite sport. All

falcons were now set at liberty, and the Shōgun's Master of the Hawks and his subordinates discharged. As for horsemanship, it was strongly discouraged. For clipping the manes and paring the hoofs of their steeds, twenty-five "criminals"—some of them samurai—were banished to the islands of Idzu in 1692. Later on, in 1708, Arai Hakuseki records that in the September of that year, a law was issued (really re-issued) forbidding the cutting of horse's hair ;

"and all, both those led and those ridden, soon looked like beasts from the wilderness . . . In November three laws for the protection of birds and beasts were (re)issued, and so even men, whose duty it was to ride, walked instead, and led their horses."

From this we see that this extraordinary legislation continued in full force for more than twenty years, its individual provisions being issued and reaffirmed time and again. All of them were only a century later than the famous instructions of the great general, Kato Kiyomasa, to his samurai of Kumamoto. It is small wonder to meet with the following in Arai Hakuseki's *Autobiography* :—

"On 28th July (1709) I sent in another memorial (to the new Shōgun, Iyenobu) calling attention to the condition of the Shōgun's arms and standards, which had been so neglected during the many years of peace that they were useless. The Shōgun privately told his officials to make the needed repairs and have all in readiness for the festivals of the next two years ; *and he did not inspect the armoury that year lest shame should be cast on the memory of his predecessor.*"

It is more especially in connexion with the atrocious barbarity with which the penalties of these Animal Protection Statutes were inflicted that a Japanese writer is impelled to express his wonder that there was no attempt at insurrection.

"That such a deteriorated government," he exclaims, "did not find any one to lead a rebellion when men's minds were full of it, was owing to the transmitted virtue of the Tokugawa family."

From the eighth to the twelfth century, when Buddhism was the state religion and the sovereign a devout if not bigoted Buddhist, it is no matter of surprise to meet with numerous instances of legislation for the protection of animal life. Such legislation generally assumed the form of appropriating large tracts of country here and there as preserves within whose bounds the fowls of the air, the beasts of the field, and the fish of the stream and pond were immune, and there is abundant evidence to show that it was extremely difficult to get even these moderate provisions rigorously

enforced for any length of time. To inflict the death penalty for infractions was felt to be absurd and highly dangerous. In these ages the Kyōto rulers thought twice before incurring the awful responsibility of shedding human blood, for there was nothing more dreaded than the possibilities of what the "rough spirit", the vindictive ghost of the slain, might do. The last serious attempt to enforce the Buddhist injunctions against the taking of life by legislation was made by Shirakawa I towards the end of the eleventh century.¹ Before the rough and ferocious spirit of rising feudalism, it failed hopelessly. A certain retainer of Taira Tadamori was summoned before the Kebiishi board for an infringement of the ordinances. He at once pleaded guilty, saying he would cheerfully submit to the penalty. What that exactly was he did not know; at the worst it would be imprisonment or exile. It was his special duty to supply his master's table with fish and game, and for any failure on his part to do so the punishment was death. When reported to the ex-Emperor the incident was passed over with a laugh, no penalty being inflicted at all. A century before this, the Minamoto chieftain, Mitsunaka, thought it expedient to enter religion. When it came to the injunction against the taking of life, the old warrior pretended not to hear, afterwards explaining to the Chief Priest that his acceptance of that special command would be prejudicial to the martial spirit it was the prime object of his house to foster among its members and adherents. In the early Kamakura period the chase was one of the most serious interests of life; Yoritomo's great battues around the base and on the slopes of Fuji really served the purposes of modern reviews and grand military manœuvres. In the city of Kamakura, *Inu-ou-mono* was one of the three chief forms in which proficiency in archery and horsemanship was tested in tournaments.² Dogs were let loose in a wide space palisaded with bamboos, and mounted samurai pursued and

¹ The character of the Emperor Shirakawa (1073-87) is fully described in Vol. I, pp. 278-9 of this work. Although he abdicated in 1087, he continued to rule as Cloistered Emperor till his death in 1129. His superstition, though he was otherwise of strong character and determined will, was as marked as that of Tsunayoshi, six centuries later, and brought nearly as much distress on his country through his extravagance in temple and statue building and in celebrating great religious festivals and progresses, while in order to carry out fully the Buddhist inhibition of taking animal life he confiscated fishermen's nets, and so deprived thousands of their livelihoods. It is hardly correct to say that his prohibitions failed hopelessly.—J. H. L.

² An exhibition of this sport was given in the palace grounds at Tōkyō in 1879, in which many persons of high rank took an active part. It certainly afforded scope for skill in both horsemanship and archery, but only blunted arrows were used. It was said to be indigenous to the province of Satsuma.—J. H. L.

shot them down. Towards the close of the Kamakura régime, Hōjō Takatoki's kennels, it is true, did become very expensive. Certain regular days of the month were fixed for the great dog-fights in which the Regent delighted. His mastiffs were fed on fowls and fish, and decked with collars of gold and silver ; when the victorious champion in a canine tournament was led through the streets, people were expected to doff their head-gear and even to kneel down reverently. Even so, Takatoki's kennels were not for the reception of mangy street mongrels, nor were his fighting dogs supposed to be separated by douches of rose-water. These few incidents and considerations, among scores that might be cited, should serve to indicate the radical incompatibility between the Buddhist canon against the taking of life and the spirit of Japanese feudalism. And now the astounding thing is this :—

Between 1687 and 1709, the social organization of the empire was feudal, and the administration was entirely in the hands of the military class. Yet during this period of two-and-twenty years, the prohibition against the taking of life was enforced with a measure of universality and success that was utterly unattainable in the very hey-day of Buddhism, six or eight centuries before, when Japan was practically a Theocracy, when the civilian official was everything, and such military men as there were, were regarded as little better than menials. That the fifth Tokugawa Shōgun should have been able so thoroughly to impose his will upon his vassals and the empire in a matter that, from the very rise of the feudal system, had been found utterly inconsistent with, and antipathetic to the Samurai spirit, must surely be regarded as one of the most remarkable incidents in the history of Japan. More than any other single thing perhaps, it reveals the inherent strength of the Tokugawa despotism in the clearest light.

Tsunayoshi himself was neither a particularly strong nor a particularly able man, while the Bakufu councillors at this time were mediocrities, capable of nothing beyond mere routine work. From this, it should be tolerably plain that it was not so much the men as the system of administrative machinery they manipulated that really counted. It has been pointed out that the Tokugawa was the greatest feudal family in Japan ; that the Bakufu domain was simply a fief like Satsuma, or Choshiu, or Higo, or Tosa, or Kaga, though on a much higher pinnacle scale of wealth and power. All these, and the rest of the outside feudatories were constrained to

bend to the will of the Tokugawa for a variety of reasons. Individually they were helpless before the overwhelming resources of the Bakufu. Even if knit firmly together in a general league, their united forces would have been vastly inferior to those of the Tokugawa House, and the Tokugawa Fudai. Even if left free to form a league, any generally concerted action among the outside lords was impossible, for their mutual jealousy and rivalry were intense. Some of them hated their fellows more than they detested their common over-lord, the Shōgun, who, it must be remembered, was fortified with the Imperial mandate to maintain order in the Empire. These outside lords were not left free to attempt concerted action, at least not before 1862. At all times the consorts and younger children of each feudatory, were kept interned in the Yedo *yashiki*, and he himself was bound to pass every alternate year in Yedo, while when he repaired to his domains, his eldest son or prospective successor was obliged to replace him in the Tokugawa capital. Furthermore, any of the clan Karō or officials who gave rise to suspicion were promptly ordered to repair to Yedo. This system of perpetual hostages put the outside feudatories completely at the mercy of the Bakufu. As for the Tokugawa Fudai Daimyō, they were still more at the mercy of the four or five of their fellows who sat on the Grand Council. Any serious dissension among them might furnish the outside Daimyō with an opportunity to throw off the Tokugawa yoke, and every Fudai felt that the overthrow of the Tokugawa Shōgunate could not possibly incur to his advantage. By this time, the office of Karō in most of the fiefs was becoming hereditary in certain families, and it was the Karō, and not the Daimyō that really governed the clans. Many of these hereditary Karō were men of small ability, but they all had wit enough to perceive that anything in the shape of a revolt or a revolution would be disastrous to themselves and to the prospect of transmitting their lucrative and influential positions to their sons. Their interests were intimately bound up with the maintenance of things just as they were. If their Daimyō did evince any wish to enter upon a policy of adventure, they would take very good care to curb him, or to get him replaced by some son or relative of a less enterprising temper. But, in truth, by this date, thanks to the effeminate and indulgent nurture of the heirs to the fiefs, the great majority of the Daimyō had sunk to mere *fainéants*—little better than figure-heads and puppets!

The only thing in the form of a remonstrance against the insensate folly of the Life Protection laws¹ that came from a Daimyō, proceeded from the illustrious Mitsukuni of Mito. In 1690, he retired from the headship of the fief in favour of his nephew, Tsunaeda. In 1694, however, Mitsukuni interrupted his work on the *Dai Nihon Shi* to make a circuit of the Mito domains. His hot indignation was aroused when he saw the miserable condition to which the little patches of the farmers were reduced by the ravages of birds and wild beasts. He at once issued orders for their destruction, and packing some of the pelts of the largest animals that were killed neatly into boxes he sent them to Yanagisawa Yoshiyasu, who was by this time almost absolute controller of the Bakufu, by express couriers, with the written message :—

“As winter is coming on, and you are getting old, it is important that you should try to keep warm. I trust you will find this trifling present of some use, as I have done myself.”

Yoshiyasu concluded that the Lord of Mito must be mad to send this most improper and highly illegal gift.

In 1692, on the occasion of the deportation of twenty-five “criminals” for the heinous offence of trimming their horses’ manes and paring their hoofs, a certain Ishikawa (or Koishikawa), in the Castle service, had the courage to send in a memorial of some twenty articles, exposing the shortcomings of the administration, and one of its paragraphs severely criticized the Life Protecting legislation. For this the memorialist was stripped of his position and placed under restraint in the house of a relative.²

It is rather remarkable to find that on the whole, Tsunayoshi remained on tolerably good terms with the Daimyō. He inaugurated,

¹ Kaempfer, who has already been quoted on this subject, further tells us :—“Nobody may, under severe penalties, insult or abuse these dogs, and to kill them is a capital crime, whatever mischief they do. Those that die must be carried up to the tops of mountains or hills, as the usual burying places, and very decently interred. The natives tell a pleasant tale on this head. A Japanese, as he was carrying up the dead carcass of a dog to the top of a mountain in order to its burial, grew impatient, grumbled, and cursed the Emperor’s birthday and his commands. His companion, though sensible of his complaints, bid him hold his tongue and be quiet, and instead of swearing and cursing, return thanks to the gods that the Emperor was not born in the sign of the Horse, because in that case, the load would have been much heavier (Kaempfer, vol. i, pp. 198–9).—J. H. L.

² After the murder of Hotta, in 1684, it soon became a very risky matter to memorialize the authorities about grievances. Kumazawa Banzan met Hotta in 1682, and the two men appear to have found themselves in accord in their views on many matters. In 1687, Kumazawa sent in a memorial to the Bakufu suggesting remedies for certain abuses in the administration. For this he was sentenced to seclusion in his house at Koga; and for the last four years of his life (1687–91) he had to refrain from all lecturing or writing.

it is true, his rule by a very drastic treatment of the collateral Tokugawa house of Takata in Echigo, and ruthlessly confiscated its broad domain of 260,000 *koku*. This was only an index of further severe measures, and during his administration from first to last domains to the extent of 2,300,000 *koku* were dealt with, most of them, not as the result of the maladministration of their holders, but by the operation of the principle of escheat. To certain of these lands, Fudai were promoted from less valuable fiefs, while 308,000 *koku* were assigned to twenty-nine new houses. In this period the Tozama lords were really treated with great consideration. Mayeda of Kaga was raised in court rank, while three of his Karō received the distinction of the fifth class. We find Shimazu of Satsuma indulging in some very candid criticism of the scandalous debasements of the currency which were effected at the Tokugawa mints but, apart from this, there is nothing to indicate that the great feudatory was not in the best of terms with the Shōgun. An unprecedented step was taken in incorporating several of the Tozama in the official service, although, in the so-called Legacy of Iyeyasu, we are told that Tozama lords, however able they may be, cannot have seats in the Rōjū nor any part in the government.¹

On the whole, the Daimyō class was not disaffected in Tsunayoshi's time. Of course, hostile criticism was a dangerous luxury, for, as has been said, the Tokugawa secret service was everywhere. The "dog-laws" and their congeners provided an especially rich harvest for the miserable scum of delators, as may be inferred from the Yedo street-notice previously quoted, and the placard on the proclamation stance at Kurume. As for the Bakufu officials themselves, every man among them was bound hand and foot by the *Seishi* (the written oath to carry out all orders to the letter, whatever they might be) that all had to sign with the blood-seal.² As has been said, the net effect of this was that every government employee had to stifle whatever embryo of rational or moral conscience that might occur to him. Plainly a leader for any revolt against the "dog-statutes" was not to be looked for in this quarter.

¹ It was an endeavour to check one of Kaempfer's assertions that led me to this discovery. He speaks of the young Prince of Hirado having just become a Temple Magistrate. Now, the Matsuura family of Hirado (63,000 *koku*) was an outside or Tozama house. However, Kaempfer was quite correct—Matsuura, Iki no Kami, was made a Temple Magistrate on 13th January, 1692. No Tozama was then actually appointed to the Great Council, but several were made Sobayōnin—a position of much more influence at that date.

² For this among the officials of Nagasaki, and especially the interpreters, see Kaempfer *passim*, and more particularly bk. iv, ch. 10.

As to the Rōnin, the days of Yui no Shōsetsu had gone, seemingly never to return. The Rōnin of Iyemitsu's time were either dead or frail old men by this time, and in the days of Iyetsuna and Tsunayoshi there were much fewer confiscations than there were under the third Shōgun. Furthermore, Yedo, Kyōto, and Ōsaka were all rapidly increasing in wealth as the years went on, and the lordless man had much less difficulty in finding a means of livelihood than he had fifty or sixty years before. Many being merged in the industrial and trading classes. Often the Rōnin was now a harmless Chinese scholar, and, now and then, an expounder of the *Taiheiki*,¹ or a public story-teller. Chikamatsu Monzaemon (1653-1724), the so-called Shakespeare of Japan, and certainly one of her greatest dramatists, was of the swarm of the two-sworded cast-adrift and disinherited. For any daring member of the class to combine 3,000 or 4,000 lawless and resolute desperadoes under the very noses of the authorities, as Yui had done, was now impossible, for ever since that time the lordless man had been kept under very close observation. Even an Otokodaté had now to be very circumspect. The City Magistrates pounced upon 200 members of two confederations that were indulging in irregularities somewhat freely, cut off about a dozen heads, and dispatched the others to enjoy the picturesque seascape around the islands of Idzu for the remainder of their natural lives. The Bakufu really had but little to fear from the Rōnin; even the boldest and most truculent among them thought it no shame to turn their backs and flee precipitately rather than face the snarling of an ill-conditioned wayside cur.²

¹ The *Taiheiki* (*The Record of Great Peace*) is one of the most esteemed of classical works on Japanese history. It is a history of feudal Japan from the foundation of the Shōgunate by Yoritomo down to the accession of the third Shōgun of the Ashikaga dynasty (1181-1368) with special reference to the events of the reign of the Emperor Go Daigo (1318-39), the ninety-sixth of the Imperial line, and his efforts to shake off the yoke of the Shōgunate. As this was one of the stormiest periods in history, the scope of the work somewhat belies its title, but its popularity was such that it gave rise to a class whose profession it was to read and expound its contents to public audiences.—J. H. L.

² It was in 1693 that Cotton Mathers published his *Wonders of the Invisible World*. It was in 1716 that the last execution for witchcraft took place in England (at Huntingdon); while an old woman was burned at the stake at Dornoch in Scotland for the "crime" in 1722. At Bamberg, in Bavaria, the executions for witchcraft from 1610 to 1640 were at the rate of about a hundred annually. Between 1627 and 1629, 157 of these "criminals" were executed in 29 batches of burnings. Between 1660 and 1664, thirty were executed in the district of Lindeheim, where the total population amounted to about 1,000. In 1619, about 200 witches and wizards were hanged or burned at Labourt at the foot of the Pyrenees. These are only a few samples of scores of cases that might be cited. And meanwhile the Spanish Inquisition was busy. It is well for Westerners not to be too ready in our ridiculing the "dog-legislation" in old Japan. The results were revolting indeed, but our judicial murders for witchcraft and heterodoxy were not a whit less so.

“Learning and the military arts are as the two wheels of the carriage”—such was the conventional simile used to express the co-ordinate and equal importance of a mastery of the sword and of the pen for the ideal samurai of Japan. In Katō Kiyomasa’s age the vehicle was running along the face of a steep slope with all the weight thrown upon one wheel. Mitsukuni of Mito and other broad-minded chieftains of his time endeavoured to place the carriage on a level track and to distribute the weight fairly and equally. Mitsukuni died in 1700, and after his death, the carriage again began to run tilted on one wheel—learning, or rather learning and polite accomplishments, being unduly emphasized. Tsunayoshi’s own personal example, and the extraordinarily liberal patronage he extended to Chinese scholars, Japanese antiquarians, and the fine arts, contributed not a little to this result. His Life Protection statutes did still more. We have just seen their effect upon archery and horsemanship, and upon the Shōgun’s own arsenal. There can be little doubt that they affected the ethos of the samurai class as a whole, if not profoundly, at all events considerably. At all times the two-sworded men had abundance of leisure, but now, with horsemanship and archery positively discouraged, and with such little store set upon proficiency in the military arts in general by those in authority, the leisure of the samurai expanded or degenerated into idleness and sloth. Many of them had no real innate love for the study of the Chinese classics. If they did perforce endure the headaches that were the chief, perhaps the only result of their efforts to spell them out, it was merely because they felt they could not afford to be out of the fashion. The tedium and ennui of castle-service or *yashiki* life had to be dissipated somehow, and, in contemporary Yedo, there were abundant means of diversion for people of all tastes. Many of these were neither very reputable nor very moral, but nothing much was said against indulgence in them, provided sacrosanct dogs and sparrows were left alone. At this time, too, the samurai had plenty of the Shōgun’s debased coins to spend. In the first place, as has been said, the stipends of the Castle officials were considerably augmented soon after Tsunayoshi’s accession. The Life Protecting statutes also tended to make them comparatively rich men for the time at least.

Such an assertion may very well sound nonsensical. However, it is generally admitted that between 1695 and 1709, the purchasing

power of the Samurai's stipend was much greater than it ever was before, or ever was afterwards. The explanation usually tendered is that the contemporary debasements of the coinage drove up the price of rice, and that when the samurai converted the surplus of his rice-stipend into cash he found himself at a great financial advantage. The effect, however, of the debasement of the currency would be the appreciation, not merely of rice, but of all commodities, and so far as any change in the coinage was concerned the samurai would therefore find himself in the same relative position as before.

The fact would seem to be that there was a great appreciation of rice, apart from any question of a debased currency at all, and that it was owing to diminished annual yields while the population still went on increasing. In Iyeyasu's time it is estimated that the cultivated land in the empire amounted to about 5,000,000 acres; under Iyemitsu this area was greatly extended, and during the first half of Iyetsuna's Shōgunate the work of reclamation still continued to be vigorously prosecuted, especially in the outside fiefs such as Tosa and Bizen. This of course meant a steady augmentation of the national income, no less than of the population. It also indicates the ultimate source of the astonishing increase in wealth and population of contemporary Kyōto, Ōsaka, and Yedo. During the first four years of Tsunayoshi's rule, the reclamation of new land probably continued. But a short experience of the Life Protection statutes put an end to that, and not only so, but a great deal of old land presently fell out of cultivation, for the farmers lost heart at having to stand by passively while their small holdings were being ravaged by ever-increasing swarms of field-mice and flocks of sparrows, to say nothing of larger beasts and birds. Again, such chickens as they reared they dared neither kill nor sell. It is no wonder that many peasants presently abandoned their holdings in despair, while in such land as still continued to be worked the returns became more and more meagre, on account of the toll levied by innumerable feathered and four-footed ravagers. Naturally, for this reason alone, rice tended to rise rapidly in price.

In Yedo, as elsewhere, it was now a perpetual Lent. Neither fowl nor game, nor flesh of any kind could legally be served on any table in Japan for the space of nearly twenty years. This naturally involved a greater consumption of rice. Now, the samurai stipend

was a fixed quantity, and in the case of the outside clan *yashiki* men this was paid almost entirely in rice. As for the Bakufu officials, the payment was partly in money, but the money portion of the salary was much the smaller. At this date the total of the money disbursed for salaries was 300,000 *ryō* (300,000 in debased money), while rice amounted to between 1,000,000 and 1,400,000 *koku*, which would be worth twice or thrice as much as the money.¹

Much of this rice would be a surplus quantity, and would be sold on the market by the *Fuda-sashi*, or brokers specially attached to the Shōgun's granaries to act for the Castle samurai. It is not difficult to perceive how this peculiar combination of circumstances tended to place the samurai in a very advantageous financial situation for the time being, apart from all question of a depreciated currency. Some of the very lowest castle-officials were paid wholly, or almost wholly, in money, and for them the situation became, on the contrary, a very trying one indeed, so much so that we hear of relief being extended to some 6,000 military men in Yedo at this time. But their position was exceptional. As a general rule the Yedo samurai were extremely well off at this date.

Few samurai thought either of hoarding or of investing money; such practices were not in consonance with the traditional way, or ways, of the warrior. The increasing, and for the time being somewhat plethoric, revenues of most samurai householders were promptly and right royally disbursed. A century or even half a century before the Samurai's superfluous funds would undoubtedly have been spent on weapons or war-harness for himself, or trappings for his charger. But armour was scarcely ever donned nowadays, and to so much as trim the mane of a steed or pare its hoofs was nothing short of a felony punishable by transportation. Accordingly, the money now went on finer clothes for the master himself, or on richer robes and girdles and hair-pins for his wife and concubines and daughters, while the menials in his household were augmented in number. Social entertainments were vastly different affairs from what they

¹ Early in Iyetsuna's time, the procedure for regulating the computation of the rate of the equivalence between rice and coin was determined. The City Magistrate summoned the leading rice-merchants to a consultation. Acting on the data furnished by them, he then fixed the rate for the next four months, and a placard giving details of this was posted at one of the Castle-gates. One hundred *hyō* was taken as the basal figure in these calculations. In the earliest times (Iyetsuna) the rate fixed was 18 *ryō* (£25) for 100 *hyō*; but of course, this rate fluctuated. About this time (1700) it seems to have gone up to 40 *ryō* for 100 *hyō*. The rice-merchants were kept under strict official surveillance—regraters, forestallers, and engrossers were summarily evicted from Yedo and their property confiscated.

had been in Katō Kiyomasa's times—fine dinner-services, rich viands and wine, costly house-furnishings were now *de rigueur* for any one who was not content to pass for a rustic. Kiyomasa imposed the death penalty on his samurai for dancing or organizing dancing parties which meant that they were to keep away from tea-houses. Now, tea-house parties, with crowds of dancing-girls as waitresses, were great functions in Yedo. Their great promoters were the *rusui* of the clan *yashiki*. These *rusui* were seneschals left in charge of the *yashiki* and of the affairs of the clan when the Daimyō was absent from Yedo. They were exceedingly powerful, and having plenty of opportunity to amass wealth by perquisites, pickings, "squeezes" and general venality, they almost invariably appreciated the wisdom of making hay while the sun shone. Between the *rusui* of the various clans there was great rivalry in everything, and now the chief ambition of each was not to be outdone in luxurious and ostentatious display by the representative of any other clan. The position of these seneschals has been often compared by Japanese historians to that of the diplomatic corps in modern Tōkyō. That is, as far as their functions went, for the modern diplomatic corps did not use tea-houses for their dinner parties. These seneschals did, and the sums wasted on these functions were immense. No doubt they began gravely and decorously enough, but it was not unusual for them to degenerate into riotous debauchery before all had drunk themselves to sleep and quiet. The theatre also had become a great and fashionable institution in Yedo. At this time, dramatic performances were of three species: the *Nō* drama, in which court grandees and samurai could take part as amateur performers without any derogation from their dignity, the marionette stage, and the popular stage, which were both alike plebeian and professional, and so more or less disreputable.¹

At this time the artistes of the four *Za*, or common theatres of Yedo figured as great and consequential personages in fashionable society, patronized by the Shōgun and his favourites, and eagerly

¹ For the *Nō* drama, see Brinkley's *Japan*, vol. iii, pp. 18-59; and Aston's *Japanese Literature*, pp. 197-214. Some details about the origin and development of the marionette and popular theatres will be found in Inouye's *Sketches of Tōkyō Life*, chap. ii and iv; Aston's *Japanese Literature*, pp. 273-8, and Brinkley's *Japan*, vol. vi, pp. 106-22. It was in Tsunayoshi's time that the first great "star" of the popular stage appeared in the person of a certain Horikoshi Ebizō, who assumed the stage-name of Ichikawa Danjurō (1660-1704). In the last quarter of the nineteenth century, the famous Danjurō, who then bore the name, was the eighth in succession to, if not in descent from, the founder of the house. See Inouye's *Sketches of Tōkyō Life*, pp. 23-6.

courted and caressed by the two-sworded aristocrats of Yedo and their households. As has been said, Tsunayoshi aspired—and not altogether vainly—to distinction in the rôle of his own court-preacher, but he was not averse to seasoning the dryness of his doctrinal discussions with lighter passages and pastimes. From his boyhood he was passionately fond of the *Nō* drama; he frequently appeared on the stage in person, and, like Nero of old, he gradually became overmastered by the craving for that incense of approbation and applause which is as the very breath of life to the nostrils of the histrionic artist. On his accession to the Shōgunate, he at first took his administrative duties seriously, but after the death of Hotta he soon lost interest in such prosaic work, and entrusted the bulk of it to his Sobayōnin, at first chiefly to Kaempfer's Bingo Sama, and later to Yanagisawa. He was thus free to devote himself to what were really the preoccupations of his life. These were scholarship in all its forms, but more particularly Chinese classics and philosophy, and later, divination and debauchery. After these two main interests of life, the *Nō* drama came to absorb a great amount of his attention and energy.

As early as the summer of 1681 the first company of *Nō* players for service in the Shōgun's court was organized. All the members were raised to the status of Hatamoto and were formed into a corps of Pages known as the *Kiri-no-ma-ban*. Five years later (1686) yet another company was recruited from the sons of Daimyō and Hatamoto who had good voices and who showed a capacity for acting, and these were constituted into the *Tsugi-no-ban*. Next year some ten or a dozen actors of the four great popular theatres were selected to instruct the aristocratic amateurs, and presently these lucky social outcasts found themselves elevated to the dignity and emoluments of Hatamoto and duly enrolled in the *Rōka-ban*, as the *Tsugi-no-ban* now came to be named. To these new companies of actor-pages *Kashira* (Captains) were appointed, and these were soon put on the same footing as the captains of the *Sho-im-ban* and the *Koshō-gumi*, the original companies of military pages, recruited exclusively from the proud old Mikawa warrior-houses.

Many of the Daimyō and not a few of the Castle officials found the subtleties of Chinese philosophy altogether beyond their capacity, and in their innermost hearts loathed the study of the canonical books. In this *Nō* mania of the Shōgun, everyone gifted with a particle of musical talent, however incapable in all other

respects, discerned a rare opportunity for pushing his fortunes at Court. All that was needful was a little professional coaching and hence the artistes of the four *Za* soon found themselves with the *entrée* to all the great mansions in Yedo, where they were petted and caressed by *rusui* and even by Daimyō, while the family lecturer on the lore of Confucius had to wait and patiently warm his hands over the brazier in the chilly ante-room.

The dresses for the various parts in a *Nō* drama were very sumptuous and costly, and the audiences were highly fashionable in their attire. Consequently a good proportion of the incomes of the samurai class readily found its way into the cash-boxes of the Yedo haberdashers, while in only too many cases very serious financial liabilities were incurred. This was perhaps the worst feature of the *Nō* mania. As a mere pastime for aristocrats with ample leisure and means, little could be said against the *Nō-gaku*, for in its repertoire there was nothing unclean or morally objectionable. With the *Jōruri*¹ the plays performed in the marionette theatre, the case was vastly otherwise, for not a few of them were pronouncedly sentimental and erotic. In truth, they were very often the reverse of suitable literature for domestic circles. Ōsaka—the Vanity Fair no less than the commercial capital of the Empire—was the birth-place of the puppet-stage, and it still continued to be its headquarters. But at this date some of the most expert *Jōruri* artistes repaired to Yedo, and had no difficulty in carrying the city by storm. They were invited to give exhibitions in the great mansions, where the inmates themselves soon took to *Jōruri* chanting, and this species of private theatricals became one of the most serious businesses in the gay round of fashionable life. To say nothing of the baneful effect of these displays upon morals, the economic results were of consequence, for these *Jōruri* functions were usually very expensive affairs.²

¹ *Jōruri*—is really the explanatory or descriptive narrative, which is sung or intoned to the accompaniment of music by a chorus, seated at the side of the stage, during the progress of a drama. It is the analogy of the chorus in the Greek theatre. From this origin the term extended to the whole of the marionette performances (*ayatsuri shibai*) which are a favourite feature in Japan and which are given with a high degree of skill, especially in the Ōsaka theatres. From this it has again extended to the regular theatre, and the ordinary drama. Brinkley defines *Jōruri* as “a kind of musical drama, the name of which is derived from the title of a piece first composed by a female attendant of Oda Nobunaga”, the great general of the sixteenth century. Aston, on the other hand, ascribed its origin to the name of the heroine in a drama of the same century, founded on the loves of Yoshitsune, Yoritomo's heroic brother.—J. H. L.

² After each of their “distinguished” receptions by the Shōgun in 1691 and 1692, Kaempfer and his comrades had to pay a round of calls at the mansions of the

Presents to his superior, or superiors, were also a very serious drain on the Samurai's income. It is commonly asserted that the two-sworded man was immune from taxation, and such no doubt was the theory. In practice, it was vastly otherwise. At the New Year, and on certain other occasions the vassal was supposed to render thank-offerings to his immediate over-lord, sometimes even in the form of money. These gifts are represented as having been purely voluntary. As a matter of fact, they were virtually compulsory, for any neglect to tender them would very soon be attended by inconvenient consequences, and might even occasion a forfeiture of the delinquent's fief. That of course, would not be assigned as the reason for casting the vassal adrift. Some other plausible pretext would naturally be found for getting rid of him. The subordinate castle-official was in a particularly trying position. He was nominated to his post by one man and directly controlled by another, and the goodwill of both had to be conciliated and retained. Furthermore, in addition to the regular staff of censors, there were spies everywhere, and everyone whose secret whisper might be dangerous had to be propitiated. As for Yanagisawa and his friends, a flood of wealth came pouring in upon them. Possibly the Daimyō found their tribute to the Sobayōnin far more onerous than it was to the Shōgun. The customary gifts of each feudatory to the Shōgun had long before this been prescribed and regulated, and were all duly set forth in the *Bukan*, compiled in the Great Censors Bureau. As recorded there, they seem trivial indeed. But, as a matter of fact, it was only mint and anise and cummin that were set down in black on white. These regular and recorded offerings were to the casual and unrecorded gifts as the little finger is to the

Councillors of State, Temple and City Magistrates, and other officials. In most cases, they were compelled to give an exhibition of singing and dancing for the delectation of the fair sex in the various establishments. If we take into account the social circumstances of the time, and bear in mind that actors were then (temporarily) held in such high general esteem, we may believe that Kaempfer was correct in alleging that the grandees on whom they called had no intention of slighting their guests when they pressed them to exhibit their musical and terpsichorean accomplishments. It seems that the extraordinary reception they had from the Shōgun was really considered distinguished by the courtiers, for after it their civility to the Dutch was sensibly augmented. This becomes intelligible enough, if we recollect that the approbation of the Shōgun for a clever piece of *Nō* acting meant so very much to the fortunate performer. The only other independent outside power that then sent envoys to Japan was Korea, and Korean missions (which received much better treatment in Japan than the return Japanese missions did in Korea) were always expected to provide an exhibition of equestrianism in the outer castle-grounds. The Loochooans also sent envoys, but Loochoo, though nominally a vassal state of China, was really an appanage of Satsuma.

thigh bone. Some notion of the actual situation in this matter may be gleaned from the following extract from Kaempfer :—

“ It is reckoned an inestimable honour to treat the Emperor, but such a one as may undo and ruin the person upon whom this particular favour is bestowed, because, whatever is scarce and uncommon, must be provided, and everything pay'd at an excessive rate. As an instance of this, it will suffice to mention what Bingo did a few days ago. There being then a ball at Court [a *Nō* play, most likely]—he sent a Soccano—[Sakana]—as the Japanese call it (being a small treat of a few things laid on a wooden machine, made in form of a table, which the Japanese send to each other in token of friendship) to the Emperor, consisting of two Tah (tai) or Steenbrassem, as we call them, which he bought for 150 Cobangs, and a couple of shell-fish, which cost him 90 Cobangs. A Cobang is worth five Ducats, so that the whole treat amounted to 5,200 Ducats or of about 2,400 *l.* sterling.” [The arithmetic here is evidently wrong; it should evidently be 1,200 Ducats, and £240. In the preceding paragraph Kaempfer says that Bingo had got an increase of 300,000 bags of rice to his revenue, thus making it 700,000 bags in all. Taking $3\frac{1}{2}$ bags to the *koku*, this would be 200,000 *koku*. But this is either a mistake, or the gift must have been a private one, never officially recorded. In the *Bukan* of 1695, Bingo Sama's assessed revenue is stated at 73,000 *koku*—no more than it was in 1688.]

It is not difficult to understand that the ceaseless search for rareties (*mezuraties*, as worthy old Kaempfer calls them)¹ of all sorts to be utilized as presents, must have exercised a most stimulating effect upon the arts and crafts of Japan. In almost every branch of artistic industry, the Genroku epoch (1688–1704) is distinguished for the excellence of its productions. The Jōkenin (Tsunayoshi) lacquer is especially famous, and this is only one item in a score that might be readily cited. Captain Brinkley says, *à propos* of sword-furniture, that “the history of this century contains so many incidents of importance that it is difficult to marshal them in clear sequence”. The remark is especially applicable to the Genroku period, and applicable too in almost every department of decorative art and industry. And no wonder, perhaps, for the money of the Empire was then being poured out upon its artistic productions in profusion.

It may be well to pause here, and take a brief but broad view of the general economic state of the empire at the time. Neither the Shōgun, nor his favourites, nor the Daimyō, nor the Samurai were hoarding money. On the contrary, they were spending it lavishly

¹ “*Mezuraties*” is evidently Kaempfer's way of writing and converting into a noun the root of the adjective “*Mezurashiki*” “rare”, “curious”, or “strange”. —J. H. L.

with both hands. The question then suggested itself--where did the money ultimately go? It certainly did not leave the country to any great extent, for the foreign trade was inconsiderable and strictly regulated, and the money earned by imports had to be expended on return cargoes. The artists and artisans and traders reaped a rich harvest for even the money lavished on the unproductive classes, actors, dancing-girls, and the like, ultimately found its way into the tills of the shopkeepers. Some of these now acquired huge fortunes. Kii-no-Kuniya's establishment, at the entrance to Uyeno, covered a whole block, and his residential quarters were said to be more magnificent than those of any Daimyō in Yedo. His extravagant vagaries at last gave offence to the authorities; his enormous wealth was sequestered, and he died a homeless outcast. A similar fate overtook young Yodoya of Ōsaka in 1707. The bulk of his confiscated wealth consisted of objects of art in gold and silver, in tea-equipage, in pictures, and in costly furniture and ornaments. He owned, besides, a great deal of house-property in Ōsaka, Fushimi, and Kyōto, and some 200 acres of rice-fields, although merchants were forbidden to hold arable land. The money owing by several Daimyō amounted to about £50,000, in addition to an old bond of Iyeyasu's for 80,000 *kōban*, equal to £120,000. The actual money found in his strong boxes included 120,000 *koban* (£180,000), and silver to the value of 85,000 taels (£17,000). Nor were Kii-no-Kuniya and Yodoya the only great commercial magnates of the age. At the present day (1924) the Konoike, the Mitsui, and the Sumitomo are among the most important financial powers in the empire. All alike were established before and were enjoying great prosperity in the Genroku epoch. Alongside them, in Ōsaka, Kyōto, and Yedo, were scores, nay hundreds, of flourishing firms and houses. In the conventional social scale, the merchant stood at the very bottom, below the artisan, and still further below the farmer, but the farmer in this epoch had but scant reason to plume himself upon the superiority of his status.

In truth, as has been already said, the position of the cultivator was miserable in the extreme, and it was rapidly drifting from bad to worse. The dire effects of the Life Protecting statutes have already been set forth. In addition to this, the rapidly mounting expense of fashionable *yashiki* life in Yedo constrained the feudatories to continue increasing the customary obligations of the peasant, and

to devise new imposts. Taxes were presently levied on subsidiary items of produce, which had hitherto been exempt, and corvée work, which at one time was fairly reasonable and often partially remunerated, now tended to become an intolerable burden. So far from any new reclamation of wild land being attempted, great stretches of arable land were falling out of cultivation. This was most serious, for the soil was the real ultimate source of the national wealth. In short, the economic structure of the empire was becoming top-heavy, and its base was being surely narrowed and not very slowly undermined. Another generation of this state of affairs, and the results must infallibly have been disastrous. As it was, the position was full of danger. The cultivators, constituting some eighty per cent. of the population, had nothing beyond a bare subsistence, miserable at the best, and many of them could scarcely find even that. The Shōgun, his court, the Daimyō, and the *yashiki* population of Yedo were living in extravagant luxury upon the peasant's labour, and none of them were accumulating money or wealth. Where the national savings, such as there were, did actually go, we have just seen; into the coffers of the merchants of Ōsaka, Kyōto, and Yedo, and beyond certain contributions for municipal purposes these worthy citizens paid almost nothing in the way of taxes. In cases of financial extremity (as in 1865) the Shōgunate could and did occasionally utilize them as a sort of economic sponge, as the Jews were utilized by the early Plantagenets, and call upon them for heavy forced loans. In ordinary times, their only considerable fiscal outlay was in the shape of presents to the officials, and these presents were in the nature of a very adroit casting of the bread upon the waters.¹

It is not strange to find that the carelessness and wastefulness

¹ "About the same time Yamato-no-Kami said to Noriyuki, the younger brother of Zembō Asson: 'Your directions to that merchant cannot be carried out.' 'What directions?' asked Noriyuki, and investigation showed that his name had been forged to an order permitting a merchant to coin gold, and that Noriyuki's wife was implicated. Some of the men concerned in this were crucified, and others banished. I said to Zembō Asson: 'This comes from the prevalence of bribery and corruption, and that is why the merchants are full of these schemes. It must be stopped, or we shall have these terrible scandals constantly.' So Zembō consulted with the Rōjū, and a law was passed. (Even I was offered 500 *ryō* last year by a priest in connexion with the Nagasaki affair, and a further promise was made of 300 *ryō* annually to each of my sons, if the desired plans were carried out. What then was probably offered to men of high official rank?)" *Autobiography of Arai Hakuseki, T.A.S.J.*, vol. xxix, p. 232. Yamato no Kami was Kuze, then (1716) one of the Rōjū. Zembō was Manabe, the Sobayōnin. The implication of a high-born dame in this affair is by no means such a singular incident as might be supposed.

of Tsunayoshi's administration emptied the treasury of its reserve fund and drove the officials to most irregular shifts to maintain the balance between current revenue and disbursements. It was usual for one special member of the Rōjū to be entrusted with the charge of the treasury department, and in connexion with this he was also supposed to control the Dutch and Chinese trade at Nagasaki. For some twenty years, Inaba, Mino no Kami (Kaempfer's *bête noire*), acted in this capacity, and on his resignation, in 1681, his son-in-law, Ōkubo, the Daimyō of Odawara, took over this special work. Kaempfer also blames him for contriving measures to hamper the Dutch; but the poor man does not appear to have possessed the wit necessary to do so. He left the affairs of the Treasury entirely in the hands of subordinate officials, who had no difficulty in hoodwinking him. Ōkubo left the Rōjū in 1698, and in the following year the charge of finance was assigned to a Junior Councillor, Inagaki by name. He soon found it advisable to close his eyes and see nothing, for the Shōgun's favourite Yanagisawa, was all-powerful, and Ogiwara, one of the three Finance Magistrates, was one of his protégés. A debasement of the coinage was determined on in 1695, and Ogiwara was appointed to his office in May, 1696, for the purpose of carrying the measure through. He remained in office down to 1712; and between 1695 and 1712 there were several successive debasements of the smaller coins and at least two of the *koban*.¹

During the preceding three generations the old Keicho² *koban* of Iyeyasu's time was the standard. This was a composite coin, in which there was 85·69 per cent. of gold, and 14·25 per cent. of silver. In 1695 this was changed to 56·41 per cent. of gold and 43·19 per cent. of silver. In 1710 the old ratio was practically restored, but the weight of the coin was reduced from 4·7 *momme* to a little under 2·5 *momme*.³

As for the so-called silver coinage, an approximate idea of what

¹ For information about the Tokugawa Coinage generally, see Dr. Scribas' paper in *Mittheilungen der Deutschen Gessellschaft für Natur- und Völker-Kunde Ostasiens*, 29^{tes}, Heft; Mr. Van der Polder's paper in *T.A.S.J.*, vol. xii, pt. ii, and especially Dr. Munro's excellent volume on *The Coins of Japan*.

² Keicho is the nengo or year name of the period (1596-1614) in which these coins were first minted. The inferior coins which replaced them under Tsunayoshi were also distinguished by the nengo, or the period, in which they were issued—Genroku, 1688-1703.—J. H. L.

³ It may be well to have a rough working notion of all this. A *momme* = 3·756521 grammes. An English sovereign weighs 7·9881 grammes. Thus a *momme* was a fraction less than the weight of a half-sovereign. Four *momme* went to the Koban or *ryō*, which was thus a little less than two English sovereigns in weight.

happened may be indicated. Down to 1695 the silver coins consisted of 80 per cent. of the white metal, and 20 per cent. of copper. In 1695 the percentage of silver was reduced to 64 ; in 1706 to 50, later on to 40, and at last to 32. One outcome of this progressive debasement was that enterprising private individuals established mints of their own and put better coins in circulation than those of the Bakufu, with great profit to themselves. In thirteen years, in the Tokugawa cities and towns alone, as many as 541 ¹ of these counterfeiters were crucified for thus venturing to convert the Government into a public laughing-stock.²

Of course the Treasury netted immense profits from this procedure. Some Japanese authorities place the ill-gotten gains at as high a figure as 8,000,000 or even 10,000,000 *ryō*. But Arai Hakuseki, who assailed Ogiwara with the greatest acrimony and at last compassed his downfall in 1712, limits these gains to 5,000,000 *ryō*. In addition to this, the officials concerned contrived to line their own pockets to some good purpose. It was discovered that Ogiwara, by some of his latest and most audacious *coups*, had netted as much as 260,000 *ryō*, a tremendous fortune for an official with a stipend of 3,707 *koku* per annum.

However, all this was not so disastrous as it might seem to be at first. Even at this time, bills of exchange and what were virtually private bank notes, played an important part in the great Ōsaka-Yedo commerce, and the credit of these does not seem to have been seriously affected. Luckily, perhaps, the Bakufu itself never emitted a paper-currency of its own.³

If it had done so, the experiments at this time might have been very much more pernicious in their effects. Certain of the clans—Echizen for example—had been issuing *han-satsu* or “clan paper” since the middle of Iyetsuna’s administration, and it was only in 1707 that the practice was forbidden by the Yedo authorities. Again, at Kajiki, Shimazu of Satsuma had a mint of his own in which copper coins were cast, and it was only about this time that it was closed. In remote country districts, at least, most transactions were carried on by barter. So the evil, great as it was, was not so

¹ According to other authorities, these executions were spread over the years 1698–1715, i.e., seventeen, not thirteen years as stated in the text.—J. H. L.

² For the state of the coinage in contemporary England, see Macaulay’s *History of England*, chaps. xxi, xxii. For France consult Lavissee’s *Histoire de France*, tomes vii, viii, *passim*.

³ In 1867 it did sanction paper money for use in the port of Hyōgo ; but this was withdrawn almost as soon as authorized.

widespread in its results as might be supposed. In contemporary England the coinage was indeed effectually reformed, but every year witnessed an augmentation of a rapidly mounting national debt. In contemporary France not only was a national debt mounting up by leaps and bounds, but the coinage was being debased in every successive issue. In Japan the *Bakufu* *all the time was continuing to pay its way from year to year, and nothing in the shape of a national debt was being incurred*. Another important consideration to be kept in mind is that in Japan the financiers of the paternal administration were subjected to an extra strain by a series of terrible natural calamities. They began at the end of 1703, about six weeks after the Great Storm in England, which blew down Eddystone Lighthouse.¹

On the night of 30th December, 1703, the greater part of Yedo was wrecked by an earthquake. According to the statement of a clerk attached to the City Magistrates' office, reports of 32,000 deaths had been received a few days later, and at that time the death-roll was still incomplete. There is often good reason to question the accuracy of the figures we meet with in the accounts of such calamities, but, in this case, it seems probable that the number of victims usually given—37,000—is not much, if at all, exaggerated. This was only one result of the upheaval.² At the same time a series of huge tidal waves swept the coast from Suruga right round to the Pacific side of Kadsusa and Shimōsa, wrecking and carrying off whole hamlets, and even towns here and there. Some of the peaks of Hakoné were fissured and boiling water spurted out in hundreds of places. Nearly every post-house on the Tōkaidō, between Odawara and Shinagawa, either came down or was damaged beyond repair. Altogether, the loss of life outside Yedo must have been a heavy one. While Yedo was still engaged in burying its dead, a fire broke out in Mito *yashiki* in Koishikawa a week after the earthquake, while a hurricane was blowing. The sparks were carried across the Sumida, and up towards Hongō and Yushima, and the whole north-east and eastern quarters of the city, or at all events as much of them as the earthquake had spared, were reduced to ashes. The loss

¹ Readers will no doubt be familiar with Macaulay's account of it in his Essay in Addison. Such a storm, it is safe to say, would very soon have been forgotten in Japan, where tornadoes are of yearly occurrence.

² *Vide* footnote on p. 84.

of life, though nothing like so great as in 1657, was still not inconsiderable, there being 1,230 victims on this occasion. Within five years (15th November, 1708) came another earthquake. In Yedo it was reckoned that it was only about one-fifth as strong as its predecessor of 1703, but on the other hand the area affected was much more extensive, for even the Chūgoku and Shikoku, to say nothing of Kyōto, were all badly shaken. The chief damage was from a succession of great tidal waves that came pouring in upon the whole Pacific sea-board from Sagami to Kishū, and even beyond. Nor was this the end to the disasters of the time. To quote from Arai's Autobiography:—

“ On 17th December, 1707, I was summoned to the Castle. The night before there had been an earthquake ; that morning there were sounds like thunder ; ashes covered the ground like snow, and a thick cloud in the south-west flashed lightning. As I entered the Castle, the ashes covered the ground, and trees and grass were white . . . The heavens were black. I went to my lord (2 p.m.), and I lectured to him by candle-light. The ashes ceased falling in the evening, but the earth continued its shaking and roar. On the 19th the heavens were again darkened, there were thunderings, and at evening ashes fell in abundance. We learned that day that Fuji-san was in eruption. Black ashes fell constantly till the 11th of January, 1708. On 1st March, 1708, an edict commanded the removal of the ashes in the four provinces of Musashi Sagami, Suruga and Mikawa ; and as the expense was great, a tax of six *ryō* per hundred *koku* of land was laid upon each Daimyō.”

Five previous eruptions of Fuji stand recorded in the annals of Japan, those of 800, 864, 936, 1082, and 1649, and of these the first two appear to have been serious. That they added to the torrents of lava which must have flowed from the mountain in prehistoric times is not unlikely, and what is almost certain is that they must have contributed no small portion of the immense deposits of ashes and scoriæ that now conceal the enormous lava streams of primeval times. On this occasion (1707–8) there was no outflow of lava—but the older beds of ashes and scoriæ were appreciably thickened. Altogether this eruption did not entail such serious consequences as those of Mount Bandai in 1887, or of Sakurajima in 1914. No lives appear to have been actually lost, although there was a good deal of illness in Yedo on account of the polluted atmosphere the people had to breathe for some weeks. Yet the material losses were serious. Crops in the devastated ground at the time were scanty, but great tracts of fertile arable land were rendered useless for tillage. After five years of successive disasters in and around Yedo, Kyōto and the Home Provinces had their share of

suffering. On 28th April, 1708, the Imperial Palace and a large portion of the old capital were burned down, and the duty of promptly reconstructing the palace had to be undertaken by the already bewildered financial officials of Yedo. A substantial amount of Bakufu domain land lay in the old Home Provinces, and this year, just when the rice upon it was ripening for what promised to be a bounteous harvest, terrible rains set in, and the floods ruined everything. While the waters were still out, this tract of country was swept by a typhoon whose destructive violence more than equalled that of the Great Storm in England in 1703. Among countless other buildings, scores of stately fanes and shrines were either levelled with the ground, or seriously wrecked—and policy and piety alike dictated that the Bakufu should contribute to the cost of their reconstruction or repair.

In the face of this incessant heaping of calamity upon calamity, it is no matter for surprise to find that the aged Shōgun came to entertain thoughts of retiring. In spite of Life Protecting Statutes, Temple-building, elaborate high masses, and other solemn and costly religious functions, all hopes of obtaining further issue of his own body had to be abandoned. His only daughter, the Lady Tsuru, was wedded to Tsunanori, the head of the Kishū branch of the Tokugawa family, and in 1704, the couple were installed in the Nishi-Marū. This signified that the child to which it was expected the Lady Tsuru would presently give birth would be made heir to the Shōgunate. But Tsuru died childless before the year was out; and so this last hope was also frustrated. Thereafter, there was nothing left but to follow the course that had been recommended by Mitsukuni of Mito years before. This was to acknowledge Tsunayoshi's nephew, Tsunatoyo, Lord of Kōfu, as the rightful heir to the Shōgunate. The succession would have gone not to Tsunayoshi, but to an elder half-brother, Tsunashige, of Kōfu, if he had been still alive. But he died in 1678, prematurely worn out by debauchery and evil living, and at that time it was not generally known that he left a son behind him. While no more than seventeen years of age, he had a *liaison* with one of the waiting maids in his *yashiki*, and she had given birth to a boy. But in view of the marriage projected between the Lord of Kōfu and an aristocratic dame of Kyōto, this fact was carefully concealed, and the child was consigned to a retainer, who adopted it and reared it as his own. However, Arami, as this *Karō* was named, took the precaution of informing the Regent

Hoshina about the matter, and so had no difficulty in producing evidence that the boy was really Tsunashige's child, when the death of the latter without any heir seemed to threaten the extinction of the Kōfu fief. The Shōgun, Tsunayoshi, afterwards confirmed the young man's title to the Lordship of Kōfu, but he was not very anxious to have him as his own successor. However, as there was no help for it, Tsunatoyo of Kōfu was installed in the Nishi-maru as heir-apparent, his name having been altered to Iyenobu (1st January, 1705).

The Kōfu fief thus became vacant, and it fell to the Shōgun to dispose of it. His mother strongly urged that it should be bestowed upon her (and the Shōgun's) favourite, Yanagisawa, for the last ten years Daimyō of Kawagoye (82,000 *koku*). But Tsunayoshi, for a wonder, showed some hesitation, much as his mother's request might harmonize with his own inclination. However, the Castle of Kōfu, with by far the best portion of the fief (assessed at 150,000 *koku*) was made over to Yanagisawa, who at the same time was accorded the treatment of a great Kokushū Daimyō at the Shōgun's Court. Long before this, Yanagisawa was declared *Rōjū-kaku* and ultimately even *Tairo-kaku*; and in many, if not most, matters, he was becoming the real ruler of Japan. In August, 1705, the Shōgun's mother, Keishō-in, died; and on the plea that he had to observe mourning for her for three years, Tsunayoshi shut himself up in the interior of the Palace and ceased to have any meeting with the Rōjū at all. His interest in learning and art still continued, but his chief occupations now seem to have been medicine, divination, and debauchery. Everything tended more and more to pass through or into Yanagisawa's hands. In short, it was becoming a Japanese version of Tiberius and Sejanus.

The Heir-Apparent in the Nishi-maru had, however, now to be reckoned with. On certain important matters, Yanagisawa had to report to and take counsel with him. The subtle and wily favourite at once endeavoured to wheedle himself into Iyenobu's good graces; it was to him that Arai refers in his Autobiography when he writes:—

“So too, when Lord Kōfu was heir-apparent, did one of the ruling Shōguns' men seek his favour. But he gained nothing, as was right.”

So long as the Shōgun's seat was occupied by Tsunayoshi, the crowd of fair-weather courtiers and nobles felt there was wisdom in avoiding any open breach with Yanagisawa.

In the summer of 1708, Tsunayoshi abruptly informed the Heir-Apparent that it was his intention to retire in his favour as soon as proper arrangements could be made. In ordinary circumstances an ex-Shōgun would retire to the Nishi-maru ; but it would presently become the residence of Iyenobu's infant son and a new Palace would have to be erected elsewhere. A site to the north of the Castle was selected, and, in spite of the difficulties of the financial situation, it was seriously meant to undertake this costly structure ; we learn the sequel from the following passage in Arai's Autobiography :—

“ Towards the end of July (1708) the people who lived near my house were compelled to move to make room for a new palace to the north of the Castle. But the new palace was never built. The Shōgun was ill, and my Lord (Iyenobu) held the New Year's reception in his stead (10th February, 1709). On the afternoon of the tenth (19th February, 1709) I saw a great hurrying to and fro, and in the evening was astonished to learn that the Shōgun was dead.”

It will be thus seen that Arai gives us but scant information about the death of Tsunayoshi. It is probable that the exact circumstances of this event will remain open for conjecture and debate. A highly sensational account of the incident will be found in Titsingh's *Illustrations of Japan* (pp. 30-2) ; and nearly all foreign, and many Japanese writers adopt the legend there given, at least in its essence. In its least incredible form, the story runs that Tsunayoshi was induced by Yanagisawa to bestow upon his (Yanagisawa's) son, Yoshisato, the Province of Suruga in addition to the fief of Kōfu which the young man would inherit on his father's death or retirement from active life. The Shōgun's consort, a daughter of the ex-Kwampaku, Takatsukasa, tried hard to dissuade Tsunayoshi from making a grant that would give rise to much commotion and scandal, and, failing to move him from his set purpose, she stabbed him to the heart and then committed suicide. Modern investigators have scouted this story as a fable, and have adduced facts which constitute strong evidence against its correctness. Some of these investigators allege that the fifth Shōgun died of small-pox, which was then ravaging Yedo and the Kwanto.¹

¹ No sovereign in all history was ever more blighted in his career or reputation than Tsunayoshi by his favourite, Yanagisawa, had it not been for whom he might have had a reign as prosperous and beneficial to his country and as much to his own honour as it was in its earliest years, when Kaempfer, his contemporary, describes him as “ a prince of great prudence and conduct under whom his subjects

The funeral ceremonies did not take place till 3rd March, for much had to be done before Tsunayoshi's corpse could be buried. It was "The Books" that ruled most things in those days, and Confucius had said: "Change not your father's way for three years." But many of the deceased Shōgun's "ways" were insupportable, and the fiction that so long as the late ruler was unburied he was not legally dead made an immediate repeal of his measures possible. The removal of the houses to the north of the Castle was at once countermanded, while the debased copper coinage issued in the previous November was recalled. Most important of all, the various Life Protecting Statutes were one after the other rescinded. What a sigh of relief the nation at large must have heaved!

The mischief done by a rigorous enforcement of these most insensate statutes for more than a score of years was not to be repaired by their mere repeal. No doubt there would be at once a better yield on the soil still under cultivation, and the abundant game slaughtered to protect the crops would meet with a ready market after a national Lent of two-and-twenty years. But great stretches of land had gone out of cultivation; the peasants in many cases had perished of starvation; in still more they had gone to swell the thronging urban and wayside population of pedlers and hucksters when they had not become beggars outright. In consequence of these statutes, the innumerable brothels of the empire were filled to overflowing.¹ To win this displaced and demoralized population back to the life of the peasant in the land

were happy and flourishing". Yanagisawa began life in a subordinate position in the Shōgun's household and from that, mainly by pandering to his master's worst vices and superstitions, he gradually rose in rank and wealth till he became a Kokushu Daimyō with a revenue of 150,000 koku. There has been much controversy as to the actual circumstances of Tsunayoshi's death. The generally accepted theory is that he died of small-pox, which was very prevalent at the time, but there are many versions of the facts of his alleged murder by his wife, not for the reason given in the text, but because he wished to nominate Yanagisawa's son not only to the Lordship of Suruga but to the succession to the Shōgunate, thus supplanting the rightful heir, in the belief that he himself was the actual father of the son. Titsingh describes the circumstances attending this suggestion, but is silent on the supposed paternity.—J. H. L.

¹ According to Kaempfer, all the inns along the great high roads, with their thronging traffic, were also brothels. "Not only the great and small inns but the tea booths and cook shops in the villages and hamlets of the great island are abundantly and at all times furnished with numberless wenches," who were at the disposal of travellers of every degree. *Vide* Kaempfer, vol. ii, pp. 345-6. This custom of combining the trades of hotel and brothel keepers continued till after the advent of Europeans and occasionally caused unpleasant incidents. There can be no reason to consider Kaempfer's description as being in the least degree exaggerated.—J. H. L.

might well be the task of years, if indeed it was possible at all. To heal the terrible wound inflicted upon the agricultural economy of the empire, something more than the mere repeal of the obnoxious legislation was necessary. Constructive measures were imperative ; but unfortunately these had to wait until the eighth Shōgun's time. Meanwhile, Arai Hakuseki was ready to save the empire by—a reform of Ceremonial !

CHAPTER VI

THE FORTY-SEVEN RŌNIN

EVERY historian of the Tokugawa age is emphatic on the subject of the great debasement of the moral currency among the samurai class that began in the Regency of Sakai and culminated under Tsunayoshi in the Genroku and Hō-ei year-periods. Reference to this unpleasant matter has been made in the previous chapter ; and although detail was not heaped upon detail, as might very easily have been done, enough was said to indicate that the moral fibre of the two-sworded men had indeed degenerated sadly. And yet it was just when things seemed to be moving downhill with break-neck speed that what the Japanese regard as one of the greatest feats of derring-do that has ever been accomplished within the four seas of the Empire was achieved. There is no tale better known in Japan than the story of the Revenge of Akō, or the Loyal League, while the story of the Forty-Seven Rōnin, as it is usually known among Europeans, is the only episode in the Tokugawa annals with which foreigners are almost universally acquainted. The incident has become so famous that it has been deemed advisable to devote a short chapter to its consideration.

In a preceding chapter it was stated that when Iyemitsu reformed the etiquette of the Shōgunal palace, he sent the chiefs of the two Kōke houses of Kira and Osawa to Kyōto to undergo a special course of training in the ceremonial of the Imperial Court, and that the duty of superintending the reception of the Imperial Envoys at Yedo became an hereditary prerogative of the chiefs of these two families. It became the custom to impose on a Tozama Daimyō the task of defraying the expenses of the Envoy's sojourn in Yedo, and of attending upon and of introducing them at the Shōgun's Court. In order to do this properly it was necessary for the host to put himself under a course of instruction from Kira or Osawa, and to discharge his commission under the direction of the Masters of Ceremony, as Kira and Osawa practically were. At this date it was Kira Yoshinaka who usually discharged the duties of the office. Like many of his fellow-officials he was venal, with a most pronounced

itch in his palm, and unless the Daimyō, consigned to his tender mercies, took adequate steps to appease his greed, he was apt to make matters very unpleasant for him indeed. To be put to public shame, to be subjected to "loss of face", was a terrible wound to the knightly honour of a feudatory, and Kira, in his position, could easily find the means of exposing his aristocratic pupils to ridicule, if not to contempt. In 1698, he made himself so unendurable to Kamei, Daimyō of Tsuwano in Iwami, that Kamei made up his mind to poniard him. However, that night Kamei apprised his steward of his intention, and the latter at once hurried off stealthily to Kira's mansion, with a load of costly presents. Next day Kira was exceedingly courteous to the Daimyō who, not knowing of the reasons which had brought about this complete change of demeanour, abandoned his anger and renounced his intention of killing him. Thus, by the cleverness of his steward, was Kamei, with all his house, saved from ruin.¹

In 1701, it was Asano Nagamori, Daimyō of Akō in Harima, that was saddled with the burden, or the honour, of receiving the envoys of the Emperor and the ex-Emperor. On this occasion, Kira must have pushed things too far, for although it was never known what individual incident it was that exhausted Asano's patience, the precise occurrence itself is clear enough from the following testimony of Kajikawa, an attendant of the Shōgun's consort :—

"On 21st April I went to the palace. I entered the waiting-room, and there I heard that the Imperial Envoys were to be received earlier than had at first been determined. So I left the waiting-room and went in. In the great corridor I met two priests. I asked one of them to call Kira, but he came back and told me that Kira had gone to the Great Council Chamber. I then got him to summon Asano who was with Daté (Asano's colleague) in the great reception room. Asano came, and I gave him the message from my mistress. Just then I saw Kira

¹ Kira's full name and territorial title were, Kira Yoshinaka (according to Brinkley, Yoshihide) Kōzuke no Suke. Kōzuke is a province to the north-west of Tokyō. The title Suke is peculiar. The usual title of feudatories of all degrees was "Kami", a word which has many meanings according to the ideographs in which it is written, but generally involving the idea of superiority in rank or office. In this case, it was applied to the provincial Governors of former times and from them transferred to the feudatories under the Tokugawa. Suke was an assistant or helper, and in three fiefs in the Empire it was substituted for Kami in describing the feudatories, not that they were of any lower degree in rank than their fellow feudatories, who were known as "Kami" but because the latter title in these three cases were reserved for princes of the Imperial family. Akō was a fief in the province of Harima with a revenue which had been reduced to 20,000 *koku* at the time of the Restoration, though at this period it was of much greater wealth and power. *Kōke*, which has previously in this volume been translated "Chamberlains", here signifies "noble houses".—J. H. L.

coming from the reception chamber, and I went forward to meet him. We met at about twelve or fourteen yards from the corner pillar of the chamber, and I had just asked him whether it was true that the hour of reception had been changed, when behind his back I heard a loud voice : ' Have you forgotten the grudge I have owed you for a day or two ? ' At the same time, some one fell upon Kira from behind, and cut him on the shoulder. I looked at the speaker, and saw to my great astonishment that it was the Lord Asano. Kira turned round and received another cut on the forehead. He ran a few steps towards me, and then fell to the floor. Asano dashed forward to attack him once more, but I caught hold of his arm. By this time, other nobles had come to the rescue, so that Asano was easily disarmed. He was straightway taken to the Willow Chamber, all the while crying out that he had killed Kira, as he owed him a grudge for his insolence. As to Kira, he was carried, insensible, into the doctor's room."

Of course the penalty for drawing a weapon with lethal intent in the Shōgun's palace was death—by *hara-kiri*.

The assault took place at ten in the forenoon. Asano was presently handed over to the custody of Tamura, Daimyō of Ichinoseki, in Mutsu, who sent ten samurai, thirty servants, and fifteen palanquin-bearers to fetch the culprit to his *yashiki*. There he arrived in a palanquin, meshed round with cords, at four in the afternoon. Meanwhile his fate had been settled, and he was presently informed that he had been condemned to disembowel himself. The reason for this unusual haste was that the Shōgun wished to be merciful ; Kira had not been fatally wounded, and it was well that Asano should not learn that this was so, for he could not then face his doom with resignation. At five o'clock (in the very same day) Shōda, the censor, arrived with the death-sentence. It had been purposed that the *hara-kiri* should take place in the great reception room of Tamura's *yashiki*, but the seneschals bethought them that it would be wanting in respect to let Asano die in the room where the censor sat. So they reared a dais of three mats, covered it with a rug, and hung it about with lighted lanterns. When it was ready Asano, in the ceremonial dress of the samurai (*Kami-shimo*), was escorted into the reception room where Shōda produced the sentence and read it out. Asano calmly returned thanks for being permitted to die as befitted a samurai, and then rising he proceeded to the dais attended by two assistant censors. As he sat down a dirk, wrapped in paper with only two inches of its steel exposed, was placed on a stand before him and one of the censors took his position behind him as his " second " with a naked sword poised ready in his hands. As Asano bent forward to grasp

the dirk, the censor's sword fell upon his neck. So Asano did not really disembowel himself.¹

The reason for this was that Asano's own dirk had been wrested from him in the palace, and, in the haste and confusion, it was a dirk by Bizen Nagamitsu and a precious heirloom in the Tamura family that was placed before him. So, lest it should be soiled, the assistant censor was speedy in his office of second, and struck off Lord Asano's head before he could use the dirk. That evening, Daigaku, Asano's younger brother, sent to receive the corpse, and that very night it was buried at the Temple of Sengaku-ji in Takanawa.

On 26th April, five days after the death of Asano, two of his vassals appeared at the Castle of Akō with intelligence of the calamity. Now, Akō was 420 miles from Yedo by the shortest route, so these men can have lagged but little on the way. That same night, fast upon their heels came Haru and a comrade with a letter signed by Toda, Daimyō of Ōgaki in Mino, by Asano's uncle and by his younger brother, Daigaku, announcing that Asano had

¹ The following from Titsingh is fairly correct. "All military men, and persons holding civil offices under the Government are bound, when they have committed any crime, to rip themselves up, but not till they have received an order from the Court to that effect; for if they were to anticipate this order, their heirs would run the risk of being deprived of their places and property. For this reason all the officers of the government are provided, in addition to their usual dress, and to that which they put on in the case of fire, with a suit necessary on such an occasion, which they carry with them whenever they travel from home. It consists of a white robe and a habit of ceremony made of hempen cloth and without armorial bearings. The outside of the house is hung with *white* stuffs; for the palaces of the great and the places at which they stop by the way when going to, or returning from, Yedo are hung with *coloured* stuffs on which their arms are embroidered—a privilege enjoyed also by the Dutch envoy. As soon as the order of the Court has been communicated to the culprit, he invites his intimate friends for the appointed day and regales them with *saké*. After they have drunk together some time, he takes leave of them; the order of the Court is then read to him once more. Among the great this reading takes place in the presence of their secretary and the inspector; the person who performs the principal part in this tragic scene then addresses a speech of compliment to the company; after which he inclines his head towards the mat (takes up the dirk from the stand before him, and cuts himself with it across the belly, penetrating to the bowels. One of his confidential servants, who takes his place beside him, then strikes off his head. Such as wish to display superior courage, after the cross cut, inflict a second longitudinally, and then a third in the throat. No disgrace is attached to such a death, and the son (usually) succeeds to his father's place.

"When a person is conscious of having committed some crime, and apprehensive of being thereby disgraced, he puts an end to his own life, to spare his family the ruinous consequences of judicial proceedings. This practice is so common that scarcely any notice is taken of such an event. The sons of all people of quality exercise themselves in their youth for five or six years with a view that they may perform the operation, in case of need, with gracefulness and dexterity, and they take as much pains to acquire this accomplishment as youth among us do to become elegant dancers or skilful horsemen; hence the profound contempt of death they imbibe even in their earliest years. This disregard of death, which they prefer to the slightest disgrace, extends to the very lowest class among the Japanese."

made away with himself and strictly charging the Akō retainers to surrender the Castle to the Bakufu commissioners without demur. On being questioned as to whether Kira was dead or not, Haru said that although he had repeatedly put the same query to Lord Toda, he had stubbornly refused to answer.

Two neighbouring Daimyō were presently instructed by the Bakufu to take charge of the Castle of Akō, and Araki and Sakakibara were the censors dispatched from Yedo to superintend its transfer. When this and the fact that Kira was still alive became known to the retainers, most of them resolved to draw up a petition, hand over the Castle, and then solemnly commit *hara-kiri* at the great entrance to the stronghold; for then, they reasoned, the Bakufu would be sure to punish Kira as he deserved. At the head of this party was Ōishi Kuranosuke. But Ono Kurobei headed another section, who argued that such a step would only further offend the Yedo authorities. However, Ōishi and sixty others entered into a written compact to carry out their purpose. There were others who did not actually sign the document, but who were nevertheless bent upon following their Lord "upon the dark path". Just then three more retainers came in from Yedo, and they refused to have anything to do with such a compact. But not, like Ono, from fear or prudence. Far from it, for they were clamorous for vengeance on Kira. In Yedo two of their fellows were even then hot upon Kira's tracks, but he was so strongly guarded by the troops of his son Uyesugi,¹ Lord of Yonezawa, that all their efforts to kill him had proved abortive. A band of at least twenty stout and resolute men would be needed for any successful attempt. Asano's stewards in Yedo had been asked to help, but they had cravenly excused themselves, and hence the presence of the three zealots in Akō to find men more of their own mettle.

Meanwhile, Ōishi had forwarded a petition to the Board of Censors, setting forth that, as Kira was still alive and in honour, the elders of Akō found it almost beyond them to hold their clansmen in control, and praying that the matter might be settled in a satisfactory manner. The messengers arrived in Yedo only two days after the two censors had left for Akō, and so there was nothing for it now but to give up the Castle. Between the 25th and 30th of

¹ In 1664, the last of the Uyesugi of Yonezawa died childless. Kira's son was then adopted as head of the Uyesugi House but the domains of the clan were reduced from 300,000 to 150,000 *koku*.

May, the two censors inspected and took it over. In the inventory of its appurtenances there was an entry of some half-dozen ailing dogs duly provided for in terms of the law, and for this the clan Karō were highly commended. During these five days, Ōishi repeatedly entreated the censors to ensure the succession of Daigaku (Asano's younger brother) to the headship of the clan. They promised to lay the matter before the Great Council, and at first the Great Council thought well of the proposal.

It was the prospect of Daigaku's succession that kept Ōishi from making common cause with the zealots from Yedo. They strongly insisted that, as Kira was over sixty, he might die a natural death at any time, and so defraud them of their revenge. In the end Ōishi talked them over, dwelling upon the harm they might do to Daigaku's prospects, and proposing that, in the event of Kira's death robbing them of their vengeance, they would commit *hara-kiri* in a body. And so things remained until 1702. In January of that year, Kira became *inkyō*, and was succeeded by his grandson, Sahyōye. In August, Daigaku, who, up to that time had been confined to his own house, was consigned to the ward of Asano, Daimyō of Aki. So Akō did not pass to Daigaku, and the house of Asano of Akō was irretrievably ruined. Then, Ōishi Kuranosuke resolved upon taking revenge.

Meanwhile, Ōishi had separated from his wife and two younger children, and had taken up his residence in Kyōto. He and his confederates broke up their households and sold their effects, a proceeding which made no small stir in Kyōto and Fushimi at the time. Intelligence of the incident was conveyed to Kira, and he thereupon redoubled his precautions. It was presently rumoured that some of the Akō-rōnin had been seized at the various barriers, and some of those in Kyōto urged Ōishi to postpone the journey to Yedo till next spring. When those already in Yedo heard of this they were furious; Yoshida (*æet* 61) and Horibe (*æet* 75) declared that at their age they could not be sure of living till next spring, and vehemently insisted upon prompt and immediate action. Ōishi thereupon broke with the more cautious party in Kyōto and proceeded to Yedo, whither indeed the majority of the confederates had already gone. From this time Ōishi ceased all communication with Asano Daigaku, so that he might in no way be implicated in the consequences of the project. For two months, after the break-up of his household, Ōishi remained in Kyōto, and during this time it

is probable that he did play the part of a roisterer to throw Kira off his guard, although the traditional account of his long and inveterate profligacy is certainly incorrect. The Kyōto conspirators left behind anticipated that Ōishi's rashness would be his and their undoing, and accordingly they severed all connexion with him. By August, 1702, the confederates, who originally numbered over 120, were reduced to about sixty, and by December, various defections had brought the number down to no more than forty-seven.

Since the summer of 1702, Uyesugi of Yonezawa had been seriously ill, and Kira now frequently visited the sick man in his *yashiki* outside the Sakurada Gate, and often passed the night there, away from his own mansion across the River Sumida, in Honjō. Furthermore, Kira was passionately fond of *cha-no-yu*, and he often visited, and was visited in turn, by other votaries of the cult, so that altogether his movements were very uncertain. Now, it so fell out that in Honjō, there was a *cha-jin*, Yamada Sōrin by name, and he was intimate with Kira. One day a certain merchant of Ōsaka called upon this Yamada, desiring to become his pupil, and he was accepted as such. This man was no Ōsaka merchant at all, but one of the confederates, who, as luck would have it, had learned *cha-no-yu* in his youth. He soon found out from Yamada that Kira was to have a tea-party in his own house on 23rd November. The date was, however, postponed to 6th December, and then again to 14th December. Now, the 14th was the very day of the month on which Lord Asano died, and the *rōnin* thrilled with joy at the omen.

On the afternoon of that day, they set one of their number to watch at Kira's gate, and he presently reported that several visitors, including Yamada himself, had entered. Kira would surely be found at home that night. So late in the evening, the *rōnin* assembled in a house near-by Kira's mansion, and made all their preparations.¹ They dressed like officers of fire brigades, only over this dress they wore *haori*, which they threw away at Kira's gate. Inside their sashes they twisted iron chains. They all had white sleeves to distinguish them in the darkness, and a piece of leather with their real and assumed names on the right shoulder. Darkness had fallen when they left their rendezvous and parted into two bands, one to

¹ The City Companies of Firemen were not instituted until a score of years later. The tradition that makes the *rōnin* wear coats-of-mail, with the forty-seven characters of the syllabary for their distinguishing badges, is without any foundation.

assail the front, the other the back gate of the mansion. The latter section headed by Ōishi's son and Yoshida, set ladders against the gate. A few scrambled over, seized and bound the porters, and then admitted their comrades. At the preconcerted signal, the other band, under Ōishi himself, lit their torches, poured in through the front gate, battered in the doors of the entrance hall, and burst into the reception room. Four or five samurai opposed them, but these were very summarily disposed of, as were a page and a priest who fought most determinedly. The *rōnin* quickly cut all the bow-strings, and snapped the shafts of all the spears in the armoury and elsewhere. Ōishi had specially cautioned his followers to see to it that there should be no outbreak of fire. Kira's neighbours did at first fancy that the disturbance was caused by a fire, but, as they could see no flames, they sent their retainers up on the roofs of their *yashikis* to find out what was really occurring. Two of the *rōnin* at once informed them of their purpose, and charged them not to interfere, as they would take hurt if they did so.

Some of the *rōnin* broke in the door of Kira's chamber. Kira was not there, and all hurrying and scurrying to and fro in quest of him was in vain. One of them bethought himself of the charcoal shed, and when they entered it, plates, tea-cups, and lumps of charcoal came whizzing about their ears. When one of the band thrust his spear into the dark interior two men sprang out, and laid about them lustily, but they soon went down. Another man who drew his sword as a *rōnin* thrust at him shared their fate. As far as age went, the *rōnin* fancied that this corpse might be Kira's, but the face was so besmeared with blood that there was no sign of the scar left upon it by Lord Asano's dirk. But to their joy they detected the marks of an old cut upon the shoulder, and when they fetched one of the porters they had bound, he assured them that it was indeed Kira who lay before them. So, forthwith, they sounded their whistles to summon their comrades, and all assembled at the rear of the mansion. In a loud voice one of them called out to the neighbours on the housetops that now that Kira was dead their object was accomplished, and that they had no other purpose in view. Only six of the forty-seven were wounded, while, of the inmates of the mansion, sixteen men lay dead, and twenty sorely wounded, while twelve had made their escape. Sahyōye, Kira's grandson and successor, was himself wounded in two places.

With Kira's head the *rōnin* left the *yashiki*, and proceeded

towards the Ekō-in. They had intended to commit *hara-kiri* there, but they found the gates closed. So they paused and bethought themselves that it would be well to await the sentence of the Shōgun, as the world would then better understand their motives. They had also expected to be assailed, and the space in front of the Ekō-in would have afforded them a vantage-ground. But no one interfered with them, so they proceeded across the Sumida, and passed on through the whole extent of the city to the Sengakuji in Takanawa. Here the *rōnin* entered the cemetery, and placing Kira's head, duly washed and cleansed, before Lord Asano's tomb, they prostrated themselves in prayer to his spirit. (The head was then put in a box, and on the following day two priests took it to Kira's mansion.) They then went to the temple porch, laid down their weapons, and asked to see the Abbot, who was well acquainted with them all. Ōishi handed to the Abbot a list of their names, telling him that two of them had just been dispatched to the Censorate with a written report of the affair. From ten in the morning till four in the afternoon they remained in the temple. Then they were summoned to appear at the censor's office, and they left Sengakuji in an ordered column, marching two abreast, Ōishi and his son at their head, while six of the wounded and the aged were borne along in palanquins.¹

At Sengoku, the censor's mansion, the *rōnin* were officially examined, and then informed that they were to be consigned in four parties to the ward of as many Daimyō, which for lordless men was very flattering treatment indeed. After this, the censor ceased to speak as such, and for his own personal satisfaction proceeded to ask them many questions about the happenings of the previous night. It was to Hosokawa of Kumamoto (540,000 *koku*) that Ōishi himself, with sixteen of his comrades, was entrusted, the others were distributed among the smaller Daimyō of Matsuyama,

¹ The document (*saimon*) which the *rōnin* in Mitford's story are said to have placed before the tomb is a fiction of later times. That which Mitford saw must have been written afterwards. In 1721, Sengaku-ji was burned down and most of the *rōnin* relics then perished in the flames. The official account of their doings styled *Sengaku-ji Kakisage*, prepared under orders from the Shōgun, is not really authentic. The Abbot of Sengaku-ji finding no means of getting any information in his own temple after the fire, borrowed an account penned down by hearsay by Shōten, who, in 1703, was Abbot of the neighbouring temple of Kogaku-ji.

A Satsuma man caused a stone to be raised to the memory of Hayano Sampei, a page of Asano, who killed himself rather than serve another master, nearly a year before the execution of the vendetta. On this stone appears the name of the man who erected it. Hence the story of the Satsuma man spitting upon Ōishi lying drunk in a Kyōto gutter. It has no other foundation, but it is current through all Japan, and not only implicitly credited, but the subject of numerous paintings by artists of high degree.—J. H. L.

Chōfu, and Okazaki. Hosokawa sent no fewer than 750 men to fetch the seventeen committed to his charge. It was past ten o'clock when the cavalcade reached his *yashiki* in Shirokane, and yet, late as the hour was, Hosokawa at once proceeded to the officers' room to meet them, and to load them with expressions of admiration and praise. He felt highly honoured, he assured them, to be entrusted with the care of such staunch and loyal *samurai* as they had proved themselves to be; he begged them, though many attendants were set about them in obedience to the Shōgun's orders, to be quite at their ease, and to repose themselves after their laborious exertions. He then ordered supper to be set before them and withdrew. As for the other smaller Daimyō, they did not see the *rōnin* that night, but, on learning what had taken place at the great Shirokane *yashiki*, they were not slow to take their cue from the powerful *Kokushū* Daimyō of Higo,¹ and they personally bade the *rōnin* welcome on the following day.

Meanwhile Yedo was in a ferment. The castle officials, no less than the clan *samurai*, were exceedingly anxious that the lives of the *rōnin* should be spared. The Hyōjōsho had the matter submitted to it, and after due deliberation formulated the following propositions:—

1. Kira Sahyōye whose duty it was to have fought to the death, but who escaped with a few slight wounds, should be ordered to disembowel himself.

2. Such of Kira's retainers as had offered no resistance to the *rōnin* should be beheaded; those who were wounded in the fight should be made over to their relatives.

3. Those in Kira's mansion who were not *samurai* should be cast adrift.

4. Iyesugi (Kira's son and Lord of Yonezawa) who did not so much as attack the *rōnin* as they marched from Kira's mansion to *Sengakuji* should be punished. At the least, his domains should be confiscated.

5. The fact that the *rōnin* staked their lives to avenge the death of their lord showed that they were truly loyal men. Their deeds accorded with the injunctions of the First Shōgun which incite men to loyal and filial acts, and though their confederacy and their use of arms had the colour of a disturbance of the peace yet, had it been otherwise, they could not have accomplished their purpose.

6. The law forbade confederacies and the taking of oaths, yet that they harboured no malice against the Shōgun was apparent from the quiet and peaceable manner in which they had surrendered the Castle of Akō in the previous year, and there was no doubt that nothing but absolute necessity had led to their forming a confederacy (in defiance of the law).

¹ The province of which Kumamoto is the principal town.

The report ended with a recommendation that the *rōnin* should be left permanently under the charge of the Daimyō to whom they had already been respectively consigned. It bore the seal and signature of every member of the Hyōjōsho (High Court), of the three Temple Magistrates, of the four Chief Censors, of the three City Magistrates, and of the four Finance Magistrates. The Shōgun Tsunayoshi himself was really anxious to save the lives of these men, but even he, in such a case as this, could not set aside the claims of the law. If the Princely Abbot of Uyeno had interceded for them, he would have been heard, and Tsunayoshi did go so far as to see His Eminence and indirectly hint that such a course on his part would be appreciated. But the Abbot either did not understand or did not choose to do so, and so the law had to take its course. On the forenoon of 20th March, 1703, each of the four Daimyō above-mentioned received notice from the Great Council, with whom the final decision rested, that censors would be sent to pronounce sentence upon the men of Akō they had in ward. When these officials arrived the following sentence was solemnly read out :—

“ When Asano, Takumi no Kami, who had been ordered to receive the imperial envoys, heedless of the occasion and the place, attacked Kira in the palace, he was commanded to perform *hara-kiri* ; while Kira, Kōdzuke-no-suke was pronounced innocent. Vowing vengeance for the death of your Lord, you, forty-six retainers of Takumi, leagued yourselves together and assaulted Kira’s dwelling with missiles and weapons. The manner of your attack showed contempt for the authorities and now for your heinous crime it is ordered that you commit *hara-kiri*.”¹

At Hosokawa’s, Ōishi bent forward, and in the name of all thanked the censor for a sentence that enabled them to die as samurai. Araki, who was censor on this occasion, then expressed his concern

¹ It will be noticed that the number of the band is here officially given at 46 and not 47. At the Sengaku-ji, when Ōishi handed in a list of their names, the Abbot counted them over, and found no more than forty-four, two men having gone to the censors. When the *rōnin* assaulted Kira’s mansion, they had posted a placard setting forth their reasons for doing so, and had all signed the document. The names then ran to 47 ; and the last among them was a certain Terazaka. It was this man that had disappeared. Whenever questioned on the matter, the *rōnin* answered that Terazaka, being a mere *Ashigaru*, had run away after the attack, probably from love of life. Accordingly he was branded as a coward. But, in 1704, Terazaka appeared before Sengoku, the Censor, and begged to be punished according to law as he had taken part in the night attack in Kira’s mansion. The censor reproved him severely for what was tantamount to finding fault with the Shōgun’s government, at the same time secretly furnishing him with money for travelling expenses. On the night of the attack Terazaka had been dispatched by Ōishi to convey the tidings of their success to Lady Asano and to Daigaku who was then in Hiroshima. Terazaka afterwards lived at the Sokeiji in Yedo, dying at the age of eighty-two.

at having failed to compass Daigaku's succession to the Akō fief, and also his sorrow for their doom, although the accomplishment of the revenge must be a source of keen satisfaction to them. He further informed them—although he was careful to say that he did so privately and not in his official capacity—that that very day Kira Sahyōye's estates had been confiscated, and the house of Kira ruined. Ōishi voiced the gratitude of the *rōnin* for the punishment meted out to the house of their foe, though indeed, he said, they had no cause for ill-will against Sahyōye himself.

Then one after another, according to their rank, they were summoned to the platform expressly reared for the purpose outside the great reception hall, and there in due order calmly made an end of themselves.

It must not be forgotten that at the time, Ōishi and his comrades were lordless men, and so not legally entitled to the privileges of samurai. But, as a matter of fact, the death sentence on them was pronounced and carried out in a fashion that had never before fallen to the lot of mere ordinary retainers. The treatment accorded the whole band was such as was wont to be accorded great Daimyō, and other immediate feudatories of the Shōgun.

For an exhaustive examination of all the official and other documents bearing upon this famous episode, we are indebted to Mr. Shigeno, one of the most scientific of modern Japanese historians. One result of his laborious researches is that, while a certain amount of the picturesque gets consigned to the limbo of the storytellers' hall (Yosé), the true story of Ōishi Kuranosuke adds considerably to his moral and intellectual stature. The authentic evidence goes to show that his conduct throughout was marked with singular moderation and foresight, and, when it came to the point, determination and audacity. His single-mindedness for the honour and welfare of the house of Asano is apparent at every turn. Nor were his clansmen by any means unworthy of their leader. On the little fief of Akō, with its assessed revenue of 53,000 *koku*, there were in all 322 vassals drawing official stipends. To the feudal Japan of the time, with a dry-rot of moral decadence sapping the fibre of the city samurai so disastrously, it seemed nothing short of marvellous that among this number so many as forty-seven should have been found eager to follow their Lord to the "Yellow Streams". And it must not be overlooked that among the other 275 there were not a few ready to persevere in case Ōishi and his band should fail, as

they fancied he would do. As for those who refused to co-operate in the enterprise, or who afterwards withdrew from the league, so much is to be said at least, that not one among them turned traitor or played the part of informer at the expense of his fellow-clansmen.

Whenever mention is made of the vendetta in old Japan this episode of the Forty-seven Rōnin is at once cited as the typical case. But it is far from being a typical case, indeed it is a highly exceptional one. Before 1703, there were many instances of the vendetta in the Empire, but perhaps the best-known, and most often referred-to, were those of the Soga brothers, and of the Iga *Kataki-uchi*. The former occurred in Yoritomoto's days, five centuries before—the latter so late as Hidetada's time.¹

Then the year preceding the Akō episode saw the accomplishment of the Ishii-Akahori vendetta.² It made a great sensation at the time and, had it not been so completely overshadowed by the episode of the Forty-seven Rōnin, would doubtless have become one of the most often-told tales of the country.

In every one of these latter cases it was to punish the murderer, or at least the slayer of a father and not of a lord that the Avenger of Blood imbued his hands. Such a duty was strongly inculcated in the Chinese Classics. In the second book of the Book of Rites the law is thus laid down:—

“With the slayer of a father a man may not live under the same heaven; against the slayer of a brother a man must never have to go home for a weapon; with the slayer of a friend a man may not live in the same state.”

Here, be it observed, nothing is said about the slayer of a Lord.³

¹ The story of the Iga vendetta is given in Mitford's *Tales of Old Japan* under the title of “Kazuma's Revenge”. His version is, however, incorrect in some details. The learned translator is, of course, not to be held responsible for that, for his purpose was merely to reproduce the legends that were most famous in the Japan of his time. His volume has become a classic, and it is well worthy of the distinction, for no other single book has succeeded in conveying a sense of the real social and moral atmosphere of Tokugawa Japan so thoroughly and effectually as Mr. Mitford's perennially interesting volume has done.

² This incident has been previously referred to more than once in this present volume. I have no recollection of ever having heard of it before, and have not only failed to find any reference to it in such authorities as are at my disposal but inquiry among the most qualified Japanese literates in London has only shown that their knowledge of it is on a par with my own.—J. H. L.

³ The Tokugawa jurists asserted that the duty of assuming the vendetta was partly answerable for the severity of the penal code. When a man was sentenced to death for any, and especially for a political, offence it was only prudent to see to it that there should be no subsequent risk from the Avenger of Blood. Hence, it was common to exterminate the whole household of the condemned man.

Nowhere it would seem did Confucius say anything authoritative as to how the murderer of a Lord was to be dealt with. The classical precedent for this in China dated from the Sengoku, or "Warring Country" period, several centuries after the compilation of the Canonical Books. A certain Yojō was in the employment of three successive Lords, the first two of whom treated him with no special consideration. He then took service with a certain Chikaku, who afterwards compassed the deaths of Yojō's two former masters, and who was in turn killed by one Chō Jōshi. Now, Yojō had been held in high esteem by Chikaku, and he made three abortive attempts to avenge him. On the last occasion he was seized by Chō Jōshi, who asked him why he was so eager to avenge Chikaku while he had shown himself so lukewarm about the murder of his first two lords. Yojō frankly replied that it was the nature of the treatment he had received in each case that had been the determining circumstance.

"This story," remarks the commentator, "as well as many others bearing on the Chinese and Japanese custom of avenging the death of a master, shows that the execution of the vendetta was not held obligatory in cases where a retainer was not specially attached to his master and where the benefits he received were not sufficient to call for the risk or loss of his own life."

In matters of loyalty and filial piety, Arai Hakuseki was at once a purist, and a great authority. In 1682 he entered the service of Hotta, the Tairō, who was assassinated in 1684.

"His son was very unfortunate," says Arai, "and cut down the allowance of his samurai, and *many left his service*. I was not in confidential relations with him or his father but would not leave at such a time, for if one has enough for oneself and family *such desertions* are not loyal even though the service be unsatisfactory. It is natural that a samurai should be poor, yet he must maintain his station, but finally my funds gave out."

And he left. Now Arai had originally been a vassal of Tsuchiya, Lord of Kururi in Kadzusa. After a short time as a *rōnin* he became a vassal of the Hotta family. After another brief space as a lordless man he entered the service of the Daimyō of Kōfu, who presently became the Shōgun, Iyenobu. Thus, Arai had at least three different lords, and he would readily have taken service under a fourth, if Yoshimune had seen fit to utilize his talents. In Japan, no less than in feudal China, the high-sounding precept that "a faithful vassal should not serve two lords" was formally endorsed and approved. But when it came to the plain prose of practice,

Arai's case is by no means the only contemporary one, which seems to indicate that the maxim was taken as a counsel of perfection. It might serve very well as a copy-book head-line, but, in the ordering of his life, the samurai plainly felt that the injunction was better honoured in the breach than in the observance. As a simple matter of fact, the despised plebeian now and then made a much better showing in this matter than did the samurai. When Arai became a *rōnin* he was followed by two domestics who would not leave him, and who said they could provide for themselves somehow. Some of the famous Forty-seven Rōnin were accompanied into beggary by their household servants and, in these cases, the servant not only provided for his own wants but for those of his (economically) helpless master as well. Scores of analogous instances crop up in the course of a perusal of the old documents of the Tokugawa age. It is true that in Japan there have been many cases of murderers of their lords being punished by their fellow-vassals. The instance of Kōsai being killed by Miyoshi for compassing the death of their common chieftain, Hosokawa Masamoto, in 1507, and of Akechi paying the full penalty for the assassination of Nobunaga in 1582, will at once occur to the reader.¹ But, in nearly all such cases, it usually jumped very nicely with the personal interest of the righteous vassal to assume the office of the Avenger of Blood. In the Akō vendetta, the case was vastly otherwise. To accomplish their purpose the forty-seven had perforce to outrage the law in one of its most strictly enforced provisions. There could be no hope of worldly material profit in any shape or form to any one sharing in any way in the plot. At the best it was death by *hara-kiri*, and death by decapitation as a common criminal was a by-no-means remote probability, while it was possible that all the members of their several households might be involved in their doom.

It will be observed that the *rōnin* were punished not for the actual killing of Kira but for the *manner* in which they accomplished their purpose. The indispensable preliminaries for legalizing the vendetta had not been complied with. The so-called "Legacy of Iyeyasu" is a fabrication, penned a full century or more after the first Tokugawa Shōgun was entombed among the forests and mountains of Nikkō. But, in many of its articles, it sets forth the established

¹ For Hosokawa *vide* Vol. I, p. 625, and for Akechi, Vol. II, pp. 176-81, both of this work.—J. H. L.

customs and jurisprudence of Tokugawa feudalism correctly enough. One paragraph in it deals with the subject of the vendetta.

"In Japan, there is an old saying that the same heaven cannot cover a man and the slayer of his father, or mother, or *master*, or elder brother. Now, if a man seek to put to death such a slayer, he must first inform the Ketsudansho office at the Hyōjōsho, and say in how many days or months he can carry out his intention. This is to be entered in the records of the office. If he kills the slayer *without such previous intimation he is to be regarded as a murderer.*"¹

Now, to have made any such notification would have put Kira so thoroughly upon his guard that he could never have been touched; so much is recognized in the fifth and sixth paragraphs of the Hyōjōsho report on the episode quoted a few pages back. In the peculiar circumstances, it was generally considered that the *rōnin* were punished for a mere technicality. Even Hayashi, the official Chinese scholar, wrote Chinese stanzas lauding them as heroes, and although the Bakufu spoke to him about the matter privately,

¹ According to certain authorities the man-slayer even then could not be assailed with impunity within the precincts of the Imperial palace, or of Yedo, Ōsaka and Suruga Castles, in Nikkō, or in Uyeno, but that is a doubtful point, as would appear from the Ishii-Akahori case. In 1698, the following document was handed to Ishii Genzō and a copy of it entered in the official register: "Know all men that I, Kawaguchi, Settsu-no-Kami, the City Magistrate of Yedo . . . hereby give full permission to Ishii Genzō and Ishii Hanzō to slay their father's murderer, Akahori Gengoemon, wherever they may find him in Yedo, *even though it should be within the sacred precincts of the Castle.*

Besides those mentioned in the text, there are scores of other cases of vendetta (*Kataki-uchi*) which were sufficiently marked by the circumstances that attended them, both in their inception and execution, to earn records in history, and no doubt many more scores in remote districts of the Empire, or among samurai of lowlier grade which have been passed over in silence. Sometimes, the revenge was accomplished in a fairly fought duel, sword to sword; sometimes by an ambush, and not infrequently by what seems to us assassination, pure and simple. In the latter cases, it is to be remembered that the murder, which provoked the revenge, was probably effected in the same fashion. The last recorded incident was in the years 1867-8, when a samurai of high degree of the Mito clan was murdered in the most wanton manner by another samurai of the Tosa clan, who silently crept up behind his victim and cut him down from the back. The clans, among whom the practice was most prevalent were, it may be mentioned, the very powerful ones of Satsuma, Tosa, Aizu, and Mito. In this case, it will be seen that the parties were of two of these rival clans. The murderer fled, but he was seen and described by a beggar, and the two sons of his victim devoted themselves to their sacred duty of revenge with patience and self-sacrificing determination that were worthy of Ōishi Kuranosuke himself. They even abandoned their homes and disguised themselves as common coolies. Their story is long to tell here, with all its striking incidents, and it must be sufficient to say that they were at last successful, and within a year from the date of the murder, the murderer fell beneath the swords of the two devoted brothers. As they had complied with all the legal formalities, they suffered no penalty. Their deed was lauded in the official gazette, and "all men praised their conduct". This was in the last days of the Shōgunate. In 1873 the practice was forbidden by a notification of the Imperial Government which declared that "henceforth no one shall have the right to seek revenge or pass judgment for himself, no matter what the cause, and those who follow the ancient custom will be punished according to law". Since then, there has been no case of it. Unlike "*hara-kiri*" and "*junshi*", it is dead.

no public censure was passed upon him. Ogyū Sorai, who had been Kira's lecturer or reader and who was a protégé of Kira's son, Uyesugi, issued a pamphlet in which he assailed the *rōnin* for failing to commit suicide at the Sengakuji, without sending any notice to the censor at all. This gave rise to a great commotion among the Chinese scholars of the time, and an embittered controversy over this point went on for years. Modern authors have divided these writers into pro-Bakufu and anti-Bakufu according to the view they supported. This betrays a serious misconception of the actual circumstances of the time—it was only in the nineteenth century that perfervid loyalists began to exploit the episode of the Forty-seven *Rōnin* for their own special purposes. The Shōgun was inclined to save the *rōnin* from their doom, and the Great Councillors, though they had to administer the law, had the greatest admiration for, and sympathy with, the "criminals". They, in common with every Daimyō in Japan, readily perceived that the incident could be turned to the greatest possible profit. Dr. Aston has well remarked on the "commanding position of loyalty in the *Table of Moral Precedence*" which, "in the morals and ideas of this period, overshadows and dwarfs all other obligations." Before 1703, the tendency on the whole may have been in this direction, but it was only after the Akō vendetta that it became so pronouncedly dominant. The Japanese is frequently not merely a man of sentiment but a sentimentalist, and, in common with the generality of mankind, is ruled more by the figments of imagination than the calculations of reason. Now this episode was so startling and thrilling that it appealed to the imagination with greater force than any other single incident that could be named in the history of the empire. From Satsuma to Tsugaru it focussed the national attention—for the time men spoke of nothing else, thought of nothing else. Everything else was for the moment forgotten—except perhaps the Dog-Laws, which even Ōishi had so faithfully obeyed. Two days after the attack on Kira's mansion, we hear of broadsheet accounts of it being hawked about throughout the whole city of Yedo. The popular writer was soon at work upon a more or less imaginative treatment of the whole incident, and, during the Tokugawa age, about one hundred different versions of the tale were published. In 1703, Chikamatsu Monzaemon (1653–1724), one of Japan's three greatest dramatists, was in the full vigour of his powers, and he at once seized upon the Akō vendetta as a theme.

His play held the stage until 1744, when Takeda Idzumo (1691–1756) produced his thrice-famous *Chūshingura*, the most popular play ever put upon the boards in Japan.¹

More than a century and a half later the tale was told to Sir Rutherford Alcock, the first British representative to Japan, then installed in the Tōzenji, only a few hundred yards' distant from the tomb of the *rōnin*, before which the incense has never ceased to smoke.

“As this story was recited to me I could not help reflecting on what must be the influence of such a popular literature and history upon the character as well as the habits and thoughts of a nation. When children listen to such fragments of their history or popular tales, and, as they grow up, hear their elders praise the valour and heroism of such servitors, and see them go at stated periods to pay honour to their graves centuries after the deed—and such is the fact, it is quite obvious that general talk and unhesitating approval of what with us, perhaps, would be considered great crimes, may have very subtle and curious bearings on the general character and moral training of the people. What its exact influence may be we cannot determine, perhaps; but that it is deep and all-pervading, affecting their general estimate of all deeds of like character, whether it be the slaying of a Regent, or the massacre of a Foreign Legation, is very certain, and presents a state of things well worthy of serious consideration.”²

¹ On the anniversary of the attack on Kira's house, the *Chūshingura* is still acted in most of the theatres throughout the Empire. In the great warlike fief of Satsuma, the *Sha*—something originally like the old Spartan mess organization—are still maintained in a modified form; and in every one of these the reading of the *Chūshingura* begins with the lighting of the lamps, and continues through the night of the fourteenth of the twelfth month (old style) as regularly as the year comes round.

A very scholarly and complete translation of the *Chūshingura* was made and published by the late Mr. F. V. Dickens, under the title of *The Chūshingura, or the Loyal League, a Japanese Romance*. The play occupies a greater position on the Japanese stage than even *Macbeth* or *Hamlet* on the English, and deservedly so, as it is full of thrilling incidents, vividly illustrative of the life of the period. It is always well put on the stage, and well acted.—J. H. L.

² Sir Rutherford Alcock almost invariably, both in his admirable description of life in Japan in his day in what is still one of the most interesting books that has been written on Japan (*The Capital of the Tycoon*, 2 vols., 1863) and in his official dispatches, took the very worst view of the character and disposition of the samurai. The samurai was, in his eyes, “of that extinct species in Europe, still remembered as ‘swash-bucklers’, swaggering, blustering bullies, many cowardly enough to strike an enemy in the back or cut down an unarmed or inoffensive man, but also supplying numbers ever ready to fling their own lives away in accomplishing a revenge or in carrying out the behests of their chief . . . no mean adepts in the use of their swords from which they were never parted; one a heavy, two-handed weapon, pointed and sharp as a razor, the other, short like a Roman sword and religiously kept in the same serviceable state—both as dangerous and deadly weapons as man can well possess. Often drunk and always insolent, the samurai is the terror of all the unarmed population and street dogs, and as a general rule, offensive in gesture and speech to foreigners.” Sir Rutherford may well be excused for not having taken a more roseate view of the knighthood of Japan. Twice his Legation was attacked at night by bands of samurai with the object of murdering all its inmates, though he was himself not in Japan on the second occasion, and he

In connexion with this episode, one rather important point remains to be adverted to. In view of the resolute daring displayed by Ōishi and his comrades, it may well seem that the general moral degeneracy of the samurai of this age has been greatly exaggerated. We have no reason to distrust the accounts of contemporary writers who have touched upon the matter, but we must bear in mind that it was with Yedo and the state of things there prevalent that they dealt. Now, the Yedo of 1700 was to the rest of the empire what London was to England at large in the reign of Charles II. In spite of the scandalous and brazen-faced depravity of the English court and of the fashionable circles in the metropolis at that date, there were tens of thousands of households in the country where a sober, healthy, robust, and "God-fearing" family life was quietly and unobtrusively led. From such accounts as those Arai Hakuseki gives us of his father's life,¹ it is not unreasonable to suppose that a somewhat analogous state of things prevailed in contemporary Japan. In many of the castle-towns, on many of the outlying fiefs, the samurai were still under a tolerably strict and salutary regimen. The strenuous ferocity of Katō Kiyomasā's time had indeed been tamed; in many cases tamed only too effectually. But, in many remote country places, the fierce old spirit was by no means dead, it only slumbered and needed nothing but a suitable stimulus to rouse it to vigorous action. Still, it was gradually passing even in the country districts; it was by the old men (Yoshida *aet* 61; Horibe *aet* 75) of the former generation that Ōishi's hand was finally forced. In Yedo, the resident Akō *rusu-i* made rather a poor showing—at first they absolutely refused to move in the matter, when appealed to. In Yedo, in truth, the case seemed well-nigh hopeless. On Iyenobu's accession an attempt was made to stem the *debâcle*. Tsunayoshi's favourites were cashiered, Yanagisawa found it advisable to shave his head and enter religion. The Shōgun's harem was broken up and his forty "boys" restored to their relatives. Gambling was prohibited, actors were deprived of their swords and forbidden to associate with samurai; the wearing of silk crêpe and the visiting of temples in bodies by women were

never stirred outside the Legation boundaries without justifiably feeling that he was incurring a very present risk of assassination, a risk shared by all his fellow Europeans, which culminated in the death of many by the terrible swords he has described.—J. H. L.

¹ Quoted in the next chapter, *vide* p. 240.

interdicted; and street walkers and private prostitutes were drastically dealt with. But something more than these negative or superficial measures was needed. Iyenobu had good intentions, and his counsellor, Arai, had ideas; but neither Iyenobu nor Arai was really capable of diagnosing the malady correctly, and devising and applying a radically effective remedy. That was to remain over as work for a greater man than either of the twain.

CHAPTER VII

IYENOBU AND IYETSUGU

(1709-16)

THE new Shōgun, Iyenobu, now forty-seven years of age, was more fortunate in his early upbringing than Shōguns generally were. He had been reared in a modest household as the son of a simple samurai; and so naturally must have acquired some practical acquaintance with the actualities of everyday life. A century before, such a knowledge was indispensable to any clan chieftain who aspired to better, or even to maintain, his position, and in truth, not merely Hideyoshi, but most of his captains who founded great houses were furnished with little other learning than this. But such commonplace knowledge was now held in scant esteem; every lord and lordling in the Empire aspired to distinction as a proficient in the wisdom of the Sages of China. Possibly Iyenobu's early training in the "Books" was somewhat neglected. At all events, in 1695, when he was thirty-three years of age, we find him telling Arai Hakuseki that he had "thrice read the Four Classics, the Little Learning, and the Kinshiroku, but that he did not yet fully understand the Way of the Sages". For the average Daimyō of the time, such an inventory at three and thirty would no doubt be creditable; in the case of a mere plebeian scholar, the elementary nature of Iyenobu's attainments at this age would have invited contempt from youths not yet out of their 'teens. However, under Arai's tuition, the Lord of Kōfu, as Iyenobu then was, made a determined effort to make up for lost time. During the next nineteen years or so, Arai delivered no fewer than 1,299 discourses for his lordship's enlightenment, and during the earlier portion of this time at least, the poor Daimyō was also being industriously operated upon by a rival artist in the person of a certain Yoshida, a pupil of Hayashi's, the Lord Rector of the University of Yedo. These lectures were very solemn functions indeed.

"His Lordship wore his robes of ceremony at the lectures, save in summer, when he wore his unextended robes and a *hakama*. He did not sit on the dais, but on the mats, nine feet from me. Even in the

hottest weather, he did not use his fan, nor brush away the mosquitoes, and when he had a cold he carefully averted his head when he blew his nose. Though the lecture lasted two hours, all sat immovable throughout."

These were the halcyon days of the Chinese scholar in Japan. None of these lecturers at the Courts of the various Daimyō was very richly fee'd—Arai, for example, began with a stipend of rations for forty men—but they were held in honour and respect, and some of them were able to establish a great ascendancy over their aristocratic pupils. That Arai succeeded in doing so is undoubted. It is interesting to remember that he was the contemporary of Fénelon, and that he was performing for the future Shōgun of Japan much the same office that the Archbishop of Cambrai was discharging for the Duke of Burgundy. Only there were some important points of difference to be taken into account. The Duke of Burgundy was a mere boy, thirty years younger than his preceptor; Arai (born 1657) and the Lord of Kōfu (born 1662) were both men in the full vigour of their faculties, with no greater difference in age between them than five years.¹

It will be remembered that the Great Fire of Yedo (1657) hastened the end of Hayashi Razan. This same conflagration gave Arai his early nickname of "Spark", for he was born just three weeks after the event in a temporary dwelling in Yanagiwara, where his parents had installed themselves. His father was a *metsuke*,

¹ Arai figures so conspicuously in the History of Japan between 1709 and 1716, that it becomes necessary to say something about his antecedents. European readers may be referred to the following sources: Aston's *Japanese Literature*, pp. 244-57. Wright's *Capture and Captivity of Père Sidotti in Japan*, *T.A.S.J.*, vol. ix, pt. ii. Dr. Lönholm's *Arai Hakuseki und Pater Sidotti*, *M.D.G.N.V.O.*, Heft 54, and especially Dr. Knox's condensed translation of Arai's Autobiography in *T.A.S.J.*, vol. xxix, pt. ii.

This last document is of very high value, but it must never be forgotten that it is an *ex parte* statement, and that such statements are rarely, if ever, to be taken at their full face value. It does not improve matters to allege that this composition was written strictly for Arai's own family, for in the nature of things such a document, making the political disclosures and indulging in the free and caustic criticisms it did, could never have been published in Tokugawa Japan. No one could have known that better than the author himself. Thus there was no possibility of having any of his assertions either verified or contradicted, and not the slightest risk of anything like adverse criticism. In the volume, as it stands, if there is no very flagrant *suggestio falsi*, there is an abundance of *suppressio veri*. Before this document can be utilized by the modern historian it has to be collated with other contemporary evidence, and carefully checked in not a few of its paragraphs. Yet, notwithstanding, what Dr. Knox claims for it must be ungrudgingly conceded. "It has its value as giving us perhaps the most vivid picture of old Japan obtainable, a picture of the real Japan and not the fancied land of travellers and poets and foreigners. It would be difficult possibly to match it as a bit of history, not necessarily that all its statements are correct, but as giving us an insight into the centre of Japanese life and power."

or police-officer in the service of Tsuchiya, a small Daimyō of 12,000 *koku* in Kadzusa. Arai's account of what he remembered about his father is worth quoting, inasmuch as it affords us a peep into the interior economy of an average samurai household of the time :—

Ever since I came to understand the heart of things, my memory is that the daily routine of his life was always exactly the same. He never failed to get up an hour before daybreak. He then had a cold bath and did his hair himself. In cold weather the woman who was my mother would propose to order hot water for him, but this he would not allow, as he wished to avoid giving the servants trouble. When he was over seventy, and my mother also was advanced in years, sometimes when the cold was unendurable a lighted brazier was brought in, and they lay down to sleep with their feet against it. Beside the fire there was placed a kettle with hot water, which my father drank when he got up. Both of them honoured the way of Buddha. My father, when he had arranged his hair and adjusted his clothing, never neglected to make obeisance to Buddha. On the anniversaries of his father's and mother's death he and my mother prepared the rice for the offerings. This duty was never entrusted to servants. After he was dressed he waited quietly till dawn, and then went out to his official duty . . . Since I remember there were but few black hairs on his head. He had a square-shaped face with a high forehead. His eyes were large, he had a thick growth of beard (a rare thing for a Japanese, by the way) and was short of stature. He was, however, a big-boned, powerful man. *He was never known to betray anger, nor do I remember that, even when he laughed, he gave way to boisterous mirth. Much less did he ever descend to violent language when he had occasion to reprimand anyone.* In his conversation he used as few words as possible. His demeanour was grave. *I have never seen him startled, flurried, or impatient.* When he applied the *moxa* he used to say there was no use in small and few applications, and would put on five or seven great patches at the same time without showing any sign of suffering. The room he usually occupied he kept cleanly swept, had an old picture hung on the wall, and a few flowers which were in season set out in a vase. *He would spend the day looking at them.* He painted a little in black and white, not being fond of colours. *When in good health he never troubled a servant, but did everything for himself . . .*¹

Not less interesting, perhaps, is the account Arai gives, not so much of his schooling—for he was to all intents and purposes a self-taught man—as of his boyish studies.

“ In the autumn of my eighth year (1665, the year of the plague in London, in European reckoning, but most likely in 1664, according to the Japanese style of counting) Tobe (his lord) went to the province of Kadzusa, leaving instructions that I was to be taught writing (in his

¹ Of his mother, Arai writes : “ Mother wrote a fine hand, composed good verses, and read many books. She taught all this to my sister. She was a skilful player of checkers and chess, and taught me to play. She had the finger-tips for the *Koto*, she thought women should weave cloth and make clothes, and so she made father's and mine. I have some of her making still. The proverb, says ‘ like marry like ’ ; and so it was with my parents. They were alike in words and actions.”

Yedo mansion). In the middle of the twelfth month of that year (January) he returned, and I resumed my attendance on him. In the autumn of the next year, when he went again to his province, he set me a task, ordering me to write out every day in the day-time 3,000 (!) Chinese characters in the round or cursive script, and at night 1,000 ! When winter came on and the days became shorter, it frequently happened that the sun approached the setting before my task was finished. I would then take my desk out to a bamboo veranda which faced the west and finish it there. Moreover, as I sometimes got intolerably sleepy over my nightly task, I arranged with the man who was told off to serve me to put two buckets of water on the aforesaid veranda. When I became drowsy I took off my coat and poured one of the buckets of water over me. I then resumed my clothing and went on writing. The cold produced in this way for a while answered the purpose of keeping me awake. But after a time I became warm again, and the drowsiness came back, when I poured water over myself as before. With two applications of this kind I was able to get through most of my work. This was in the autumn and the winter of my ninth year . . . From my thirteenth year Tobe used me to conduct most of his correspondence."

Down to 1677, Arai remained in the service of the Tsuchiya family. In that year, as the result of a succession dispute, he lost his position, and for the next five years he was a lordless man. In 1682, he at last found service with Hotta, the Tairō, but, ten years later, he withdrew from the employment of Hotta's son and successor almost penniless, and once more he was a *rōnin*.¹ He went to Yedo and there established himself as a teacher. Assisted seemingly by the kind offices of Kinoshita Junan he soon had enough pupils to keep the wolf from the door. This Kinoshita was a Kyōto scholar, who, after teaching in the old capital for a score of years, was employed by the Daimyō of Kaga, and ultimately (1682) was invited to Yedo by the Shōgun, who entrusted him with some minor official work. It seems that Arai, who enrolled himself among his pupils some years before, did get instruction from Kinoshita at this time, but apart from this, his studies were prosecuted without the help of any teacher. However, the intellectual atmosphere of

¹ During his first experience as a *rōnin*, he was asked to marry the granddaughter of the richest man in Japan, who offered him a hoase worth 3,000 *ryō*, and all he needed for his studies. The offer was made because Arai was expected to become famous. He declined it, and the young lady afterwards married another scholar. Here we meet with an early instance of what later on became not so very uncommon. Merchants stood at the very bottom of the social scale but not a few of them were accumulating enormous wealth, and that enabled them to establish matrimonial connexions with the gentry. A century later we meet with numerous cases of merchants' sons being adopted into Samurai families as prospective heads. On the other hand, we read in Arai's time of Samurai becoming prosperous merchants. See *T.A.S.J.*, vol. xxix, pt. ii, p. 207.

Japan was now vastly different from what it was in Nakae Tōju's early days, for not only were good text-books and commentaries plentiful and cheap, but almost everyone now knew something about Chinese philosophy. What had been great mysteries and brilliant discoveries in Nakae's day and generation were now common places in every little castle-town. Much of Arai's time was spent in Yedo, and in the Tokugawa capital there was abundant opportunity for rapidly acquiring knowledge that must have taken Nakae infinite trouble and time.

Arai's reputation was so rapidly established that, in less than a year after his removal to Yedo, he was told that he could easily find a post as clan-lecturer, if he would only consent to enrol himself among Hayashi's pupils as a mere formality. It appears that Hayashi had a complete monopoly of the disposal of such positions. For all that, Arai refused to bow the knee to Baal in the person of the "Lord of the Great Learning". Just at this time, however, the Kōfu clan requested Hayashi to supply a man for a post of thirty men's rations, but he happened to have none available. Accordingly Kinoshita was appealed to, and he at once recommended Arai, at the same time insisting that the offered stipend was insufficient. This difficulty was got over, and on 8th December, 1694, Arai delivered the first of his 1,299 lectures to the Lord of Kōfu, and under him and rival professors his Lordship was steadily conducted through the whole Chinese canon from title-page to colophon. He also showed a keen interest for less recondite subjects, for botany, and for the utensils of everyday life and the mechanical processes by which they were produced. Plants and other objects he had drawn from life, and these sketches were so numerous that when collected they filled no fewer than 380 volumes. He displayed also a great liking for history. Now, at this time, when a Japanese scholar spoke of history, it was the History of China he meant—unless there was something in the context of his remarks indicating another subject. One reason for this, of course, was the dominant place that Chinese studies, generally, then, occupied in Japan. In addition to that it must be remembered that while there were many Chinese standard Histories available, no great History of Japan had ever so far been written. The Nihongi and the Six National Histories were all terribly dry-as-dust compilations, and, even so, they brought the national annals down to A.D. 888, and no further. After that, there were chronicles, such as the Azuma-Kagami, covering a few genera-

tions here and there, and fancifully embroidered historical romances like the *Taiheiki*, which was now being expounded by story-tellers at every second street corner. Of anything in the shape of an attempt at a connected, much less a scientific, historical narrative, covering the long ages after A.D. 889, there was nothing. Mitsukuni and his band of Mito scholars were, it is true, zealously at work on the *Dai Nihon Shi*, but that was to end at A.D. 1413; and even so, the very earliest section of it was not to be available until 1715. History was supposed to be a speciality of the Hayashi family, and besides the Honchō-Tsūgan they had produced several works dealing more particularly with the Tokugawa age. Arai considered these to be uncritical, disfigured by mis-statements, and defective in other respects. To obtain a good practical working knowledge of Japanese history from such sources was no easy task. Naturally the Lord of Kōfu, overburdened as he was with his Chinese studies, had to acquire his Japanese History by a less heroic course than wading through this huge morass of confusion. Arai thus describes his own efforts :—

“After my lecture we usually went to another room and took our ease. My Lord would ask me questions about China and Japan, and especially as to the House of Tokugawa. So, at his request, I wrote a history of all the Daimyō of more than 10,000 *koku*. I would first make an outline, and, as he approved, would fill it out, making careful inquiry of the different Daimyō. I began to write on the eleventh of the seventh month, and finished in the tenth month. The history was chiefly occupied with the events of the 80 years from 1600 to 1680. It relates how the domains of 337 Daimyō were won, inherited, augmented, or decreased . . . I wrote the preface myself and presented it to the Shōgun, on 17th March, 1702. He named it *Han Kampu*.”

From this it appears that the twenty volumes of this rather bulky feudal history were composed in the space of three months in the author's leisure hours. The rapidity of execution ceases to be so very surprising, if several modern Japanese critics are correct in their contention that Arai found most of his material in volumes published, or at least compiled, by the Hayashi family, and that he made no scruple about “conveying” long stretches of their work to his own pages. Other cases unfortunately are not wanting to indicate that a cheerful acknowledgment of his indebtedness to other scholars can find no place in any catalogue of Arai's virtues.

He was an omnivorous reader, and among other subjects he devoted some attention to Japanese antiquities. Before Tsunayoshi's time, antiquarian studies were a monopoly of

certain Kugé houses in Kyōto. As has been said several times, Kyōto antiquarian experts were induced to remove to Yedo in the last quarter of the seventeenth century. From their works, Arai doubtless learned a good deal, but in Yūshokugaku, as antiquarianism was termed, he was regarded as a mere "country scholar". The Lord of Kōfu appreciated his erudition, it is true, but when he became the Shōgun Iyenobu, he deemed it advisable to provide himself with a more authoritative instructor in the old court-lore of Japan. This he was able to do very easily. Iyenobu's consort was the daughter of the ex-Kwampaku, Konoye Motohiro, and this great noble had the reputation of being the most profound scholar in Kyōto in his own special antiquarian field. He was now invited to pay a visit to his daughter, and in May, 1710, he arrived in Yedo, and took up his quarters in the Densō *yashiki*, Arai being added as a sort of supernumerary to the commission charged with attending to his comfort. Every alternate day the old nobleman proceeded to the Castle and expounded the Nihongi and the Genji-Monogatari to his son-in-law, the Shōgun. Whenever Iyenobu failed to understand anything, Arai was sent to the Densō *yashiki* on the following day to ask for explanations, and to take them down in writing. It appears that Konoye Motohiro soon came to have a high appreciation of Arai's undoubted ability and a liking for his personality, and so the latter had a splendid opportunity of acquiring esoteric lore that was then beyond price in the Kwantō. Thus, at last, Arai *did* have a teacher; and not only that, but the very best teacher in this special branch of science that was to be found in Japan at the time.¹

In January, 1710, the new Emperor, Nakamikado, was to be crowned, and Arai was dispatched to attend the ceremony and the great functions held in honour of the occasion. The ex-Kwampaku's son was then acting as Sesshō, or Regent, in Kyōto, and Arai was recommended to him by Konoye. The Sesshō really exerted

¹ "As I review my life, it would appear that I should have made much greater progress had I had good teachers, when I began to write at three years, study poetry at six, and the 'Way' at seventeen . . . In this matter of study no one has been more unfortunate." *T.A.S.J.*, vol. xxix, pt. ii, p. 109. He does not make any special boast of his impediments in his Autobiography. Nor does he mention that he was rather badly set-down at first by the ex-Kwampaku. He had been pluming himself on his antiquarian lore before Konoye's arrival, and had designed a certain gate in the Castle in the "correct" ancient manner. The ex-Kwampaku laughed at the structure in question, and Yedo laughed in turn at the discomfited assurance of the architect.

himself to assist Arai in every way, as did also another court noble of great authority on old court ceremonies.

Arai not merely acquired a great store of unwritten recondite lore on this occasion, about robes, hats, deportment, and such-like—but he established a connexion with his noble friend which enabled him afterwards to appeal to him by letter when he had to deal with any doubtful point in these very solemn and serious matters. He thus became, after the return of the ex-Kwampaku to Kyōto, recognized as undoubtedly the foremost authority on all the profundities of old Court ceremonial and similar learning in the Kwantō. In that special field, Hayashi, Rector of the University, and the official Kōké had alike to hide their diminished heads before him. This serves in some measure to explain one rather strange feature in Arai's autobiography. That a scholar of the robust common-sense which he frequently displayed, should be found attaching so much importance to the details of Court dress and the minutiae of etiquette, may well seem surprising, but a certain type of subordinate attache of the court has often found his own account not only in magnifying his chief but in setting a supreme importance upon any trivial special knowledge or accomplishment of his own. It is perfectly true that there are many Japanese in subordinate positions whom it is a pleasure and a privilege to know—manly yet modest—self-respecting yet courteous to all who deserve to be treated courteously. There are not a few indications, however, that Arai was not of that type. With all his sterling qualities—and he had a good many of them—he certainly was not averse to “blowing his own conch-shell” upon occasion, and that very lustily too. To give an illustration of his methods:—

Konoye had come from Kyōto with an important Imperial, or rather ex-Imperial, commission to discharge. As has been said, it had for long been the custom to force all the Sovereign's children, except the Heir Apparent, to “enter religion”. The ex-Emperor Reigen was very anxious to see this practice abolished, to have future Princes established in secular life and permitted to found houses of their own, and future Princesses permitted to marry. Through his influence with Iyenobu, Konoye had no difficulty in getting the Shōgun's assent to the proposal. As a matter of fact, the Princely house of Kanin was then established, its first head being Naohito, the brother of the reigning Emperor,¹ Nakamikado,

¹ The Imperial princely house of Kanin is the fourth of the Imperial families

while one of the Imperial Princesses was then betrothed to the Shōgun's infant son, Iyetsugu. Arai, no doubt, did write the formal memorial necessary for taking such a step; yet there can be no doubt that the real author of the scheme was the ex-Kwampaku, Konoye Motohiro. Yet Arai in his Autobiography boldly appropriates the whole credit to himself.¹

The ex-Kwampaku's sojourn in Yedo did not a little to confirm the already very satisfactory relations that had prevailed between the Bakufu and the Imperial Court ever since the beginning of Tsunayoshi's administration (1680). In expounding the Nihongi and subsequent works, Konoye found opportunities for dwelling upon what were shortcomings in the Bakufu system from the Court point of view. One result of this was the removal of the inscriptions "Imperial Court Domain" and "Ex-Emperor's Domain" on the boundary-posts of the lands allotted for the support of the Court, the reason being that this language assimilated the Sovereign and ex-Sovereign to the Daimyō, who held their fiefs as vassals of the Shōgun. A still stranger result was that an attempt was made to introduce Court dress into Yedo Castle, and to array, at least on ceremonial occasions, the holders of the various degrees of Imperial Court rank in the hats and robes appropriate to their grades. Even at hunting-parties—which among samurai were for purposes of military drill mainly—those who held Court rank were supposed to appear in the old Kugé costume worn on such occasions. Court carpenters were brought from Kyōto to construct a new castle-gate properly. For all his exertions, Konoye was granted 1,000 *koku* extra per annum, while his second son was authorized to establish a house of his own with a revenue of 500 *koku*. At the same time, not only was the Kyōto palace rebuilt, but considerable

in which an heir to the throne can be found in the event of the failure of the direct line. The present (1925) head of the house is Prince Kotohito, the sixth in succession but not a direct descendant of the founder, the fifth of the line having died without issue, and one of the younger sons of Prince Kuni-ye, the nineteenth prince of Fushimi, having been adopted as his successor. The House has already furnished an occupant of the throne from whom the present Emperor is directly descended. In 1779 the Emperor Go-Momozono died without an heir, and Prince Tomohito, the son of the third prince of Kanin, was chosen to succeed him and became the Emperor Kōkaku, the 118th of the Imperial line (1780-1816). He abdicated in the year last mentioned but continued to exercise the Imperial functions, from his "Palace of Retirement" till his death, twenty-four years later.—J. H. L.

¹ See *T.A.S.J.*, vol. xxix, pt. ii, p. 134. After setting forth the text of his memorial he goes on: "The Shōgun listened attentively and said so great a proposal needed careful thought. Both suggestions were adopted. This one thing I did for the country which gave me birth, and whose Imperial favour I had secured."

extra allowances were also granted for the support of the Court. That Iyenobu had any intention of deposing the Sovereign, as has been sometimes asserted, is absurd, and to credit Arai with inspiring him with any such notion is perhaps still more absurd. It must not be forgotten that Arai did *not* govern Japan; he was indeed of far less political importance than is generally supposed.¹

It is easy enough for any one who can read between the lines of Arai's Autobiography to perceive that the real power behind the Shōgun's throne was the Sobayōnin, Manabe Norifusa. He had been brought up with Iyenobu, and had been his seneschal at Kōfu. In 1707 he was made a Daimyō, and after 1709 he occupied with Iyenobu the position that Yanagisawa had done with Tsunayoshi. But Manabe was a very different sort of man from Tsunayoshi's fallen favourite. His master's mind was seriously given to the task of ruling the empire as it should be ruled, and Manabe was unwearied in the devoted but unobtrusive counsel and assistance he so ungrudgingly rendered. He was so constant in his attendance that he went home only four or five times a year, and after the infant Iyetsugu became Shōgun, he did not go home at all.

"He had no time for study" Arai tells us "but he was of very fine natural parts. He satisfied everyone and made no errors. He was much criticized without reason as carrying on the government himself. But that was even said of me though I had no power at all and could only state my views."

It is plain that on a great many matters Manabe never consulted Arai, while in some of those which he did lay before him, he obviously did not act upon his advice. Manabe evidently had the great gift of being able to keep out of quarrels and wrangles, and Arai and he continued to live and act in great, if not absolutely perfect harmony. Arai's knowledge of precedents in the "Books" and of rites and ceremonies was of great service to the practical hard-headed, smooth-spoken Sobayōnin, and Arai divined that any serious breach with him would be fatal to himself in the end. It is safe to presume that if Iyenobu had been faced with the disagreeable necessity of getting rid of one or other of the two men, it would not have been Manabe that would have found his services dispensed with. As

¹ He does make a modest claim for himself: "No Shōgun for many years deserved such praise as my Lord . . . As of old, Yu aided Shun, so to my own family may Manabe and I be said without error to have contributed a twentieth to the success of his reign. This shows, too, how intimate was my relation to the Shōgun."

regards the Rōjū there were at the death of Tsunayoshi only four Great Councillors—Tsuchiya, who had then been 22 years in office ; Akimoto, 10 years ; Inouye and Ōkubo each 4 years, and these were all retained in office. Besides these, two more members were added in 1710 ; but one of these latter retired in 1711, and the other in 1712. In addition to all these, Ii, the Lord of Hikone, who had acted as Tairō from 1697 to 1700, was once more installed in that high office, and occupied it from 1710 to 1714.

Of none of these men did Arai entertain any very exalted opinion.

“They were all weak and deficient in intelligence ; and Manabe had trouble in making clear the simplest matters to them. The Great Council did indeed meet every day but it only received the Shōgun’s instructions and knew nothing of the affairs of state. The Councillors feared the Shōgun’s wisdom and Manabe met them privately, coached them, and prepared them for interviews.”

How far all this is true, it is difficult to say. It is clear that none of these Councillors was specially remarkable for ability. On the other hand, it is questionable whether they were so absolutely incapable as Arai represents them to have been. Arai was not a generous critic of those who thwarted his purposes in any way, and during the four years immediately following Iyenobu’s death in 1712, the Rōjū not only frequently declined to adopt his views but, after 1716, many of the innovations that he had succeeded in getting introduced were abandoned, to his disgust and despair. And the damning fact, for him at least, is that the Empire has rarely if ever been so soundly and efficiently administered as it was between 1716 and 1744. There is little doubt that it was really Iyenobu himself who governed Japan between 1709 and 1712. He still listened to an occasional lecture from Arai, and, after the lectures, we occasionally hear of him producing elaborate statements of difficult cases that had just come to him from the Hyōjōsho, handing them to Arai, and requesting him to sift them and write out his opinion upon them. But Arai’s recommendations were adopted only after mature consideration. Sometimes the Shōgun actually wrote out the decision with his own hand.¹

That he often had personal interviews with Magistrates and other subordinate officials on administrative matters is also perfectly certain. From these and many other circumstances it is plain that

¹ The various law-cases given in Arai’s Autobiography are worthy of close study. We must not forget that in Japan, as elsewhere, a Law Court was not necessarily a Palace of Truth.

the Sixth Tokugawa Shōgun was a hard and conscientious worker, but his rule of little more than three years was too brief for him to be able to accomplish a tithe of what was necessary to save the samurai from moral decline, and to rescue the peasantry from the misery into which they had fallen during the rule of his misguided and superstitious predecessor. Iyenobu's death was at the time regarded as a great national calamity, and if there had been no Yoshimune between 1716 and 1744, it is highly probable that we should even now be inclined to take this view of the matter. But, on taking a broad view of the situation, it is almost impossible to allay the suspicion that Iyenobu, had he lived thirty years longer, would not have proved equal to the great task that the eighth Shōgun so successfully accomplished. With all his fine moral qualities, Iyenobu had not the breadth and grasp of mind that are essential to a great statesman. In many things he did not get near the root of the matter at all; he was too little in contact with the actualities of the situation and he set too much store upon the Ways of the Sages. The crying evils of the times were not to be met by any mere cleansing of the outside of the cup and platter, and that may be said to be all that the Reform of Ceremonies, on which Arai's heart was so insistently set, accomplished.

In most modern Japanese Histories an inordinate amount of space is devoted to the war that raged between Arai and Hayashi Nobuatsu, the Rector of the University, between 1709 and 1716. Down to this time, the Jusha, as official Chinese scholar of the Bakufu, had always been a Hayashi. Hayashi Nobuatsu—born in 1644, and so thirteen years Arai's senior—was the third of the line. He had been greatly trusted by Tsunayoshi, and was the recipient of many favours from him. According to all former precedent it fell to him to draft the late Shōgun's epitaph. When he had completed his task, Iyenobu submitted it to Arai's inspection. He at once pronounced it to be faulty, and wrote out another in proper form. The two documents were then submitted to the Princely Abbot of Uyenō, and he declared in favour of Arai's composition. At the beginning of each successive administration the Bukē Shohatto had to be issued anew. The original set of 1615 was drafted by Hayashi Razan, while his grandson, Hayashi Nobuatsu, revised those published by Tsunayoshi, and he now sent in a redraft of some of the regulations. Again, Arai found fault with certain sections of the phraseology, and the result was that he was entrusted

with the work of compiling the *Shohatto* for Iyenobu's régime. Hayashi was so mortified that he sent in his resignation of the post of *Jusha*, but it was not accepted. When the ex-Kwampaku, Konoye, came to Yedo, it was Arai, and not Hayashi, that was selected to act as amanuensis for him. After the death of Iyenobu in 1712, Hayashi was again consulted by the Council, and his advice was to the effect that an infant Shōgun had no need to go into mourning, and that the announcement of his accession could be dispatched to the shrines of Nikkō and Isé at once. This brought Arai out of his semi-retreat, and Yedo was convulsed for weeks with this great question, and the squabble between the two rival *savants*. In the end, Arai gained his point. In another quarrel respecting the use of the ideograph *Shō* in the names of the year-periods, his opinion was rejected by the authorities. The explanation was that Hayashi achieved his victory by playing upon the superstitions of the Court ladies, and so enlisting their support. Even so, he was merely taking a leaf out of Arai's own book, for Arai himself had just done as much in the debate about the young Shōgun's mourning.

Between 1713 and 1716, Arai's position was not nearly so strong as it was while Iyenobu was Shōgun. In November, 1714, he actually sent in his resignation, for a great slight had, he considered, been offered to him. The second anniversary of the death of Iyenobu came round, and so far from being entrusted with the superintendence of the details of the ceremonies, Arai was not even invited to attend ! Manabe contrived, however, to smooth things over and Arai remained in the Bakufu service down to the death of Iyetsugu in June, 1716, when he again sent in his resignation, and on this occasion it was quietly accepted. Hayashi, on the other hand, was still continued in his hereditary office. Hayashi was neither a strong man nor a genius, but it is hard to believe him to have been the incompetent sycophant such as Arai represents him to be, for no other reason than that the eighth Shōgun was not particularly fond of having worthies of that sort in his service.

The practical matter of prime importance in which Arai strenuously exerted himself for the public good was the restoration of the coinage. Very full particulars of the determined battle he had to fight are given in his Autobiography. The problem indeed was a difficult one, yet not so difficult as might be supposed. After 1709, for some years there were no natural calamities of any consequence to be faced, while the revenues from the land were improving,

and as already pointed out, nothing in the shape of a national debt had been incurred. Finally, there was plenty of native metal available. The real difficulty to be overcome was official obstruction and dishonesty, and Arai claims, probably correctly, that it was his own efforts alone that broke up the ring of chartered counterfeiters and robbers. As for the plan adopted to replace the debased coinage, he admits that it was not the one he submitted, but one similar to it.

"The plans contained items I did not approve, and were badly executed. Much was stolen, the law was changed and little good came of it, naturally enough, since men, ignorant and without ability, were eager to show what they could do. Manabe came to agree fully with me."

In the course of the agitation over the question, a placard was posted on Arai's gate, on which was written "The Place for Making Decrees about Gold and Silver". Such placards had been posted in the beginning of Yoshimune's administration, and in other periods, but this was the worst of all. The Council of State desired to forbid them, but the Shōgun said, "No! They may contain some truth, and I shall not stop all expression of opinion." Far from forbidding them, he ordered the officials to show them to him. This is but one incident out of many that might be adduced showing that the Shōguns were not always kept in ignorance of what was happening, and of what people were thinking and saying, and that they did occasionally dare to have opinions of their own.¹

Iyenobu died in November, 1712, leaving the Shōgun's seat to a sickly child of three. In 1716 this seventh Shōgun also died, and with his death the line of Hidetada became extinct. The infant Shōgun's corpse was conveyed to Zōjōji to be interred on the 101st anniversary of the capture of Ōsaka Castle, and the superstitious regard this as a judgment from Heaven upon his descendants for Hidetada's treatment of the house of Toyotomi Hideyoshi.

An interesting question is, "Who really governed Japan during these three and a half years of the infant Iyetsugu's nominal rule?"

¹ "We talk of the Shōgun having had this or that policy, but it is a phrase only. The real rulers of Japan (that is, of the part which the central power reached) were those (Great) Councillors. From the time of Iyemitsu, the third Tokugawa Shōgun, there was probably not a single occupant of that commanding position (except Yoshimune, the eighth Shōgun) who did not register without hesitation whatever decree the Councillors agreed upon." Professor Wigmore's *Private Law in Old Japan*, part i, page 29. Tsunayoshi and Iyenobu at least have to be exempted from the scope of this assertion. About the others, we shall see presently.

Ii, Lord of Hikone, continued to act as Tairō for the first eight months, and in 1713, Kuze, Yamato no Kami, and in 1714, Matsudaira Nobuyasu and Toda Terazane entered the Rōjū, the veteran Tsuchiya (from 1687) and Inouye (from 1705) still retaining their places in it. During these years there was no particularly important achievement to put on record, but on the other hand there was no commotion or disturbance. The only friction was between Hayashi and Arai. The latter was still busy with his three volume and two hundred and eleven point memorials, but as a rule such things did not meet with much attention from his superiors. From all the information that can be gathered, the inference is that the Sobayōnin, Manabe, was doing most of the work. One of those quiet, determined, unflagging men, who really keep the business of the world moving without calling out like the proverbial fly on the wheel, and who are gathered to their fathers without any undue fuss and are then forgotten. Between 1709 and 1712 Arai's influence was based on his personal intimacy with the Shōgun and on his profound knowledge of precedents and ceremonial. On the death of Ineyobu it was on the latter alone that he had henceforth to rely. During Iyenobu's short régime he had accumulated a considerable amount of fresh information, especially about foreign countries and diplomatic intercourse. His knowledge was certainly not profound but it was enough to raise him to the position of the bat in a birdless village, or of the one-eyed man in the country of the blind. He could never be justly accused of the crime of keeping his light under a bushel. On the contrary, he was only too prone to make full display of all his garnered intellectual treasures on the slightest of temptations, and often without any temptation at all. In 1710, he was entrusted with the duty of "arranging for the reception and entertainment and farewell" of the Korean embassy, which arrived to congratulate the new Shōgun on his accession, and he determined to rise to the full height of the occasion. To understand fully the significance of the storm in a teacup that then ensued, it becomes necessary to say something about the intercourse that had been resumed between Japan and Korea some eight years or so after the withdrawal of the Japanese troops from the Peninsula in 1598.¹

To clear the ground, the following extract from Mr. Hulbert's *History of Korea* will be serviceable:—

¹ See preceding volume of this work, p. 359.

"The Japanese had for several years been pressing for the resumption of the old-time relations, half diplomatic and half-commercial, which had been carried on through the southern port of Fusan. Now, in 1609, consent was gained, and Yi Chi-wan for Korea and Gensho and Yoshimas [the first of these was a Zen priest, the other an agent acting for Sō, the Daimyō of Tsushima] for Japan met and worked out a plan for a treaty. The Japanese insisted that all three of the ports which had formerly been open should again be opened, but this was peremptorily refused, and only Fusan was opened. The number of boats that could come annually (from Tsushima) was reduced to twenty. Great diplomatic agents from the Shōgun were allowed to stay in Korea one hundred and ten days. The agents from any Daimyō in Japan could stay eighty-five days, and special agents could stay fifty. The strictness with which the Koreans bound down the Japanese as to number of ships, and men, and length of stay, and the refusal to open three ports, show that Korea was doing all this more as a favour than by demand, and history shows that at any time she felt at liberty to withdraw support from them. The amount of rice and other food that Korea *granted was hardly more than enough to support the embassy* when it came . . ."

From the foregoing it will appear that the Koreans made provision for carrying on diplomatic relations not only with the Shōgun but with the Daimyō who were the Shōgun's vassals, and even with the agents of the latter. To us, all this may seem very odd and "very Oriental". But in truth it was quite in accord with contemporary European practice, for we readily forget the fact that the central power was by no means so strong in the seventeenth century as it was destined to become.¹ This peculiar state of relations gave rise to no small confusion in the diplomatic intercourse carried on between Japan and Korea. The Bakufu usually employed Sō, the Lord of Tsushima, as an intermediary. But in certain matters—trading especially—Sō often acted on his own initiative, and not only that, Sō's agents often acted without consulting him. In the exchange of diplomatic courtesies between the Koreans and the Shōgun a great difficulty at once presented itself. The former addressed their dispatches "from the King of Korea to the King of Japan". In his reply the Shōgun did not appropriate the title of King to himself, and the Korean envoy stubbornly insisted that the dispatch he took back *must* come from "the King of Japan", inasmuch as it was to "the King of Japan" that he had been accredited. If, from "the King of Japan" did not appear in the Shōgun's reply, he (the envoy) would very likely be deprived of his head when he returned home. The poor man was

¹ See Lavissee, *Histoire de France*, tome vii, pp. 50-3.

in a very sad trouble over this, inasmuch as the Bakufu Councillors would not yield. But in Tsushima, the Zen priests, who then assisted Sō and his agents to transact business with the Koreans, opened the Shōgun's dispatches, and surreptitiously inserted the ideograph for "king" in the space after the Shōgun's name. It was not till Iyemitsu's time that this was detected, and then there was serious trouble, Sō's agent being seized and banished to Tsugaru, the priests ousted from all concern with dispatches, and their supervision entrusted to Hayashi Razan. Down to Arai's time this task continued to be discharged by a member of the Hayashi family. Now the Hayashi were Arai's detested rivals, and this circumstance alone would have sufficed to provoke Arai to try to prove that the established method of dealing with Korean missions was highly improper and derogatory to the dignity of the Shōgun and of the empire. Arai, indeed, had some good reasons for his contention that the diplomatic intercourse between the two countries was not on a proper footing. How Japanese missions to Korea were treated appears from the Korean account just quoted. Besides that, they were denied admission to the capital itself. On the contrary, the Korean envoys to Japan were treated in the most munificent and magnificent fashion. Old Will Adams witnessed the reception of the mission in Hidetada's time, and Cocks has transcribed his account of it :—

"I had almost forgotten to tell your Worship of the coming of the ambassadors from the King of Korea to the Emperor (i.e., Shōgun) of Japan, having about 500 men attending upon them. They went up at the same time I went to the Emperor's court, and were by the Emperor's command entertained by all the *tonos* (Daimyō) through the territories they passed, and all at the Japon's charge, they first beginning with the *Tono* of Tsushima, and next with him of Hirado, etc., and coming to the court of the Emperor made them to dine at his own table, they being served by all the *tonos* of Japan, every one having a head attire of a reddish colour with a little mark of silver like a feather in it. Mr. Adams was in presence and saw it." ¹

According to the regulations of the Bakufu, the feudatories between Tsushima and Yedo had to spend a very large amount of money upon the sumptuous entertainments they had to provide for the Korean ambassadors, and their train. The reason was twofold. In the first place it was part and parcel of the Bakufu policy to weaken the Daimyō by draining their resources on any plausible pretext, and in the second place it was intended to impress

¹ Cocks' *Diary*, vol. ii, p. 299.

the Koreans with a due sense of the power and resources of the empire. Arai, however, was perfectly reasonable in maintaining that the dignity of the empire would be more fitly consulted if the Korean mission and Japanese missions to Korea were put on a strict footing of reciprocity, but there was one weak spot in the Japanese position. Japan had a settlement in Korea, and was really anxious for a continuance of commercial relations between Fusan and Tsushima. Korea had no settlement on Japanese soil, and took little interest in the Fusan-Tsushima trade. Accordingly, any high-handed measures towards the Korean mission would probably lead to the expulsion of the islanders from Fusan, and so possibly to an outbreak of hostilities. Arai was, if not actually blind to these considerations, at all events indifferent, for, in his dealings with the Koreans, he now "grasped the nettle" very firmly indeed. Not a few of his innovations must indeed be commended on the score of good sense, and to these the envoys do not appear to have made any strong objection. The gross and wilful extravagance imposed upon the Daimyō was abolished, and the Koreans were sincerely glad to be content with a modest meal of four courses instead of the gargantuan banquets of fifteen courses, morning and evening, and thirteen at noon, which had hitherto made them martyrs to indigestion.

"Our proposal was to give our guests the same treatment as that accorded our ambassador in Korea. We added money for their other expenses. This change occasioned no debate, as the feasts were very tedious to the Koreans, and they preferred the money."

In certain other points, matters were not so smoothly and easily arranged. Arai insisted that they should cease to ride into their inns in palanquins, and that they should come forth from their apartments and descend to the courtyard to meet the messengers of the Shōgun and to bid farewell. This last demand the envoys refused to discuss, and at Ōsaka it was only when the Daimyō of Tsushima's men-at-arms were on the point of seizing them and carrying them downstairs by *force majeure* that they yielded. In Yedo, they were subjected to very strict, if not actually downright, discourteous treatment. In most things Arai carried his point; but at last matters came to a deadlock:—

"The ambassador objected to my use of a certain ideograph in our formal reply to their communication, because the ideograph occurred in the name of the seventh ancestor of their King. They insisted that the word be mutilated. I refused . . . They became rude in their replies,

and I refused to continue the discussion. They would not give up and went to the Daimyō of Tsushima and asked him to mutilate the word privately, as otherwise they could not survive their return, and war might result. So I was again asked to agree, but I replied that all other matters were trifles compared to this, and that I would die first. So next they went to the Shōgun, and he decided that the ideograph be mutilated on condition that the character in the Korean dispatch should be treated likewise."

As a reward for all the badgering he had undergone in Japan, the head of the mission was sentenced to death on his return to Korea. It is said that Arai at one time proposed to kill the envoy and then immolate himself in the orthodox fashion.¹

This drastic proceeding was not forced upon him, but he was so vexed that he sent in his resignation as soon as the embassy left Yedo. The Shōgun summoned him and explained that he had acted as he had done because he did not wish to lose all that had been gained on account of a single point, and in a speech distinguished by a marked measure of that "sweet reasonableness" in which Arai was so hopelessly lacking, he thoroughly disarmed the resentment of his irate preceptor. Arai was doubtless perfectly competent to instruct his august pupil in the lore of the Sages and the mysteries of regulation Court dress, but, when it came to an exercise of sound judgment and common-sense, it was the Shōgun who was generally called upon to give the lesson. On this occasion, Arai's stalwart "foreign policy" was far from commending itself to his fellow-officials. "In all this," he says, "our countrymen opposed me more than the Koreans themselves." Among the hostile critics was the future Shōgun, Yoshimune, at that time Lord of Kishū. Upon his accession he re-established the intercourse with Korea on the old footing, remarking that he was not going to be so foolish as to endanger the work of Iyeyasu and its results by exposing the empire to the risk of foreign war over what were really mere trivialities. From this circumstance, some modern Japanese writers assure us

¹ For full details see *T.A.S.J.*, vol. xxix, pt. ii, pp. 150-60. For the first interview with the envoys at Kawasaki, "I decided that ordinary robes would not do, and obtained an appropriate costume from the Shōgun. My hat had a coloured rim, my robe was purple, its skirt was drawn together, and my sword had silver ornaments. I put shoes in my palanquin, and when the ambassador met me at the gate of the inn, I put them on and left my palanquin. *But only men who understand our national institutions and the ceremonies of the Shōgun's Court can discuss these things.*" In 1715, Arai met the envoy from Lūchū in the Satsuma *yashiki*. "I wore a robe of a peculiar make, a cap, my ordinary sword, and a red fan which had been given me by the former regent."

we may form a conception of the salutary dread the Japanese had of the power of Korea even a full century after they had been driven out of the Peninsula. But another construction may reasonably enough be placed upon these remarks of Yoshimune. At that date, the population of Japan stood somewhere in the neighbourhood of 25,000,000, while the Korean census of 1667 had accounted for no more than 6,000,000 souls, a figure that had only advanced to 7,006,428 in 1767. Besides, at the accession of Yoshimune in 1716, Korea was so distracted with the broils of contending factions that any great united overseas effort was impossible. Yoshimune was resolutely bent upon effecting the regeneration of Japan by going thoroughly to the root of the ills from which she was suffering at his accession, and to accomplish this purpose peace was indispensable. No doubt Arai was patriotic enough, according to his lights, but Yoshimune's conception of patriotism was other than his.

Arai asserts that he remained in office after the death of Iyenobu in 1712, for two reasons mainly. In the first place, he wished to see that the reform in the coinage was properly carried out. This indeed was effected in 1716. In the next place, he had been entrusted with the task of putting the foreign trade of Nagasaki under stricter regulations and severer restrictions. In Iyenobu's time he visited Nagasaki in order to collect the information that was necessary to enable him to take the contemplated step. "Already in the late Shōgun's time," he says, "I had written up the subject in eight volumes containing two hundred and eleven points, great and small." These eight volumes doubtless have their value. But if their worth is to be judged by the following statements of the author, it is plain that they must be scanned pretty closely before their assertions can be utilized:—

"Until 1601, foreign ships might come and trade anywhere, but that was the period of the great Ming dynasty in China, and their laws permitted only licensed boats to come. Only foreign ships of war came to Nagasaki. The Dutch, in 1600, first went to Sakai, but in Keichō 13 (1608) their trade was transferred to Hirado, and two years later to Nagasaki. The Chinese trade was confined to Nagasaki in Keichō 13."

It would indeed be a feat to pack a greater number of errors into four short sentences; almost every proposition in the above statement is inaccurate, or at least misleading. In truth, Arai's

colossal self-assurance occasionally led him into most serious misconceptions. However, it would be a waste of time to expatiate upon his dogmatism in matters where his knowledge amounted to little more than a smattering. It will be more profitable to devote a chapter to the foreign trade of Japan between 1640 and 1720, utilizing not so much the results of Arai's researches as the records of the Dutchmen in Deshima.

CHAPTER VIII

FOREIGN RELATIONS (1640-1720)

IN the preceding volume of this work, a good deal was said about the fortunes of the early Dutch in Japan. In that volume they were mainly regarded as political factors, and it may therefore be well to deal more precisely with the results of their economic activity during their thirty odd years' sojourn in the "little fisher-town" of Hirado.¹

The vessels hastily dispatched from Patani to open up tradal relations with Japan had only makeshift cargoes, and some of the chief items, such as pepper, were not suitable for the Japanese market.²

Specie was left behind in Hirado to establish a factory, but for two years he had little or nothing to sell. A supply of Dutch goods arrived from Patani in 1611, but no great volume of business resulted and, even when the first ship direct from Holland appeared in 1612, the sales were neither very rapid nor very profitable. Just as prospects seemed to be brightening, the great Ōsaka campaigns of 1614-15 brought all trade to a temporary standstill, and so dissatisfied were the "Seventeen" in Amsterdam with their Japanese venture that, in 1616, they instructed the Governor-General in Java to close the Hirado factory. It was perhaps fortunate for the shareholders of the Company that the Governor-General presumed to over-ride these instructions. It is true that in 1615, the Hirado imports amounted to no more than 57,000 gulden (12 gulden = £1) and the exports to 66,000 gulden. But in 1616 the exports jumped to 195,000 gulden, and in 1617 (when the Dutch

¹ Dr. Nachod's *Die Beziehungen der Niederländischen Östindischen Kompagnie zu Japan im siezehnten Jahrhundert* is an excellent book in many ways. By assiduous delving in the Royal Archives at the Hague the author has put himself in a position to clear up many misconceptions on the part of Kaempfer, Siebold, Munsterberg, and others. Dr. Nachod regrets that he has no command of Japanese, and such weaknesses as there are in his work are to be attributed to this circumstance mainly.

² We often meet with the legend that the Dutch lost heavily on their earliest ventures because their cargoes consisted mainly of cheese, for which Japanese palates had no relish. The inventory of the ladings of the pioneer vessels is now accessible in the *Nihon Shiryō* and elsewhere. A glance at these documents is sufficient to dispose of this fine old Dutch Cheese legend.

had five large vessels in Hirado for the first time) the factory had Chinese wares to the value of 820,000 gulden to dispose of. The reason why the "Seventeen" had been led to abandon Hirado was because the Dutch, excluded from all trade with China, had no prospect of being able to supply the Japanese market with Chinese wares. Only by capturing the Portuguese galleons and other craft from Macao, as well as by the seizure of Chinese junks on the high seas, could they hope to furnish Japan with a portion of the Chinese silk so much in demand, and the 820,000 gulden worth of Chinese wares above alluded to came from two Chinese vessels that the Hollanders had seized. A little later Hirado became of prime importance to them as their chief base for naval operations against Manila and Macao.

As regards the Dutch-Japan trade between 1617 and 1625 it is likely that we shall have to be content to remain very much in the dark, for only a few authentic details seem to be recoverable. About the imports for 1621-4, we know very little. But we know that, during these four years, the exports amounted to a total of 1,040,401 gulden. We know also that silver represents 511,695 gulden of this amount, that only about 1,100 piculs of copper were exported in the first three of these years, and that in 1621-2, as much as 212,000 catties of camphor were carried away. In 1627, the value of the imports was 722,000 gulden, and of the exports 715,261 gulden, and we know that between 1st April, 1628 and 11th January, 1633, the net profit on the Hirado trade was £37,750. But the fact is that during the greater part of these years there was no Dutch trade in Hirado. In consequence of the Nuyts episode (dealt with in the preceding volume) an embargo was placed on all Dutch shipping and the Hirado warehouses were closed. In 1633, the Hollanders made a profit of 241,000 gulden, while, in 1634, the volume of their trade was returned at 1,500,000 gulden. In the following four years their net profits amounted to the immense sum of 6,334,010 gulden! Their imports for these years are set down at 8,823,100 gulden, while their exports for 1636 and 1637 are given at 6,440,000 gulden.

This sudden leap into commercial prosperity admits of an easy explanation. The Decree of 1635, forbidding Japanese to leave the country, relieved the Dutch from all further competition with the Japanese mercantile marine and the expulsion of the Portuguese in 1637 at once threw a great part of the trade of their most formid-

able rivals into their hands. Although the Portuguese had been interned in Deshima in 1635, their trade was far from being paralysed by the restriction of their freedom. In 1636 their exports alone amounted to between 62 and 63 tons of gold—that is to say, about 6,200,000 gulden.¹

It was in 1640 that the Dutch trade attained its acme of prosperity. The imports that year grew to 6,295,367 gulden, and the exports to 3,943,079 gulden. Three years later the figures were 680,436 and 1,175,958 gulden respectively. That is, in 1643, the trade suddenly contracted to less than a fifth of its volume in 1640. Meanwhile the Hollanders had been removed from Hirado to Deshima.

For the first few years of Dutch trade in Deshima the details are incomplete. But Van Dam, who bases his figures upon an inspection of the Company's books in Batavia, assesses the gross profits of the Nagasaki factory for the years 1642 to 1660 at 13,852,255 gulden. He estimates the expenses of all sorts for this period at 1,482,430 gulden, so that the net profits reached 12,369,824 gulden, an average return of something over £54,000 a year. What the net profit of the Deshima factory was in 1661 we do not know exactly, but from 1662 down to 1700 we have precise figures. From these it appears that during these 39 years, the Company's profits from its operations in Japan amounted to 25,416,376 gulden. Curiously enough, this is almost the same annual average as that given by Van Dam for the years 1642 to 1660, between £54,000 and £55,000 per annum. As the capital of the Dutch East India Company was £540,000, the profits of the Japan trade were for long sufficient to pay an annual dividend of ten per cent. We must not forget that, on the exports from Japan, which were sometimes nearly double the imports in value, there was an additional profit of 80 or 90 per cent. On the other hand, besides the maintenance of its fleet, fortresses, and other establishments, the Company incurred an expenditure of £260,000 per annum in salaries and wages, having at the end of the seventeenth century 18,000 men in its employ.

It may be of interest to examine some of the details of the Dutch Deshima traffic, which, for a short time, represented about one-half,

¹ It may be noted that the Portuguese in Deshima were *not* treated as prisoners. They had to lodge and transact business in Deshima, but they were free to pass out and walk about Nagasaki at any time. During the whole of their sojourn in Deshima the Dutch *were* virtually prisoners.

and later a third or a fourth of the whole overseas commerce of Japan during the two centuries of seclusion. The first point that attracts attention is a rather startling one, when we bear in mind that the great staple of the modern Japanese export trade is silk. This item at the present day usually represents about 40 per cent. of the value of Japanese products sent abroad ; in 1910, for example, it was accountable for £17,389,000 in a gross total of £45,843,000 ; in the following year the figures were £17,790,000 and £44,750,000. In the seventeenth century, silk was the chief Japanese import. It had always been the most valuable item in the cargoes of the Macao galleons, and in those of most of the Chinese junks that frequented Japanese ports.¹ At first, the Hollanders had very little

¹ Taking the exchange value of the yen roughly at 2s., the value of silk, both raw and manufactured, exported from Japan in 1921, was over 52, and in 1922, nearly 80 millions sterling, out of a total export trade of 125 and 164 millions sterling, respectively, in the two years, silk being by far the largest item in the whole trade and the United States being equally, by far, Japan's best customer. It may be assumed that Japan would think long and deeply before provoking a war, the very first result of which would be loss of so important a contribution to her commercial and industrial wealth.

Romance seems to be an element never found to be entirely wanting in any incident of Japanese life, and the silk trade and industry forms no exception to the general rule. Silk, as is well known, had its first origin in China, the ancient records testifying to its use over two thousand years B.C. At the beginning of the Christian era there was an immense overland trade in it, the secret of its production being, however, very rigorously guarded in China. It is mentioned both in the *Kojiki* and in the *Nihongi*, the two earliest histories of Japan, and the product at least appears to have been imported into, and to have been in use in, Japan at an early date in the Christian era. The Emperor Suinin (28 B.C.-A.D. 70), sent a present of three pieces of red silk to the King of Imna, one of the three kingdoms which shared Korea at that day. It was on a silk coverlet that the Princess Tachibana floated away on the rough Sagami waves, when she sacrificed herself for her husband in the year A.D. 110, and from an early date the silk industry became an important one, cocoons and teachers having both been originally obtained from China through Korea, China not having guarded her secret so effectively from her Eastern, as she did from her more distant Western, neighbours. Silk was through all subsequent generations the favoured material for both clothing and bedding of the upper classes, and the product in Japan whatever its extent may have been, was, it is evident from its import by Chinese and Dutch traders during the period of isolation elsewhere referred to in this volume, not sufficient to supply the national requirements.

Whatever may have been the quantity of its production, the excellency of its quality was very speedily perceived by European merchants on the opening of the country and it became an important feature in the export trade. At a very early stage 18,000 bales were exported, according to Sir Rutherford Alcock, in one year, and during the five years, 1865-70, the average annual export was 13,600 bales. During this period the Japanese producers were exceptionally favoured in one respect, as it was then that the *pebrine* plague became prevalent in both France and Italy, and in both countries the silk industry was almost ruined, so that for a time Japanese could obtain almost any prices they asked. Unfortunately, they killed the goose that laid the golden eggs. Italian and French graineurs flocked to Japan where, during several successive seasons, they bought healthy annual eggs, with which they gradually replaced their own extinct worms. The export for a few years became a large one, so large indeed that the Peninsular and Oriental S.S. found it profitable to run a special steamer for the transport of the *graineurs* and their cards, and the farmers in Japan reaped large profits.

share in this silk trade. It was only about 1634 that their transactions in it began to be considerable, when they imported about 314,000 gulden worth of it. In 1640, the figure advanced to 1,007,350 gulden, but this amount was not exceeded until 1662, when the value of the import was 1,079,000 gulden. In this year, the total Dutch imports were valued at no more than 1,518,783 gulden, and this value was not exceptional. Silk did not always represent as much as 70 per cent. of the total annual import, but it was responsible for 7,824,000 gulden of the 12,418,000 gulden worth of wares brought in by the Dutch between 1665 and 1672. Between 1686 and 1697, its value was only 1,690,000 in a total of nearly 7,000,000 gulden.

When the Dutch established themselves in Formosa (1624) they were able to get a supply of silk from the Chinese traders who frequented the island. In 1637, they opened up communications with Tonquin, and established a factory there eleven years later. About the same time or a little later, they acquired a base in Bengal ; and it was from Tonquin and Bengal that they drew their supplies of silk after 1662.

The Dutch are often accused of having depleted Japan of the noble metals. They were greatly impressed with the excellence of the Japanese coinage as soon as they became acquainted with it and, naturally enough, were eager to get as much as they could of it on advantageous terms. But they exported very little gold during their Hirado period, in spite of the fact that Kaempfer refers to this period as the "Golden Age" of their trade. Indeed, the total of their exports in commodities of all sorts cannot have exceeded a value of £2,500,000 between 1609 and 1640, and it was probably a good deal under that amount. From all that can be gathered only the very smallest fraction of this value went out in gold. Its export at that time had been exceedingly bad business. In the record of one isolated exchange transaction in Nobunaga's time,

But the end was disastrous. The exorbitant prices that were readily paid for eggs tempted the Japanese to devote attention mainly to their production, and part with the very best of their stock while neglecting the yarn and leaving themselves only eggs of inferior quality. The consequence was complete restoration of the industry in both France and Italy, when buyers of eggs no longer made their annual visits to Japan, the eggs on which so much labour had been spent became unsaleable, and the raw silk, reeled in Japan from inferior cocoons, showed a sad deterioration in quality from what it had been before the short-sighted policy of a people, who failed to understand their own best interests, produced its natural results. Had it not been for this, Japan might have obtained control of the silk market of the world. As it was, it required many years of careful cultivation and active Government supervision before her old standard of quality was restored.

we find that the ratio of gold to silver was as 1 to 9·5432. This was a special instance, but in 1613 we find Saris writing to his Directors that whereas the ratio of gold to silver was 1 to 12½ in Europe, it was 1 to 13 in Japan. At that date, the Portuguese in Macao could buy as much Chinese gold as they liked at ratios of 1 to 6 or 1 to 8, according to the quality of the metal. It thus actually paid the Chinese and Portuguese to bring gold to Japan and exchange it for silver, and there are authentic records of such transactions being carried through at a ratio of 1 to 14. About the actual amount of gold carried away by the Portuguese we have no authentic records, and the most plausible estimates are little better than guesses. Dr. Riess¹ roundly declares that there was absolutely no Portuguese export of gold from Japan, and makes very short work of Munsterberg's estimate of £3,800,000 and Geerts's still wilder guess at £59,500,000 for the whole period of Portuguese intercourse with Japan, and the probability is that Dr. Riess comes very near the truth.²

Thus, inasmuch as the export of gold was no paying speculation for the Dutch, they could not have been very much distressed when the Bakufu prohibited its export in 1641. When the Governor of Nagasaki told them in 1662 that they would thenceforth be free to deal with gold, the authorities at Batavia looked askance at the indulgence. The price set upon it was too high—about 20 per cent. above its actual exchange value in Japan—and for the first three years the Hollanders sent away only a little over 12,000 kobans. When the price was reduced, in 1668, about 114,000 kobans went out in that single year, and 336,000 in the course of the next four years. This rate was not maintained, and between 1662 and 1696 less than a million kobans in all were exported. The value of the koban is generally reckoned at two guineas each—although from Cocks's Diary it appears that the exchange value in his time (1613–23) was only 27s. This would mean a value of something like £2,000,000 at the most.

In 1696, there was a debasement of quite 30 per cent. in the intrinsic value of the coinage, and the Dutchmen then found they

¹ *Allerlei aus Japan*, vol. ii, p. 113.

² The mistakes generally arise from failure to grasp the fact that a "Ton of Gold" was merely a unit of reckoning for 100,000 gulden worth of anything. A ton of silver meant a value of 10,000 gulden, but this unit soon dropped out of use. As Riess shows, ignorance of this fact has confused Kaempfer's editors and commentators on one important occasion. *Allerlei aus Japan*, vol. ii, p. 107–10.

could dispose of the kobans only at a loss of 20 per cent. in Batavia, and of $24\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. on the Coromandel Coast, where they were chiefly utilized. But they had to take them, nevertheless, for the copper and other commodities tendered did not pay for the full volume of their annual imports. In 1704, the profits on these were $32\frac{1}{2}$ per cent., and this was a black year; usually they were over 50 per cent., and sometimes they ran up to 100 per cent., or beyond. So the loss of $24\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. on a few thousand kobans was not a serious item in the total value of the trade, and by skilful operations this loss could be made good in the long run. Between 1696 and 1707, the Dutch took away 150,623 of the debased kobans, worth not two guineas, but, at the outside, twenty-eight shillings. In 1710, there was a new issue of kobans worth only a guinea each. A decade later Yoshimune reformed the coinage and restored it to its pristine purity. The export of gold was finally prohibited in 1752. Occasional exports continued to that date, but in many years there is no reference in the books of the Factory to any transactions in gold. Dr. Riess calculates that in twenty years between 1711 and 1752 for which there are data, the value of the gold exported cannot have exceeded £200,000. In twenty-two years, where we have no mention of gold, there were probably no exports of it at all. Riess, on very good grounds, arrives at the conclusion that the total export of gold from Japan, from its discovery by the Portuguese down to its reopening to foreign intercourse in 1853, did not probably exceed £2,375,000 in actual value. Only a few individual pieces were taken to Europe, where the gold of Japan had no influence upon the market.

The statement made by Arai Hakuseki on this subject in his tract *Honchō Tsūyō Jiryaku* (Short Notes on the Circulation of Japanese Metals) do not bear investigation, although since its translation by Klapproth in 1828, the tract has been quoted as an unimpeachable authority by three generations of Western publicists. Writing in 1708 he says: "There go out of the Empire annually about 150,000 *koban*, or 1,500,000 in ten years." At that date the Chinese took away no gold from Japan, first because it would have been unprofitable, and in the second place, because its export was forbidden. The only possible exporters of Japanese *koban* at this time were, therefore, the Dutch. Between 1696 and 1707 their total export amounted to 150,623 pieces! According to Arai their exports for these twelve years must have amounted to about

1,800,000 pieces. Such was his approximation to accuracy in a matter he was especially detailed to investigate, and the data for which were easily at his disposal. When he deals with earlier Tokugawa times, he substitutes reckless guesses for laborious investigation.

As regards silver, the Dutch did export it in considerable quantities during the Hirado period (1609-40). The figures for several years are not available, but according to the accounts we have the total value of the capital was 4,060,000 gulden. Possibly this amount might, to be accurate, have to be nearly doubled. In 1668, the Dutch export of silver was stopped, but during their first twenty-seven years in Deshima they sent away about 12,000,000 gulden worth of silver in all. It is a curious incident that the Dutch must have put the ordinary Japanese subject to much greater inconvenience by their export of copper than by their export of the noble metals. This arises from the circumstance that, in ordinary buying and selling in Japan, gold was scarcely, if ever, and silver very rarely, used, the great medium of circulation being the copper coinage.¹

Early in the eighth century Japan began to have a copper coinage of her own, but the mint ceased operations about A.D. 960. Thenceforth, for more than six centuries, until 1587, Japan was dependent upon China for her medium of exchange, and her importations of Chinese copper coins were considerable. Hideyoshi re-established a Japanese mint, and, under the early Tokugawas, the Japanese mint-masters were very hard worked men. Presently, instead of importing copper coins, the Japanese began to export them in millions. During the period between 1609 and 1700 we have details for seventeen different years only, but in eleven of these special years, the Dutch carried away 140,000,000 copper "cash". In 1671 they exported 19 tons' weight, and in 1675, nearly 120 tons' weight of copper coins, while the value of the export in the three years 1672-4 is recorded as having been 250,000 gulden, which would probably mean between sixty and seventy millions of copper cash. No wonder that money should get scarce in Japan in spite of the assiduity of the Shōgunal mints! Naturally, it was only in occasional years, after the mints had been unusually busy, that the Dutch handled copper coin in this wholesale way. About 1668, Hideyoshi's Daibutsu began to be melted into

¹ For details see Dr. Munro's excellent work on *The Coins of Japan*.

“cash”, and the huge Dutch exports of 1671 to 1675 were really, in all probability, fragments of the Daibutsu.¹

This export of copper coins was merely an accidental ancillary to the Dutch trade in copper.² It was during their Deshima period that the red metal became an item of importance, and finally developed into the great staple of their export trade and became the sole consideration which prevented them from carrying out the intention to which they often gave expression to abandon their Deshima factory and to terminate their connexion with Japan. In Hirado they had not directed much attention to copper. In 1621 and the two following years they shipped about 1,100 piculs, possibly of a value of £2,500, but during the next decade no reference is made to it in the account books. In 1634 it was shipped in considerable bulk, and by 1637 its exports had risen to 20,450 piculs. The authorities then prohibited its further export. It again began to be a staple of trade in 1646, and an annual average of about 4,000 piculs were sent away during the next decade. In 1657, 14,100 piculs, and in 1664, 24,195 piculs were exported, and in 1698 as much as 29,370 piculs of a value of about £80,000 in a total return freight of £129,000. This was the highest figure ever reached, but in the preceding thirty years as much as 20,000 piculs of copper or more were shipped on eleven occasions. The total Dutch export of copper down to 1700 amounted to about 790,000 piculs. Prices varied, but £3 per picul seems to have been a fair average. Thus, the Dutch exports of copper were more valuable than their exports of gold in the seventeenth century and copper was exceedingly profitable, while gold was quite the reverse. It was round copper that the great battle raged between the Dutch and the Japanese authorities. The former were continually exerting themselves to get their supplies increased, while the Japanese, on the other hand,

¹ Those who can carry their memories back to the early seventies of the nineteenth century will not be surprised to learn that Hideyoshi's majestic image of Daibutsu suffered the vandalism of being converted into copper cash when they remember the great export which then took place of sweet toned and historic temple bells, which were deliberately broken up and sold as old copper at a price which made it an item of trade, returning a fair commercial profit, but the same vandalism does not appear in the case of the image. It was erected in 1612, long after Hideyoshi's death to take the place of one destroyed in the earthquake of 1596, and it in its turn was destroyed in another earthquake along with the great building which sheltered it, in 1666, two years before the melting process of its fragments begun. The image itself was 52 feet in height, and the roof of the building 150 feet. For the costly results of both on the fortunes of Hideyoshi's ill-fated son, *vide* Vol. II, p. 517 et seq.

² See the *Coins of Japan*, pp. 120–3. Kaempfer states that the Dutch did not ship copper coins “unless they were asked for at Tonquin or other places”.

were doing all they could to restrict these supplies. It will be well to grasp this point firmly—that all through the last century and a half of the Deshima factory, the great question that dwarfed everything else was this question of the amount of the copper export. Just as silk was for long the chief item of import, copper was the great staple of export, and remained so down to the reopening of Japan to unrestricted commercial intercourse with the outside world. The only other constant item of export that calls for remark was camphor. In 1621 and 1622, about 208 piculs, worth about £470, were shipped. From 1633, a certain amount of camphor went out every year, usually between 15 and 30 piculs, but sometimes as much as 50 piculs or a little over. The average price was a little higher than copper—about 13 taels per picul.

Ledgers and invoices and bills of lading have their uses no doubt but as literature they are not very entertaining. It is with great relief then that we can escape from these dry-as-dust documents, and turn our attention to themes with something of human interest about them. Only on one small additional point it may be well to go briefly into figures, for a clear idea of the cost of running the Dutch factory in Japan may obviate a few possible misconceptions. The first year in Deshima for which the accounts are complete was 1651, in which the maintenance expenses were 115,516 gulden, but in the following year they were only 76,309 gulden. Between 1653 and 1669, they varied from 55,727 gulden to 107,990 gulden. In 1670 they increased to 128,508 gulden, and during the rest of the century they never fell below that amount, while in 1686 they further rose to 196,696 gulden (£16,400). Between 1687 and 1700, the expenses of Deshima totalled £178,134, an average of about £14,000 a year. (It will be remembered that the net profit of the factory averaged between £54,000 and £55,000 per annum.) Kaempfer has given a brief analysis of the expenses of 1686 and 1687, and a perusal of his very interesting chapter on contemporary Dutch trade will give a fair idea of the numerous local claims upon the Deshima exchequer.

The first decade in Deshima had its anxious moments for the Hollanders—indeed, at one time they were in serious danger of expulsion from Japan. For this they had to thank the march of political events in Europe, and the enterprise of the great Governor-General, Van Diemen. Every schoolboy knows that Tasmania was originally called Van Diemen's Land by Tasman in honour of

the Governor-General who fitted out the expedition of three vessels that discovered that island in 1642. It is also common knowledge that, in the course of the same voyage, Tasman discovered what is now New Zealand, and the Gulf of Carpentaria, and charted the North and West coasts of Australia. It is not so widely known that he was the first European navigator to sight the Bonin islands, which he did in his first great cruise in 1629. In that year, his objectives were the fabled Islands of Gold and Silver, lying about 450 miles off the east coast of Japan in about Lat. $37\frac{1}{2}^{\circ}$ N.¹

On that occasion Tasman had cruised in his two small vessels for six months, lost thirty-eight of his crew of ninety men, and had at last reached the Dutch settlement in Formosa in dire distress. In spite of this experience he did not abandon all belief in the legend of the island El Dorado off the coast of Japan. In 1643, another expedition of two ships, the *Breskens* and the *Castricum*, with a complement of 116 men, was dispatched on the quest.

The two vessels were separated in a severe storm off Shikoku. Captain Vries in the *Castricum* continued his voyage, and ultimately coasted the great island of Yezo, discovered the southern Kuriles, Iturup and Urup, of which he took possession for the Company, and landed on the east coast of Saghalin in Lat. 49° . Then, baffled by fogs and foul winds, Vries turned to the south-east on a fruitless search for the fabled Islands. On his return journey he met the *Breskens*, which he believed had foundered off Shikoku, and both ships then made for Taiwan (Formosa) which they reached on 18th November, 1643. The *Breskens* (Captain Schaep) had in fact followed almost the same course, and made the same discoveries as her sister-ship, though Schaep and nine of his men had landed for a supply of provisions on the north-east coast of Japan, where they were arrested, and ultimately conveyed to Yedo to be examined.² The Japanese were convinced that they were not Dutchmen. Shortly before this, five Jesuits from Manila were arrested in Chikuzen and were also sent to Yedo to be examined by Inouye, Chikugo no Kami.³ The arrival of the ten

¹ In the previous volume reference was made to the Spanish attempt to locate this El Dorado.

² For details and "sources", see Nachod's excellent book *Die Beziehungen der Niederländischen Ostindischen Kompagnie zu Japan im 17ten Jahrhundert*, pp. 306-11.

³ Details will be found in Charlevoix or Page's, or any other ecclesiastical History of Japan, the latest of which is *Le Catholicisme au Japon par L. Deplacé, S.J.* 1910. Sir Ernest Satow's remarks on pp. 42-62 of vol. i, pt. iv, *T.A.S.J.*, deal with this incident among others from the Japanese standpoint.

Dutch prisoners created a great stir in Yedo, and it was only on the appearance of Elserack, the Director of Deshima, that Schaep and his companions were set free after five months' detention. It happened that the Hollanders had laid themselves seriously under suspicion at the beginning of the same year (1643). In 1640, Portugal at last succeeded in throwing off the Spanish yoke, under which she had been restive for the preceding sixty years, and the Dutch very promptly came to an understanding with the new royal house of Braganza. In January, 1643, Overwater, the Deshima Factor, communicated information of this event to the Yedo authorities, and great was their displeasure thereat. At his audience with the Rōjū on 17th December, 1643, Van Elserack was informed that, in future, whenever a Dutch vessel touched anywhere in Japan, she must at once establish her nationality and furnish the local authorities with the number and names of the ship's company, whereupon her immediate needs would receive attention. If these formalities were not complied with, the vessel would be seized, her crew put to death without respect of persons, and the Deshima director held responsible. The Hollanders were also instructed to inform the authorities at once if they heard anything, in Holland or in the Indies, of Romish priests being dispatched to Japan, or of any Spanish or Portuguese projects against the empire.

The Portuguese embassy of 1647 to Japan has been mentioned in the preceding volume. *En route* the vessel touched at Batavia, and the Dutch furnished it with supplies, a pilot, and a few men. This much the Japanese learned from the Portuguese themselves, and in the following year the Dutch presents were rejected, and no audience accorded the mission to Yedo. To make matters worse, in that very year (1648), the Peace of Westphalia had put an end to the eighty years' strife between Spain and the United Provinces. In view of all these events, the Dutch thought it well to resort to the extraordinary step of sending an embassy direct from Holland, but an ambassador was not easily found. The Japanese despised merchants, so a nobleman was desirable as head of the mission, but no nobleman was willing to accept the charge. The Company, therefore, fell back upon a Doctor Juris, in the person of Peter Blokhovius, then Rector of a Latin school, whose stipend was fixed at 80 gulden per month, not a very expensive ambassador. On arriving at Batavia he received full written

instructions—probably drafted by Caron—but he was so ill that it was feared that he might not live to reach Japan. In case of his death, his body was to be embalmed, conveyed to Nagasaki, and there shown to the Japanese authorities, while the second in the mission, Frisius, was to proceed to Yedo. Blokhovius actually did die on the voyage, and his entrails were put in a casket and buried at sea to the accompaniment of the due allowance of guns. At Nagasaki, after his remains had been inspected by the Japanese authorities, he was accorded a second funeral on a sumptuous scale. This is of importance because on being interested in Deshima, the Dutch were told that their dead must not be interred in Japanese soil, but taken out of the harbour and buried at sea, while the old Dutch cemetery in Hirado was desecrated and laid waste in 1642. In 1654, a Hollander died on the annual journey to Yedo, and, in that year the Governor of Nagasaki assigned a plot on the Inasa hill to be used as a cemetery.

Frisius and his colleagues were successful in their mission. On 20th January, 1650, the envoy was informed that the Shōgun accepted the explanation regarding the Portuguese mission of 1647, only it would be well for the Dutch to be more careful in future. As Iyemitsu was really ill at the time, Frisius waited in vain to be received in audience, and at last he left Yedo on 16th April, 1650, carrying very substantial return presents with him. This mission of 1649-50 is remarkable inasmuch as it constitutes a landmark in the history of Japanese medicine. In Hirado days most Dutch vessels carried surgeons—in Cocks's *Diary* we have references to several of them, as well as to at least five English surgeons—and it is clearly established that the Dutch surgeons were consulted occasionally by Japanese doctors. In Kaempfer's, Thunberg's, and Siebold's times, it was taken as a matter of course that the Dutch surgeon should accompany the Deshima directors on their visits to Yedo, but it was only in 1649-50 that the precedent for this concession was established. Dr. Caspar Schamberg then accompanied the mission, and was retained in the Shōgun's capital for six months after Frisius had left on the return journey. In Japanese works we sometimes meet with mention of the "Kaspar school"; and very erroneous statements about "Kaspar", and the date and duration of his stay in Yedo have been accepted as authentic. He had as companions, Byleveld and two others, who were "requisitioned by the Japanese authorities

as instructors in artillery and other arts ". On this occasion three interpreters from Deshima accompanied the mission to Yedo. Until then, usually only one went. In 1655, two were required and thenceforth this was the minimum. In 1659, the route of the mission was changed. Instead of proceeding from Nagasaki to Shimonoseki by boat, as it had hitherto done, it followed all the overland route through Kyūshū which Kaempfer and Siebold have described so minutely.

During the first two decades the personnel of the Deshima factory seems to have been more numerous than it was in Kämpfer's time. In 1660, including the "black Dutchmen", or slaves, there were as many as eighteen on the island, among them being a boy and a girl, the children of Indyk, the chief of the Factory for that year. Next year there was quite an invasion of females and children—refugees from the Dutch establishments in Formosa, then on the point of falling into the hands of the great Chinese captain, Koxinga. This event makes it advisable to consider the march of events in China in so far as they affected the Dutch in the Far East, especially in so far as the Chinese were their rivals in the trade of Japan.

During the later years of the Ming Dynasty—from 1552 to 1643—all direct intercourse with Japan had been strictly prohibited by the Nanking Government. Yet, notwithstanding, after the Korean war not a few Chinese seem to have made their way to the Island Empire. Smuggling craft came from the Chinese ports themselves, while quite an extensive junk trade was carried on between Manila, Annam, and Tonquin, and the Japanese harbours. We meet with notices of Chinese vessels at Kagoshima and Tomari and other havens in Satsuma, as well as at Kuchinotsu, Karatsu, Hakata, Shimonoseki, and even at Sakai. But their chief resorts, early in the seventeenth century, were Nagasaki and Hirado. In the former we hear of them receiving permission in 1602, to bury their dead in the grounds of Go-shin-ji at Inasa, while in Cocks's *Diary* we hear frequently of Whaw, "Captain" of the Chinese in Nagasaki, and of his brother Andrea Dittis, living in Hirado, as the head of all the Chinese in Japan. In Hirado, in Cocks's time, there appears to have been quite a considerable Chinese colony. In Nagasaki we learn that his contemporary, the Governor, Hasegawa, allowed the townspeople to lodge the Chinese and charge a ten per cent. commission on their cargoes, *as an inducement for them to*

give up their Christianity. In 1633, this commission of ten per cent. was reduced to one-half. A year or two previously (between 1629 and 1632) the entrances and clearances of the Chinese junks had begun to be registered; in 1636, Nagasaki was declared to be the only Japanese harbour open to the Chinamen, and in the same year "the inspection of the cargo imported in Chinese junks was introduced". From this it becomes evident that the Yedo bureaucracy had contrived to monopolize the whole of the Chinese trade three years before the expulsion of the Portuguese and five years before they monopolized the whole foreign trade of Japan by the removal of the Hollanders from Hirado to Deshima.

In Nagasaki the Chinese for a long time enjoyed a large amount of personal liberty. They could move about freely in the town, and down to 1666, they could lodge wherever they pleased. In that year their place of residence was restricted to the street (or rather block) whose turn it was to control the Chinese trade for the year.¹

In some respects the Japanese authorities treated the Chinese with even less consideration than was accorded to the Dutch. On very rare occasions, the latter were put under restraint for smuggling or other offences. But none of them ever suffered the capital penalty. In 1644, we hear of six Chinese being summarily executed, while fifteen more were imprisoned and forty others banished. They had been detected carrying letters to Macao and Cambodia, presumably to Christians there. This event happened at the very beginning of the renewal of the legitimate trade between China and Japan. Three years later, in 1647, about thirty junks arrived in Nagasaki, duly sanctioned by the Manchu Government, but these represented a mere fraction of the Chinese shipping then frequenting Nagasaki. In 1639, as many as ninety-three junks entered the port, the majority of which carried the flag of the "pirate" Iquan—even then a great thorn in the flesh to the Dutch. To get a clear understanding of the situation, it is necessary

¹ Certain blocks took it in turn to control the Chinese trade from year to year. Bidders sent in their tenders to the *Otona* or Head man of the Ward, and the average of the three highest tenders was taken as a fixed rate for the wares. The *machi-doshiyori* (street-elders) reported the price to the Governor; it was then officially notified to the Chinese who were at liberty to take their cargoes back, if they were dissatisfied. In 1672, the system of general tendering was abolished, and twelve members of the guild-merchants of the five Shōgunal cities were chosen to tender on behalf of the merchants.

to cast a brief glance upon the recent course of events in the Middle Kingdom.

During the last century the Ming Dynasty, which had ruled China from the capital at Nanking since 1365, had been waning in power and prestige. About the time of the arrival of the Portuguese in Japan they had proved impotent to protect the sea-board from the ravages of Japanese pirates, while in 1542, the Tartar Zenta invaded Shensi, and actually threatened the capital itself. Some thirty years later this Zenta was bought off with a bribe. He was made a prince of the Empire, and accorded certain commercial privileges, and yet a few years after received a grant of land in Shensi. A generation or so later these Tartars of Shensi, chafing under Chinese misgovernment, rose in revolt, pushed on into China, and routed the force sent to crush them; and three years after, in 1619, they gained another great victory which made them masters of Liaotung. In 1620, their chieftain, Teen-ning, declared himself independent, and, establishing his capital at Moukden in 1625, there consolidated his power for greater efforts. Under the last Ming Emperor, Tsang-ching (1627-44), China was one seething chaos of disorder and rebellion; and of the rebel chiefs, Le Tsze-ching became so formidable that he was able to overrun most of the north and seize Peking. When the news of this disaster reached the general commanding on the Liaotung frontier he at once concluded peace with the Manchus and engaged their help to crush the formidable insurgent. They at once entered China, routed the force Le sent to oppose them, and marched on Peking (whence Le meanwhile withdrew after firing the Imperial Palace), and, overtaking the retreating army, cut it to pieces. Thereupon things followed the course that might have been expected. The Manchus, once firmly established in Peking, refused to retire, and, making that city their capital and declaring the ninth son of Teen-ning Emperor, they laid claim to the whole of China. What contributed to open the way to this claim was that Tsung-ching, the last Ming sovereign, had committed suicide on hearing of the capture of Peking by Le in 1642. The Mandarins at Nanking had indeed chosen an Imperial prince of Ming stock to ascend the throne, but in 1644, Nanking also fell into the hands of the Manchus, and only the south-eastern coast provinces remained to be reduced. Here, however, the resistance was vigorous and protracted, and one unexpected development of the strife was the serious disaster it brought upon the Dutch.

The story, which can only be briefly outlined here, is one of the most romantic in the annals of the Far East. Incidents in it furnished the greatest of Japanese dramatists, Chikamatsu, with the materials for his masterpiece *Kokusenya Kassen*, or the *Battles of Koxinga* (1715), which, after the lapse of nearly two centuries, is still played by the theatrical troupes of Tokyo and Ōsaka. Among Cocks's Chinese contemporaries in Hirado we hear of a certain "Iekquam" who "came from Cort" and brought him "1 barso wyne, 170 egges". This was doubtless that Iquon who was soon to become so notorious as a pirate and—a sea-power. This man, originally a poor tailor, had gone to Macao and there taken service with the Portuguese, by whom he was made a convert and baptized as "Nicholas". He soon found an opportunity for proceeding to Japan as a petty trader, and, settling at Hirado he there married a Japanese wife, by whom (in 1624) he became the father of Koxinga, destined to be one of the most famous men of the time. Henceforth Iquon or Chung-Chilung, or Tei-shi-ryo, or Nicholas—for the adventurer was a man of many names—prospered in his ventures exceedingly, and before he was an old man he had become the richest merchant in China. A band of pirates had established themselves in Formosa, and, being elected chief of these freebooters, Iquon took toll of all the junks that sailed the China Sea. At the date of the capture of Peking by the Manchus his fleet numbered no fewer than 3,000 vessels. Master of this overwhelming sea power, Iquon proved a terrible thorn in the side of the Tartar conquerors, and they thought it well to buy him off. He did, it is said, accept a Manchu princess as a reward for his conversion, but he soon returned to his allegiance to the Mings—only, however once again to prove himself a turn-coat. On the second occasion the offer of a general's command was the bribe that seduced him. When he went on shore he was very civilly received by the Manchu commander; but on wishing to return to his ships he was politely urged to visit Peking. Once in the capital, he was thrown into prison—and kept there till his death.

Meanwhile the command had devolved upon his son, the young Koxinga, who for years held Fukhien and parts of the surrounding provinces against all the numerous expeditions sent against him. In 1658 he sent a mission to Yedo to invoke Japanese aid, but it was no part of the policy of the Tokugawas to embroil themselves in the affairs of other countries. About a year before

this he led an expedition of 170,000 men against Nanking, and had conquered all obstacles and forced his way to the very gates of that capital when he was foiled mainly because of dissensions among his own officers. This miscarriage had the effect of driving him back upon the coast belt and the sea, on which the only opposition he had to dread was that of the Hollanders, who had made league with the Tartars. The latter now ordered all the seaboard villages and towns to be burned to the ground and the country laid waste, and forbade the people under pain of death to live within three leagues of the coast. These measures compelled Koxinga to cast about for a new and better base of operations. The fertile island of Formosa seemed especially suited for this, and even long before this he had been meditating its conquest. It is perhaps unnecessary to remark that at this date Formosa formed no part of the Chinese Empire. Down to 1624 the history of the island lies in obscurity. We know that some Japanese rovers had established themselves in the north, that Iyeyasu had vainly tried to establish relations with its inhabitants in 1609, and that the son of Tôan, Regent of Nagasaki,¹ had been dispatched to conquer it in 1613, but that his squadron had been wrecked on the way. Ten years after this latter incident, upon their disastrous repulse from Macao, the Dutch established themselves in the Pescadores ; but on being notified by the Chinese that their presence there was objectionable while Formosa was entirely at their disposal, they transferred their factory to Anping, on the opposite coast, and there built three forts, of which Zeelandia was the chief. This was in 1624, and two years later the Spaniards from Manila erected a fort near Kelung in the North, whence, however, they were driven by the Hollanders in 1642. At the time of the occupation of Anping in 1624, there were several thousand Japanese and about an equal number of Chinese settlers in Formosa, but as the restrictive edicts of 1636 caused the return of most of the Japanese, the Dutch found themselves alone with the natives and the Chinese. The latter increased so rapidly that the capitation tax levied on them soon brought in as much as 200,000 guilders ; and at last, fancying their numbers equal to the effort, they rose against the Hollanders and tried to expel them. In this attempt they were defeated with great slaughter ; for the natives, who hated them heartily, rallied

¹ For an account of this person *vide* Vol. II, p. 609, where he is more correctly described as "Deputy Governor" of Nagasaki.—J. H. L.

in support of the Dutch and wreaked a fell revenge for the cruelties they had endured at the hands of the Chinamen. These natives appear to have been on very good terms with the Dutch, who, strange to say, strove strenuously to convert them to Christianity. As Protestant missionaries were then unknown, ministers in the pay of the Government were sent to the work, and so successful were they that we are told before 1650 "5,900 East Indians in the Isles of Formosa had accepted the Christian belief". One feature of this propaganda was the establishment of schools in which the use of the Dutch language was compulsory.

Even by 1650, Formosa was regarded by the Dutch East India Company as one of its most valuable possessions. Apart from its own great natural resources, it was all-important by reason of its geographical and strategical position. It might very well have developed into what Hong-Kong is nowadays—the great receiving and distributing centre of Far Eastern trade, and have been invaluable as a base for the armaments with which the Dutch fondly believed they were yet to capture Macao and Manila. With these two great entrepôts in its hands, the empire of the Netherlands-India Company would have been a splendid one indeed, and so powerful that the Japanese underlings in Nagasaki might have soon been driven to reconsider and revise their attitude towards its representatives and officials.

All these fair prospects were wrecked, as Siebold says and shows, by "inexcusable blunders and flagitious intrigues" among the Hollanders themselves. As early as 1646, it is said that warning was sent from Japan to Batavia of possible danger to Formosa from the Chinese "pirates", and six years later (1652) a Jesuit, just arrived from China, asserted that it would be well to give heed to the warning—advice that was further commended by the Chinese insurrection in the island in that very year. In 1654-5, there were fresh rumours of disquieting import; in the next year, Koxinga forbade any more Chinese to pass to Formosa, while in 1657, indications and reports were so ominous that the Governor of Taiwan made Zeelandia and the other forts ready for an attack, and sent to Batavia for assistance. Koxinga, however, apprised of all this, contrived to disarm the suspicions of the Hollanders and to lull them into a treacherous sense of security. Admiral Van der Lahn was indeed dispatched in command of a fleet from Batavia in July, 1660, with a commission to attack Macao in case

Formosa was in no danger, and as the glory and gold to be won from this latter enterprise blinded him to everything else, he took Governor Coyett's refusal to allow him to proceed against the Portuguese settlement in the Canton river so much amiss that he returned with his squadron to Batavia, there to spread calumnies against Coyett and to get all the measures taken for the defence of Formosa revoked as unnecessary. And meanwhile Koxinga had landed in the island !

At daybreak on 31st April, 1661, his fleet appeared off Taiwan, ran between Forts Zeelandia and Provintia into the spacious harbour, and while a number of his vessels anchored between the two forts and interrupted their communications, the rest, with the assistance of the resident Chinese, disembarked the troops and the material of the expedition. The whole of this was the work of two short hours. The scanty garrison of Zeelandia could do little against a force of over 20,000 men, and, after some gallant efforts in the open, had to retire behind their walls. In the combat with the hostile fleet the Dutch ship *Hector* was blown up, while the other three vessels then in harbour succeeded in fighting their way to the open sea, carrying with them a good proportion of the effective force of the defenders. Koxinga, now reinforced by 25,000 of the Chinese settlers, summoned the forts to surrender, and on being offered a lordly ransom he made answer that it was not the treasures of the Dutch but the possession of Formosa he wanted—he even offered the garrison free transport to Batavia with all their goods and munitions of war. If Koxinga had pressed the attack at once, the forts must have fallen ; but he delayed to do so, and meanwhile the defenders found time to strengthen their position. On the 25th May, the besiegers attempted to storm the fort under the fire of twenty-six guns they had got into position—without any protection for the gunners, however—on the preceding night, but the Dutch musketry rolled back the assailants, and in a desperate sortie the Hollanders even succeeded in spoking the Chinese guns. A few days later Koxinga thought it expedient to convert the siege into a blockade, and devoted his attention to the reduction of the rest of the island.

At Batavia, meanwhile, the calumnies of Van der Lahn and his coterie had had their effect, and on 21st June, 1661, Advocate-Fiscal Clenk was dispatched to supersede Coyett in his office. Then, just two days later, the *Maria*, one of the three vessels that

had fought their way out of Taiwan harbour,¹ arrived with intelligence of Koxinga's descent. The intriguers were now unmasked, Coyett's recall was cancelled, and Caeuw was sent to the relief of Zeelandia. Clenk had meanwhile arrived there, to find, of course, to his utter surprise, the harbour filled with a hostile fleet, Provintia in the hands of the enemy (it had fallen on 4th May) and Zeelandia blockaded. He sent Coyett the dispatch from the Batavia Administration, and announced himself as his successor; but instead of complying with urgent entreaties to land and assume the duties of his office, he sailed off to safe Japan, where he posed as Governor of Taiwan, and allowed himself to be laden with attentions and honours. The relief squadron under Caeuw arrived off Taiwan on 12th August, but adverse winds compelled it to make for the Pescadores,² whence it returned on 10th September, and, running into the harbour, anchored under the guns of Zeelandia. The Hollanders now assailed the Chinese both on land and water, but a contrary wind frustrated the effort of the fleet, while the sortie by the garrison of the fort proved disastrous. Then, just at this juncture, came offers of assistance from the Manchus, and Caeuw, exceedingly anxious to get away from so unpleasant and unhealthy a locality, found an excuse to do so in the advisability of proceeding to arrange matters with the Viceroy of Fukhien. He proceeded to the Pescadores, and thence he steered for—the Company's Factory in Siam! Then he returned to Batavia, and ended up his achievements with a glowing official report. Although thus deserted and in the direst straits, the gallant Coyett and his men still held out. At last Koxinga, apprised of the extremity of the garrison by deserters, opened three batteries against the fort and stormed the Utrecht redoubt, whence he could command Zeelandia, and then Coyett, constrained to accept the honourable terms of capitulation that were again offered him (1st February, 1662), withdrew with the remnant of the garrison to Batavia. The reward he received from the Company for his services was two years in jail, after which he was banished to Banda, whence, after twelve years, he was allowed

¹ The other two appear to have made for Nagasaki.

² The S.W. monsoon would have been blowing at its fullest force at this time, and the heavy sea on the bar opposite the two forts, where Anping now is, would possibly have prevented any communication with the shore, not to speak of entering the harbour. At that season of the year, even steamships in the present day have frequently to run from this anchorage for shelter to the Pescadores.—
J. H. L.

to return through the exertions of his children and friends in Holland, who succeeded in interesting the Prince of Orange in his favour.¹

In the following year, 1663, the Company, in concert with the Manchu Government, made a strenuous attempt to recover Formosa; but the expedition was an utter failure. Two of the three vessels that escaped from Anping when the *Hector* was blown up, made for Japan. One of these the *Gravelende* put in at Keelung, and took on board all the Dutch residents there to the number of 170. Among these there were three Dutch ladies, sixteen children, and some female slaves, who on the arrival of the vessel at Nagasaki, were all permitted to take up their quarters in Deshima. Among the refugees was the Preacher, Marcus Masius, and during his stay on the island he baptized an infant, and married a Dutch widow to one of the staff of the Factory, both the religious ceremonies being celebrated in the presence of the Otona and the Japanese interpreters. What makes the incident still more remarkable is the circumstance that just about this time a hundred Japanese Catholics were executed at Nagasaki for nothing but their faith.²

¹ Although the subsequent history of Formosa does not concern us here, it may be worth while to cast a passing glance upon the fortunes of the royal house established there by the semi-Japanese Koxinga. Koxinga demanded tribute from the Philippines, and the result was the great Chinese massacre there in 1662. He died in the following year at the age of 39, and was succeeded by his eldest son, Ching King Mai (Teikei) who regained the Pescadores, repulsed a Chinese expedition in 1664, and invaded the mainland in 1674, and 1678. On his death at the age of 34 in 1681, his son found himself so weakened by the Tartar recapture of the Pescadores and the amnesty the new dynasty offered to all who would submit, that he surrendered Formosa to the Tartar General and went to Peking, where he was made a Duke. At the same time (1683) Formosa was incorporated with the Province of Fukhien. It has been the fashion to write of Koxinga as a pirate. As a fact he was one of the romantic heroes of Far Eastern history, a gallant and capable sailor, a tactician, a strategist and a born leader of men who to the very last carried on a hard-fought war in endeavouring to save the throne of his sovereign and the liberty of his country from the yoke of the alien Manchu invaders. Driven from the mainland of China he took possession of Formosa from which, after having overcome a very stout resistance, he drove the Dutch, who had had a prosperous settlement there for nearly forty years, in 1662. His purpose was to hold Formosa as a base from which he could harry the conquerors of China, but his early death soon afterwards put an end to all his great schemes. The story of his life and of the Dutch settlement in Formosa, which he destroyed, is fully described in *Formosa under the Dutch*, by the Rev. W. Campbell, a very able work by a missionary of the Presbyterian Church of England.—J. H. L.

² In Valentyn's *Oud en Nieuw Oost-Indien*, we meet with reference to another Dutch Preacher being in Deshima about 1682. Kaempfer doubtless was acquainted with this gentleman's account of the situation; at all events both Kaempfer and this minister make use of the same Virgilian quotation in a similar context. The minister is wroth over the indignities to which the Dutch mission were forced to submit at the Shōgun's court, and over the absolute lack of all religious ministrations in the Factory and on board the Dutch ships. It is connected with this that

The loss of Formosa was then of much more serious moment to the Hollanders than the general reader may conceive it to have been. It is bootless to urge that they could still console themselves with the possession of the rich island of Java, for at that date Java was not in their possession. All that time, and down to 1705, all that they held of it was Batavia and a few exiguous strips of territory around that settlement. In 1662, Formosa was the most extensive appanage of the Company beyond the Cape of Good Hope, and might well in time have become the chief base of its power. It is not extravagant to assume that the events of 1661-2 exercised a far-reaching influence upon the subsequent course of Far Eastern history, and prevented very important changes in the political map of the Eastern Pacific.

Naturally enough, in Japan the Dutch lost seriously in prestige in consequence of this disaster to their arms. Some time later on, by way of reprisals, they attacked a large Formosan junk with a crew of about three hundred men, and disabled her,

“ So that although she drove for thirteen days after the attack, yet not above nine of the whole company saved their lives. Upon this heavy complaints were made by the Chinese to the Government of Nagasaki, and with so good an effect that 27,000 taels damages were assigned to them out of our treasury. Some time after, about the year 1672, one of our ships called the *Kuyenberg*, having unfortunately stranded upon the coast of Formosa, the ship's company was barbarously murdered and the whole cargo taken possession of by the Chinese subjects of Koxinga ; whereupon we made our complaints before the very same Court against this act of hostility, but with so little success that, far from having any damages assigned us, we could not obtain the restitution of so much as one farthing.”

From this, among other things, we may infer the Dutch in Nagasaki soon found themselves confronted with a Chinese competition from the dominion that had just been reft from them. But this was not all.

During the first twenty years in Deshima the successive chiefs of the Factory had to expend a great deal of ink over two questions in particular. The first of these was the chicanery of the interpreters ; the second was the problem of private trade on the part of the officials of the Company. Both questions were closely connected with each other.

he quotes Virgil's *Quid non mortalia pectora, cogis auri sacra fames ?* But the degradation of his compatriots in his opinion reaches its extreme in their lewdness with native prostitutes.

It is well to bear in mind that 300 years ago Portuguese was what English is at the present day—the *lingua franca* of traders in the Far East. A young Dutchman coming to Hirado did not as a rule devote much time to learning Japanese; but he had to become conversant with Portuguese as quickly as possible. We often find that Dutch vessels carried an instructor in Portuguese, and in this, as in so many other points, the Dutch East India Company was imitated by its English rival. Hundreds, if not thousands, of Japanese could speak Portuguese in those days, and so for the post of *jurebasso* or interpreter there was extensive competition. Consequently, an interpreter was not generally a person of any great consequence, for he could readily be replaced by another in case he proved incompetent or untrustworthy. With the removal of the Dutch to Deshima this state of affairs came to an end. Two interpreters were then assigned to the Dutch by the authorities, and these interpreters, though paid by the Dutch, were Government officials. Gradually the interpreters increased in number, and by Kaempfer's time they had grown into the great corporation so minutely described by him with many accusations of much evil and very little good in their character and conduct. In drafting the instructions for the mission of 1649–50, Caron described "the interpreters as long-headed people, whom you can trust, as they depend upon the Company". This was perhaps the greatest mistake Caron ever made in his life. Since he left Japan in 1640 there had been a complete reversal of the old order of affairs in this respect. So far from being the humble servants of the Dutch Factor, the interpreters were now his masters, and held him hopelessly at their mercy in scores of points. In 1652, Sterthemius, at the end of a long and bitter attack upon the official interpreters, wound up by informing the Batavian authorities that the situation had become unbearable. What it was forty years later on we learn from Kaempfer. Provided they did not go so far as actually to close their Japan Factory, the fretting and fuming of the Batavian authorities could have little influence upon the Deshima college of interpreters. It was mainly owing to the adroit manœuvres of these interpreters that Deshima became, and continued to be, the only one of its numerous factories where the Company was totally powerless to enforce one of its fundamental regulations. In common with the English Company, the Dutch East India Company had from the very first forbidden its officials to engage in any trade

on their own private account. In the Far East, this regulation was generally enforced with the greatest rigour. One of the chief duties of the lynx-eyed Fiscal in Batavia was to ferret out cases of clandestine trading, and to prosecute the offenders. In the old Hirado days, several chiefs of the Factory were called to account, and one of them at least (Neijen-roode) was stripped of all his gains, and otherwise punished. Of course, an officer with a salary of £100 per annum (this was the usual stipend attached to the post of Director in Hirado and Deshima) who had to supervise an annual turn-over of several hundreds of thousands of pounds might expect some indulgence if he took advantage of some of the scores of opportunities that presented themselves to turn an extra honest penny on his own account, but for peccadilloes of this sort, the Fiscal at Batavia showed no indulgence at all. His instructions on this point were rigorously imperative, and besides, he received a percentage of all fines and forfeits. In 1646-7, the Deshima Factor, Versteegen, received express orders to see to it that no private trade went on in Deshima. His efforts to check it were not very successful, and after reiterated instructions from headquarters, Sterthemius, in charge in 1651, moved rigorously in the matter, and got hopelessly beaten. The private trade was usually conducted with small men outside the great guilds of merchants that tendered for the Company's cargoes, and the suppression of all private trade would seriously injure their interests. Such, at least, was what the interpreters alleged they had been ordered by the Governors to tell the Factor, and they further told him that the private trade had to be regarded as legitimate. Of course, the pickings of the interpreters in it were not inconsiderable, inasmuch as they were intermediaries in all transactions. All that now remained for the Company to do was to regulate this private trade; we shall see presently how it stood in Kaempfer's time.

What Cocks called a "ring of rich usurers" from the Imperial towns had early in the century got the Portuguese silk under what was called the "Pancado". That guild merchant—for such it was—had been extremely anxious to place the Dutch in Hirado under the "Pancado" also, which means that they would either have had to sell their silk at a comparatively low official appraisement, or take it away again. For their first fourteen years in Deshima, the Dutch *were* under the Pancado, as were also their Chinese rivals. Bengal and Tonquin silk cost less than China

silk, although the Pancado was the same for all three, and the Dutch were therefore put to no very great inconvenience. Where the Chinese made but a small profit, or no profit at all, the Dutch now always disposed of their silk to considerable advantage. Shortly after 1650, the astute Chinese at first appeared with a few vessels only, and led the appraisers to believe that no more junks were coming that season. Then, when a high Pancado had been fixed, the other Chinese vessels came pouring in in squadrons. In 1655, as much as 1,400 piculs of unexpected silk were suddenly thrown into Nagasaki after a very high Pancado had been named. So ruinous would their losses have been that the Japanese Guild merchants refused to take delivery, and the Government had to buy the silk. From that time it continued to take this course, and the venerable Pancado thus received its *coup-de-grâce*.

Among the various vexatious regulations imposed upon the Dutch when they were interned in Deshima was one compelling them to carry back all the wares not disposed of at the great annual sale. This was enforced only for a year or two. Another compelled them to set sail on the 20th day of the ninth month, irrespective of the weather. This, too, was afterwards slightly amended. The thirty years, from 1641 onwards, are generally known as the period of "free trade", for, during that time, no restriction was placed upon the volume of imports and exports, and apart from the Pancado, the prices were not fixed by any official appraiser. In 1672, all this was suddenly changed, and the Dutch then found themselves subjected to the "Taxatic Handel" or, as the Japanese called it, the *Shihō Shōbai*. The Governor of Nagasaki, according to Kaempfer (who got his facts from Camphuysen, who was Director in Deshima in 1672):—

"Demanded samples and patterns of all the goods we imported for sale, in order to show them to persons who had some knowledge of their goodness and value"—really to ten selected members of the guild-merchant of the five Shōgunal towns—"to be by them taxed and estimated. Meanwhile, the merchants resorted to his palace, there to view the goods, and having resolv'd what goods they intended to buy, and in what quantity, the Governor without permitting us to be present, agreed with them, and sold them himself. The agreement being made, as may be easily imagined, for a price far below what we usually sold them at, he acquainted us with it, indulging us, however, so far as to give us the choice whether we would part with the goods for the price he had set upon them or else export them again . . . The price set upon our commodities after this manner was reduc'd every year, and we were necessitated rather to part with them for a small profit than

to export them with loss. They obliged us, into the bargain to take in payments for our goods the *Koban* (which we had hitherto taken for 59 or 60 Mas, and which is current among the natives only for 54 to 59) for 68. What was got by this way of dealing, as also the overplus of the prices set upon the goods, was called by them *Aidagin*, that is, the Middle money, and assign'd for the use and common benefit of the town of Nagasaki. In this condition it would have been impossible for us to stay in the country, and the continuation of the proceeding would have infallibly forced us to abandon our trade here."

At the time, the Dutchmen were convinced that it was Inaba, Mino no Kami (who was a member of the Rōjū from 1657 to 1681) that they had to thank for this ill turn of fortune. Caron had won great favour by the present of a candelabrum which was sent to Iyeyasu's shrine at Nikkō, where it may still be seen. Inaba, Mino no Sama, now wished to present a similar candelabrum to the neighbouring shrine of Iyemitsu, and requested the Dutch to procure it for him. When it arrived in 1666, the Governor of Nagasaki, not knowing the circumstances, selected it for inclusion among the annual presents to the Shōgun, and so it was by the Shōgun, and not by Inaba, that the candelabrum was sent to Iyemitsu's shrine.

"Mino," writes Kaempfer, "disappointed in his expectation, thought himself offended to the highest degree, and from that moment took such a hatred to the whole Dutch nation, as without a fatal and sufficient revenge he knew would be pursued, even after his, by his descendants and relations. The Japanese in general, when once they throw a hatred on a person, know how to conceal it for a long while, till a favourable opportunity offers to take revenge for the insults and affronts they have, or fancy to have receiv'd. In like manner, Mino watch'd the opportunity to put the revenge he meditated to take of us in execution, and it offer'd no sooner but he gladly embrac'd it and chastis'd us most severely."

The new Governor of Nagasaki, who introduced this "Taxatic Handel" was indeed a relative and dependent of Inaba, Mino no Kami, and the Dutch may have had good grounds for their accusation. Inaba had, however, no grudge against the Chinese, and yet, the Chinese were also subjected to the "Taxatic Handel" in the same year (1672) as the Dutch. Furthermore, Japanese publicists were getting anxious about the future of the mines, and several clan administrators were exerting themselves to "check imports" by endeavouring to produce as many of the imported wares as they could in Japan itself. Among others, Mitsukuni of Mito was striving with all his might to make his own fief as self-supporting and as self-sufficing as possible. And Mitsukuni's prestige was high

among contemporary scholars and thinkers, while his influence with the Bakufu was very strong. The import checking school of economists was rapidly growing in power, and in the following generation, the Shōgun Iyenobu and Arai Hakuseki became its leaders, while, a little later, the great Yoshimune was to leave nothing untried to render the empire independent of foreign supplies.

At this date (1672) we are told, the Chinese commerce with Nagasaki was worth nearly thrice as much as the annual Dutch trade. Not only had old Portuguese trade from Macao largely fallen into Chinese hands but Formosa now also maintained an active trade. Chinese craft also came from Tonquin and the coast-line right round to the Straits of Malacca. In 1656, an embassy appeared from Siam, but owing to some informality in the dispatches it carried, it was not allowed to proceed to Yedo. Yet the old trade with Siam went on, although in junks captained by Chinese. So steadily did this Chinese traffic increase, that we are told :—

In the two years of 1683 and 1684 there arrived as many as four hundred junks, “every junk with not less than fifty people on board, making for each year not less than 20,000 Chinese visitors.” “They came over,” writes Kaempfer, “when and with what number of people, junks, and goods they pleased. So extensive and advantageous a liberty could not but be very pleasing to them, and put them upon thoughts of a surer establishment, in order to which, and for the free exercise of their religion, they built three temples at Nagasaki, according to the three chief languages spoken by them (those of the northern, middle, and southern provinces), each to be attended by priests of their own nation to be sent over from China.”

Meanwhile the Dutch had been writhing under the “Taxatic Handel” and in 1682, they took the extreme step of sending to Yedo the draft of the original privileges they had received from Iyeyasu, accompanied by an intimation that they would abandon Deshima and the Japan trade if the present state of affairs was to meet with no remedy. This firm stand seemed to be effective. The “Taxatic Handel” system was abolished in 1685, but it is questionable whether the conditions substituted for it were not even more disadvantageous. Henceforth, the annual sales of imports were to be limited to a value of 300,000 taels (£75,000) and all goods of any one year’s importation remaining after that amount had been realized were to lie over in the storehouses till the next annual sale. At the same time a sort of *Pancado* was re-established and the annual export of copper was limited to

25,000 piculs (roughly speaking, 150 tons). And so matters stood in Kaempfer's time (1690–2).

From the very worthy but somewhat prosy Westphalian doctor, we get a most minute and most interesting account not only of the conditions of the trade but of the life in Deshima, which for some two centuries was one of the most peculiar plots on the face of this planet. In 1691–2, it had seven or eight permanent Dutch residents—or rather prisoners, for the chief and almost the only respect in which they differed from prisoners was that, while the latter were supported at the public expense, the Hollanders had to support not only themselves but a whole swarm of greedy, useless, loafing parasites as well. It is true that if they were anxious to keep down their obesity they had the run of the unoccupied portions of their three-acre island for exercise. They might take a turn at digging and delving in their little garden patch, or they might saunter along the 200 paces of the main street of sorry two-storied Japanese houses which ran across the middle of their domain or, if in an extra energetic mood, they might find a running track of 600 yards in the narrow path that skirted the four sides of their curved oblong. Although the stones on which this path rested were lapped by the salt-water all round, the prospect from it was neither very extensive nor very romantic, for it was enclosed with a palisade of:—

“pretty high deal boards, covered with small roofs, on the top of which is planted a double row of pikes like *chevaux de frise*, but the whole very weak and unable to hold out against any force. Some few paces off, in the water, are thirteen posts, standing at proper distances, with small wooden tablets at the top, upon which is written in large Japanese characters an order from the Governors strictly forbidding all boats or vessels, under severe penalties, to come within these posts or to approach the island.”

From their upper rooms in the two-storied buildings in which the Dutch resided, regaled by the various odours of the multifarious merchandise stored on the ground floors, they *could* see something besides the beautiful sky when they threw their paper windows open. But even then the view, although lovely, was not extensive, inasmuch as the narrow three-mile slit of water that formed the haven was everywhere hemmed in by wooded hills that swept up abruptly from the strand.¹

¹ The harbour of Nagasaki, with its picturesque wooded hills, rising abruptly almost from the beach is justly considered one of the most beautiful in the world,

During autumn Deshima was a fairly lively place, for then the annual ships arrived, the officers and crews were landed on the island, sales went on and cargoes were purchased. But on the sailing of the vessels after a two or three months' stay, nine or ten months had to be faced when the sole employment for most of the residents was the killing of time. The director, the secretary, and the doctor disposed of about a third of this period in the yearly embassy to Yedo ; but for their companions of lower rank almost the only travelling that could be done was up and down the main street and round the inside of the palisades of Deshima. The occasions on which these journeys could be lengthened were at once rare and expensive. Kaempfer tells us :—

“ The few Dutchmen who remain at Deshima after the departure of our ships are permitted once or twice a year to take a walk into the adjacent country, and in particular to view the temples about Nagasaki. This liberty is oftener granted to physicians and surgeons under pretence of going to search for medicinal plants. However, this pleasure-walk falls very expensive to us, for it must be made in company of the *Otona* (Japanese Headman of Deshima), of our ordinary interpreters and other officers in our service, who are handsomely treated by us at dinner in one of the temples of the Shinshiu sect ; and we must on this occasion, and that with seeming satisfaction, see our purses strongly squeezed for the most common civilities shown us by the priests of that temple.

“ The festival of Suwa, the patron and protector of Nagasaki, falling just upon the time when our ships lie in the harbour, our people are permitted to view this solemnity from a scaffold, built at our own expense, our presence being not only thought honourable to their saint, but, what they value still more, advantageous to many of his worshippers. It may easily be imagined that our train and guards are not lessened upon such an occasion. On the contrary, we are examined and searched four times before we come to the place where the solemnity is performed, and again counted over several times with all possible accuracy when we go up and when we come down from the scaffold, as if it were possible for some of us to slip out between their fingers. Our slaves also are admitted to this solemnity as black Dutchmen.

“ Another day is set apart for viewing five large boats which must be constantly kept at the expense of the Dutch East India Company for the lading and unlading of our ships. This is again done with the same numerous retinue, which we afterwards entertain at dinner at one of the neighbouring temples.”

There are many other passages in which Kaempfer vents his spleen at the sponging and extortionate proclivities of the Nagasaki

and the view from the old Dutch settlement right down the whole length of the harbour to the islands which cover its entrance, was picturesque in the extreme.—
J. H. L.

underlings and their protégés and on-hangers indulged at the expense of individual Dutchmen. In his time, as has been said, there were seven or eight Hollanders on the island, and the common mess of these seven or eight men gave employment to one cook at 150 taels, another at 140 taels, and another at 130 taels—altogether 420 taels, or over £100 per annum—two grooms of the kitchen, an apprentice or two, usually the cook's sons, and several labourers to carry water.

“ This is the reason that our table is so very expensive, since the best part of the year, the time of our sale only excepted, there are actually more cooks than people to provide victuals for. And yet we have strict commands from the Governors of the town not in the least to alter this number, nor to get our victuals dressed by our own people . . . Even the cloth and stuffs which are brought over for our own use must be delivered into the custody of the *Ottona* till one of their own tailors, sworn for this purpose, cuts them, allowing each of us just so much as will make him a good suit.”

Then they had a useless gardener and some other menial servants thrust upon them, among the latter being a man to look after the few cattle they kept—the males among which were constantly :—

“ getting secretly poisoned or having their legs broken in the night to prevent their multiplying too much, which 'tis apprehended would turn to the disadvantage of the commissioners of victualling.”

These latter worthies were evidently a pilfering lot. They consisted of about seventeen housekeepers of Nagasaki with their families, and, having a close monopoly, they made the Hollanders

“ pay at least twice or thrice as much as things are sold for at the market. They also furnish our people on demand with courtesans ; and, truly, our young sailors, unacquainted with the virtue of temperance, are not ashamed to spend five rix dollars (£1) for one night's pleasure, and with such wenches, too, as a native of Nagasaki might have for two or three *mas* (1s. or 1s. 6d.), they being none of the best and handsomest ; nor do the masters of the women get more than a tael (5s.). The rest is laid up in the cash of this company for their own private use, or, as they pretend, to hire proper servants to conduct the damsels over to our island.”

But all this petty contemptible sponging and cozening amounted to little when we turn our attention to the wholesale fashion in which the East India Company itself was exploited. Every Japanese official employed in connexion with Deshima had to be paid either directly or indirectly (often directly, but still oftener in both ways) by the lessees of the island. And this Beadledom was

veritably like the Devils that entered into the swine, for its name truly was Legion. Let us briefly glance at some of the items in the list, bearing in mind that for nine months of the year there were just seven Hollanders to be looked after and restrained from eating up Nagasaki or attempting the conquest of Japan. In the first place eight interpreters, eight or ten apprentice interpreters, over 100 house-interpreters. Then the headman of the ward of Deshima, his deputy, the night-watch under him, the five secretaries of the island, fifteen coolie superintendents, and thirty-six treasurers, besides small fry too insignificant and too numerous to mention, and at the time of the annual sales not single spies, but spies in battalions. No such paradise for officious loafers ever existed as that in Deshima for the upkeep of which the worthy burghers of Amsterdam and Rotterdam were responsible. The entry of their vessels into Nagasaki, their unlading, and their lading would have been very trying functions for the stay-at-home stock-holders of the Company if they could have witnessed them. Boats were forced upon the Dutch skippers to tow their vessels to the anchorage—sometimes as many as a hundred where a third of the number would have sufficed. At the unlading of the cargoes the ships' companies had to stand idly by while gangs of pilfering coolies had to be handsomely paid for killing time in discharging the vessels in a fashion that would have been a revelation to the most advanced and enlightened of corporation day-labourers:—

“The coolies who are employed in lading and unlading our ships are people unknown to us and taken out of the town. All we know of them is that we must pay them well for their trouble. In order to make it beneficial to the whole town the *Ottona* of each street keeps a list of what people in his street are willing and able, to serve as coolies, that in their turn they may be sent over to Deshima.”

Besides all these indirect “squeezes”, the company had to make a direct money contribution to the town of Nagasaki. On the abolition of the appraisement system and the substitution of the new conditions in 1685, a duty of 15 per cent. was imposed upon the 300,000 taels worth of goods it was allowed to dispose of at the annual public sale, and the 45,000 taels thus resulting were distributed among the heads of the households in the city “in proportion to the trouble they must be at, on account of the public offices they must serve by turns”. As a matter of fact, however, although paying duty on 300,000 taels, the Company's sales did

not really amount to that sum. The taels were converted into Japanese *koban* at the rate of sixty-eight mace per *koban* instead of at its nominal current value of sixty mace¹—and hence, instead of goods to the value of 50,000 *koban* being disposed of, a halt was called when 44,118 *koban* had been netted by the so-called *kamban* (i.e. sign-board) sale.

Kaempfer's account of this *kamban* is interesting. After telling us about the preliminary announcement of date and conditions to the Japanese merchants, that two stewards from the Governor and the chief officers of the island must attend, and that the direction of everything was in the hands of the chief interpreter, to the virtual exclusion of the Dutch functionaries, he goes on :—

“ The sale itself is performed in the following manner. Only one sort of goods is put up at a time. Those who have a mind to buy them give in some tickets, each signed by feigned names, and signifying how much they intend to give for a piece or a catty of the article on sale. I took notice that every merchant gives in several tickets. This is done in order to see how matters are like to go, and to keep to a less price in case he repents of the greater, for which purpose they are signed only by feigned names ; and because of the great number and sub-division of the small coin, it seldom happens that two tickets exactly agree. After all the bidders have given in their tickets, the directors proceed to open and assort them. They are then delivered to the presiding chief interpreter who reads them aloud, one after another, beginning with the highest. He asks after the bidder three times, and if there is no answer made he lays that ticket aside and takes the next to it. So he goes on, taking always a little less, till the bidder cries ‘ Here I am ’, and then draws near to sign the note and to put his true name to it with black ink, which the Japanese always carry about them. The goods first put up being sold, they proceed to others, which they sell in the same manner ; and so they go on till the sum determined by the Emperor hath been raised, which is commonly done in two or three, seldom in four days of sale. The day after each *kamban* the goods are delivered to the buyer and carried off. A company of merchants of the five Imperial cities have obtained the monopoly for buying and selling raw silks, of which they would fain oblige us to make up at least one-third of our cargoes.”

In addition to this commerce of the Company, there was a so-called private trade, which in course of time was to give rise to not a few unsavoury incidents. The Company's sales fell short of 50,000 *koban* by 5,882 *koban*, which represented some 40,000 taels, and, as Kaempfer puts it, “ to make the officers concerned in carrying on the Dutch trade some amends for their trouble and hard usage,

¹ Its real value in Japan seems to have been no more than 58 or 59 mace (29s. or 29s. 6d.).

they were allowed to dispose of goods to this amount for their own benefit"—and also, it would appear, for that of the Japanese officials. At all events, it was by the latter that the arrangement was initiated, and it was for this reason that the Company did not venture to interfere with it. The acting director might sell to the value of 10,000 taels; the new director to the extent of 7,000; his deputy or the person next after him to the extent of 6,000, while the captains of the ships, the merchants, clerks, etc., shared the remainder, as they happened to be in favour with the chief managers and the Japanese interpreters. The nominal duty levied on this trade was not 15 per cent. but 65 per cent. on goods sold by the piece and 67 per cent. on goods sold by weight, and thus the resulting revenue ought to have been some 27,000 taels. However, we are told:—

“ If the directors stand upon good terms with the chief interpreter, and have found ways and means to secure his favour by making him large presents at the Company's expense, he can contrive things so that some of their goods be put up and sold upon the first or second *kamban* among the Company's goods, and so, by reason of the small duty, produce 65 to 70 per cent. profit. This, too, may be done without any prejudice to the Company; for in casting up the sums paid in for the goods, these articles are slipped over. If they have any goods beyond the amount they are legally entitled to, chiefly red coral, amber, and the like, it is an easy matter to dispose of them in private by the assistance of the officers of the island, who will generally themselves take off their hands. The *Otona* himself is very often concerned in such bargains, they being very advantageous. Formerly we could sell them by a deputy to the persons who came over to our island, at the time of our *kamban*, and that way was far the most profitable for us. But one of our directors in 1686 played his cards so awkwardly that ten Japanese were beheaded for smuggling, and he himself banished the country for ever.”

A director who really did know how to play his cards properly reaped no insignificant pecuniary consolation for the humiliations and the indignities to which he had to submit. Kaempfer, while protesting that they were all honourable men, insinuates that there was a certain amount of not very cleanly acquired money in their minimum annual pickings of 30,000 guilders (£2,500). In his time the extreme term of a director's appointment was three years, no two of which could be consecutive, the officer in question having to be changed every year in accordance with the regulations of the Japanese authorities. As for the town of Nagasaki, it reaped a rich harvest out of its monopoly of foreign commerce, for the

Chinese contributed 360,000 taels as duty on their wares and 16,000 taels as rent to the funds of the town—a total revenue of 453,580 taels (£114,000), fully equal to that of one of the smaller Kokushiū Daimyō.

In addition to what the Dutch disbursed in Nagasaki, they had also to make presents to the Shōgun and to various dignitaries in Yedo, Kyōto, and Ōsaka, and to defray the expenses of the annual embassy to the Tokugawa capital. In Wagenaar's time (1656–7–9) we find that one of these missions cost the Company 15,636 gulden for presents, and 14,356 gulden for travelling expenses. Towards the end of the seventeenth century the total outlay on the annual mission to Yedo usually amounted to over 60,000 gulden.

Yet onerous and troublesome as these annual missions to the Shōgun's Court were, the Chinese, whose diminished trade had been fixed at twice the value of that of the Dutch, were exceedingly eager to be allowed to send a yearly embassy to Yedo. This they were debarred from doing on the ground that they were mere merchants, representing no political interest whatsoever, whereas the President of the Factory in Deshima was not merely a trader but the representative of a Corporation whose territorial possessions counted as Dutch national colonies. In the annual reception at the Yedo Court the Dutch President was granted the status of a Daimyō, since, with the exception of some officials of the Bakufu, no one below that rank was admitted into the Shōgun's presence. Although the Hollanders on the way to and from the capital were subjected to greater surveillance than any of the feudal lords, yet it must not be overlooked that the regulations about the latter on their journeys were exceedingly precise and exceedingly strictly enforced.¹ The Bureau of the Ōmetsuke had a section—the *Dōchiū Bugyō*—that had the management of the five (later the eight) great highways—and its code of regulations, the *Dōchiū Bugyō Kokoroe*, was very precise. An acquaintance with these regulations and a perusal of Kaempfer will disclose the fact that the treatment of the Dutch embassies was far from being exceptional in every respect. They often complain of the train of useless, lazy, yet officious spongers and loafers thrust upon them, ostensibly to support their dignity, but really, they believed, to drain their purses. The retinue of 100 or 150 that accompanied them was, however,

¹ Commissioners of travelling. Kokoroe, memorandums or instructions.—J.H.L.

an exiguous one when compared with that of a great *Fudai* Daimyō.¹ A small feudal chief of 50,000 *koku* who went up to Yedo with seven horsemen and sixty footmen was allowed 100 porters by the road regulations. In various other matters, too, the President of Deshima was merely subjected to the ordinary code of the highways. In traversing Kyūshū, Kaempfer tells us, the Dutch mission received nearly the same honours and civility from the lords of the several provinces it passed through as they showed to travelling princes and their retinues, and later on in the same paragraph he repeats :—

“In our whole journey from Nagasaki to Kokura, everybody we meet with shows us and our train that deference and respect which is due only to the princes and lords of the country.”

Between Ōsaka and Yedo these public marks of honour and respect were none so plentiful, but here the road mostly ran through the estates of the Tokugawa, or of their *Fudai*, and the Tokugawa vassals were wont to be arrogant in their attitude towards the trains of the *Tozama*, or outside lords, no less than towards the Hollanders. Even here Kaempfer says :—

“As regards our accommodation on the road, the same is—with regard to the carriage of us and our baggage, the number of men and horses provided for that purpose, the inns, lodgings, eating, and attendance—as good for our money as we could possibly desire . . . We go to the same inns which the princes and lords of the country resort to—that is, to the very best of every place. The apartments are at that time hung with the colours and arms of the Dutch East India Company, and this in order to notify to the neighbourhood who they be that lodge there *as is customary in the country*.”

With respect to the general treatment accorded the mission, Kaempfer is emphatic in his commendation of the courtesy of all Japanese except the Tokugawa officials :—

“I must own that in the visits we made or received in our journey we found the civility to be greater than could be expected from the most civilized nations. The behaviour of the Japanese, from the meanest countrymen up to the great prince or lord, is such that the

¹ Kaempfer himself gives a full account of these Daimyōs' retinues ; but it is to be feared that he is not very accurate in his figures. “The retinue of one of the chief Daimyō, as they are called, is computed to amount to about 20,000 men, more or less ; that of a *Seiomio* to about 10,000 ; that of a Governor of the Imperial cities and Crown lands to from one to several hundreds, according to his quality or revenues.” By a *Seiomio* Kaempfer evidently means a *Shōmyō*—a feudal lord with an assessed revenue of less than 10,000 *koku*—equal, roughly speaking, to £10,000. For a petty “princelet” of this description, a train of 10,000 men would have been utterly absurd.

whole empire might be called a school of civility and good manners. They have so much sense and innate curiosity that if they were not absolutely denied a free and open correspondence with foreigners they would receive them with the utmost kindness and pleasure."

What the Hollanders really had to complain about was the extraordinary surveillance they were subjected to by the officials charged with the conduct of the embassy. Whenever and for whatever purpose any of the three Dutchmen dismounted on the route the whole train came to a halt and several officials at once attached themselves to him and remained by him till he mounted again. On reaching an inn the travellers were at once hurried into one of the rearmost apartments and practically immured there, for they could only walk out into the small garden behind the house.

"All other avenues, all the doors, windows, and holes, which open any prospect towards the streets or country, are carefully shut and nailed up, in order, as they would fain persuade us, to defend us and our goods from thieves, but in fact to guard us as thieves and deserters. It must be owned, however, that this superabundant care and watchfulness is considerably lessened upon our return, when we have found means to insinuate ourselves into their favour, and by presents and otherwise to procure their connivance."

In short, the envoys had a fine taste of the two evils that chiefly marred the pleasure of life in Tokugawa Japan—espionage and the officious meddlesomeness of the contemptible, sponging Jacks-in-office who overran most of the empire like a plague. Yet Kaempfer was able to make use of the mariner's compass he secretly carried with him; while:—

"Open and exposed to everybody's view was an inkhorn; and I usually filled it with plants, flowers, and branches of trees, which I figured and described (nay, under this pretext whatever occurred to me remarkable). Doing this, as I did free and unhindered to everybody's knowledge, I should be wrongly accused to have done anything which might have proved disadvantageous to the Company's trade in this country, or to have thrown any ill suspicion upon our conduct from so jealous and circumspect a nation."

As regards the real formal reception of the envoy by the Shōgun—undignified as it was from a European standpoint—the Dutchmen had abundant reasons for not taking the degradation too keenly to heart, as Kaempfer himself indicates:—

"The Emperor having in the meanwhile seated himself in the hall of audience," he writes, "Tsinakami and the two commissioners came in and conducted our president to the Emperor's presence, leaving us behind. As soon as he came thither, they cried aloud *Hollanda Captain!*

which was the signal for him to draw near and make his obeisance. Accordingly he crawled on his hands and knees to a place showed him between the presents, ranged in due order on one side, and the place where the Emperor sat on the other, and then, kneeling, he bowed his forehead quite down to the ground, and so crawled backwards like a crab, without uttering one single word. So mean and short a thing is the audience we have of this mighty monarch. *Nor are there any more ceremonies observed in the audience he gives even to the greatest and most powerful princes of the empire*; for having been called into the hall, their names are cried out aloud; then they move on their hands and feet humbly and silently towards the Emperor's seat, and, having showed their submission by bowing their forehead down to the ground, they creep back again in the same submissive posture."

Here, again, the Dutch envoy received the treatment of a Daimyō; and there were millions in Japan who would have deemed themselves honoured indeed if admitted to grovel before the head of the august house of Tokugawa. So far, indeed, the Dutchmen might have consoled themselves with the reflection that if they suffered in dignity, they suffered in common with the most select and the very best company. But what are we to say of the outrageous farce that followed—almost a repetition of Samson making sport for the Philistines?

"Formerly all we had to do at the Emperor's Court was completed by the Captain's paying the usual homage, after the manner related. But for about these twenty years last past, he and the rest of the Dutchmen that came up with the embassy to Yedo were conducted deeper into the palace, to give the Empress and the ladies of her Court and the princesses of the blood the diversion of seeing us. In this second audience the Emperor and the ladies invited to it attend behind screens and lattices, but the councillors of State and other officers of the Court sit in the open rooms in their usual and elegant order . . . The hall of audience consisted of several rooms looking towards a middle place, some of which were laid open towards the same, others covered by screens and lattices. Some were of fifteen mats, others of eighteen, and they were a mat higher or lower according to the quality of the persons seated in the same. The middle place had no mats at all, they having been taken away, and was consequently the lowest, on whose floor, covered with neat varnished boards, we were commanded to sit down. The Emperor and his imperial consort sat behind the lattices on our right . . ." We sat down "on the above-described middle place, having first made our obeisances in the Japanese manner, creeping and bowing our heads to the ground, towards that part of the lattices behind which the Emperor was . . . After the usual obeisances Bingo (the chief councillor) bid us welcome in the Emperor's name. The chief interpreter received the compliment from Bingo's mouth and repeated it to us. Upon this the ambassador made his compliment in the name of his masters, returning their most humble thanks to the Emperor for having graciously granted the Dutch liberty of commerce. This the

chief interpreter repeated in Japanese, having prostrated himself quite to the ground, and speaking loud enough to be heard by the Emperor. The Emperor's answer was again received by Bingo, who delivered it to the chief interpreter, and he to us. He might have indeed received it himself from the Emperor's own mouth, and saved Bingo the unnecessary trouble; but I fancy that the words as they flow out of the Emperor's mouth are esteemed too precious and sacred for an immediate transit into the mouth of persons of a low rank.

"The mutual compliments being over, the succeeding part of this solemnity turned to a perfect farce. We were asked a thousand ridiculous and impertinent questions. They desired to know how old each of us was, and what was his name, which we were commanded to write upon a bit of paper, in anticipation of which we had provided ourselves with an European inkhorn. This paper, together with the inkhorn itself, we were commanded to give to Bingo, who delivered them both into the Emperor's hands, reaching them over below the lattice. . . . The Emperor, hitherto seated almost opposite to us, at a considerable distance, now drew nearer and sat himself down on our right, behind the lattices, as near as possible. He ordered us to take off our cappas, or cloaks, being our garments of ceremony; then to stand upright that he might have a full view of us; again to walk, to stand still, to compliment each other, to dance, to jump, to play the drunkard, to speak broken Japanese, to read Dutch, to paint, to sing, to put our cloaks on and off. Meanwhile we obeyed the Emperor's commands in the best manner we could, I joining to my dance a love-song in High German. In this manner and with innumerable such other apish tricks, we must suffer ourselves to contribute to the Emperor's and the Court's diversion. The ambassador, however, is free from these and the like commands, for, as he represents the authority of his masters, some care is taken that nothing should be done to injure or prejudice the same, and, besides, he showed so much gravity on his countenance and whole behaviour, as was sufficient to convince the Japanese that he was not at all a fit person to have such ridiculous and comical commands laid upon him."

The envoy (Oouthoorn) of the following year (1692), however, possibly because his gravity of countenance was not sufficiently impressive, was required to join in the antics and to contribute his quota, to the amusement of the company in common with his two even-Christians and subordinates. These shows—there were two of them in 1692—were fully as pronounced in buffoonery as that of 1691 had been.

"Soon after we came in, and had, after the usual obeisances, seated ourselves in the place assigned us, Bingo-sama welcomed us in the Emperor's name, and then desired us to sit upright, to take off our cloaks, to tell him our names and ages, to stand up, to walk, to turn about, to sing songs, to compliment each other, to be angry, to invite one another to dinner, to converse one with another, to discourse in a familiar way like father and son, to show how two friends or man and wife compliment or take leave of one another, to play with children,

to carry them about in our arms, and to do many more things of a like nature. They made us kiss one another like man and wife, which the ladies, by their laughter, showed themselves to be particularly pleased with. It was already four in the afternoon when we left the hall of audience, after having been exercised after this manner for two hours and a half."

However, on the second of these occasions, Kaempfer, knowing what was before him, seems to have made up his mind that the laugh should not be altogether on one side :—

"The obeisances made," he tells us, "I was ordered to sing a song ; I chose one which I had formerly composed for a lady for whom I had a peculiar esteem, and as at the latter end I extolled her beauty and other excellent qualities in a poetical style above the value of hundreds, thousands, millions, of pieces of money, I was asked by order of the Emperor what the meaning of it was, upon which I returned in answer it was nothing but a sincere wish of mine that heaven might bestow millions of portions of health, fortune, and prosperity upon the Emperor, his family, and Court."

As the interpreter was ignorant of German, Kaempfer could indulge in this prank with no inconvenience to himself ; but his two companions in tribulation must have been not a little put to it to maintain serious faces. Later on, a shaven priest, with "a fresh ulcer upon one of his shins of no consequence", was brought in to be treated by the Dutch doctor, and Kaempfer told him to keep on the plaister, and not to be familiar with "sacki-beer", "pretending to guess by his wound, which I did upon much better ground by his red face and nose, that he was pretty much given to drinking, which made the Emperor and the whole Court laugh". At the end of this variety-troupe performance, the actors were regaled with a feast before all, just where they sat. They tasted a little of the various dishes, and the interpreter being ordered to take up the rest and carry it to the Dutchmen's lodgings—the poor man could scarcely stagger under the weight—they were ordered to resume their cloaks, to approach nearer the screen, and to take their leave one after another. In the waiting-room outside they bade good-bye to their conductors :—

"Amidst the compliments and loud acclamations of the courtiers, so favourable a reception as we had met with from his Imperial Majesty being much beyond whatever they remembered anybody could boast of."

The acclamations and congratulations must have sounded somewhat strange to the ears of the Hollanders who had just

been treated like so many trained apes or intelligent performing fleas from an Asakusa show-booth. Things had indeed changed since the days of Spex and of Saris. In his attitude towards strangers from afar the great Iyeyasu was consistently courteous and considerate, while even Cocks, with a pronounced proclivity to abject subserviency, was not called upon to level his head to the bare boards when admitted to Hidetada's presence in 1616. Since that date there had been a portentous development—not indeed of Japanese, but of Tokugawa insolence and arrogance—a development for which the officials of the ruling house were mainly responsible.

It is questionable, however, whether the Dutchmen regarded the function as in any way very degrading to themselves. On their way up they were assured by the Governor of Ōsaka that it was a singular favour to be admitted into the Emperor's presence at all, and to have a solid two hours and a half of the luxury on any terms whatsoever was perhaps something to boast of. The audience that honoured their pantomime was certainly a very orderly and, according to Kaempfer, a very civil one, and at Nagasaki the Jacks-in-office were wont to be very economical in the matter of civility when the prisoners of Deshima were concerned. The good humour, with which the Hollanders went through their pranks and antics before the Court, did much to make them popular in Yedo. To this popularity they must have attributed the wonderful change in the behaviour of the Governor of Nagasaki, then in the capital. This worthy was Kawaguchi, Tsi-no-kami, whom Kaempfer had previously described as:—

“A handsome, well-shaped man, about fifty years of age, cunning and malicious, and a great enemy of the Dutch (who ascribed to him the authorship of the new arrangement for their trade), an unjust and severe judge, but an agreeable, liberal, and happy courtier, with an income from his private estates of 4,700 *koku*.”

After the audience at Court, the Dutchmen went to call at the houses of the three Governors of Nagasaki, and were met by Kawaguchi:—

“the one then in Yedo, just by the door of his house. He was attended by a numerous retinue, and, having called both our interpreters to him, he commanded them to tell us his desire that we should make ourselves merry in his house. Accordingly we were received extraordinarily well, and desired to walk about and divert ourselves in his garden, as being now in the house of a friend in Yedo, and not in the

palace of our governor and magistrate at Nagasaki. We were treated with warm dishes and tea, and all the while civilly entertained by his own brother, and several persons of quality of his friends and relations."

Kawaguchi was evidently an adept at catching the slightest indication of the precise direction in which the chopping and capricious breeze of Court favour set, and trimming his sails so as to make its lightest breath contribute to speeding him onward in his course.

Before leaving the capital there was also a formal audience with the Rōjū at which one of the body directed the usual orders to be read to the "Captain Hollanda". These were five in number and Kaempfer specifies the prohibitions against interfering with Chinese or Luchuan junks trading to Japan and against the introduction of Portuguese or priests as being the most important articles in the document. In Wagenaar's time (1659) the Dutch had been forbidden to hold

"any communication with the Kirishtan sect, or to bring any missionaries into the country",

and had been furthermore charged to communicate every year:—

"any information concerning the Kirishtan sect which it may be desirable for his Highness to hear."

Although Kaempfer attributes the strict watch and ward over the Hollanders at Nagasaki mainly to the desire and determination to prevent smuggling, he yet relates incidents which go to show that the precautions were in a measure directed against any possible introduction of priests into Japan. As soon as a Dutch ship sighted Japan all on board were required to give up their prayer-books and other books on divinity, together with all European money (which might possibly be stamped with a cross or some other religious device) in their possession to be packed away in an old cask and carefully concealed from the Japanese till the vessel departed again. No one was allowed to pass from the ship to Deshima or vice versa without a passport.

"At night, when the commissioners sent on board the ship return with their retinue to Nagasaki, the cabin is sealed up in their presence, and all the Dutchmen accurately counted over, to see that none be wanting, which would occasion a very great confusion. During my stay in Japan, it happened that a common sailor unfortunately was drowned in the night, nobody perceiving his falling into the water. At the review made the next morning (for it is constantly made every morning and night) the fellow was missed. This unlucky accident suddenly stopped

all proceedings, and the fear lest it should be a Roman Catholic priest who had made his escape into the country occasioned such a consternation among the Japanese that all the officers ran about, scratching their heads, and behaving as if they had lost their senses, and some of the soldiers in the guard-ships were already preparing to rip themselves open, when at last the unlucky fellow's body being taken up from the bottom of the harbour put an end to their fears."

Although there had been no arrival of missionaries since 1643—forty-seven years before Kaempfer's time—the Japanese were thoroughly persuaded that the religious orders in Manila and Macao were still keenly watching for an opportunity. In 1643, Inouye, Chikugo-no-kami, the Grand Christian Inquisitor of Japan, extorted a confession from the priests captured that year among other points to the effect that Japanese children were being educated as *religieux* in Manila for the express purpose of reopening the propaganda in Japan.

"It was commonly reported that in this way a large number of 'Bateren' were to be brought up in various countries to be sent to Japan in a continuous stream."

Twelve years later a proclamation was issued raising the reward for denouncing a Father from 200 to 300 pieces of silver,¹ a Brother from 100 to 200 pieces, and offering fifty pieces for the detection of a catechist or a believer, and setting forth that if concealment be practised, and the fact be discovered through some other channel, the other members of the offender's company of five will be considered guilty of an offence. The real motive that prompted these enhanced rewards is made clear by the language of an enactment of the following year, 1656 :

"Strict vigilance must be exercised to prevent any 'Bateren' finding his way into the country. Sufficient time has elapsed for the children who were believed to have been sent some years back to be educated as priests to have reached an age at which the project may be carried out. The execution of the plan will no doubt be facilitated by their ability to pass themselves off as native Japanese by manners and dress. Punishment is therefore threatened against anyone who, knowing of the arrival of a foreign vessel, shall neglect to give information ; his whole family and the inhabitants of the same locality will be involved in the offence."

There were repetitions of the edict of 1656 in 1658, 1661, 1664, 1671, 1678, and 1682, in nearly similar terms ; while 1675 saw renewal in more distinct language of the old enactment of 1641,

¹ A *shuet* of silver weighed about 5 oz.

which condemned to death the whole crew of any junk in which a missionary should reach Japan, and offered pardon and a reward equal to twice the sum the captain had received for the priest's passage to anyone who should turn informer. Although the rewards offered for the detection of priests and believers were very handsome, the payment of them constituted no very serious drain upon the Imperial treasury. It had become the custom to send all the suspects to Nagasaki to be interned in the common prison there, and in 1668, an official report speaks of 163 as having been detained there for some time, while the years 1667 and 1668 must have furnished an additional number of several tens of *accused* persons. In 1671, a few arrests still continued to be made, and in 1674, Okano, a Governor of Nagasaki, suggested that suspension in the pit (the *fosse*) should be applied only to those actually sentenced to death:—

“ For while some were able to endure for five or even seven days, weaker constitutions gave way after an hour or two, and thus frustrated the hope of getting evidence from them.”

From Kaempfer we learn that three arrests were made in 1683, and that in his time the numbers of suspects in prison had been reduced to about fifty, all peasants who knew little of the faith they professed beyond the name of the Saviour and of the Virgin Mary, which, indeed, the Dutch would have us believe was all that not a few of the Japanese converts had ever known.

From him we also get a full account of the ceremony of *Ye-fumi*—that is, the trampling on the pictures of Jesus Christ and of the Virgin and Child—which had to be gone through by all the inhabitants of Nagasaki every year to prove that they did not belong to the “ wicked sect ”. The street officers, with two attendants carrying the metal plates, entered each house in turn, the images were laid on the floor, and the list of the household being called over, all were required, one after the other, to tread upon them. Young children not able to walk were held in their mother's arms so as to touch the images with their feet. The origin of this practice is difficult to trace. It seems first to have been suggested to Hideyoshi, when he was thinking of instituting a general persecution in 1597, by Mayeda Gen-i, Governor of Kyōto, who, under the name of “ Guenifoin ” appears as one of the greatest patrons of the Jesuits in the missionary letters. As no general persecution was

then instituted, the device was not adopted ; but certain Japanese authorities assert that it was the enforcement of this suggestion of Mayeda Gen-i by Takenaka, Uneme-no-kami, Governor of Nagasaki in 1629, that gained for his Excellency the great reputation he acquired by his success as a Torquemada. Paper pictures were first used, but as they were soon worn out, wooden slabs (*ye-ita*) were substituted until, in 1669, twenty bronze plates, made of metal taken from the altars of the Christian churches, were cast and engraved by an engraver of Nagasaki, Yuasa by name. Other plates had evidently been cast before Kaempfer's time, for whereas those cast by Yuasa were about five inches by four inches and one inch in thickness, those used in 1691–2 were of the much larger dimensions of those now in the Imperial Museum of Uyeno in Tokyo. Annually this trampling on the images continued in Nagasaki from the 4th to the 9th of the first month, and at one time these images were afterwards lent to the neighbouring Daimyō to be used in putting their vassals to the test. The Dutch are suspected of having lent themselves to the practice of *Ye-fumi* to recommend themselves to the authorities ; but so far we have met with no evidence that can be adduced in support of the accusation. That some Americans did so seems to be well established, for in 1848, or 1849, all the fifteen deserters from the whaler *Ladoga*—eight Americans and seven Sandwich Islanders—and one seaman from another American whaler who was held in durance at Nagasaki, stated that they had all been required to trample on the crucifix as a proof that they were not Portuguese, that reason being suggested to them when they evinced a reluctance to comply with the demand. We also meet with mention of a shipwrecked band of two Scotchmen, two Dutchmen, a Fleming, and an Englishman, stranded on the Satsuma coast in 1704, being constrained to comply with the formality.

If we are to believe Kaempfer, it was the dread of the surreptitious reintroduction of Christian doctrines into Japan that was at least partly the reason why the Japanese authorities laid serious restrictions upon the trade with China in 1684 to 1685.

“ Not only did the increasing number of Chinese visitors excite jealousy, but what more aroused the suspicion of the Japanese was that the Jesuits, having gained the favour of the reigning monarch of China, with the liberty of preaching and propagating their religion in all parts of the empire, some tracts and books which the Jesuit Fathers had found the means to print in China in Chinese characters

were brought over to Japan among other Chinese books, and sold privately, which made the Japanese apprehensive that by this means the Catholic religion, which had been exterminated with so much trouble and the loss of so many thousand persons, might be revived again in the country."

All this anxiety to guard against a problematical reintroduction of Christianity into the empire might very well strike one as being somewhat hysterical. But in 1708, an incident occurred which impressed the authorities with the conviction that the extreme vigilance hitherto exercised had been, and still was, absolutely necessary. The report that Japanese children were being educated as *religieux* at Manila appears to have been perfectly correct. At all events, a knowledge of Japanese was kept up by certain priests in that city for generations after all intercourse with Japan had ceased. So late as 1738, a Japanese grammar (*Arte de la Lingua Japonica*) was published in Mexico, of all places in the world, where its author, Oyangusen, finished his days after having been a missionary in Cochin-China, and superintendent of two convents in the Philippines.¹

However, by the beginning of the eighteenth century the knowledge in question had become a book-knowledge merely, for after some training in Manila, we find the Sicilian priest, Abbé Sidotti, unable to make himself intelligible in Japan when he proceeded to carry out his self-imposed mission there in 1708. In the September of that year he was landed from a Spanish vessel on the mountainous island of Yakushima, some miles to the south of the entrance to Kagoshima Gulf, and on the local authorities notifying the Daimyō of Satsuma of the incident, the priest was ordered to be sent to the Satsuma capital. Thence he was transferred to Nagasaki where he could only get the authorities to understand that he did not wish to see the Dutchmen :—

¹ This is the fourth of the Japanese grammars compiled by the missionaries. The first in Latin and Japanese (*De institutione Grammatica libri iii., cum versione Japonica*), written by the Jesuit Alvarez and printed at Amakusa in 1593, was probably the grammar presented to the monks who came as envoys from the Philippines in that same year, and on whose ignorance of the language, the intriguers Hasegawa and Harada were trading. The second, in Portuguese (*Arte da Lingua de Japon*) printed at Nagasaki in 1604, was the work of Father Rodriguez, interpreter at the Courts of Hideyoshi and of Iyeyasu successively. An interesting paper on some features of this work by Professor Chamberlain will be found in vol. xvi of the *Transactions of the Asiatic Society*. The third grammar (*Ars Grammatica Japonicæ Linguae*) is Collado's published at Rome in 1632—a somewhat mediocre performance. In dealing with the difficulty of the acquisition of the correct pronunciation of the Japanese syllable *tsu*, the best means the author can bethink himself of is to advise students to pray to Almighty God to guide their lips aright!

“So, placing paper screens between them, the authorities caused the Hollanders to listen, but there were many things they did not understand; and inasmuch as his speech was half Japanese, it was yet more difficult to comprehend. But he seemed desirous of saying many things, and so at last it was said, ‘You should tell what you wish to find out to the Dutch residents.’ He replied, ‘I will do so.’ Among the Hollanders were a man named Atereyanto and Capitan Yasufuru Han Mansteru, who had learned the old Roman language. They went together into the room where he was. (The language of that country is the Latin tongue.) Through these the reason of his coming was learnt, and so the Nagasaki commissioners communicated with Yedo. Afterwards I [i.e. Arai Hakuseki] heard that when he met the Hollanders he seemed to become very proud. They for some reason appeared to be afraid of him. They had learned that language, but as it was six years before, they had forgotten it, and did not very well understand what he said; but after he had explained, they comprehended by degrees. In the summer of the next year [1710] the Government told the Nagasaki commissioners that he was to go to Yedo. Therefore, choosing three interpreters who had become accustomed since the previous year to his language, on the 26th of the ninth month they left Nagasaki and came to Yedo in the middle of the eleventh month (January 1711). Then as the commissioners who presided over the prohibition of the religion of Yaso [Jesus] received orders to that effect, he was placed in the prison of their office (in Koishikawa).”

During the whole long, wearisome way from Nagasaki to Yedo, Sidotti, a man over six feet in stature, was kept cramped up in a *kago*, one result of which was that he practically lost the use of his lower limbs for some considerable time afterwards. The reason of his protracted detention at Nagasaki was that the death of Tsunayoshi, the fifth Shōgun, occurred in 1709, and the Yedo authorities were fully occupied with his obsequies and with the installation of his successor. This latter was his younger brother Iyenobu, till then Daimyō of Kōfu, where Arai Hakuseki was employed as Court lecturer on Chinese philosophy. As has been already mentioned, the new Shōgun took Arai with him to Yedo as a trusted but unofficial adviser, and among the multifarious commissions entrusted to Arai in this capacity was the task of finding out what had brought Sidotti to Japan. One outcome of this was the composition of the three volumes of the *Seiyō Kibun* (“Notes of the Western Ocean”), in which Arai gives a history of the episode together with such information regarding the geography and history of European countries as he was able to glean from the prisoner.¹ For Sidotti’s scientific ability Arai had the greatest respect:—

¹ In the *Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan*, vol. ix, will be found a

“In respect of general knowledge and good memory even at Roma he was considered very learned. In astronomy and geography the Japanese could not come near him at all. I inquired as to the ancient matters at Roma, and he said: ‘There are many kinds of learning there; among these I am acquainted with sixteen.’ For example, as to astronomy and so forth, the first day I met him, as the day was nearly ended, I inquired of the commissioners, ‘What hour may it be? As there is no bell to strike the hour in the neighbourhood I don’t know.’ Then, turning his head and observing the position of the sun, and looking at his own shadow, bending his fingers and calculating, he said: ‘In my country’s fashion it is such a division of such an hour of such a day, of such a month and year.’ This was by the triangular sun-dial method, and appeared very simple to him, but I don’t think you would say it was very easy.”

But with Sidotti’s faith it was an entirely different matter:—

“When he came to speak about his religion, it appeared to me to be not in the slightest respect like the true way. Wisdom and folly became suddenly interchanged in him; at first I thought him very intelligent, but when he began to explain his doctrine he became like a fool; it was just as if one had heard the words of two men. At this point, though I knew that, although that Roman learning is well accustomed to deal only with matter and mechanics, and is acquainted with things derived from matter, yet it is not acquainted with things above matter; yet I thought that perhaps the doctrine of the existence of a Creator may not be false. So then after that our talk ended.”

To their credit, be it said, the higher authorities in Yedo, taking their cue from Arai probably, were thrown into no very great panic by the reappearance of a Christian priest in Japan after an interval of five-and-sixty years. To the positive and practical and very matter-of-fact minded Arai¹ the generally supposed subversive Christian doctrine appeared so intrinsically absurd and nonsensical as to be *per se* utterly impotent to work any national mischief. No doubt he wondered how it was that it had ever been

translation of the chief portion of the *Seiyō Kibun* by the Rev. Mr. Wright, from which the quotations in the text are taken, and a much fuller treatment by Dr. Lönholm in the *M. d. D. G.*, Heft 54, pp. 149–89. See also Marnas, *La Religion de Jésus ressuscitée au Japon*, tome I, pp. 59–77.

¹ That Arai had a strong inclination to the mere matter-of-fact is attested by his report on Sidotti’s habits. “He always ate twice, after noon and at sunset. At the two meals he had rice; in the soup were wheaten dumplings fried in thin sauce, and in it herring or fish [as if herring weren’t fish!] and onions were boiled; a little vinegar and salt were put in. The dessert consisted of four roast chestnuts, two oranges, five dried persimmons, and one piece of cake. On his day of purification he ate only once—at noon; but he ate dessert twice on those days—eight roast chestnuts, four oranges, ten dried persimmons, four round ones, and two pieces of cake. I don’t know whether he threw away the peel of his dessert. Even on fast days he ate fish, and after he came to Yedo he would not enter a bath even once, but he wasn’t a bit dirty; and except when he was eating he drank neither cold nor hot water.” Eight roast chestnuts, four oranges, ten dried persimmons, four round ones, and I don’t know if he threw away the peel!

considered dangerous, for he had obtained from the inquisitor's office three volumes—most likely those penned by Father Sebastian Viëyra immediately before his martyrdom in 1634—on the Christian faith, and he had found that Sidotti's exposition of it “was in no way different from what was contained in these three volumes”. Spanish and Portuguese territorial aggression was no insistent menace to the existing generation; it was now nothing more than—not a geographical, but—a historical expression, which “old custom” and tradition had, if not sanctified, at all events stereotyped. Accordingly Sidotti was subjected neither to the *fosse* nor to any other form of torture. He was simply kept in the Koishikawa prison, where, by working upon their fears of Hell, he recalled to a profession of their faith the relapsed domestics of the apostate Christian priest, Francisco Cassola, whom torture had constrained to abandon his faith in 1643.¹

“They said, ‘Formerly when our master (Cassola) was alive, he secretly taught us his doctrine; but we did not know that he acted contrary to the laws of the land forbidding the religion of Yaso when he taught that doctrine. Now that we have become very old, we have seen how this Roman, not regarding his life for the sake of religion, has come many thousand miles, is captured and dwelling in prison, and loth as we are to lose the short span of this life, yet, as it is a fearful thing to fall into the soul prison, we have received the doctrine from him and become believers. As it would be opposing the goodness of the Government not to confess these things, we confess thus much. However it may turn out for us, we ask that we may be dealt with for our crime according to the laws.’ When they confessed, the commissioners separated the two (husband and wife) from each other. The next year (1715) in the third month, when the Hollanders came to Yedo, we interpreted the Roman's words. The crime of having secretly given instruction to the old couple in opposition to his former words was inquired into, and he was bound in prison. Then he showed his real thoughts; raising his voice, he abused the commissioners, called out the names of the old people, and, strengthening their faith, ceased not day and night advising them to hold steadfast until death.”

Yet, even so, the death penalty was inflicted neither on the converts nor on Sidotti who died a natural death in prison some little time afterwards (17th November, 1715). Arai formed several theories about the motives that had prompted the priest to come on his mission, but inasmuch as he came well provided with money, Arai puts forward the following as the most likely one:—

¹ When Cassola died is not known. Chiara died in 1685, at the age of 84, and Brother Andrea Viëyra in 1678. Another inmate of the Kirishtan Yashiki was a Sicilian priest arrested on Yakushima in 1643, while an Annamite Christian died in it so late as 1700.

“When he lived in his own land, he heard that gold and iron coins had become altered in Japan, and thought, perhaps, people may have become poor there; if so, there will certainly be distress. When the people are suffering, the command of the Government prohibiting the religion of Yaso will not be kept. Even though it be observed, if I drew people with money to this doctrine, that prohibition will cease. And so he may have come to Japan.”

It is to be observed that Arai was the leading political economist and the greatest authority on financial questions in his day, and that at that very time he was vigorously opposing a proposed debasement of the coinage which was advocated as a means of relieving the monetary embarrassment of the Bakufu. Arai had pointed out to the Government that it might adopt any one of three courses with Sidotti; either to send him back to his own country, or to detain him in imprisonment, or to put him to death as prescribed by law. He himself strongly recommended the first; but the second was practically adopted in the order given to the commissioners by the Shōgun.

“The religion of Yaso has been prohibited in Japan from of old. Now, with respect to that Roman’s coming here, he says that he came here to complain that former messengers were truly not deserving of punishment; he must have come to bring letters from Roma. However, he has come to our land deceitfully without such letters. Even if his words be true, we must regard the subsequent circumstances with suspicion. But since he says he is an envoy from his country, we must not put him to death. After this we shall wait for the production of testimony as to what he says, and deal accordingly.”

One consequence of this incident was (1711) the recasting and the reissue of the anti-Christian proclamation. The rewards offered to informers were now increased to 500 pieces of silver for the discovery of a Father, 300 for a Brother, and 100 for that of a catechist, or member of “the sect”; while a further reward of 300 pieces was offered for the discovery of persons who, after apostatizing from Christianity were reconverted. Catechists or converts who turned evidence against missionaries of their own class were to receive 500 pieces (say £600), according to the value of the information they furnished, and in case of concealment punishment was likewise threatened against the headman of the village, the other members of the Company-of-five to which the offender belonged, and against his relations. This draft of the edict was the final one, and continued to appear upon the *kōsatsu*¹ or

¹ The *Kōsatsu* were the Public Notice Boards, generally of artistic design and sheltered by either a shed or a roof, modelled on those of temples, which were

public notice-board of every village down to the early years of Meiji, for from Sidotti's time down to the arrival of Perry, no foreign missionary or clergyman found his way into the empire. After the suppression of Christianity and the expulsion of the Portuguese, it was always the aim of the Bakufu to have as little as possible said or written about Japanese Christianity or early European intercourse. How thoroughly this part of the national history was being wrapped in oblivion may be divined from the Sidotti episode. When Arai Hakuseki was commissioned to examine the intrepid Sicilian priest, it is plain that he had only the vaguest ideas of Christianity or of its history in Japan, although he was regarded as the leading historian of his age, and his chief work, the *Han-kampu*, dealt with the period between A.D. 1600 and 1680. The researches he now had to undertake into Christianity and its record in the empire made him what he already was on the history of foreign trade—the authority on the subject. Here, too, some of the estimates he makes are as erratic as we have found them to be in connexion with the export of specie and copper. He tells us, among other things, that 200,000 or 300,000 of his countrymen suffered death for their Christianity. A grosser exaggeration even than his export of 150,000 *kobans* per annum between 1696 and 1707.

It is interesting to find that the chief interpreter in Deshima questioned Sidotti in Portuguese—which the priest could not understand. In Kaempfer's time, the study of the old *lingua franca* of commerce in the Far East was still kept up in the college of

erected in the principal streets of the great towns, along the high roads, and in small towns and villages throughout the Empire. Their principal *raison d'être* was to make known to the people what may be termed the fundamental principles of general morality. They proscribed, among other things, riot, conspiracy, absconding from registered homes, murder, arson, and robbery, and enjoined observance of the five social relations: love, between parent and child; righteousness, between master and servant; distinction, between husband and wife; order, between old and young; faith between friends. But the main prohibition, the first in order of sequence was:—

“The evil sect called Christian is strictly forbidden. Rewards will be given for reporting suspicious persons.”

The boards had continued in this form for nearly 200 years, and the proclamation against Christianity remained in these terms till November, 1868, when, in deference to the strong remonstrances of the Diplomatic Representative of Western Powers, it was altered by the omission of the word “evil”, the rest of the prohibition being renewed in even stronger terms. In this state, it was retained during the first years of the new Imperial Government, until 1873, when, its effect on the European estimate of Japanese civilization having been realized, it was withdrawn along with all the other contents of the notices. Even then, however, it was not admitted that legal toleration was to be given to Christianity, and the reason for the withdrawal was alleged to be that all the notices were so well-known to the people that their public announcement was no longer necessary.

interpreters. The last occasion on which this language had to be put to practical use was in 1685 when a Portuguese vessel from Macao arrived in Nagasaki for the ostensible purpose of restoring a number of Japanese castaways to their native land. The Portuguese were treated with great civility and thanked for their kindness, but were ordered to come no more. The visit of the English East Indiaman *Return* to Nagasaki in 1673, has been alluded to in the preceding volume. The Governors of Nagasaki fully expected that the English would be allowed to resume their trade, and exerted themselves heartily to make matters smooth for them. It was the English king's marriage with a daughter of the house of Braganza—a Catholic Princess—and the St. George's cross on the vessel's ensign that determined the Japanese to decline to renew the old commercial relations. A century later the East India Company thought of making yet another attempt to reopen trade with Japan, but the project was dropped when it was understood that the chief item in return cargoes would be copper, for the English copper mines were very productive about that date. In 1699, the Company established a factory at Canton, and, through it, and the Chinese, carried on a small indirect trade with Japan.

As has been said, it was the discovery of some Jesuit treatises in Chinese among the books the junks brought over that especially excited the suspicion of the Japanese against the Chinese. But there was another reason:—

“Not long ago a Tartar Mandarin came over with a very numerous retinue and in quality of Admiral of a small fleet of six junks, but he was obliged forthwith to return to China, for the Japanese gave him to understand that their country would not bear any other commanders and Mandarins but such as were natives of it.”

In addition to this, the import-checking school of economists were seriously perturbed about the great and ever-swelling volume of the Chinese trade, and the great drain of silver it involved. Accordingly, it was resolved to bring the Chinamen under regulations analogous to those imposed upon the Dutch when they were transferred to Deshima. Suyetsugu Heizō's son had lost his position of Daikwan in 1676, and all his property was then confiscated, his splendid botanical garden at Jūzenji Mura among the rest. The garden was now ruthlessly laid waste, and a lot of shabby structures hastily erected on it for the future accommodation of the Chinamen. They were still free to walk about in Nagasaki by day, but these

huts were to be their sole lodging-places and all buying and selling had to be done within a ring-fence. This arrangement dated from 1688, but, three years earlier, measures had been taken to check the influx of Chinese and Chinese wares into Japan. In 1685, when the Dutch trade was fixed at a maximum of 300,000 taels, the Chinese were restricted to double that amount. A summary end was then put to their export of silver, and the price of all their goods had thenceforth to be paid in copper or in Japanese wares. Instead of coming over with 200 junks, manned by some fifty men each, and with crowds of passengers, the Chinese were now restricted to 70 junks per annum with crews of not more than thirty. Of these junks, fewer than fifty came from the ports of the Middle Kingdom; the remainder were distributed among Tonquin, Siam, Cambodia, and the neighbouring States. One actually came from Batavia.

Kaempfer tells us that the Chinese really carried on a much greater trade than they were supposed to do :—

“Some of the junks, which came to Nagasaki early in the year, after they have dispos’d of their cargoes return to clean and to be new painted and varnished, then they take in another cargo and other hands on board and so make the voyage twice the same year without the Japanese being able to discover their cheat. Others go to Satsuma early in the year, as if they had been cast thither by chance or stress of weather, dispose of what goods they can, then haste back to take in a new cargo and so go up to Nagasaki.”

Besides their casual dealings in contraband, the Satsuma people had a legitimate semi-foreign trade of their own. The Shimadzu family had been suzerains of Lūchū since 1609, in spite of the fact that the king of Lūchū accepted investiture from the court of Peking. In truth, the position of the Lūchūan sovereign was altogether a peculiar one. On the accession of a new Tokugawa Shōgun, the “King” had to apply through the Lord of Satsuma for reinvestiture, and he also had to dispatch embassies to Yedo to return thanks on his own accession to the throne. In the *Tokugawa Jikki* we meet with mention of fifteen of these missions between 1611 and 1850, and Arai Hakuseki has told us about the one he had to meet in his time. A trade of as much as 125,000 taels per annum between Lūchū and Kagoshima was sanctioned, and by this route a good many foreign commodities found their way to Kagoshima, and a good many Satsuma products—notably soy sauce—found an ultimate market abroad. The immediate practical

result of Arai's visit to Nagasaki as commissioner to report on foreign trade was another reduction both in the number of licensed Chinese craft, and of the maximum annual export of copper allowed to the Dutch. In 1714, this was fixed at 15,000 piculs. Instead of the eight or nine vessels of early Deshima days, and the six of Kaempfer's time, two or, at the outside, three, now sufficed. And the prospects of any improvement were remote; for the import-checking school of economists was now the orthodox one, and it was all-powerful at Yedo.

The Siam trade had not indeed ceased, but it had fallen into the hands of Chinamen, and thus the Dutch and the Chinese were the only foreigners who (apart from Koreans) maintained commercial relations with Japan. From this circumstance, a serious misconception arose. In the later eighteenth century it became an article of belief that by a fundamental law of the empire, none but Dutch or Chinese could trade with Japan. Of course, any such "fundamental law" was a pure figment of the imagination. But for their King's marriage with a Roman Catholic princess, the English would have been gladly readmitted in 1673. It was of Roman Catholicism and Roman Catholic Powers—especially Spain and Portugal—that the early Tokugawas stood in dread, and such "fundamental laws" on the matter of foreign intercourse as there were were directed against Roman Catholicism and Roman Catholic Powers. (We have met with Pastor Masius exercising important clerical functions in the presence of the Deshima authorities in 1662.)

One important point still remains to be noted. In his dealings with foreigners and foreign powers, Hideyoshi never took instructions from the Imperial Court, never once consulted it on the subject. In this respect he was imitated by the early Tokugawa Shōguns. For the expulsion first of the Spaniards, and later of the Portuguese, and for the suppression of Christianity, the Bakufu alone was responsible. It was it, and it alone, again, that decided the question whether the Dutch, the English, the Chinese, and the Siamese should be admitted to trade and residence in the empire or not. This consideration appears to be either completely ignored, or at least slurred over by modern Japanese writers. The question became of vital importance at, and immediately after, the reopening of Japan to intercourse with the outside world in the middle of the nineteenth century.

CHAPTER IX

YOSHIMUNE (1716-44)

WITH the death of the seventh Shōgun, Iyetsugu, as has been said, the line of the second Shōgun, Hidetada, became extinct. At his accession in 1712, Iyetsugu was a sickly child of three years, and his father Iyenobu had foreseen that it was not probable that his infant heir would survive him long. In such an eventuality it would be necessary to have recourse to the provisions formulated by Iyeyasu a century before, to regulate the succession question. These provided that, in case of failure of the direct line, the next Shōgun would have to come from one or other of the Go-san-ké families of Owari, Kishū, or Mito. It was upon the head of the Kishū house that Iyenobu's choice had fallen. Before his death, he directed that, in the case of the death of Iyetsugu without issue, Yoshimune, the Daimyō of Kishū, should be installed in the Shōgun's seat. As a matter of fact, Yoshimune was nearer in descent to Iyeyasu than Iyenobu himself; Iyenobu was a great-great-grandson of the first Tokugawa Shōgun, while Yoshimune was a grandson of Yorinobu of Kii who had at one time been suspected of complicity in the great Rōnin conspiracy of 1651, and he consequently stood in the more immediate relation of great-grandson to the founder of the line.

Yoshimune's worldly prospects were in his early manhood the reverse of brilliant, for he was merely a younger son. In the ordinary course of events, the most he could hope for was to be adopted into some childless Daimyō family, as the prospective head of the house; failing that he would have to pass through life in obscurity, much as an ordinary samurai, upon an allowance from his eldest brother. However, as a boy he seems to have had great charm of manner; in his fifth year (1682) he attracted the notice of the Shōgun (Tsunayoshi) on the occasion of a visit of the latter to the Kishū *yashiki*, and later, he always made a very favourable impression when he appeared at the palace. Not merely the Shōgun but many of his powerful favourites became interested in the promising youth, and at last it was resolved that

something should be done for him. Accordingly, he was set up as the head of a small house of his own and installed as a Daimyō at Nibu in Echizen in 1697. The revenue of Nibu was assessed at 30,000 *roku* but, in truth, it was no more than 6,000 or 7,000 *roku*. Matsudaira Terusada, the Sobayōnin, heard of this, and at once exerted himself to rectify matters. This unsolicited kindness Yoshimune never forgot; indeed, it was ever his way to remember favours and to cherish no private grudges.

Yoshimune's eldest brother, Tsunanori, was married to Tsunayoshi's only daughter, and had been installed in the Nishi-maru as prospective heir to the Shōgunate. But his consort soon died, childless, and then very unwillingly Tsunayoshi had to revert to the house of Kōfu for a successor, and Iyenobu was designated heir-apparent. Presently Tsunanori died childless, and, in 1705, his next brother, Yorimoto, who had succeeded him, also died. Just before his death, Yorimoto adopted Yoshimune as his heir and thus, contrary to all expectation, Yoshimune found himself in the proud position of chieftain of one of the three great collateral Tokugawa houses. Soon, while he was in the full vigour of his matured powers (*æt* 39), fate carried him to the rulership of the empire. He was a fortunate man indeed, but, in truth, as the sequel was to prove abundantly, it was the Japanese people at large that were most to be congratulated upon his accession to the Shōgunate.

During the previous generation the empire suffered from a complication of evils, and among these not a few were owing to the circumstance that the reins of administration had been too often handled by the mere doctrinaire officials. Almost everything was viewed through Chinese spectacles, through the distorting medium of the Canonical Books of the Middle Kingdom. Before the simplest practical measure could be adopted, the appropriate precedents in "the Books" had to be found and duly set forth in long memorials, sometimes actually extending into volumes. We have seen the learned fifth Shōgun spending precious hours upon hours lecturing now to the Daimyō, now to the assembled Castle officials, and it is tolerably safe to assume that Shōgun, Daimyō, and officials would have all been much more profitably employed in making themselves acquainted with the actual circumstances and pressing needs of the people they were supposed to govern. As for the sixth Shōgun, Iyenobu, he was indeed of a more practical cast of mind than his immediate predecessor, and

he did exert himself strenuously to improve the administration of justice, to reform the currency, and to regulate the foreign trade, while we have noted that he was fully alive to the value of knowing what people were thinking and saying about the measures he was adopting. One wonders where he found sufficient time to do all this and, at the same time, to read and digest Arai's memorials extending to three volumes on one subject, and eight volumes and 211 points on another, and long disquisitions on the "Fifteen causes of Fires".

In devising his measures and in giving the law to the empire, Hideyoshi had no need of platitudinous memorials; in fact, with a knowledge of no more than 800 Chinese ideographs he could never have got through a single one of Arai's verbose lucubrations. Nor had Iyeyasu shown any great inclination to hearken to men "for their much-speaking". In 1613, Captain Saris's first memorial was returned to him with the request that he should curtail it, "inasmuch as the Japanese greatly affected brevity." Neither Hideyoshi nor Iyeyasu, nor any of their great captains, knew much of Chinese history nor of any history at all. If they had known, it is not at all likely that they would have allowed themselves to be dominated by the "dead hand" of its precedents in devising the polity they established. They were emphatically men of the present, their great aim was to grasp and master actualities; to cut the coat for the empire in accordance with the cloth of these actualities; to forecast the natural developments of the present, and to provide for the future in the light of such a forecast. The cautious, and not merely far-seeing but wide-seeing Iyeyasu, in laying down the lines of the Bakufu Administrative Machine, was glad to avail himself of hints from any source, and he was not slow to pick the brains of men like Fujiwara Seigwa and Hayashi Dōshun. It is significant that one of Hayashi's tasks was to explore the *Azuma Kagami* for details of the Kamakura Bakufu. A summary of this dreary old chronicle was of far more value to Iyeyasu than all the histories of China put together. He was shrewd enough to perceive that history gets most of the light it has to give from the present; that instead of being the standpoint from which the present is to be interpreted and guided, the present should be the standpoint, and history regarded merely in the light of illustration and commentary. Now, a century after the death of Iyeyasu, Japan was not merely being strangled by

red-tape. Far worse than that, she was in danger of being throttled by the "Dead Hand" of precedent, laboriously extricated from the dust-heaps of Chinese antiquity by pedants like Hayashi and Arai. A few generations more of the rule of the doctrinaire would have brought the empire to a dangerous pass.

From such a danger, Japan was now saved by Yoshimune. As a boy, he had, of course, had to master his "Books" in common with most boys of the time. But he was far from being "bookish" by nature. He was passionately fond of an active, out-of-doors life, and days upon days were spent in hunting and fishing excursions among the romantic scenery of his native Kishū. In the course of these rambles he came into the closest contact with humble farmer and fisher-folk and thus acquired an intimate knowledge of their conditions of life, of their joys and of their troubles, of their grievances and of their general mentality. Again, when in Yedo, it was his custom to roam all over the mercantile quarters of the city, generally with a single attendant, now and then with none. Long before he attained to man's estate he had mastered nearly all that city plebeian life could teach him. Such lore, of course, was regarded as very trivial and vulgar by the "superior" young men attending Hayashi's courses in the University of Yedo, but for Yoshimune's future work it was to prove of far more value than the whole of the "Four Books" and the "Five Classics". On becoming a Daimyō in his twentieth year, he took the administration of his little fief very seriously and when, in 1705, he became the head of the great Kishū house, he soon gave evidence that the breed of lords like Ikeda Mitsumasa of Bizen was by no means extinct. In short, since the second Shōgun, Hidetada, no Shōgun had ever had such a splendid early training for the discharge of the onerous responsibilities of the great office as Yoshimune had gone through. In some respects he was even more fortunate than Hidetada. The latter had the inestimable advantage of being drilled and schooled and coached by his great father, Iyeyasu, for the first thirty-seven years of his life, but even such a training was not without the defects of its qualities. Constant dependence upon the counsels of his father had done much to weaken Hidetada's own personal initiative, and he had never come into contact with the common people as Yoshimune had done; all his life was passed among the samurai. At this date (1716) the samurai class had drifted into a condition that called for radical reform, but Yoshimune

was right in regarding this reform as being by no means the most serious and insistent problem that faced him. The common people constituted the real basis of the nation, and the state of the peasants generally had become very miserable. Without resort to any very special legislation the degeneration among the city samurai might be checked. All that was necessary was to find something to keep the two-sworded men fully occupied, and to play skilfully upon their feeling of pride. Even this could be done without much lecturing. Yoshimune knew far better than to assume the *rôle* of his own court-preacher.

On becoming Shōgun, one of the first things he did was to send for the Great Councillors. He began by asking them how much money there was in the treasury. Not one of them could say exactly. Yoshimune smiled and inquired how much rice there was in the Bakufu granaries. This query also nonplussed them. Yoshimune smiled again and asked how many turrets the Castle had. The Councillors had to shake their heads and apologize for their ignorance once more. This time Yoshimune merely smiled and put no more questions. But the hint was sufficient; the Rōjū at once perceived that they were expected to take the duties of their office seriously and to acquire an intimate knowledge of the details of the administration. This was a fair earnest of the eighth Shōgun's general methods. He was always the very pink of courtesy; he never stormed and he never preached, but he could, and often did, give a gentle hint in a very effective way.¹

On first thought it may seem strange to find that the administration of 1709-16, was the reverse of popular, and that it was often

¹ At Yoshimune's accession there were five Great Councillors. These were as follows:—

Tsuchiya, Sagami no Kami, 1687-1718.
 Inouye, Kawachi no Kami, 1705-22.
 Abé, Bungo no Kami, 1711-17.
 Kuzé, Yamato no Kami, 1713-20.
 Toda, Yamashiro no Kami, 1714-29.

During the 28 years of Yoshimune's administration there were half-a-score of new nominations to the Rōjū, two appointees held office for two years only, and two others died within a few months of their nominations. Omitting these, the list stands thus:—

Mizuno, Idzumo no Kami, 1717-30 (resigned).
 Matsudaira Norimura, Sakon Shōgen, 1723-45 (resigned).
 Matsudaira Iga no Kami 1724-8 (died).
 Sakai, Sanuki no Kami 1728-35 (died).
 Matsudaira Idzu no Kami 1730-44 (died).
 Matsudaira, Sakyō Daibu, 1730-44 (resigned).

Andō, a Kishū vassal, was in the Rōjū from 1722 to 1724; then he was transferred to the service of the Shōgun's heir, Iyeshige, in the Nishi-maru.

contrasted with that which immediately preceded it. But it must be borne in mind that by popular opinion we are to understand the views expressed by the Castle officials and the *yashiki* population of Yedo. These circles had their own reasons for dissatisfaction with the new order of things for, whatever may have been his shortcomings, Arai exerted himself manfully to put down the scandalous venality that was rampant. This perhaps was the main cause that prompted hostile criticism, but the critics, of course, had to keep this carefully in the background and base their attacks upon matters that had at least the appearance of respectability. In the country at large it is not probable that Iyenobu's rule was unpopular; on the contrary, the mere repeal of the Life-Protection Statutes must have enabled the whole agricultural population to heave a great sigh of relief. At all events, on the demise of the sixth Shōgun, the people all went into voluntary mourning—a tribute of respect that had been paid to no previous Tokugawa Shōgun. The fact remained that the austere régime of 1709 to 1716 was marked by a number of ill-advised measures and innovations. Far too much attention had been directed to a mere reform of ceremonial, as if the crying moral and social evils of the time could be remedied by any mere Pharisaical cleansing of the outside of the cup and platter.

Accordingly, Yedo at large was delighted when it discerned what it fancied to be sure indications that the new Shōgun was to revert to the institutions of Tsunayoshi. But truth to tell, Tsunayoshi was never regarded by Yoshimune in the light of a model. Many of the institutions of Tsunayoshi's time were more akin to those of Iyeyasu than were those of Iyenobu and, from first to last, Yoshimune's great question to himself was: "*What would Gongen-sama (Iyeyasu) have done in the present circumstances?*" He was, however, no mere servile copyist of his illustrious great-grandfather, for not even Paul himself realized more keenly than Yoshimune that "the letter killeth, but the spirit giveth life".

As we have seen, Yoshimune made no sweeping change in the personnel of the Great Council at his accession. In the Junior Council there was only one change, a Temple Magistrate being promoted to the seat vacated by a member who tendered, or who was made to tender, his resignation. Similarly, the old staff of Temple, City and Finance Magistrates, was retained without any great shuffling of the official cards. But with respect to the Shōgun's

more immediate attendants, the Sobayōnin, it was otherwise. Manabé's resignation was promptly accepted and he retired to administer his own fief of 50,000 *koku* at Takasaki in Kōdzuke.¹ Ogasawara, Arima, and Kanō, three of Yoshimune's Kishū retainers were brought from Wakayama and installed as Sobayōnin, while Tsunayoshi's cashiered favourite, Matsudaira Terusada, who had befriended Yoshimune in the obscure days of his youth, was presently reinstated in his old position.

From what has been said of the idiosyncrasies of the two men, it may be premised that there was no room for Arai Hakuseki in Yoshimune's service. The new Shōgun was an exceptionally good judge of character, and he doubtless felt that sheer incompatibility of temperament would have soon led to strained relations between himself and Iyenobu's well-meaning, but very dogmatic and self-assertive, preceptor. Indeed, Yoshimune felt it necessary to initiate his rule by abrogating three or four of the innovations for which Arai claims not a little credit in his autobiography. The elaborate etiquette of the old Kyōto court was tolerable among civilian courtiers whose chief business was to kill time but, among the warrior class, which required to be rescued from the effeminacy into which it was rapidly drifting, the introduction of such elaborate etiquette was greatly to be deprecated. The decline of the vigour of the Kamakura Bakufu was occasioned by a complex of factors but, among these, one of the chief had been the demoralizing influence of the Shōgunal palace, after *Kugé* institutions had been established in it. Accordingly, Yoshimune at once cancelled the new regulations about hunting-costume, and gave the samurai to understand that hunting expeditions were not to be allowed to degenerate into picnics. Every one had to appear in an equipment suited to the work. As has been said before, feudal hunting parties were really organized for the purposes of military drill, and to Yoshimune the idea of drilling his vassals arrayed in gorgeous court dress was too ridiculous for words. Arai's Middle-Gate, usually called the Four-legged Gate, was constructed on the correct esoteric principles of antiquity. Yoshimune ordered it to be pulled down. Hayashi drafted the *Buké Shohatto* for Tsunayoshi; Arai convinced Iyenobu that this draft was objectionable in several

¹ One of his descendants, Manabé Norikatsu (1802-84) was destined to play a very important part in the stormy political world of 1858.

respects and procured the acceptance and issued a new one of his own. Yoshimune appealed to Hayashi again, and the *Buké Shohatto* now published were almost identical in wording with those of the fifth Shōgun. On the resumption of intercourse with Korea, Arai's innovations in regard to the reception of Korean envoys were also set aside and the old order of things restored. Only one of Arai's "reforms" was retained. The extravagant banquets to the envoys on their way from Tsushima to Yedo were curtailed, and the Daimyō relieved of this serious tax on their resources, the Bakufu now assuming all the costs of the mission. Even Arai's regulations about Nagasaki were overhauled and modified. All this must have been cause for profound mortification to the masterful pedagogue, who, however, professed to be more than contented with the enjoyment of his well-earned *otium cum dignitate*.

According to the usual routine, the Go-san-ké tendered their oath of fidelity to the new Shōgun. Yoshimune declined to receive it, assuring them there was no need of any such mere formality on the part of those who must always be the main props of his power. On the other hand, he exacted a document of this nature from the Ladies of the Palace for the first time in the history of the Shōgunate. The court dames had often given trouble by their intrigues, and they had nearly always been a great cause of needless expense and profusion. About fifty of the most stylish among them were now discharged. In distributing the new *Buké Shohatto* to the feudatories, Yoshimune assured them that it was little more than an established formality that had to be complied with—he had no doubts of their fidelity, and he had nothing special to say to them beyond pointing out that it was the duty of their position to see to the correction of abuses in their fiefs, and that for efficient administration the practice of economy was indispensable.

Personally, he himself set the best of examples in this respect. He felt incommoded by the sumptuousness of the Shōgun's sleeping apartments and was wont to take his short night's rest on a pallet spread in the great corridor. His ordinary dress was of cotton stuff, and his usual fare simple in the extreme. In this, and indeed, in several other respects, he was more like one of the best of the Hōjō regents than a magnificent Shōgun. In his personal intercourse he was as simple and unpretentious as any Hōjō had ever

been ; he was endowed in no stinted measure with what is perhaps the most distinctive faculty of the "great gentleman", that of putting the humblest at ease in his presence. Hitherto the Dutch envoy had been compelled to crawl before the Shōgun concealed behind a curtain of split bamboo, and, later on, to degrade himself by joining in the clownish antics that were imposed on his companions for the entertainment of the Shōgun and his court. Yoshimune would have none of that ; the blind was removed, and he met the Dutchmen face to face, and treated them like rational civilized beings. He got them to give exhibitions of equestrianism for the benefit of his samurai, and one of them, a certain Ketzer or Keyser, a very good rider, was at one time very busy as a riding master in Yedo.

At the same time, such convention and ceremonial as were really helpful, if not absolutely necessary, in the circumstances of the time, were by no means wantonly disregarded. The privilege of audience with the Shōgun was not to be accorded to all and sundry, for in a nation so ingrained with aristocratic prejudices, a Tokugawa Shōgun could never afford to behave like the President of a Republic, or to allow the democratic etiquette of a White House to find any entry into the Castle of Yedo. The distinction between Hataamoto and *Go-Kenin* was now clearly defined ; the former had the privilege of audience on certain stated occasions, while the latter had not. But on the other hand, Yoshimune was prompt to recognize any exceptional talents among his lower vassals, if their possessor was brought to his notice in any way. One reform he introduced into the civil service enabled him to promote humble men of ability with much less difficulty than had been the case under his predecessors. Hitherto, each office had its fixed stipend ; a man invested with an office drew the emoluments not only during his tenure but even after his resignation, and he often transmitted them to his son. The tendency of this was to make the tenure of office hereditary, for in the case of a new man being appointed to a post two stipends had to be paid, practically. This was a serious drain upon the treasury, and it did not a little to impair the efficiency of the administration. Yoshimune ordered that, when a man who had a hereditary stipend of, say, 300 *koku*, was appointed to an office with an annual emolument of 500 *koku*, his original stipend should be raised to the latter amount, but, on his demission of the office in question, it should revert to the original amount.

The enforcement of this very simple rule (*Tashi-daka*)¹ enabled Yoshimune to promote not a few obscure men of talent without any detriment to the treasury and with great advantage to the efficient conduct of the administration.

As regards the ordinary samurai of the clans, the Shōgun was supposed to have no intercourse with them. It was with the clan chieftain or his representative *rusu-i* only that he came in contact. But Yoshimune made a point of according audience to such outside samurai as had distinguished themselves in any special art or way. It was mainly by rousing and playing upon the spirit of emulation among the two-sworded men that he accomplished the all-important task of checking the further spread of the moral morass that was threatening to engulf the privileged class. The measures he adopted were very simple ; so simple indeed that it was not till the lapse of a few years that their real purpose was generally divined, for he was at once master of the art of keeping his own counsel and greatly averse to making any parade of good intentions. The Hawking Bureau, which had been abolished by Tsunayoshi, was restored and all killing of game within a circuit of twelve miles around Yedo was strictly forbidden. Every hour that could be spared the Shōgun spent in the hunting field. Any specially good work, especially in the matter of marksmanship, was sure to be commended and rewarded in some way or other. A knowledge of this fact soon became general among the samurai, and every second man began to be assiduous in his practice at the butts. Archery had become as good as a lost art in consequence of Tsunayoshi's Life-Protection Statutes ; it now speedily revived. The Shōgun's hunting train swelled to huge proportions, and presently great battues, such as Yoritomo organized on the slopes of Fuji-san in Kamakura days, became regular functions on the Plain of Musashi. In the course of one of his earliest hawking excursions, the Shōgun came to the Nakagawa, and called upon his escort to swim the stream. In the whole cavalcade only two men could do so. A few months later he took his attendants to the Ōkawa reach of the Sumida, and plunging into the flood on horseback himself, he ordered them to follow. In the old warlike times, the Bushi practised the art of swimming streams and estuaries on horseback in full panoply, and some of the feats that were then accomplished had become " mince-meat

¹ *Tashidaka* signifies any sum added to another to make up a deficiency in the latter.—J. H. L.

in people's mouths", as the Japanese put it. Even, in Iyemitsu's time, the art was not unknown; the interest of one of the most thrilling stories of that age centres upon an episode of this nature. Under Iyetsuna (from 1672) the samurai entirely neglected this branch of their training. Now, in 1716, it was revived, and the competitions at Isomura and elsewhere ultimately called forth the liveliest emulation. For long Yoshimune's fondness for the hunting field was popularly regarded in the light of a mere personal craze, and he was generally spoken of as the "Hawk Shōgun" or "Bird-catching Shōgun", while his hobby was held in no very high esteem by the lieges. But, in 1726, the ulterior purpose of all this must have become plain even to the most dull-witted. In that year all from the Grand Councillors down to the lowest samurai were ordered to participate in a great hunting expedition. As many as 60,000 men were mustered, and kept in the open for several nights, and put through the evolutions of an army in the field, the Shōgun himself directing everything. Since the Shimabara campaign of 1638, nothing of this sort of thing had been known in Japan. After that campaign, we have seen that the military lecturer became a prominent figure in Yedo society, and that he maintained his importance for nearly a decade. It was the decay of this importance among other things, that led to Yui's daring conspiracy, and the suppression of that great Rōnin plot had been fatal to the prospects of the *Gungakusha*.¹ Under Iyetsuna and Tsunayoshi, no encouragement whatsoever was given to the study of military science, and the professional expounders of the art of war could find neither an audience for their lectures nor a public for their treatises. Under Yoshimune, the *Gungakusha* once more found himself and his efforts appreciated. He never reacquired the immense social prestige he enjoyed between 1638 and 1645, but he began to wield a certain measure of influence, and in the next generation we shall again find him giving the Bakufu some grounds for anxiety.

In accomplishing his reforms among the Bakufu samurai, Yoshimune was greatly aided by the experience he acquired as Daimyō of Kishū. He brought up some of the picked men from Wakayama, and when his Bakufu vassals showed themselves incompetent or slack in the discharge of any duty assigned to them,

¹ The lecturer or expert in military science.—J. H. L.

the Kishū men were quietly set to work in order to provide the Yedo samurai with a standard. All feeling of shame was by no means dead among the latter, and they soon winced at the humiliation of being outdone and outclassed by mere *Baishin*, mere clan samurai, whom it had become the tradition to regard as very inferior members of their class. One of these Kishū clansmen, a certain Matsushita, gave the Yedo men one very sharp lesson. The Shōgun had a state-barge, which had not been used for years. One stormy day, when the sea was running high in Yedo Bay, Yoshimune ordered the barge to be launched, manned, and taken to Uruga and back. The officials were aghast at such a command. Matsushita, however, mustered a crew, took command, and by skilful seamanship accomplished the task. On disembarking he said that the whole thing had been mere child's play; on the coast of Kishū a day and a sea of that sort would be regarded as fit and proper for a pleasure excursion. The only difficulty in the trip was the barge itself; it was built in a most unhandy fashion and he strongly recommended that it should be broken up and replaced. Accordingly, carpenters were fetched from Kishū; and a fleet of thirty boats, suitable for any sort of weather, was soon afloat. The officials were inclined to sneer, and asked each other what possible use could ever be found for these boats. They received their answer in 1728, when certain sections of Yedo were threatened with destruction by the terrible flood of that year, and these boats were the means of saving thousands of lives, when ordinary craft could not face the typhoon then raging. The Shōgun's work among the samurai was accomplished without any great resort to punishment, for most of the Bakufu men responded readily enough to the wordless but insistent appeal that was made to their feelings of emulation and their sense of self-respect. Many of them, however, were so lost in sloth, frivolity, effeminacy and debauchery, that it became necessary to adopt firm measures to save them from themselves. Such hopeless cases were mostly found among the Kobushin-Hatamoto of from 200 to 2,900 *koku*, who held no office. The manner in which these worthies generally brought themselves within the grasp of the law is somewhat peculiar.

In his excellent volume on *Things Japanese*, Professor Chamberlain has devoted a brief, but most amusing, article to the subject of "Fashionable Crazes". From time to time, these swept over the empire with all the speed and virulence of an epidemic.

Sometimes they disappeared as suddenly as they arose, leaving no permanent effects behind them. In modern Japan they have been especially numerous ; but at no time in its history has the empire been without them. Here it may be sufficient to allude to the mania for Portuguese dress and " Things Portuguese " generally for a few years in Hideyoshi's time, although scores of similar instances could be readily adduced. In Tsunayoshi's time, we have had to deal with the rage for the Nō drama, for private, theatricals, and for the popular stage itself. Equally prominent was the furore for the composition of *Haiku* or *Haikai*,¹ which were " poems " in seventeen syllables, as distinct from the orthodox *Tanka* which consisted of thirty-one syllables and five lines. In the hands of Bashō (1644-94) and disciples of a kindred moral calibre, nothing was to be said against the *Haiku* ; in fact a great deal could be urged in its favour, as a perusal of Professor Chamberlain's learned monograph will serve to show. A vulgar variety of *Haiku* was, however, evolved, wherein one person composed the first five syllables, and another the last twelve. " This, which was known as the ' *Kammuri-zuké* ',² formed the very furthest point to which the disintegration of Japanese verse was carried. Sometimes people turned the making of epigrams into a kind of lottery, in which the winner gained a dollar, or they employed it as a vehicle for riddles and for caricatures of proverbs." The learned writer assigns the marked decline in the standard of epigrammatic excellence to the period between 1720 and 1750. In truth, this *Kammuri-zuké* feature of the *Haiku* made its appearance long before that date. Even in the Genroku age (1688-1704) the practice became a furore. All over the empire, especially in Yedo and the other large cities, it became the main interest in life for large sections of every class of the population, merchants, artisans, and even farmers often so neglected their business that they were ruined, for the teacher, the *tensha*, or corrector of the pieces produced at these functions, was often exceedingly avaricious. But it was the gambling feature that was most objectionable, and it was this special feature undoubtedly that in only too many instances gave these *Haiku* functions their tremendous vogue. Many Japanese are naturally

¹ On this subject see Aston's *Japanese Literature*, pp. 289-96. But the classic in this field is Professor Chamberlain's masterly paper on *Bashō and the Japanese Poetical Epigram*, *T.A.S.J.*, vol. xxix, pt. ii, pp. 243-362.

² Literally, " cap-putting on " or " capping ", a form of amusement in versifying not unknown in England and not entirely unintellectual.—J. H. L.

prone to gambling¹; in the old Kyōto court the vice was rife, and in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries samurai would often stake their arms, armour, and horse trappings on a cast of the dice, even on the eve of a battle, and so have to go into action in incomplete panoplies, and sometimes with no armour at all. In Tokugawa times the vice did not reach this extent among the samurai, but it became common in Yedo and continued to be so throughout the history of the city. A glance at the headings of the pages in the voluminous *Tokugawa Jikki* is sufficient to suggest that the authorities were conscious of the wide prevalence of the evil. In 1665, for example, games of chance were forbidden under severe penalties; in 1666, lotteries were interdicted, while between these complementary enactments, proclamation was made that whoever lost his estate by gambling should make disclosure of the circumstances to the magistrate, and it would then be recovered for him, if possible. One of the first measures Arai pressed upon the sixth Shōgun (1709) was the prohibition of gambling. The gamblers may have paid some little heed to the edict, but the repose they took from their labours seems to have been a very brief one. At all events, in Yoshimune's first years, gambling was notoriously rampant, and at last he felt constrained to appoint a Hatamoto officer with a staff of constables for the special purpose of suppressing it. The *Haiku* craze, which had called for drastic legislation in Tsunayoshi's time, was now worse than ever; and under the cover of *Haiku* functions the gamblers were fleecing thousands daily. So when the newly appointed officer began his rounds he found plenty of

¹ The Japanese of all degrees, both high and low, are, always have been, and, so far as one can judge the future by the past, always will be inveterate gamblers, both with cards and dice, notwithstanding that gambling is a criminal offence, liable to drastic sanctions. One who takes a Sunday walk among the hills adjacent to any large town seldom fails to come across a party, in some secluded dell, out for a full day's gambling, and, as to the upper classes, I have known a poker party, in the most exclusive club in the capital, hold a sederunt for nearly forty-eight continuous hours, when large stakes changed hands. Of course, this incident was exceptional, and it caused an alteration in the club rules, but it was an index of what may take place not infrequently, in private mansions or hired rooms. One chapter in Yoshimune's code, which, with all its subsequent amendments and additions, comprises nearly forty sections, refers entirely to gambling, whether by dice, cards, lotteries, or verse competitions, not only capping competitions, but those in which the stakes go to the compiler of a verse judged to be the best. Severe penalties are provided, imprisonment, heavy fines, social degradation to the outcast class, banishment, confiscation not only of houses in which the gambling takes place but of the land on which they stand, and the penalties extend to the landlords, landowners, neighbours, servants, money lenders who provide gamblers with funds, and others implicated in any way. Several of these provisions were continued in the Imperial codes of 1871 and 1872, though the penalties were less severe.—J. H. L.

occupation in raiding the resorts where these functions were held. It was with no small uneasiness that the Shōgun learned that among the captures then made, the *Kobushin-Hatamoto*¹ were exceedingly numerous. Accordingly eight Hatamoto inspectors were appointed for the control of the whole of this class in 1719. Five years later, in 1724, Honda, Daimyō of Koriyama in Yamato, died without an heir, and the fief then escheated to the Shōgun. Yoshimune took this opportunity to transfer Yanagisawa's son from Kōfu to Koriyama (150,000 *koku*) and Kōfu Castle thus reverted to the Bakufu. It was now ordered that *Kobushin-Hatamoto* who mis-conducted themselves were to be deported to Kōfu and detained there under strict regulations till they evinced some determination to reform. The first batch consigned to the care of the new Warden of Kōfu comprised about a hundred of the most hopeless cases ; and from this date down to the fall of the Bakufu, banishment to Kōfu became a common punishment for such Hatamoto as fell into disgrace. Kōfu keep thus became a sort of high-class penitentiary for the gentry.

Among other retrenchments the new Shōgun curtailed the expenditure on the Palace Gardens and placed them under more efficient management. At the head of the staff employed in them he placed a certain Yabuta, an old Kishū vassal of his own. This man, who was thoroughly trusted by the Shōgun, was instructed to report on everything he saw or heard not only in connexion with the gardens but in the city itself. It was his wont to spend days roaming about in the citizens' quarters, entering into converse with all sorts and conditions of men, and keenly noting all that was passing, and on the first suitable opportunity to make full report of all this to the Shōgun himself. Yoshimune was thus kept wonderfully well-informed as to what the people at large were thinking and saying and doing. In modern times, it is easy for a ruler to learn all this from the Press but, apart from occasional broad-sheets issued on the occurrence of some specially thrilling incident, such as the episode of the Forty-seven Rōnin, there was, of course, no Press in Japan. Such a device as this adopted by Yoshimune was a proper enough one in the circumstances, for his object in keeping himself apprised of the various phases of public opinion was merely

¹ The *Kobushin-Hatamoto* were Hatamoto with estates yielding annual revenues of from 100 to 3,000 *koku*, and who held no public or court office. They had to pay taxes to cover the cost of minor repairs in the palace, and in certain public buildings, hence their name *Kobushin*, "little building."—J. H. L.

to enable him to discharge the duties of his office in the most efficient manner. In Iyemitsu's time, for instance, a progress of the Shōgun through Yedo had always been preceded with a vast amount of preparation, or, as the irreverent might call it—fuss. All houses had to be closed,¹ wickets at the side-streets shut, dogs and cats kept out of the way, house-roofs repaired, the streets swept and sanded, and so on. Ever since the third Shōgun's time, regulations of this sort were enforced whenever the ruler of Japan appeared in the streets of the capital. None of his predecessors had spent a fraction of the time in the open air that Yoshimune now did. Every second or third day he and his hunting-train passed through some section of Yedo. Of course no citizen would dare to venture a word of public protest against the great inconvenience the lieges were put to by all the commotion that immediately preceded a Shōgun's passage but, when out of all reach of official ears, the townsmen did not hesitate to talk freely about what they regarded as an infliction. They soon ceased, however, to have any grounds for complaint on this score under Yoshimune. A series of *machi-fure* (street proclamations) notified that most of the established regulations in connexion with Shōgunal progresses were henceforth abrogated; all that was really needful was that the route followed by His Highness should be kept clear of obstructions. This may serve as a sample of many small reforms that originated from the budget of news and criticism supplied by Yoshimune's head gardener Yabuta. We meet with no notice of any citizen being punished, or in any way called to account for what he may have said of the Shōgun and his administration in Yabuta's presence. Under a wise and conscientious Prince like Yoshimune, the *Niwa-ban*, as these gardener-spies were called, no doubt performed a very useful and beneficial function, though it is not difficult to see how the institution (which became a permanent one) might readily become highly pernicious, as it did under some of Yoshimune's successors, when the *Niwa-ban* or *Ommitsu* (Secret Spies), a generation or two later, were the most detested functionaries in Yedo.

In 1721, the Shōgun had resort to yet another device to enable him to keep his finger upon the pulse of opinion. This year witnessed the installation of the famous "Complaint Box" (*Meyasu-bako*)

¹ It would be more correct to say that the upper floors of all houses had to be closed, the object being that no one should look down on the great magnate as he passed.—J. H. L.

in front of the Supreme Court buildings.¹ Into this box everyone, gentle or simple, was at liberty to drop his written complaint or memorial on any matter of public interest whatsoever, on the condition that every document so deposited bore the name and address of its author. No notice was to be taken of anonymous communications, while there were stringent vetoes against slander or mere self-seeking; against complaints not supported by an intimate knowledge of the facts, and against petitions connected with cases which had not previously been submitted to the proper authorities. In structure, this box was very much like a modern post-box, and the key was kept by the Shōgun himself. The strictest precautions were taken to insure that its contents should be seen by no one else, and that there could be no possible tampering with them after their insertion in the slit. Such an institution has been regarded as a great novelty by some modern writers, and, possibly enough, it was so considered by the unlettered citizens of Yedo in Yoshimune's day. Every Chinese scholar, however, must have known all about the mythical Emperor Shun with his "board and drum of complaint". Furthermore, we know that the Nihongi was still read in Yoshimune's days; we have met with Konoye Motohiro lecturing upon it to Iyenobu. Now, in the Nihongi² there is a long exposition of the Chinese lore on the subject of the Bell of Remonstrance, as a preamble to the introduction of the institution into Japan.³ Again, in Kamakura times, we hear of a Bell of Remonstrance being hung up at the entrance to the Record Office. Yet, in spite of all that, Yoshimune's *Meyasu-bako* was a novelty, practically speaking, for no Tokugawa Shōgun ever had recourse to such a device before, although it was not unknown in local fiefs.

Doubtless this new-fangled device spread a wholesome measure of consternation in many quarters. Henceforth, no member of the official hierarchy could have any precise idea of how much or how little the Shōgun happened to know of his own doings. All realized the possibility of being under the immediate eye of a strict task-master on the most unexpected occasions. Accordingly, everywhere, prompt attention was given to the discharge of routine

¹ Later on there were similar *Meyasu-bako* installed in Ōsaka and Kyōtō.

² Aston's translation, vol. ii, pp. 210-11.

³ The use of the bell and petition box was introduced by the Emperor Kōtoku, the thirty-sixth of the Imperial line, in the year A.D. 646.—J. H. L.

duties, there was a wonderful abandonment of official slackness wherever it had prevailed, and the menace of detection and punishment hung over every deviation from the paths of rectitude. The cashiering of a few of the most culpable of the officials had a most telling effect, though, on the whole, cases of punishment were not numerous. Yoshimune kept all knowledge of the most compromising memorials to himself; without mentioning any names he would request the censors, or possibly the *Niwa ban* to collect and furnish him with all possible information in such and such a matter, on such and such a point, and he collated the information obtained in this way with the particulars in the Complaint-Box petition. After digesting the data and arriving at a conclusion in his own mind, he would presently find an opportunity of imparting to the compromised official one of those gentle, courteous hints which he could convey with such tact and skill. Generally a few words were more than ample, for the Shōgun was well aware that a true artist always leaves plenty of scope for the play of the imagination.

Many of the Complaint-Box memorials were submitted to the Great or the Junior Council, to the Magistrates, or to the officials within whose purview their subjects would fall in the ordinary course. Some memorials indeed, were accorded the utmost publicity. A certain *Gungakusha*,¹ Yamashita by name, was bold enough to assail the Shōgun and his administration in very blunt and straight-flung terms. Yoshimune produced the document, and either read it out, or had it read out to the Councillors, Magistrates, and all the assembled officials. They listened with amazement, for under Tsunayoshi such freedom of language on matters of state would infallibly have procured for the writer a speedy trip to Hachijō at the public expense, and a permanent sojourn in that lonely serf-beaten isle at his own. In spite of a certain amount of wrong-headedness this memorialist undoubtedly had ample grounds for the criticisms contained in more than one of his plain-spoken paragraphs, and the Shōgun, in recognition of that fact, and of the fearless straight-forwardness of the author, ordered that he should be rewarded with a gift of 300 *ryō* for the advice he had tendered.

The translation of the term *Meyasu-bako* as "Complaint-Box" may give rise to some misconception, and convey a too restricted idea of the nature of the documents that might

¹ Vide p. 323.

be, and actually were, deposited in it. In truth, it was far from being a mere analogue of the personal columns or the "Letters from correspondents" page in a modern newspaper. Every one who had a novel idea or project in his head sketched out a prospectus or its equivalent and thrust it into the box. Some of these schemes were no doubt fantastic, and the good-natured Shōgun must have found no small amusement in the perusal of the scores of frivolous or impracticable recommendations that poured in upon him. On the other hand, several of the measures of great and permanent public utility then undertaken were really suggested by *Meyasu-bako* memorialists. One called attention to the suitability of certain shallow marshes and lagoons on the Shimōsa coast for a saltfield, and a small expenditure of money sufficed to provide the Kwantō with what has since then continued to be one of its chief sources of salt-supply. About the same time, a Rōnin pointed out that there was a large stretch of first-class land on the Shimōsa-Kadzusa boundary line lying quite undeveloped, and that this might be reclaimed with advantages. The Shōgun at once sent officials to inspect and report on the land, and the result was that an annual crop of 50,000 *koku* of rice was soon added to the supplies that came into Yedo from the Kwantō. In 1723, a city physician urged the establishment of a dispensary for the benefit of the poor, and recommended that land should be appropriated for a pharmaceutical garden, and stocked with all sorts of medicinal herbs and plants. There had formerly been such a garden in the Koishikawa district, but it had been expropriated by Tsunayoshi, as a site for one of the new Shingon fanes or the buildings connected with it. These buildings were now demolished, and a tract of some forty acres reconverted into a Botanical garden in accordance with the doctor's suggestion. Fifteen years later, Yedo was swept by a violent epidemic, and the city was thrown into the utmost consternation and confusion. The people, as usual on such occasions, fashioned a huge straw-man, and with the blowing of conch-shells, the striking of bells, and the rolling of drums, conveyed it to Shinagawa and there set it on fire and cast it into the sea. Such was the approved and orthodox way of ridding themselves of the God of Plague. Meanwhile, the Koishikawa garden had been well seen to and its plants had made capital progress. A dispensary was opened in the garden, and medicine supplied gratuitously to all applicants. This proved to be of more service

in allaying the popular alarm than the casting away of the God of Plague in Shinagawa bay.

The Rōnin class had greatly dwindled in numbers during the two preceding generations, but it had by no means disappeared. Among the Rōnin were some men of undoubted ability (as there always were) and under an ordinary Shōgun the services of these men would almost certainly have been lost to the nation. We have just seen that the *Meyasu-bako* enabled a Rōnin to add some 50,000 *koku* of rice to the annual yield of the Kwantō. This service, important as it was, can scarcely be put on the same plane as that rendered by a certain Iga Hachirōgi, another lordless man, to whom even the foreign historian of the Tokugawa age owes no small meed of obligation. Down to his day almost every ninth or tenth page in the *Tokugawa Jikki* or similar records is headed either "Great Fire" or "Fire-extinction Regulations". Now, these "Great Fires" may have been vital experiences for those who participated in them, but the frequency of their occurrence makes the stereotyped accounts to be encountered deadly dull reading for the searcher in the literature of the times. After Iga's day the caption of "Great Fire" does not disappear by any means, but it ceases to be the chief item in the contents of the records compiled by the old annalists.

What Iga proposed should be done was comparatively simple. Where the chief streets intersected, large spaces should be cleared of buildings, and the ground left open, while the corner buildings should be of the nature of the earth-built plastered fire-proof store-houses, now known throughout the Far East as "godowns". The fearful extent of the disasters when fire broke out was generally to be attributed to the sparks and blazing débris carried for miles, perhaps, on the wings of the gale. To meet this Iga suggested that all roofs of straw, shingles, or oyster-shells, should be at once prohibited, and tiles ordered to be substituted. The idea was forthwith adopted, but a glance at the records of Yoshimune's administration is enough to show that the common notion that the innovation at once recommended itself to all the people is utterly mistaken. For a score of years at least, the tile-roof regulation had to be issued and reissued with wearisome reiteration. Expense was the great stumbling-block, and although funds were advanced from the Shōgun's treasury from time to time, generally in the shape of loans, landlords were slow to move in a matter which put their

tenants to so much temporary inconvenience and their own pockets to such a strain. However, the occurrence of a few successive "Big Fires" enabled the authorities to accomplish their purpose; and at last thatch and shingle roofs became, to all intents and purposes, things of the past in Yedo. An efficient fire-extinction service was also organized in the capital. Down to this time, as has been said, the only fire brigades in existence were supplied by a dozen or fifteen small Daimyō, or by Bakufu men under the control of Hatamoto. Now, the citizens were entrusted with the duty of furnishing the firemen. Every street was ordered (1718) to provide its own night-watch and, in case of an outbreak of fire, to supply thirty firemen, besides thirty additional men to assist fugitives and clear away débris. These men, who were at first selected from among shopkeepers and apprentices, were found to be unequal to the rough work required, and next year (1719) they were replaced by workmen employed in house-building, who proved to be eminently fitted for the task. This was the origin of the famous *i-ro-ha* companies of the ten Yedo fire brigades. They were at first intended only for service in Yedo proper, but their sphere of operations was subsequently extended to south-eastern Yedo beyond the Sumida stream.

Under Yoshimune the municipal administration of his capital speedily attained a high degree of efficiency in almost every department. The leading spirit in reform was Ōoka Tadasuké, one of the few worthies of the Tokugawa régime whose names are still household words throughout the empire.¹ His appointment to the post of City Magistrate in Yoshimune's second year (1717) caused much surprise in the official world, for such extraordinary promotion was entirely unprecedented. Yoshimune had, however, sound and solid reasons for breaking through the red tape of bureaucratic routine on this occasion. On the borders of the Kishū domain at Yamada near the Great Shrines of Isé, the Bakufu had installed a Bugyō, not a

¹ The permanence of Ōoka's fame is no doubt greatly owing to the popularity of the *Ōoka Seidan*, which purports to be a collection of *causes célèbres*, forty-three in number, tried by this Japanese Solomon, and though the book contains many anachronisms, most of what it relates is founded on fact. The longest of these narratives deals with an attempt of a young Buddhist priest to pass himself off as a son born to Yoshimune by a serving-woman in his youth. In *Tenichi-bō*, as the story is termed, we find a Japanese analogue of Shakespeare's Prince Hal and the Chief Justice, the actors in it being young Yoshimune and Ōoka. However, when we remember that Ōoka was born in the same year (1677) as the future eighth Shōgun, we cannot avoid some suspicion that the alleged incident is apocryphal.

very highly important functionary, for the stipend of the office amounted only to 200 or 300 *koku*. For years, a boundary dispute existed between the Kishū farmers and those in the Yamada lands, and although the rights and wrongs of the affair were simple and plain, no Bugyō had hitherto ventured to pronounce a decision. The Daimyō of Kishū always had the ear of the Shōgun and of his great officers and, for a small Bakufu Bugyō to incur the Great feudatory's displeasure, might be equivalent to putting an end to his own insignificant official career, especially when everything pointed to the likelihood of the Lord of Kishū soon becoming Shōgun himself, a prospect which rendered the situation still more delicate. However, on being appointed to the Yamada post, Ōoka soon showed that such considerations were not to be allowed to stand in the way of performing his duty. He at once went into the case, and promptly rendered judgment against the Kishū men. Yoshimune was told of this at the time. He said nothing, but his transference of the bold magistrate from this obscure, ill-paid post to one of the most responsible positions in the Bakufu civil service (1717) clearly indicated how highly he rated a fearless sense of uprightness. Of course the Shōgun must have satisfied himself about the measure of Ōoka's ability, for something more than the mere possession of good intentions was necessary for the efficient discharge of the manifold and onerous functions of a City Magistrate in Yedo.

During the preceding century there was no lack of great judges on the Tokugawa bench, among whom the two Itakura, father and son, who had acted as Shoshidai in Kyōto from 1601 to 1654, were generally placed in a special class of their own. Ōoka was City Magistrate in Yedo for twenty years (1717-36) and Temple Magistrate for twelve more (1736-48). When he retired to a small Daimyōate of 10,000 *koku* at the end of thirty years' judicial service, it was universally admitted that the merit of his record fully entitled him to be ranked with the two Itakura. In truth men of Ōoka's calibre were then sorely needed in the City Magistracy and on the Hyōjōsho bench. Under Sakai's regency the administration of the law had become exceedingly corrupt. During the first few years of Tsunayoshi's rule a serious effort was made to reform this state of things, but after Hotta's death in 1684, bribery and corruption and the bringing of back-stairs influence to bear upon the judges became as rampant as before. Iyenobu certainly did exert himself to purify the law courts, and often went carefully

into the merits of difficult cases himself. On more than one occasion we have found Arai, to his infinite credit, doing his best to get notorious judicial wrongs rectified. Notwithstanding all this, Yoshimune found on his accession that the workings of the law-courts stood in dire need of strict personal supervision. Often several hours of his busy day were devoted to the sifting of cases he had ordered to be submitted to him. Among the selection which he made not a few were cases in which the accused in a criminal, or the litigants in a civil, case were of the humblest station, and the monetary value of the matters in dispute trivial indeed. But this was no real waste of the Shōgun's time ; it is easy to see that its effect upon the judicial officers must have been highly salutary.

The state of the law also called for his attention. No Tokugawa code was in existence. Certain general principles and certain important statutes on important special points were, of course, matters of common knowledge among the officials. Outside of this, an accurate knowledge of the law was far from common even among those whose duty it was to administer it. As for the common people the authorities had hitherto gone upon the Confucian maxim that "the people should be made to follow, but should not be made to know, the law".¹ Commoners were kept in ignorance of the penal laws ; if they did some things they were told they would be punished, but they were not told what the exact penalty would be, though no doubt their imagination might suggest it, and, apart from the special prohibitions of certain acts, they never knew when some seemingly harmless action on their part might bring them within the clutch of the law.² Yoshimune was convinced that the difficulties in trying "to make the people follow", arose from the fact that they were not "made to know". Sheer ignorance, he held, was the cause of much misconduct. He was, it is always to

¹ In 1795, Bishop Horsley declared in the British House of Lords that he "did now know what the mass of the people in any country had to do with the laws, but to obey them".

² In 1718, we are told, there were as many as 33,037 money-actions instituted in Yedo, and some thirty years later, we find the Hyōjōsho bench complaining that "money actions before us have recently increased to such an extent that if we are to try all of them, as we do now, the Court-days of the Chamber will be occupied with those actions exclusively, and no others can be heard". The current notion that Commoners in Tokugawa times were kept entirely ignorant of the laws is based on a misconception. It was merely the penalties and some of the provisions of the Criminal law that were kept secret. In Kamakura times too, there was plenty of civil litigation. A similar misconception prevails on the matter of insurance. The Japanese had an excellent system of marine-insurance. What Doeff correctly asserted in 1806, was that they had no knowledge of *Fire-insurance*.

be remembered, more intimately acquainted with the commoners and their ways than any previous Shōgun, Iyeyasu himself, perhaps, not excepted.

It was of prime importance that the law, so uncertain on many points, should be ascertained and settled and that the various provisions should then be embodied, even if not promulgated, in a code. So much preliminary work was necessary that to accomplish this must be the task of years. Meiro Kyusō and another Chinese scholar (Takase) were set to work to render the Ming and Tang codes into Japanese, and the judicial officials were supplied with these translations and instructed to refer to them when rendering their decisions. In Japan there were some legal treatises of the Tang Dynasty that had been lost in China itself, and one of these in the possession of the ex-*Sesshō*, Konoye Iyehiro, was now placed at Yoshimune's disposal. All the Bakufu legislation for the preceding century had to be carefully overhauled and sifted, and this again was an undertaking not to be accomplished in a day, while Yoshimune deemed it well to have an extensive judicial experience of his own before attempting to draft a permanent code. Meanwhile he felt that certain abuses in the law as it stood, could be remedied piecemeal. The matter of a prompt gaol delivery, for instance, could be enforced. At the beginning of 1716, the city prison was burned, and in the course of investigation that followed, some startling circumstances were disclosed. Among the prisoners who had then escaped were "some whose trials were still unfinished, though begun sixteen years before, and the original accusations against them were forgotten, their friends dead, and they themselves if and when released", were without homes in which they could take refuge. The new Shōgun determined that there should be no more cases of that description. Accused persons were re-ordered to be put upon trial at once, and guilt or innocence determined with as few remands and as little delay as possible. After the installation of the Meyasu-bako, in 1721, the friends and relatives of any prisoner had an easy means of bringing any injustice in treatment accorded him before the notice of the Shōgun himself, and both gaolers and judges had therefore to be careful in their treatment and procedure. The relatives of any one unjustly condemned were also allowed to appeal against the sentence, provided they were furnished with fresh evidence of material importance, and such an appeal might be lodged even after the infliction of capital

punishment. This may seem a somewhat strange provision, but we must never forget that the social unit in Japan was not the individual but the family, and that the family honour was a consideration of the utmost importance. So much indeed might be inferred from the clause in one of Yoshimune's "Printing-and-Publication Regulations" which accorded the right of action for libel to the descendants of any dead man who was traduced by a living author. It has been already stated that, according to the old Tokugawa law, all the members of a criminal's household participated in his doom. The terrible rigour of this original principle was somewhat mitigated by the efforts of Hoshina in Iyetsuna's time, but Yoshimune desired that punishment should be an individual matter, the relatives of the accused being called in question only when they were really *participes criminis*, or in certain other very exceptional cases, treason, for example. It might happen, nevertheless, that they became liable to punishment for misconduct disclosed in the course of the trial which western jurists would hold to be entirely unconnected with the special issue before the court. We must bear in mind that a court of justice in old Japan included in its functions not only the punishment of the evil but the reward of the good, for the Tokugawa Magistrate sat on the bench to enforce ethical, no less than legal, principles.

Torture was, as in China, a legalized institution in old Japanese law-courts. It could be applied not only to accused, but to witnesses as well till Yoshimune directed that it should henceforth be employed in the case of the former alone, and that even in the case of the accused, it should not be used for the purpose of forcing him to disclose accomplices, as had been the case till that date. No one could be executed or punished in any way till he had appended his seal to a written confession of his crime, no matter how clear and convincing the evidence against him might be. It was merely to criminals whose guilt was beyond doubt, and from whom both cross-questioning and threats had failed to induce an admission of guilt that torture was applied in order to extort the confession that was necessary for the vindication of the law. In contemporary England such criminals would have been incontinently sent to the scaffold irrespective of any confession.¹

¹ A full description of judicial torture as practised during the Tokugawa régime is given in Mr. J. C. Hall's paper on the Tokugawa Legislation (*T.A.S.J.*, vol. xli, part v). Four methods were employed. 1, Scourging, beating the shoulders and

In time all was ready for beginning the work of codification. The Hyōjōsho officers were utilized as a commission for this purpose, Matsudaira Norimura, the ablest of the Rōjū, being placed at its

buttocks with a whip termed the "Investigation whip", made of three strips of split bamboo tightly bound together with hemp rope. One hundred and fifty blows might be given with short intervals, at various stages, during which the prisoner was asked to confess. 2, Hugging the stone. The prisoner knelt, with his arms tightly braced, on a platform of three cornered stones and heavy slabs were then gradually piled on his knees. 3, The Lobster. The arms and legs were tightly bound with hemp rope, and the prisoner kept in this condition until after three or four hours the body became wan and pallid and gave signs of the approach of death. 4, Suspension. The prisoner was suspended from a beam, by his wrists, tightly bound together behind his back with green hemp rope, which gradually cut into the flesh. All these methods were successive and in cases of obstinacy might be applied to the same prisoner, intervals of a few days being allowed for rest and recovery between each stage. All were carried out with extreme rigour, but, severe as they may seem, they were less so than "the boot" contemporaneously employed by the Duke of York in the Covenanters of Scotland, or, a hundred years later, but also contemporaneously with the Tokugawa, than "the pitch cap" or the "picketing" universally used by the British troops in Ireland on the rebels (often on quite innocent peasants) of 1798. The Japanese suspension, only used as a last resort in extreme cases after all other methods had failed, was in fact milder than the Irish picketing, and that again was milder than the pitch caps. All these forms of torture in Japan were very much milder than those used in pre-Tokugawa days, and even in the case of the Christian persecutions under the first three Shōguns of the dynasty. A full description of the latter is given in the *Story of Old Japan*.

Very shortly after the Imperial Government came into power, new codes of criminal law were compiled, in accordance with which torture was in future limited to scourging, and in 1873 it was formally entirely abolished as an item in judicial procedure, but neither provisions was strictly carried out. In 1873, M. Boissonade, a distinguished French jurist in the service of the Japanese Government, while working in his office in the Department of Justice one day, heard deep and continued groaning coming from an adjoining room. Not getting any explanation of its cause, he investigated it for himself, and found a fairly young man "Hugging the Stone". He at once pushed over the slabs, released the sufferer, and told the Government that he would not continue in their service for another day if such brutality continued to be tolerated. This incident produced the nominal abolition of torture, but it also showed that the provisions of the law of 1871 could be made a dead letter at the will of the officials. And so it has also been with the abolition. Years afterwards the present writer had every reason to believe that torture was still and not rarely used in local police offices, while it is notorious that it was freely used with pristine severity on alleged rebels, both in Korea and Formosa, often on persons who were entirely innocent. I knew, from unquestionable authority, of many instances in Formosa. England cannot, however, throw stones at Japan on this account any more than she can for the practice of preceding centuries. There is nothing that the Japanese Gendarmerie (at all ordinary times a splendidly trained force) did in either Korea or Formosa that cannot be paralleled to the fullest extent by the acts of the "Black and Tans" and the "Auxiliaries" in Ireland in 1920-1.

The Boissonade incident is described in Professor Chamberlain's encyclopaedic work *Things Japanese*, under the caption "Foreign Employes in Japan", a work which is full of interesting information, conveyed with both humour and the literary skill which characterizes all Professor Chamberlain's works, and is encyclopaedic only in the variety of the subjects of which it treats, consisting as it does of only one small and easily handled volume. The incident was, however, well known to me when it occurred and I was well acquainted with both M. Boissonade and the sufferer whom he rescued, the late Count Mutsu, whose offence was a political one. Twenty years later Count Mutsu was Minister for Foreign Affairs, an office which he held for several years, and his son was also for several years Secretary of Embassy in London.—J. H. L.

head and charged with the general superintendence of the enterprise. As each article was drafted it was submitted to the Shōgun. If he approved of it as it stood, it was copied by one of the Sobayōnin, and returned to the commission. If he was not satisfied, which was frequently the case, with the drafts placed before him he called for details and full explanations, and frequently proposed important and salutary amendments. Three or four years were occupied in formulating a final draft of the 103 articles of which the so-called *Hundred Articles of Kwampō* really consisted, and in 1742, the whole received the Shōgun's formal sanction, and became the law of the land. Henceforth this code was the basis of all criminal law, modifications of some of the original articles were inserted from time to time below the text of these articles; and in this form the code was again revised and issued as the *Kajō Ruiten* in 1790 in the Shōgunate of Iyenari, the eleventh Shōgun.¹

By "issued", however, it must be understood that it was among the judicial and administrative officers that copies of the penal code were distributed. Even Yoshimune rested content with communicating no more than the elements of criminal law to the common people. The old *Jōei-Shikimoku* of Kamakura days was still used here and there by a stray writing-master as a copy-book. We hear of Yoshimune rewarding one of these village worthies he discovered in the course of one of his hawking excursions at Shimane in the neighbourhood of Yedo. At this date, there were about 800 teachers of penmanship in the mercantile quarter of the capital, and passages from the translation of the Ming Code were distributed among them to serve as "texts". These schoolmasters were also presented with copies of the translation of the *Rikuyu-Engi*, or "Exposition of the Six Principles", a celebrated primer of Confucian morality, for the Shōgun held that a knowledge of ethics was of even more consequence than an acquaintance with the provisions of the law.

¹ A very full translation of Yoshimune's code by the late Mr. J. Carey Hall, formerly H.M. Consul-General at Yokohama, is contained in *T.A.S.J.*, vol. xli, part v. The same learned scholar has, in previous volumes of the Society's transactions, also described the Hōjō Code, the Jōei Shikimoku, called also the Go-seibai Shikimoku (vol. xxxiv), the Ashikaga Code or Kemmu Shikimoku (vol. xxxvi, part ii), and the laws promulgated by the three first of the Tokugawa Shōguns (vol. xxxviii, part iv). Yoshimune's code continued in force, with slight modifications introduced from time to time, till 1871, when a new criminal code, termed "the chief points of the New Fundamental Laws", was issued by the Imperial Government. It was followed two years later by the "Revised Fundamental and Supplementary Laws". Summaries (not translations) of both these codes by the present writer are contained in *T.A.S.J.*, vol. v, part ii. Both were about ten years later replaced by new codes, largely based on Western models.—J. H. L.

Another innovation of the time was an attempt to utilize the erudition of the *Jusha* or Chinese scholars in a more sensible fashion than it had been. Hayashi, Daigaku no Kami, was still President of the Seidō, or University of Yedo, and after a period of semi-eclipse in Arai's time, he once more found himself a personage of some consequence, though Yoshimune was far from making as much of the Rector of the University as his predecessor Tsunayoshi, and he seems never to have made a personal visit to the Seidō, during the whole of his administration, though he took care to apprise himself of its procedure. The officials were ordered to attend certain courses of lectures and, in addition, Hayashi and his assistants were requested to provide a special course of instruction for the public at large. It was at the same time hinted to them that in these discourses they should lay stress upon what was of real essential importance, and dispense with learned disquisitions about the exact import of Chinese characters and with similar exegetic minutiae. This recommendation appears to have ruffled some of the *Jusha* rather seriously. They were inclined to regard it as a distinct slight to scholarship. At the same time the Shōgun instituted other courses of popular lectures in the Takakura *yashiki*, and at several points in or near the mercantile quarter, and engaged some of the ablest men to be found to discharge what were virtually the duties of University Extension Lecturers. Among others we find the names of Muro Kyusō, of Kinoshita, the son of Arai's teacher, and of Butsu Sorai. Presently, keen rivalry set in between these as representatives of different schools of thought, as keen perhaps as that which prevailed in Kyōto in the days of Sugawara Michizane. The Shōgun, however, was convinced that progress was the usual result of a clash of opinions, and showed himself ready to encourage any one who evinced inclination and ability to think for himself. A certain Nakai had opened a private school in Ōsaka and Yoshimune ordered a plot of land to be given to him as a site for more extensive buildings, while some important scholastic institutions in Kyōto (Itō's among them) were also accorded substantial encouragement. Hayashi was supposed to be the Bakufu's hereditary *Jusha* or Chinese scholar, and as we have seen, Hayashi Nobuatsū was now occasionally entrusted with official work. But he never attained to any great measure of influence under Yoshimune, nor did Arai's friend, Muro Kyusō, who was also in the

government service.¹ Kyusō was ultimately selected to act as tutor to the heir-apparent—Iyeshige—which meant, of course, that the Shōgun must have had a high regard for his personal character, though it is evident that he did not possess a great or an original mind. In sheer intellectual ability he fell far behind the brilliant Ogyu Sorai (1666-1728), who was probably what Dr. Aston commits one of his very rare errors of judgment in representing Arai to have been—the most distinguished of Japanese Confucianists. Whether he commanded the confidence of Yoshimune to the same extent as the plodding, rather commonplace, Muro Kyusō, is more than doubtful; but what is certain is that the Shōgun showed himself keenly interested in Sorai and his books. From 1721 onwards we meet with rather frequent notices of interviews between the Shōgun and the philosopher, and after Sorai's death in 1728, his posthumous works were duly presented to, and accepted by Yoshimune as they were successively published.

The relations between Yoshimune and Sorai are of no small interest in the light of what took place two generations later, in 1790 to be precise. In that year the teaching of all "heretical doctrines" was suppressed in the University, and soon after in all the great clan schools. Thenceforth no occupant of a Professorial chair was to expound anything but the Teishu philosophy, the system elaborated by the great scholars of the Sung dynasty in China. Sorai was perhaps the most formidable opponent of that system that Japan produced during the Tokugawa régime. In the special chapter on Chinese philosophy in this volume he has already been named together with Yamaga Sokō (and Itō Jinsai) as a leading light in the so-called "Ancient" School of Philosophy. The doctrines of Yamaga and Itō were a reproduction and development of the teachings of Confucius and Mencius, but they rejected the deductions which in China and Japan had been drawn from the words of these great sages by the Teishu school. Sorai was at one with them in rejecting these deductions, but he furthermore declined to recognize Mencius

¹ For Kyusō see Aston's *Japanese Literature*, pp. 257-66, and Dr. Knox's monograph in *T.A.S.J.*, vol. xx, pt. i. In Dr. Knox's translation, the reader will doubtless be struck by the bold freedom of Kyusō's language here and there. It must not be overlooked that Kyusō was perfectly well aware that he was risking nothing by indulging in it; that, on the contrary, it would meet with the Shōgun's high approval if it came to his ears. The incident of Yamashita and his memorial would not be likely to be soon forgotten.

as any authority at all. Xavier was astonished to be so often asked whether he considered man to be naturally virtuous or the reverse. This was one of the questions that divided the schools of ancient China, Confucius, and still more Mencius, insisting on the innate goodness of humanity. Shuntz on the other hand maintained that the human heart is deceitful above all things and desperately wicked, and in following him, Sorai was as emphatic in his support of the doctrine of original sin as any Presbyterian divine could well be. Sorai had a rough and rude upbringing; for long periods he was constrained to keep body and soul together on bean-curd refuse, and in his early days he had thus come to have an intimate acquaintance with the unpleasant realities of life. Later in his life he was in the service of the court favourite, Yanagisawa, and in the Yanagisawa *yashiki*, the seamy side of things was always conspicuous. In all this, the philosopher had doubtless been very unfortunate, but it had the effect of making him pause and consider how far the orthodox doctrines, as expounded by Hayashi, served to explain society as he had actually found it. The average Tokugawa *Jusha* was little better than a mere book-worm, seeing everything through a distorting and blurring medium of texts and treatises and commentaries, and never thinking of reading in the great book of life that has always lain open for the perusal of the intelligent. Sorai's distinction was that this volume had been his chief manual, in truth, he seems to have been as much a man of the world and a "specimen" as Diderot's Rameau was to prove himself to be a generation or two later on. Yet withal, even in the matter of the written and printed word, he had furnished himself with a culture much more extensive than could be claimed by any of his contemporaries. In addition to the usual Chinese texts and commentaries he had eagerly absorbed works on language, military science, economy, politics and music. To acquire a knowledge of Chinese as actually spoken by a living Chinaman he had gone to Nagasaki, and from the Chinese whom he met there he learned to read their language as they themselves read it, without construing it into Sinico-Japanese as was universally done in Japan. To style he paid great attention, and his critics admit that he became the master of a rare style, which possessed many of the superior qualities of classical Chinese.

Many of the works left us by the Tokugawa *Jusha* indicate only too clearly that their authors, instead of mastering their authorities,

were themselves often entirely mastered by the materials with which they wrought. Not a few of their works are mere translations or paraphrases of Chinese commentaries; others are little better than pedantic and prosy disquisitions on commonplaces that usually serve as copy-book headlines. To digest their reading, to see how far it was consistent with itself and with the facts and principles of experience, and then to co-ordinate and integrate the result into an organic harmonious whole, to accomplish such a task few among them were competent. Few among them indeed seem to have suspected that the philosopher could be confronted by any such task. In truth, in his day and generation, Sorai would appear to have been almost the only one who addressed himself to an effort of the kind. As a reward he was constantly assailed by his contemporaries as being a mere eccentric with an unappeasable itch for acquiring notoriety by the "novelty and oddity of his opinions".

As has been hinted, Yoshimune, while not hesitating to avail himself of their services, where they could be of some practical benefit, had nothing of Tsunayoshi's or Iyenobu's extreme regard for the Confucianists of the time. The gist of all they had to say had already been said, said too often in fact, and the eighth Shōgun was much too busy a man to spare time to listen to the reiteration of what to him were so many stale platitudes. Hence, it is not unlikely that it was the very "novelty and oddity" of Sorai's opinions that led Yoshimune to evince such a measure of interest in this Japanese Hobbes. It is far from likely that Yoshimune agreed with Sorai's doctrines in their entirety, for he was no cynic, while the cynicism of the philosopher is frank and pronounced, but he found in him a man who, at all events, had the ability to think for himself, and the courage to expound unpalatable and unpopular truths, or what he honestly conceived to be truths, and to develop them to their logical consequences.

To Sorai it appeared that the essence of Confucianism was political, that its chief object is the establishment of good government by the employment of men whose moral characters are in a high state of development. Such a text must have readily commended itself to the Shōgun who had promoted Ōoka from his obscure country post to one of the most responsible in the administration and who was keenly on the outlook for men of Ōoka's breed.

The Soraistic definition of virtue might also have met with Yoshimune's approval:—

“All that benefits men, all that succours the people is virtue, because this is the desire of all.”

With Sorai's account of the origin of morality it might have been different:—

“*Morality is nothing but the necessary means for controlling the subjects of the empire.* It did not originate with nature, nor with the impulses of man's heart, but it was devised by the superior intelligence of certain sages (*seijin*), and authority was given to it by the State. *Morality may be regarded as a device for governing the people.* ‘Sages’ is a title given to manufacturers—to the men who framed laws, rules, moral maxims, and precepts for other men. These sages were in every way superior to ordinary men, and no amount of study will suffice to raise a man to the level of a sage. There was in the character of these sages a combination of remarkable traits, and this combination it was that constituted their greatness. Their imitators may succeed in cultivating certain of their moral and intellectual qualities, but they cannot reproduce the type as a whole. In China Confucius had no equal. Such men as the Sung commentators were but poor imitators of him, and when men like our Itō Jinsai and others aspire to figure as sages, we see how vain is the attempt. They follow the great sage, but a long, long way off. To try and adopt the ideas of the great teacher and carry them out in daily life, this, one can do, but this is very different from setting oneself up as an authority.”

In the light of subsequent developments this and similar passages in Sorai's works are of no small interest. Before the century was out, there was to be a great revolt, not against the Sung philosophy merely but against the dominance of Chinese influence in the moral and intellectual life of Japan, and in the vigorous assault delivered upon the sages of China, and their “abominable doctrines”, Motoori undoubtedly utilized these contentions or admissions of Sorai as weapons of attack. Sorai had even gone so far as to speak of himself as a mere “Eastern Barbarian”; and much of the virulence of the Shintō Propagandists' language is perhaps to be explained as a recoil against the extreme abasement of Sorai's attitude towards Chinese philosophy and philosophers.

Among all the Tokugawa *Kangakusha*, he appears to be one of the very few whose works are worth translating. Renderings have been made of several pieces of his pupil Dazai (1680–1747), who, however, is deficient in the combination of qualities which Sorai regarded as the essential feature in the constitution of what is called

“genius”. In Sorai’s own case, the combination consisted in a profound acquaintance with the stern realities of life and an ability to think for himself, a wide and yet solid scientific and literary culture, the power of digesting his acquisitions, rendering them and his experiences consistent and co-ordinating and integrating the results into a harmonious organic whole, and lastly the mastery of a style of exposition at once lucid, concise and trenchant. Even with all this Sorai can hardly be regarded as a sage, for a sage implies a degree of moral elevation to which Sorai remained a stranger. He is of the “Honesty-is-the-Best-Policy” school of moralists.

The long reign of the Emperor Kang-Hi (1661-1721) was a period of great literary activity in China. Splendid new editions of the Classical and Canonical Books, of the works of the Sung Commentators, and of sets of the National Histories, poured from the press in rapid succession, and these were supplemented by solid modern scientific treatises, the great dictionary of Kang-Hi, and a great encyclopædia. Sorai heard of all this during his intercourse with the Chinese frequenting Nagasaki, and it was probably owing to his instigation that we must attribute Yoshimune’s unceasing efforts to procure every important publication that appeared or had recently appeared in contemporary China. The Nagasaki officials had to give numerous commissions to the licensed junks to bring copies of all these works, while any volumes brought on the traders’ own initiative were sure to be readily purchased by the authorities. In fact, the Chinese, whose incurable smuggling proclivities had inclined the Bakufu more than once to contemplate their absolute exclusion from Japan, were now welcomed with sincerity on account of their books and their drugs. The list of books, imported by the Bakufu at this time, is a long and very remarkable one. Strangely enough, the Japanese were in a position to make some return in kind, albeit a slight one. During his visit to Nikkō in 1728, Yoshimune sent officials to inspect the library of the Ashikaga Gakkō, the great school of the Kwantō, so famous in the Middle Ages. Many old Chinese manuscripts were disinterred from its chests, and some of these proved to be transcripts of works that had been utterly lost in the land of their nativity. These were now taken to Yedo and printed, and copies dispatched to China where, we are told, they were much appreciated. The special object of search in the Ashikaga library at this time was, however, not so much Chinese as old Japanese manuscripts. Tsunayoshi had paid a good

deal of attention to old Japanese literature and antiquities and, as has been said, brought Kitamura and other scholars from Kyotō to Yedo and set them to work on the preparation of old texts for the printer. This was in a measure resuming a task that occupied a good deal of Iyeyasu's time in the last period of his life. Now, Yoshimune's chief model was his great-grandfather, and he made a serious effort to carry on the enterprise that had been initiated by Iyeyasu but neglected by the two generations that followed him, of collecting old Japanese manuscripts. Yoshimune's chief agent in this was a citizen of Yedo, one Aoki Konyō, who spent long years roaming all over the empire on his quest for antiquarian literature. His travels took him to Nagasaki, and there he became so much interested in the Hollanders that he induced the Shōgun to station him at Nagasaki permanently for the express purpose of learning their language. Yoshimune had already divined the importance of Western science, and had cancelled the century-old veto against the reading and translating of European books. Astronomers had especially urged this course upon him. He was for very practical and prosaic reasons deeply interested in the subject. Meteorology and the seasons had an intimate bearing on agriculture. Agriculture was the basis of the whole national economy, and from first to last the Shōgun was untiring in his efforts to grapple with the extremely serious agrarian problems of the age and to devise satisfactory solutions for them. In truth, Yoshimune devoted so much attention to this all-important field that one begins to wonder how he contrived to find time to get through the tremendous amount of work that must be placed to his credit in connexion with other affairs. Assuredly he was one of the hardest workers—probably *the* hardest worker—in the empire of Japan between 1716 and 1744.

At the beginning of his administration he had to face a serious deficit in the treasury, so much so that he was actually driven to borrow 200,000 *ryō* from rich merchants and to obtain a considerable rice-loan from some of the Daimyō. Just as he was bringing the financial chaos into something like order, a terrible typhoon completely ruined the harvest of 1718, in the Kwantō, and both Yedo Castle and Yedo itself suffered severely. Extensive repairs became urgently necessary, for the Korean embassy and the Lūchū envoys were on their way and they had to be properly received. At nearly the same time, the Kōfukuji at Nara was burned down, and in one of the great Yedo conflagrations of 1720, the Uyeno

temples were reduced to ashes. The costs of re-erection were heavy, and they fell mainly upon the Bakufu. These disasters made further rice-loans necessary. In return for the loans, the Daimyō's term of obligatory residence in Yedo was temporarily curtailed by one-half, and they were therefore for the time relieved from a heavy burden of expense. The authorities were also confronted by popular discontent occasioned by the appreciation of commodities, and the dismissal of the clan chieftains, with their crowds of retainers, to their own domains did not a little to lower prices to their ordinary level. This was only a palliative, it is true, but meanwhile the effect began to show itself of the energetic reforms instituted in the Bakufu lands in 1716, and before a decade had passed all liabilities were discharged while in almost every succeeding year there was a substantial surplus revenue.

From the beginning of the administration the Bakufu domain had been taken vigorously in hand. Great riparian works—the dredging and alignment of river courses; the construction of new and the strengthening of old embankments; canals, for irrigation purposes—had been early planned and duly carried to completion. For once, at least, in the history of Japan, the very important matter of country roads had received a certain amount of attention, and, what was most remarkable, a vast extent of land in the Kwantō was either restored to cultivation or reclaimed and brought under cultivation for the first time. The reclamation of a tract of waste land on the Shimōsa-Kadzusa boundary, producing 50,000 *koku*, was only one case in point, for the same sort of work was prosecuted all over the Bakufu home domain, and the result was that in a few years the food supply of Yedo could almost be obtained from Kwantō produce alone. At the same time, it was now easier to feed Yedo than it had ever been before, for the return of the Daimyō, with their trains, to their fiefs, lessened the throng of menials in their *yashiki*, and, at the same time, reduced the chances of employment for casual unskilled labour in the city. A good deal of this labour must have reverted to the land, where there was again plenty of employment for it, while the new hopeful state of things in all the Kwantō villages must have enticed many to return who had been driven from their homes and holdings by Tsunayoshi's insensate Life-Protection Statutes. Hitherto Yedo had been merely the great consuming centre, the belly of the empire. In 1732, for the first time, it figured in a different rôle. In that year

an insect pest ravaged the rice-fields of Kyūshū. Shikoku, the west of the main island, and the whole of south-western Japan were threatened with, and to some extent suffered, the horrors of famine. The Shōgun's granaries on the banks of the Sumida were, however, full to repletion and, as soon as he learned of the plight of the southern Daimyōates, a great fleet of transports was laden by him with Kwantō rice and dispatched to the afflicted districts. Although as many as 169,000 victims died, the calamity would have been infinitely worse but for the prompt action of the Bakufu. We have heard of the Bakufu lending a sum of 40,000 *ryō* for famine relief in Bizen in Iyetsuna's time, but this is the first occasion on which we meet with mention of the dispatch not of money but of rice for such a purpose. The rich merchants of Yedo, following the example of their lord, subscribed liberally to the famine-relief fund, and the Shōgun had a full list of the names of the contributors printed, one copy of which was presented to the emperor, and the others were either sold or distributed among the people. Altogether Yoshimune's work on this occasion deserves to be classed with the best work of the kind accomplished by the best of the Kama-kura Hōjō, while his attitude towards the afflicted people is in glaring contrast to that of those Ashikaga Shōguns who had thought it no shame to continue in their course of pompous ostentation, frivolity and debauchery, all unheeding, while the peasants were dying on the roadsides like stricken flies and a daily average of 700 or 800 corpses was gathered in the streets of Kyōto almost under the very walls of the Shōgun's palace. No doubt the form of government and the structure of the administrative machine are very important matters, but after all it is the character and ability of the man, or men, who manipulate the machine that are the weightiest considerations, so far as the happiness and welfare of the governed are concerned. It was to his skill and judgment in the selection and handling of men that Yoshimune's brilliant yet solid success in the administration of the Bakufu domain is mainly to be attributed. His chief agents in Yedo were, of course, the Finance Magistrates, or Commissioners. Of these there were always four, two of them being specially concerned with the treasury and the mint, and the other two with the control of the Gundai and Daikwan. During Yoshimune's administration of twenty-eight years there were a good many changes in the personnel of this body of officers. Few of them were actually dismissed; some died

in harness, while several of them were promoted to the great censorate.

None of them attained the celebrity of the famous City Magistrate, Ōoka, but they were all of good repute, and the general level of ability among them was high. At the same time, they were all kept gently, yet very firmly, in hand; no one among them could venture on the freaks indulged in by the notorious Ogiwara under Tsunayoshi and Iyenobu.

Almost as important as they were the thirty or forty Gundai and Daikwan, who represented the majesty of the Shōgun and of the law in the various sections of the wide-spreading Bakufu lands. In several districts these offices had become hereditary and in six of them they remained so down to 1868. This state of affairs was advantageous in many respects, but it was not without its drawbacks. Successive occupants of the same family were not necessarily all of the same ability; some at this date were really inferior men, while others were too much inclined to fall into a torpid routine, and to let things drift. One or two of them were venal. At first, the Shōgun had some slight difficulty in imposing his will upon some of these functionaries; one, indeed, was discovered to be playing the part of a wanton obstructionist. However, the installation of the "Complaint Box" in 1721, enabled Yoshimune to bring this worthy to book, and after his cashierment there appears to have been little more trouble. An obscure rustic, a certain Tanaka Kyūgu, about the same time presented a memorial on Local Administration, in which he indulged in the luxury of frank-speaking. Abuses were mercilessly exposed and scathingly denounced, while some of the Shōgun's own measures were criticized in no very courtier-like fashion. Yoshimune at once perceived the importance of the document. Its author was taken into official employment as chief of the Kawasaki post-station, and was afterwards made one of the Daikwan. The Shōgun did not wantonly remove officers until he had given them an opportunity to mend their ways; but he was always on the outlook for proper men to replace them in the event of their failing to rise to the standard of efficiency he exacted.

One point on which the Shōgun strongly insisted was that the Daikwan should assemble the villagers and clearly explain the purposes of the laws and regulations that were issued from time to time. This was merely in accordance with Yoshimune's maxim

that the people could be "made to follow" more readily if they were first "made to know". It was from this time that the *Kumi-chō* (group-record) began to assume the importance that it ultimately attained in village administration. Reference has already been made to the *seishi* or written oath of fidelity as regards the discharge of his functions that every Bakufu official had to subscribe, and attest with the "blood-seal". The principle had already been applied among the peasants in different localities, but it was only now that it developed into a regular and established institution. The *Kumi-chō* embodied the gist of all the regulations and laws already in force and, as new ones were issued, their gist also was incorporated. The language was generally in the form of a promise or undertaking, "We will do so-and-so," or "we will refrain from doing so-and-so" as the case might be. The document ended with an oath that villagers would strictly obey and enforce the articles to which they pledged themselves, and all the house-fathers put their names and seals after this in the order of their groups in the village. The record was then periodically—in some instances as often as once in three months, or even once a month—explained by the village headman, occasionally by the Daikwan himself, to all the people in his charge. As new regulations were issued, or as the village population changed, the *Kumi-chō* was revised or recompiled, with the usual oath appended, and signed and sealed with great solemnity. We are told that by the end of the eighteenth century there was scarcely a village in Japan where the *Kumi-chō* was not among the chief instruments of administration.

It may be instructive to direct attention to one feature in the phraseology of these *Kumi-chō* articles. It is illustrated in the following clauses as samples:—

"If a young man who has been temporarily in the service of a Daimyō or Hatamoto and has obtained the privilege of wearing two swords returns to his village, he is not to continue to wear the swords, as this is contrary to ancient custom, and we, the Kumi, the Nanushi, and Toshiyori *will consider ourselves responsible in the matter.*

"Only *ryōshi* (hunters) may carry guns. If others use them secretly *they will be punished.*

"Whoever abandons his *kumi* shall be reported, and upon investigation *shall be punished.*

"All tradesmen and farmers, when they are met on the road by any person of Samurai rank, or by the retainers of such person, shall, if on horseback, dismount and wait till he has passed, and shall also refrain from doing anything to trouble or inconvenience him. In case of a

breach of this rule, *any punishment may be inflicted which may appear to be deserved.*

"Counterfeiters of coin shall be reported.

"In case of a fire all shall run immediately to the storehouse and try to save it. Those who wilfully absent themselves shall on investigation be deemed culpable."

In all these cases, it will be noted the villagers are simply told what to do or what not to do, and informed that they will be held responsible, or punished, but nothing whatsoever is said of the nature of the punishment, an omission which supports the contention that the express provisions and penalties of the Penal Code were not communicated to the people at large in Tokugawa times.¹ Apart from the introduction or rather the revival of the "Five-men" group system of Frank-pledge, and its extension under Iyemitsu, the scheme of local administration established by Iyeyasu had undergone but little modification since his death. This scheme, as has been said, was uniform only in its general principles. The great Tokugawa fief was constituted of a congeries of former fiefs, each of which had its own peculiar administrative institutions, and it was one of Iyeyasu's chief principles to disturb the customary order of things as little as possible. Hence the great divergencies in small particulars in such matters as the calculation of and methods of paying taxes that were often to be found even in neighbouring villages. Before this date there were two chief methods of assessing the farmer's dues to the government. In one, the assessment was made annually by the revenue officials after an inspection of the actual state of the crops. This *mi-tori* system, as it was called, seemed on the face of it, to have much to recommend it but, in practice, it was found to give rise to great trouble and inconvenience. It was, at the same time, the source of much scandal, for the "simple-minded" peasant was well aware that it was often highly profitable to placate the assessor before his visit. The theory of the other method was quite simple. The total average annual production of each plot of land was taken for a decade: on this basis an assessment was made for an indefinite time, and a certain proportion of the assessed product was collected as tax. Yoshimune desired to make this system universal, with the proviso that in bad years a reasonable deduction from the usual levy should be

¹ The examples of *Kumi-chō* and cognate documents given in Simmons and Wigmore's monograph (*vide supra*) will repay careful study.

made, after official appraisement. He did not venture to impose his will arbitrarily in this matter. The Daikwan were instructed to explain the disadvantages of the *mi-tori* method to the cultivators, and to endeavour to induce them to consent to its abandonment in favour of the system of permanent assessment. After the change was effected it was possible to arrive at an accurate notion of the fiscal capacities of the Bakufu lands. The assessed annual yield of these was now returned at 4,088,950 *koku*, of which 1,387,570 *koku* were levied as taxes. There can be no doubt that under Yoshimune the gross average annual yield was of a much higher amount but, from the surplus, the Bakufu reaped no advantage except that of having to deal with prosperous and contented communities of tax-payers.

It has already been abundantly explained that, from one point of view, the Bakufu domain was merely the greatest of the fiefs into which the empire was then partitioned.¹

In the preceding paragraph, we have been dealing with the work of Yoshimune, not so much as Shōgun, but as an ordinary feudal administrator of a great fief, although indeed there was very little of feudalism about the administration of the Bakufu lands, for they were all managed by salaried intendants who held no part or parcel of them. For the local administration of the lands not owned by the Bakufu Yoshimune was not responsible and, beyond urging upon the Daimyō the importance of efficiency and economy, he did not presume to interfere. His own example was not without its effect ; in his time, there was once more as much healthy activity in most of the fiefs as there was in Tosa and Bizen between 1650 and 1660. The mischief that was done under the slack régime of the Regent Sakai and afterwards by Tsunayoshi's misguided Life-Protection Statutes was at last effectually repaired. So vigorously had the reclamation of waste land been prosecuted, that by 1750 there was more than twice as much land under cultivation in Japan

¹ This can be most easily grasped by attending to the assessed revenues of the five most extensive domains of the time.

	<i>Koku.</i>
The Bakufu	4,088,950
Mayeda of Kaga	1,022,700
Shimazu of Satsuma	770,800
Datē of Sendai	620,050
Tokugawa of Owari	619,500

In the Bakufu domain, the revenues of Hatamoto holdings are not included ; in the case of the clans, the revenues of the great sub-vassals that would correspond to the Hatamoto are included.

as there was in the year of Sekigahara (1600) a century and a half before. Strict accuracy of figures is, of course, not to be expected in any estimate of the cultivated acreage of the country from time to time, but the assertion that there were only about 5,000,000 acres under tillage in Iyeyasu's days (1600-15) and over 11,000,000 acres in 1750, is perhaps approximately correct. What at first seems utterly incredible is the statement that in some years the rice-yield under Yoshimune amounted to no less than 60,000,000 *koku*! A little consideration may lead to the conclusion that these figures may not be very exaggerated. There was nearly as much land under cultivation as there is now, and a greater proportion of that land was in all probability then appropriated for rice-fields, than is at present. But the most important factor in the case is that a great extent of these fields must have been more productive than they are nowadays, for the fertility of the wide expanses of reclaimed marshes and bottoms must originally have been many degrees greater than it was after more than a century of continuous cropping. What is almost certain is that after Yoshimune there was no addition to the cultivated superficies of the empire. In some of the northern fiefs—notably that of Yonezawa—we do indeed hear of extensive reclamation projects being carried out a generation or so later, but against this has to be set the fact that in many other quarters a great deal of arable land had meanwhile gone out of cultivation.

It is somewhat odd to find that one effect of this great augmentation to the annual resources of the empire was to plunge certain sections of the community into dire economic distress. A concrete hypothetical case will best serve to show how such an unexpected state of affairs resulted. As has been said, many of the officials were paid partly in rice, and partly in money, but many among them were paid in rice solely, as were also all the ordinary vassals, not in office. An official or a vassal who drew a three-men's ration, received 5·4 *koku* of rice per annum, and this constituted the whole of his assured income. Of this 3 *koku* would be consumed by his family; and the surplus of 2·4 *koku* would be converted into cash to purchase clothes, fuel, fish, miso, and other personal and household necessities. Rice became so abundant at this time that 2·4 *koku* realized on the market no more than a single *ryō*—something between twenty and thirty shillings—a totally insufficient sum to defray the needs of gentle birth and breeding, though the purchasing

power of money was then manifold to what it became a few generations later. It was the very lowest class of vassals that suffered most, but the middle and even the higher grades of the samurai also suffered in a very trying fashion. Under Tsunayoshi, rice was abnormally high; and the rice-stipend, when converted into money, made the average samurai a tolerably well-to-do man. The result was that an expensive style of living became general, and continued to be so for a whole generation. The only expedient in this new era of diminished incomes was the curtailment of expenses and the return to the comparative simplicity of life in the pre-Genroku days. This was too heroic a course for many who had long been accustomed to the whirl of fashionable life, with its unceasing round of ostentation and frivolity. The common resource was the money-lender; debts were recklessly contracted on the expectation that the shrinkage in the annual income would be only temporary, and that rice would soon be once more quoted in the market at the general rate prevalent in Tsunayoshi's time. The Shōgun tried to induce his vassals to retrench, and there was a considerable sumptuary legislation during his administration, which on the whole, was not injudicious, but notwithstanding these measures, and attempts that were made to regulate the rate of interest, not a few samurai families fell hopelessly into the clutches of the usurers or of the *fuda-sashi*.¹

What complicated the economic situation rather seriously was the peculiar state of the coinage. Here again we meet with a complete reversal of the conditions that prevailed during the later Genroku (1688–1704) and the Ho-ei (1704–11) periods. Then the economic embarrassment of the time had partly resulted from the debasement of the coinage. The trouble was now occasioned by the superiority of the coins struck by Yoshimune's mint. Hitherto, of all the gold coins issued by the Shōgunate, the original or *Keichō-ōban*,² Koban, and subsidiary pieces were the best in quality. Yoshimune's earlier issues were slightly superior even to these. One of the new pieces was to count only as two of Tsunayoshi's,

¹ The Fuda-sashi were persons specially licensed as brokers for the purchase of their rice allowances from the retainers of feudal lords. They were generally willing to make advances at high interest on the security of the allowances and falling into their hands may have been analogous to people of good social standing in modern days giving a bill of sale on their household effects, or having recourse to the pawnbroker.—J. H. L.

² Keichō—name of year period (1596–1615) in which this coinage was issued.

although they were intrinsically worth a good deal more, and the correctness of Gresham's generalization was presently confirmed by what now took place in Japan. Towards the end of the eighth century the great emperor Kwammu¹ fulminated against the hoarders of coin, and insisted upon a certain proportion of the annual produce of the fields being stored in the national granaries. In the eighteenth century we seem to meet with a genuine instance of history repeating itself, for we now find not a few laws and instructions which are identical in tenor with those of Kwammu Tennō. Hoarding money was now prohibited in a series of enactments, while the Daimyō were instructed to store 100 *koku* of rice annually for every 10,000 *koku* raised in their domains. As regards the hoarding of money, it was only the new coins that were being stored away. These, indeed, seemed to disappear almost as soon as issued, and the old debased pieces continued to be the only medium of exchange. The economist, Ogyu Sorai, had advised a reduction in the quality, and an augmentation in the number of the new pieces and, seven years after his death, his recommendation had ultimately to be adopted.

The rice trade had always been of great consequence in Japan, but now, with the extraordinarily augmented harvests to handle, its thorough organization became a pressing necessity. In a previous chapter,² some account was given of the system of rice transport organized by Kawamura Zuiken for the provisioning of Yedo. Certain parts of this system were now overhauled and rendered more efficient. It was the long voyage from Dewa and Niigata round by Shimonoseki to Ōsaka that seems to have been the object of special attention at this date. Sixty years before, the Dewa and Echigo rice was really needed in Yedo, but it was no longer wanted in the Tokugawa capital after the effects of the extensive reclamations of land in the Kwantō and along the north-eastern coast of Japan began to appear. In truth, its conveyance to Yedo had become a source of embarrassment to the authorities, for after 1735 their aim was not to reduce the price of rice but to keep it from going down. Accordingly it now became usual for the west coast crop to be sold in Ōsaka or even in Shimonoseki, and the proceeds transmitted in bills to the Bakufu treasury.

¹ Kwammu (782-806), the fiftieth Emperor of the Imperial line—*vide* vol. i, pages 191-220.

² *Vide* page 221.

Meanwhile, some time before this, what was practically a rice exchange had been established by some of the great Ōsaka merchants, and was officially sanctioned though all time-bargains, or dealings in "futures", were forbidden. This restriction was evaded by fictitious entries in the exchange records until it was detected and prohibited about 1725. Great inconveniences resulted and the authorities thought it well to reconsider all the factors in the situation with the result that, a few years later, time bargains were formally sanctioned. The city magistrate, Ōoka, appears to have taken the chief part in the settlement of the matter. About the same time a rice exchange was established in Yedo and authorized to buy and sell rice for future delivery. The real object in this was not to lower, but to force up, the price of rice. It failed signally, and in 1731 it was suppressed. Two years later the price of rice did go up in Yedo with most inconvenient consequences. In order to relieve the misery in the south-west the Shōgun had depleted his granaries, and the cereal supply in Yedo had then fallen so low that a certain speculator, Takama by name, succeeded in engrossing most of it; in commercial argot he "cornered the market". The venture did not turn out to be quite so profitable after all. Yedo rose in a mob and, in broad daylight, wrecked his business premises and destroyed, or appropriated, their contents. Rice riots were destined to become frequent enough half a century later, but this seems to be the earliest authentic instance of a rice riot in the Tokugawa annals. As has been said, the City Magistrates usually had a very short and sharp way of dealing with engrossers and forestallers—they confiscated their property and banished them from Yedo.

In 1707, the Bakufu interdicted the Daimyō from issuing any more clan paper currency. It was now (1730) deemed advisable to repeal this prohibition. Daimyō of 200,000 *koku* or over were to be allowed to issue gold, silver, or copper bills for a period of twenty-five, and the smaller lords for one of fifteen years. In 1755, the licence to do so was restricted to silver bills only, while subsequent legislation merely limited the privilege to feudatories who already possessed it. Under Yoshimune we thus meet with the somewhat strange and unwonted phenomenon of the national economy being thrown into disorder by the very abundance of the crops and the excellence of the coinage. In addition to this there was yet another matter for solicitude, a matter which in modern France, at all

events, would be regarded not so much with equanimity as with the liveliest satisfaction. At an early date the Shōgun appears to have grasped the fact that Japan was soon to be confronted with the population question. As the social unit in Japan was not the individual but the family, a check might be put upon the increase of the population by restricting the number of heads of families. In 1721, we find the authorities forbidding the sale of land, whether openly or secretly, in the name of another, or by way of mortgage, and reducing the term for which mortgages might be effected to ten years. Furthermore, farmers who held ten *tan* ($2\frac{1}{2}$ acres) of land or less, were forbidden to divide it among their children. In the section of the Tokugawa *Jikki* that deals with this epoch, the caption of “*Yōshi*” (Adoption) at the head of the pages is almost as frequent as that of “Great Fire”; indeed, the amount of legislation on the subject of succession and adoption at this time was enormous. The net outcome was to establish the principle of primogeniture, and to make it difficult, if not impossible, for any but the eldest son or sons adopted as heirs into other families to marry.

At the same time the population was enumerated and orders issued that a new census should be taken every six years. Circumstances made it tolerably easy to take a census. Since the prohibition of Christianity every commoner, as well as the lower samurai, had to obtain from the village priest a certificate of being free from all taint of the “Evil religion”, and to have his name recorded in the temple register. These registers were revised annually, so that all that was necessary to do for census purposes was merely to collect the totals recorded in temple registers, and add them together. In 1721, each Daimyō was requested to take a census of his subjects, and to forward the result to the central authorities. Neither samurai nor their servants, male or female, were required to be recorded, while all under fifteen years of age might be counted or omitted at the option of the several Daimyō. As a matter of fact, they were counted by all the Daimyō except two. Mayeda of Kaga omitted them, and about 240,000 must therefore be added to the total of 576,734 plebeian subjects which he returned. The Daimyō of Bizen did not count infants under five years of age; so five per cent must be added to the 396,500 he actually enumerated. Thus, there is not much difficulty in arriving at an approximately correct idea of the total population of the empire. In 1732, the commoners were supposed to number 26,912,816. Some authorities maintain

that the outcast classes—the Eta and the Hinin—were included in these figures, but the balance of probability is against the contention. In 1871, the samurai class numbered 1,945,000, and there is no reason to believe that they were proportionately less numerous at this date. Including the samurai and their servants, between 2,000,000 and 3,000,000, must be added to the 27,000,000 commoners, and so, in 1732, the total population of the empire cannot have fallen much below 30,000,000 souls.¹

This large population had little more than 11,000,000 acres of cultivated land available for its support. Indeed, in most sections of the empire, the extreme margin of possible cultivation had been reached, and scarcely another acre of waste land remained to be reclaimed. Furthermore, in the ordinary course of things, the natural fertility of the soil lately broken in must tend to diminish as the years rolled by, and there were also such contingencies as floods, typhoons, droughts, and insect pests to be reckoned with which, in spite of the provision made for such emergencies by storing cereals in the Bakufu and the clan granaries, could not fail to be very serious in their effects. Usually, indeed, the whole of the empire was not afflicted by any one of these or similar scourges at the same time, and what the Shōgun did in 1732 to relieve the distress in the south-west might always be imitated. Such effective famine relief was a much more difficult task than on first glance it might seem to be, and we rarely, if ever, find Yoshimune's effort repeated by the Bakufu. It has to be borne in mind that there was but little clan inter-communication. The natural difficulties might no doubt have been overcome if any serious effort

¹ The population of Japan during the Tokugawa period is exhaustively and scientifically dealt with in a paper by Professor Garrett Droppers, a distinguished American economist, *T.A.S.J.*, vol. xxii, p. 258. Incidentally he shows that, while the Japanese are naturally an exceptionally prolific people, who marry at a very early age, the population remained practically stationary from 1721, the first year in which a national census was taken, down to 1846, although it was a period of profound peace. The checks to any increase were famine, pestilence, calamities of flood, fire, and earthquake, and sexual immorality. Prostitution was on a large scale and, as elsewhere indicated in this volume (*vide* p. 132), pederasty was far from uncommon. As a contrast to this want of increase, the population, starting from a not much larger basis in 1859, when the country was opened to foreign intercourse, than from 1721, had obtained an estimated total in 1922 of nearly 58,000,000, as compared with a little over 30,000,000 in 1846. It had almost doubled in sixty-three years. What might Japan have been to-day had it not been for her long isolation from the world? Her people died by tens of thousands from starvation, while food in abundance was knocking at her doors and clamouring for admission. Again, can we throw stones at her for adhering to her traditional policy? She refused admission to food from abroad. In the Irish famine of 1846-9, there was food in abundance actually in the country, but it had to be exported lest what the statesmen and economists of that day termed "the legitimate course of trade" should be interfered with.—J. H. L.

had been exerted but, so far from making any such efforts, the feudatories usually did everything in their power to isolate their fiefs. They were extremely averse to outsiders acquiring any knowledge of the topography of their domains, of the strategic positions, and the avenues of communication within them. Such roads as there were were led through precipitous ravines, along rugged mountain scarps, over torrential streams and broad river channels which were purposely left unbridged. Where the roads or paths crossed the frontiers, strong guard-houses were erected, and in cases where outside traders were allowed access, heavy tolls were generally levied upon their wares. In many fiefs, no merchant was allowed to pass the barriers, for spies could assume the guise of pedlars as easily as of pilgrim priests. This was notably the case in Satsuma. The few "Bakufu dogs", as Tokugawa emissaries were called, that did find entrance there, usually met with short shrift, and Yedo knew better than to put itself to the trouble of asking any questions about their fate. In fact, but for the circumstance that its chief with an attendant train had to repair to Yedo and reside there for every alternate year, the fief of Satsuma was almost as completely isolated from the rest of Japan as Japan was from Korea, or China, or the outside world at large. In the extreme north, again, some of the Daimyōates, notably those of Uyesugi and Satake, were nearly as self-centred as Satsuma, leading their own solitary, isolated lives, within their own circumscribed bounds, separated from their neighbours and the world by "mountains and mutual fear". Accordingly, when droughts or blights or typhoons, or any other natural calamity ruined the crops, each of these isolated communities had generally to fight the resulting famine as best it could, alone and unassisted. The Shōgun had only too much reason for impressing upon such feudatories the high importance of regularly depositing a percentage of their annual crops in the clan granaries. This course had now become an indispensable item in any efficient system of local administration, and general efficiency in local administration could not henceforth be impaired without leading to indescribable misery and disaster. The huge population was now pressing heavily upon the limits of subsistence, and any administrative abuses likely to throw land out of cultivation was criminal in the extreme.¹

¹ It is not impossible that the idea of a census was suggested to Yoshimune by the example of Korea. For poll-tax purposes, it had long been customary in

One circumstance contributed greatly to Yoshimune's success in fighting the famine in the south-west. He had previously won the confidence of the Daimyō. What he did at the usual distribution of the *Buké Shohatto* has already been recorded. Furthermore, he insisted upon a great reduction in the value of the presents tendered by the feudatories, and again, for nearly a decade, he abridged the term of the enforced residence of the Daimyō in Yedo. It seems to have been his intention to modify Iyemitsu's regulations in connexion with this matter very materially. Instead of spending alternate years in Yedo and on their own domains, Yoshimune proposed to reduce the Yedo term of residence for the Daimyō to one year in three, or one year in five. This was partly in the interests of the efficient administration of the fiefs, and partly with a view to enable him to grapple more effectually with the canker of effeminate frivolity that was sapping the fibre of the Yedo samurai. The capital, he believed, had become too magnificent, and in this he discerned a serious moral menace. However, there was ultimately no permanent departure from the essentials of the *Sankin-Kōtai* system as organized by Iyemitsu. It is said that Muro Kyusō was responsible for this, he pointed out to Yoshimune the probable, nay, the inevitable, future danger that would result under a weak or unpopular Shōgun from the adoption of his proposal. There can be no question about the correctness of Muro's contention, for the system of hostages was the very keystone in the arch on which the unchallenged supremacy of the Tokugawas rested. With the western Daimyō on their own domains four years out

the Peninsula to count the population every three years. In 1669, the result of the Korean census recorded a population of 5,018,644 souls, that of 1717, 6,846,568, while in 1753, it had increased to 7,238,522. The Chinese census of 1741 appears to have been fairly accurate in enumerating a population of 143,400,000, nearly five times as great as that of Japan. It is strange to find Asia so much ahead of Europe in this matter of census-taking. The earliest attempt of this nature in modern Europe was the British census of 1801. "It is difficult at present to realize the idea that, long after Adam Smith's time, the number of the inhabitants of the British Empire could only be guessed at as the populousness of China is at the present day; and, as in all matters of statistics which have their own simple solution through specific inquiry, the guesses about the population of the empire were not only vague but extravagantly contradictory." It is estimated that about 1732, the Hapsburg Monarchy controlled a population verging on 29,000,000, including its subjects in the Austrian Netherlands and Northern Italy. At the same time France had probably between 18,000,000 and 20,000,000; Russia, 16,000,000; the British Islands between 11,000,000 and 12,000,000; and Spain about the same number. London had an estimated population of 580,000, and Paris one of 540,000. In Japan, Kyōto was at least equally, and Yedo twice, as populous, while in Ōsaka, the commercial capital, there were probably more rich merchants with greater fortunes than were to be found in either of the great capitals of Western Europe.

of five, there would have been opportunities for intrigues and confederacies which were absolutely impossible so long as the rigorous *sankin-kōtai* system of Iyemitsu was strictly enforced. Attempts to break through the Tokugawa surveillance over the Imperial Court in Kyōto would then probably have followed. Towards that court the Daimyō may not have been actuated by any very sincere sentiments of devotion. There were certainly in the last period of the Ashikaga Shōgunate ample opportunities for the feudatories to evince their loyalty to the Imperial House in a practical fashion, yet, during all that time, with the exception of the Ōuchi of Yamaguchi, scarcely one of them exerted so much as a little finger to rescue the Court from the misery and indigence into which it had fallen, and to restore to it some measure of the respect and influence to which it was entitled. Now it would doubtless have been different, as Titsingh was acute enough to perceive. After telling us that "the Shōgun is also honoured by the Dairi with a rank and office at his court", he proceeds:—

"Though the Dairi is considered at the court of the Shōgun, to use their own expression, as a hand with two fingers, or as a piece of ancient Japanned ware that is highly esteemed for its beauty, the Shōguns affect to set a high value on favours of this kind; a circumstance which flatters the pride of the Dairi, and seems to cheer them in their state of dependence. The Shōguns have the more reason to act thus, because, as the Dairi is a descendant of Tensō Daijin (the Sun-Goddess) and regarded as the supreme head of the Empire, manifest proofs of his displeasure might furnish a pretext for enterprises that would occasion the greatest commotions; for many of the most powerful princes, ashamed of the servitude to which they are reduced, would eagerly fly to his assistance *in hopes of putting an end to their own humiliation and shaking off an ignominious yoke.*"

It is to be noted that the position of the outside feudatory houses had now become much more assured than it was in the early days of the Tokugawa Shōgunate. Since 1697, not a single great outside family had been dispossessed of its domains, and down to the fall of the Bakufu not a single one was henceforth destined to become extinct or dispossessed. As has been said, Iyeyasu confiscated about 6,000,000 *koku* of domain, Hidetada and Iyemitsu each about 5,000,000 *koku*, Iyetsuna 1,180,000, and Tsunayoshi 2,300,000 *koku*. Under Iyenobu, no more than 20,000, and under Yoshimune, only 30,000, *koku* of land were appropriated by the Bakufu, mainly as the result of the operation of the principle of escheat. It was to the operation of this principle that the

appropriation of the Tsūyama fief in Mimasaka (186,000 *koku*) was due in 1697, the last Mori then dying without heirs. In 1664, the Uyesugi fief of Yonezawa was reduced from 300,000 *koku* to half that assessment, and these were the last instances of any great outside Daimyō's domains being seriously interfered with by the Bakufu down to 1865. Under the first three Shōguns, many Daimyō, some of the greatest outside lords among them, were deprived of their lands on the ground of maladministration, real or alleged. After the great Echigo case in Tsunayoshi's second year, the Bakufu confiscated no more territory (or at least very little territory) for this special reason. About 1740, the head of the Sakakibara family of Himeji (150,000 *koku*) made himself extremely notorious by his dissipation and extravagance, and the Great Council considered the advisability of confiscating his fief. All that was done, however, was to caution the erring lord, and to remove him from Himeji to a domain of an equal assessment in the far north. A century before, he would in all probability have been ordered to commit *hara-kiri*; and all his vassals would have become Rōnin, except that some, no doubt, would have followed him in death.

Besides this, Iyeyasu, Hidetada, and Iyemitsu all showed themselves extremely ready to profit by the laws of succession. These laws were then extremely illiberal, and down to 1651 they were always rigorously enforced. Since that date they had been gradually amended, and now, by the timely adoption of an heir, it had become easily possible to save a domain from escheat. And not only that, but Yoshimune, at least, was exceedingly averse to enforcing the law, even when there seemed to be no possible escape from it. A good instance of this is incidentally recorded in Titsingh's book.

About 1739, a certain Itakura, a relative of the Junior Councillor Itakura, Sado no Kami, became mentally deranged, and conceiving a grudge against his kinsman, the Councillor, he determined to kill him in the Palace. The day he selected for the attempt was a full court day. In the dim light of the corridor the assassin mistook his man, and cut down Hosokawa, the Daimyō of Kumamoto, who chanced to come along accompanied by a solitary palace attendant. The attendant fled, and Hosokawa, who was left weltering in his blood, soon expired, while :—

“ the report being spread that one of the princes, who had come to pay their court to the Shōgun, had been assassinated, a great agitation ensued among the persons of their retinue who were in waiting outside the palace, each being apprehensive for the life of his master.”

Meanwhile, the councillors drew up and presented a report to the Shōgun plainly stating that Hosokawa had been assassinated by Itakura :—

Yoshimune appeared to be deeply afflicted, and either doubting the death of the Prince, or deeming it prudent to conceal the event for some time, he ordered his wound to be dressed by his surgeons and boiled rice and water to be given to him. The Councillors replied that this could be of no service since the prince had long been dead, but the Shōgun, pretending not to hear them repeated the order to give him boiled rice and water. He caused it at the same time to be publicly reported that the Lord of Kumamoto had been wounded by Itakura, but was still alive, and one of the sub-inspectors in a loud voice ordered the guard at the gates to desire Hosokawa's servants to carry his chair to the back entrance to take up their master. This order produced the best effect and the confusion instantly subsided. The attendants of the other princes were relieved from their anxiety ; even those of the Lord of Kumamoto took courage, thinking their master was still living, and their tranquillity was restored. The corpse was carried away in a palanquin and the Hosokawa retainers were ordered to keep quiet till they had further instructions from the Shōgun. " The servants of the Lord of Kumamoto were profoundly afflicted by his death ; the women burst into tears. His relations assembled and resolved to inform the Shōgun that the prince had died of his wounds. Scarcely had they come to this determination when a Councillor of State arrived to inquire in the name of the Shōgun concerning the state of the prince and brought a dish of dried smelts in token of his affection . . . After his departure they again deliberated, and finally agreed to defer the report till the following day . . . Next day, a councillor of State came on behalf of the heir-apparent to inquire after the health of the Lord of Kumamoto, declaring that his master was extremely uneasy about him, and bringing a present of Korean ginseng for the solace of the patient. He then announced in the name of the Shōgun, that the permission to adopt his youngest brother which Hosokawa had solicited in the previous year was granted, and that his adopted son should succeed him even if his father were no longer living . . . The report of the prince's death was deferred till the 21st, and then that event was publicly announced at the palace " —six days after the assassination.

In the strict terms of the law of succession it was necessary that adoptions should be sanctioned *before* the death of the father adoptive ; otherwise there would be an escheat of the fief. In all probability Hosokawa's request in the previous year to be allowed to adopt his brother was a mere fiction of the Shōgun's, of a piece with his orders to serve the dead man with boiled rice and water. Under Hidetada or Iyemitsu, such an opportunity to appropriate the great Higo fief, so strategically important, would have been eagerly snatched. This incident may serve to exemplify Yoshimune's rare gift of *savoir-faire*, his capability, his tact, his

great thoughtfulness for others, but indeed the wonderful combination of these and other admirable qualities in him could be illustrated by scores of anecdotes. The so-called "gentleman" in Japan now and then proves to be rather disappointing, as he is occasionally apt to do under other suns and skies. The real Japanese gentleman is, however, a grand type, and in the person of Yoshimune, the eighth Tokugawa Shōgun, we meet with this type at its very highest level.

Yoshimune was unwearied in his efforts to get primogeniture recognized as furnishing an indefeasible title to the succession to the headship of households. His main object in this was obvious enough. When succession questions settled themselves automatically, the chief cause for the dissensions and intrigues that had at one time or another convulsed almost every great family would, he believed, be removed, but, by one of those strange ironies of fate, which seem to make mock of the highest efforts of human wisdom and foresight, he was destined to discover that this apparently sound and salutary legislation could be productive of evils as gross and grievous as the abuses it was intended to cure. His own first-born son, Iyeshige, was of little comfort to his father; he was not only an intellectual weakling but he was a confirmed debauchee to boot. As the future ruler of Japan, he appeared to be utterly hopeless. In glaring contrast to him, his next brother, Munetaka, seemed to have inherited his father's character and ability in no stinted measure. The ablest member of the Great Council, Matsudaira Norimura, went so far as to hint to the Shōgun that it might be advisable to remove Iyeshige from the Nishi-maru and recognize Munetaka as the future ruler. It might be inferred from the nature of Yoshimune's reply to the suggestion that he had silently debated it in his own mind. With a deep sigh, he told Matsudaira that perhaps the necessity of resorting to such an extreme step might be averted. By implication at least, he admitted that he was in a serious dilemma. If his own eldest son were now disinherited, all his efforts on behalf of the principle of primogeniture would be *ipso facto* nullified. Every family council in the empire would arrogate to itself the right of determining succession questions, and the old round of intrigues and intestine broils would be revived. On the other hand, to entrust the destinies of Japan to such an incompetent sensualist as Iyeshige would be almost criminal. There seemed, however, to be a way of circumventing

the difficulties and perplexities of the situation. Yoshimune was hale and robust; there was every reason to expect that he might attain as great an age (75) as Iyeyasu, the last eleven years of whose life were spent in nominal retirement, with his son and successor Hidetada as titular Shōgun. Iyeshige already had a son, a bright and winsome boy of eight. Accordingly, Yoshimune now (*æt* 67) resolved to retire nominally, to allow his eldest son a certain term in the Shōgun's seat, and then when Iyeharu, as the grandson was named, attained man's estate, to force Iyeshige to make way for him, if his continued debaucheries had not previously proved fatal.

Yoshimune's fourth son, Munemasu, had been adopted into the Kishū family, and had duly succeeded to the headship of that fief, but provision had to be made for his second and third sons. According to the hereditary usage of the Tokugawa family, they would naturally have been made Daimyō, and each enfeoffed with a suitable estate. But to reduce them to the rank of Daimyō was objectionable for two reasons. In the first place, it was no easy matter to find fiefs for them and, besides this, the case of Tsunayoshi, no less than that of Iyenobu, had shown that unexpected difficulties might be thrown in the way of a mere Daimyō being raised to the Shōgunate. Now, in the event of the extinction of Iyeshige's line, the houses of one or other of his second or third brothers would naturally supply the occupant of the Shōgun's chair. In view of all this, Yoshimune assigned a mansion within the Castle enceinte, and a revenue of 130,000 bales of rice to each of these two sons, and established them as the heads of the two new houses of Tayasu and Hitotsubashi. Later on, Iyeshige's second son, Shigeyoshi, was treated in a similar manner, becoming the founder of the house of Shimidzu. All of them were given high court rank and high court titles—two of them being called *Kyō*, or ministers, of the old Eight Boards, while the other had a military title of equal rank.¹

¹ Yoshimune's two sons were named respectively Munetake and Munetada. Mansions were assigned to them inside of the two gates of the palace known as the Tayasu and Hitotsubashi gates, and from these they took their new titles. Mr. McClatchie mentions all these three gates in his very valuable paper on the castle (*T.A.S.J.*, vol. vi, p. 119), but he derives their names from those of the Sankyo, instead of the reverse as was actually the case. Iyeshige, the ninth Shōgun, followed this example and conferred on his second son a mansion within the Shimidzu gate and a new title in keeping with it, and thus the three new families of Tokugawa descent were founded and became known as the *Sankyō* or "The

CHAPTER X

IYESHIGE AND IYEHARU (1744-86)

TO Yoshimune,¹ the eighth Tokugawa Shōgun, must be accorded the distinction of having demonstrated the real capacity of paternal government when it is at its best. When, however, everything depends upon the personal character and abilities of the head of the national household, the principle of primogeniture is attended with the gravest of risks as was now to be shown in the most conclusive manner. In Iyeshige, the ninth Shogun, it appears to be impossible to recognize one single moral feature of his illustrious sire. The contrast between Yoshimune and Iyeshige was even greater than that between Yorimoto and Yoriye, for the roystering Yoriye's vices were those of a robust man, and he had, at least, the traditional Minamoto aptitude for manly martial exercises. What Iyeshige really was may be gathered from Titsingh's account of him, an account whose general correctness is only too substantially corroborated by all the contemporary Japanese evidence.

Three Branch Families", each of the three being vested on their foundation with a revenue of 100,000 *koku*. All this was in imitation of what had been done by Iyeyasu when he created the *Go san-ke*. "The Three Houses" of Kii, Mito, and Owari, the heads of the powerful and wealthy fiefs of those names, conferred by Iyeyasu on his three younger sons, from whose families an heir to the Shōgunate was to be selected in case of failure of the direct line. The *Sankyō* were a second reserve for Tokugawa heirs in case of failure of both direct and Sanke lines. Mito took his title from his castled town in the province of Hitachi; the other two from the provinces in which were their castled towns of Wakayama (Kii) and Nagoya (Owari). All three took precedence of all other Daimyōs of every degree, and of course had very large revenues. Iyeyasu's direct line came to an end with Iyetsugu, the seventh Shōgun, who died childless, and the next seven Shōguns, from Yoshimune downwards, were all members of the House of Kii. The fifteenth and last Shōgun, Yoshinobu (1866-8), was of the House of Mito, his immediate predecessor having also died childless at an early age. Both the *Go san-ke* and the *Go Sankyō* are to be distinguished from the *Go Sekke*, "The Five Regent Families" of the Imperial Court, Konoe, Kujō, Nijō, Ichijō, and Takatsukasa, from among whom the "Kuambaku" or Regent during the minority of an Emperor was always chosen. They were all of Fujiwara descent and the highest nobles in the Empire. The three *Sankyō* and the five *Sekke* are repeatedly mentioned throughout history and all these families enjoy high rank in the modern peerage.

¹ Titsingh gives the following description of his last illness and death:—

"In the month of June, 1751, he had for the second time a paralytic seizure, and so rapid was its progress that, in the following month, prayers were ordered to be put up in all the great temples for his recovery and the physicians were specially charged to neglect no means for restoring him to health; but all their efforts were fruitless, and he expired on the 20th of the same month (12th July, 1751) to the great regret of the whole Empire. The mourning was general. Women and children, the high and the low wept for him as for a father."—J. H. L.

"On the death of Yoshimune in 1751, Iyeshige became sole master of the Empire, and governed without control. An inordinate passion for women and strong liquors had already impaired his health. In his youth, and while still heir-apparent, he had indulged these propensities to such an extent that his father severely reprimanded him on the subject; and with a view to divert him from his bad inclinations he had frequently made him pass six or seven days together at the country house of Suga-no-goten, where he had no other amusement than hawking. After the death of his father, being released from the only curb that restrained him, he again plunged into the same excess, and spent whole nights, either with women or in drinking *saké*, so that his health declined from day to day. His speech became affected, he could no longer make himself understood but by signs, and he was obliged to issue his orders through Idzumo-no-Kami. He was soon obliged to keep his apartments on account of a weakness of the urinary organs. On stated occasions the Shōgun is obliged to go to the Temples of Uyeno, Zōzōji and Momiji-yama to offer up his prayers before the tablets consecrated to his predecessors. It was not without difficulty that Iyeshige was able to perform this duty . . . In 1755, returning from the Temple of Uyeno in his palanquin, he had scarcely reached the gin-seng warehouse which is close to it when he felt a natural call, which he could not defer till his arrival at the palace, and which compelled him to order his people to take him back to the Temple, a circumstance heretofore unexampled. The architects were immediately commanded to erect three resting-places for the Prince on each of the two roads to the Temples of Uyeno and Zōzōji; but this precaution was useless, as the increasing infirmities of the Shōgun confined him ever afterwards to the palace."

On the very face of it, it will be plain that Yoshimune could not possibly have found a more incompetent successor than this *fainéant* sensualist, Iyeshige. "A cypher! A mere figure-head!" the reader may be tempted to exclaim, but this would be to misconceive the true bearings of the situation very seriously indeed. The Shōgunate as an institution was now vastly different from what it had been five centuries before in the Kamakura epoch. Then, in truth, the office of Shōgun was ornamental, and its successive occupants, high-born Fujiwaras or Imperial Princes, could be, and were, treated as so many bedizened puppets; at any time their nominal subordinates, the Hōjō Regents, could afford to seize their persons, and pack them off to Kyōto, like so many bales of damaged merchandise, without the slightest compunction and with the utmost impunity. So far, under the Tokugawas, no subordinate had been able to enact the role of a Hōjō Regent. Apart from Iyetsugu, who died in his infancy (1716), Iyetsuna (1651-80) was the only one of the Tokugawa Shōgun who had not in the last resort ruled the empire in reality as well as in name. During the last

decade of his sway, the Tairō Sakai became all-powerful but, on the death of Iyetsuna, the aspiring Tairō met with such short shrift from Iyetsuna's successor, Tsunayoshi, that the lesson was not likely to be forgotten nor Sakai's ambitious attempt imitated. Tsunayoshi's will was really law in the empire when he chose to exert it, as in the case, to take one illustration, of his insensate "Life-Protecting Statutes" which continued to be enforced for more than a score of years. His immediate successor, Iyenobu, was a man of no great originality, it is true, but it was he and not Arai or the Rōjū who governed Japan from 1709 to 1716, and during the twenty-nine succeeding years, between 1716 and 1745, Yoshimune was not merely the master of Japan, but the first servant of the State.

The result of this was that the Shōgun's great office was regarded with profound respect mingled with awe; the prestige of the Shōgunate as the great operative institution of the age never stood higher than it did during the first six years of Iyeshige's administration while Yoshimune still survived. Even when Yoshimune had passed away (1751) no high official would dream of taking a step of any consequence without the Shōgun's assent. Every one knew that a word, nay, a stutter, from the stammering Iyeshige would be sufficient to strip him of office, rank, revenue, and domains, while a mere hint to commit the "Happy Dispatch" could not be gainsaid, if it chanced to be dropped. For presuming to tender a memorial of advice, Iyeshige's own brother was ordered to confine himself to his own mansion. Yoshimune's most trusted Councillor, Matsudaira Norimura, after the Shōgun himself the ablest statesman of the time, had once suggested to Yoshimune the advisability of disinheriting Iyeshige. This fact, perhaps reached the new Shōgun's ear, but, apart from it His Highness bore Norimura a special grudge for having induced Yoshimune to relegate him to the Suga villa when his excesses had gone too far. At all events, one of the first things Iyeshige did was to dismiss this great statesman and, within a year from his accession, all his father's Great Councillors, with the exception of Hotta, Sagami no Kami, had met with the same fate. Hotta was a man of ability, it must be admitted; as Commandant of Ōsaka he earned a great reputation as a judge and administrator, and as regards mere intellectual ability, his contemporaries classed him with Matsudaira Norimura and Ōoka Tadasuke, but the course of events was soon to prove that he was of inferior moral fibre. He

had shown himself very eager to stand well with the heir apparent ; perhaps he divined that Matsudaira Norimura's career would be a brief one under the new Shōgun, and that he could then aspire to a chief place in the Great Council. Immediately after the death of Yoshimune, Hotta discharged all the old Shōgun's personal attendants :—

“ To prevent a tumult he gave to those who have been in the service twenty years 50 *kobans* (£70), and thirty to such as had served ten years, that, as he said, they might be enabled to support their wives and families. The old Shōgun had given them a place to live in, but Hotta turned them out, and each was obliged to hire a small apartment. They consulted together as to what should be done, and drew up a petition which they presented to the High Priest of Uyeno, begging to be employed by the reigning Shōgun, as they had been by his father. The High Priest promised to lay it before the councillors of state, which he did, without effect. Among these poor creatures was a man named Nakashima Shimbei, who went every day for three years to entreat the Priest to procure his reappointment, but his efforts proved unsuccessful owing to the malice of Hotta. Hotta's cruelty to so many servants of the old Shōgun whom he turned without cause out of their places, rendered him an object of public hatred.”

Hotta was quite well aware that the new Shōgun had no liking for any of his father's friends or favourites and it was by time-serving devices like the foregoing that he continued to maintain his position in the Rōjū down to his death in 1761. Besides Hotta, the only man of ability in the Great Council was Matsudaira Takemoto, Ukon Shōgen.¹ In 1747, he had been promoted to the Rōjū at the instance of Yoshimune, although “ every one exclaimed against the danger of conferring such important functions on a person of his years ”. He did not fail, however, to justify the old Shōgun's belief in him. He possessed energy equal to his intelligence. His extreme indulgence to his inferiors won their affection, and gained him universally the character of an excellent master. The old Shōgun, before he died, whispered in his ear, so as not to be heard by any other person, that he was to direct alone all the affairs of the State. Under a Shōgun like Yoshimune, Matsudaira Takemoto would have had a great and beneficent career of public usefulness. Under a later Kamakura Shōgun, or under a Shōgun like Iyetsuna, he might also have accomplished a great deal, but as has just been insisted upon, Iyeshige, though grossly incompetent, could not be regarded as a cypher or treated as a puppet. To do anything

¹ “ Ukon Shōgen,” officer of the Bodyguard of the Right, i.e. the second company of the Household Guards.—J. H. L.

of consequence without his sanction would rouse his wrath, and to incur his ill-will meant dismissal from office, if not absolute ruin. Now, Iyeshige was often so ill, so drunk, or so befuddled that he could not meet his Councillors at all. When he did meet them subsequently, they were in mortal terror for frequently they could not make out what he said, or rather what he was trying to say. Almost everything had to be interpreted by one of his personal attendants, who could understand his language of grunts and stutters and signs. Titsingh seems to have been correctly informed about this peculiar situation when he says:—

“ Ōoka, Idzumo no Kami, one of the bodyguard of the young Shōgun, Iyeshige, rose from day to day higher in his favour. The Councillors of State, both ordinary and extraordinary, applied to him to submit their petitions to the Shōgun, and the placemen, from the highest to the lowest, paid court to him. Whoever was desirous of obtaining an employment, or being removed to a better one, had recourse to him and offered him presents. Matsudaira Takemoto was the only one who was above calling on him; nay, he did not send him the tail of a fish. ‘He is but one of the bodyguard,’ said he, ‘while we are officers of distinction; let others do as they think proper; I, for my part am resolved not to degrade myself.’ Thus there was always some coolness between them; Matsudaira gave himself no concern on that account, but continued to perform the duties of his post with zeal and intelligence.”

The Ōoka Tadamitsu, Idzumo no Kami, here alluded to, came of the same stock as the famous City Magistrate but he belonged to a cadet branch of the family. In his youth, he had been attached to the person of the heir apparent, and in this difficult position he succeeded in winning the goodwill of Iyeshige and the confidence of Yoshimune alike, while he was also extremely popular with all with whom he came in contact. Indulgent and ever ready to excuse the faults of others, he followed in all points the example of Yoshimune’s most trusted Sobayōnin, Kannō, Ogasawara, and Shibuya. It was not till the death of the old Shōgun that his real character became apparent. In the very year of Yoshimune’s death he was made a Daimyō; in 1754, he entered the Junior Council, and two years later he was formally appointed Sobayōnin. During the nine years of Iyeshige’s own personal rule (1751–60) Ōoka was the most powerful figure at the Shōgun’s court, and at the date of his death in 1760, he was one of the wealthiest men in Japan. The fortune he amassed was not a very cleanly earned one, in fact it was mainly the results of “presents”, or in plain language, bribery and

corruption. In the art of dissimulation both Ōoka Tadamitsu and Hotta must have been tolerably proficient, for Yoshimune was a wonderfully keen judge of character. Present-giving has always been not merely a recognized but an indispensable feature in Japanese social intercourse, and to the unsophisticated, outside barbarian, its etiquette is often a very puzzling matter. It has been said with reason that in no country of the world do "*les petits cadeaux qui entretiennent l'amitié*" play a more charming part than in Japan. On the other hand, the Japanese, no less than the Greeks of old, are often most to be dreaded when "bearing gifts". To draw the exact line between genuine tokens of disinterested goodwill and attempts at bribery and corruption is now and then a truly difficult business. Iyenobu found it advisable to repress lavish present-giving, and in this he was followed by Yoshimune. Now, on the contrary, the Daimyō were officially informed that, henceforth, their gifts should be of a really substantial nature, and certain of them who were somewhat slow to accept the hint, presently found themselves saddled with the onus of repairing Temples, and executing similar public works in Yedo.

These presents, or their alternatives, of course, tended to impose a strain upon the finances of the fiefs, and the clan tax-collectors had to become somewhat rigorous in their methods. Under the old Shōgun, Daimyō found that the surest way to court favour lay in the efficient and benevolent administration of their domains; now it was becoming plain that it was the tax-product of their fiefs, and not the methods by which it was obtained that was of prime importance. Within ten years from the death of Yoshimune the administration in some of the outside lands had become scandalous. In Kanamori's little fief of Gujō in Mino, for example, the farmers had been driven to riot and insurrection, and at last, after many vain attempts, were able to bring their grievances before the Great Council in Yedo, in 1759. Meanwhile, their lord had become involved in a series of lawsuits about some shrine lands on his domain, and these had been before the Hyōjōsho for some time. The investigation that now took place disclosed that wholesale bribery had been going on in the High Court of Justice itself. One of the Great Council, a Junior Councillor, a Finance Magistrate, a Censor, the local Gundai in Mino, were all cashiered or otherwise punished, while Kanamori was stripped of his fief, two of his Karō executed, and several others of the fief councillors deported to the islands of

Idzu. In this special case, Matsudaira Takemoto appears to have been able to assert himself to good purpose, but he must have been painfully conscious that to stem the tide of maladministration and corruption which had now set in would be hopeless so long as his efforts were paralysed by the incompetence of the Shōgun. The wonder is that he did not abandon the attempt to do so, and vacate his office in sheer hopelessness and disgust. Long before this he must have found his position a lonely one, for all Yoshimune's illustrious officers had already left or been removed from the scene. In 1748, Ōoka Tadasuke retired. From 1737 onwards, the pivot on which the whole local administration turned was the great Finance Magistrate, Kamio, Wakasa no kami. He died in 1753, and his later colleagues and successors were not of *his* kind. Most of them knew only too well that Ōoka Tadamitsu, Idzumo no Kami was a very amiable, pleasant-spoken gentleman, with a little weakness for presents, and that it was far more important to keep the Shōgun's keeper in good humour than it was to ensure the strict discharge of their official duties by the *Gundai* and *Daikwan*, as Kamio had done. And so, through the whole civil service, the dry-rot of favouritism, fraud, and corruption spread from the top downwards with appalling rapidity.

Every one of the three dozen *Gundai* or *Daikwan* on the Bakufu Home Domains, besides being a lawyer, was supposed to be a man of more than ordinary practical common sense, a passable judge of character, and an expert accountant. Every one of them could appreciate the change in the moral atmosphere of Yedo officialdom since the deaths of Yoshimune and Kamio, and in the altered circumstances of the time many of them had no difficulty in arriving at the conclusion that, so far from being the best policy, honesty was the scurviest kind of policy that could be imagined, it was becoming a mere luxury, and a very expensive and unfashionable one at that. Hence, honesty presently vanished; there was no longer a pestilent "Complaint-Box" to be feared—if people were so misguided to put anything into it, the Shōgun would not be in a condition to read it, and Ōoka, Idzumo no Kami was a very amiable, good-natured, pleasant-spoken gentleman with a little weakness for presents. So presents he should have, as should also the new Finance Magistrates, to their dear hearts' content. Within five years from the death of Yoshimune, *Gundai* and *Daikwan* had convinced themselves by practical experience that, provided

they retained the goodwill of Ōoka and their superiors in Yedo, they could do pretty much as they chose in the wide tracts of country committed to their tender mercies. The prosperity prevalent among the Bakufu agriculturalists made it tolerably easy for them to find the wherewithal to placate the higher bureaucrats at first. The whole Bakufu domain was now assessed at a little over 4,000,000 *koku*, but in good years the total of the crops raised in it went far beyond that figure.¹

Each of the forty local officers would thus administer a domain assessed at about 100,000 *koku* on the average. The legitimate tax-product to be forwarded to Yedo or sold in Ōsaka or stored in the local granaries, as the case might be, would amount to about 40,000 *koku*, and would come from perhaps a hundred different villages. Under Yoshimune, the annual levy was fixed at a permanent figure, as we have seen. We now hear of instances of Daikwan reverting to the old *mitori* system on their own responsibility. This enabled them to vary the annual tax on the produce of any plot of land at their own arbitrary will; if the revenue officer delayed to appear to make the appraisement, the crop might be ruined, for it could not be reaped until it had been appraised. The farmer found it to his advantage to conciliate the local officials betimes, and, if he did so, his tax would be reduced in proportion to the value of his thankofferings. Newly reclaimed land was usually exempt from taxation for a certain term. In the case of much of the soil reclaimed in Yoshimune's time, that term was now reaching its limit. Here again, much might be accomplished by judicious thank-offerings. Again, there were repartitions of the gross taxation of the Intendancy among the various villages within its circuit, and among the various households in single villages. In connexion with this we meet with a good many of the abuses which made the levy of the *taille* in contemporary France so vexatious. There were boundary disputes between villages, quarrels between households, suits between temples and shrines and their incumbents and parishioners. Altogether there was plenty of opportunity for fishing in troubled waters, if the Daikwan and his subordinates were minded to do so.

¹ In 1838 this assessment stood at 3,281,578 *koku*. For details of the Gundai and Daikwan districts, see *Journal of American Oriental Society*, vol. xxxi, pt. ii, p. 157. Dr. Asakawa's series of papers in that Journal are of great interest and high value.

In addition to all this, the Daikwan began not merely to increase the old taxes but in some instances to impose new ones on their own responsibility, and the *corvée* work, that had always been a prominent feature in Japanese rural administration, developed into a terrible engine for the punishment of villages that made themselves offensive. The net result was that the Bakufu lands were presently seething with discontent. What especially aggravated the situation was that the change for the worse in local administration was so extraordinarily sudden. In Yoshimune's time, we do indeed meet with two mentions of agrarian outbreaks, one in the Yamagata and the other in the Sendai fief, but neither of these was in the Bakufu domains. There had been few, if any, *Monso* (Gate-Complaints) even.¹

A Daikwan, who by his exactions furnished reasonable grounds for a *Monso*, would have been summarily dismissed in Yoshimune's time. Now *Monso* became quite frequent; they had ceased to have any great terror for the local officials, for in case rumours of them did get transmitted to Yedo, they could easily be glossed over or explained away. The peasants, finding *Monso* of little avail, soon had recourse to still more desperate expedients in certain quarters. One section of the widely scattered home domain lay far away in central Hyūga in Kyūshū, and the remoteness and isolation of the situation probably emboldened the Daikwan to play the petty tyrant with even more than the measure of truculence that had now become common. Here, by 1759, the peasants had been fleeced to the skin, and even their skins seemed to be threatened. So, to save them, some of the bolder spirits among them resolved to make a supreme effort. A great crowd abandoned their holdings and marched over the border into the lands of the Daimyō of Takanabe, and purposed to settle there. This did have the effect of at last bringing the officials to their senses. While they were considering what steps should be taken to retrieve the immediate situation, the remaining farmers on the estate rose in a seething

¹ Punishment of farmers who make complaint to the Lord with menaces and then desert the village :—

“For the ringleaders, death; for the *nanushi*, banishment from the province for a long period; for the *kumi-gashira*, banishment from the village with forfeiture of land; for the village itself, a fine based on the amount of its assessment. However, the punishment may, according to circumstances, be reduced one or two degrees if the lord has been guilty of injustice, and especially is severe punishment to be avoided if the farmers are not in arrears for their taxes.” *Kujikata Osadamegaki* II. Art. 28 (1741).

mob under mat-flags and with pointed bamboos for spears drove the Daikwan and his posse of two-sworded constables out of the Government buildings which were then wrecked and plundered. It was only when troops were obtained from the neighbouring Daimyō of Nobeoka and Sadowara that the outbreak was quelled and order restored. It was but eight years since the death of Yoshimune, and yet here was more than matter enough to make the good old Shōgun turn in his tomb.

Repeated incidents of this description were of the worst augury for the near future. Extortion, fraud, chicanery, official corruption in every form soon utterly disgusted and disheartened the peasant. Of what use was it, he asked himself, to drudge and moil, if all the results of any extra exertion on his part were to be at once pounced upon by the tax-collectors and his fellow harpies? Those farmers who could do so, absconded; those who had to stay on made a point of exerting themselves as little as possible. In many places, one-half of the population was trying to support itself by gambling or the exercise of its bucolic wits. Naturally enough the bounteous harvests of Yoshimune's times became a thing of the past; the yields of cultivated fields tended to diminish and great stretches of fine land to go out of cultivation. This meant a diminution of the tax-rice, of course; and to make up for the deficiency the revenue officers put an extra turn of the screw upon anything that was taxable. Rice was no longer stored annually in the local granaries according to the terms of Yoshimune's legislation, and presently to make up the cargoes of tax-rice that had to be dispatched to Yedo and Ōsaka, the local storehouses were depleted. Even so, the Bakufu revenue began to shrink, and the granaries on the banks of the Sumida had to be emptied to meet current expenses. In an over-populated empire of some 30,000,000 souls, the pinch of hunger was sometimes felt, even in ordinary seasons. What was likely to happen in the event of a series of unpropitious years and natural calamities, such as had been experienced towards the end of Tsunayoshi's administration? There was a dearth in 1749, and again in 1757, but few of the administrative officials seem to have worried greatly over the difficulties of the situation or the general drift of affairs. Doubtless a man of Matsudaira Takemoto's moral and intellectual calibre must have pondered deeply over the impending menace, but while Iyeshige was Shōgun he could do little to avert it. The only ray of hope was that Iyeshige could not

possibly live for long ; he must soon pay the penalty for his long career of unbridled debauchery acting on a physique that had always been delicate. These anticipations were realized and he died in 1761 at the age of 55 years, but already in the previous year he had made way for the tenth Shōgun by resigning his office to his son, Iyeharu, who thus became Shōgun at the age of 23 years. On the very day when he was invested by Imperial patent about half the city of Yedo was burned down, a natural bonfire to celebrate the joyful event.

Matsudaira Takemoto had now plausible reasons for hoping that his talents might at last become of some real positive service to the empire. One of his colleagues, a mere nonentity, had just died, and another one was transferred for service with the retired Shōgun in the Nishi Maru. In 1761, the able but unscrupulous and time-serving Hotta, Sagami no Kami, died about the same time as the ex-Shōgun Iyeshige, and of the new Councillors appointed to fill the vacancies in the Rōjū, one Akimoto, Tajima no Kami, was a man after Matsudaira's own heart, intrepid, energetic, sturdily honest, a sworn foe to favouritism and venality. At the time, men of such a breed were sorely needed indeed. But, after all, it was the character of the new Shōgun that was the real key to the situation, and there were ample grounds for expecting great things from him. As a boy he had been the chief solace of his grandfather's heart, his great sheet-anchor of hope for the future. As a child he had been winsome and quick-witted ; in fact, some of the anecdotes recorded of him indicate that people regarded him as a sort of infant prodigy. But, as in only too many cases of precocity, his index of mental expansion was a small one, and the limits of development were not difficult to reach. This may have been partly the result of his unfavourable environment as he grew up ; possibly, if he had had the benefits of Yoshimune's training for some years longer, he might have become an infinitely abler man than he proved to be. Until the death of Yoshimune his education had not been neglected. His tutor, Narushima, laid much stress upon Japanese history, and Iyeharu was uncommonly well-acquainted with the exploits of the great figures in the national pantheon, while he was carefully instructed in the orthodox theories of administration. Unlike his father, he was no physical sluggard ; on the contrary, he was proficient in all the martial accomplishments of the samurai, and was one of the best shots of his time, whether with the bow, or the musket.

He began his régime with an effort to make the Hyōjōsho once more what it had been in the times of his grandfather. At his accession he discovered that it was seriously in arrear with the suits before it, and he at once instructed the bench to have them all cleared off within six months, and to make it a rule that no case in future should be allowed to drag on for a longer term unless for some very special reason. Shortly afterwards, the whole Hyōjōsho bench were instructed to revise Yoshimune's code, and to append to its various articles any modifications that experience had shown to be necessary or advisable. This work was not finally accomplished until 1767, when the *Kajōruiten* received the Shōgun's sanction. Iyeshige had troubled himself as little about the military training of the samurai as Tsunayoshi had done, and in this field it seemed that Yoshimune's work had ultimately proved of no avail. Iyeharu now showed himself inclined to take it vigorously in hand. In front of Iyeyasu's shrine in Uyeno he instituted exhibitions of horse-archery, and many of the Samurai again became assiduous in their practice at the butts. Unfortunately, the new Shōgun did not insist upon these functions being carried out with the simplicity that characterized them in the Kamakura age, as his grandfather had done. On the contrary, they were always held with great pomp and circumstance, and so were eagerly welcomed by the frivolous, fashionable society of Yedo as occasions for making display of its taste in dress and personal adornment. At this date, too, a great craze for temple-going and sermons was prevalent, and its inspiring motive was neither piety nor devotion, but a mere love of display. To devotees of this description the horse-archery functions at Uyeno came as a veritable godsend, and the drapers and tailors and haberdashers of Yedo profited immensely. One outcome of all this was to plunge many of the samurai still more deeply into the slough of financial distress. We have seen that, by 1736, the crops had become so abundant that it was necessary to resort to a debasement of the coinage, and various other devices in order to bolster up the price of rice in the interests of those who drew rice rations from the Bakufu and clan granaries. The immediate result of this was to drive up the price of commodities generally. After the death of Yoshimune the harvests began to dwindle, and now, owing to the scandals that disgraced the local administration, almost everywhere they had shrunk so far that they were insufficient to supply immediate demands, while the storage of surplus rice

had become an impossibility. Naturally, rice now went up tremendously, apart from any question of a debasement of the coinage, but the samurai, as a class, did not profit much by this state of things, for the deficiency in the annual crops made it necessary to reduce their stipends. On the other hand, most of them were so entangled in the mad whirl of fashionable life that it was impossible for them to "reduce their standards of luxury and display", for any such course would have exposed them to the contempt of their associates. Greed and vanity, whether singly or in combination, must unfortunately be counted among the most common and most powerful determinants of human action in every country under the sun, and none among the sinful sons of men have been greater slaves to vanity than the average Japanese, especially the average samurai. He was supposed to be greedy of nothing save honour, but his very respect for what he regarded as the claims of honour, the approbation of small-souled people as vain and giddy as himself, now made him intensely greedy of money in spite of all traditions.

The point of supreme importance was to attract the favourable notice of the Shōgun, or of those who had access to his ear. Not only in the case of archery festivals, but in everything else, Iyeharu gave indications that he was exceedingly fond of magnificence and sumptuous display. Hence, to those who aspired to shine in the fashionable life of the time—and there were few who did not—money became a matter of the utmost consequence. Those in positions of influence—or supposed positions of influence—acquired it easily enough, "presents" came streaming in upon them. On the other hand, most of those who paid them court were in a vastly different situation, they were nearly all living beyond their steadily diminishing incomes. Some were over head and ears in debt to the *fuda-sashi*, with their stipends mortgaged for several years to come. Others, still more unfortunate, fell into the clutches of some member or other of the guild of blind Shampooers (*Zatō*),¹ whose tender mercies towards their debtors were those of the wicked. Duns were to be met with in the porch of every second or third Hatamoto house in Banchō, while many of the clan samurai

¹ *Zatō* is the general term for blind men who follow the occupations of shampooers or street musicians, both of which classes alike perambulate the streets. The blind shampooers have always been the most merciless and exacting of usurers.—J. H. L.

had to be careful about the quality of their callers. The young Shōgun was exceedingly popular not merely with the samurai but with the citizens as well, for his personal tastes were good for trade. Yet Iyeharu was the reverse of affable; on the contrary, it was exceedingly difficult, if not absolutely impossible, for even the higher officials to approach him. As he grew up he began to evince a marked dislike for new and unfamiliar faces, and presently the only people he cared to see were his own personal attendants, whom he trusted implicitly, and the ladies of the Court. Not that he was either a profligate or a physical sluggard like his father, for he spent a good deal of his time in the healthy open air, hawking and hunting, and, at first, he interested himself in what his Great Councillors and other officers were doing though he was not at all anxious to meet them personally. During his régime there was a certain amount of legislation—sumptuary laws among others—and some of the measures submitted for the Shōgun's sanction seemed to be excellent, but it most unfortunately proved that they were rarely seriously enforced; like the great horse-archery functions of Uyeno they were mainly for purposes of show. They were almost invariably placed before His Highness not by the Rōjū or its monthly president but by his personal attendants, who were his media of communication with the great executive officers. One consequence of this was that the traditions of Iyeshige were continued. The real rulers of Japan were still the Sobayōnin.

In Iyeshige's time the all-powerful favourite, Ōoka Tadamitsu, took care to attach his son, Tadayoshi, to the person of the heir apparent, and now, on the deaths of Iyeshige and the senior Ōoka, the sons of the two continued the relations that had subsisted between their fathers. However, the young Ōoka had to share the confidence of Iyeharu with a colleague, a certain Tanuma Mototsugu. Tanuma (born in 1719) was the son of one of the Kishū samurai who accompanied Yoshimune to Yedo. In the old Shōgun's time he held an officer's commission in the *Koshō-gumi*, but does not seem to have been regarded with any very marked degree of favour. Under Iyeshige he found means of ingratiating himself with Ōoka Tadayoshi, and the latter, discerning in him a serviceable tool, contrived to place him near the person of Iyeharu. A few years after the latter's accession young Ōoka died, and henceforth, down to Iyeharu's death in 1786, Tanuma continued to be his master's right hand man in everything. In Iyeshige's last years he was

raised to Daimyō rank, and assigned a seat on the Hyōjōsho bench. A few months later he was transferred to a new fief of 20,000 *koku*, and under Iyeharu he was formally appointed Sobayōnin. In this man—if we are to trust the native historians—we meet with an extreme instance of one of the worst types of Japanese character. Towards his superiors, or those whom he had any reason to court or fear, insinuating and smooth-spoken, and in case of need, fawning, cringing, and servile; to those below him, or to such as he had no reason to dread, or who did not choose to propitiate him duly, insufferably haughty and outrageously insolent. And withal, an exceedingly able man; no great scholar, or rather no scholar at all, so far as the Chinese classics went, but exceedingly well-read in the great book of human nature, and especially well acquainted with its most unclean pages.

Before many years passed Tanuma had almost every one of the officials quailing before him. One morning, in 1767, he met the Rōjū, Akimoto, Tajima no Kami, in the great corridor of the palace, and according to the established etiquette he should have saluted his superior in the official hierarchy by placing his hands upon his knees and bending forward. So powerful had he lately become that he could even venture to slight the Rōjū, and he was on the point of passing Akimoto by without any notice when the latter sharply called him to account and exacted the proper salute from him. A few weeks later Akimoto found it advisable to tender his resignation and retire into private life. Two years afterwards, Tanuma was appointed Acting-Councillor, while in 1772 he was installed as a regular member of the Rōjū. In the Great Council he occupied the lowest seat, but he was far more powerful than all his colleagues combined, who soon appreciated the wisdom of thwarting him in nothing. On the contrary, official salvation consisted in divining and anticipating his wishes. One of his wishes was easy enough to divine, but to satisfy it or rather to satiate it, was a very different matter. Ōoka Tadamitsu had a pronounced weakness for “presents”, but Tanuma’s appetite for them was ravening and unappeasable. It might have been supposed that the increased revenue of his new fief of Sagara in the province of Tōtōmi (assessed at 57,000 *koku*), which Ieharu bestowed on him at an early stage in their relations as lord and vassal, would have been ample to maintain his state, but even its revenues were no more than a trickling rivulet among the huge streams of wealth that poured in upon him from many quarters.

Some of this wealth Tanuma had to disburse; it was of great consequence for him to be on the best of terms with the ladies of the Palace, and although flattery there might do much, it was not injudicious to reinforce it by more solid and substantial tokens of esteem. One of Yoshimune's first cares was to curb all extravagance in the Great Interior of the Palace, and to place everything there on a footing of economy and simplicity. Under his grandson, as great a proportion of the minishing annual revenues of the Bakufu were absorbed by the Great Interior as had been the case in the wasteful times of Tsunayoshi. Iyeharu's harem was perhaps fully as costly as the *Parc aux Cerfs* of Louis XV on the other side of the globe, although Iyeharu was not a profligate like Tsunayoshi or His Most Christian Majesty of France; it was simply that he had a profound, ingrained dislike for anything that approached rusticity or simplicity, and a consuming passion for what the Japanese call *Kwabi*,¹ pomp, parade, splendour, and magnificence. Accordingly, Tanuma knew better than to allow the official auditors to make any stir or trouble about the innumerable financial irregularities that were to be found in the portentously increasing household accounts of His Highness; nay, rather than have his numerous friends among the fair dames of the court clamouring about any stint of supplies, he would satisfy them out of his own means from time to time, as he was perfectly well able to do without feeling the slightest pinch of inconvenience. When his chief *yashiki* was confiscated at his fall in 1786, it was found to be glutted with what might have been the accumulated spoil of a great captured treasure-house, while a huge surplus of valuables, which could find no room in the recesses and store-houses of the *yashiki*, overflowed into a row of accessory buildings. Nearly all this immense hoard of treasure had been contributed by office-seekers, either such as aimed at being gazetted to posts for the first time, or such as hoped for promotion. Without Tanuma's sanction or aid, access to the world of office, or advancement to its more lucrative and influential posts, was equally impossible. The old posts were fairly numerous, and many new ones were created, but, even so the official loaves and fishes could not be made to satisfy everyone, for the hungry applicants were legion. Many handsome presents from people who could but ill-afford to make them, brought the tenderers nothing, not

¹ In its primary meaning *Kwabi* signifies "beautiful as flowers in bloom".
—J. H. L.

even an expression of thanks, yet whoever aspired to anything must needs cast his bread upon the waters. Again, those who actually did obtain something durst not be ungrateful or unmindful, they could be dismissed with far greater ease than they had been appointed. If tolerably regular in their tribute, their tenure of office was secure in spite of all but the most serious shortcomings. What would have been regarded as outrageous scandals in Yoshimune's time were now nothing more than mere peccadilloes to be passed over with a smile. Public decency indeed became of little consequence when Tanuma was at the summit of his power.

About that time a certain Mikami, Mino no Kami, was promoted to the Colonelcy of the Nishi Maru Shoimban (Inner Company of Life Guards) and a week or so later he gave a banquet to celebrate the occasion in his mansion in Banchō. Among the guests were at least half-a-dozen who added the title *Kami* to their names, as lords of their several fiefs. Some years before this, the Geisha (singing-girls) had made their first appearance, and now at the great banquets held every night in some Yedo mansion they, as well as the Taikomochi or buffoons from the Yoshiwara, were in great request. On this occasion the host had engaged the services of some of those most in vogue. Before the evening was far advanced every one was tipsy, and Geisha, buffoons, and guests all alike began to pelt each other with the viands. The dinner tables and service were smashed, the interior of the mansion wrecked, and after a number of indescribable pranks the aristocratic host and all his guests poured out in an uproarious rout and proceeded to finish the hideous orgy in the Yoshiwara.¹ On the next day there was an important Palace function, and the new Colonel of the Inner Life Guards and his guests were still too drunk to be able to appear at their posts of duty. This was an offence punishable with at least the entire confiscation of all the offenders' property; while "evil moral reputation" involved deportation to an island, or perhaps an order to commit *hara-kiri*. Had such a scandal been possible in Yoshimune's day the extreme penalty would probably have been inflicted. As it was, the offence was too glaringly gross and flagrant to be passed over, but all that was done was to relieve the offenders of their commissions. For a few years this special outburst in Mikami's Banchō mansion continued to be spoken of

¹ For a similar episode in contemporary Paris see Taine's *L'ancien Régime*, bk. ii, ch. ii, at end.

as the greatest and wildest orgy of the time but, in sober truth, there was no lack of similar functions, equally unrestrained and riotous, and if the Colonel and his guests had been able to appear on duty on the following morning the incident would have brought him *éclat* rather than punishment. In the penultimate decade of the eighteenth century, Yedo banquets were characterized by even a deeper measure of sumptuous dissipation than any of the "little suppers" in contemporary Versailles or Paris, and while no less extravagant, they descended to lower depths of licence and to the worst forms of depravity. Gambling was also as common and involved at high stakes in Yedo as in Paris, and the austere characteristics of the samurai in the days of Kiyomasa and Yoshimune seemed to be replaced by those of profligate and self-indulgent *roués*, eager to acquire money, which it was formerly the samurais' proud boast to despise, by any means, for the gratification of their vices. It has been stated that, in addition to the samurai proper, the various *yashiki* in Yedo were thronged with crowds of menials drawn from the Kwantō and the neighbouring lands. They were generally hired by the year. At the end of their term of employment (although many remained in the capital) they were supposed to return to their native villages and there resume their original avocations. It is not hard to conceive what the moral effects of their return to the country must have been upon the social economy of the village communities to which they belonged. These were now generally seething with an only too justifiable spirit of unrest and discontent, inasmuch as the extortions, exactions, chicanery, and insolence of the local administrative chiefs and their petty minions made it very hard to earn a livelihood by honest labour alone. These menials returned from Yedo had, as a Japanese author alleges, acquired the speculative point of view, and the extravagant habits that ruled there. They thus carried about them a certain restless and flippant air, and the half-exhausted inhabitants of the village contained elements most susceptible to this sort of influence. Soon every part of the country came to feel a longing for easy money and an easy life. From the end of the seventeenth century the supply of applicants, even for menial service in the warrior's or merchant's household, was growing scarce. In order to remedy this difficulty the authorities, who in the earlier years had taken great pains to forbid sales of persons and to limit the terms of personal service, were now obliged to modify the law to a considerable extent. Every

district, if not every village, contained landless persons who would live rather by speculation, trading on popular superstitions, gambling, fraud, or robbery, than by any form of honest labour. Gambling had become so generally prevalent throughout the provinces of Shimōsa, Kōdzuke, and Shimotsuke by 1767 that the taxes were mostly in arrear, agriculture neglected, and large tracts of arable land gone, or going, out of cultivation. The village usurer, who was not infrequently a gambler, and often in collusion with the petty officials, held scores of his neighbours in his clutches. Even in the good times of Yoshimune, a contemporary expert asserted that a debt of 5 *ryō* (£7) would ruin an average farmer in five years. Now the rates of interest exacted were much higher than they were in 1720, for the risks were far greater. Not a few of the hopeless, broken men took to the high road, and whole provinces, especially around Yedo, were presently infested with gangs of the most desperate class of brigands.

In the great south-western fiefs, such as Satsuma, Higo, Chōshū, Tosa, and in Mayeda's wide Kanazawa domain, matters were not quite so bad. On the contrary, in some of them, in Higo especially, much administrative work of a high degree of honesty and efficiency was actually being done at the time. In other fiefs the state of things was about as desperate as it was in the Bakufu domains. So much is clearly apparent in the case of the Uyesugi fief of Yonezawa before the new chieftain Harunori entered upon his famous reforms about 1770. It has already been mentioned that the Uyesugi chieftain had incurred ill-favour with the Yedo authorities for failing to protect or to avenge his natural father, Kira Yoshinaka, assassinated by the Forty-seven Rōnin in 1703, the Hyōjōsho having actually gone so far as to recommend the confiscation of his domains. In 1753, the clan incurred the displeasure of Iyeshige or his favourites—possibly it had not fulfilled legitimate expectations in the matter of “presents”—and found itself saddled with the task of repairing the main building of the Tō-ei-zan Temple in Uyeno. The cost of this work made a serious inroad upon the finances of Yonezawa, and it appeared to be the intention of the Bakufu to ruin the clan entirely, as Uyesugi, having completed the first task, was next ordered to re-erect the grand entrance to the fane. It was only by inducing the Daimyō of Owari to intervene that the *corvée* was transferred to another clan, the Ogasawara of Kokura. As it was, the Uyesugi fief was

so terribly crippled that its position seemed to be well-nigh hopeless. Its 750 square miles of territory lay away from the sea in the far north of the Main Island, ringed in with rugged, inhospitable mountain-ranges. In fertility and natural resources its valleys ranked very low and they were buried deeply in snow for five months in each year. It was sparsely peopled, according to the Japanese standard, for it supported only about 100,000 souls. "Supported" is scarcely the word to use, for, at this time, the penury and destitution that prevailed within the Yonezawa domains almost beggared description. Whoever could do so absconded, and those who could not only remained to rot and die. The exactions of the tax-collector were ruthless; the debts of the clan amounted to a fabulous sum while we are assured that at times samurai and officials could not raise so much as five gold pieces among them by their united efforts. To crown all, the last of the Uyesugi seemed on the point of passing away, leaving no posterity behind him but a crazed, half-witted, delicate girl. It was with no small difficulty that a husband could be procured for her for personally, of course, she had no attractions to tempt any suitor, while the terrible conditions of the ancestral domains made her of but scant consideration as an heiress in the marriage market. It was finally arranged that a younger son of the Akizuki family, who held a 27,000 *koku* fief in Hyūga, should wed her and assume the heavy responsibilities of Chief of the Uyesugi house. When it is stated that the new chief, Uyesugi Harunori, was a mere boy of sixteen when he assumed the position, it would scarcely seem that the dismal prospects of the clan had been sensibly improved. The cynical fashionable society of Yedo must have been vastly amused at what might well be regarded as the precocious and impracticable manifestation of his ambitions that was soon made by what they regarded as a verdant youth. On the very day of his instalment as chief of the Uyesugi clan he sent in the following vow to the Great God of Kasuga, his tutelary deity throughout his life:—

I. The exercises, literary and military, such as I have prescribed to myself, shall I prosecute without negligence.

II. To be a father and a mother to my people shall be my first and chief endeavour.

III. The words that follow shall I never forget, day or night:—

"No extravagance, no danger.

Give in charity, but waste not."

IV. Inconsistency between words and acts, injustice in rewarding

and punishing, unfaithfulness and indecency—from these I shall diligently guard myself.

The above shall I strictly observe in future, and in case of my neglect of the same, let the punishment of heaven overtake me at once, and the family fortunes be for ever ruined.

It was not till two years after this (in 1769) that the youthful chief fared forth from Yedo to assume charge of his mountain-ringed domain in the wilds of the far north. When he crossed the Yonezawa frontier, the succession of sights that met his eyes was lamentable in the extreme. It was heart-breaking. Away towards the foothills a sour, sullen, sombre, expanse of bleak, wind-swept moors and wastes ; alongside the high road wretched huts, and here and there clusters of hovels where villages should be. Wherever anything human was met, there were fluttering rags, shivering nakedness, filth, misery, destitution, and utter degradation. Towards the end of the first day's weary and depressing journey, his attendants observed the young lord diligently blowing through the stem of his tobacco pipe at the tiny charcoal fire in the brazier in his palanquin. "We can serve your Lordship with a good fire," said one of his suite. "Not now," was the reply, "I am now learning a great lesson. What it is I will tell you by-and-by." When they put up at an hotel for the night, the attendants were summoned together. Said the Chief :—

"As despair took hold of me as I witnessed my people's miseries, my attention was caught by the tiny charcoal fire before me that was just on the point of going out. I built it up, and by blowing at it gently and patiently, I succeeded in resuscitating it. 'May I not be able in the same way to resuscitate the land and the people under my care?' This I said to myself, and hope revived within me."

The object-lesson and the parable were approved and most effective instruments of instruction in old Japan. To save the clan from imminent dissolution the crushing burden of debts had to be at least lightened. The stipends of the retainers were at once cut down by half, but in this case not charity but economy had to begin at home. The chief's household budget had hitherto stood at 1,050 *ryō*, it was now reduced to 209 *ryō*. Forty-one out of the fifty female servants were discharged ; Uyesugi himself would wear nothing but cotton clothing, and have only three courses of the plainest food at a meal. All this was nothing more than a mere detail in his scheme of administration. His fundamental maxims here were, (1) To have no waste places in his domains, and (2) to have no idlers among his people :—

"His samurai he turned into farmers, and recovered thousands of acres from desolation and the wilderness in that way. He ordered lacquer-trees to be extensively planted. Every samurai family was required to plant fifteen nurslings in its yard, and every other family five, and every temple twenty within its enclosure. For every tree planted over the required number a bounty of 20 *mon* was given, and for every one that died and was not replaced, a fine of the same amount was exacted. Over one million nurslings of this valuable tree were thus planted within his territory in a very short period—a matter of very great consequence to posterity. A million more of the paper-mulberry were planted in places which allowed no cultivation. But Uyesugi's chief aim was to make his domain a great silk-producing district. For this purpose, funds were required which his impoverished treasury could not supply. He therefore still further reduced his household budget from 209 to 159 *ryō*, and used the money thus saved to promote the silk industry. The few thousand mulberry stocks he began with soon propagated themselves, and in course of years his whole domain had no space left for more. 'The Yonezawa district to-day and its splendid silk-produce testify to the patience and benevolence of its ancient chief. The Yonezawa brand ranks highest in the market.' When public welfare was at last assured (all the clan debts had been paid off by 1785, in sixteen years) Uyesugi could think of no impossibility, for he had patience to make up for any lack of means. So it was that the poorest of the Daimyō projected and completed two of the most stupendous engineering works ever undertaken in Old Japan. One was the conduct of water for a distance of twenty-eight miles over viaducts and long and high embankments, all of which are masterpieces of hydraulic engineering. The other was the turning of the course of a large stream through a tunnel, 1,200 feet of which was through solid granite. The latter work took twenty years. Among Uyesugi's vassals was a certain Kuroi, a slow speechless man, passing as a good-for-nothing. The chief discovered in him a mathematician of rare ability. With his rude instruments he made careful surveys of the ground, and planned out the two works which to his contemporaries appeared like madness. He completed the first and died while engaged on the second. The work was nevertheless continued according to his plan, and twenty years after its commencement the tunnel was bored through from both ends, the outlet section meeting the intake section four feet *below* the level of the latter—a wonder of accuracy in calculation when the transit and the theodolite were unknown instruments in the land. Deserts began to bloom, and plenty flowed in abundance into Uyesugi's territory, Yonezawa alone of all northern provinces, knows of no drought to this very day.

"Uyesugi furthermore imported improved breeds of stock, stocked ponds and streams with eels and carp, brought in miners and weavers from other provinces, removed all toll-houses and commercial restrictions, and endeavoured in every way to develop the resources of the fief. These measures, with his extermination of idlers from among his people, and their conversion into useful workers, brought about such changes that the once poorest district in the land became a type of productivity towards the close of Uyesugi's life, and has continued to be so ever since."

So much as regards some of the mere material results of Uyesugi Harunori's administration, an administration on which he entered it must not be forgotten when he was an inexperienced youth of eighteen or nineteen years. Still more important is it to consider the discipline and methods by which these results were achieved.¹

Uchimura continues his story :—

“ No good government is possible without right men in right places, and such men Uyesugi would have, though the hereditary nature of the feudal government was against his democratic idea of ‘ a man according to his abilities ’. Out of his impoverished treasury he paid men of abilities very liberally, and placed them over his people in three distinct capacities. First there were the governor and his sub-officers, ‘ fathers and mothers ’ of the people. To these one of his injunctions was as follows :—

“ ‘ The child has no knowledge of its own ; but she who mothers it understands its needs and ministers thereto, because she does it from her sincerity. Sincerity begets love, and love begets knowledge. Only be sincere and nothing is unattainable. As is the mother to the child, so must the officer be to his people. *If only the heart that loves the people lies in you, you need not lament the lack of wisdom in you.*’

“ The second class of officers were itinerant preachers, who were to teach the people in morals and ceremonies, ‘ of filial piety, of compassion towards widows and orphans, of matters of marriage, of decency in clothing, of food, and ways of eating, of funeral services, of house repairs, etc. The *whole* territory was divided into twelve districts (dioceses) for this purpose, each with a presiding teacher (lay-bishop) over it. These bishops were to meet twice a year for mutual conference, and to make occasional reports to the Chief of the progress of their works among the people. The third class were policemen of the strictest kind. They were to detect the people's vices and crimes, and to punish them severely for their offences. Mercy they were to show to none, and every nook of villages and towns was to be carefully scrutinized. It was a diocese's shame to furnish offenders and every preacher took upon himself responsibilities for troubles his district gave to the police.

“ The three functions together worked admirably. His general administrative policies went through the governor and his subsidiaries. But our Lord says ‘ To rule a people that is not taught is costly and ineffectual ’. And such teaching was furnished by the lay-bishops to give ‘ life and warm circulation to the whole ’. Teaching without discipline is ineffectual. Hence the strictest police system to make the teaching more effectual and the mercy shown more conspicuous. The youth of nineteen must have had no little insight into human nature to have enabled him to frame such a system of governing mankind.

“ The new machinery was in operation for five years without meeting with molestation from any quarter. Order began to show itself, and hopes revived of the possible resuscitation of the despaired-of society.

¹ The extracts already indicated are from *Japan and the Japanese*, by Uchimura Kanzō, a little book of very high merit. The literature on Uyesugi Harunori and his tutor Hosoi runs to many thousands of pages. Possibly Mr. Ikeda's *Life*, published in 1906, will be found most serviceable by those more deeply interested in Uyesugi.

Then came the trial. One day seven of the highest dignitaries of the district approached the young chief with their grievances, and tried to wrest from him words for the immediate abrogation of the new system of government. The chief is silent. He would have his *people* judge him, and if *they* object to the new administration, it and he would willingly yield up its and his places to the better and abler. So he called a general council of his subjects at once. Armoured and sword-girt they gather in thousands in the Castle and wait for the business. Meanwhile our Lord resorts to the temple of the great god of Kasuga to pray for a peaceful issue to the trouble. Then he meets his beloved subjects, and asks them if, in their opinions, his administration is against Heaven's will. The governor and his associates say 'No'. The police, one and all, say 'No'. Captains and sergeants say 'No'. Different mouths with one voice say 'No'. Our Lord is satisfied. His mind is made up. He calls the seven before him and passes sentence upon them. Half of the fiefs of five of them were confiscated and the five were 'shut up within their gates for ever'. Two of them, the head conspirators, were dealt with according to the code of the samurai. They were permitted to perform *hara-kiri*, bowel-cutting, a dignified method of self-destruction. Conservatives and grumblers thus disposed of, good began to flow in in abundance.

"One beautiful feature of the oriental knowledge is that it has never treated economy apart from morality. Wealth with their philosophers is always the effect of virtue, and the two bear the relation to each other of the fruit to the tree. You manure the tree, and the fruit will surely come, without your effort. You manure 'Love to the people', and wealth will be a necessary outcome. 'Therefore the wise man thinketh of the tree, and he hath the fruit. The small man thinketh of the fruit, and he hath it not.' Such was the Confucianism indoctrinated into Uyesugi's mind by his worthy teacher, Hosoi. Herein, therefore, lies the grandeur of all of Uyesugi's industrial reforms, that his chief aim was to make *virtuous* people out of his subjects. The hedonistic view of happiness was repugnant to him. Wealth was to be had that all might be made 'decorous people' thereby, for said the ancient sage 'Decorum is known only when life's necessities are had'. Remarkably free from the conventionalities of his time, he aimed at leading his heaven-entrusted people into the 'ways of man', binding alike on the Daimyō and the tiller of the soil. Thus by one man's sincerity was chaos turned to order, and the earth was made to give out what it hid from the eyes of the unfaithful. It is yet to be seen how much sincerity can make out of this planet."

The hard-working, abstemious man enjoyed continuous health for three score years and ten. Most of his early hopes were realized. He saw his fief firmly established, his people well supplied, and his whole domain abundantly replenished. The clan, that had not been able to raise five pieces of gold by their united efforts, could now raise 10,000 at a moment's notice. The end of such a man could not be anything but peace. On 19th March, 1822, he breathed his last:—

“ The people wept as if they had lost their good grandfather. The lamentations of all classes no pen can describe. On the day of his funeral tens of thousands of mourners filled the wayside. Hands clasped and heads all bowed, deep wailings went up from them all, and even mountains, rivers, and plants joined in the universal sorrow.”

That an inexperienced youth of eighteen should have been able to devise such a wide-reaching and salutary project of reform as Uyesugi Harunori actually carried through in the teeth of difficulties that might have daunted even an Iyeyasu, is surely not the least astonishing circumstance in Uchimura's wonderful tale. It is true that this youth had not been reared as an elder son and heir to the fief; if he had been so reared, he never could have achieved a tithe of what he did. The intelligent reader will have no difficulty in surmising that at first, at least, there must have been some great *Kuromaku* or prompter behind him. We have seen what Arai did for the sixth Shōgun, Iyenobu. But Arai would probably have failed in Yonezawa in 1769; he would have concentrated too much attention upon such matters as “ a reform of the ceremonies ”, to the neglect of the far more insistent and vital problem of finding the wherewithal to pay off the crushing load of clan indebtedness and to fill the bellies of the starving tatterdemalion vassals and peasants. In the hands of Hayashi Dōshun, young Uyesugi might have become a prodigy of learning, but Hayashi could never have fired his soul and inspired him to the achievement of the real man's work he accomplished in his day and generation. With Ogyu Sorai for his early preceptor, Uyesugi might indeed have developed into a great politician. Sorai was perhaps the very best intellect among the Confucianists of Japan; the clearest, the most vigorous, the most original thinker of them all, but his cardinal tenet was that every member of the “ damned race ” is shapen in sin and conceived in iniquity, and his chief, if not his sole agent of reform, would have been the policeman. Until the advent of the “ blessed millennium ”, the “ damned race ” will doubtless always stand in need of a modicum of the policeman, or the “ fear o' Hell ” or of the hangman, or of some other visible or imaginary penalty, but to get their best out of the sinful sons of men by mere coercion and terrorism is impossible. At this crisis in Yonezawa it was in getting the very best of which he was capable out of every one of his subjects that Uyesugi discerned the sole hope of salvation. To effect this, some-

thing more was necessary than the "Honesty-is-the-best-policy" doctrine. Nakae Tōju's "Do right for the mere sake of doing right", transcendental and impracticable as it might appear, was really the only practical kind of creed for the work-a-day exigencies of the situation. From his early boyhood, Uyesugi Harunori was in the hands of Hosoi Heishū who continued instilling the bracing tenets of oriental transcendentalism into him early and late. Hosoi accompanied his young lord to Yonezawa, and remained with him there till his death in 1801. Hosoi, it was, who was the prompter of the boy chieftain's grand projects of reform.

Three or four centuries before, the Uyesugi family were great patrons of learning. The Ashikaga Gakkō—Xavier frequently refers to it as the University of Bandoue, and thought of getting missionaries installed in some of its chairs—owed much to their munificence. In their great Echigo domain, one of the first, if not indeed the very first of the modern clan schools, was organized in Hideyoshi's time, but since the removal of the clan to Yonezawa, there had been no local college for the samurai. Now, even before the debts of the clan were entirely liquidated, Uyesugi established the Kōjō Kwan, and installed Hosoi as its Provost:—

"The magnitude and equipment of the school were out of all proportion to the finances of the clan. It provided many free scholarships to enable the worthy poor to obtain a high-class education. For nearly a century after its establishment, the Yonezawa school continued to be a type and example to the whole country. Later on, a medical department was opened. At the time when the European medical art was looked upon with fear and suspicion, Uyesugi caused several of his subjects to be trained in the new system by Dr. Sugita, of great celebrity as the first Japanese physician after the Dutch method. Once convinced of its superiority over Chinese medicine, he spared no expense to get all the medical apparatus he possibly could, and placed it in his school to be freely used in instruction and practice. Thus, fifty years before Perry's squadron appeared in the Bay of Yedo Western medicine was in general use in one of the mountain districts of north Japan."

The modern Japanese are frequently twitted with their low and lax notions of commercial morality, while, during two centuries of seclusion, records and edicts alike tend to show that the men of Nippon were then as inveterate smugglers as any contemporary Cornishmen. Kuranari, a contemporary writer, describes how it stood with Uyesugi's subjects in these respects:—

"In Yonezawa is what they call the Label-market. Away from the habitations of men, by the side of public roads, sandals, shoes, fruit, and other commodities are exposed for sale with their prices labelled

upon them and their owners all absent. People go there, leave the prices as marked, take the goods, and pass on ; and nobody ever thinks of stealing anything from these markets. The dominion has no custom-houses or any such obstructions to free commerce on its borders and yet no smuggling is ever attempted."

It is a sad and cheerless business to have to leave this little nook of Paradise Regained in the most forbidding circumstances in the snowy and sequestered wilds of the far north, and return to the foul cesspool of the Yedo bureaucracy and the Bakufu lands. The open and unabashed traffic in offices of public trust has already been adverted to. By this time the Courts of Justice had become as the farm-yard of Augeas. Probably they were in as evil a case as those of Kamakura were just before the fall of the Hōjō. The only wise thing for an honest man to do was to keep out of them at any cost, for unless "offerings" were duly tendered to Tanuma or his favourites, the litigant with the best case in the world would assuredly find himself cast and probably ruined. And this, too, in spite of the fact that the Shōgun Iyeharu began his administration by admonishing and reforming the Hyōjōsho bench and endeavouring to restore judicial purity and efficiency to the same high standard which characterized it in his grandfather's time. Naturally enough, the local administration of justice by the *Gundai* and *Daikwan* took its colour from that of the central Supreme Court.

The petty local tyrants, however, discovered that it was after all possible to push things too far. The Hyūga *émeute* of 1759, has already been mentioned. Five years later, in 1764, the population of a whole county at the base of the Chichibu range in Musashi, driven to desperation by the exactions of the officials, abandoned their homes, and formed an entrenched camp, where they proposed to defy the authorities till their grievances were redressed and a guarantee received for proper treatment in the future. Circulars were dispatched to the villages in the neighbouring provinces, and received a prompt response. The Daikwan, as in the Hyūga case, had to appeal to the local Daimyō for troops, and in storming the farmers' rude fortifications several hundred men are said to have fallen. The captured peasants were forwarded to Yedo, where they filled the Temma gaol, and prison accommodation had to be provided for them in Asakusa and Shinagawa, where they were packed so closely together that they are said to have died in scores. Some thirty or forty of their ringleaders were executed, and the others were presently returned to their villages. From this date, almost

every year was marked by the promulgation of edicts prohibiting "forcible petitioning" and rioting, but still the agrarian riots went on in one quarter or another. The odd thing to find is that meanwhile the penalties for these offences were not increased, but reduced. This would seem to indicate that the authorities recognized that the peasants' grievances were serious, and that they were afraid to push things to extremities. In truth, as the result of these outbreaks, the Kwantō Daikwan became very cautious and circumspect, for the Bakufu was now reprimanding them for the progressive diminution in the annual tax-yield forwarded to Yedo. Prices, already high, still kept rising. Once more the truth of Gresham's generalization manifested itself, only the most inferior of the various kinds of coin then supposed to be in circulation were current to any extent. The Finance Magistrates thought to find a remedy for inflated prices in extensive new issues from the mint, but the supply of copper was insufficient, and speculators began to reap a rich harvest as mining prospectors. These "Yamashi"¹ (Mountain-teachers), as they were called, would report the existence of a copper-mine in the territories of a Daimyō, and the Bakufu would forthwith incorporate that special district in the Tokugawa household domain. Some of these adventurers were not slow to indicate other ways and means of replenishing the Yedo exchequer. One suggested to Tanuma that there were "possibilities" in the Chinese trade of Nagasaki. Its great staple was sea-weed and similar marine produce. At that time, the supply came from the great northern island of Yezo, and was furnished almost entirely by the Matsumae family. A "Yamashi" was now dispatched to Yezo to investigate the actual and potential profits of the traffic, and, a little later, the Bakufu deprived Matsumae of his chief source of revenue, and declared the Yezo-Nagasaki trade a government monopoly. The officials sent to conduct it almost at once began to cheat and maltreat the Ainu, and a series of Ainu riots had to be put down with the help of the Matsumae Samurai (1784).

Two other "Yamashi" pointed out that a considerable revenue might be obtained from the silk-produce of Shimotsuke and Kōdzukey. The story is a long and intricate one, but the main incidents were the erection of silk inspecting offices throughout the

¹ *Yamashi*, in commercial parlance signifies an unscrupulous speculator, an adventurer or promoter of bubble companies.

two provinces, the exaction of high fees for the services of the officials, and the confiscation of all silk found in the Yedo market without the official stamp upon it. At last the population rose, burned the inspector's houses, and drove the authorities to their wits' ends. Here again it was felt that it might not be advisable to push things to extremities, for Tanuma was too deeply involved in the affair.

The Bakufu was now to discover that it had been gaily dancing on the deadly brink of a precipice for years. Apart from some great fires in Yedo, and a few typhoons and floods in the provinces, it had so far had to deal with no great succession of natural calamities such as had marked the earliest years of the century. But this happy immunity was now destined to end just at the very time when the long-continued maladministration had made it utterly hopeless for officialdom to cope with them. The angry gods now began a seven years' reign of wrath. Although its actual results were nothing but the merest foretaste of what was to follow, the initial calamity was at once terribly sensational, and sufficiently destructive. It began in the summer of 1783:—

“On 27th July, at eight o'clock in the morning, there arose in Shinano a very strong east wind, accompanied with a dull noise like that of an earthquake, which increased daily, and foreboded the most disastrous consequences. On 1st August, there was a tremendous noise accompanied by earthquake shocks, the walls of the houses cracked and seemed ready to tumble; each successive shock was more violent, till the flames burst forth with a terrific uproar from the summit of Asama-yama, followed by a tremendous eruption of sand and stones. Though it was broad day, everything was enveloped in profound darkness, through which the flames alone threw at times a lurid light. Till the 4th of August the mountain never ceased to cast up sand and stones.

“The large village of Sakamoto and several others situated at the base of the volcano were soon reduced to ashes by the ignited matter which it projected, and by the flames which burst forth from the earth. The inhabitants fled; but the chasms everywhere formed by the yawning of the ground prevented their escape, and in a moment a great number of persons were swallowed up or consumed by the flames; violent shocks continued to be felt till the 5th, and were perceptible to the distance of twenty or thirty leagues; enormous stones and clouds of sand were carried by the wind blast towards the east and north.

“The water of the Yoko and Karuizawa streams boiled; the course of the Tone-gawa, the largest river in Japan, was obstructed and the boiling water inundated the adjacent country, doing incredible mischief. The bears, hyænas (*sic*) fled from the mountains and flocked to the neighbouring villages, where they devoured the inhabitants or mangled them in a horrible way.”

The foregoing contemporary account, supplied to Titsingh,

harmonizes wonderfully well with the generality of the vernacular accounts I have had to read through. In a later report, transmitted to Titsingh, the following details are noteworthy :—

“On 4th August, about one o'clock several rivers became dry ; at two a thick vapour was seen at Azuma over the Tone-gawa, the black muddy water of which boiled up violently. An immense quantity of red-hot stones floating on the surface gave it the appearance of a torrent of fire. . . . On the 5th at ten in the morning, a torrent of sulphur, mixed with rocks, large stones and mud, rushing from the mountain, precipitated itself into the Azuma-gawa and swelled it so prodigiously that it overflowed, carried away houses and laid waste the whole country. The number of persons who perished was immense . . . At Karuizawa there fell such a prodigious quantity of red-hot stones that all the inhabitants perished in the flames with the exception of the chief magistrate ; the exact number of the dead is not known . . . On the 6th about one o'clock large trees and timbers of houses began to be seen floating in the river of Yedo, which was soon afterwards completely covered with mangled carcasses of men and beasts . . . In Shinano the devastation extended over a tract of thirty leagues. [Here follows a list of villages overwhelmed.] Many other villages, besides these here named either partly disappeared or were swept away. It was impossible to determine the number of the dead, and the devastation was incalculable.”¹

¹ This was a season of considerable seismic activity in Japan. In 1780, the volcano on Vries Island, outside the entrance to Yedo Bay, covered a great part of the surface of the island with about 20 feet of ashes and scorix. In the year before, the peak of Mitake in Sakurajima in the Bay opposite the city of Kagoshima burst into action, and about 140 of the islanders perished.

The most costly in human life of all these calamities was the series of cataclysms that overwhelmed the castle-town of Shimabara in 1793. On 25th February, the whole summit of Mount Onsen fell in, and the chasm was so deep that it was impossible to hear the noise made in falling by the stones thrown into it. Torrents of boiling water gushed from all parts, and the vapour which rose from it resembled a thick smoke. On 17th March, there was an eruption about half-a-league from the summit. The flame ascended to a great height ; the lava spread with rapidity at the foot of the mountain, and in a few days the whole country for miles round was in flames . . . The fire was not like ordinary fire, it was sparkling and of a reddish colour, interrupted from time to time by brown blazes. On 1st April, at ten in the evening, a tremendous earthquake was felt throughout Kyūshū, but particularly in the Shimabara peninsula . . . Fortunately the mischief was not so great as had been feared. The mountain meanwhile continued burning, and the lava spread obliquely towards the castle ; but being stopped in its course by a great number of rocks, it turned slowly to the north. On 10th May, when everybody was at dinner, a fresh shock was felt which lasted upwards of an hour and a half, and became more and more violent ; threatening all round with instant destruction. Several houses beyond the castle were presently engulfed with their inhabitants. Prodigious rocks falling from the mountain overthrew and crushed everything in their way. A tremendous noise resembling loud and repeated discharges of artillery was heard underground and in the air ; at length when the danger was supposed to be over, a horrible eruption of Mayeyama took place. The many lovely pine-clad islets, which render the bay of Shimabara a scene of surpassing beauty, are said to have been formed of fragments of the mountain hurled into the sea by this explosion. The greatest part of it was exploded into the air, fell into the sea, and by its fall raised the water to such a height as to inundate both the town and country. At the same time, an enormous quantity of water issuing from the clefts of the mountain, met the sea-water in the streets and produced whirlpools which in some places washed away the very foundations

The actual and immediate loss of life has been variously estimated; the *Tokugawa Jikki* puts it at 20,000; other accounts carry it to as much as 35,000, while the domestic animals that perished are said to have been "incalculable". But the immediate loss of life, although no doubt it may impress the unreflective reader most, was perhaps less serious than other results of the eruption. It put most of the soil in Kōzuke, Kai, and Suruga feet deep under ashes. All that year's crop was utterly ruined; in many of these districts there was scarcely a *koku* of revenue for the lord, and almost nothing for the cultivator left. The natural consequence was that thousands died of famine before the devastated soil could be cleared and resown. Huge tracts of the empire, as remote from the scene of the eruption of Asama as the Home Provinces on the one hand and Ōshu and Dewa on the other, were in not much better case in this year of 1783-4. Even in the preceding year there was a partial failure of the crops in the Go-Kinai. The Government granaries here had been denuded of the stores accumulated in them in the eighth Shōgun's time many years before, while in the far north, outside of Uyesugi's fief of Yonezawa there was perhaps not one single domain with any reserve of cereals to draw upon in case of famine or any similar emergency. What now happened in Ōshu and Dewa is terrible beyond belief, so terrible indeed that the ghoulish details given in the note-books of several travellers in the afflicted districts seem more like the obsessions of a hideous nightmare than anything else. However, if anyone is to be credited, surely the Regent of the empire is to be so; and this is what he recounts:—

of the houses, so as not to leave a vestige of habitations. The castle alone remained uninjured, because the water could not penetrate its strong massive walls; several houses near it were so completely destroyed that not one stone was left upon another. Men and beasts were drowned by the flood. Some were found suspended from the trees, others standing upright, others kneeling, and others again on their heads in the mud; and the streets were strewn with dead bodies. Out of all those who fled for refuge in the castle, a very small number effected their escape, and all these had received more or less injury. The cries of those who were still alive beneath the ruins pierced the heart. At length fifty criminals were sent from the castle to extricate the miserable wretches still living, and to inter the dead . . . The tubs which are used in Japan instead of coffins, were uncovered in the cemeteries, or broken, the large stones laid over them being carried away by the torrent . . . A great number of vessels, which lay at anchor in the neighbourhood, went to the bottom; and an incredible multitude of carcasses of men and beasts, and other wrecks, were brought down by the current, so that ships could scarcely force a passage through them. The wretchedness that everywhere prevailed was inexpressible, and filled the beholder with horror. The number of those known to have perished exceeded 53,000; and it is impossible to describe the consternation produced by the catastrophe. The number of dead bodies floating upon the river was incalculable."

"The famine of the third year of Temmei (1783) was particularly severe in the northern part of the country. A trustworthy man, who had travelled in this district told me that in a village which had previously contained 800 houses there were only 30 left, the inhabitants of the rest all having died. Having entered a village in which the houses seemed to be larger and more numerous than usual, he proposed to rest there for the night. He soon discovered, however, that not a single house was inhabited, but in all the houses he saw bones and skulls scattered about the floor. As he went on he saw innumerable bones and skulls by the roadside. He met a man leading a pack-horse on the road, who said that he could survive without eating the flesh of human beings as he was supported by a rich uncle. In some places even those who abandoned themselves to eating human flesh could not find food enough to live. Great numbers starved to death. The price paid for a dog was 500 *mon*, sometimes even as high as 800 *mon*, a rat 50 *mon*. A rare work of art found no purchasers and could not be exchanged for a *go* of rice. If a person died he was of course eaten by the survivors. Those who died of starvation, however, could not be eaten, because their flesh decayed so soon. Some people, therefore, killed those who were certain to starve and put the flesh into brine so as to keep it for a long time. Among other people there was a farmer who went to his neighbour and said, 'My wife and one of my sons have already died from want of food. My remaining son is certain to die within a few days, so I wish to kill him while his flesh is still eatable, but being his father, I do not dare to raise the sword against him, so I beg you to kill the boy for me.' The neighbour agreed to do this, but stipulated that he should get a part of the flesh as a reward for his service. This was agreed to and the neighbour at once killed the boy. As soon as the deed was done, the farmer, who stood by, struck his neighbour with a sword and killed him, saying that he 'was very glad to avenge his son and at the same time have double the quantity of food'. These are a few of the terrible stories told of the great famine of Temmei. 'In these times,' says our author, 'stealing and incendiarism were not considered wrong and went unpunished.'"

In 1785 there was a drought in the Home Provinces, and the crops there failed again. In the following year, there were terrible floods in the Kwantō; the embankments of the Tone-gawa gave way in many places, and all the wide plain traversed by the river was ravaged and ruined for that year utterly. Large sections of Yedo were under water and many of the people were drowned. Elsewhere, especially in the north, there was no rain at all, and the crops withered utterly. According to Bakin,¹ a contemporary writer :—

¹ Bakin (1767-1848) is Japan's most famous novelist, and though his works are not altogether favourably criticized by Dr. Aston, the most competent of European critics, who gives a full description of Bakin's life and works in his *History of Japanese Literature*, he merits a high place among the best known writers of fiction of the world. The first extract in the text is from the works of Shirakawa Rakuo, who was not Regent but Minister of Finance under Iyenari.

“Next year (1787) the price of rice rose higher than before. The price had been double the normal rate, but it soon advanced till it was three and four fold. Barley, wheat, and millet rose proportionately. Some rice dealers refused to sell at any price. What made matters worse was that rice dealers, both wholesale and retail, for the sake of making larger profits, had bought up all the rice, especially from the Samurai class. In many cases rice merchants over-reached themselves and stored the rice until it was worm-eaten. The people noticed the avarice of these speculators and forestallers, and petitions were sent in to the Government to force the dealers to sell their rice and not to store it. In May the *machi-bugyō* (city governors) answered the petitioners, saying that they had examined the rice dealers and found that there was no rice to sell. Instead, the governors told them to use beans, peas, wheat, and millet. This advice did not satisfy the people, and they began to abuse their rulers. This was the beginning of a series of riots. At the same time the rice dealers formed a union not to sell more than a certain amount (from 100 to 200 *mon*) to each person daily. Even this amount was sold only at certain fixed hours in the day, generally very early in the morning, so that men and women, young and old, who feared to be too late, gathered together in crowds in front of the rice shops, and shouted and quarrelled in their struggle to get their *quantum* of rice. After a time, however, the rice dealers refused to sell any rice at all, but, it is said, concealed it in their godowns. From this time there was really nothing left for the poorer classes to eat except a kind of sea-weed. Some rich men, such as Mitsui and Mitsukoshi, wisely put boiled potatoes in front of their stores, and allowed apprentices under fifteen years of age, who ran errands for their masters, to eat as much as they pleased. In this way the consumption of rice was economized. But most people were in a wretched half-starving condition. Cattle and horses lay dead by the wayside. By June, I saw dogs eating grass.

“On the night of the 20th June a crowd of people (whence they came was never known) destroyed the house of a rice dealer in Kojimachi. This was the first act of destruction. After this, mobs collected everywhere, and by the 24th, all the houses and godowns of the rice dealers of Yedo were destroyed. Not a single rich man who sold or hoarded rice escaped. Besides the rice dealers, the sellers of *saké* (wine) and *mochi* (rice-bread) were attacked. On the 25th the work of destruction extended to the rice dealers of Shinagawa, Kawasaki, and Kanagawa. The mobs usually consisted of from 50 to 100 men. At first they carried on their work of destruction by night, or very early in the morning. Most shopkeepers lit a candle in their shops to show that they were not rice dealers; the other shops were generally torn down and looted. Finally, however, the rioters became bolder and carried on the work of destruction by day. Sounds of crashing, shouts, and clamour, were heard a long way off. ‘I saw,’ says Bakin, ‘the shop of a rice-dealer, called Mansaku, in Demma-cho, attacked by the mob. They cut open the bags of rice and scattered the grain on the street. Chests and boxes

they broke to pieces and threw the contents out of the shop. Respectable women and children of the poorer class mingled with beggars and pickpockets and put the rice in their sleeves and bags. No one attempted to stop them or drive them away. The dealers were utterly helpless and did nothing to stop them. At last the Government sent officers to quell the rioting, but they did not succeed in arresting anyone. At the head of one of the most notorious mobs, was a young apprentice 15 or 16 years of age, who was so active that people were frightened at his mere appearance, and thought that he must be a kind of hobgoblin, called *tengu*. As for the rest, no one knew who they were. The Government finally gave orders that anyone might seize a rioter or even kill him if necessary. So every shopkeeper armed himself with a long bamboo spear in order to drive off the mob. But in reality the measure proved futile. As soon as the mob came, the shopkeeper stood shivering at his own door helplessly watching them destroy his shop in his very presence. The same condition of affairs existed in Kyôto, Ôsaka, and the surrounding districts, so that it seemed as if the rioters acted in concert on some secret understanding. This, however, was not the case. In all these cities the houses and godowns of rice-dealers fell a prey to the fury of the mobs, until finally there was nothing left for them to destroy. Thus after about a month of this lawlessness the rioting came to an end.

"In the autumn of the year 1787, the Government imported rice into Yedo from all parts of the country and offered it for sale as cheaply as possible. Moreover, the new crop of wheat and barley was harvested and helped to relieve the famine. A considerable quantity of worm-eaten rice which had been stored by speculators in out-of-the-way places also was sold about this time. Yet in spite of all these favourable circumstances, the price of rice remained for a long time double the ordinary price."

The results of this state of affairs are apparent in the census returns. In 1780, the non-Samurai population stood at 26,010,000; in 1786, it had gone down to 25,086,466; while in 1792, by which time there must have been a slight measure of recovery since the last year of distress (1789-90), it was no more than 24,891,441. "This is the lowest figure recorded in any census of the Tokugawa period, and is a fitting culmination to an era, noted in the history of Japan, as a time of starvation and misery." Thus, in the course of these seven lean years something between a million and a million and a quarter of victims must have succumbed to the horrors of famine and the resulting or accompanying diseases. This exceeds by almost a full half the total that perished on the battlefields of the most deadly European struggle of the century. During the Seven Years' War, waged on three continents and on as many oceans, no more than 850,000 combatants are reckoned to have perished. During the two centuries of seclusion Japan was spared from the horrors

of war, it is true. Yet the closed State, especially with the population pressing hard upon the limits of subsistence, is not exempt from peculiar risks of its own.¹

What makes the tale of these seven inexpressibly disastrous years so extremely sad is that most of the misery could have been averted. That such was the case is abundantly clear from the record of the Yonezawa fief. The wretched condition of this bleak and inhospitable tract in 1769 has already been set forth. Yet before the advent of the years of famine Uyesugi had the granaries of his clan full to repletion. Many of his subjects doubtless felt the pinch of hunger somewhat severely before the worst was over, but none actually died of starvation it is said. Now what was possible in the forbidding circumstances of Yonezawa was surely equally feasible in more favourably situated domains. What might actually

¹ It may be interesting to draw a comparison between this famine—the famine of Temmei as it is termed, Temmei being the *nengo* of the period in which it occurred—and that which occurred in Ireland, sixty years later, during the years 1846–9. That of Temmei lasted continuously in its full force from 1783 to 1787 or, according to Professor Droppers, less severely from 1781 to 1788. There were other great calamities during the same period, especially the disastrous eruption of the volcanic mountain, Asama, which caused the deaths of 35,000 people. According to the figures in the text, between 1,000,000 and a 1,250,000 people died from famine or diseases that naturally followed famine, while the population between 1780 and 1792, five years after the famine, had decreased by 1,119,000. During these years Japan was not only prevented by her national policy of isolation from obtaining the food that was available in cheap abundance from abroad, but even within her own boundaries, where the ruin of the crops was not universal, the different fiefs resembled, to some degree, the national in their local policy of seclusion, and those not affected by the scarcity selfishly retained for their own use the food that might have been shared with others. In Ireland, the great famine lasted from 1846 to 1849, and did not come entirely to an end till 1851. Warning had been given of its approach, and as Ireland was open to all the world and all the world knew of its calamity when it came, full provision could have been made to meet it and to relieve it. Abundance of food was even produced in Ireland itself, but in the view of the English Government which ruled Ireland at the time, the legitimate course of trade could not be interfered with, and the food was exported to provide the funds necessary for the payment of their rack-rents to absentee landlords. According to Earl Grey: “If the landlords, as a body, had done their duty to the population under them, the existing state of society would never have been such as it was.” As it was, the resultant horrors were terrible enough, though not so ghastly as in Japan. “Many people were glad to live on a single meal of cabbage a day; many feasted on the dead bodies of horses, asses, and dogs; there is at least one horrible story of a mother eating the limbs of her dead child; seaweed, diseased cattle, and diseased potatoes were greedily devoured.” This was in 1846. Matters were worse in 1847, and continued till 1849, in which there was a return to the greater ghastliness and more multitudinous horrors of 1847. The mortality from famine in five years was officially recorded at 985,366. This was in a population in round numbers, of 8,000,000, as compared with 30,000,000 in Japan. Emigration took away 1,180,000 people, of whom 200,668, enfeebled by hunger and disease, died on the voyages or on their arrivals at their destinations. “The holds of the emigrant ships, crowded and filthy, carrying double the legal number of passengers, ill fed and imperfectly clothed, with no doctor on board, were like the Black Hole of Calcutta.” In 1841, the population of Ireland was 8,175,000. Ten years later it had fallen to 6,552,000, though the Irish, as a prolific people, easily rival the Japanese. (These particulars are taken from *The Parnell Movement*, by Mr. T. P. O’Connor, M.P.)

be done to retrieve the disaster by determination and energy, even where no due preparations had been made to meet it, was demonstrated in the not very remote fief of Shirakawa. Young Matsudaira Sadanobu, the future Regent of the empire, succeeded to the headship of this clan in the very midst of the awful famine of 1784. That very year he had to face a loss of seventy per cent. or eighty per cent. of the usual revenue, while his peasants were on the point of starvation. He at once started the repair of the Abukuma-gawa embankments as relief-works, imported cereals, dried fish, and other kinds of cheap food, and had the satisfaction of finding the death-roll on his estates a mere fraction of what it was in the neighbouring daimyoates.

As for the Bakufu, down to 1786, it did little or nothing. In that year it issued the so-called "Thrice Advantageous Decree". In the midst of its beautiful platitudes one clause of this document ordered the rich merchants of Ōsaka to advance funds to the Daimyō, and the Daimyō were ordered to borrow from the merchants. The Bakufu was going to appropriate one-seventh of the interest paid. The traders openly said that this would deprive them of capital which was absolutely necessary for the prosecution of their businesses, and that if so deprived of it they would be driven to close their establishments. But their real secret ground of reluctance to sacrifice themselves for the country was that they could not trust the Government. The decree was merely another device, they held, to help Tanuma to fill his already richly plenished coffers and warehouses. So little or nothing came of this Threefold Advantageous Decree, for it could not be enforced. At last, however, in 1787, the problem of famine relief was attacked resolutely by the Bakufu. And with good faith, too, for in 1786 there had been a sweeping change in the personnel of the administration. Iyeharu, the tenth Shōgun, had passed away, and Tanuma had fallen.¹

¹ Iyeharu died on the 30th September, 1786, at the age of 47 years, after a reign of twenty-four years. He is accredited with having had six children, two sons and two daughters, and two adopted children, the latter furnishing an instance of the curious results of adoption in Japan, where adopted are not only vested with all the legal rights of natural-born children, and are subject to all their liabilities of absolute subjection, but seem to receive and return all the affection that may be expected from, or by, the latter. Of Iyeharu's own children, one daughter and one son died in childhood. The surviving daughter married the great feudatory of Owari, and the son was the young prince whose early death is described below. The adopted son succeeded to the Shōgunate as Iyenari, the eleventh Shōgun, and the adopted daughter married Prince Kujo, one of the "Go sekke", the five Regent Houses, of the Imperial Court at Kyōto.

CHAPTER XI

IYENARI'S MINORITY (1786-93)

OF Iyeharu's two sons, one died in childhood. The other, born in 1763, was formally named heir apparent in his third year. As he grew up, he gave abundant promise of capacity; and in addition to this he had the great gift of endearing himself to all classes of his future subjects. Accordingly, on his premature death in 1779, the nation went into voluntary mourning for him, as they had done for Iyenobu in 1712.¹

Titsingh asserts that the young prince died of a spitting of blood, occasioned by falling with his horse (one imported by the Dutch) down a precipice while hunting. Presently, it began to be whispered that Iyemoto had really been poisoned by one of his attendants in the hunting field (at Shinagawa), at the instigation of Tanuma. Tanuma possibly looked forward to the accession of Iyemoto with a good deal of apprehension, but that he really prompted such an atrocious crime as rumour now laid to his charge is scarcely probable. The Shōgun, soon after this sad event, determined to adopt a member of one of the Sankyō houses as a son, and so provide for the succession in case of his own sudden demise. It was not from Tayasu, the senior, but from Hitotsubashi, the second of the three families, that the heir was selected. One reason for this was that Tanuma's younger brother was seneschal in the Hitotsubashi mansion, where he was all-powerful. Thus, the accession of a new Shōgun taken from that family would not be likely to threaten the power of Tanuma and his camarilla in any way. So, in 1781, Hitotsubashi Harunari's eldest son, Iyenari, was adopted by Iyeharu and duly installed in the Nishi-maru as heir apparent to the Shōgunate.

¹ Some Japanese writers assert that Iyemoto was the first and only Tokugawa prince for whom the nation went into voluntary mourning, but Arai Hakuseki claimed this distinction for Iyenobu, sixty-seven years earlier. Other authors maintain that it was Yoshimune who introduced sugar-cane cultivation into Japan although we find Iyenobu asserting that the Japanese were able to grow sugar-cane themselves. The distinction of being the pioneer in anything, no matter how trivial, is eagerly coveted by some Japanese, and the historian must always be on his guard against accepting the validity of these claims without exhaustive investigation.

Two years later, in 1783, Tanuma's son, Mototomo, Yamashiro no Kami, was assigned a seat in the Junior Council. His tenure of office was, however, brief. On 13th May, 1784, he was assassinated as the Tairō, Hotta, was exactly a century before. This incident has been very fully dealt with by Titsingh, and yet his accounts leave the reader in a state of uncertainty and doubt, for there are not a few statements in them that seem to be at serious variance with each other :—

“ Though many Japanese of the highest distinction and intimately acquainted with matters of government still consider Japan as the first empire in the world, and care but little for what passes out of it, yet such persons are denominated by the most enlightened *I no uchi kaeru*, or ‘ frogs in a well ’, a metaphorical expression which signifies when they look up, they can see no more of the sky than what the small circumference of the well allows them to see. [The frog in the well knows not the great ocean.] The eyes of the better informed had long been fixed on Tanuma, the son of the Counsellor of State, a young man of uncommon merit, and of enterprising mind. They flattered themselves that when he should succeed his father he would, as they expressed it, widen the road. After his appointment, he and his father incurred the hatred of the grandees of the court by introducing various innovations that were censured by the latter as detrimental to the welfare of the empire. He was assassinated on 13th May, 1784, by Sano Masakoto, as related in my *Annals of Japan*. *His crime put an end to all hopes of seeing Japan opened to foreigners, and its inhabitants visiting other countries*. Nothing more, however, would be required for the success of such a project than one man of truly enlightened and imposing character. At present after mature reflection on all that is past, they are convinced that the secret artifices and intrigues of the priests of Shaka were the real cause of the troubles which for many years disturbed the peace of the empire.”

While this view of the general situation is not necessarily totally at fault, I have so far found nothing going to confirm its correctness in the native records of the time. On the other hand, the long and circumstantial account given of Tanuma's assassination in Titsingh's *Annals of Japan*, tallies very well indeed with the purport of what we meet with in these records.

Tanuma's assassin, an officer in the Shimban-gumi, or “ New Company of Life Guards ” held an estate at Sano, not far from where the Tōkaidō Railway to-day descends the slope from Gotemba, at the base of Fuji-san, to Numadzu. Tanuma had requested him to exchange it for another, but as it had been held by the family for generations, Sano declined to do so. A little later he was deprived of it. Tanuma had also refused to return a

genealogical chart which Sano lent him and he had insulted Sano in the hunting field. Thus the assassin had ample grounds for harbouring resentment on his own personal account, but Japanese writers contend that he was also prompted by public and patriotic motives, although they are not so explicit on this point as Titsingh.

“From all the circumstances attending the murder, it is to be presumed that several persons of the highest distinction were privy to, and encouraged, it; and the general hatred which the two counsellors of State had drawn upon themselves serves to confirm the opinion. It is even asserted that the original intention was to kill the father to prevent the reforms which he and his son, who were in the highest favour with the Shōgun and his family, were successively introducing into the different departments of the State, and by which they had incurred great odium. But it was considered that, as the father was old, death would naturally soon put a stop to his projects, whereas the son, who was in the prime of life, would have time to carry into effect all the innovations they had planned and that, moreover, it would be impossible to inflict a severer blow on the father than by snatching from him his son. The death of the latter was, in consequence, determined on.”

The assassin was indeed permitted to die by his own hand; but the function was carried out in the *agariya* or gaol, with a prison official and not a personal friend of the culprit's as “second” :—

“His wife, a lady of exquisite beauty, and only 22 years of age, when informed of his death, commended his conduct, and plunged a dagger into her throat with a courage equal to that of her husband. Tanuma's corpse was privately interred in the night. The hatred and indignation of the people were so violent that they threw stones from all sides at the coffin and those who accompanied it. Sano, on the contrary, became an object of public veneration. He was considered as a victim, who had devoted himself for his country. His grave, on which a stone was erected as a mark of honour, is visited by all persons of distinction, and by the military who repair thither to offer up prayers and thanksgiving for the service which he rendered to the State.”¹

The elder Tanuma soon began to realize that his position

¹ The sentiment which does honour to the memory of political assassins, still survives in Japan. The spirits of the Forty-seven Rōnin are steadfastly worshipped, notwithstanding the commercial materialism that has largely replaced the all-sacrificing devotion of feudalism, but a more modern instance is that of Viscount Mori, Minister of Education and at one time Envoy in London, who was assassinated by a youth named Nishino Buntaro on the very day in February, 1889, on which all the nation was joyfully celebrating the promulgation of the new Constitution. The assassin was cut down on the spot but, from the paper found on him, it appeared that the reason for his act was that Viscount Mori had desecrated the Imperial Shrine at Ise by touching a curtain with his walking stick. The grave, not of the murdered minister, but of the fanatical assassin was for years afterwards, and may be so still, never without fresh flowers, and it was the object of such frequent pilgrimages and prayers, that, at last, the Government decreed that the practice of honouring dead criminals should cease.—J. H. L.

was becoming critical. The Shōgun's death was not likely to be long deferred, and during the minority of his successor (Iyenari) attempts to overthrow him were certain. His chief hope lay in getting the prospective Shōgun's father, Hitotsubashi Harunori, chosen as Regent. The crisis actually came in September, 1786, when Iyeharu's days were seen to be numbered. Tanuma had two of his own physicians taken into the Shōgun's service, but their services were futile, and Iyeharu died on 12th September. Tanuma tried to conceal his death till he could perfect his arrangements, but the Go-san-ké were keenly on the alert. They met in the Owari *yashiki* and promptly concerted their measures. On 18th September, when Tanuma proceeded to the Castle, he was met by a Sobayōnin who "advised" him to return to his *yashiki* and send in his resignation. Tanuma at once saw that the bolt had fallen in spite of all his precautions. Shortly afterwards, his brother (a Sobayōnin) and two Finance Magistrates, the leading figures in his camarilla, were stripped of their offices.

The Go-san-ké at first pressed Tayasu's second son, the lord of Matsuyama in Iyo, to assume the office of Tairō. As he was on good terms with Tanuma, and was aware that one of his first duties would be to degrade him, the lord of Matsuyama positively refused to enter the Great Council. The Go-san-ké then fell back upon his younger brother, Matsudaira Sadanobu, Lord of Shirakawa, who had been adopted into the Matsudaira Hisamitsu house a few years before. He was now made President of the Rōjū and, in the following year, when Iyenari received his patent as Shōgun, he was promoted to the great office of Hosa or Regent. In December, 1786, the Go-san-ké went so far as to deprive Tanuma of 20,000 *koku* of his revenue and his chief *yashiki* in Yedo, and to order him into seclusion. In the following year, his castle was demolished, and his fief confiscated, and in 1788, he died a poor, dishonoured, and broken man. How far we have got the exact truth about him it is impossible to say; his enemies had triumphed and could do what they pleased, and to tamper with the records in those days was considered no mortal sin, even by those of the most tender conscience. Why Titsingh's estimate of Tanuma is so greatly at variance with the one usually accepted in Japan has, of course, to be accounted for. Probably it was inspired by Kuze, Tango no Kami, one of the Governors of Nagasaki, who had served for long under the fallen statesman.

Although he had not yet reached his thirtieth year, the newly appointed Regent, Matsudaira Sadanobu, had already won great reputation as an administrator. The measures he had adopted to combat the famine in his own fief of Shirakawa in 1784 have already been referred to. In many respects he appears to have adopted Uyesugi Harunori's administration as a model. Some problems, however, he solved in his own way:—

“ When he first went down to Shirakawa he found that there were more men than women ; that it was difficult for poor men to marry ; that the population was yearly decreasing, and that the cultivated land was gradually becoming desolated. In order to remedy this state of affairs, he arranged that old people above ninety should be pensioned, that pregnant women be registered, that a mother having more than five children be rewarded with rice. At the same time he sent commissioners to Echigo to collect poor women, who were brought to Shirakawa and married to bachelors, assigned land and houses, and instructed in farming and weaving. In this way he put a stop to the old vice ; population began to increase, and many new lands were opened. Sadanobu also encouraged the planting of young trees, so that within a few years a traveller entering his domain was delighted by seeing green all around him as far as the eye could reach.”

The occurrence of famine, or any similar calamity was often seized upon by feudal lords as a pretext for curtailing the stipends of the samurai. Sadanobu contented himself with retrenching his own expenses, and only resorted to a reduction of his vassals' incomes when such a step could not possibly be avoided. One of the very first things he did as Regent was to express his high admiration for Uyesugi Harunori and his work, and to recommend the administration of the Yonezawa fief as a model to the other Daimyō. His own work as Regent touched almost every sphere of the national and social economy. Yet extensive as it was, it is possible to deal with it succinctly enough. He began by announcing that it was his prime intention to revert to the institutions of Kyōhō (1716–35) that is to say, to the régime of his grandfather, the illustrious Yoshimune. In 1790, orders were again issued that all the feudatories should store 100 *koku* of rice in the clan granaries for every 10,000 raised on their estates. In the Bakufu domains no new taxes were to be imposed, but the coinage was to be reformed, and frugality strictly enforced. Even in the matter of dress it was his grandfather that Sadanobu took as a model. He repaired to the Castle in the cheapest and simplest of raiment, and his gaily-attired colleagues were promptly shamed into drawing up a self-denying ordinance prohibiting the wearing of costly apparel, and

the giving or receiving of presents. A Daimyō, who fancied that Sadanobu was really a hypocrite at bottom, sent him a gift worth 100 *ryō*. The Regent at once acknowledged the mark of affection and devotion by sending him a return gift of the value of 150 *ryō*. The hint was a gentle one, but it was enough; when the incident became generally known, Sadanobu ceased to be troubled by the tender of any "thank-offerings" for favours to come. Among other things, the Regent insisted on looking very closely into the Shōgun's household budget. The stern measure he had just meted out to the grizzly-haired favourite of the Court Ladies (Tanuma) had incensed them greatly; when they saw that sacrilegious hands were to be laid upon what was to them as the very ark of the covenant, the commotion was intense. The court dames refused to discharge their duties any longer. One of them, a certain Lady Ōzaki, one of Tanuma's chief agents, was then dismissed, and thereupon the rest of them tendered their resignations. To smooth over this matter took much time and trouble and, down to the end of his administration. Sadanobu's "dearest" foes were those of the Great Interior.

The Regent was fortunate in finding able men of his own cast of mind and temper willing to serve under him. Matsudaira Nobuaki in the Rōjū; the two Junior Councillors, Honda and Hotta; the Sobayōnin, Kanō; the Finance Magistrate, Negishi, and the City Magistrate, Ishikawa, all entered into his plans and projects of reform with the greatest enthusiasm and determination. The administration of justice by the Hyōjōsho again became pure, prompt, and efficient; in the country districts, the Gundai and Daikwan were held to strict account, the corrupt and inefficient among them being cashiered, and capable and honest men appointed in their places. Naturally to restore to the cultivator the measure of prosperity he had enjoyed in Yoshimune's time was an uphill, if not a hopeless, task as the maladministration of the previous forty years had greatly demoralized the agrarian proletariat. It sounds ludicrous to be assured that habits of luxury had spread among peasant communities where the ordinary standard of living was so terribly low according to all modern European notions. But a whole crowd of Japanese writers well acquainted with the actual conditions of the time are at once unanimous and emphatic in this seemingly absurd contention:—

The artificial dead peace, together with the debased currency of

the period, had continually tended to breed luxury among the toiling population of the village, and furthermore luxury did often so operate as to reduce the productive capacity of the peasant family. "Formerly," says a writer of the Sendai fief in 1790, "when a farmer could bring up two, three, four, or five sons, all the younger sons were hired out to other farmers as soon as they were old enough, saved their wages and married, or were adopted into families. There was everywhere an abundant supply of cheap labour for the fields. The farmers could also keep horses which yielded manure. The productive power of the soil was large and rice was plentiful. The peasants could likewise afford to have daughters. Marriage was inexpensive, the population increased at the normal rate and the Heavenly Law was fulfilled. But now (1790) marriages cost the man 30 *kwan*, and the woman's family almost 40. It being increasingly hard to maintain a household, the average peasant has now seldom more than three children, and the poorer tenant only one child. Labour gets scarce and dear, having risen from 5 or 6 to 10 *kwan*, and still rising every year. Horses get fewer, and manure more difficult to procure. It being often impossible to take care of one's own holding, it is rented to anyone willing to till it, but who is naturally inclined to neglect the land that is not his own. In recent years most land has yielded on the average only 15 to 16 *koku* per *chō*, instead of the former average of 20 *koku*."

This was the condition of affairs in Sendai, where the administration was distinctly good. In the Bakufu lands matters were infinitely worse at this date. To devise and apply effective remedies for the ingrained evils of the previous generation of maladministration would, of course, be the work of years. Yet by well-considered and vigorous measures, sumptuary laws among them, the Regent did not a little to revive the drooping fortunes of agriculture in the Tokugawa household estates. But the great source and sink of corruption was Yedo, the belly of the empire. All through the Tokugawa epoch we are continually hearing of the increasing prosperity of Yedo; indeed, writers are just as unanimous and emphatic about this phenomenon as they are about the impoverishment and decay of the rural districts. Yoshimune, as we have seen, early discerned a menace in this state of affairs, and by relaxing the Sankin Kōtai regulations for a time, and by other measures endeavoured to send the superfluous floating population of the metropolis back to the land. In Ōoka's early days, the non-*yashiki* population was reduced to 501,000. In 1787, it was found that it stood at 1,367,840 souls. In this human hive, of course, it was not all luxury and magnificence. The picture of the extremes of wealth and want meeting there described by Siebold, just half-a-century later, would have been perfectly applicable to the Yedo of Iyenari's earliest years. And of the magnificence that prevailed

a great deal was utterly unsubstantial and factitious. By this time, thousands of Hatamoto and samurai families had hopelessly outrun their means, and were plunged in a bottomless quagmire of indebtedness. Yet appearances had to be kept up, and a gay and gallant show abroad maintained, although the family rice-pot at home was all but empty. So desperate was the general financial situation that the Regent became convinced that the knot could not possibly be untied; the only thing to do was to cut it summarily. Under the Ashikaga Shōguns, *Toku-sei* or "Acts¹ of Benevolent Administration", otherwise a cancellation of samurai indebtedness, were resorted to on perhaps half-a-score or a dozen of occasions. A similar drastic remedy was now applied. Sadanobu ordered that all Hatamoto debts of more than six years' standing should be nullified, and that those incurred within that term should be paid off in instalments at reduced interest. Furthermore, the maximum rate of interest was henceforth to be no more than one per cent. monthly. The following extract from Professor Mikami's Biography of the Regent is instructive:—

"Sadanobu was very eager to purify society of its licentious and dissolute habits. Many years of peace had led the young Hatamoto into idle and profligate courses. The old spirit of the Samurai, which placed honour above everything, was well-nigh a thing of the past. Greed took possession of the Samurai, so that we find in the new *Buké-Shohatto* of 1787 the following additional clause. 'In negotiations for adoption or marriage, no reference must be made to money or property.' As a matter of fact, people could not marry unless they were well off, and in consequence many fell into dissolute habits. In days of old when Samurai assembled, the talk used to turn upon personal prowess and warfare; it now ran upon fair women, and many young Hatamoto were constant *habitués* of the Yoshiwara.²

"Sadanobu made a hard endeavour to reform these young men, and to stem the profligacy of the time. On the one hand he rewarded filial sons, virtuous wives and faithful servants, and, on the other, reprimanded and punished dissolute samurai, and harassed the keepers

¹ The expedient of the "*Tokusei*" was first used under the administration of Sadatoki, the seventh of the Hōjō Regents (1284-1300). He issued a law in 1297, which interdicted the pledging of their property by samurai, forbade all legal processes for the recovery of interest, and cancelled all mortgages. The experiment was repeated many times under the Ashikaga (by Yoshimasa alone thirteen times) for the relief of the samurai from the results of dissipation and extravagance. Under the Hōjō, it was intended to relieve distress caused by the expenses of the repulse of the Mongols. The literal meaning of *Tokusei* it may be said, is "Virtuous Government".—J. H. L.

² This is an almost verbatim repetition of the phraseology to be met with in several Genroku and Hō-ei (1688-1709) documents, referring to the dissoluteness of these year-periods. The new clause that Professor Mikami says was now inserted in the *Buké Shohatto* does not appear in those of 1787. It is to be found in those of Iyenobu drafted by Arai Hakuseki.

of brothels and women of easy virtue, especially the *Geisha*. In 1789, he proscribed the establishment of new brothels, took rigorous measures to suppress unlicensed prostitution, and prohibited mixed bathing in the bath-houses of the city."

The conventional and time-honoured theory, of course, was that a samurai's soul should be above all considerations of money or filthy lucre. But, even, as early as the latter half of the seventeenth century, the language used in certain clauses of Mitsukuni of Mito's famous Instructions to his vassals is conclusive that theory and practice were vastly different matters. Under Tsunayoshi and again under Iyeshige and Iyeharu, we have seen that jobbery and bribery were notorious and rampant. Now the bribe-takers and many of the bribe-tenderers were samurai. Again, in Tanuma's time, public offices were sold and almost everyone was acquainted with the fact. And those who profited by this most illegal and nefarious traffic were samurai. The difference between the traffic in offices in Japan and in contemporary France were two. In France, the traffic was perfectly legal, and commoners might purchase offices and so become nobles. In Japan, the traffic was decidedly illegal, and commoners could not purchase office directly and so become samurai. In Arai's time we have met with an instance of a rich merchant trying to mate his daughter with a poor samurai and ultimately succeeding in doing so. By this date (1787) it had become not only usual for rich commoners to marry their daughters to samurai, but to get their sons adopted into samurai families. In truth, what the Russian Golownin was told about a quarter of a century later is fairly accurate :—

" Merchants are not privileged to bear arms ; but though their profession is not respected their wealth is ; for in Japan, as in Europe, riches supply the want of talents and dignity, and attain privileges and honourable appointments. The Japanese told us that their officers of state, and men of rank, behave outwardly with great haughtiness to merchants, but in private, are very familiar with the wealthy of that class, and are often under great obligations to them. We had with us for some time a young officer who was the son of a rich merchant, and who, as the Japanese said, owed his rank not to his own merit, but to his father's gold, thus, though the laws do not favour the mercantile profession, yet its wealth raises it, for even in Japan, where the laws are so rigorously enforced, they are often outweighed by the influence of gold."

The average Japanese samurai was not avaricious by nature but he was often vain, and far too fond of display, and far too eager for distinction. This led him into an expensive and ostentatious

style of living ; and the consequence was that, in spite of all the fine-spun, high-sounding theories of Bushidō, money came to be of supreme importance to him. He often became not so very scrupulous as to the means and methods of acquiring it, and, worse than that, he was forced to become a hypocrite, with sounding phrases about honour on his lips and the worship of Mammon in his heart of hearts. In the remote country fiefs things, happily, were often vastly different, but there can be but little question that the true old samurai spirit of Katō Kiyomasa's age was well-nigh extinct in the Yedo of 1786. Long before this, as has been asserted in a previous chapter, the *Rusui* or resident Karō in the Daimyō's *yashiki*, who represented their lord in Yedo during their alternate years of absence on their fiefs, had made themselves notorious by their ostentatious extravagance and debauchery. The Regent now deemed it well to give them a hint to mend their ways. When they showed a disposition to treat the admonition as a joke, Sadanobu spoke in much plainer and sharper terms, and during the succeeding years the *Rusui* felt constrained to behave with some regard for decorum. But by the end of the century they were once more at their old time-honoured pranks undisturbed.

From first to last there was a tremendous amount of sumptuary legislation during the Tokugawa régime. During Iyetsuna's minority the Bakufu councillors, no less than clan officials, were especially active in this direction. Again, under Iyenobu and Yoshimune, we hear much of "Economy Decrees" (*Kenyaku-rei*), and under these two Shōguns, who could at least claim the merit of personally practising what they made their ministers preach, these regulations were really enforced. Under Tsunayoshi and again under Iyeshige and Iyeharu, we also meet with frequent mention of *Kenyaku-rei*. But these were merely part of the great game of keeping up appearances that then went on everywhere. All these Shōguns were lovers of the sumptuous and magnificent, and their subjects, no doubt, keenly appreciating the humour of Satan gravely reproving sin, paid no heed to the *Kenyaku-rei* whatever. In the course of the two centuries we are dealing with in this volume the Bakufu had intermittent spasms of virtue. Under the Regency of Matsudaira Sadanobu (1786-93) the authorities were assailed by one of them, and although the attack was of no long continuance, it was exceedingly acute while it lasted.

The females of the non-samurai classes were forbidden to

embroider their garments ; no gold hair-pins or similar costly ornaments were to be used, neither were tobacco-pipes nor pouches to be ornamented with precious metals. The manufacture of expensive sweetmeats was interdicted ; gold and silver foil were not to be used on toys, and even the dimensions of dolls were to be curtailed ; in short it was war to the knife upon everything that savoured of Vanity Fair. A few of the articles in these decrees of Sadanobu's were new, but most of them were merely repetitions of some of his grandfather's sumptuary regulations. Fifty years or so later on, we shall find Yedo suffering from a still more intense spasm of official virtue, the outward symptoms of the malady being to all intents and purposes identical with those of the period immediately before us.

Much had been done for the municipal organization of Yedo in Yoshimune's time. Sadanobu now carried his grandfather's work in this sphere a step further. In 1790, he called for a detailed statement of municipal finance for the preceding quinquennium. On ascertaining the average annual budget, he reduced it somewhat and of the amount thus economized he ordered ten per cent. to be allotted for extraordinary expenses, twenty per cent. to be refunded to the landowners, and the remaining seventy per cent. to be accumulated as a city fund. This fund, to which a government subsidy was twice added, was entrusted to the management of the aldermen (*machi-doshiyori*) and was utilized to cope with unexpected disasters and emergencies.

On the whole, the Regent's six years' term of administration was highly beneficial to the empire at large, but it might very well have been more so, if Matsudaira Sadanobu had been a man of his grandfather's calibre. That he fell a good many inches short of Yoshimune's intellectual stature becomes clear when we turn to a consideration of the mistakes he committed. In two instances, at least, he showed a lack of judgment and in one a lack of principle where the eighth Shōgun would not have been found tripping. The first of these brought him into serious collision with the Imperial Court, and ultimately led to his retirement. In connexion with it, it may be well to review the relations of Kyōto with Yedo since the death of Iyenobu.

Under the fifth and sixth Shōguns, these relations were exceedingly harmonious and cordial, as we have said. Indeed, it had been arranged that Iyenobu's son, the seventh Shōgun,

Iyetsugu, should wed an Imperial Princess when he became of age, and that in future the Shōgun's consort should be of Imperial stock. The premature death of Iyetsugu in 1716 interfered with this project, indeed, it was not till a century and a half later that it was realized, and it was then adopted mainly as a means of propping up the failing and tottering fortunes of the Tokugawa Shōgunate. Upon Yoshimune's accession (1716) the intercourse between Yedo and the Imperial Court became much less intimate than it had been under his three predecessors. One of the eighth Shōgun's great aims was to revive the military spirit among his vassals, to restore the old traditions of simplicity and frugality, and to check all empty pomp and display that might lead the Daimyō and Hatamoto into frivolity and effeminacy. The appearance of missions from the Imperial Court in Yedo had become exceedingly frequent since 1680, and the Imperial envoys always had to be sumptuously entertained and fêted. A continuance of this state of things would have interfered seriously with Yoshimune's cherished projects, so he courteously gave it to be understood in Kyōto that henceforth Imperial envoys need not be sent to Yedo except on what were practically statutory occasions. It is obvious that he really intended no slight to the Court of Kyōto by this intimation, and that he was far from wishing to wound the *amour propre* of the courtiers in any way. Yet the intimation gave serious offence. Towards the end of his life, Yoshimune established two of his sons with high rank and titles as heads of houses that might supply a successor to the Shōgunate in the event of the main line failing; and, later on, yet another similar house was created. This appeared an imitation of the Four Imperial Princely Houses that could furnish an occupant to the throne in case of the Emperor dying childless, and the Kyōto nobles were not slow to murmur about the overweening presumption of the Bakufu in this affair. Yet, in most matters, Yoshimune showed himself most respectful towards the Imperial household. Tsunayoshi began the task of investigating the sites of the old *misasagi* or burial mounds and tombs of the Emperors and putting them in a state of decency and repair. This work was carried on and completed by Yoshimune, although his successors neglected it scandalously. Means for the proper celebration of the great court functions, such as the *Dai-jō-e*,¹ were liberally

¹ The Dai-jō-e (called also the Daijōsai) is the ceremony of offering rice at the coronation of an Emperor to the spirits of the Imperial ancestors.—J. H. L.

supplied, while the revenues of the Sovereign and the courtiers were always promptly paid in full.

Notwithstanding, the courtiers were far from being as well off as they were two generations before. Then they earned large incomes as instructors in certain kinds of esoteric lore of which they held a virtual hereditary monopoly. This monopoly had gone. In astronomy, in history, even in Japanese antiquities and ancient literature, they were now outclassed by a crowd of outsiders, while in Chinese philosophy they were mere amateurs as compared with the great lights of the Teishu and the rival schools that had arisen. In fact, instead of sitting in the seat of the teacher, we now find them figuring as docile and appreciative pupils. Even a century before, we have seen them acknowledging the superiority of Kumazawa Banzan, and it was on account of his growing influence among the Court Nobles that Kumazawa's philosophical discussions were brought to such an abrupt termination by the Bakufu. Now, just 100 afterwards, there was a repetition of the Kumazawa Banzan incident. A certain Takenouchi Shikibu from Echigo had settled in Kyōto to study medicine. His object was merely to obtain a means of support; his main interests being Chinese philosophy and Shintōism. It is in him that Yamazaki Anzai and the principles he taught at last appear as an active militant force. Takenouchi had studied the old Shintō doctrines under Tamaki Isai, one of their earlier expounders, and he had also been deeply impressed with the *Seigen Igen* and other writings of Asami Keisai,¹ one of Yamazaki's most distinguished pupils, and a most uncompromising advocate of the "Divine Right of Kings". Presently Takenouchi began to give courses of lectures. In these the old and threadbare platitudes about "Loyalty" duly appeared, but the question was asked, "Loyalty to whom?" His discourses on the *Kojiki* and *Nihongi* and the early history of Japan and Japanese Institutions supplied an answer to the query, which, of course, was a most inconvenient and soul-perturbing one to the Bakufu officials in the Castle of Nijō. In 1755 or 1756, the lecturer was denounced to these authorities but, as the result of the investigation then ordered, he was found to have been misrepresented. This may have emboldened him; at all events in 1757 no less a personage than the

¹ I cannot identify either this author or his work, and neither are mentioned in Dr. Aston's *History of Literature*. It is impossible to translate the title of the work without having the ideographs in which it is written, but it may signify *The Dignity of an Oath*, though this is little better than guesswork.—J. H. L.

See *Dictionnaire d'Histoire et de Géographie du Japon*, par E. Papinot, M.A.

Kwampaku himself again called the Shoshidai's attention to Takenouchi's activities. By this time he had acquired a numerous and influential following among the Court Nobles, and it was probably the unrestrained expression of virulent Anti-Bakufu sentiments which had become common among the courtiers that excited the Kwampaku's anxiety about the possible consequences. This time, Takenouchi was put under ward ; and seventeen of his titled pupils were degraded and stripped of their offices and emoluments. Some authorities assert that Takenouchi was then punished for teaching his pupils military science and for secretly procuring a store of arms, but all the authentic evidence is against any such contention. His chief offence was his bold assertion of the Emperor's right to rule Japan, his doctrine that the loyalty of every Japanese was due not so much to his immediate over-lord or to the Shōgun as to the august descendant of the Sun-Goddess. In 1758, Takenouchi was released, but he was ordered to withdraw from Kyōto. After eight or nine years, chiefly spent in Ise, he appeared in Yedo, and there became entangled in one of the most mysterious complications of the century, the alleged plot of Yamagata Dai-ni and his confederates.

Yamagata (1725-68) had been a Bakufu police-officer in Kai, but was discharged for killing a man in a quarrel. He then went to Yedo, and there established himself as a *Gungakusha* (Military Lecturer) and in time acquired a large clientele of pupils. There were many public abuses rife at the time, and Yamagata was not slow to assail them whenever he found a sympathetic audience. Ultimately it was resolved that active measures should be taken to effect a reform, although what the conspirators really aimed at is difficult to make out. We are told that their intention was to begin by burning down the capital with " fire-works ". That would have been no difficult thing to do, for half of Yedo was burned down every decade or so without any question of " fire-works " at all. The incendiarism of Yedo was indeed one of the items in the programme of the Great Rōnin Conspiracy of 1651, but it was nothing more than a detail in a wide-ramifying, well-thought-out, general plan of operations. What was to be accomplished by the concerted action of 3,000 to 4,000 resolute men at widely separated points of the empire, while Yedo was in flames and immediately afterwards, was the all-important feature in the great attempt of 1651. Here we can discern nothing whatsoever in the shape of a general plan of action ; the

whole volume was to consist of a few haphazard chapters of accident which the city police alone could have very well brought to a summary conclusion at any time. It is questionable if even as many as fifty men were seriously committed to this wild and fantastic adventure, and of those actually engaged in it a large number could in no wise be depended on. Several turned informers, three at least, retainers of the Rōjū Abé, the former Shoshidai of Kyōto, were plainly nothing but *agents provocateurs*. The leading spirit really seems to have been a certain Fujū Umon, who had been in the service of, or at least had connexions with, a prominent court noble. Fujū pointed out that among the conspirators there was no name of sufficient weight to figure as a head for such a great enterprise, and he was commissioned to inveigle some of the Kyōto *Kugé* into the plot. Takatsukasa appears to have been informed of it, at all events, at the last meeting of the plotters, we hear of an enigmatical poem of his being read and construed as encouragement and sanction for proceeding with the business. Meanwhile, the Rōjū Abé had become cognizant of what was going on, and now one of his colleagues was also approached by an informer. In 1766, the Bakufu suddenly pounced upon thirty-four of the band and put them in prison where they remained for about a year, but no more than twenty-two of the thirty-four arrested received any further punishment, and most of these who did were merely expelled from Yedo, or banished to the islands of Idzu. One of them was ordered to commit *hara-kiri*; Yamagata and Fujū were decapitated, and Fujū's head exposed on the public pillory at Shinagawa. One small Daimyō, Oda, a descendant of the great Nobunaga, was so far compromised in this affair that he was stripped of his fief and confined to his own city mansion.

Takenouchi, sentenced to banishment, died on his way to Hachijō. It was he that the conspirators had used as their intermediary with Kyōto:—

“Takenouchi who had gained many friends at the court of the Dairi during his long residence in Kyōto, observed that Okamoto, a physician of Kyōto, was as well as himself an intimate friend of Tokudaiji, a servant of the Dairi, a man of great bravery and abilities, who had often declared in their hearing that *he was ashamed of living in such a mean way with the Dairi, while the Shōgun, nay, even the princes, lived in greater splendour than the Dairi himself, and that if he had sufficient strength he would overthrow the government*. They in consequence directed Okamoto to communicate their design to him in hopes that if he entered into it, they would obtain a written permission from the Dairi.”


This passage taken from Titsingh is really of consequence, for it gives us a glimpse of the earliest germination of the seed that was to spring up and attain its full fruition in the Restoration of Meiji just a century afterwards.

The somewhat subterranean Imperialistic movement thus initiated by Takenouchi was carried on during the next generation by two rather noted successors. In 1765, Takayama Masayuki, then eighteen years of age, arrived in Kyōto to prosecute his studies. He presently obtained the favour and protection of the Dainagon, Nakayama, an ardent Imperialist, and one of the ablest of the court nobles, who directed his protégé's attention to the ancient history of the empire. On the Bridge of Sanjō, the young man knelt down, facing towards the Imperial Palace, and publicly venerated the Emperor from afar. Then he started forth on a crusade to rouse in the people of the empire at large the long-dormant sense of respect and duty towards the line of the Sun-Goddess. His end was a very strange one; in 1793, he committed *hara-kiri* at Kurume in Chikugo "afflicted at the state of the country, and offering himself up as a victim to the Imperial cause". By this time, Gamō Kumpei, then twenty-five years of age, had entered upon a similar mission, and was scouring the country deploring that "the tombs of the Emperors were in ruins and that their authority was unrecognized and contemned". In their day and generation, Takayama and Gamō were regarded as mere eccentrics (*kijin*), and their utterances were the voices of men crying in the wilderness. Such episodes were nevertheless of sinister and menacing portent to the fortunes of the Bakufu. It must be frankly admitted that Tokudaiji and his fellow-nobles had ample grounds for resentment on the score of the niggardly pittances doled out to them by the Bakufu, and the squalid meanness of the establishments to which most of them were reduced. The annual rice-allowances for the Imperial nobles (between 120,000 and 130,000 *koku*) were the product of certain definite lands, and under Yoshimune these lands had usually produced the crop necessary for the full payment of these allowances. Under Iyeshige and Iyeharu the Imperial estates were as badly managed as the Bakufu domain generally, and there were besides occasional droughts and floods and typhoons in the Go-Kinai. These lands thus came to show a serious deficit. It had been customary to make up such a deficiency, or at least a part of it, from the Bakufu rice-granaries in Fushimi, but ultimately the

officials began to raise difficulties in the way of this practice. About 1774, the Court protested; an investigation into accounts and account-books followed, and a wholesale system of fraud, swindling, and speculation was disclosed. Some of the stewards and their subordinates in the employment of the Palace and of the nobles were decapitated, and others were banished, while certain of the offending Bakufu officials were dealt with drastically. In 1788, matters appear to have again become nearly as unsatisfactory as they were in 1774; at all events we then find Kobori, the hereditary magistrate of Fushimi, summarily cashiered and stripped of his 10,000 *koku* fief at Komuro in Ōmi. This was the work of the Regent, Matsudaira Sadanobu, who had visited Kyōto about that time in connexion with the work of the re-erection of the Imperial Palace then in progress. In spite of the terrible famine that had to be fought in northern Japan, this task had to be taken vigorously in hand, for the Palace was reduced to ashes in common with the whole ancient capital in the Great Fire on 8th–12th March, 1788.¹ The Bakufu at once issued orders for the rebuilding of the Imperial Palace and that of the ex-Empress, the expenses being levied from the various clans. The Regent himself superintended the work, and was careful to see to it that the new structures should be much more magnificent than those just burned down. While the contractors were at work he appeared in Kyōto and was granted audience with the Emperor and the ex-Empress, and when their Majesties proceeded to occupy the new Palaces, towards the end of 1790, they were greatly pleased with the buildings, and conferred rewards upon the Shōgun and the Regent. It seemed as if the cordial relations of Tsunayoshi and Iyenobu's times between the Imperial and the Yedo courts were on the point of being restored. Yet, within a year, the Regent had come into sharp and bitter conflict with the Emperor and his ministers. To understand the point at issue, it becomes necessary to devote some little study to the Imperial genealogical table.

¹ From one of his Japanese correspondents, Titsingh got a very detailed account of this great conflagration in which 2,630 lives were lost and 183,000, or, as some other accounts say, 191,000, dwellings were consumed. If we allow an average of five for each household, the citizen population of Kyōto would then have amounted to 915,000 or 945,000 souls. In Siebold's time (1826) it stood at 780,000 in 117,000 houses, an average of nearly seven inhabitants for each. If the figures for 1788 are correct, Kyōto must have been considerably more extensive then than it was when Siebold passed through it.

The following table shows the descent of the Emperor Kōmei (1847-67) the 121st Emperor of the line from the Emperor Higashi-Yama (1687-1709) the 113th Emperor.



It will be seen that the line of Higashi-Yama's son, Nakamikado, failed with the 118th sovereign, Momozono II, who died in 1779. The grandson of Higashi-Yama's younger son, Naohito, then ascended the throne as Kōkaku Tennō. His father, Prince Sukehito, who was then alive, never having reigned. The youthful sovereign, who was only ten years of age at his accession, was very anxious to have his father treated as an ex-Emperor. In the early Heian age, it was the custom for a new Emperor to offer the title of Dajō-Tennō (otherwise Dajō-kō or Jōkō)² to his abdicated predecessor, but the custom, like so many others, was abandoned during the troubles of Ōnin (1467-77), and was only resumed in 1736. On two occasions, once in the early thirteenth and once in the fifteenth century, this title of Dajō-Tennō had been bestowed by Emperors on fathers who had never reigned. There was therefore undoubtedly good precedent for the step the Emperor Kōkaku now wished to take and it was the unquestionable prerogative of the sovereign at his own discretion to grant titles and to confer Court rank. Yorimoto, the founder of the Shōgunate, had never called this into question for a moment, all that he insisted on was that none of his *own vassals* should be granted Court rank or office without his

¹ For the dates of the reigns, etc., of these sovereigns, *vide* Appendix. The numbers here prefixed to each sovereign's name, are for the reason explained in the appendix, one in advance of those formally recognized by the Japanese as correct.—J. H. L.

² Dajō is synonymous with Daijō—great Government—as in Daijōkwan—supreme council of the Empire—Dajō-Tennō literally signifies “Great Government Emperor”.—J. H. L.

assent or recommendation. This limitation applied only to the original grant; with their subsequent promotion in the Court hierarchy he did not presume to interfere. For a sovereign of Japan to have to appeal to the Bakufu for its sanction to the new measure now contemplated by Kōkaku Tennō was surely a great derogation from the Imperial dignity. Yet, in 1789, the sanction of the Bakufu for the measure in question was actually solicited. No immediate official reply was given, but the Regent wrote a private letter to his kinsman, Takatsukasa, giving him to understand that he could not approve of the Imperial wish. For some considerable time the matter remained dormant but, in 1791, the young Emperor (then in his twentieth year) had the courage to attempt to force the situation. He convoked all the great officers of his court, laid the circumstances before them, and requested them to advise him as to what course should be pursued. With only a few dissentient voices they urged that the Bakufu should be pressed to return a definite official answer forthwith. The Regent again endeavoured to evade the issue. However, Kyōto became so insistent that the issue could not be evaded any longer and the Imperial Court was at last informed that it was a very serious matter to confer the title of Dajō-Tennō upon one who had never occupied the throne, and that such a title could not be so lightly handled. The discontent, which had been simmering among the Court nobles, now burst into a violent explosion and relations between Yedo and Kyōto became a good deal more than strained. Finally, however, the ex-Empress Sakuramachi II expressed the opinion that the sovereign would be acting more dutifully towards his father if he abandoned the project rather than raise troubles by pressing it. This view of the situation at last commended itself to the Emperor; the Bakufu on its part offered to contribute 2,000 bales of rice to the support of Prince Sukehito's establishment, and the incident was supposed to be closed. Before this settlement was reached, however, two Court nobles, Lords Nakayama and Hōki-machi, had been summoned to Yedo to account for their conduct in connexion with the affair. Sharp words had then passed between them and the Regent, and Nakayama had been punished with 100, and his colleagues with 50 days' confinement, each in his own mansion. Later on, they were deprived of their offices, while the Bakufu did not scruple to vent its ill-will upon other prominent supporters of the Imperial project.

The truth would seem to be that the Regent's visit to Kyōto, in 1788, ostensibly for an inspection of the work of re-erecting the burned palaces was really for the purpose of making himself acquainted with the actual trend of opinion among the Court nobles, and that he returned to Yedo far from satisfied. The strong Imperialist, anti-Bakufu sentiment, awakened by Takenouchi a generation before, had not been extinguished ; indeed, it seemed to be spreading. At that very time Takenouchi's work had been taken up and was being vigorously prosecuted by Takayama. Sadanobu's attitude in this Imperial title affair seems to have been determined by the resolve to overawe the Court nobles, and to give the Imperialistic movement a set-back, if not an absolute check. If such indeed was the secret mainspring of his action on this occasion, the event merely serves to demonstrate his mediocrity in the sphere of political manœuvring. If he had been minded to bring matters to a decisive issue on some one point or other and on that crush the Court nobles in open conflict, he could scarcely have selected his battle-ground with less adroitness and perspicacity. On constitutional grounds he was hopelessly in the wrong, and he was sure to be overborne in any reasoned argument over the point at issue. Then the question united the Court nobles in one common cause, while the Hōjō policy towards them had almost invariably been " Divide et impera ". Furthermore, this matter now furnished the Court with a distinct and easily understood grievance ; it was the best of platforms for the discourses of perfervid Imperialist partisans like Takayama and Gamō.

Some of the Kugé at this time were men of ability, notably that Lord Nakayama who had been selected to argue the Imperial-Title case at Yedo. What threatened, however, to make reawakened Imperialistic sentiment an active and formidable force was its advocacy by plebeian literati, who had taken umbrage at the neglect with which their class had latterly been treated in Yedo. How highly considered a personage the Chinese lecturer (*jusha*) was in the days of Tsunayoshi and Iyenobu has already been described. Under Yoshimune, whose mind was of an eminently practical cast, real scholarship was far from being slighted, but little respect was shown for the mere platitudinous pedantry into which Japanese Confucianism then threatened to degenerate. Original minds like Ogyu Sorai still met with respectful treatment, but such minds were comparatively few in the later days of the eighth

Shōgun. All the changes, radical or immaterial, that could be rung on the leading concepts and propositions of the various schools of Chinese philosophy had been rung by this time, and for any real positive advance fresh sources of knowledge had to be tapped. Hence, Yoshimune's encouragement of old Japanese studies, of astronomy, of medical science; hence, his interest in Dutch learning and his fondness for modern Chinese books. Apart from Dazai Shuntai, there was perhaps not a single Chinese scholar of first-class rank in Yedo at the death of Yoshimune. Under Iyeshige, not even the slightest encouragement was extended to Chinese scholarship by the Bakufu, while in Iyeharu's time the Court lecturers often found themselves treated with ridicule, covert, generally, but now and then open and downright. Hayashi Nobuyoshi's *Seidō* was burned in the great conflagration of 1772. One feature of the economy then professedly practised by the Bakufu was to close as many public buildings as possible, and of those burned or otherwise destroyed from time to time to rebuild only those which were absolutely necessary. The authorities acting on this principle refused to rebuild the *Seidō*, whereupon Hayashi protested strongly. When his protest came before the Rōjū, Tanuma looked at the paper and remarked, "The *Seidō*? The *Seidō*? What is worshipped there, a *kami* or a *hotoke*?" A Finance Magistrate gravely informed him that it "was neither a *kami* nor a *hotoke*, but a Chinaman, named Confucius, who lived more than 2,000 years before, and who wrote a book called *Rongo*, which seemed to be rather famous". Not a single one present at the sitting so much as smiled. No doubt Tanuma's crass ignorance was merely feigned; and his colleagues probably fancied they would best curry favour with him by entering into his humour of thus mocking the scholars and their cult. Later on, we hear of bands of gay young Hatamoto life-guardsmen scandalizing the Court lecturers by stopping them as they passed to inquire whether Madame Confucius was good-looking or not! No wonder then, that scholars had shaken the dust of Yedo off their sandals as a testimony against the insolence and contumely with which they were being treated in the Shōgun's capital. In Kyōto, the Court nobles had but scanty fare to offer them, but to be appreciated by the highest in rank and the bluest-blooded in the empire was soothing to that *amour propre* which had been so badly ruffled in Yedo. Hence, many of the ablest literati of the time had set their faces towards Kyōto, where they

presently began to find the conditions of existence not so very straitened after all. It had been usual for the outside clans to send the most promising students in their schools to Yedo to finish their education in Hayashi's Seidō. Now, with Yedo a sink of moral corruption, the Seidō in a hopeless state of inefficiency, and the Court lecturers treated as so many learned buffoons, the more intelligent Daimyō began to think twice before dispatching the best intellects in their clans to be debauched and demoralized in the Shōgun's Gomorrah, and Kyōto became the great resort of the graduates of the clan colleges bent on a further prosecution of their studies. As regards higher educational facilities, even Ōsaka, that great city of shop-keepers, was far ahead of Yedo, and the school of Nakae Sekizen was by no means the only great one in the city that was now thronged with country students, although it was the chief. In addition to this, some of the clans, Chōshū, Higo, Hizen, Yonezawa, for example, had men of high reputation and ability on the staffs of their colleges, while some of the small obscure fiefs in the north of Shikoku were hives of *Kangakusha*.

The Regent was shrewd enough to appreciate the dangers that lurked in this situation, and his visit to the west in 1788 doubtless impressed him with the necessity of taking some measures of reform. The Seidō must be restored and reorganized, and its old prestige revived. Its then head, Hayashi Nobuyoshi, was childless, and it was therefore arranged that he should adopt the second son of the Daimyō of Iwamura in Mino, who had a great reputation as a scholar, and entrust the fortunes of the Seidō to him. Shortly before this, Shibano, Okada and other scholars had been invited to settle in Yedo, and they, as well as Bitō, were now appointed to chairs in the Seidō under Jussai, as the new Hayashi was called. The Seidō, now a purely government institution, speedily regained a measure of its old prestige in spite of the fact that it was reorganized as a mere "cramming-school". The intellectual viands provided in its halls cannot have been very satisfying to the honest and disinterested searcher after truth and knowledge. The only fare provided being the orthodox Teishu gospel. The commentaries chosen as textbooks were carefully selected, and no lecturer was allowed to criticize or supplement their contents in any way. On the part of the students, everything was to be accepted unhesitatingly, without question or argument or discussion. It was a most heinous crime to cavil at any *ex cathedra* utterance ;

the expression of any doubts or dissent was sure to lead to the expulsion of the daring offender. A greater travesty of education could scarcely be imagined, if the two great aims of every teacher should really be to stimulate intelligence and to help to build up character. The Procrustean regulations enforced in the Gakumonjo¹ (as the Seidō was called from 1797) with Draconic rigour were expressly intended to stifle all individual intellectual initiative, while their effect on the formation of character was to put a premium on hypocrisy. Imagine Nakae Tōju being invited to occupy a chair in the renovated University of Yedo! On occasion Nakae could make use of emphatic and straight-flung language, and his reply to such a hypothetical invitation would be highly entertaining reading. It goes without saying that few men of any real force of character would be found on Hayashi's staff of professors, while any intellectually able man in the faculty must have been painfully conscious of the falsity of the position he occupied. Such indeed was the case with the famous Satō Issai (1772-1859), who really belonged to the school of Ōyōmei.²

Under Tanuma, as we have seen, the civil service had become thoroughly demoralized, and appointments to its offices a mere matter of money. The Regent had at once put a stop to this, and during his very first year he succeeded in thoroughly purging and purifying the service. In the reforms he instituted the old system of examinations was resuscitated and amended, and it was to this circumstance mainly that the Seidō owed the great measure of consideration in which it was presently held by the Hatamoto. These gay young roysterers could no longer venture to amuse themselves by quizzing the grave and solemn Court lecturers with impudent queries about the looks of Madame Confucius. On the contrary, they suddenly found themselves under the iron heel of the new Hayashi and his Professors. Hayashi Jussai was of a masterful character, and a martinet in discipline, with a strong

¹ Gakumonjo means simply a school-house or any building devoted to study. Seido, in its primary sense, means a temple dedicated to Confucius, and this sense was extended to the building in which the study of his works was carried on.—J. H. L.

² "It was only for considerations of worldly interest that Satō did not proclaim himself to be a thorough-going follower of Ōyōmei's system. Like the Bishop of Gloucester in the days of Charles I, of whom it is said that he required £1,500 a year to prevent him from declaring his conversion to Roman Catholicism, so Satō was a Shushi philosopher simply because he was at the head of a Shushi school. He lacked the courage of his opinions, and it was not until after his death that his real opinions were found expressed in unequivocal language." *T.A.S.J.*, vol. xxxiv, pt. iv, p. 60.

inclination to magnify the importance of his office and position. In 1795, he induced the Bakufu to issue an edict declaring that henceforth only those who subscribed to the Teishu body of doctrine (as expounded in the Seidō of course) should be eligible as candidates for government positions! This "Prohibition of Heresies" as it was called, was soon enforced in the outside fiefs, and the great clan schools became as narrow, rigid, and hide-bound in their curricula and regulations as the Seidō itself. As was only to be expected, this "Prohibition of Heresies" called forth a great storm of protest from the adherents of the Ōyōmei and Kogaku schools, but it was quite ineffective, and "heretical" professors had presently to choose between conformity or resignation of their positions.

As has just been said, it was Hayashi Jussai who prompted this measure. Two years before it was issued the Regent had demitted his office. Yet it was enforced with Sadanobu's full approval, and Japanese writers are nearly unanimous in the view that it was really Sadanobu who was responsible for it. In this matter at least, he did not follow in his grandfather's steps, for we have seen Yoshimune making it a point to treat all schools of thought with respect and extending his favours impartially to all who seemed in any way to merit them. Sincerity was a quality on which Yoshimune had set great store; his grandson while professing to value sincerity, made no scruple about putting a great premium on hypocrisy. Sexual immorality is not lightly to be condoned, and for his efforts to cope with this vice, then so prevalent in Yedo, Sadanobu is entitled to respect, but to suppress brothels and street-walkers on the one hand and, on the other, to convert the best men into intellectual prostitutes, is surely a case of straining at a gnat and swallowing a camel. At the date of its promulgation, the "Prohibition of Heresies" might perhaps have been regarded as not merely a harmless but even as a salutary measure. Its enforcement, however, was ultimately destined to prove terribly disastrous to the fortunes of the Tokugawa Shōgunate. For the next two generations the ablest intellects among the youth of the outside clans continued to smart and wince under the tyranny of the lifeless tread-mill system of instruction imposed upon them with an ever-growing irritation, a more and more over-mastering tendency to revolt. Among the protagonists in the movement that led to the overthrow of the Bakufu, some of the ablest drew their force and

inspiration from the "Heresies" of the Ōyōmei school. The Regent's action in the Imperial-Title case had furnished the Court nobles with a real and easily comprehended grievance and knit them into a common bond of hostility to the Bakufu. The effect of the Prohibition of Heresies was to excite a deep measure of sullen and rooted resentment in the successive leaders and moulders of popular opinion among the clan samurai. In 1795, it was a case of sowing the wind; two generations later the whirlwind had to be duly reaped by the Bakufu.

In these two affairs it was the Regent's political acumen that was at fault. In a third matter, his treatment of the distinguished scholar Rin Shi-hei, Matsudaira Sadanobu appears to great moral disadvantage. This Sendai scholar had made three visits to Nagasaki and had there learned a great deal from the Dutchmen about the march of political events in the west. In the expansion of the Muscovite empire he discerned a great future menace to Japan, and in his *Sangoku Tsūran*,¹ published in 1786, he endeavoured to arouse his countrymen to a sense of the peril. As if to lend point to his contentions, in that very year a Russian man-of-war appeared on the Yedo coast. In 1788, Rin Shi-hei had an interview with the court noble Nakayama (whom we have just seen in conflict with the Regent) and, in the following year, with the Regent, to whom he then expounded his views at length. Meanwhile, since 1777, he had been at work on his *Kaikoku Heidan*,² in which he dealt with the question of the coast defence of the empire. In 1792, this book was published at Sendai. The reward for his fifteen year's hard work on this treatise was a scurvy one indeed. At the beginning of 1793 he was arrested by orders of the Bakufu and conveyed under escort to Yedo, where he was presently condemned to imprisonment in his brother's house in Sendai on the ground that:—

"With a view of acquiring a reputation he had written strange and absurd stories about the risk of foreign invasion based on mere hearsay or groundless conjecture, that he had agitated the people, and that he had described points of strategic importance and inserted maps in his books."

¹ *Sangoku Tsūran*, a study of three countries.—J. H. L.

² *Kaikoku Heidan*—war talks on the coastal provinces. Rin Shi-hei is better known as Hayashi Shihei, Rin being the sinico-Japanese equivalent of Hayashi. In his great work, he pointed out that the marine policy of Japan, which forbade the building of large ships, left her coasts, on which there were no defences, helpless against naval attacks by foreigners. Not only was he imprisoned till his death, but the blocks of his book were broken up.—J. H. L.

Six months later on he died in confinement. Now follows the strange thing. In that very year the Regent issued orders to the sea-board clans to strengthen their defences, and about the same time he proceeded on a tour of inspection along the Idzu, Sagami, Awa, and Kadzusa coast ! His biographer says :—

“ Many people laughed at his precautions, but the course of subsequent events was to demonstrate that he was uncommonly far-sighted.”

Now to acquire a knowledge of a man's original views, to imprison their author, and then to acquire a reputation for foresight by acting upon these views, does not strike one as being a masterpiece of plain dealing or honesty. In fact, it may be fairly said to have been quite the reverse. This was almost the last of Matsudaira Sadanobu's official acts as Regent. In that year (1793) he suddenly sent in his resignation, and it was accepted. Although he had been strongly supported by the Go-san-ké and the Rōjū, there had always been a strong cabal working against him in the youthful Shōgun's immediate entourage. The Shōgun's own father, Hitotsubashi Harunari, had expected to be made Regent as Tanuma intended he should be. When Harunari tried to establish an ascendancy over his son, Sadanobu interfered, and his interference occasioned some painful scenes between the boy Shōgun and the Regent. The Ladies of the Court also cherished a bitter resentment against him, and their continual carping at last began to influence Iyenari, who had now attained his twentieth year and wished to assume the personal discharge of the functions of his office. But the chief cause of the Regent's retirement was to be sought elsewhere ; his action in the Imperial-Title affair had raised up a band of formidable enemies against him.

In the six years of his Regency, Matsudaira Sadanobu repeated the work of his grandfather in a measure. Between 1670 and 1709, the clock of state and local administration had run down, and Yoshimune had wound it up and set it going once more. Between 1751 and 1786, it again ran down, and Sadanobu did his best to retrieve the situation. The history of the next sixty years is to a great extent an account of a third running down of the administrative timepiece, and the strenuous but abortive attempt of Mizuno Tadakuni, Echizen no Kami, to repeat the work of Matsudaira Sadanobu.

CHAPTER XII

IYENARI (1793–1841)

THE eleventh Tokugawa Shōgun, Iyenari, was destined to have a longer tenure of office than any other occupant of the Shōgunal dais. The last Shōgun of the Kamakura period had been a puppet for five-and-twenty years;¹ in the Ashikaga age, Yoshimitsu, the third Shōgun of that house was titular Shōgun from 1368 to 1395, and wielded authority for thirteen years more after his nominal retirement. Three Tokugawa Shōguns—Iyetsuna, Tsunayoshi, and Yoshimune—occupied the main castle of Yedo for nine-and-twenty years each, while the last spent six years more in the Nishi Maru as ex-Shōgun. From his accession in 1786, down to his retirement in 1837, Iyenari was titular Shōgun for a full half-century. It is true that for the first six or seven years of this period, down to 1793, he was under tutelage. On the other hand, although he made way for his son, Iyeyoshi, and removed to the Nishi Maru in 1837, it was really by him that the Shōgunal power was exercised until his death in 1841. Thus, his personal rule lasted for the unprecedentedly long term of eight-and-forty years.

Like his immediate predecessor, Iyeharu, Iyenari had enjoyed a great reputation for cleverness and ability in his youth. It need scarcely be said, however, that the standard by which the youthful abilities of a prospective Shōgun were measured was not necessarily a very high one. What is plain is that Iyenari, while a better man than Iyetsuna or Iyeshige, was neither a statesman nor a great worker. In the age of Iyeyasu he would have been a nonentity; if the eldest son of Iyeyasu, he would probably have been summarily set aside in favour of the second-rate, yet safe, sagacious and plodding Hidetada. As Hidetada's successor he would probably have wrecked the Tokugawa Shōgunate, while, if in the position of Yoshimune in 1716, he would have placed the fortunes of his

¹ The six Shōguns of the Kamakura period were all, though either of the noble Fujiwara lineage or of the Imperial family, helpless puppets under the domination of the Hōjō regents, and the only difference between the last and his five predecessors was that he held his phantom dignity longer than any other.—J. H. L.

house in the direst jeopardy. To accomplish the work of the eighth Shōgun he would have been utterly impotent ; he would probably never have attempted to accomplish it, even if he had had the prescience to discern the crying and urgent need for it. The splendour, the magnificence, the luxury of the Genroku and Hō-ei periods (1688-1709) would have been so irresistible in their appeal, that their traditions would infallibly have been continued. Apart from this, even if desirous of reform as Yoshimune was, Iyenari's limited capacity would have been sadly unequal to any such task. Intellectually, he was a mediocrity ; physically, while not exactly an invalid, he was far from robust. He was subject to epileptic fits ; but, apart from this infirmity, he had not the bodily stamina that enabled the great Yoshimune to "toil as terribly" as the very best of the Hōjō ever did.

It would, however, be a serious misconception to regard Iyenari as a puppet. Any one venturesome enough to persist in thwarting him did so at the peril of his fortunes. The Regent, Matsudaira Sadanobu, did impose his will upon Iyenari in various matters, notably in preventing the Shōgun's father, Hitotsubashi Harunari, from taking up his quarters in the Nishi Maru ; and the Sobayōnin, Matsudaira Nobuaki, did remonstrate with the youthful ruler more than once in very frank language, but it was before Iyenari assumed the personal direction of affairs. After 1793, we do indeed meet with instances of opposition to the Shōgunal will, and sometimes the opposition appeared to be effectual, but in the end Iyenari contrived to have his own way, and those who may have been inclined to remonstrate, finding such a course highly detrimental to their own prospects, prudently refrained from doing so. On the other hand, scarcely one of the fifteen Tokugawa Shōguns could be characterized as an autocrat pure and simple. The nearest approach to an autocratic régime was in the days of Iyemitsu, who, as has been said, filled nearly all the great offices of State with "new men", very much as Louis XIV did in the latter half of the same century. Yet, although of autocratic temper, the third Shōgun was not capricious. Once provided with proper tools for the execution of his purposes he rarely, if ever, discarded them, and although he made no scruple about amending, he rarely presumed to ride rough-shod over the established laws of the land. Tsunayoshi, again, was of a somewhat autocratic temper, but he seldom thought fit to change the personnel of the Great Council, and of the higher

departments of the civil service. He merely ignored the Rōjū, and acted through his Sobayōnin, Makino, Yanagisawa, and Matsudaira Terusada. He was indeed able to impose his pernicious and foolish Life-Protecting Statutes upon the empire, but, on the other hand, although desirous to spare the lives of the Forty-seven Rōnin, he did not dare to suspend the law even in a case where popular sympathy was so markedly on the side of the culprits. One of Yoshimune's great merits had been that he had confirmed the claims of established law and usage so far as they were not unsuitable to the peculiar circumstances of his age. In truth, during the period with which we are now dealing, the nearest approach to arbitrary autocracy was under the Tairō Sakai, (1672-80), and afterwards under Tanuma.

On several occasions, between 1652 and 1853, we meet with instances of the operation of more or less effective external checks upon the power of the Shōgun. In Iyetsuna's time, we find the Go-san-ké exercising an important influence in various matters of high State policy. They had seats in the Council convoked to decide what answer should be returned to Koxinga's appeal for Japanese intervention in the affairs of China. Under Tsunayoshi, the only Daimyō who presumed to protest against the Life-Protecting Statutes, was Mitsukuni of Mito. Before this it had been owing to Go-san-ké support that Hotta was enabled to frustrate Sakai's plans in 1680. At the death of Iyeharu and accession of Iyenari in 1786, these three great branches of the Tokugawa house asserted themselves to good purpose in two matters of vital moment. As we have just seen, they proved strong enough to break the yoke of the hitherto all-powerful Tanuma, to upset his project of making the young Shōgun's father (Hitotsubashi Harunari) Regent, and to instal a nominee of their own in that great office. At all times, they had the prerogative of expressing their views on matters of high policy, and of remonstrating whenever the occasion seemed to justify remonstrances. During the early years of Iyenari's rule, the Go-san-ké had still to be reckoned with. Later on, two of Iyenari's own sons were adopted either as heads or prospective heads of the Owari and Kishū families, and any opposition from these two great houses was therefore no longer to be feared. On the death of the eighth lord of Mito without children in 1829, an attempt was made to set aside his younger brother, Nariaki, and to deal with Mito as Owari and Kishū had been dealt with. But the intrigue—for such

it really was—failed. One outcome of this incident was that the Mito house presently became antagonistic to the Shōgunate and ultimately contributed greatly to its subsequent overthrow. Besides, the Go-san-ké the Daimyō, who met in the Tamari Hall of the Castle, had the privilege of freely expressing their opinions on the government and its policy. The first *Tamari-tsumé* was the son of Hoshina of Aidzu, who was Regent during the minority of the fourth Shōgun. At this date, the Daimyō who met in the Tamari-no-ma were Hoshina of Aidzu, Ii of Hikone, and Matsudaira of Takamatsu. In 1793, this Council was greatly strengthened by the inclusion of Matsudaira Sadanobu, who was appointed a member of it upon laying down the Regency.¹

In addition to the influence he exercised as a *Tamari-tsumé*, Sadanobu could act through his friends and former subordinates who still remained in the Rōjū. Of these, Honda (attached to the Nishi Maru) held office till 1798; Matsudaira Nobuaki till he was dismissed in 1803, and Toda till 1806. Down to the end of the century, the Great Councillors succeeded in imposing their will upon the Shōgun in not a few matters but, after that date, there was a steady decline of their authority, and by 1841 they were quite as powerless as they had been under the fifth Shōgun, Tsunayoshi. It was not because there were no good or capable men among them, for Matsudaira Nobuaki (reappointed in 1806) Ōkubo Tada-zane (1818-37), and Mizuno Tadakuni were all men of respectable ability, the last indeed a man of very considerable ability and of great force of character. The real reason was that Iyenari had recourse not to the Great Council but to favourites of his own for advice. It was the influence of the Shōgunal seraglio that was now dominant in Japan.

Even during the first ten years of Iyenari's personal rule the Rōjū, though powerful, had an uphill battle to fight. The Shōgun's father, Hitotsubashi Harunari, had been balked by the Regent in his intention to instal himself in the Nishi Maru. On Sadanobu's resignation (1793), he was at last able to compass his purpose. Over his son he exercised a strong and, on the whole, pernicious influence and, down to his death in 1826, he continued to interfere in the

¹ Sakai of Himeji was added later on. As for Sadanobu, it should be said that after his retirement from office, he was transferred from Shirakawa to Kuwana in Ise (the original fief of the Hisamitsu Matsudaira house) in 1823, that he became *inkyo* in 1826, and died in 1829. His time was mainly devoted to the administration of his own fief which he raised to a high degree of prosperity.

administration, often thwarting the best-considered projects of the constitutional councillors. Matsudaira Nobuaki and his colleagues were really serious in their intentions to carry on and complete the reforms instituted by the Regent. Hence, year after year, we meet with notices of sumptuary legislation and measures aimed at the gross moral corruption of the times, but Japanese writers are correct in their contention that, in the long run, such measures were merely dead-letters. Doubtless, they might be vigorously enforced when promulgated, but the ardour of the executive officers soon cooled, and within a few months matters would be much as they had been before. When this came to the knowledge of the Rōjū, there would be a repetition of the ordinances, another spasm of activity on the part of the officials, and then an outburst of extravagance in some new direction. The minor officials soon grasped the fact that power was slipping from the hands of the Rōjū, and that a judicious measure of conformity to the tastes of the occupants of the Nishi Maru might ultimately inure to their advantage. The Shōgun's father was a man of the age of Tanuma (in fact Tanuma's brother had been his chief *karō*) and had but little liking for what he considered to be the Puritanical fads of the erstwhile Regent. Through his efforts Mizuno Tadamoto and a good many others of the old Tanuma coterie were restored to favour and office, not a few of them being attached to his own court; and life in the Nishi Maru was rapidly becoming as gay and festive and magnificent as it was in the Shōgun's palace before the fall of Tanuma. Thus, the high moral principles and the Draconian sumptuary legislation of the Rōjū tended to become matter for open ridicule among the courtiers, and the knowledge that this was so, did much to temper the zeal of the smaller official with discretion. Before the death of Hitotsubashi Harunari in 1826, corruption, wastefulness, and extravagance had become nearly as pronounced as they had been in Tanuma's time, and during the subsequent decade and a half matters certainly did not improve. The influence emanating from the harem was almost as pernicious as that of the Nishi Maru. Iyenari had wedded in 1789, his consort being a daughter of Konoye Tsunehiro. But she was merely an adopted daughter of Konoye, for she was born in Kagoshima, the third daughter of Shimadzu Higehide, that long-lived Daimyō of Satsuma, whom we meet with in the narrative of Siebold as well as in the pages of Titsingh. This alliance naturally

tended to bring the Shōgun into intimate relations with the court nobles as well as with the great feudal house of Shimadzu. One son of Shigehide had been adopted by the Kuroda family of Chikuzen and yet another as the head of the Okudaira family of Nakatsu; in 1826, we find the eighty-four year old ex-Prince of Satsuma going with the Prince of Nakatsu to Ōmori to welcome Siebold, then on his way to Yedo. The Okudaira and Kuroda houses thus also came to acquire a considerable influence at the Shōgun's court, as did others of the numerous relatives and friends of the Shōgun's legitimate consort. At all events, we sometimes find them ignoring the regulations of the Rōjū in at least certain minor matters. The Shōgun, however, was no believer in monogamy as an institution. What the exact tale of his concubines amounted to it is difficult to say, but that they must have been fairly numerous becomes apparent from the fact that only a few of them presented him with as many as two children, and that he was ultimately credited with the paternity of no fewer than fifty-one. It is true that a good many of these cost little more than the expenses of an infant funeral, and that many others died before the age of puberty. Even so, nearly a score remained to be provided for. The practice of creating new appanages for the Shōgun's younger sons was definitely abandoned in the time of Yoshimune, and to add to the number of the Go-sankyō was deemed inadvisable. Accordingly adoption was resorted to as the easiest measure of relief. Two sons were adopted as prospective heads of the Kishū and Owari families; another was disposed of to the house of Echizen, and three or four others to as many Fudai Daimyō. Daughters were married to the Lords of Kaga, Hizen, Mito, Owari, Echizen, and various other feudatories. Naturally this affinity with the Shōgun greatly raised the prestige and importance of these special houses, and relieved them from the dread of the Rōjū, in which their ancestors had stood for several generations. Naturally, also, they became recipients of special marks of the Shōgun's favour; their court rank was raised, and they were allowed certain privileges in the use of crests, saddle furniture, and various items in the paraphernalia of feudal pomp and State generally reserved for scions of the ruling house. Not to be hopelessly eclipsed by these favourites of fortune the other feudatories resorted to bribery on a lavish scale to secure equivalent privileges. It was in the sale of offices that Tanuma and his gang had found one of the chief sources

of their ill-gotten wealth ; now it was in the traffic of marks of distinction, the privilege to make use of certain trappings of pomp and parade that the Palace favourites found their most lucrative returns. During the last twenty years of Iyenari's régime, the pomp and splendour of the feudal processions were such as Yedo had never witnessed before. It may indeed be questioned if they had ever been equalled in Kyōto in the very hey-day of the old capital's magnificence under the third Ashikaga Shōgun, Yoshimitsu.

Not only between the Daimyō themselves and their *Karō* and superior vassals, but between the lower samurai of the various clans there was the keenest rivalry in the matter of making a gay and gallant show on the way from the *yashiki*, up through the Castle gates and on to the Shōgun's palace. Naturally enough, the Hatamoto, the Shōgun's own devoted vassals could not allow themselves to be outvied in taste, in style, in the graces and splendour of personal adornment, by mere country samurai, and the social and economic results of all this display may be inferred easily enough. In the first place, if need be, and there generally was the most pressing need, money was freely borrowed. Most of the Daimyō were deeply in debt to the great merchants and bankers of Ōsaka or their agents in Yedo ; their retainers were often at the mercy of the blind money-lender, as the Hatamoto were at that of the *Fuda-sashi*. The creditor class, of course, tended to become wealthier and wealthier. Again, the extravagance of the hitherto unheard-of feudal pomp that now prevailed, the wastefulness and luxury of *yashiki* and Castle life, stimulated trade and industry—especially the artistic artisan crafts—into abnormal activity. Yedo and the other great cities were now raised to the very acme of their material prosperity. With plenty of money to spend, their citizens lived right royally ; and brothel-keepers, tea-house and fashionable restaurant-owners, *geisha*, mountebanks, actors, and all the other parasites of society, generally as numerous and varied in the Shōgun's capital at that and some other periods of its history as they were in Paris under the third empire or in London in the years preceding the great War, now reaped a golden harvest. Where the money now tended to go, if not always to remain, is not hard to perceive. Neither is it hard to find an answer to the question where it came from. The sole and only resource of the feudatory, when hard pressed, to keep afloat in the maelstrom of empty and costly frivolity in Yedo and to effect a partial composition with his banker from time to time,

was to levy fresh taxes upon the already over-burdened peasantry of his domains, sweating and toiling in his rice swamps from early morn to dewy eve.

How much the great Yoshimune effected for the agriculturist has already been set forth. At no time in the history of the empire was the Japanese peasant so prosperous as he was between 1720 and 1751, in spite of the famine of 1735, and the deficient harvest of 1749. Under Yoshimune's two successors the *dégringolade* had been swift and terrible. During his brief Regency of six or seven years, Matsudaira Sadanobu exerted himself strenuously to retrieve the situation, but apart from his own fief, where he indeed accomplished marvels, and the Bakufu domain, where his efforts were only beginning to bear fruit at the date of his resignation, he really did not succeed in ameliorating the lot of the Japanese peasant at large. He officially commended Uyesugi for his excellent work in Yonezawa, and he sharply reprimanded Hachisuka of Awa for his flagrant excesses. The Regent undoubtedly had good intentions in abundance, but the gap between aspiration and achievement was not to be bridged by anything less than the terrible toil of a quarter of a century at least. The fact is that, from the close of the eighteenth century, the wretched state of the Japanese peasant became more and more miserable. The burden of taxation continued to augment: the main tax on land, mostly paid in rice, but occasionally commuted, or partially commuted into money, had long been so heavy that there was no possibility of increasing it. In addition, however, to the land tax, there were secondary customary imposts, special taxes on subsidiary products, and on occupations, and *corvées*. As for the *corvées*, they belonged to two different categories. In the first place, the peasants had to render certain gratuitous services to their lord, repairing the roof of his dwelling and out-houses, attending to his fences and drains, cutting and supplying his firewood and many others. In the second, they had to construct or repair roads, bridges, reservoirs, and other public works. The *corvées* were levied either on the holding in land, or on the adult peasantry, and were often commuted for money. Some payment had originally been made for them, and the expenses for extraordinary public works, as, for example, after a flood or an earthquake or a volcanic eruption (such as Fuji in 1707 and Asama in 1783) were supposed to be disbursed by the authorities, but the tendency was towards the exaction of unpaid labour, and towards

the end of the eighteenth century this tendency became more and more pronounced. In 1616, in Satake's fief of Akita, the corvée had been 236 days' labour for every 100 *koku* of assessed revenue per annum. In 1799, the 200,000 peasants on the Mito fief of 350,000 *koku* had to furnish 2,000,000 days' labour between them. In 1845, in the Sendai fief, the corvée, instead of being 236 days' labour per 100 *koku* as it had been in Akita in 1616, was fixed at 6,000 such units per 100 *koku* !¹

It is not infrequently asserted that one great cause for the augmentation of the peasant's burdens was the increasing costs of the administration. Such a proposition is a disputable one, at least. At this date, the various bureaux were certainly over-staffed and the ship of State generally over-manned, but it had been so from the beginning of the régime. It was partly the outcome of the jealousy and suspicion that permeated the whole structure of Tokugawa administration where almost every man was a spy upon his neighbour and was in his own turn, under his neighbour's surveillance. Under Iyenari, there was no very marked increase either in the number of administrative officials or in the current expenses of the actual administrative machine. Neither the Great Council nor the Junior Council nor any of the three great magistracies cost more than before. As regards the outside offices, we indeed find that, from about 1815 onwards, an extra allowance of 10,000 *koku* per annum was granted to the Kyōto *Shoshidai*, and an equal amount to the commandant of Ōsaka Castle. This was really in the nature of a secret service fund. Iyenari determined to conciliate the Imperial family and the Court nobles so bitterly estranged by the Regent's action in the Imperial-Title affair, and, for this purpose so much money had been found necessary that one *Shoshidai* after another had vacated his post in seriously embarrassed circumstances. As it had now become the settled routine for the Ōsaka Commandant to be promoted to *Shoshidai*, an annual allowance of 10,000 *koku* was allotted to him also to enable him to enter upon office in Nijō Castle with ample funds in hand.

The Russian menace had got seriously upon the nerves of the authorities in consequence of Muscovite activity in the Northern

¹ As regards the customary dues, and the general state of affairs among the farming population, it will be advantageous to consult Dr. Asakawa's *Notes on Village Government in Japan after A.D. 1600*, in the *Journal of the American Oriental Society*. The amount of honest work that these short papers entailed must have been immense.

seas ; and official after official was dispatched to Yezo to investigate and report on the position. Even as early as 1800, we find Ino Chūkei setting forth to make a survey and a map of the island, but at his own expense. In 1802, the Bakufu deprived the Matsumaye family of the administration of Eastern Yezo and installed a Governor (*Bugyō*) of its own at Hakodate. His stipend was no more than 1,500 bales of rice, and the expenses of his staff could not have been very heavy ; in truth, the appropriated territory must have more than defrayed the costs of its administration. In 1808, we hear of as many as 2,000 samurai being dispatched to garrison Yezo, but as they were drawn from the two clans of Aidzu (1,550 men) and Sendai (400 men) there was no drain upon the Bakufu treasury in connexion with them. Close to Yedo, there had been a slight increase of expense in connexion with the port of Uraga at the entrance to the Bay, a Governor and staff having been installed there to deal with the inspection of the papers of the Ōsaka freighters. Now, in 1819, in consequence perhaps of Captain Gordon's¹ visit to Yedo in his 65-ton brig in the preceding year, an extra Governor was appointed. The expense was, however, insignificant, the post not being very high in the official hierarchy. In Yedo, we find the stipend of Hayashi, Daigaku no Kami, raised to 3,000 koku, while the regular professors in the reorganized University were now paid by the Bakufu. All these items, with a number of still smaller ones, did not amount to any considerable total ; indeed, it is questionable whether the expenses of genuine state administration were augmented by as much as 50,000 *koku* during the period with which we are now dealing. Bribery was rampant and notorious, it is true, and the average official relied more upon his opportunities than upon his stipend for support. Doubtless the bribe that went into the official's pocket had to be wrung from the tiller of the soil in the last resort, but bribes and the legitimate expenses of the administration are different things.

What was really extravagantly costly at this time was the Shōgun's domestic establishment. As soon as the Regent and his colleague had been removed from the control of the household Budget, the expenses went up with a bound, and, since that date,

¹ Captain Gordon was an English naval officer who entered Yedo Bay in a small brig in June, 1818, and asked permission to trade. He was subjected to all the restrictions imposed on the Dutch at Nagasaki, and the permission was refused, but otherwise he was courteously treated. See Hildreth's *Japan as it Was and Is*, chap. xiv.—J. H. L.

they had been ever mounting and mounting. In 1838, the year after Iyenari became *inkyō*, the Nishi Maru was burned to the ground, and the ex-Shōgun then had to return to the main palace. He was accompanied by 350 Court ladies and 250 female attendants.¹

It was on these and their relatives that money was now spent more lavishly than it had been before. In Yoshimune's time, when the Bakufu lands were assessed at 4,080,000 *koku*, the revenue was no greater than it now (1838) was when the assessed yield had shrunk to 3,281,000 *koku*. A larger proportion of the taxes had come to be paid in money, and the money receipts were about 50 per cent. greater than they had been a century before. Yoshimune's household had been managed with the strictest economy, and had consumed only a small percentage of the gross annual revenue. With Iyenari, the case was vastly different, and waste, profusion, extravagance, and empty ostentation held high carnival in the Yedo seraglio. In Yoshimune's time, the granaries had been filled to their roofs with cereals intended to cope with a possible series of lean years. The demands of the "Great Interior" now made any such thing an impossibility. Some writers have treated Iyenari as a Tokugawa analogue of the third Ashikaga Shōgun, the magnificent Yoshimitsu (1368-95) but, on scanning the matter a little closely, the superficiality of the analogy soon becomes apparent. With all his faults and shortcomings, and they were many, Yoshimitsu could, and did, work hard when there was any pressing necessity for him to do so; he unquestionably possessed the reserve of staying power which is indispensable for success as a statesman. It would be gross flattery to describe the eleventh Tokugawa Shōgun as a worker. Yoshimune probably accomplished as much strenuous toil in a month—or even in a week perhaps—as Iyenari did in a year. We hear of Iyenari summoning the Bench of Magistrates to the Fuki-age gardens to discuss and decide cases in his presence, but this was only on very rare occasions, and the proceedings were merely formal, if not actually farcical. When we recall Yoshimune's untiring and assiduous efforts to render the administration of justice pure and efficient, and the many hours of lonely toil he spent over the contents of the "Complaint-Boxes", we must be pardoned the smile provoked by Iyenari's cheap posturing and posing as a Solomon. And yet Iyenari is often bracketed with Yoshimune as having done much to retrieve the fortunes of the

¹ See Ikeda's *Ō oku no Jōchū* (Ladies of the Tokugawa Harem).

Tokugawa Shōgunate ; and the years of Kwansei (1789-1800) are often coupled with those of Kyōhō (1716-35). But the reforms of Kwansei were not constructive as were unquestionably those of Kyōhō, they were mostly of the nature of palliatives that never got near the root of the matter at all. Besides, the reforms of Kwansei, such as they were, were no work of Iyenari's. They were effected by the Regent, Matsudaira Sadanobu ; and all that Iyenari subsequently did, during his eight-and-forty years of personal rule, was to undo them, or to allow them to be undone.

The points of real analogy between Iyenari and the great Ashikaga Shōgun, Yoshimitsu, are three in number. In the first place, both had a profound liking for magnificence, splendour, and costly display. In the second, Yoshimitsu had been socially intimate with his great feudatories, and, as we have just seen, the unusually close relations between Iyenari and some of the great feudal houses led to a marked decline of the power and prestige of the Rōjū. In the third place, there are points of similarity in the respective attitudes of Yoshimitsu and Iyenari towards the Imperial House and the Court nobles.

In the early years of Iyenari's régime, the relations between the Bakufu and the Court were rather peculiar. Iyenari himself had married the adopted daughter of Konoye Tsunehiro, and the Go-san-ké were also connected with others of the Go-sekké by marriage. This ought naturally to have led to a certain degree of intimacy between the Court and the house of Tokugawa. But Matsudaira Sadanobu's action in the Imperial-Title affair had estranged the Court and the Court nobles. In the course he had then followed he dissatisfied the Go-san-ké, to whom he had originally owed his appointment, while he had been strenuously opposed by the Shōgun's father, Hitotsubashi Harunari. On the resignation of the Regent in 1793, the Bakufu officials in Kyōto found themselves in a very difficult situation. They had taken their tone from the Regent, and had latterly conducted themselves with a certain measure of overbearing arrogance towards the Court nobles. Now this had to be modified, they felt, for the relations of affinity between the Go-sekké on the one hand, and the Shōgun and the Go-san-ké on the other, might very well provide a medium for preferring complaints against them that might possibly be attended with serious consequences. Accordingly, they had recourse to lavish bribery to still the tongues of their Courtly critics. So lavish

indeed had this present-giving latterly become that, as has been said, every successive *Shoshidai* now vacated his post in serious financial difficulties and, although the office was often an immediate stepping-stone to a place in the Rōjū, it had come to be but little coveted. In 1804, a certain Mizuno Tadashige, Dewa no Kami, learned that it was intended to make him Ōsaka Commandant. This meant that, in the ordinary routine of promotion, he would by-and-by find himself installed in Nijō Castle with all the responsibilities of *Shoshidai* upon his shoulders. He at once hurried off to his patron, the Shōgun's father, pointed out to him the difficulties of the *Shoshidai*'s position and begged to be appointed to a home post, if he really was to be promoted. Accordingly, instead of being sent to Ōsaka, he was thereupon made a Junior Councillor (*Wakadoshiyori*) with the special duty of superintending the affairs of the interior of the Shōgun's palace (*okugakari*).

His duties now brought him much in contact with the Shōgun ; and as he was not deficient in ability, he soon got to know His Highness perfectly. He was not a Mizuno by birth but, after chopping and changing from one family to another, he was now the prospective head of one branch of the Mizuno stock. At this time, it should be remarked, the Mizunos were as numerous and prominent and as confusing to the historian as the Hondas were in Iyeyasu's later days, for during the earlier decades of the nineteenth century, half-a-dozen Mizunos at least appear more or less conspicuously in the Tokugawa records. The rise of the Mizuno house was owing to its connexion with Tanuma, and still more, with Tanuma's friend, the Shōgun's father, Hitotsubashi Harunari. Several Mizuno dames also were influential in the harem, and the influence of the harem at this date was in certain respects quite as great as that of the Rōjū. Now, Mizuno Tadashige, Dewa no Kami, was a man who knew how to profit by his opportunities. He soon made himself nearly as indispensable to Iyenari's personal comfort as Ōoka had been to Iyeshige's, though his rise of official position was steady rather than swift. In 1812, he was attached as adjutant (*Sobayōnin*) to the person of the heir apparent Iyeyoshi in the Nishi Maru. In 1817 he became Honorary Rōjū, while in 1818, he was made an ordinary member of the Great Council. During the next seventeen years, down to his death in 1835, he was perhaps the most influential man in the empire. For fully thirty years he must be regarded as a real force in the social and political world

of his day ; and during this time he had the satisfaction of seeing the relations between Yedo and Kyōto gradually placed on the footing of cordiality and harmony that had characterized them between 1680 and 1716.

In the Tokugawa age official intercourse between the Shōgun and his sovereign was carried on in a rather circuitous fashion. The Shōgun communicated his will to the Rōjū ; the Rōjū transmitted the communication to the *Shoshidai* in Kyōto ; the latter then sent one or other of the two Tensō with the message to the Kwampaku, by whom it was finally laid before the Emperor. The Emperor's reply passed through an equal number of hands (or mouths) before it reached the Shōgun ; only instead of the Tensō, the Gisō were employed to transmit the return dispatch (or message) to the *Shoshidai*. The number of the Gisō varied from three to five ; all were of comparatively high rank, selected from among the Dainagon, Chūnagon or Sangi, who were of course all court nobles. At this period, Mizuno seems to have been in constant communication with the *Shoshidai*, and to have often acted independently of and without the knowledge of, the Great Councillors. In so doing he was undoubtedly undermining the power of the Rōjū, which was also being sapped at the same time by the unwonted measure of consideration accorded by the Shōgun to the great feudatories who had become connected with him by marriage or adoption. His plainly expressed approval of the bribery then resorted to at Kyōto is also censurable. In 1815, when Sakai, the *Shoshidai*, joined the Rōjū in Yedo, he was head-over-ears in debt to certain Ōsaka millionaires, and was being lampooned in street songs in Kyōto for his inability to discharge his obligations. It was at this time that, owing to Sakai's complaints and Mizuno's representations, the extra annual allowance of 10,000 *koku* was accorded to the two great outside officials, the *Shoshidai* of Kyōto and the commandant of Ōsaka Castle. Shortly after this the two hundredth anniversary of the death of Iyeyasu came round and, in connexion with the attendant ceremonies, a special Imperial mission was sent from Kyōto to Yedo. It had again become customary at this time to treat Imperial envoys to Yedo with as much consideration and distinction as had been bestowed upon them during Tsunayoshi's Shōgunate, and to shower valuable gifts upon them. On this occasion, special and extraordinary efforts were put forth to please the Imperial representatives, and they must have returned to

Kyōto highly charmed and delighted with their experiences in the Kwantō. In 1817, the great festival of the Iwashimizu shrine, which used to be graced by the presence of the Sovereign and his Court, was restored in all its ancient splendour at the expense of the Bakufu. About the same time the Emperor, Kōtaku, abdicated, and the new palace then erected for him gave the ex-sovereign the keenest delight. During the last two reigns, there had been no celebration of the Dai-jō-e; this great function was now revived with surpassing magnificence. In 1824, when the ex-Emperor proceeded in state to the Shūgakuji, the *Shoshidai* was charged with the duty of escorting him with the full garrison of Nijō and all the officials under him; and this became an annual function for which the Bakufu provided the funds. The coronation ceremony of the new sovereign, Ninkō, was also celebrated with unwonted brilliance, likewise at the expense of the Shōgun. Nothing, in short, was left undone by Iyenari to conciliate the goodwill of both the Emperor and his Court at Kyōto.

The Imperial Court on its part, was not slow to evince its high appreciation of the unwonted attentions thus lavished upon it. In 1817, Iyenari was made Udaijin (Minister of the Right), a little later, Sadaijin (Minister of the Left), while, in 1827, upon attaining his fortieth year of tenure of office as Shōgun he was advanced to the supreme dignity of Chancellor of the Empire (Dajōdaijin).¹ It is true that Hidetada, as well as Iyeyasu, had been recipients of the same great title but, in their cases, it was conferred upon them only after they had made way for a successor in the Shōgun's office. Of all the fifteen Tokugawa Shōguns, Iyenari was the first as well as the last to combine the offices of Chancellor of the empire and Shōgun in his person at the same time. Taira Kiyomori had indeed been Dajōdaijin; but there was no permanent Shōgunate in his day. In the whole course of Japanese history the third Ashikaga Shōgun, Yoshimitsu, is the only instance of a member of the military house occupying the peculiarly distinctive position that Iyenari now held. In the person of the eleventh Shōgun, the House of Tokugawa had seemingly attained the very zenith of its splendour, but in sober truth, it may well be questioned whether any of the fourteen successors of Iyeyasu did so much towards bringing the fabric of Tokugawa greatness crashing to

¹ Dajodaijin and Daizodaijin are synonymous.—J. H. L.

the ground as the Magnificent Iyenari. It was upon the efficiency of the administrative machinery installed by Iyeyasu and supplemented by Iyemitsu that the fortunes of the Shōgunate mainly depended in the last resort. By more than one previous Shōgun, the Great Council of the Bakufu had been treated with but scant respect, but by no previous Shōgun had the prestige of the Rōjū been wounded as it was in the early decades of the nineteenth century by Iyenari.

Intercourse between the Shōgun and the sovereign's Court had become amicable and intimate, and—what was especially damaging to the Rōjū—direct. The courtiers of Kyōto were ceasing to tremble at the mere idea of incurring the displeasure of the Yedo Councillors, now that there was easy access to the ear of the Shōgun, who could make or mar each and all of the Councillors at his own good pleasure. A similar remark applies to the great feudatories, with whom the Shōgun had formed ties of affinity. In certain respects, the difference in the measure of authority wielded and the degree of respect enjoyed by Iyenari's Councillors and Iyemitsu's "New Men", two centuries before, almost amounted to a contrast. It is often asserted that such a state of affairs was merely the natural result of the mental and moral inferiority of the men of the time, but against this facile explanation, several considerations may be urged. Under Iyenari's long administration there never was any lack of men of respectable talents. Now and again, in such cases as some of the Matsudairas, of Ōkubo, of Mizuno Tadakuni, of Abé Masahiro, we meet with men who might have been able to hold their own in the Great Council even in the early years of Iyetsuna, but during Iyetsuna's minority a Great Councillor did not need to be anxious about his position; under Iyenari the ever-present consciousness of the risk of dismissal must have done much to paralyse all energy and initiative whether individual or collective. The case of Mizuno Tadakuni, Echizen no Kami, will be found instructive. He was perhaps the ablest man of his time, which covered the last years of Iyenari's and the first half of Iyeyoshi's régime. He entered the Great Council in 1834, the year in which the Shōgun's favourite, Mizuno Tadashige, ended his long career. Shortly afterwards Iyenari decided to imitate the first two and the eighth Shōguns, and make way for a successor in the person of his son, Iyeyoshi. This was a step that involved a great deal of expense, and it was mainly by handsome financial assistance from Shimadzu of Satsuma

and some of the other feudatories, related by marriage or adoption to the Shōgunal house, that the Nishi Maru (Western Enceinte) was renovated properly to serve as a palace for the retired (inkyō) Shōgun. In 1837, Iyeyoshi was duly invested with the Imperial Patent, and his father and his huge household removed to the Nishi Maru. In the following year the renovated Nishi Maru was reduced to ashes, and the re-erection of the structure from the bare foundations had to be undertaken. With the finances in disorder, and the empire just escaping from the pinch of one of the greatest famines recorded in its history, this was a task that was not likely to be undertaken gladly by anyone, especially as the structure was to be re-erected on a much more magnificent scale. However, Mizuno Tadakuni did not seek to shirk the responsibility when he was nominated General Superintendent of the enterprise. To procure the needed funds he began by levying a tax of two per cent. upon the revenues of some forty of the feudatories, among whom were Kishū, Owari, and Kaga, and it was proposed to impose a heavy contribution upon the Hatamoto and petty castle officials, most, if not all, of whom were hopelessly in debt, so that the prospect of a new burthen of taxation created an intensely bitter feeling among them. Thereupon, Mizuno dropped the project, and appealed to the goodwill of the Daimyō. Mito and Satsuma responded with liberal contributions, both of money and material; their example was followed by others, and presently the smaller Tokugawa vassals began to send in petitions praying to be allowed to tender specific sums. Mizuno's adroit management won him Iyenari's regard and goodwill. The ex-Shōgun presently entrusted him with the work of making alterations in the interior. This brought Mizuno into contact with some petty authorities with divergent aims, and he was denounced to Iyenari by some of those he had unwittingly offended. He was now in imminent danger of disgrace, and he was only able to save himself by conciliating a small official, who had the ex-Shōgun's ear, with a bribe of 500 or 600 *ryō*. The ablest member of the Great Council was at the mercy of the domestics of the ex-Shōgun, and constrained to bribe a petty underling to make peace for him and save him from ruin.

In connexion with this episode Mizuno discovered that bribery had been systematized and elaborated into a great business enterprise. Narushima, the compiler of the *Tokugawa Jikki*, was then at work

in the Castle, and he had mastered the methods of the palace harpies. This knowledge he now placed at the disposal of Mizuno. Shortly afterwards (1841) Iyenari died, whereupon Mizuno addressed himself to the task of cleaning out this Tokugawa analogue to the Stables of Augeas, and several hundreds of the palace officials or menials were duly punished for their misdeeds. As at the death of Tsunayoshi, so now something of an ecclesiastical scandal had to be dealt with. One of Iyenari's favourite mistresses was a devout adherent of the Nichiren sect of Buddhists, and she had succeeded in persuading the ex-Shōgun to make a profession of that special creed, and he heaped temporal and mundane favours upon its priesthood, both in Yedo and the vicinity. The Tokugawa house had from old been adherents of the Jōdo sect, and this defection of the ex-Shōgun (together with its very practical consequences) excited a strong feeling among the monks of Zōjōji. They had always had the *entrée* of the Palace, and most of the palace Ladies went to them for ghostly counsel. They thus had ample opportunity to intrigue and to counter-mine, and they now exerted themselves might and main to baffle the insidious attempts of the Nichiren Sectaries to oust them from the Shōgunal favour and patronage which they had enjoyed without interruption from the days of Iyeyasu. At the death of Iyenari, the two palaces in Yedo Castle were divided into two great religious factions, that is, so far as the Ladies of the "Great Interiors" were concerned. As Mizuno, Lord of Echizen, Abé Masahiro, the Temple Magistrate, and most of their coadjutors all belonged to the Jōdo sect, it was perhaps no great matter for wonder that the interloping Nichiren monks and their supporters should now find themselves not only reft of all influence and favour, but even, in certain cases, severely punished for what was now characterized as arrogant presumption and chicanery. The Ladies of the Great Interior were soon to prove Mizuno's most dire and dangerous foes; it was most fortunate for him at this juncture, perhaps, that their religious animosities threw them into great opposing camps, and so made general united action against the reformer's innovations impossible for a season.

For years the absolute necessity for drastic reforms had been apparent to a few thinking men. That the body politic had once more become seriously distempered was indisputable, symptoms of the gravest significance were to be detected in almost every rank of society by the eye of the discerning, although the governing

class in general and the bourgeoisie in Yedo and the other great cities of the empire were perfectly contented both with themselves and with the general political and economic situation of the empire. However, in 1837, there came an incident sufficient to rouse the discerning to some sense of the dangers into which the nation had been drifting for a full generation or more.

It will be remembered that there had been a seven years' famine in the penultimate decade of the eighteenth century. Now, after a series of normal harvests, the country was again called upon to face a succession of six lean years. The cause of the dearth varied from year to year, and from place to place. At one time it was excessive cold, at another a long continued drought, in one section of the country a plague of noxious insects, elsewhere typhoons, floods, or frosts. Again the starving people perished in tens of thousands hopelessly and helplessly in many districts. In the large cities—in Yedo especially—the authorities did make an effort to relieve the absolutely destitute, but the results could not be described as satisfactory. The agents employed in this work often proved to be entirely unsuitable for it. They showed themselves to be at once callous, greedy, and dishonest, and thought it no shame to find in their office of mercy a means of enriching themselves. If the Yedo famine relief work was inefficient and unsatisfactory, in Ōsaka, the situation was nothing short of a great open public scandal. As has been said, Ōsaka was the great distributing centre for Tokugawa Japan. In this great mart there were at all times stocks not merely of rice but of almost every kind of perishable commodities, and to fight the famine on one spot should have been comparatively easy, in spite of the fact that, at one time, the failure of the crops in the Home Provinces had been complete, and the streets of the city congested with throngs of starving peasants who had been driven from their little holdings in the country by sheer hunger. The holders of these stocks of rice and other necessities of life were merchants whose gospel it was that the trader's business was to make as great a profit as he could on all occasions, so that when famine was stalking abroad, there was nothing unreasonable in his refusing to part with his stores for anything less than famine prices. From what we are told about the merchants of old Japan, we gather the unwilling impression that they were often terribly cold-blooded and heartless, callously indifferent to every considera-

tion except their own financial gains or losses. We are told by the annalist that in Ōsaka at this time

“The authorities acted in the most shameful manner towards the helpless and destitute people. The rich merchants also, by bribing the officials, took advantage of the general distress and bought up all the rice and other necessities and sold them only at outrageous prices, thus making capital out of the general misery and filling their own pockets at the expense of the starving thousands. Instead of doing anything for their assistance they added to their own luxury and spent their ill-gotten gains in every kind of degraded pleasure.”

What made it comparatively easy for the merchants to corner the market, not merely in rice, but in almost every staple of commerce was the peculiar system of Guilds Merchant which had grown up in the course of the previous six generations. It must be understood, however, that Guilds had been a feature of Japanese industrial and commercial life ages before the Tokugawa supremacy began. In the thirteenth century the Hōjō Regents had limited the number of traders that might ply their vocations in the city of Kamakura, and they either were organized, or organized themselves into corporations, whose members had to submit to regulations devised to check unprofessional practices and to promote the general welfare of the body corporate. Into this body corporate admission had to be purchased by a new member, and that could only be done when a vacancy occurred, either by forfeiture or by death without heirs. Thus, membership in any of these corporations came to have a monetary value, and in certain circumstances it might really be a very valuable asset.

In the Tokugawa age the fundamental principle remained unchanged. The main difference between the Guild system of Kamakura and of Yedo days was that resulting from political, social, and economic developments. In the thirteenth century, there were no more than two considerable cities in Japan—Kyōto and Kamakura—and between these there was scarcely any exchange of commodities. In Kamakura, life was simple, and wants were few; and hence the merchant Guilds were generally composed of pedlars or retail dealers, while outside of Kamakura and Kyōto, most of the country districts were self-supporting, subsisting on their own products, and purchasing almost nothing from elsewhere. This was still the case throughout the greater portion of rural Japan in Tokugawa days, although of course, the Daimyō

and their more considerable vassals would naturally expend part of their revenues in the castle-towns of their fiefs, and so occasion the rise of commercial communities in quarters where such communities were unknown in Kamakura days. Here, doubtless, there would be something of the nature of guilds among the traders as well as among the artisans, but the political and social circumstances of the age and the environment made it impossible for these local corporations to attain any great measure of development or to acquire any considerable measure of power and influence. On the lands composing the Tokugawa domains, the situation was vastly different. Scattered as they were over the face of the empire from Hyūga to Yezo these lands formed by far the largest domain in Japan. And—what was most important of all in the present connexion—they contained an urban population of some 3,000,000 or 4,000,000 souls. Instead of the two great cities of Kamakura days, there were now five so-called “Imperial” towns. Two of these, it is true, were not very populous; but in spite of that they were of no little consequence. Sakai was in a sense merely a suburb of Ōsaka, but it was the seat of the copper-smelting establishments which supplied the Dutch with their chief staple of export. Nagasaki was the sole seat of foreign trade and, notwithstanding its comparative insignificance, it contributed more to the Bakufu treasury than all the other so-called “Imperial” cities together. Kyōto, the ancient capital, was now the great manufacturing and industrial centre of Japan; Ōsaka was the great distributing centre; and Yedo, the capital, to the support of which it was the duty of all other districts to contribute. Not only were these five great cities in intimate tradal relations with each other but, as has been said, the great bulk of the inter-clan commercial transactions had to pass through the hands of Ōsaka firms. Here, it will be seen, there was ample scope for the development of commerce on the grand scale; in short, the situation demanded an elaborate and complex system of organization, of combination, and of specialization. That the Japanese traders were not slow to rise to the height of the possibilities opened up to them by the passing of the great commercial marts of the empire into the sole control of the Tokugawa Shōgunate the English merchants then in Japan very soon discovered to their cost and vexation. On 19th March, 1620, Cocks wrote:—

“That which chiefly spoiled the Japon trade is a company of ruch usurers whoe have gotten all the trade of Japon into their owne handes . . . which maketh me altogether aweary of Japon.”

In this "company of such usurers" we have an early example of a Tokugawa "guild merchant". A certain number of firms domiciled in the Shōgunal cities have organized themselves into a corporation for the purpose of obtaining complete control over the chief staples of foreign trade, and have succeeded in obtaining the approval of the authorities. Later on, when the Dutch got penned up in Deshima, this corporation came to have the monopoly of all the wares that arrived in Dutch ships. It was only by being formally admitted into the corporation that any other Japanese firm could get permission to participate in this particular trade, and to obtain admission it was necessary to purchase the rights of some member who wished to retire from it. Thus, membership of the guild was something analogous to a share in a modern joint-stock company. As has just been said, it came to be a valuable asset which could be sold (although not without the approval of the other members of the guild) or pledged, and was not infrequently deposited as security when it became necessary or advisable to negotiate a loan. This special corporation was subject to strict governmental supervision in certain respects as both the Bakufu Treasury and the municipality of Nagasaki exacted a fixed annual revenue from the Deshima trade, but, apart from this liability, the guild prosecuted its operations in its own fashion through officers elected or appointed by itself. The prime objects were to restrain any outsiders from poaching in its own special preserves, to regulate all prices, and if not to eliminate competition entirely, at all events to restrict it to certain simple well-defined and openly recognized channels.

In the purely domestic trade of the Shōgunal towns, a system of analogous guilds rapidly tended to establish itself in almost every line of trade, with this difference, that for a considerable time there was no direct Government interference, inasmuch as the Government had no thoughts of deriving any revenue from the internal commerce of the empire. In a society where the family and not the individual was the unit, something like a mild caste system easily grew up in commerce no less than in handicrafts. Once a household had established itself as purveyors of any special commodity, the tendency was for son to succeed father in the special occupation for generation after generation. Any neighbour venturing to set up a new rival establishment would naturally be regarded as an interloper and those already in possession of the field

would organize themselves into what were practically guilds to protect themselves against any such unwelcome competition. In so doing, they could count upon the tacit approval of the constituted authorities, for the Tokugawa government was anxious to secure worthy representatives in each branch of trade, and was not averse to seeing all trades becoming hereditary in old established households. The trade guilds were thus in the main a natural growth of custom, and in a measure the great bulwark of custom against the inroads of competition.

It was in Ōsaka that the guild system showed its earliest and most powerful development. Here, the old established firms were long able to restrict the number of houses entitled to do business in any special line of commodities merely by those methods of moral suasion to which Japanese society was so extremely sensitive and so readily responsive in the good old days of feudalism. It would be hard to mention a single item of commerce that was not entirely manipulated by one of those spontaneous growths for the mutual protection of all who made their livelihood by dealing in it. In the middle of the eighteenth century there were about 100 guilds, great and small, in Ōsaka. Some of these included several hundred establishments; the bathhouse *Kumi* counted as many as 2,004 members; the wholesale rice dealers' *Kumi* 1,351 members; the vintners', 1,707; the pawnbrokers', 613, and the druggists', 273. The others were much smaller in number; there were no more than fifty-two money-changers; fifty booksellers; forty wholesale greengrocers, and only nine wholesale oil merchants.

For many years, the guilds appear to have been dominated by a combination of the most powerful among them, including the trades concerned with the great staples of commerce, cotton, dry goods, ironware, paper, oil, drugs, matting, earthenware, lacquered ware, and wine. This was known as the "ten *Kumi*" of Ōsaka, and towards the end of the seventeenth century a similar combination was formed in Yedo, though the guilds in the capital were far from being as powerful as they were in Ōsaka; in fact their components were, in a majority of cases, either originally or actually mere branches of great Ōsaka houses, and they never exceeded sixty-eight in number. Among the most important of them were the wholesalers; the rice-brokers (*fuda-sashi*) for dealing with the rice-stipends of the Hatamoto, and the castle officials; the bath-houses, and the hairdressers. In Yedo, the artisan-guilds were not

without importance, while there were corporations of Government merchants and of contractors for river-cleaning, garden-making, aqueduct repairing, road-making, and bridge-building. Besides these, there were guilds for merchandise-boats, passenger-boats, water-boats, and even mud-scows. Many of these Yedo *Kumi* were merely local and not of very much intrinsic significance, but apart from the powerful fishmongers' corporation, most of the Yedo guilds concerned with the great staples of life were greatly dependent upon, if not actually controlled by, the similar confraternities in Ōsaka, a circumstance that presently gave umbrage to the Bakufu authorities.

In the first half of the Tokugawa régime, the guilds pursued the even tenor of their way without either provoking or inviting Government interference. In 1659 the authorities did take upon themselves to determine the personnel of the pedlars' guild. Eight years before they had given some attention to the bath-houses of Yedo, but the grounds of interference were ethical and political rather than economic. The Bakufu councillors, at this date, were attempting to grapple with the prevalence of sexual immorality, and they were also in grave anxiety about the Rōnin who might readily utilize the bath-houses as rendezvous. In the upper stories of these bath-houses vices were practised which the authorities could not hope to control without enlisting the services of the bath-house keepers by means of the licence system. As Yedo grew in dimensions, these licences increased in value, so that pawnbrokers readily accepted them in pledge for loans. Almanac-makers were also in time subjected to the licence system, their numbers being limited to eighty-one. From the early part of the seventeenth century there were money-changers both in Ōsaka and Yedo. In 1660 those in Ōsaka organized themselves into a corporation, but it was not till 1718 that the Yedo men were incorporated. This was done at the instance of the authorities who furnished 600 of them with licences, and at the same time prohibited unlicensed persons from pursuing the avocation. In 1725 the Government also sanctioned a rice-exchange at Dojima in Ōsaka. Four years later a similar rice-exchange was organized in Yedo but it lasted only a few years. On the other hand the Yedo *fuda-sashi* guild, which was also regulated, if not instituted by the authorities in 1724, continued in existence down to the fall of the Tokugawa Shōgunate. With these and perhaps a few other minor exceptions

the guilds continued to be virtually self-constituted and autonomous down to the latter half of the eighteenth century. The volume of trade had then increased to such proportions that the guilds found themselves no longer able to control the enterprise of interlopers, and so application was then made for Government recognition and sanction of the monopoly which the guilds claimed to be entitled to by old-established use and wont. This period (1764-86) was the age of the Tanumas, when bribery, more or less in evidence at all times, was especially rampant and notorious. Thus, the guilds had no great difficulty in obtaining their demands, and thenceforward each guild was accustomed to pay an annual "thank-offering", and to supplement it with presents of the staples in which it dealt. A quarter of a century after this, the authorities were openly in receipt of as much as £20,000 per annum as "thank-offerings" from the guilds of Yedo, and the perquisites of the officials from the guilds as a whole must have been of no inconsiderable value.

At this time, the whole trade of the five Tokugawa cities had passed into the hands of what were virtually trusts, that is to say, into the control of associations of merchants engaged in the same branch of commerce and pledged to observe certain rules in the conduct of their business, and to adhere to fixed rates. No member of a confederation was now allowed to dispose of his licence except to a near relative, and if any interloper ventured to engage in the business of any licensed confederation he made himself subject to condign punishment. In spite of the limit imposed upon the transfer of these certificates of membership, these documents were varied in value from £80 to £6,400, and so, of course, counted as a very valuable security when a loan had to be contracted. These monopolistic traders gradually acquired immense wealth and fell into the most luxurious habits. We hear stories of some of them spending £5 upon the first bonito of the season, and more than twice that sum on the first fruit of the egg-plant; while the luxurious sumptuousness of their private establishments, as it became more and more pronounced, naturally excited the envy and cupidity of the less-favoured members of the community. It especially offended the aristocrats and the two-sworded men, many of whom were almost permanently under heavy financial obligations to these plebeian merchant princes. This feeling had been steadily growing since the beginning of the nineteenth century, and in the

thirties of that century when the whole empire was being pinched and emaciated by a seemingly interminable famine, the indifference and callousness of the rich mercantile class provoked the most bitter resentment among those to whom the claims of compassion and humanity still counted for something.

It was in Ōsaka that this resentment found its clearest and most forcible expression. In the course of the great dearth half-a-century before there had been serious rice riots in Yedo and elsewhere, and the rich merchants were probably aware that these might now be repeated. A mere outbreak of mob violence was, however, not so very formidable a matter; the constituted authorities might safely be counted upon to deal effectually with any such contingency. A peasant revolt under peasant leaders could never go very far or continue very long, although it might do some considerable damage to property. On the other hand, the case might be very different if two-sworded men were the organizers and leaders of the outbreak. Now, for the first time in Tokugawa history since the siege of Shimabara, exactly two centuries before, we find samurai actually making common cause with the afflicted and down-trodden plebeians; and the result was a commotion far more serious than any that had occurred since that time.¹

The protagonist in this great Ōsaka *émeute* of 1837 was not merely a two-sworded man but an ex-Government official. Ōshio Heihachirō was the son of an Inspector of Police attached to the City Magistrate of Ōsaka. In his fourteenth year, Heihachirō was placed under the care of Hayashi, Daigaku no Kami, in the Seidō, and after a distinguished course of five years there, he received an appointment as instructor in that institution. Shortly after, his father died, and Heihachirō was summoned to Ōsaka, where he succeeded to his father's office and emoluments. As Police-Inspector, Ōshio had certain limited judicial functions to perform, and his honesty and uprightness in the discharge of his duties won him the regard of the people, as well as of Takaye, the City Magistrate of Ōsaka. The latter was recalled to Yedo in course of time, and his successor, Atobe, proved to be corrupt and heartless. Ōshio, finding the situation hopeless, presently resigned and devoted himself to the education of a number of disciples he had gradually gathered around him.

¹ Yui no Shosetsu's conspiracy in 1651, would have been a much graver affair, if it had not been detected while still in the bud.

In a previous chapter, some allusion was made to the " reforms " introduced into the University of Yedo in the last decade of the eighteenth century. No one was now allowed to enter the University who failed to conform with the rigid orthodoxy of the Teishu philosophy which had been adopted as the official doctrine of the bureaucracy. It was upon this doctrine that Ōshio had been reared, but he had really little sympathy with the dry, narrow, conventional formalism which characterized that creed and its professors. So strong became his dislike for the exaggerated importance placed upon mere external mechanical propriety that at last he threw the Teishu system overboard, a thing which many a promising young official no doubt wished to do, but one which very few indeed had the courage to do, for it meant the sacrifice of all prospects of a career. In the rival Ōyōmei school—now branded as heretical—stress was laid upon the worth of generous impulses and the promptings of a pure conscience ; and in this, the philosophy of Nakae Tōju's latter days, Ōshio found both a spiritual refuge and a source of inspiration. " Do right for the sake of doing right " was the main spirit of the doctrine that he impressed upon the ardent followers who now gathered around him to learn wisdom and—fencing.

As the famine got worse and worse, and the authorities did nothing, Ōshio memorialized the City Magistrate, Atobe, praying earnestly that steps should be taken to relieve the terrible distress that was getting more and more intense every day. His petition was ignored. Then he gave free rein to his indignation and hotly denounced the callous selfishness of the officials and the merchant princes. He furthermore sold off all his property and spent the proceeds in relief work. All he could do was, of course, no better than a drop in the ocean ; its only value lay in furnishing a model for imitation, but he had no imitators.

Then, as 1836 had been a terrible year, and 1837 promised no improvement, he became desperate and resolved to have recourse to desperate means. In consultation with his followers, old friends among the police, some young samurai, and—what was most significant of all—a few Rōnin, he sketched out a plan for overthrowing the officials and " depriving the merchants of their inhuman gains ". A manifesto entitled the " Punishment from Heaven " was distributed in Ōsaka and the neighbouring districts, copies being affixed to the pillars of all the temples and shrines.

The language used was as simple and plain as possible, and parts of it were very significant.

"The officers have no respect for *the will of the Emperor*, and act in utter violation of the laws established by the Tokugawa Shōgunate."

The 25th of March was the day selected for the outbreak. On that day the two Magistrates were to inspect the wards of the city, and after the inspection they were to take their recreation in the house of a police inspector, situated just in front of Ōshio's own abode. Ōshio called together his party of police, samurai, Rōnin, students, and the more wealthy farmers in the neighbourhood; their plan was to kill the Magistrates in the house opposite, seize the castle, and then compel the capitalists to distribute their property among the suffering people. Two police inspectors in the plot were to burn the Magistracy by way of a diversion. However, on the preceding day, a constable who doubted the success of the enterprise revealed the whole plot to Atobe, the Magistrate, and the two inspectors who were to set the Magistracy on fire were sent for. One of them died fighting, the other escaped and ran off to Ōshio to inform him that they had been betrayed. The only thing that now remained was to sally forth, do all that could be done, and die gallantly. Ōshio thereupon fired his own house, while his men set the torch to great mansions in various parts of the city, calling upon the destitute to take whatever they pleased. The Castle authorities sent out all their troops and desperate fighting ensued, Ōshio's party being ultimately overborne by sheer weight of numbers. But they had succeeded in reducing a great part of the city to ashes, over 18,000 houses, 1,100 "godowns" and five bridges being burned in the course of the two days' conflagration. Ōshio made good his escape to Yoshino, but on returning to Ōsaka the house in which he found refuge was discovered and surrounded by officers of the law, whereupon he set fire to the building and committed suicide with time-honoured samurai orthodoxy.¹

It was significant that Ōshio was not slow to find imitators. Shortly afterwards there was a similar outbreak in Echigo, and in the following year another in Mikawa. To find samurai and

¹ Ōshio was "accompanied in death" by his son, who, as the father was only forty-five years of age, must have been little more than a youth. As is usual in such cases, he left a memorial condemning the corruption and neglect of the officials and their indifference alike to the welfare of the sovereign and the nation.

Rōnin heading revolts against the Tokugawa authorities was extremely ominous in the light of subsequent events. These events took place sixteen years before the appearance of Perry and his "black ships" at Uraga. Another sixteen short years were to pass, and then the stately fabric of Tokugawa autocracy and splendour was destined to fall in ruins to the ground, the chief agents in its destruction being not so much great feudatories and their old high-placed hereditary *Karō*, as discontented, ambitious, two-sworded men of the feudal rank and file among whom some of the most enterprising and the most dangerous were Rōnin.

Upon the old Shōgun Iyenari, who had attained the age of sixty-four years, and was then preparing to demit his office after having held it for fifty-one years, it is questionable whether this great Ōsaka *émeute* produced any serious impression, but one of the Great Council seems undoubtedly to have taken the matter to heart, if we are to judge by subsequent developments. Mizuno Tadakuni, Echizen no Kami, had then been a member of the Rōjū for three or four years. Under Iyenari there was no scope for initiative, and to enter upon the scheme of reform on which he had evidently been brooding for some time was impossible, so long as the old ex-Shōgun continued to direct or rather to misdirect affairs. With Iyenari's demise in 1841, the situation became greatly changed, and Mizuno at last found himself in a position where he could venture to act with a fairly free and firm hand. The new Shōgun, Iyeyoshi (1837-53) was little better than a nonentity, though, having been born in 1782, he was already forty-five years of age when his father made way for him. During the four years of his titular rule he had not evinced the slightest inclination to form any judgment or to exert any will of his own, and after he became the actual, as well as the nominal head of the Bakufu system (1841), he continued to be almost equally lethargic. Whoever among his ministers and courtiers could secure his ear and his confidence could safely count upon being allowed a free hand in the discharge of his duties without risk of check from the Shōgun. In 1841, Mizuno's reputation for ability stood exceedingly high; and Iyeyoshi was glad to leave all matters of policy in his charge. Mizuno had, however, been taking measures to provide himself with more than Shōgunal countenance if not support.

In revolving his projects of reform he had naturally made a close study of Matsudaira Sadanobu's efforts and methods between

1786 and 1793. Sadanobu had been a nominee and representative of the Go-san-ké—the noble houses of Kishū, Owari, and Mito—and it was mainly owing to their sympathy and support that he had been able to maintain his position and achieve the measure of reform he succeeded in effecting. Now, however, it was vain for Mizuno to expect any aid from Kishū and Owari, for sons of Iyenari had been adopted as heads of these two great houses. With Mito the case was very different. In 1829, the eighth Daimyō of Mito died without leaving any offspring of his own, and his legitimate successor was his brother Nariaki, then twenty-nine years of age. Nariaki was already known as an able, strong-willed man, and the hereditary clan councillors, who had allowed the fief to drift into disorder and demoralization, were by no means eager to see a chief at the head of affairs who would be likely to take his position and his duties seriously. Accordingly, when the Shōgun (Iyenari) through his favourite, Mizuno Tadashige (*not* Tadakuni) attempted to impose another of his sons upon Mito (as he had already done in the case of Kishū and Owari) the responsible councillors of the fief showed themselves complacent and compliant enough. The project was, however, extremely distasteful to some of the Mitō samurai, and the leaders of this faction—Kawase, Aizawa, and Fujita Tōko—were ultimately able to secure the succession for the legitimate heir, Nariaki, and naturally one of his first steps upon his accession was to replace the old clan councillors with the men who had so loyally supported him. This episode was the origin of a bitter internecine clan feud which, after smouldering and simmering for nearly forty years, at last broke out into a bloody and disastrous local civil war. The new Mito councillors were not slow in inaugurating drastic reforms, though they were mainly of a conservative nature. They aimed at tightening the reins of administration, restoring the ancient discipline, and reverting to the good old days of the second Mito prince, the famous Mitsukuni. Their spirit differed greatly from that presently abroad in the neighbouring little fief of Sakura, where a ready welcome was being accorded to Dutch learning, and to a body of new ideas which were vehemently scouted by the scholars and politicians of Mito, who were intensely nationalistic and even Chauvinistic. It was upon the glories of the past, and not the pregnant possibilities and promise of the future, that their attention was fixed. Interest in the ancient history of Japan and in Shintō had for long been intense in their

fief. and although at this date, the Teishu philosophy was supposed to be the orthodox official philosophy in Mito as elsewhere, the Mito scholars had developed, or were developing, a pragmatic eclecticism of their own. The leading man in the intellectual life of the clan was now Fujita Tōko, who was a curious blend of the *littérateur*, the philosopher, the teacher, and the practical statesman. He counted as a force far beyond the narrow confines of his own clan, and several of the men, who subsequently figured as protagonists in the great revolution of 1868, were eager to profit by his acquaintance and his instruction.

Shortly after Ōshio's *émeute* in Ōsaka, Fujita had directed his attention to the general conditions of trade and commerce, and had come to the reasoned conviction that the guilds, with their virtual monopolies, were highly detrimental to the economic interests of the empire at large. One special point in his argument was that since Ōsaka was the controlling centre of the guilds the system exposed the Yedo market to all the vicissitudes of the great distributing emporium, where commercial crises and fluctuations were becoming more and more frequent. The pamphlet in which these views were propounded was not without its influence, and Fujita's views were generally endorsed and adopted by his lord, Nariaki, who was on intimate terms with Mizuno, Echizen no Kami, the most influential member of the Great Council. The latter now took drastic action with respect to the guilds and by a series of edicts issued in the course of 1841-2 he practically exterminated them. The terms *kumiai* (guild), *toiya* (wholesaler), *nakama* (partner), and other characteristics of the system, were to be used no longer; the payment of yearly "thank-money" (*myōga-kin*) and of all other guild burdens was abolished; no merchant must henceforth confine himself to wholesale trade; forestalling was strictly forbidden, and retail selling was in no case to be stopped. Finally, all present prices were to be reduced twenty per cent. and a schedule of the reductions was to be set out in front of every shop for official inspection. Lord Mizuno had excellent intentions, but he had no very deep knowledge of economics, and the Seidō men, to whom he generally resorted for enlightenment, were not much better informed. In a year or two commercial prosperity was found to have departed from Yedo. With the loss of their shares, many merchants were ruined, while mutual confidence disappeared, and the volume of transactions shrank to a small

part of what it had been. The effect on producers and on prices soon became disastrous, and within a few years, the city elders were found petitioning the Government for the re-establishment of the old order. In 1851 the guilds were actually re-established with their old regulations, modified by certain new provisos. All newcomers were henceforth to be freely admitted as members, unless special exigencies, approved by the Government, made restrictions advisable. Henceforth, there was to be no limitation of shares: share-certificates were no longer allowed, and yearly fees no longer exacted by the authorities.

Any modern economist who makes a special study of this episode in the commercial history of Japan will do well to bear in mind that the effects of the abolition of the guild system were complicated by other features of the great and sweeping reform attempted by Mizuno, in which indeed the guilds were one item only. In addressing himself to this effect, Mizuno had assured himself of the support of the powerful Nariaki of Mito, whose drastic reforms within his own fief made the Mito administration famous throughout the length and breadth of the empire. He also took further measures to strengthen his position. To have possession of the Shōgun's ear was all-important, accordingly Hori, a relative and a trusted confidant of Mizuno, was now made *Sobayōnin* or Adjutant to His Highness. Furthermore, fresh blood was introduced into the Great Council itself. Hotta, Daimyō of Sakura, who later on was to negotiate the American treaty with Townsend Harris, was raised from the Junior Council to the Rōjū, while a place in the Rōjū was also found for Sanada, the Lord of Matsushiro in Shinano. Sanada was a Tozama, or outside Daimyō, although it is to be noted that he ranked henceforth as a Fudai. He was, by birth, the second son of the Regent, Matsūdaira Sadanobu. He attracted Mizuno's attention by his firmness of character, while he was also remarkable for his advanced opinions, opinions which he mainly drew from his retainer, Sakuma Shōzan, a strong advocate of the reopening of Japan to foreign intercourse. Hotta was at that time, or was shortly to become, a great admirer of Western science; at all events, from 1844 onwards he did everything he possibly could to promote the study of Dutch among his retainers, and to derive all the practical benefits he could from European science and culture.

In the lower branches of the administration Mizuno exerted

himself to find what he considered to be the right men for the various posts, but he was not very fortunate ; indeed, one special appointment of his was peculiarly unfortunate. For the execution of his reform measures the City Magistrates of Yedo were all-important functionaries and one of these was soon found to be lacking in zeal. The man that after a short time replaced him erred in his excess of zeal, and by his Draconic severity he did much to bring his patron Mizuno into that public odium which ultimately led to his fall. Torii was an able man in his way,¹ but there were grave defects in his character. He was a hide-bound pedant, a Pharisee of the Pharisees among the orthodox Teishu philosophers ; the bitter foe of all heresy whether in the form of the Ōyōmei school or of Dutch learning. In addition, he was utterly unscrupulous, and so malignant that he acquired the nickname of "the Viper".

In 1841, instructions were issued to the officials that the administration was thenceforth to be conducted on the models of Kyōhō (1716-35), and Kwansei (1789-1800), which meant that an effort was to be made to imitate the reforms of the eighth Shōgun, Yoshimune, and of the Regent, Matsudaira Sadanobu. A cursory glance at a catalogue of Mizuno's "Reforms" is, however, enough for us to perceive that the reconstructive spirit which animated Yoshimune's work had never been grasped at all, and that even Matsudaira Sadanobu's "Reform" had been imitated more in its details than in its essentials. The Regent had taken the samurai vigorously in hand. Yoshimune had made his influence felt by the Daimyō as well as by every other class in the land, mainly by moral suasion and the force of personal example. Mizuno was always careful not to offend those in high places ; and now it was commoners, and especially the townsmen of Yedo, who experienced the rigour of his reforming hand. The houses and villas of some worthy citizens, whose style of living was too luxurious, were demolished and the owners banished from Yedo, the famous actor, Ichikawa Danjurō, being among the culprits. Theatres were put under strict regulations, most of the story-telling halls were closed ; tea-houses and archery booths were also closed, and their female inmates sent to the Yoshiwara ; women were forbidden to take lessons on the *samisen* or to learn *Jōruri*. Professional

¹ Several of his legal decisions will be found in Wigmore's *Materials for the Study of Private Law in Old Japan*, T.A.S.J., vol. xx, supplement, pt. iii.

female hairdressers lost their licences, and every woman had to dress her own hair. Merchants and their dependents were allowed no dress that was not made of one of the three regulation materials, spun silk, cotton, or hemp. The use of *habutaye*, crêpe, satin, or imported silk (including imitations) for sashes, collars, or fringes for sleeves was strictly prohibited. Hairpins, combs, and cakes all received official attention, while novels and decorated sign boards were among the scores of things that were now prohibited.¹ As for farmers, they were forbidden to appear in Yedo, while all those then in the city were ordered back to their respective districts and punished severely when they failed to obey the order. Such are a few examples of Mizuno's legislation at this time. In Yedo, Torii and his minions enforced the various ordinances with the sternest rigour; cases of people, even women, dressed above the standard being stripped naked in the streets were not infrequent. The constables on the other hand, often found a source of revenue in the regulations. It soon became known that they were receiving bribes and extorting blackmail, and this fact helped to swell the outcry that began to make itself heard against the Reform and its authors. Presently, the citizens were clamouring that trade was being utterly disorganized and brought to a standstill and that the prosperity of Yedo was being wantonly ruined. As time went on, Mizuno's colleagues endeavoured to convince him that his measures were being enforced with too great severity, and that many of them were ill-advised. At the beginning of 1843, one of his colleagues, Inouye Masaharu, was dismissed from the Rōjū, and, in the October of the same year, the resignation was accepted of Mizuno's former right-hand man, Hotta, who had been remonstrating rather strongly with his chief and former friend. A month afterwards, Mizuno himself was dismissed, while all his followers, including Torii, were at the same time summarily stripped of their offices.

The Court ladies had joined in the clamour against the reforms, and they were formidable adversaries.² Mizuno had, however,

¹ It was at this date the Tamenaga Shunsui, the author of the *Iroha-bunko*, was imprisoned, not for that work, but for the pornographic strain in several of his other books.

² An interesting story is quoted by Dr. Greene in the appendix to his essay on Takano Chōei. The Shōgun was fond of flavouring his stewed fish with ginger sprouts. One day, the fish came on without the accustomed flavour, and on the Shōgun asking the reason, he was told that Mizuno had forbidden the cultivation of ginger, as he regarded it as a luxury. The Shōgun then said that he remembered having a conversation with Mizuno on the general topic of luxuries, and had given his assent to their prohibition, but he had no idea that he would deprive the people of ginger sprouts.

come into conflict with many besides the Court ladies, over various matters of policy before his fall. Inundations in the Kwantō had made extensive riparian works necessary, and when Mizuno urged the local Daimyō to take them in hand, they insisted that the expenses should be defrayed by the Bakufu. The projected visit of the Shōgun to Nikkō entailed great expense, and Sanada urged that the visit should be postponed to allow funds to be spent on the coast defences. On this question Mizuno was on bad terms with one of his chief supporters. The money was ultimately found, but it was only obtained by a further debasement of the coinage, an expedient to which Mizuno had already had recourse on more than one occasion to make good the annual deficit in the Bakufu treasury. What was most serious of all was that Mizuno had now lost the backing of Lord Nariaki of Mito, while his efforts to retain it had brought him into collision with his fellow-councillors and even with many among his own followers. Nariaki was a fervid exponent of *kinnō*, of devotion to the Imperial House, and Mizuno fancied the surest way of retaining Nariaki's goodwill was by showing unusual attention to the Court in Kyōto. Among other marks of regard, he established a school for the Court nobles to be supported by Bakufu funds. Twenty years later, this institution became of consequence when the empire was convulsed with the cry of "*Sonnō Joi*"! In spite of all this, Mizuno came into collision with Lord Nariaki on the question of foreign intercourse. Nariaki was aware of the weakness of the national defences, and was constantly impressing on the Bakufu the necessity of casting cannon and building modern men-of-war. He strongly advocated the repeal of the old law which two centuries before had strangled Japanese maritime enterprise, but he was at the same time strongly opposed to the small school of thinkers who advocated an indulgent treatment of foreigners. He firmly believed that the Expulsion Decree of 1825 should be enforced in all its rigour, and it was over the question of modifying its severity that he and Mizuno became estranged. Fuller details about this subject will be given in a following chapter: here it will suffice to say that when Mizuno did presume to modify the Expulsion Decree in 1842, his old friendship with Nariaki came to an end.

In less than a year after his fall, Mizuno was again back in office, while Lord Nariaki had been ordered to make way for his son as head of the Mito fief, and to confine himself to his Komagome

mansion in Yedo. This, however, was no work of Mizuno. Doi, who had succeeded him in November, 1843, had long looked askance at Lord Nariaki's reforms and his *kinnō* doctrines, while he looked with suspicion upon his projects for building men-of-war and casting ordnance. Early in 1844 Nariaki had caused the bells of many Buddhist monasteries in his fief to be melted to provide material for his cannon-founders, and the Buddhist priests, supported by the strong opposition party in Mito, had been able to bring influence to bear upon the Shōgun and his ministers. Nariaki was removed from the headship of his house; the progressive Councillors, Fujita Tōko and his colleagues, were ordered into confinement, and representatives of the opposition called to office in the clan. As these men were all of mediocre capacity, the Mito fief soon began to drift back into the conditions of 1829 when Lord Nariaki initiated his reforms. Although thus removed from direct control over his own fief, Nariaki was a power still to be seriously considered. Many of the other great feudatories expressed a lively sympathy with him and the views he advocated, and the ascendancy he was gaining among these nobles now became stronger than ever. Although in confinement, he was still one of the most influential men in the empire, a fact that the astute Abé Masahiro, presently to be head of the Rōjū, was not slow to appreciate.

Abé Masahiro, when only twenty-five years of age, entered the Great Council upon Mizuno's fall in 1843. His chief, Doi, did not last long. The castle was destroyed by fire in 1844, the Shōgun barely escaping with his life, while there were many casualties among the ladies of the Great Interior. Doi had to face the onerous task of reconstruction, and in this he failed signally. Abé Masahiro could then easily have become head of the Rōjū, but he recommended the recall of Mizuno to that position. Besides the reconstruction of the Castle, there was yet another very serious problem to be dealt with, and Abé preferred not to be saddled with the chief responsibility. The King of Holland had sent his famous letter to the Shōgun, the reply to this had to be considered, while the whole position with respect to foreign relations called for the most careful and profound deliberation. In this field, Mizuno had already made some considerable innovations; and he was known to have definite and well-considered views on the subject. Hence the chief reasons for his recall. His term of office was a brief one on this occasion. In March, 1845, he was suddenly dismissed, banished

to a poor fief at Yamagata in northern Japan, and ordered to confine himself to his own house. This was the end of his career. His second and final fall was owing to no immediate offence of his own, but to the misconduct of some of his former subordinates, for which he was held to be indirectly responsible. About this time there was a bitter dispute between two rival claimants for the headship of the Gōtō family, in which the superintendence of the mint had been vested since the days of Iyeyasu, and in connexion with this case there were many surprising and unsavoury revelations. It became apparent that Torii, the former City Magistrate, had been grossly unjust in some of his decisions, and that in more than one instance he had been a judicial murderer. He was now ordered to be confined for life in the ward of the Daimyō of Marugame. (He was only released in 1866, and survived till 1874.) Mizuno's return to the Rōjū had caused a great panic among the officials. Rumours of impending dismissals on a wholesale scale were afloat, and when it was known that Torii was exerting himself to get back into official life his adversaries joyously availed themselves of the disclosures in connexion with the Gōtō case to push the matter home, and so make a summary end of him and his patron, Mizuno.

Mizuno Tadakuni is now only remembered on account of the extravagances in his futile attempts at reform. It is quite possible to exaggerate the importance of the economic factor in history, although, indeed, it is often the dominant one, and in most cases a very weighty one. Yoshimune clearly grasped the fact that any moral amendment must be preceded and accompanied by wide-reaching constructive economic measures. He was unwearied in his efforts to stimulate production and increase the wealth of the nation in every possible way, and as regards the distribution of that wealth, he tried to persuade the privileged and administrative class that justice demanded that the hard-working producer—especially the farmer—should be ensured a fair share of the produce of his toil. Behind Mizuno's reforms we search in vain for any such fundamental principles. Yoshimune was unwearied in his quest for the right men to aid him in carrying out his projects; Mizuno, on the other hand, was singularly unfortunate in the selection of his subordinate officers. His ideas of reform have not inaptly been likened to the notion of curing a distempered constitution by cutting off the heads of the most prominent pimples appearing on the face and the surface

of the body. At the very time he was turning Yedo topsy-turvy with his so-called Reforms, the mantle of Yoshimune had fallen upon a real reformer, who in his humble sphere was truly working wonders. In previous chapters a good deal has been said about Nakae Tōju, Yoshimune, the great Shōgun, and Uyesugi Harunari, the Lord of Yonezawa. In these three men and in Ninomiya Sontoku we see Tokugawa Japan at its very best.¹

It is impossible to go into the details of Ninomiya's work here. Only it may be said that Ninomiya was a mere self-educated peasant born (1787) and brought up in the most grinding poverty, and that to the end of his days he was lord of no domain, but at best a trusted servant of others. His early work was on Ōkubo's fief of Odawara, which he extricated from a very hopeless position. Then he was in the service of the Soma family, which he made one of the wealthiest feudal houses of the time. His career came to an end in the employ of the Bakufu, which sent him to effect a reform in the Nikkō district in the very year (1853) the "black ships" came to Uraga. Three years afterwards, he died in harness at Imaichi in the seventieth year of his age. The moral and economic work accomplished by this extraordinary man was really marvellous, and its results persist to this very day for, even in the highest official circles in the empire, there is a powerful school of thinkers who are strenuous advocates of "Ninomiya principles" while, in several sections of Japan, Ninomiya's credit associations still play an important part in the social and economic life of the people. Ninomiya Sontoku was in every way a far greater and finer man than Mizuno Tadakuni.

The pressing question of a reply to the Dutch king's dispatch seemed to have been almost settled when Mizuno was removed from the political stage. Abé Masahiro, Ise no Kami, assumed the chief place in the Great Council. For the next twelve years, Abé will continue to be the most prominent figure in the administration policy of Japan. Young, vigorous, able, versatile, and supple, he

¹ For Ninomiya, see Mr. Uchimura's *Japan and the Japanese*; the Rev. R. C. Armstrong, "Ninomiya Sontoku" in *T.A.S.J.*, vol. xxxvii, pt. ii; Professor Droppers, "A Japanese Credit Association," and Professor Longford, "Notes on Ninomiya Sontoku," both in *T.A.S.J.*, vol. xxii, pt. i. Professor Droppers gives a good bibliography in *A Japanese Credit Association, T.A.S.J.*, vol. xxii, pt. i. The last has a good bibliography, the most important item in which, Tomita's *Hōtoku-ki*, has recently been translated by Mr. T. Yoshimoto.

was the proper man to pilot the ship of State through the unwonted storms to which it was presently to be exposed, but there was one serious defect in his character. He was too prone to shirk the burden of responsibility in difficult crises, and to transfer it to other shoulders. And this defect had not a little to do with the collapse of the Bakufu within little more than a decade from his death in 1857.

CHAPTER XIII

THE SHINTŌ PROPAGANDA

ALLUSION has already been made to the circumstance that by a strange irony of fate one of the factors that contributed to the ultimate overthrow of the Tokugawa power was that very school of Chinese philosophy which had been sedulously encouraged and fostered by Iyeyasu and elevated to something analogous to the position of an Established Church for the military caste by his later successors. Here, in the words of the Japanese adage, was a veritable case of one "getting one's hand bitten by a pet dog". It is to be remarked, however, that if Chinese philosophy had continued to retain undisputed possession of the intellectual field, it is not very probable that its exponents would have been so ready to turn their pens against a Government that had done so much for it. For nearly 100 years, however, there had been fierce strife between the Kangakusha (or Chinese scholars) and the Wagakusha, whose speciality was native Japanese learning; and by the beginning of the nineteenth century the Wagakusha had made such headway that several of their doctrines were either explicitly or tacitly admitted and adopted by the followers of the orthodox Teishu philosophy. One of the most important of these was the divinity of the Mikado and his undoubted right and title to claim the unquestioning obedience of all within the seas of the empire. With the Chinese philosophers, loyalty still, as before, counted as the greatest and most imperative of all the virtues, but now, under the influence of the teachings of the Wagakusha, several of the orthodox philosophers began to consider the question as to the precise direction in which that loyalty should be directed in the case of a clash of claims upon it. For the time being, with Yedo indisputably in the ascendant, the question was merely an academical one; but should Kyōto choose to assert itself, it would at once be swept into the vortex of practical politics, and on the precise answer returned to it, much—in fact, everything—would depend. So much Ogyu Sorai seems to have perceived nearly a century and a half before the problem began to press for solution.

It is somewhat strange to find that Matsudaira Sadanobu, the Shōgun's Prime Minister (1787-93) was not alive to the danger for, in his time, the revival of pure Shintō had gone so far that no great prescience or acuteness was necessary to perceive in it something more than a mere potential menace to the fortunes of the Bakufu. And yet, when in 1795 he proscribed all the heterodox schools of Chinese philosophy, instead of laying a heavy hand upon the Shintōists as well, he even went out of his way to patronize and encourage them, although indications of the effect of their propaganda must have been patent everywhere. In 1781-2, some of his Japanese friends insisted to Titsingh, Head of the Dutch Factory in Deshima, that Europeans were mistaken in applying the term "Emperor" to the Shōgun, the "Dairi" being the only legal Emperor, and the Shōgun but an officer to whom the "Dairi" had entrusted the administration. In spite of the "stationary" civilization of the Tokugawa régime, things in Japan had been moving since the days of Nobunaga, of the Taikō and of Iyeyasu—for in those times it does not appear that any Japanese insisted, either to the Jesuits or to the Philippine missionaries, or to the English or the Dutch, that the "Dairi" was the true and the only "Emperor" of Japan. In this fact, if known, a really far-seeing Minister would have discerned a dire menace to the Tokugawa sway, but Matsudaira Sadanobu, although much extolled by some writers for his sagacity, does not seem to have had any large measure of the constructive imagination characteristic of the true statesman.

The story of the revival of Chinese learning in Japan under Iyeyasu has been told in a former chapter. For nearly a century after the institution of the Tokugawa Shōgunate the study of this learning engrossed the attention of the national intellect. Towards the close of the seventeenth century, however, in certain quarters a consciousness arose that Japan in the past had had a literature of her own and that her literature was not altogether unworthy of study. This feeling was especially strong in Mitō, where the Daimyō was spending about a fifth of the revenues of the fief upon the production of his great historical and antiquarian works. These works were indeed written in Chinese, or rather in Japanese-Chinese; but, dealing exclusively with the early fortunes and developments of the empire as they did, it is not difficult to understand how it came to pass that Mitsukuni's interest in Japanese scholarship was roused, and a certain Shimokabe was entrusted by him with

the task of editing and writing a commentary on the *Manyōshū* (or "Collection of one Thousand Leaves"), the oldest of the numerous anthologies of Japanese poetry. This was a compilation of the later eighth or earlier ninth century, and to the Japanese of Mitsukuni's time it was no more intelligible than Caedmon's Paraphrase was to Dryden's contemporaries. In the course of six or eight centuries there had been almost as great (if not, indeed, greater) changes in the language of Japan than there had been in that of England in the same period,—changes in vocabulary, in accidence, and in syntax alike.

Antecedent to the introduction of Chinese literature into the country, the Japanese appear to have had no system of writing of their own, and the oldest Japanese literary work that has come down to us was expressed in Chinese characters. This work was the *Kojiki*, or Records of Ancient Events, compiled in A.D. 712, which sets forth the early traditions of the Japanese, beginning with the myths which constitute the basis of Shintō, and bringing its story down to A.D. 628. Although it was all written in Chinese characters yet the bulk of the text is Japanese phonetically expressed in the same script. Eight years after its compilation the *Kojiki* was followed (720) by another work covering the same ground as the *Kojiki* and bringing the history down as far as A.D. 697. This work, the *Nihongi*, was not merely written in Chinese characters but in the Chinese language, and from this time onwards Chinese in Japan was employed almost exclusively in the composition of histories and of serious works generally to an even greater extent than was Latin for these purposes in contemporary Europe. Notwithstanding all this, the eighth, ninth, and tenth centuries, during which Chinese was emphatically the language of the learned in Japan, were the golden age of pure Japanese classical literature. Towards the end of the period, about A.D. 1000, the Court-lady Murasaki-no-Shikibu in Japan actually succeeded in doing what Richardson and Fielding only accomplished in England a little more than a century and a half ago. Her *Genji Monogatari* (Narrative of Genji) is a true novel realistic in the best sense of the word—that is, in so far as "we see depicted real men and women, especially women, as they are, in their everyday lives and surroundings, their sentiments and passions, their faults and weaknesses". About the quality of the work, and about the claim of certain Japanese critics that it deserves to be ranked with the

masterpieces of European fiction, there may be some room for discussion, but about its proportions there can be no dispute whatsoever. For these proportions are extremely bounteous; it is in fifty-four books, and in one well-known edition there are no fewer than 4,234 pages. However, with its qualities or with its proportions we have little to do here. What is to our purpose—which is to indicate the origin and progress of the revival of interest in old Japanese literature and old Japanese institutions which ultimately contributed in no small measure to the fall of the Shōgunate—is the following extract from Mr. Aston:—

“ The *Genji* is not intrinsically a very difficult work, and no doubt the author’s contemporaries found it quite easy to understand. But since then the language, institutions, and manners, and customs of Japan have changed so much as greatly to obscure the meaning not only to European students but to the Japanese themselves. Piles of commentary by native editors have been accumulated over it, and their interpretations are often so blundering and inadequate that Moto-ori found it necessary to devote to its elucidation a critical work in nine volumes, mostly taken up with correcting the errors of his predecessors.”

This *Genji Monogatari* of the Court-lady was preceded by other so-called *Monogatari* or Narratives, all, however, stories of no great length, and of a romantic character far removed from the realities of daily life. These were also all written in Japanese, not in Chinese as the professedly serious works of the time were; and besides the *Monogatari* were diaries, travels, and miscellanies, among which last the *Makura Zōshi* of Murasaki’s fellow Court-lady, Sei Shōnagon, holds the place of honour. In all this body of literature, neither political theories, nor history, nor systems of religion, nor philosophy, were touched, much less seriously dealt with and, apart from literature of this kind and the *Kojiki* already alluded to, the only Japanese prose of the epoch of any importance was the *Genjishiki*, or “ Institutes of the Period Genji ” (901–923), the two first volumes of which contained “ minute directions for the celebration of the Shintō rites of worship, including the Norito or liturgies used on these occasions, which were now for the first time, so far as we know, committed to writing, although in existence for centuries previously.

Furthermore, as things go in Japan, the *corpus poetarum Japonicorum* for these two or three centuries was a considerable one. For, as has been already hinted, while the prose of Japan is the prose of Brobdignag, her poetry is that of the Land of

Lilliput. A standard novel in fifty-four volumes and 4,234 pages ; an ordinary "poem" in thirty-one syllables dispersed in five lines ! The two great and famous anthologies of this time are composed entirely of these five-line flights or—dashes. In the *Kokinshu*, the later of these collections compiled about A.D. 922, there are over 1,100 pieces, and in all these there are only five *Naga-uta*, or "Long Poems". When it is stated that "Locksley Hall" would be a very long "Long Poem" in Japanese, it will be readily admitted that whatever may have been the offences of Japanese prose writers on the score of prolixity, Japanese bards have always evinced an unflinching trust in the maxim that "brevity is the soul of wit".

The earlier of the two anthologies is that *Manyōshū*, or "Collection of a Thousand Leaves", to which reference has already been made. It is much more extensive than the *Kokinshu*, for it includes as many as 4,000 "poems". But the difference between the two anthologies is not one of bulk merely. In the course of the 100 odd years that lie between the dates of their compilation a most important innovation in the art of writing had been made in Japan. The poets of the *Manyōshū* expressed themselves by the employment of Chinese characters, using them phonetically. This system was open to two objections. "A Chinese character is a complicated contrivance, consisting of numerous strokes, and as a complete character was required for each syllable of the polysyllabic Japanese words, an intolerable cumbersomeness was the result. The second objection was that a Japanese syllable might be represented by any one of several Chinese characters. Several hundreds were actually in use to write the forty-seven syllables of which the language consists. It was no easy matter to remember so many either in reading or in writing. To meet those difficulties the Japanese did two things ; they restricted themselves to a limited number of characters for use as phonetic signs, and they wrote these in an abbreviated or cursive form. There are two varieties of the script thus produced, which are known as the *Katakana* and *Hiragana*. No exact date can be assigned for their introduction, but for the present purpose it is sufficient to know that both had come into use by the end of the ninth century"—that is, in the interval between the compilation of the *Manyōshū* and of the *Kokinshū*. This consideration serves to explain how much easier it was for later students of early Japanese to understand the

Kokinshū (Poems Ancient and Modern) than it was for them to make out the *Manyōshū*, and how it was that the publication of commentaries on the *Manyōshū* became so extensive during the literary renaissance of the Tokugawa age.¹ Thus, all things considered, among them the perverse ingenuity of Fujiwara-no-Sadaiye (thirteenth century A.D.) in the matter of the *Gosho-kana*, alluded to in the footnote, it will easily be understood why it was a harder task for the scholars of the times of Mitsukuni of Mitō (1622–1700) to grapple with the riddles of the *Manyōshū* than it was for Dryden's contemporaries to deal with the text of *Beowulf*. Hence, there is no necessity to have recourse to sheer criminal laziness as an explanation of the laggard progress made by Shimokabe in the execution of the task entrusted to him by the Daimyō of Mitō. Meanwhile, the fame of Keichū (1640–1701), a Buddhist priest, but the son of a *samurai*, who since 1662, had been travelling over Central Japan prosecuting his studies, especially that of Japanese poetry, reached Mitsukuni's ears, and Keichū was promptly invited by him to settle in Yedo and there complete Shimokabe's work. This invitation and subsequent ones were declined, but Mitsukuni sent one of his own retainers to study under Keichū, and the priest then set to work and soon completed a commentary of twenty volumes on the *Manyōshū*, and dedicated it to Mitsukuni. About the same time Kitamura, another scholar,

¹ Writes Mr. Otsuki: "After letters were introduced, composition came into use, and by means of these letters (i.e. Chinese characters) the various meanings of words were explained; but in these (Japanese) writings the foreign style of composition had to be adhered to. When Chinese learning had made much progress in Japan, the native literature was made to imitate it, and even Government enactments were in accordance with Chinese style. Nevertheless, the colloquial language could not be changed, so that although the Chinese style was used for the written language, the spoken language remained as it always had been. Even at the present day the written and spoken languages are different from each other. Before the Japanese Middle Ages the orthoepic differences between direct and indirect sounds, or pure and impure, were distinctly observed. *On this account, that which was written coincided exactly with that which was spoken.* As Chinese learning became more extensively followed, this ancient precision was gradually lost. Still, during the periods Kwampeï (A.D. 889–97) and Yenchō (A.D. 923–30) the priest Shōjū and Minamoto-no-Shitagō each published a dictionary, in both of which the definition of the words was very clear, and the spelling in the Japanese alphabet-sounds was particularly good, so that up to this time the deterioration had not been very considerable. *After this there were few who studied the correct accents, and none who corrected the faulty pronunciations.* Fujiwara-no-Sadaiye, following the profession of poet, established a system of his own for the employment of the Japanese alphabet-sounds, which not only differed from that in ancient use, but also impugned the correctness of ancient books on this subject. *This false system called the 'Goshokana' was used for four hundred and fifty years without its errors being discovered by anyone.*"

edited and annotated the *Makura Zoshi*, the *Genji Monogatari*, and other *Monogatari* (narratives) of the tenth and eleventh centuries.

To the government of the time all this seemed not merely harmless but even praiseworthy and laudable. It was Iyeyasu's policy to induce the Kyōto Court nobles to devote their attention to poetical studies and poetical exercises, and now, the greater their absorption in the craze for recovering and writing in the "true ancient style", the less time would they have to occupy themselves with contemporary affairs and—with intrigue. So long as this antiquarian craze was a purely literary and poetical one, the argument was perfectly sound and perfectly rational. But, by the middle of the eighteenth century the leaders of the movement were beginning to assert that the mere composition of Tanka in the "true ancient style" was the smallest of the interests to be attended to. And before the end of the century the dragon's teeth of militant political Shintōism had been effectually sown.

In this revival of pure Shintō the Japanese regard Kada Adzumamaro (1669–1736), a son of the warden of the Shintō temple of Inari, near Kyōto, as the pioneer. He differed from Keichū mainly in devoting less attention to poetry and more to antiquarianism—to the oldest national records, to old laws, and to the chronicles of the noble families—while he almost marks a new departure in sounding the first note of that hostility against Chinese learning which was to become a dominant passion with his successors. Somewhere about 1730, he was commissioned by the Yedo authorities to revise and edit the ancient texts, and on returning to Kyōto the Tokugawa authorities are said to have actually given a favourable response to the memorial he presented to them urging the establishment of a school for the study of the Japanese language and literature. In this document he protested most vigorously against the utter neglect of Japanese learning for Chinese, which up to that time (1735) had been almost universal. However, his death in 1736, interfered with the project.

Some two years before his death, Kada had received a certain Mabuchi, then a man of thirty-six or thirty-seven years, among his pupils. During the latter half of his life Mabuchi (1697–1769) gave a wonderful development and impulse to the main ideas he had received from his teacher. With him the chief aim was to illustrate the early and the prehistoric ages and, inasmuch as the accounts of

these had been strongly tainted and vitiated by an admixture of Chinese notions in their transmission, Mabuchi's insistence upon the necessity of the mind of the student being perfectly emancipated from Chinese influences, and his hostility to the predominance of Chinese studies in Japan, were even more pronounced than those of Kada had been. He studied poetry assiduously, and indeed he composed no small amount, but with him all this was merely a means to the supreme end, of thoroughly mastering the old language in order to deal with the documents illustrating the history and development of the empire before it became "contaminated" by intercourse with China. "Contaminated" is a strange word to use; yet that that was precisely what Mabuchi meant is abundantly clear from scores of passages in his works. The following citations from Sir E. Satow's Monograph on the *Revival of Pure Shintō* may suffice to indicate how very strong Mabuchi's anti-Chinese bias really was:—

"In ancient time, when men's dispositions were straightforward, a complicated system of morals was unnecessary. It would naturally happen that bad acts might occasionally be committed, but the straightforwardness of men's dispositions would prevent the evil from being concealed and growing in extent. So that in those days it was unnecessary to have a doctrine of right and wrong. But the Chinese being bad at heart, in spite of the teaching which they got, were only good on the outside, and their bad acts became of such magnitude that society was thrown into disorder. The Japanese, being straightforward, could do without teaching."

Possibly enough the Tokugawa authorities would allow all this to pass with approval, and such of them as had a sense of humour with a certain amount of amusement, for the 8,000,000 gods of the old pantheon had evidently bestowed upon the arch-champion of their cult a "gude conceit o' himsel'" and eke of his ancestors in no stinted measure. Yet as a sober matter of fact, before the lapse of 100 years the development and the extension of this national or tribal "gude conceit o' oorsells" was to cause the Tokugawa administration much trouble and embarrassment—was, in short, to contribute in serious measure to its overthrow and ruin. For Mabuchi must bear no small measure of the responsibility for that ferocious and fanatical hatred of foreigners and all things foreign which occasioned so much of trouble in the land between 1853 and 1868. However, as in Mabuchi's time Japan was really a hermit nation, with no intercourse with the outside world, and

apparently free from all risk of having the equilibrium of its internal economy either upset or changed by the impact of external powers or forces, the Tokugawa councillors may very well have considered it perfectly safe to give this nationalistic and anti-Chinese propaganda the fullest scope. But what about the following ?—

“ Mabuchi argues that ‘ while the Chinese for ages past have had a succession of different dynasties to rule over them, Japan has been faithful to one uninterrupted line of Sovereigns. Every Chinese dynasty was founded upon rebellion and parricide. Sometimes a powerful ruler was able to transmit his authority to his son and grandson, but they in their turn were inevitably deposed and murdered, and the country was in a perpetual state of civil war. A philosophy which produced such effects must be founded on a false system.

“ ‘ When Confucianism was first introduced into Japan, the simple-minded natives, deceived by its plausible appearance, accepted it with eagerness, and allowed it to spread its influence everywhere. The consequence was the civil war which broke out immediately after the death of Tenji Tennō in 671 between that Emperor’s brother and son, which only came to an end in 672 by the suicide of the latter. In the eighth century the Chinese costume and etiquette were adopted by the Court. This foreign pomp and splendour covered the rapid depravation of men’s hearts, and created a wide gulf between the Mikado and his people. So long as the Sovereign maintains a simple style of living, the people are contented with their own hard lot. Their wants are few, and they are easily ruled. But if the Sovereign has a magnificent palace, gorgeous clothing, and crowds of finely-dressed women to wait on him, the sight of these things must cause in others a desire to possess themselves of the same luxuries ; or, if they are not strong enough to take them by force, it excites their envy. If the Mikado had continued to live in a house roofed with shingles, and whose walls were of mud, to wear hempen clothes, and to carry his sword in a scabbard wound round with the tendrils of some creeping plant, and to go to the chase carrying his bow and arrows, as was the ancient custom, the present state of things would never have come about. But since the introduction of Chinese manners, the Sovereign, while occupying a highly dignified place, has been degraded to the intellectual level of a woman. The power fell into the hands of servants, and although they never actually assumed the title, they were Sovereigns in fact, while the Mikado became an utter nullity.’ ”

Why the ever-suspicious Tokugawa censorate, with, as a certain writer has put it, “ its eagle eye swift to smell out offences and heresies,” failed to suppress this passage and the whole *Koku-i-kō* in which it appears, belongs to that category of questions which it is easier to ask than to answer. Possibly its officers fancied that there was no necessity to watch or to doubt the loyalty and fidelity of a scholar who by express invitation had entered the service of a scion of the house of Tokugawa, for from 1746 to 1760, Mabuchi

was patronized by Tayasu Munetaka, the son of the previous, and the brother of the then ruling, Shōgun, and the founder of one of the three Go-sankyō families. Likely enough the censors failed to perceive that the term *Koku-gaku*, or “national learning” was on the point of expanding its scope far beyond the poetastering in “the true ancient style” with which it had till then been held to be synonymous. Most of the numerous pupils that flocked to Mabuchi doubtless wished to acquire nothing from him except the proficiency in the art of rounding or capping a stanza, the display of which at proper times and seasons frequently lifted needy and obscure courtiers to place and power. But among them were some who went further than this.

“By a fortunate coincidence, the study of pure Shintō could not be successfully prosecuted at first hand without a previous acquaintance with ancient forms of the language, and the result was a natural tendency towards a combined devotion to the two subjects, which is explanatory of the wide meaning of *Koku-gaku*, ‘national learning,’ sometimes erroneously used to signify the study of poetry alone.”

However, be the explanation what it may, the fact remains that the Bakufu censorship interfered neither with Mabuchi nor with his still more illustrious successor, Moto-ori, the great body of whose work was instinct with latent political tendency highly menacing to the domination of Yedo. Moto-ori (1730–1801) who was a physician at Matsuzaka in Ise, had only one interview with Mabuchi. This was in 1761, when Mabuchi was sixty-four and Moto-ori about thirty years of age. The conversation on this occasion was a remarkable one. The younger man,

“spoke of his project of writing a commentary on the *Kojiki*. Mabuchi replied that he also had wished to explain the sacred writings but in order to do this it was first necessary to get rid of the effects of Chinese philosophy, and discover the genuine beliefs of antiquity. The first step towards their elucidation was to recover the ancient language, which could only be done by studying the *Manyōshū*. This preliminary task he had himself accomplished, and he urged Moto-ori, who was yet young, to apply himself diligently to the study of the *Kojiki*.”

The outcome of this advice was that for some thirty-four years Moto-ori was engaged on his monumental *Kojiki-den*—a work pregnant with dire disaster to the Tokugawa supremacy. This, an edition of the *Kojiki*, with an elaborate commentary, was commenced in 1764, its first part completed in 1786, the second in 1792, and the last in 1796. The printing of it, however, which was

undertaken in 1789, was not finished until 1822, a score of years after the death of the author. It runs to forty-four large volumes of clear print, two of which are devoted to prolegomena, three to indexes arranged chronologically, while one contains a tract on Cosmogony by Hatori, one of Moto-ori's pupils.

Before the scope of this work can be appreciated, it becomes necessary to have some notion of at least the general character and the outlines of that *Kojiki*, to which the briefest of reference has been made early in this chapter (p. 469). A highly competent authority has pronounced it to be a very poor production, whether considered as literature or as a record of facts; as history, being much inferior to the contemporary *Nihongi*, written in Chinese. It must be borne in mind that although Moto-ori made full use of the *Nihongi* (and its continuations), yet his attitude towards it was exceedingly hostile. For not only was it written in Chinese but it was strongly infected with pestilential nonautochthonous notions, with vain and vile imaginings fabricated in, and imported from, China. And Chinese imaginings or Chinese philosophy or Chinese anything else at once sufficed to excite the spleen of Moto-ori who, whatever his shortcomings, was certainly entitled to have the merit of being a "good" hater imputed to him for righteousness. So much at least may reasonably be inferred from numerous passages analogous in tenor to the following :—

"In China all good and bad fortune of men, all order and disorder in the State—everything, in short, which happens in this world—is ascribed to the action of *Ten* (Heaven). Using such terms as the Way of *Ten*, and the Principle of *Ten*, they regard it as a thing to be honoured and feared above all. China, however, is a country where the true way generally has not been handed down. There they do not know that all things are the doings of the gods, and therefore resort rashly to such innovations. Now Heaven is nothing more than the region where the gods of Heaven dwell. It is a thing destitute of sense, and it is unreasonable to talk of its "command" and the like. To fear and honour *Ten*, and not fear and honour the gods, is like yielding an idle honour and awe to the Imperial Palace, and showing no reverence or honour to its Sovereign. Foreign countries, however, not having attained to the knowledge that everything is the doing of the gods, may be pardoned for believing this doctrine of the Way of *Ten*, or the Principle of *Ten*. But what is to be thought of those who, in this Imperial country, where a knowledge of the true way has been handed down, do not take the trouble to examine it, but, simply accepting the erroneous doctrines of foreign lands, imagine that which they call *Ten* is a thing of peerless excellence, and in all matters can talk of nothing but its principle? Take, again, their pedantic and wearisome *Taiki*

(the Great Limit), *Muki* (the Limitless), *Yin* and *Yang* (Positive and Negative Principles of Nature), *Ch'ien* and *K'un* (Celestial and Terrestrial Principles), *Pakwa* (Eight Diagrams of the Book of Changes), and *Wu-hing* (Five Elements), which are pure inventions of the Chinese, and for which there is really no sound reason. What consummate folly it is for those who would interpret our sacred books to rely implicitly on principles of this kind. In recent times even those who try to divest themselves of Chinese prejudices in their interpretations fail to understand the falseness of their doctrines of *Ten*, and of the Positive and Negative Powers of Nature, and do not succeed in bursting the barrier because they do not put thoroughly away from them their Chinese notions, nor resolutely rouse themselves from their deluding dreams. Moreover, the refusal of some to identify Amaterasu-no-Ohomi Kami (the Sun Goddess) as the Sun of Heaven is owing to their being steeped in Chinese narrow-minded reasonings, and so become blind to the wondrous and profound principle of the true way."

As Mr. Aston has truly said, there is food for reflection in the fact that it was possible for a man of high intelligence and vast learning like Moto-ori, not unacquainted with the philosophy and religions of India and China, to accept these childish fables as the basis of his belief. When, however, Mr. Aston goes on to make his confession of faith in Moto-ori's absolute sincerity, he need not be surprised¹ if the cynically sceptic refuse to follow him. Many anecdotes go to indicate that, in common with not a few of his countrymen, Moto-ori suffered shrewdly from "that last infirmity of noble minds"—the lust for fame. A keen, shrewd man, as he undoubtedly was, could have perceived that to garner any specially lasting meed of reputation as an expounder of Chinese philosophy would be no easy task in those days. In Japan, Chinese scholars were fully as plentiful as Doctors of Philosophy are in the Germany of to-day. During the previous century and a half every nook and cranny of Chinese philosophy had been explored, almost every Chinese commentary of note had been translated and adapted, and not seldom given forth in Japan as original work. To achieve any real originality in speculative work the Japanese intellect had been impotent. So much possibly Moto-ori observed; at all events, there is the strongest of reason to believe that he quickly recognized that his own strength did not lie in the direction of handling philosophical abstractions. He made a merit of confessing that he did not understand what the Sung schoolmen meant by their *Taiki*, their *Yin*, and their *Yang*, and the similar figments of their imaginations. Moto-ori's mental bent was all towards the concrete and the matter-of-fact and as a consequence he found himself

¹ Mr. Aston died long before this was written.

strongly fascinated by the old "national learning", where everything was at once beautifully concrete, and if not exactly matter-of-fact, certainly matter-of-fact-like. That "national learning" he could master successfully and thoroughly, and inasmuch as not much beyond the pioneer work had been done by his predecessors Keichū, Kada and Mabuchi, a wide field for investigation and research here lay virgin and unexplored. Here, indeed, "originality" could be shown, and laurels reaped even from a plain straightforward non-contentious exposition of his discoveries. But if, in addition to this, the results he reached could be utilized as ammunition for a vigorous and swingeing polemic against that Chinese philosophy which now held the Japanese intellect in thrall, the crop of bays would be all the thicker and all the more enduring. By assiduous yet judicious sounding of the tribal drum, he could hope not unreasonably to swell the proportions of his audience—mayhap of his disciples and followers, for it could not prove unpleasant to many of his compatriots to be assured and to have it demonstrated to them that after all "*they* were the people". The natural tendency of the Japanese mind, in common with the human mind generally, is to believe too readily and to believe too much, and this tendency is far from being at its weakest when the propositions or theories people are requested to accept as truths are pleasantly flattering to their importance and dignity and national vanity. Of all this the shrewd Moto-ori was no doubt perfectly well aware; certainly there is no reason to suppose that he was ignorant of the Japanese proverb to the effect that "it is the quality of faith that is important, were its object only the head of a sardine".

In spite of all this it must be candidly confessed that not a little can be advanced in support of Mr. Aston's contention that Moto-ori was really a sincere believer in that Shintō faith he professed, revived, and propagated so indefatigably. He was born and bred and spent most of his long life at Matsuzaka, only a few miles from Yamada in Ise, with its famous shrines (the most revered and sacrosanct in the empire) sacred from remote antiquity to the worship of the Sun Goddess, the ancestress of the Imperial line of Japan. Here in his boyhood he must have seen not merely thousands but millions of pilgrims pass the door of his widowed mother's house on their way to the holy places. It is more than probable that, as Mr. Aston suggests, the influence of this environment upon his mental bent and his career was considerable. It would tend to

awake and develop his patriotism, and intensity of patriotism not infrequently makes the patriot violently anti-foreign. This consideration might go a considerable way to account for Moto-ori's violent and virulent antipathy to Chinese philosophy and to everything Chinese. But Mr. Aston will have it that there was a greater and a deeper cause at work :—

“ As already stated, the Chinese nation has a strong bias against the conception of the power which rules the universe as a personal being. The *Ten* (Heaven) of Confucius and Mencius and the *Tao* (Way) of Laotze, not to speak of the *Taiki* and other metaphysical conceptions of the Sung schoolmen, all fall short of this idea. The main bent of the Japanese mind is in the same direction. But there is evidence in both countries of a contrary current of thought. Here, too, there are men born with a craving which refuses to be satisfied with abstractions in the place of a personal God (or gods) to whom they can look up as the Creator and Ruler of the Universe, and as exercising a providential care over mankind. Moto-ori was one of these . . . But whatever be the case with philosophical notions, no man can evolve a god from his own inner consciousness. He must accept the god or gods which he finds already acknowledged, whether by his own or by other people's fathers. Moto-ori's intensely patriotic temper compelled him to seek at home for the satisfaction of his inborn religious instincts. He naturally turned to Shintō. But in his time Shintō had fallen on evil days. It had suffered grievously from the encroachments of Buddhism. Buddhist priests had assumed the guardianship of the great majority of the shrines of the native cult, and had adulterated its ceremonies and doctrines with much that was alien. The native gods were not abolished—they had still some hold on the popular mind ; but they were degraded to temporary manifestations of Buddha. As one of Moto-ori's pupils said, they were made domestics in the Buddhist household.

“ This state of things was a great relief to Moto-ori. It drove him back from the present to the old unadulterated Shintō taught in the *Kojiki*, *Nihongi*, and *Norito*. Here he found the satisfaction to his mind and heart which he had failed to find elsewhere. Himself convinced of the excellence of the old national religion, he made it the business of his life to propagate it among his fellow-countrymen, and to denounce the abominable depravity of those who neglected it in favour of sophistical heresies imported from abroad.”

Now at first blush this line of argument in support of the sincerity of Moto-ori in his belief in the faith he championed would seem to be a cogent one. But it may be questioned whether its cogency is not really less than its plausibility. The weakness in it lies in the circumstance that while the Buddhists had appropriated Shintō gods and shrines and revenues the Chinese philosophers had not intruded any of their number into the Shintō priesthood, nor had they interfered with the Shintō shrines either pecuniarily

or in any other way. Yet it was not against the Buddhist corrupters and despoilers but against the inoffensive Chinese scholars that the full bitterness of Moto-ori's virulent polemic was directed. So much, indeed, appears from Mr. Aston's next paragraph :—

“ Hence arose a controversy which is not without interest to ourselves as an episode in the unending conflict between science and religion. Both parties to the struggle fought under serious difficulties. Not only could the *Kangakusha* (Chinese scholars) offer nothing to satisfy the heart-need of a personal deity, but they were sorely hampered by the imperfections of their philosophy, and by a belief in divination, ghosts, and spiritual beings, which they did not perceive to be inconsistent with it. Moto-ori and his followers, on the other hand, were weighted by an antiquated mythology, which presented many glaring absurdities even when viewed in the dim light of Chinese philosophy. The *Wagakusha* (Japanese scholars) were also embarrassed by the absence from Shintō of anything like a code or morals. They were therefore driven to deny the necessity of anything of the kind, or to put forward, as derived from Shintō, a system of ethical teaching which was really borrowed from China.”

A little further on, Mr. Aston admits that “ towards Buddhism Moto-ori's antagonism is less pronounced—that he acknowledges elements of good in it ”. Yet the writer might not unreasonably maintain that this assertion, so far from invalidating his contention, actually lends it no slight measure of substantial support. For so far from flouting—or still worse ignoring—the autochthonous gods of Japan, Buddhism had annexed the whole pantheon as avatars of its deities and saints. Nay, more, its priestly ingenuity had been found equal to the task of devising new national gods—Hachiman and Kōmpira, for instance—in addition to the 8,000,000 of aboriginal Shintō deities. However, as the fact remains that if the Shintō gods had been reduced to the position of domestics in the Buddhist household, it might have been expected that Buddhism, and not the philosophy of the Sung schoolmen, would have had to bear the main brunt of Moto-ori's onslaughts. But then, Buddhism was not contemptuously aggressive, and certainly could not offend Moto-ori's native pride and patriotic susceptibilities in the wantonly outrageous fashion some of the *Kangakusha* did. Ogyū Sorai (1666–1728), for example, had maintained that China was the centre of civilization, the only enlightened country and the only one producing sages, he himself and his countrymen being merely Eastern barbarians. Furthermore, Sorai had actually gone so far as to recommend that the Mikado, the lineal descendant of

the Sun Goddess, should be stripped of his prerogative of bestowing titles upon his subjects. In his fierce resentment against all this Moto-ori was undoubtedly sincere, and Satow is probably perfectly correct in his surmise that,

“The violence of his prejudices in favour of everything native and antique is probably due to a reaction against Chinese ideas and forms of expression, which at the time he thought and wrote bade fair to extinguish every trace of Japanese nationality.”

The ancient records and the old myths had, when not entirely contemptuously ignored, been handled in no gentle manner by certain of the *Kangakusha*. In 1716, Arai Hakuseki had penned a treatise in which they were all subjected to the clear, cold and unkind judgment of reason, and therein the Sun Goddess is euhemerised into a mere mortal, while Takama-no-Hara (“The Plain of Heaven”) is made out to be the place where her very mundane capital stood. Others, perhaps, of smaller note and name than Arai had perpetrated similar offences of a hue no less deep than his. Indeed, it comes not so much as a surprise as a shock to most men of this Imperialistic era of Meiji to find how little credence was reposed either in the ancient myths in general or in the theory of the divine descent of the Mikado in particular in eighteenth-century Japan before Moto-ori began his thirty years’ polemic in their support. His propaganda really seriously began in 1771, with the publication of his tract *Naobi-no-Mitama* (“Spirit of Straightening”) which was afterwards incorporated in the *Kojiki-den*. That tract, in which, among other doctrines of a somewhat extraordinary nature, that are now implicitly accepted, that of the divinity of the Mikado was emphatically asserted, elicited a response from a certain Ichikawa who writes in the following very outspoken terms :—

“The Japanese word *kami* (god) was simply a title of honour, but in consequence of its having been used to translate the Chinese character *shin* (*shen*), a meaning has come to be attached to it which it did not originally possess. *The ancestors of the Mikados were not gods, but men, and were no doubt worthy to be revered for their virtues ; but their acts were not miraculous nor supernatural. If the ancestors of living men were not human beings, they are more likely to have been birds or beasts than gods.*”

In connexion with this controversy with Ichikawa—for such it became by the publication of Moto-ori’s *Kuzuhana* (1780) in reply to him—one circumstance must be adverted to inasmuch as it had some bearing on the question of Moto-ori’s sincerity of

belief in the doctrines he championed. Ichikawa had roundly asserted that,

“ The stories told us about early ages must have been invented by the Mikados. The name of Amaterasu (the Sun-Goddess) is probably a posthumous title conferred at a later period. If the Sun-Goddess (Amaterasu) is the real Sun in heaven, it must have been quite dark before she was born ; and yet it is stated that before she was born there were trees and plants, clothing, weapons, boats, and buildings. If all these things existed before her birth, it seems probable that both Sun and Moon preceded that event. It is curious that stars are not mentioned in the *Jin-dai-no-maki*. To say that the Sun was born in Japan is a fiction which was probably invented by the earlier Mikados in order to support the assertion that this country is the root, and all other countries only branches. The gods in heaven make no difference between different races of mankind who are formed into separate nations by seas and mountain ranges which divide them off from each other, and the sun shines equally over all.”

“ To this Moto-ori made a neither very ingenious nor ingenuous answer.

“ In reply to the argument that if Amaterasu and the sun be identical, there must have been perpetual night before she was born, which is inconsistent with the fact of trees and plants being in existence before her birth, and that therefore the Sun must have been previously hanging in the sky, *he reiterates the statement that the goddess and the sun are one and the same*. For although she will continue to shine as long as heaven and earth endure, *she was born in Japan, and her descendants to this day rule over the empire*. The difficulty of reconciling the statements that the world was plunged into darkness when she retired into the cavern, and that darkness did not exist before she was born, is one that would strike even a child's intelligence. The critic need not make so much fuss about this point as if it were entirely a new discovery of his own (!). *The very inconsistency is the proof of the authenticity of the record, for who would have gone out of his way to invent a story apparently so ridiculous and incredible.*”

Nor is this glaring case of *Credo quia absurdum est* the only one of the kind in Moto-ori. Witness the following extract from Mr. Aston :—

“ Moto-ori's religion is frankly anthropomorphic, as indeed it could hardly fail to be if he attached any credence to the statements in the *Kojiki*. He says in so many words that the Shintō deities had hands and legs. When pressed with the obvious inconsistencies which are involved in this belief, Moto-ori has nothing better to say than they are ‘ a proof of the authenticity of the record, for who would have gone out of his way to invent a story so ridiculous and improbable, if it were not true (*Credo quia impossibile*) ? The acts of the gods are not to be explained by ordinary principles. Man's intelligence is limited, and there are many things which transcend it ’.”

Now all those European scholars who are intimately acquainted with Moto-ori's writings are at one in attributing to him great

ability as a controversialist and a high amount of the logical faculty. If they are correct in this, what is to be thought of the "sincerity" of the foregoing and of other similar passages? The founders or would-be-founders of new religions, or the would-be revivers of exploded cults, who have constituted a much more numerous tribe than is generally supposed, on occasion have begun by duping themselves. But more frequently from the first they have been fully conscious of the large measure of truth in the Japanese proverb already quoted, and fully aware that if the absurd be propounded as the mysterious, and insisted upon boldly enough and frequently enough, they will be pretty sure to attract disciples whose sincerity of belief will be unimpeachable. Hence, when Mr. Aston supports his contention for Moto-ori's own sincerity by remarking that "he had a large and zealous body of followers drawn from the highest and most enlightened classes of his fellow-countrymen", the argument is perhaps not so weighty as it seems. It is to be noted, however, that all Moto-ori's prodigious erudition and all his immense energy (it was equal to the production of no fewer than fifty-five distinct works in more than 180 volumes during the spare hours of an extensive medical practice) were *not* devoted to the resuscitation of pure Shintō so as to make it the rule of life in his time. Any such intention he expressly disclaimed; perhaps because he was shrewd enough to perceive that it was really hopeless to "call back the deities of the old pantheon to the Hades to which the neglect of the nation had consigned them". (Presently we shall find that the enthusiasm of his disciple Hirata was moderated by none of his teacher's common-sense appreciation of the practical and the possible in the direction in which, and the extent to which, "pure" Shintō could be exploited.) His professed object was merely to present the age of the gods in its real form.

"All that comes to pass in the world whether good or bad in its nature, is the act of the gods, and men have generally little influence over the course of events. To insist on practising the ancient 'way of the gods', in opposition to the customs of the present age, would be rebellion against that 'way' and equivalent to trying to excel it. *If men in their daily practice obey the laws made from time to time by the authorities, and act in accordance with general custom, they are practising Shintō.*"

It was perhaps in a certain measure, on the score of diplomatic utterances like this, that Moto-ori not merely contrived to escape

the inconvenient attentions of the censorship, but even to attract the favourable regard of the Tokugawa authorities. But he was also careful to avow his loyalty to the Shōgunate, and he was so much thought of by the Tokugawa Daimyō of Kii, on whose fief he was born, that he was invited by that Prince to draw up a memorandum on the methods by which a fief should be administered (1787), while in 1795 he was actually invested with office in the principality of Kishū. When he resigned this position in the last year of his life, he accepted an invitation to deliver lectures in Kyōto. Here he had crowded audiences, while the Princes of the Blood and many of the Court nobles sought instruction from him in matters relating to the "age of the gods" and the early history of Japan.

In spite of all his professed loyalty to the Bakufu, there can be little question that this work of the last months of Moto-ori's life contributed considerably to its ultimate overthrow. During the decade and a half preceding the fateful year of 1868, the great cry of the patriots who effected the Revolution was "*Sonnō Jō-i*", "Honour the Emperor and Expel the Foreign Barbarians." Now this cry was a compendious and practical summing up of the logical results of Moto-ori's teaching. In all likelihood Satow is not far astray in his supposition that the ruling passion with Moto-ori was hatred of those Chinese influences so dominant in Japan in his time. To assail these with effect it was advisable, if not indeed necessary, to make it clear that not China, but Japan, was the centre not merely of civilization but of the universe, and in the cosmogony of the ancient records which Moto-ori adopted and utilized for this purpose the position of the Sun-Goddess (Amaterasu) was a pivotal one.

"Japan is the country which gave birth to the Goddess of the Sun, Amaterasu O-ho-mi-kami, which fact proves its superiority over all other countries. The goddess, having endowed her grandson Ninigino-Mikoto with the three sacred treasures, proclaimed him Sovereign of Japan for ever and ever. His descendants shall continue to rule it as long as the heavens and the earth endure" . . . "To the end of time each Mikado is the goddess's son. His mind is in perfect harmony of thought and feeling with hers. He does not seek out new inventions, but rules in accordance with precedents which date from the age of the gods, and if he is ever in doubt he has resort to divination, which reveals to him the mind of the great goddess . . . The eternal endurance of the dynasty of the Mikados is a complete proof that the way called 'Kami-no-michi', or Shintō (Way of the Gods) infinitely surpasses the systems of all other countries."

Possibly it was mainly to lend support to the tenet that Japan ranks far above all other countries that he insisted so strongly upon his central "truths" that the Sun-Goddess, who was identical with the Sun in heaven,¹ was born in Japan, and that the successive Mikados were her divine descendants. In one passage at least he goes so far as to assert that for these reasons no other nation is entitled to equality with her, and *that all are bound to do homage to the Japanese Sovereign and to pay tribute to him*. Elsewhere, in repudiating all indebtedness to Lâu-tsze, he writes :—

"It has been asked whether Shintō is not the same as the Taōism of Lâu-tsze. Lâu-tsze hated the vain conceits of the Chinese scholars and honoured naturalness, from which a resemblance may be argued ; but *as he was born in a dirty country not under the special protection of the Sun-Goddess*, he had only heard the theories of the succession of so-called Holy-Men, and what he believed to be naturalness was simply what they called natural. He did not know that the gods (i.e. of Japan) are the authors of every human action, and this ignorance constituted a cause of radical difference."

Yet, although it may have been chiefly to prove Japan's national superiority that these "central truths" were urged, it ought to have needed no great sagacity to perceive that they could be applied to other purposes. Passages like the following were certainly suggestive :—

"The 'Holy Men' of China were merely successful rebels. The Mikado is the Sovereign appointed by the pair of deities, Izanagi and Izanami, who created this country. The Sun-Goddess never said 'Disobey the Mikado if he be bad',² and therefore, whether he be good or bad, no one attempts to deprive him of his authority. He is the immovable ruler who must endure to the end of time, as long as the sun and moon continue to shine. In ancient language the Mikado was called a god, and that is his real character. Duty therefore consists in obeying him implicitly without questioning his acts. During the Middle Ages such men as Hōjō Yoshitoki, Hōkō Yasutoki, Ashikaga Takauji and others violated this duty (*michi*) and took up arms against him. Their disobedience to the Mikado is attributable to the influence of Chinese learning."

¹ "What doubt can there be that O-ho-mi-kami (the Sun-Goddess) is the great ancestress of the Mikados and that she is no other than the Sun of Heaven which illumines the world ? These things are in their nature infinite, not to be measured, and mysterious."

² This is evidently levelled at Mencius's refusal of any claim of a right divine to a sovereign who failed to exercise his rule for the good of the people. "The people are the most important element in a nation ; the altars to the spirits of land and grain are the second ; the sovereign is the lightest." "The monarch whose rule is injurious to the people, and who is deaf to remonstrance and counsel should be dethroned."

Now to the casual reader this might seem merely one of Moto-ori's innumerable splenetic onslaughts upon "Chinese learning", against which, indeed, it was explicitly levelled. But the suspicious or the discerning might well have been forgiven for entertaining the fancy that what was really important here was what was to be read between the lines. For the implicit attack was something vastly different from the explicit assault on "Chinese learning", which might have been used here as a mere stalking-horse or scape-goat. Suppose Moto-ori to have addressed this or similar passages to his Kyōto audiences, what would have been the natural effect? Resentment might indeed have been roused against "Chinese learning"; but the full strength of his hearers' indignation would not have been spent on it, but have been directed against the feudal chiefs who had presumed to raise impious and sacrilegious hands against not the "Lord's annointed" but against the Lord himself—for Moto-ori had told them that "in ancient language the Mikado was called a god, and that is his real character". Now although the publication of histories of the Tokugawa times had been forbidden by the Yedo censorship, the Court nobles who flocked to hear Moto-ori were far from ignorant of how the Mikados had been treated by Iyeyasu and his descendants. They must have remembered perfectly well that Go-Yojō had been compelled (1611) to abdicate at the age of 41; Go-Mizuo (1630) at the age of 35, although he lived to 85; the Empress Myōshō at that of 21, although she lived to 74; and Reigen (1687) at 34, although he survived to 79. Even in the very year (1801) when Moto-ori was delivering his lectures in Kyōto, Go-Sakuramachi, Empress in her own right from 1763 to 1771, was then alive and hale. All this the Princes of the Blood and the Court nobles must have discussed exhaustively in the intervals between their attendances in Moto-ori's lecture-room. Although making loud and glib and frequent avowal of his loyalty to the Tokugawa Shōgunate, Moto-ori in paragraphs like the foregoing was, without even once mentioning it, by implication merely, dealing it the death-strokes of doom.

How extremely Chauvinistic Moto-ori's patriotism was might be gleaned from certain of the extracts just quoted from his writings. But inasmuch as he was in no small measure responsible for the fanatical hatred of foreigners displayed by a considerable section of his countrymen after the (forced) resumption of foreign intercourse in 1853, it may be well to give further instances of his

virulence. Our purpose will perhaps be best served by a reproduction of Satow's summary of the *Gio-jin Gaigen*, a gentle title which is translated as "Indignant Words about Ruling the Barbarians". It takes the form of a review of the relations between Japan and other countries from the earliest period down to the time of Iyeyasu, not touching, however, upon the early European intercourse of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, probably because Christianity was a forbidden question.

"That on the earliest occasion when the Mikado exchanged letters and envoys with the Chinese Sovereign the first step should have been taken by the former is a source of deep annoyance to Moto-ori. This deplorable event occurred in the year 707 under the Empress Suiko, when an envoy was sent to China to fetch a Buddhist sūtra which Shōtoku Taishi remembered to have possessed during a previous state of existence, when he was studying the sacred mysteries in that country. It is true that the Chinese histories contain notices of tribute-bearers from Japan much earlier than this date; but these envoys, whatever may have been their character, certainly were not commissioned by the sovereign. As for their paying tribute, the statement is due to the inordinate vanity of the Chinese, who fancy themselves superior to all surrounding nations, whereas they are no better than barbarians themselves and are bound to acknowledge the supremacy of Japan (!). One of the Chinese histories has an account of the mission sent by Suiko, and gives what purports to be a letter from that Empress, in which appears the famous phrase, 'The Tenshi (Son of Heaven) of the place where the Sun rises send a letter to the Tenshi of the place where the Sun sets'. If the Empress Suiko really sent such a letter she treated the Chinese sovereign with far too much civility, and if she had addressed him with some such phrase as 'The Heavenly Emperor notifies the King of Go (Wu)', he ought to have been filled with gratitude, instead of which he is represented by the Chinese historiographer as having been offended at being treated as an equal. But the truth is that Suiko wanted to get something from him, and therefore condescended to flatter his vanity (!)."

Uninterrupted intercourse seems to have continued between the two Courts for about two centuries, and then to have ceased during a period of about thirty years.

"It was unworthy of Japan to enter into relations with a base barbarian State, whatever might be the benefits which she expected to obtain. It resulted in too many cases in the shipwreck of the vessels and the profitless death of the envoys by drowning. Had the Chinese ruler paid due reverence to the Mikado as a being infinitely superior to himself the objection might have been less."

After the tenth century the Mikados appear to have ceased sending envoys to China, and Moto-ori remarks that,

“ so long as Japan wanted anything from China she overlooked the insolent pretensions of the Chinese sovereigns, but now, being no longer in a position to gain by the interchange of courtesies, she rejected all further overtures of friendship ! ”

And so the long tirade runs on. Satow has well observed that the most remarkable thing about it was that Japan was indebted to China for all the arts and sciences that make life better than nonentity, for a complete system of government and laws, and even for the very art of writing which enabled the writer to record his arrogant and spiteful feelings. Of all this Moto-ori, whose erudition was immense, must have been perfectly well aware. What, then, in this matter at least, is to be said about his sincerity ? Furthermore, the naïve fashion in which he hints that it is semi-excusable to flatter another's vanity in order to get something from him, or to submit to insolent Chinese pretensions so long as something was wanted from China, is certainly worthy of note. Moto-ori, Hirata, and Shintōists generally are never weary of expatiating upon the superiority of *Yamato-damashii*, the true Japanese spirit. It may well be asked how far this diatribe of Moto-ori's is to be regarded as a practical exposition of it, and how far it lends support to the contention that the natives of the “ Country of the Gods ” are possessed of “ a naturally perfect and true disposition ”.

Yet with all his shortcomings, it must be frankly recognized that this country doctor, whose speciality was infantile diseases, did not fall much short—if, indeed, he fell short at all—of being a great man. In his writings and in his teaching we find a chief source of that *Sonnō-Jō-i* movement which within three-score years and ten from the date of his death was to sweep the Shōgunate and feudalism into endless night. It is not indeed given to many of the sons of men who have to eke out an impecunious existence as a medical practitioner of children to count as a first-class political force in one of the most populous empires of the world for a round 100 years. And from the beginning of Moto-ori's nationalistic and Chauvinistic propaganda in 1771, down to the overthrow of feudalism just a century later, his influence, latent perhaps, was in all probability nearly as great as that of any other man of these three generations. Besides, for the men that came after him he created a new literary dialect, and we are told that his *wabun*, or Japanese composition, continues to exercise a perceptible influence

in some departments of contemporary literature. In his hands Japanese, as distinct from Sinico-Japanese, became full, flowing, picturesque and expressive. The only fault that can be urged against it is its prolixity. That, as Mr. Aston points out :—

“ is partly inseparable from his purism, which leads him to reject many useful and thoroughly naturalized Chinese words in favour of Japanese forms of expression, however circuitous, and is partly owing to an inveterate habit which he has of repeating himself, especially when an opportunity offers of denouncing Chinese proclivities or of magnifying Shintō.”

To his Japanese readers, however, all this would hardly count as a drawback. The rapid headway made by the fundamental ideas he inculcated is in no small degree to be ascribed to his consummate merits as a stylist. On occasion he could write in the simplest and homeliest of fashions ; witness his *Tama Kushige* (Precious Casket), the memorandum he penned at the request of the Daimyō of Kishu—a work, by the way, which goes to indicate that Moto-ori could have administered a fief with no inconsiderable ability.

As has been observed, Moto-ori had too firm a grasp upon the actualities and possibilities of his times to expend his energies in a vain endeavour to resuscitate pure Shintō so as to make it the rule of life. In this matter his successor, Hirata, showed himself Moto-ori's inferior in discretion, as he did in style and in everything else except application, erudition, and the quantity of work he produced. Yet withal, this Hirata was a remarkable man ; all the more remarkable as he came from Northern Japan, which has at all times been singularly unproductive of literary talent. Born at Kubota in Dewa in the year of the Declaration of American Independence (1776) he migrated to Yedo in 1795, and, becoming acquainted with Moto-ori's writings in 1801, he formally enrolled himself as one of his pupils two months before the old man's death. In 1804, he himself began to take pupils, and altogether, we are told, 553 students received their training from him. In the previous year he had embarked on that long career of authorship which was to result in the publication of more than 100 distinct works, besides a great mass of manuscript which has never been put into print. Although he was no great master of style like Moto-ori—in fact, the native History of Literature dismisses him in a few contemptuous sentences—his writings were

considerably read in his time, and certain of them did indeed exercise no small influence. But it is questionable whether those of them on which he set the greatest store were much appreciated by his public. His strenuous attempts to evolve a living, practical cult from the *Kojiki*, the *Nihongi*, and kindred ancient records had to rest satisfied with the virtue of having made the effort as their most substantial reward. To the student of comparative religion his ingenious efforts to co-ordinate the old myths into a work-a-day faith for the nation are doubtless interesting enough, but inasmuch as we are dealing merely with forces that have either promoted or retarded or influenced in one way or other the political and social development of Japan, the *Tama-no-Mi-hashira*, with its diagrams, and many similar works must be passed over in silence. What is really of consequence is the development or modification of Moto-ori's political and ethnical teachings received from the hands of Hirata, and the part the younger man played in contributing to bring latter-day *Wagakusha* (Japanese scholars) and *Kangakusha* (Chinese scholars) into line on a common basis of hostility to white-faced foreigners from the West.

In this connexion his *Summary of the Ancient Way* is important. Of its ten sections one explains why Japan is "the country of the gods"; the following one, how it is certain beyond a doubt that every Japanese is a descendant of the gods; another treats of the uninterrupted continuance of the Imperial line from the beginning of the world, together with proofs of the superiority of Japan over all countries in the world, both materially and morally; while yet another inculcates the truth that the Japanese, being natives of "the country of the gods", are born with a naturally perfect and true disposition, which from the most ancient times has been called *Yamato-damashii* or *Yamato-gokoro* (the "spirit" or "heart" of Yamato, i.e. of Japan). All this no doubt was very flattering to the tribal conceit of Hirata's readers. The following remarks from one of these sections, if not exactly humorous, are at all events amusing:—

"It is most lamentable that so much ignorance should prevail as to the evidences of the two fundamental doctrines that Japan is the country of the gods, and her inhabitants the descendants of the gods. Between the Japanese people and the Chinese, Hindoos, Russians, Dutch, Siamese, Cambodians, and other nations of the world, there is a difference of kind rather than of degree. *It was not out of vainglory that the inhabitants of this country called it the land of the gods.* The gods

who created all countries belonged, without exception, to the Divine Age and were all born in Japan, so that Japan is their native country, and all the world acknowledges the appropriateness of the title. The Koreans were the first to become acquainted with this truth, and from them it was gradually diffused through the globe, and accepted by everyone."

The following from a cosmological exposition that differs somewhat from that of Moto-ori would indicate that, however much Hirata might differ from him in his account of the Creation, he was thoroughly at one with him in holding national modesty to be but a scurvy virtue at best :—

"As it was Japan which lay directly opposite to the sun when it had sprouted upwards and separated from the earth, it is quite clear that Japan lies on the summit of the globe. It is equally evident that all other countries were formed at a much later period by the spontaneous consolidation of the foam of the sea and the collection of mud in various localities, when Izanagi and Izanami brought together the eight islands of Japan, and separated the land from the water. Foreign countries were of course produced by the power of the creator gods, but they were not begotten by Izanagi and Izanami, nor did they give birth to the Goddess of the Sun, *which is the cause of their inferiority*. The traditions about the origin of the world which are preserved in foreign countries are naturally incorrect, just as the accounts of an event which has happened at the capital become distorted when they travel to a province, and it finally comes to be believed the province was the actual scene of the event. The fact is patent that the Mikado is the true Son of Heaven, who is entitled to reign over the four seas and the ten thousand countries."

And elsewhere he calmly and complacently assures us that :—

"from the divine descent of the Japanese people proceeds their immeasurable superiority to the natives of other countries in courage and intelligence !"

His Chauvinism was, however, much less virulent and aggressive than that of Moto-ori's, and it was also expressed in much less violent and offensive language. Furthermore, the younger man's horizon was much wider. When the latter thought of foreigners he thought only of the sons of Han. Hirata took other Asiatic peoples into account, while he has also a good deal to say about the Dutch and the Russians. The existence of these latter had been forced upon his attention in a somewhat startling and unpleasant fashion. The ambassador Resanoff, resenting his rebuff at Nagasaki, had subsequently dispatched two small vessels under Davidoff and Chwostoff to plunder the Japanese settlements in Saghalin and Iterup (1806-7), and of this expedition Hirata gives

an account in his *Chishima Shira-nami* (White Waves of the Kuriles) which was intended also to be a manual of the way to "restrain barbarians" and of maritime defence. As regards the Dutch, we meet with many references to them in his works. For example, in his *Summary of the Ancient Way* (1811), already alluded to, he praises them warmly for their achievements in natural science, according to them a much higher place among philosophers than he does to the Chinese, whom, however, he dismisses as empty visionaries. It is from the Hollanders that he adopts the theory of the revolution of the earth, and he candidly acknowledges his indebtedness to them in the account he gives of the formation of the earth and its division into five continents. He mentions Kämpfer, and actually sets forth a summary of his so-styled *History of Japan*. In Aston's *Japanese Literature*, will be found a translation of an amusing altercation (before 1805) he had with a rationalistic acquaintance raised in connexion with the machine invented by the Hollanders called "electer". All this, of course, furnishes so much testimony to that development and diffusion of Dutch studies since the days of Thunberg (1775-6), which we deal with in another chapter.

As regards the alien cults in Japan—as regards Chinese philosophy, at all events—Moto-ori's attitude had been that of Cato towards the Punic capital—*Delenda est Carthago*. Hirata, on the other hand, was anxious to proceed to no such extremities. Buddhism and Chinese philosophy alike were to be captured and tamed and subjected to the yoke as beasts of burden in the service of Shintō. It is true that two of Hirata's works are devoted to the ridicule of popular Buddhism,¹ but when asked whether a pious Shintō believer was to worship Buddha, Hirata replied in the affirmative, on the ground that Shaka was also a *kami* (Shintō god). That such was really the case was proved by the Buddhist miracles which had been worked in Japan as in other countries; and furthermore, as everything which took place in the world was ordered by the *kami*, Buddhism must be in accordance with their will. Hitherto the *kami* had been domestics in the Buddhist household; Hirata would rectify matters by inverting the relative position of master and drudge.

¹ "They are racy and entertaining diatribes, but, it must be added, are disgraced by scurrilous abuse quite unworthy of the would-be founder of a new form of religion."—Aston.

Towards Chinese philosophy, or at least towards Confucianism, his attitude was no less diplomatic. One of his earliest books, the *Kishin Shinran*¹ is intended to prove that the Sung schoolmen, whose system was then dominant in Japan, had misunderstood the teachings of Confucius with regard to supernatural beings, and to show by quotations from the Analects and elsewhere that he had believed in their actual existence. Furthermore, Hirata was keen enough to understand that a religion which is without a moral code cannot hope to become the universal rule of conduct. Accordingly, instead of devising one of his own, he calmly proceeded to pilfer one from those very Chinese against whom Moto-ori had railed for thirty years in eighty-five distinct works and 180 volumes. Thus he writes :—

“ Devotion to the memory of ancestors is the mainspring of all virtue. No one who discharges his duty to them will ever be disrespectful to the gods, or to his living parents. Such a man will also be faithful to his prince, loyal to his friends, and kind and gentle with his wife and children. For the essence of this devotion is *in truth filial piety*. These truths are confirmed by the books of the Chinese, who say that the ‘ loyal subject issues from the gate of the pious son ’, and again, ‘ filial piety is the basis of all good actions.’ ”

Hirata perceived that Chinese learning had too strong a hold upon the intellect of the nation to be driven thence with a pitchfork, as Moto-ori would have driven it if he could have but had his way. Besides the Confucianist university in Yedo and the great private schools in Kyōto and Ōsaka, most of the great fiefs had each their seminary, where the mental pabulum supplied was almost entirely Chinese. From the day he began to read to the day when he quitted school or college, the average *samurai* youth at the beginning of the nineteenth century was occupied with Chinese classics, Chinese commentaries, and Chinese histories. To supplant Chinese commentaries and Chinese philosophy in the schools by purely native Japanese studies and by Shintō Hirata knew to be hopeless. The best that could be done was to endeavour to insinuate them gradually. Chinese learning could not be crushed ; the only thing then, that remained to be done was to conciliate it, and, to use a somewhat vulgar phrase, to steal its thunder.

This astutely conciliatory attitude of Hirata's, although perhaps effecting not very much for the acceptance of his theological

¹ *New Treatise on the Gods* (1805). It is in this work that the “ electer ” machine incident is given.

system, contributed not a little towards bringing Shintōists and certain of the *Kangakusha* into line on what were soon to be two matters of cardinal practical importance. The thesis of the divine descent of the Japanese and their consequent superiority to all other peoples in courage and intelligence was one that could not be very offensive to the most hidebound Confucianists in Japan—especially when it was made out, or attempted to be made out, that there was nothing in the writings of the sage that was really inconsistent with this doctrine so productive of comforting self-complacency. By a good many of the young samurai fresh from school it was adopted enthusiastically; and in 1853 we shall find even Hayashi, the head of the Confucianist University in Yedo, winding up an interview with Commodore Perry with a panegyric, if not on the superiority of the Japanese in courage and intelligence, at all events on the pre-eminence of Japan over all other nations in virtue and humanity. The spirit of the age had indeed changed since the times when Ogyu Sorai had spoken of himself as an “Eastern barbarian”. Although Hirata’s Chauvinism was neither so intense nor so openly pronounced as that of Moto-ori, yet he did quite as much as the elder scholar to stimulate and diffuse that inordinate national self-conceit which expressed itself in the cry of *Jō-i* (“expel the barbarians”) during the years preceding the Revolution of 1868. Nowhere during these years was the contempt for, and hatred of, the Western barbarians greater than among the Court nobles of Kyōto. Now, during the whole of the Tokugawa regime, Kyōto had been the great seat of the prosecution of native Japanese studies in distinction to that of Chinese learning. Allusion has already been made to the enthusiastic reception Moto-ori met with there in 1801, and to the not inconsiderable practical results of his visit. In 1822, Hirata had been requested by the Abbot of Uyeno, a Prince of the Blood, to present him with copies of his chief work on Shintō; and in the following year he went up to Kyōto and received the patronage of some of the Court nobles who brought his writings to the notice of the retired Emperor Kōkaku. It is safe to assume that in Kyōto the seed Hirata sowed fell upon no unfruitful soil.

In another direction his adoption—“lifting” is really the right word—of a moral code from the *Kangakusha* contributed its quota to ulterior developments of still greater consequence. In the chapter on Chinese Philosophy it was pointed out that the only

change made by the Japanese when they accepted the moral teachings of the Sung schoolmen—which was really that of Confucius—was to remove filial piety from the first to the second place in their “Table of Moral Precedence”, and to assign the most commanding position in it to loyalty. It was also remarked that loyalty meant not so much the reverent submission due by all his subjects to the Mikado, although in theory that was not lost sight of, as of the Daimyōs to the Shōgun, and, in a still higher degree, of men of the two-sworded class to their immediate chiefs. Now, while Hirata insisted on the high claims of this virtue, the whole general tendency of his writings and teaching was, at least by implication, to raise the question whether in a conflict of duties, this loyalty was to be directed not so much towards one’s immediate chief or even the Shōgun himself as towards the chief and superior of all, the Mikado, who “was the true Son of Heaven, entitled to reign over the four seas and the ten thousand countries”. How quickly this question passed from the mere theoretical to the stern sphere of practice will be recognized when we recall the fact that within less than a score of years after the death of Hirata (1843), not scores but hundreds of samurai were withdrawing themselves from the service of their chiefs, giving up all their emoluments and becoming homeless *rōnin* (Wave-men) in order that their duty might be undivided towards the Son of Heaven alone.

It certainly might appear strange that the Shōgunate allowed this propaganda, so inimical to its existence, to go on without curb or check. As a matter of fact, although too late in the day, it did awake to the danger. In 1836 it suppressed a work of Hirata’s, just then published, which had drawn forth warm praises from the Mikado and the *Kwanbaku*, and four years later (1840) it banished the author to his native town of Kubota, which he had not seen since the day he had surreptitiously left it with a single *ryō* in his pocket five-and-forty years before. But Hirata had already done his work; nothing now could neutralize forty years’ assiduous propagation of his views both in print and in lectures to successive scores of pupils.

However, important as the influence of Hirata, and still more so that of Moto-ori, upon subsequent political developments undoubtedly was, we must be carefully on our guard against over-estimating. Although it counted for a good deal in precipitating the Revolution of 1868, it was far from being the only force at work.

CHAPTER XIV

FOREIGN INTERCOURSE

(1721-1853)

“The ancient writers justly compare the minerals to the bones, and the other revenues of a country to the blood, the flesh, the skin, and the hair which make up the human body. The things with which taxes are paid consist in rice and other cereals, in hemp, in cloth, and in different utensils. These are renewed like the blood, the flesh, the skin, and the hair, while the minerals do not reproduce themselves, as a bone once removed from the body, does not grow again.”

SUCH is Arai Hakuseki's exposition of a view that had become a firmly held article of economic belief among the statesmen and publicists of his age. The eighth Shōgun, Yoshimune, was far from being an unreserved admirer of Arai, and, on his accession to power, he reversed Arai's policy on more matters than one. But he was in thorough agreement with Arai's views on the value of foreign trade and on the expediency, nay, the necessity, of checking the efflux of precious metals, and of copper, from the empire. When he became Shōgun in 1716 there had been no drain of silver for more than thirty years. The Dutch had been prohibited from exporting the white metal in 1668; and the Chinese in 1685. The latter had never taken gold away and the Hollanders were furnished with their gold at such an exorbitant profit to the Japanese that the few *Koban* the Company now exported were taken sorely against the grain. Although a maximum of 25,000 piculs had been set upon their annual export of copper in 1685, an extra export had sometimes been connived at, and in 1698 the lading amounted to 29,397 piculs. In 1715 the maximum was reduced to 15,000 piculs. In 1721 it was still further lowered to 10,000 piculs. The state of affairs must have been very puzzling to the Dutchmen; but it is very easy for us to understand it. The treatment accorded the annual mission to Yedo was now far better than it had been in Kämpfer's time. There were no more of the undignified variety shows the envoys had to furnish to the Shōgun; on the contrary the mission was treated with courtesy and respect. Yoshimune had been shown some Dutch books with engravings, and he had conceived a high opinion of Dutch civilization. In 1721 he abolished

the old law of 1630, forbidding the translation of European works, and he encouraged his officers to learn as much from the Dutch as they could.

When he reduced the annual export of copper first to 10,000, and later on to 5,000 piculs in 1743, the Hollanders fancied that he was trying to drive them out of the empire. Their complete withdrawal from Japan was the last thing the Shōgun desired, but he did not want them to deplete the country of its ores; and so he kept tendering them various Japanese products in lieu of copper, products, however, which the Dutch declared they could turn to no advantage. He had early grasped the fact that the empire, with all emigration forbidden by law, was face to face with a dire population question. The measures he took to deal with that have been set forth in a previous chapter. Naturally, the effect of some of these must have been felt by the Dutch and Chinese traders. For one thing, the Shōgun was trying to grow sugar and ginseng and to produce as many other foreign commodities as he could in Japan. For another, the spirit of simplicity, sobriety, and economy, he tried to inculcate among officials and feudal potentates had a tendency to reduce the demand for the objects of luxury and the curiosities on which Dutch and Chinese alike had hitherto made extravagant profits. As a matter of fact, the Chinese were more seriously affected by the new limitations than were the Dutch. The seventy Chinese junks were reduced first to twenty, and then to half that number, while the Chinese were also greatly stinted in their allowance of copper.

When, however, in 1743, the Japanese authorities notified the Dutch that henceforth one ship per annum would be enough to take away their reduced quantum of copper, they found that for once their zeal had outrun their discretion. This step on their part was met by Imhoff, the Governor-General at Batavia, with a courteously worded intimation, that if the proposed regulations were enforced, the Factory of Deshima would be abandoned forthwith, and thereupon the Japanese not only receded from their ground but promised some new concessions. The result was that from 1745, for the next ten years onwards, the average annual profits of the Company advanced to nearly 680,000 guilders (£56,500), and that, too, in spite of the fact that, meanwhile (1750), the export of gold had been totally prohibited. It is true that this restriction did not affect the public trade of the Company in any

way, for, having to purchase the new light *koban* at 68 *mas*, any exchange operations in gold would have been disastrous. But the Company's servants, who still enjoyed their right of private trade, contrived to acquire these coins at their current value in Japan and made a considerable profit by getting them smuggled out of the country. The Company was none too well served by its Deshima agents, who knew no Japanese, took no interest in what was going on around them, and generally conducted themselves in a fashion that did little to win for them the respect of those Japanese who were really desirous of knowing something about the civilization of Holland. As a rule, they had no interests beyond their ledgers, their guilders, and the schnapps; and, being not incorrectly estimated by the Japanese as dollar-grinders, pure and simple, they were regarded by the best of them with a good deal of not undeserved contempt.¹ In 1755 the Director again thought fit to complain about scanty profits, and to prefer new requests, and went so far as once more to threaten the abandonment of the Deshima Factory. This time, to his unpleasant surprise, he was curtly told that the Dutch were at liberty either to go or to stay, as they listed. They stayed; and the Japanese raised the tax on copper till the Japan trade began to bring the Company more loss than profit. However, the Hollanders kept on complaining—among other things, of the cost of the annual mission to Yedo, and succeeded in finding means to throw a good deal of the expenses in connexion with it upon the Nagasaki Treasury. In 1764, it was proposed to them that they should go on the embassy on alternate years only, but the local agents, who obtained considerable perquisites from the journey, declined this offer. These agents, with their private trade and their smuggling, still continued to eke out a fairly comfortable material existence, and in their interest as much as

¹ Two incidents may help us to appreciate the mental calibre of some of these worthy gentlemen. At Batavia, Thunberg tells us that Feith, with whom he had gone on the embassy to Yedo in 1776, on being asked at table what the name of the ruling Shōgun was, had to confess that he did not know. And yet Feith had been in Japan fourteen years and had headed the mission to the Shōgun's Court no fewer than five times. The amount of intelligent interest he took in his general surroundings was evidently not very great. On the other hand, the interest the Deshima agents took in their guilders was exceedingly keen. In 1765, the Shōgun expressed a wish to obtain a pair of Persian horses. They were later offered as a present, were gladly accepted, and the Dutch got a return present of copper worth some 45,000 guilders. Later on another pair of horses were asked for and delivered. The Shōgun's favourite son—the Dutch call him the Crown Prince—was killed by a fall from one of these horses, and the father was so frantic that he poniarded the unhappy man that brought the news to him. And the directors of the Company, notwithstanding, kept on repeatedly asking for a return present for the horses!

anything else, perhaps, the Deshima establishment was still maintained. About 1771 or 1772 one of those unforeseen accidents that will now and then happen to dislocate the most cleverly planned and sharpest schemes, occurred. In one or other of these years, one of the annual vessels from Batavia, disabled in a typhoon, was abandoned by her crew, who, in their haste neglected the standing order of the Company in such cases to set her on fire. She did not sink but some few days after she drifted to the coast of Japan, and was towed into the harbour of Nagasaki. On board this derelict the Japanese found a number of chests—all marked with the names of the Dutch functionaries to whom they belonged or were consigned—crammed full to their lids with contraband goods. Hitherto it had been usual for the captains of the ships and the director of the Factory to pass at pleasure to and from the ships without being searched, but this discovery made the astute Japanese (to use a vulgar locution) “smell a rat”—and a fat one, too. In reality, the captains had profited by their immunity from the general search to dress themselves out, for the express purpose of smuggling, in a gorgeous blue silk, silver-laced coat, cut very large and bounteously, and in this mandarin apparel they were wont to make three trips a day to and fro from Deshima, generally so loaded down with goods that they had to be supported by a sailor under each arm. The Japanese, on seeing the nature of the contents of the chests discovered on the derelict, came to the conclusion that it might be just as well to bring all and sundry, captains and director not excepted, under the scope of the search regulations. This resolution—a very natural one in the circumstances—gave rise to much impotent gnashing of the teeth among the highly respectable Dutch smugglers, and to one exceedingly comical incident at least. In 1775, Carl Thunberg, the great Swedish scientist, arrived in Japan, and the captain of the vessel that brought him had not heard of the new regulations. The worthy skipper had rigged himself in the usual capacious blue silk, silver-laced mandarin style but, much to his disappointment, the Japanese officers who boarded the vessel brought orders that he should dress like the rest; that he and the director should also be searched when they landed, and that the skipper should either stop on board, or, if he landed, should remain on shore, being allowed to visit the ship only twice during her stay. “It was droll enough,” says Thunberg, “to see the astonishment the sudden reduction

in the size of our bulky captain excited in the major part of the ignorant Japanese, who before had always imagined that all our captains were actually as fat and lusty as they appeared to be."

The Japanese, put upon their mettle by the discoveries they had made in the Dutch derelict of 1771 or 1772, were now very strict in the discharge of their Custom-house duties. The examination of the clothes and persons of all who passed to and from the ship was so strict that not even the very smallest of contraband articles could be landed. The large chests were turned upside down, and their sides, tops, and bottoms sounded to see if they were not—like so many promises—hollow. Beds were ripped open and the feathers turned over, as if the Dutch had not been proverbial for their cleanliness. Iron spikes were thrust into the butter-tubs and preserve-jars; a square hole was cut in the Gouda cheeses, and they were mangled by a thick pointed wire being thrust through their interiors in every direction. Even some of the innocent but addled eggs laid by the Javanese hens in Batavia were broken, to make sure that they did not harbour contraband valuables. From Thunberg the Swedish scholar and gentleman, we get some hints of the why and wherefore of the contempt showered upon the vulgar and grasping Dutch traders by the more refined Japanese clients.

"Formerly the Dutch took the liberty to correct with blows the Japanese coolies employed on board the ship; but in his time this was absolutely prohibited. The respect of the Japanese for the Dutch was, he writes, not a little diminished from their observing "in how unfriendly and unmannerly a style they usually behave to each other, and the brutal treatment which the sailors under their command frequently experience from them, together with the oaths, curses, and blows with which the poor fellows are assailed by them."

Nor does the account he gives of the life in Deshima tend to induce us to rate the intellectual and moral characteristics of the dozen or thirteen permanent prisoners then resident in it very highly.

"A European that remains here is in a manner dead and buried in an obscure corner of the globe. He hears no news of any kind; nothing relative to war or other misfortunes and evils that plague and infest mankind; and neither the rumours of inland or foreign concerns delight or molest his ear. The soul possesses here one faculty only, which is the judgment (if, indeed, it be at all times in possession of that). The will is totally debilitated, and even dead, because to a European there is no other will than that of the Japanese, by which he must exactly square his conduct. The European way of living is, in other

respects, the same as in other parts of India, luxurious and irregular. Hence, just as at Batavia, we pay a visit every evening to the chief, after having walked several times up and down the two streets. These evening visits generally last from six o'clock till ten, and sometimes even eleven or twelve at night, and constitute a very disagreeable way of life, fit only for such as have no other way of spending their time than droning over a pipe of tobacco and a bottle. Through the incapacity in some, and indolence in others, the Dutch possessed no Japanese vocabulary, and all the knowledge they had of the language did not go beyond the names of a few familiar articles."

In spite of all the troubles they had had with the Japanese, Thunberg found the Dutch on their embassy to Yedo were now better treated than they had been in Kämpfer's time. In 1691-2, only the director had been allowed to use a *norimon* (palanquin), the doctor and the secretary being compelled to go on horseback. Now all the Europeans in the party were promoted to the dignity of being carried in palanquins. Again, at the Court itself, the old tomfoolery of a variety show before the Shōgun and his Court was dispensed with; the Shōgun in lieu of this merely coming *incognito* to the ante-chamber to have a nearer view of the Hollanders and their dress. It appears also that in receiving the ambassador, who as usual made his obeisance in the Japanese fashion, the Shōgun and the heir apparent stood, instead of as usual sitting, "in the most interior part of the room." Altogether, on this occasion, the mission had little to complain of in the cordiality and courtesy of its reception. Indeed, it would seem that about this date an influential Liberal party, in favour of extended foreign intercourse, was forming, and if the Dutch directors had really been men of tact and ability, they might easily have reaped solid advantages from the new development. However, the man able to gauge the political situation and to profit by it did not appear until Titsingh arrived in Deshima in August, 1779.

For once at least, the Company now had an agent in Japan who was very much more than a mere man of business. A good man of business Titsingh undoubtedly was; but in addition he was a scholar and a diplomatist, and, if we are to accept Siebold's estimate of him, a statesman. Very courteous, but at the same time very frank and very firm, he at once made a most favourable impression upon the ablest men among the better-class Japanese, as one who respected himself as well as them, and so when he refused to submit to personal search, as former directors had done, on the ground that it was inconsistent with his dignity, the authorities, so far from

insisting or arguing the matter with him, not only at once yielded the point, but from that date onwards treated him with the most marked courtesy. In a very short time, he found himself not merely on a friendly but on an intimate footing with them. This he achieved in a very simple way. He kept profit-making in its proper place—which was the background—and promoted his advantage and that of his employers by displaying a real and unfeigned interest in the institutions, the sociology, and the history of the people among whom his lot was not unhappily cast for the time being. In a remarkable passage, whose general correctness is marred by one unfortunate statement, however, Siebold, without referring to Titsingh or mentioning him by name, explains the why and wherefore of the astonishing success the latter achieved in Japan.

“The Japanese,” writes Siebold, “is an enthusiast for his Fatherland, and proud of the great deeds of his ancestors; the educated as well as the ordinary man has an unlimited devotion to the ancient dynasty of the Mikados, and is deeply attached to the old civilization, the ancient customs and usages. Accordingly the stranger within the gates recommends himself in no common degree, if he flatters the nationality of the Japanese, if he holds their religion, their customs and their usages in honour, and lends a willing ear to the recital of their ancient Sagas, and the eulogies of their deified heroes. Of this weak side of the Japanese the old Netherlanders were perfectly well aware, and knew very well how to profit by it. It was also by this simple means that the tradal advantages accorded in modern times were acquired by Herrn Doeff and J. C. Blomhoff.”

The unfortunate assertion in this passage is that the “old Netherlanders” were fully aware of this amiable and far from contemptible “weak side” of the Japanese. The only “old” servants of the Dutch East India Company who appear to have been aware of it were Caron, Kämpfer, and Thunberg. Not one of these was a Netherlander. Caron was born of French parents in Holland; and the obtuse materialism of the Dutch traders constrained him to leave their employment with disgust, and to take service under Colbert. Kämpfer was a German, and although he knew this amiable weak side of the Japanese, he, according to his own account, relied much more upon a “submissive behaviour”, bribery and—the bottle!¹ Thunberg was a Swede, and although

¹ In recounting the means he took to acquire the assistance of the Japanese in his botanical studies, Kämpfer writes: “But I must confess, likewise, that at the beginning of our journey I took what pains and tried what means I could to procure the friendship and assistance of my fellow-travellers, obliging some with

he was also aware of this "weak side" of the Japanese, he obtained his liberty to botanize in the environs of Nagasaki chiefly by playing upon the sponging proclivities of the petty Japanese officials.¹ But Titsingh's own mental ability and moral backbone made any recourse to bribery or the bottle with the lower ranks of officialdom entirely unnecessary. Quick to take their cue from the attitude of their superiors, as soon as they perceived that these superiors were treating the new director as what he undoubtedly was—a gentleman—they were not slow to become very polite towards him. Nay, not merely polite, but exceedingly helpful. Titsingh was an assiduous book-hunter; and in procuring him the works he wanted they were very ready to assist, while the interpreters aided him to fathom their meaning in a fashion that evoked his heartiest commendation. Five of these knew enough Dutch to be highly serviceable, and of these he writes:—

"Far from finding them suspicious and reluctant, as Europeans are usually pleased to represent these persons, in order to palliate their own indolence, they manifested, on the contrary, an eagerness to procure for me every practicable information, to consult in various matters beyond their capacity the best informed individuals among the magistrates and clergy, and to furnish me with books which might serve as a guide to my labours."

Titsingh made many friends in Yedo, whither he went as envoy in 1780 and 1782. Usually it was the physician of the party who, on account of his superior scientific attainments, was the centre of attraction to the scholars of the capital. It must have therefore been somewhat of a surprise to the Japanese to find in the head of the mission a man of extensive learning and of rare mental ability. Accordingly, with the real intellectual society of Yedo Titsingh at once became exceedingly popular, and with several of the friends he made here—Kuchiki, Daimyō of Fukuchiyama in Tamba, among others—he maintained a regular correspondence not merely while in Deshima but for years after he had left Japan. As has been said, for some dozen years or so previous to this, as regards

a submissive humble conduct and ready assistance as to physic and physical advice, others with secret rewards for the very meanest favours and services." Again, in dealing with the search for contraband or prohibited goods of exports in the houses of Dutch before embarking from Deshima, he remarks: "Upon my own departure, although my things *for good reasons* were visited but slightly, *and over a bottle*, yet they seized upon an old Japanese razor and a few other things, just because they happened to see them."

¹ Every one of his half-day excursions cost him some £4 or £5 in providing a feast for the useless parasites that invariably attached themselves to him.

extended foreign intercourse, a spirit of liberalism had been in the air. In 1769, Matsudaira, Settsu-no-Kami, a member of the Junior Council (*Wakadoshiyori*), had actually gone so far as to propose the construction of ships and junks suitable for long over-sea voyages, and Titsingh asserts that it was only his premature death that prevented the abolition of the restrictions upon Japanese ship-building and foreign trade. Still, in spite of the death of its leader, the liberal party was fairly strong. Says Titsingh :—

“ Though many Japanese of the highest distinction, and intimately acquainted with matters of government, still consider Japan as the first empire of the world, and care but little for what passes out of it, yet such persons are denominated by the more enlightened *Ido-no-Kawadzu*—that is, ‘ Frogs in a Well ’—a metaphorical expression which signifies that when they look up they can see no more of the sky than what the small circumference of the well allows them to perceive.”¹

At this date Tanuma, the Chief Councillor, was all-powerful in Yedo, and, as has been remarked elsewhere, has been limned by contemporary pamphleteers and chroniclers in the blackest of colours. His son had lately been appointed a member of the Junior Council, and if we are to believe Titsingh, this appointment caused the Conservatives extreme chagrin, for the Liberals made no secret of their hope that when the young man succeeded his father he would “ widen the road ”. As it was, the innovations he introduced roused the hatred of the “ Frog-in-the-Well ” Court grandees, and the result was the assassination of the younger Tanuma in the palace itself by one of those political fanatics who have done so much to besmirch the pages of Japanese history (13th May, 1784).

The death of Tanuma, like that of Matsudaira, Settsu-no-Kami, proved fatal to a project which might well have modified the subsequent history of the empire. In 1783 Tango-no-Kami, Governor of Nagasaki, probably acting on Tanuma’s instructions, had requested Titsingh to bring carpenters from Batavia to instruct the Japanese in building more substantial vessels for the transport of copper from Ōsaka to Nagasaki. The ostensible reason for this was the frequent loss of junks and their cargoes on the trip ; but it may be surmised that what really lay at the bottom of the affair was an intention of proceeding cautiously to the realization of

¹ Old Japanese proverb, “ *I no kwazu daikai wo shirazu*, ” A frog in a well knows nothing of the great Ocean.

Matsudaira's project of 1769.¹ Skilled carpenters were scarce at Batavia, and could not be sent from there, so Titsingh proposed to carry a number of Japanese with him when he returned to be instructed in the Batavian dockyards. The prohibition against any native leaving the country made this course impossible, and thereupon Titsingh promised to have a model ship built at Batavia, and conveyed to Nagasaki. The promise was faithfully kept, but the assassination of Tanuma and the croaking of the "Frogs-in-the-Well", who were now regaining the ascendancy, made the model ship of scant service, and indeed put an end to all hopes that had been formed of a modification in the exclusive policy of the Japanese.

It might have been expected that during his three visits to Japan, Titsingh would have found means to improve the conditions of the Deshima trade. He did find means to do so very easily. In 1782, in consequence of the war between Great Britain and the Netherlands, no ships appeared from Batavia; and the director took advantage of the fact to stipulate for a considerable advance in the prices of the Dutch imports for the next fifteen years.

Before half that term had elapsed, however, the Dutch trade in Deshima was in a more desperate position than it had ever been in before. In the first place, beginning with 1783, there was a succession of five terrible famines, which reduced the population of the empire by a good deal more than 1,000,000 souls. In such a situation the authorities were averse to seeing money squandered upon the articles of luxury—or at least not of necessity—which constituted the bulk of the Dutch imports; while, wedded as they were to a strong belief in an extreme form of that mercantile theory of political economy (of which, perhaps, they had never heard), they deemed it no advantage to a suffering country to be depleted

¹ Ōsaka, or rather Sakai, was the seat of Japanese copper-smelting. A merchant of Ōsaka, Sumitomo by name, was taught by a Portuguese named Haku-sui about 1590, how to separate silver from lead or copper, even when it occurs in a small quantity only. Sumitomo introduced the new process in his metallurgical works, rose in wealth and power, and received an Imperial patent for the purification of copper and the separation of silver from lead and copper. In 1691, when Kämpfer was in Japan, the Sumitomos acquired the mine of Besshi in Shikoku, which even to-day is the chief source of wealth of that great mercantile house. In Kämpfer's time most of the copper came from Kii, Echigo, and Suruga. "That of Suruga is charged with a considerable quantity of gold, which the Japanese at present (1691-2) separate and refine much better than they did formerly, which occasions great complaints among the refiners and Brahmines upon the coast of Coromandel. All the copper is brought to Sakai, one of the five Imperial towns, where it is refined and cast into small cylinders about a span and a half long and a finger thick."

of its metallic resources. Then, again, the Conservatives had meanwhile been rapidly regaining power in the Yedo councils, and when, with the appointment of Matsudaira Sadanobu as Regent during the minority of the new Shōgun Iyenari, the elder Tanuma was driven from office in 1786, the last hope of the Liberals vanished. Shintōism, thanks to Moto-ori's efforts, was now making strong headway, and, according to its teaching, the autochthonous Japanese, the offspring of gods, only degraded and disgraced themselves by a maintenance of intercourse with outer barbarians, from whom they could derive neither temporary nor temporal benefit. Last of all, the factors, who came after Titsingh's final departure in 1784, seem to have been fitted rather for bagmen than for the cultured representatives of a great territorial power, treated in Japan on the footing of Daimyō. The old complaints about taels and guilders, and small profits, and great expenses, and all the rest of a petty shopkeeper's grievances were again revived, and the Conservatives of Yedo, with their open contempt for the mere trader and his money bags, were in no mood to listen to all these dismal rigmaroles about percentages and expenses and losses. In 1789 the Dutch actually discontinued their annual presents to the Governors and officials of Nagasaki, and complained bitterly about the expenses of the embassy to Yedo. In the following year they were informed that although the presents had to be forwarded annually as before, an embassy would henceforth be received only once every four years, and that from that date not 10,000 but only 6,000 piculs of copper (5,300 for the Company, and 700 for the Director) were to be exported annually, and only one, not two, Dutch ships allowed to come to Nagasaki every autumn. At the same time, however, in lieu of copper some new articles of export were offered, but the Dutch took no advantage of the concession. They continued their complaints to the Governor of Nagasaki, and these unexpected conditions led to the discovery (1792) that the interpreters had failed to communicate to them the exact purport of the contemptuous reply returned to their representations two years before. For this offence the chief interpreter had to pay dearly, and the passage he had suppressed in the instructions issued in reply to the requests of the Hollanders was now imparted to them in all its curt severity.

“ If the Netherlanders press in future for any greater increase in the export of copper, then not only shall their demand be refused ;

but the goods they have brought for it shall be burned, and trade with Japan entirely forbidden to them."

The Netherlands had cried "Wolf" too often already with regard to the threat of abandoning Deshima; the Conservative Yedo Cabinet under the influence of the pragmatic and ultra-nationalistic Regent, Matsudaira Sadanobu, now gave them clearly to understand that such a threat would not so much be regarded with equanimity as resented as a piece of presumptuous impertinence seeing that the presence of the Hollanders in Deshima was now not so much an advantage to the empire as a nuisance that had to be tolerated in consequence of the ill-judged promise of the deified Iyeyasu made to them nearly two centuries before.

The Chinese, who had ever been envious of that privilege of sending an embassy to Court which the Dutch regarded as a burden, now seized this opportunity to petition for the favour once more. The petition was refused; but the petitioners were graciously allowed to export more than twice the amount of copper assigned to the Dutch—13,000 piculs.

Meanwhile in Europe and elsewhere the Hollanders had had to face a succession of calamities. The war with England in 1780-3 had almost ruined their foreign commerce for the time being, and one Article in the Treaty of Peace had assured the British full freedom of trade with the Dutch India possessions. In 1787 the internal dissensions of the Netherlands had to be allayed by Prussian armed intervention, and the United Provinces had then to enter into a reluctant and compulsory alliance with Great Britain as well as with Prussia. In 1794-5, the French cavalry occupied Amsterdam, and advancing across the ice, captured the whole Dutch fleet then at the Texel. The next six years, down to the Peace of Amiens in 1801, witnessed a Constitution-mongering and a kaleidoscopic succession of governments that did far more damage to the country than did the loss of its fleet at the battle of Camperdown in 1797. The great Dutch East India Company had paid no dividend since 1782, and in 1798 it was finally dissolved.¹ The effects of this ultimately made themselves felt as far distant as Deshima, on the other side of the world. Dutch vessels were no longer available to maintain its communications with Batavia, and

¹ During the 198 years of its existence it had paid 3,600½ per cent. in dividends, an annual average of 18 per cent.

foreign ships had to be chartered. This circumstance is interesting from the fact that it led to the first appearance of the American flag in Japanese waters—in 1797, fourteen years after the acknowledgment of American independence, and fifty-six years before Perry's appearance at Uraga. The arrival of the first of these American vessels—the *Eliza*, Captain Stewart (who, however, was an Englishman who passed himself off as an American), created a great sensation among the Nagasaki officials. The interpreters at once perceived that the crew did not speak Dutch, but English ; and it was with the greatest difficulty that they were made to understand that although the men spoke English, they were not “the English”, but belonged to another nation ; and, what was still more vital, that they had nothing to do with the trade, but were merely hired to bring the goods in order to save them from capture. Hemmy, the head of the Factory, had succeeded in getting this explanation accepted by the Yedo Court, when next year disquieting incidents occurred. He had then gone on the second of the quadriennial embassies, and had been well received, when he died suddenly at Kakegawa on his return journey—having poisoned himself, as was generally thought. Then it was reported that the authorities discovered a project for establishing tradal relations between the Dutch and the Daimyō of Satsuma. The Japanese compromised in the affair were severely punished, but although “there were sharp speeches against the Dutch” they did not suffer. Rather, indeed, the reverse ; for after an *ōmetsuke* (censor) had come down from Yedo to visit Nagasaki and Deshima, the copper exports were increased, while Hemmy's family received a considerable present from the Shōgun, and the Governors of Nagasaki exerted themselves to make the Dutch mission to Yedo an annual one, as it had been before.

The *Eliza* came again to Japan in 1798, and in 1799, 1800, 1801, 1802, and 1803, the annual vessels were also American ; while, in 1806 there came under the Dutch flag an American and a Bremener ; in 1807 an American and a Dane, and in 1809, another American. From that year, down to 1817, there was no Dutch trade done at Deshima. In 1801 the Japanese began to complain about these American vessels, the Governor of Nagasaki going so far as to remark that “if the Company for any reason whatsoever was no longer in a position to carry on its trade with Japan itself, then all reason for the stay of the Hollanders in Japan disappeared”. To the Dutch-

men this seemed a mere pretext for dispensing with their Company, for they had heard that the authorities were at the same time negotiating with the Chinese for a full supply of those European and Indian products which constituted their own staples of import. Indeed, the supply of these commodities brought by the Cantonese junks was very considerable, for the Chinese could obtain these articles from the English East India Company's factory in Canton in exchange for tea on very advantageous terms. In England at this time the development of the factory system was proceeding apace, and in the supplies furnished to establishments like that at Canton the Dutch had seen such a menace that Titsingh had been sent to Peking in 1794 expressly to counterwork Macartney's mission there. However, it is likely that the Japanese were perfectly sincere in their complaints. They saw in these non-Dutch vessels an insidious attempt on the part of Europeans to break down the barriers of seclusion they had maintained for more than a century and a half. Shortly before this there had been several open attempts to obtain that end. In 1791, the *Argonaut*, an English vessel employed in the north-west American fur industry, arrived on the west coast of Japan, and attempted to trade there; in 1795-7, Captain Broughton touched at several points in Saghalien, then Japanese territory, and Japanese officers were dispatched from Yezo to restrict his communications and to send him away as speedily as possible.

All these attempts were still fresh in the memory of the Japanese when in 1800, Captain Stewart, who had brought the Dutch goods to Japan in an American ship in 1797, and 1798, now appeared in an American brig with a cargo of his own, and endeavoured to open up commercial relations with the empire, not on account of the Dutch, but of himself.¹ In 1803, Stewart in company with Torrey

¹ The *Eliza*, laden with camphor and copper, struck on a hidden rock as she was leaving Nagasaki for Batavia in 1798 and sank. All attempts to raise her were abortive till a Japanese fisherman achieved the task in a very ingenious yet very simple way. For this achievement he was made a *Samurai* by his lord the Daimyō of Saga. (This is interesting as going to indicate that in certain of the fiefs a plebeian of merit could occasionally elevate himself in the social scale.) When repaired and reloaded, the *Eliza* set sail again, only to be dismantled in a storm, and while she was refitting at Nagasaki the ship of 1799 came in. Stewart did not wait for her company but sailed in the *Eliza*, in which he never reached Batavia. Next year, according to one account, "he reappeared at Nagasaki, representing himself as having been shipwrecked with the loss of everything"; but as having found a friend at Manila who had enabled him to buy and lade the brig in which he had now come back, for the purpose, as he said, of discharging

reappeared with two vessels flying American colours, but really as the envoys of Calcutta merchants eager to open up a trade with Japan. He was supplied with water and fuel gratuitously, but was told to carry his rich cargoes of Indian and Chinese goods elsewhere.

Thus, the Japanese may very well have entertained a suspicion that in employing foreign ships to bring their cargoes to Deshima the Hollanders were really in collusion with other Western Powers in an attempt to force Japan open to the trade of the world. The attitude taken up by the Dutch towards Stewart in 1803 tended, however, to dispel this suspicion, and next year the appearance of a ship of Dutch nationality confirmed the impression that the Hollanders were really not playing false. In 1805 the annual ship was also a Dutchman, and this was perhaps fortunate, for the Dutch had been once more compromised by the appearance of other European claimants for intercourse with the hermit empire.

The first accredited envoy from any European Court to Japan, since the repulse of the mission from Lisbon in 1647, appeared at Nagasaki in 1804, on board the first European man-of-war that ever cast anchor in a Japanese harbour. Both envoy and ship had come from St. Petersburg—or rather from Kronstadt.

To understand the purport and importance of this mission, it becomes necessary to cast a brief glance at the Russian advance to and on the Pacific. The Muscovites first reached the Great Ocean by water when the Cossack Dejneff made his extraordinary voyage from the river Kolyma through Behring Strait to Anadyr in 1648. This route was never followed again till modern times, and for generations the only communications between Russia and the Pacific were overland. As a matter of fact the Russians had reached the Sea of Okhotsk in 1639, nine years before Dejneff's wonderful expedition. In 1649, the town of Okhotsk was founded, and it was long the sole Russian base in Far Eastern seas. It was here that Behring's ships were put together and fitted out mainly with materials sent overland from Europe; and, for long afterwards, all the Russian ships that sailed the Pacific came from the slips of

out of the sale of her cargo his debt due to the Factory for the advances made for the repairs of his lost vessel. Director Waardenaar, however, saw, or thought he saw, in this proceeding a scheme for gaining a commercial footing at Nagasaki independent of the regular trade from Batavia. He caused the goods to be sold and applied to the discharge of Stewart's debt; but he declined to furnish any return cargo for the brig, and he arrested Stewart and sent him a prisoner to Batavia; whence, however, soon after his arrival there, he made his escape.

Okhotsk. Kamchatka was occupied about 1700, and a second Far Eastern base was ultimately established at Petropavlovsk. The Kurile Islands soon attracted the attention of the Russians ; in 1713 the Cossack Kosierewski made his way as far south as Kunashir. Twenty-three years later, in 1736, the Japanese annals record the appearance of a Danish ship on the Nambu coast. This vessel was no Dane, but she was commanded by the Dane, Spagenberg, then in the Russian service. Forty years later, in 1777, Potonchew was surveying the seas to the north of Japan, ten years before the appearance of La Perouse in the same waters.

Long before this the Russians had come into contact with stray Japanese castaways who were stranded on the coast of the continent from time to time. We hear of a Japanese crew being hospitably treated by them as early as 1690 ; and we know of several such incidents in the course of the next century. In 1778 some Russians appeared at Nemuro in quest of trade, but were informed, after a year's delay, that all the foreign trade of Japan was limited to Nagasaki. In 1782, a junk from Ise was wrecked among the Aleutian Islands, and her rescued crew were sent to Irkutsk where they learned Russian. A few years later, Catherine II of Russia thought of opening up relations with Japan and in 1792 she instructed the Governor of Siberia to send the Irkutsk Japanese home, and to dispatch an envoy along with them, not as from her, but as from himself. Lieutenant Laxman was selected for the mission ; he sailed from Okhotsk in the autumn of 1792 and passed the winter at Nemuro in Yezo. Next spring he proceeded to Hakodate, whence he went by land to Matsumaye. Here, after communicating with Yedo, the authorities handed him a document to the effect :—

“ That although it was ordained by the laws of Japan that any foreigners landing upon the coast, except at Nagasaki, should be seized and perpetually imprisoned ; yet, considering the ignorance of the Russians, and their having brought back the shipwrecked Japanese, they might be permitted to depart on condition of never approaching, under any pretence, any part of the coast except Nagasaki. As to the Japanese, brought back, the Government was much obliged to the Russians, who, however, were at liberty to leave them or take them away again as they pleased, it being a law of Japan that such persons ceased to be Japanese, and became the subjects of that Government into whose hands destiny cast them. With respect to commercial negotiations, those could only take place at Nagasaki ; and a paper was sent authorizing a Russian vessel to enter that port for that purpose ; but as the

Christian religion was not allowed in Japan, any persons admitted into Nagasaki must carefully abstain from it.”¹

The Japanese seem to have expected the speedy arrival of a Russian mission at Nagasaki; at all events the sea-board Daimyō were notified that the appearance of Russian vessels off their coasts might be looked for. But none came; and all excitement about the Muscovites would probably have died down but for the circumstance that the Bakufu at least learned that a Russian settlement of some eighty men had been established on the island of Urup in 1795. At this time, the Japanese used to send parties to trade with the Ainu in the neighbouring island of Iterup in summer, but they had there no permanent establishment. In 1786 the Bakufu sent a commission to explore Yezo, with the interior of which, and with even a great part of the coast-line, the authorities were still unacquainted. In the following years commissioners continued to be dispatched on similar missions, and all through the closing years of the century the Shōgun's officers were very active in Yezo, in Saghalin, and in the southernmost of the Kuriles, the Russian settlement in Urup being regarded as a serious menace. The settlers had diminished to fourteen, and, by forbidding the Ainu to have any dealings with them, the Japanese tried hard to starve them out. Meanwhile they had put the greater part of Matsumaye fief under direct Bakufu control; had garrisoned posts in Yezo and in Iterup with levies from Tsugaru and Nambu; had surveyed and charted a direct sea-route from Nemuro to Yedo, and had dispatched the famous mathematician, Ino Chūkei, to make a map of Yezo and its dependencies. In 1800, Takadaya Kahei, a merchant of Hyōgo, built a vessel of 1,500 *koku* burthen, and with her opened up communication between Iterup, Hakodate, and Yedo. We hear of this craft hoisting the *Hi no maru* or Sun-flag of Japan—and we learn a good deal about this Takadaya Kahei from foreign sources, for in 1812 he was captured by the Russians, and he appears as Tachatay-Kachi in the narratives of Golownin and Rikord. Altogether this little outpost of the Russian Fur Company on Urup occasioned the Japanese a large amount of

¹ It ought, perhaps, to be said that Laxman although instructed by Catherine II to proceed on his mission, was ostensibly the representative of the Governor of Irkutsk. In this city, Catherine II had introduced into the Navigation School a Professorship of Japanese, the chair being filled by occupants selected from Japanese shipwrecked from time to time on the coast of Siberia. It was from the Japanese Professor in Irkutsk (a member of the Greek Church) that Klaproth (1806) acquired his knowledge of the language.

worry and anxiety. At last on 27th September, 1804, the Governor of this Fur Company sailed into Nagasaki harbour in a Russian man-of-war as envoy from Alexander I to the "Emperor" of Japan.

"When Shelikov, the Siberian fur-trader and merchant, visited St. Petersburg in 1788, Rezánov, then a young man of twenty-four, met the great colonizer by chance and immediately became interested in his plan to obtain a monopoly of the fur-trade in the islands and territories added by the Golikov-Shelikov Company to Russia, a monopoly which would not only increase vastly the wealth of the stockholders, but prevent the wholesale slaughter of sables, seals, otters, and foxes by small traders and foreigners. Rezánov became a partner in the Company, and developed an astonishing capacity for business and hard work. When Shelikov died in 1795, having obtained from Catherine only a moiety of the power and privileges he had solicited, his new partner's ambitions had far outrun his own. The two leading companies had been amalgamated, several others had been drawn in, ships and factories had been built and protected by forts, but it remained for Rezánov to father the first great Trust put into operation on American soil. For this a charter was necessary."

The charter was at last obtained in 1799, after great difficulties had been overcome.

"Rezánov was now the guardian of a Company granted, for a period of twenty years, full and exclusive privileges in hunting, trading, building, and in all new discoveries over the vast region beginning from 55 degrees north, and including the long chain of islands between Kamchatka and Alaska, and the archipelago between Kamchatka and Japan. Alaska contained over 500,000 square miles, and there were numberless other islands besides those included in the archipelagos, all of them the haunts of the richest fur-bearing animals in the world.

The Emperor Paul was murdered in 1801. Alexander, young, ardent, ambitious, ascended the throne, and the most brilliant and energetic member of his Court had no difficulty in persuading him to fit out an expedition to circumnavigate the globe, and include a diplomatic mission to Japan. In 1803, the *Nadesha* and the *Neva* put out of the harbour of Kronstadt, and, after a voyage of fourteen months, hazardous and uncomfortable, but scientifically valuable (during which Rezánov kept a diary that is preserved in the St. Petersburg Academy of Science), the ships separated, and the one bearing the Ambassador entered with pomp and pride the waters of Japan."¹

The "pomp and pride" had but little success on this occasion. Difficulties at once began when the *Nadesha* was boarded by the Japanese officials, accompanied by Doeff, the chief of the Deshima factory. The officers insisted on treating the Russian warship

¹ See Miss Atherton's essay on Rezánov in the *North American Review* for May, 1909. The great man from Kyôto she there speaks of was really a rather humble official from Yedo, Toyama, a *metsuke* or censor.

as they did the Dutch merchant-men, and ordered her armament to be sent ashore. Rezánov ultimately agreed to give up his powder, and no more ; he also brusquely refused the prostrations which the Governor's underlings demanded as representatives of the "Emperor". After these questions had been referred to Yedo, the *Nadesha* was at last assigned an anchorage, the Dutch ships being removed to another and a distant berth. After the first evening, the only communication between the Dutch and the Russians were clandestine, connived at by the interpreters, and it was only after Rezánov had become seriously ill that he was allowed to land, after permission had been obtained from Yedo. Finally, about seventy days after his arrival, a storehouse was constructed for the envoy on a small island, so closely hedged in with bamboos that nothing within it could be seen. The guard of seven marines who landed with him were permitted to carry muskets, but they were allowed no powder, and the *Nadesha* was constantly surrounded by guard-boats during the whole of her stay. After a detention of nearly six months, Rezánov was informed that a representative of the "Emperor" had arrived in Nagasaki, and that he would be received in audience on the following day. It took a long time to settle all the details of the prospective interview. Rezánov was given to understand that he must prostrate himself before this functionary.

"He declined to do so in the name of the Emperor of all the Russias but, after more parleys, he consented, there being no chairs in the hall of audience, to sit on his heels for a few minutes."

Next day he was taken ashore in the Prince of Hizen's barge, and carried to the Governor's house in Doeffer's palanquin, which had been borrowed for the occasion. But all his suite had to walk ; all doors and windows were closed, the street gates fastened, and the inhabitants told to keep out of sight. At the first interview nothing was done.¹

¹ To quote Miss Atherton : "If Rezánov looked anything like the full length painting of him lost in the fire of San Francisco, which had been brought down from Sitka after the purchase of Alaska by the United States, he must have been a superb figure in his full Ambassador's costume—red sash, cocked hat, and orders blazing on his breast. He had a tall, straight, commanding figure ; a long, pale face, smoothly shaven ; a finely cut nose ; a firm, rather large mouth ; eyes humorous and brilliant under heavy lids, and light hair which he wore short and unpowdered. At any other Court but that of Japan he would have been the most imposing figure in the diplomatic corps ; but what impression can a man make sitting on his heels ?"

On the following day a flat refusal was given to all the Russian requests, while all the presents were returned. The refusal to receive the envoy or his presents was placed on the ground that if they were received, it would be necessary to send a return mission with equal presents. To this not only was the poverty of Japan an obstacle but also the strict law in force for 170 years past against any Japanese going abroad. It was also stated that Japan had no great wants, and little use for foreign productions, of which the Dutch and Chinese brought all that was required, and that any considerable trade could only be established by means of intercourse between Japanese and foreigners, which the laws strictly forbade.

To the proud-spirited and magnificent envoy of the Tsar, this rebuff was mortifying in the extreme, and it also touched him very nearly as Governor of the Great Russian Fur Company. When he reached Okhotsk he found commissions from both the Tsar and the Company to remain in the new dominions and reform all abuses. Travelling slowly among the islands he established measures to protect the fur-bearing animals from marauding foreigners and dishonest employees, punishing, banishing, rewarding. The farther he travelled, the more he appreciated the fact that without a constant supply of foodstuffs, which the treaty with Japan would have insured, the Company would perish. He spent the winter of 1805-6 at New Archangel (Sitka) in Alaska, evolving plans for bringing the whole of the Pacific slope under the Russian flag.¹

In pursuance of this grandiose project he visited San Francisco in the following spring, and in October he set out for St. Petersburg to obtain Imperial sanction and assistance. Meanwhile the wound inflicted on his amour-propre by the Japanese had been rankling. At Sitka he built a small vessel for operations against them and, when he reached Okhotsk, this vessel and another he had bought from an American captain were dispatched to wrest Saghalin from the Japanese, and to ravage Yezo and the Kuriles.

¹ On 15th February, 1806, he wrote to Zapinsky: "I think I may say that at the Columbia we could attract a population from various parts, and in the course of ten years we should be strong enough to make use of any favourable turn in European politics to include the coast of California among the Russian possessions. The Spaniards are very weak in these countries, and if, in 1798, when war was declared by Spain, our Company had had a force corresponding to its proportions, it would have been very easy to seize California from 34 degrees to Santa Barbara and to appropriate this territory for ever, since the geographical position of Mexico would have prevented her from sending any assistance overland." It is tolerably safe to assume that it was only Rezánov's premature death (at Krasnoiarsk in March, 1807) that prevented the whole Pacific sea-board of North America from becoming and remaining Russian territory.

Chowstoff and Davidoff, the commanders of the two vessels, had little more than sixty men under their orders; yet this insignificant expedition proved sufficient to keep the whole of the north of Japan in a state of panic and turmoil for two years.¹ In 1806 the two ships burned the Japanese settlement at Kushunkotan, carrying off all the stores, seven or eight Ainu and one Japanese prisoner. Next spring, they captured the two Japanese forts in Iterup, appeared off Hakodate when they captured a war-junk, and then turned their attention to Saghalin again, plundering some junks they found in Soya Strait. In these earliest hostilities between Muscovites and Japanese, the "Soul of Yamato" so much lauded by Moto-ori and Hirata did not show to any conspicuous advantage; in truth the episode showed only too clearly that there was "something rotten in the state of Denmark", at least in the northern territory of Tokugawa Japan.

In the following year (1808) there was an equally significant incident at Nagasaki in the south.²

Of the incident in question we have an account by Doeff, President of the Factory, and another by one Tokuyemon, a sort of aide-de-camp to the Governor, and both accounts are at one as representing the cowardice and incompetence of the officials—the Governor excepted—when called upon to face a surprising emergency. The Japanese account (of which a précis has been made by Mr. Aston) is especially instructive. After telling us how when, late in September, hopes of the arrival of the annual Dutch ship had been abandoned, notice was given of the appearance of a "white sail" on the horizon, the Japanese account, as summarized by Mr. Aston, proceeds:—

"The news caused a joyful excitement among all classes in Nagasaki. There were few of the townspeople who had not some share in the profitable monopoly of foreign trade enjoyed by that city, and although our manuscript is silent on the subject, we may be sure the Japanese

¹ For details see Aston, "Russian Descents in Saghalin and Iterup": *T.A.S.J.*, vol. i, pt. 1.

² The Russians meanwhile made a practical attempt to open a trade at Nagasaki. "In 1807 the *Eclipse*, of Boston, chartered at Canton by the Russian-American Company for Kamtchatka and the north-west coast of America, entered the harbour of Nagasaki, under Russian colours, and was towed to the anchorage by an immense number of boats. A Dutchman went on board and advised the captain to haul down his colours, as the Japanese were much displeased with Russia." She was not allowed to trade, but received a gratuitous supply of provisions, and on the third day was towed out of the haven by about 100 boats.

officials had also good reason for satisfaction at the news. Of course the joy was greatest in the Dutch settlement of Deshima. After more than a year without news of Europe, without letters from friends and relations, and deprived of many a little comfort which the land of their exile could not supply, the delight of the Dutch residents may be easily imagined. The ship approached rapidly, and was already visible in the distance off the entrance to the harbour, when the interpreter who had been sent to convey the news to the Dutchmen arrived in Deshima. He reported on his return that the Kapitan (Doeff) had taken him aside, and, after expressing the joy which he and his countrymen felt at the arrival of the ship, had added: 'There are, however, some suspicious circumstances. It is very improbable that she should have delayed her departure from Batavia until so late in the season. If she had left at the usual time, and were only arriving now, she must have met with an accident and lost one or two of her masts. But the ship approaching is not deeply laden. She sails well on the wind, and her masts and rigging are in excellent order. She may be a ship of some other country, and it would be disloyal of me if I did not warn you to take every precaution.'"

As a matter of fact, although flying the Dutch colours, it was no Dutch merchantman, but a crack ship of the English navy, one of the frigates known as the "Saucy Channel Four", that was coming racing toward the fiord. The *Phaeton*, commanded by Captain Pellew, had left England eight months before, and on arriving in Bengal, Pellew, hearing that two Dutch ships were going to Nagasaki that year, had at once set out to capture them.¹ When the Japanese with the two Dutch clerks who had gone to board the vessel, approached her, a boat was lowered, and its crew seized the Dutchmen while the Japanese sculled back in the greatest trepidation. When these unlucky officials who had thus allowed the clerks to be carried off from under their very noses returned to Government House, and were admitted into the Governor's presence, they made at once a pitiable and a comical appearance. With deep-drawn sighs and chattering teeth, they told how, "all of a sudden fifteen men with pistols and naked swords had sprung out of the bottom of the foreign boat, captured the 'Redhairs', and carried them off in the twinkling of an eye. The crew of this boat were like so many fierce tigers. They were so nimble in their movements, and looked so terrible, that it seemed in no wise possible to approach them. They nevertheless pursued them, and were about to put them to the sword, when they reflected that such a course would

¹ Great Britain and Holland were then at war, for Holland at that date was practically an appanage of France, Napoleon's brother, Louis, having been installed as King of the country in 1806.

cause the Governor great anxiety, and might give rise to serious trouble (!). They therefore resolved to come back and report what had happened."

The Governor, Matsudaira, Dzusho-no-kami, whom the crisis, according to Dr. Aston's description, shows to have been a brave and gallant man, rated the poltroons in scathing terms, and to Doeff, who just then rushed in, he broke out with fury in his face, "Be quiet, Kapitan; I shall take care that your people are restored." But he soon learned to his consternation that at the harbour guard-house, where 1,000 men ought to have been stationed, there were only sixty or seventy, and these uncommanded. As has been stated in the first volume, the Daimyōs of Saga (Nabeshima) and of Chikuzen (Kuroda) had been made responsible for the defence of Nagasaki harbour but, as for generations no foreign foe had appeared there, their councillors had not unnaturally come to regard the task as a mere empty piece of formal routine. The Governor at once informed the responsible military officers that immediate measures must be taken to recover the Dutchmen and to burn and sink the ship, as the Spaniard had been destroyed nineteen years before,¹ and that combustibles and fire-ships should be provided and a scheme of action drawn up on paper and submitted for his consideration. Next day, however, the Commander-in-Chief, on being asked how the plan for burning the ship was progressing, made answer that he personally knew nothing about it, but would instruct his lieutenants to furnish a written report on the matter. At the same time, an officer, ordered to the batteries on a visit of inspection, candidly replied that he had no inclination to perform the duty of inspector, and that, besides, he had no clothes suitable for such a service. The Governor, determined to act with the few men of his own he could collect, got ready arms in the principal hall, told the head cook to look after the commissariat, and repeated his urgent messages to the Daimyō's officers, from whom, however, came only excuses and remonstrances in reply. One man forced himself into the Governor's presence and besought His Excellency to think of his mother! These are only a few of the instances of the general incapacity and cowardice that may be culled from

¹ His Excellency was weaker in his history than in his spirit. No Spanish ship had been burned and sunk at Nagasaki either ninety or 190 years before. What he most probably was referring to was the *Madre de Dios* incident of 1610.

Tokuyemon's narrative—a cowardice so general, indeed, that the Governor's physician said that *everybody* was sick—that their loins were out of joint from fright, and that he would like to have the chance of prescribing for them. However, if we are to believe Doeff, not only the Governor himself, but his secretary also, acted with courage and determination; it being with the greatest difficulty that Doeff dissuaded the latter from proceeding on board the *Phaeton* to demand the delivery of the Dutchmen, and, failing to obtain that, to stab first the captain and then himself.

It presently appeared that the Dutchmen had been seized merely to serve as interpreters and hostages to ensure the delivery of needed supplies of wood, water, and provisions. On these being sent off, one of the Dutchmen came back with a letter from Pellew asking for beef and vegetables, and threatening to fire the Japanese and Chinese junks in the harbour in the case of a refusal. The Governor still meant to fight, but the supplies were sent off in the Dutch barge, and His Excellency, seeing that all prospect of burning the *Phaeton* was hopeless, made up his mind to order her to depart at once. Some anxiety was felt lest she might not obey this order, as beef had not been sent, but about two in the afternoon, “a gentle breeze having sprung up, the ship swung round, and, setting three sails, went off like an arrow.”

“Meanwhile troops had begun to pour into Nagasaki from the neighbouring provinces, and much zeal was displayed in keeping a strict watch on the departing ship from the shore, and from boats which were sent out to observe her motions. The military officers *now* reported by letter that, in accordance with the instructions received on the previous day, preparations had been made at Fukahori to burn the foreign ship, that fire-junks had been prepared, and that they had been on the point of reporting that everything was in readiness to carry out the plan without fail, when the message came ordering them to desist from the attempt.”

With all this, it is surprising to find Seibold, eighteen years later (1826), in dealing with the elaborate secret measures of Japanese harbour defence, asserting that he knew from trustworthy sources that if Pellew had ventured further into the harbour he certainly would not have escaped. As far as can be seen from Tokuyemon's account of the episode, so long as she did not actually ground, the frigate could have done pretty much as she liked anywhere in the harbour without the least risk to herself. The elaborate precautions for harbour protection, Siebold writes, were all adopted

after, and almost entirely on account of this *Phaeton* incident and of the Russian descendants in the North in the preceding year. After the English ship was out of sight a fleet of eighty Chikuzen war-junks did indeed enter the harbour, but it was undoubtedly fortunate for themselves that they found her gone. Her artillery would have made very short work of them ; for the old Tokugawa regulations, preventing the construction of fighting ships of more than 500 *koku* (50 tons) burthen, were still in force, and a few score of crazy Lilliputian craft of this description could have effected but little against one of the crack frigates of the British navy.

It is indeed regrettable to find that this episode cost the life of the only man who had behaved like an intrepid and gallant gentleman in the crisis. On the night of the departure of the warship, Tokuyemon, after leaving the Governor, had returned to his own quarters.

“ I think,” he writes, “ it must have been midnight when Tanabe came rushing in by the front entrance, weeping and exclaiming, ‘ Haven’t you heard that His Excellency has committed suicide ? ’ I sprang up, not knowing east from west or what I was doing. I then ran to the Governor’s apartments ; and, just beyond the sitting-room, in front of the guardian god and close under the hedge, I found that he had spread a carpet, seated on which he had made a long narrow wound below his navel, and had then thrust the dagger through his throat up to the hilt. It was a magnificent *hara-kiri* ! The spirit had already departed. Watanabe tried to pull out the dagger, but it was fast clutched in the dead man’s hand. What a pitiable sight ! Alas ! the day on which it pleased Heaven to allow so brave a gentleman to perish ! ”

Several of the military officers who had misbehaved on this occasion were afterwards condemned to commit *hara-kiri*, while the Daimyō of Saga, though resident in Yedo at the time of the *Phaeton*’s appearance in Nagasaki, was imprisoned in his own *yashiki* for a space of 100 days, and required to pay an annual pension to the son of the dead Governor.

From Japanese sources we know that the Dutch had long been describing the English in the blackest of colours, dwelling especially upon all the enormities they had committed and were committing in Hindostan. This episode of the *Phaeton* did much to confirm the belief of the Tokugawa officials in the truth of the Dutch accounts. At the same time, the Hollanders seem to have exerted themselves to excite the suspicion of the Japanese against the Russians. In the fifth chapter of Golownin’s narrative will be found some strange

evidence in support of this charge. The interpreter, Murakami, informed Golownin that the "Dutch had represented that Russia and England, then united against France and her allies, had determined to extend their power towards the East; that England, acting by sea, and Russia by land, and reciprocally supporting each other, had for their ultimate object to divide China and Japan between them". Golownin asserts that when at Portsmouth in 1807, he incidentally obtained evidence from captured letters of the secretary of the Council at Batavia that Rezánov's mission had miscarried mainly on account of the manœuvres of the Dutch and their interpreters at Nagasaki. Siebold must have been well acquainted with this passage. In accounting for Rezánov's failure he even quotes some sentences from Golownin's *Narrative* which had been suppressed by the censor.¹ As regards the Russians, however, the Bakufu authorities were considerably reassured when they obtained a declaration from the Governor of Siberia that Chowstoffs and Davidoffs depredations had never been sanctioned by the Russian Government, and that the Imperial Government disapproved of, and profoundly regretted, the events of 1806-7. This statement was obtained in a rather remarkable way.

Captain Golownin, in the warship *Diana*, had been dispatched on a cruise to survey the coasts of Yezo and chart the seas around the Kuriles, and landing on Kunashir with some eight or nine of his ship's company, he was seized by the Japanese in the summer of 1811. He was sent to Hakodate, and from there to Matsumaye, where he was kept for about two years. It was only when Captain Rikord (who was sent to rescue him) was able to furnish the Japanese authorities with the assurance alluded to that the Russian captives were released. By this time captors and prisoners had learned to appreciate each other's good qualities; at all events, in the formal address of farewell from the officials to Golownin, the following sentence occurs:—

"During your long residence here, such an intimacy has arisen between us, that we cannot help regretting the necessity of our separation."²

¹ Siebold, *Nippon*, vol. ii, pp. 164-5. For Dutch double-dealing towards a projected Danish expedition to Japan in 1637, see Nachod, p. 256. Rezánov afterwards blamed the Dutch for his failure; and Langsdorff and Krusenstern both adopt the same view. Siebold's loyalty to his employers, it may be remarked, was far greater than Kämpfer's; indeed it now and then seems to betray him into special pleading on their behalf.

² Golownin's *Narrative* and Rikord's *Account* are interesting documents well worth a careful perusal.

The last paragraph in the document handed to Rikord by the Japanese Commissioners is worthy of remark, for it put an end to all intercourse between Russia and Japan for forty years—until Admiral Count Putiatin appeared at Nagasaki in 1853. The paragraph in question runs as follows :—

“ Our countrymen wish to carry on no commerce with foreign lands, for we know no want of necessary things. Though foreigners are permitted to trade at Nagasaki, even to that harbour only those are admitted with whom we have for a long time maintained relations, and *we do not trade with them for the sake of gain, but for other important objects*. From the repeated solicitations which you have hitherto made to us, you evidently imagine that the customs of our country resemble those of your own ; but you are very wrong in thinking so. In future, therefore, it will be better to say no more about commercial intercourse.”

In Golownin's *Narrative*, the real good-heartedness of the Japanese towards their captives becomes apparent in dozens of passages. At this time their attitude towards the Dutch in Deshima seems to have been considerate and generous, and to have fully deserved the panegyric it has elicited from Siebold.¹ At this time the Deshima trade had ceased entirely, and from 1809 to 1817 no Dutch vessel appeared in Nagasaki roadstead. The Hollanders could make no more presents either to the Shōgun or to the Governor and officials of Nagasaki, or to anyone else. The resources of the Factory were thoroughly exhausted, and its staff was reduced to the direst straits. In such circumstances the conduct of the Japanese did them honour, for the sympathy they extended to the Dutch was a truly practical one, and highly admirable. In 1813, however, there was one rather lively interlude in the dull monotony of these eight years, during which the Dutchmen in Deshima knew nothing of what was happening in the great outside world. Batavia had fallen into English hands on 8th August, 1811, and, until the treaty of 1814, Java was a British possession. Sir Stamford Raffles, its energetic Governor, turned his attention to Deshima and determined to get control of the Factory and of the Dutch trade with Japan. To quote Hildreth's summary of the incident :—

“ Great was the delight of Doeff when, in the spring of 1813, two vessels appeared in the offing of Nagasaki, displaying the Dutch flag, and making the private signals agreed upon in 1809. A letter was brought on shore, announcing the arrival from Batavia of Heer Waardenaar (Doeff's predecessor as Director) to act as warehouse master, of Heer Cassa to succeed Doeff as Director, and of three assistants or

¹ Siebold, *Nippon*, vol. ii, p. 166.

clerks. A Japanese officer and one of the Dutch clerks were sent on board. The Japanese speedily returned, saying he recognized Waardenaar, who had declined, however, to deliver his papers except to Doeff personally, and that all the officers spoke English, whence he concluded that the ships must be chartered Americans. Doeff went on board, and was received by Waardenaar with such evident embarrassment that Doeff declined to open the package of papers he presented, except in Deshima, whither he was accompanied by Waardenaar. This package being opened was found to contain a paper signed 'Raffles, Lieutenant Governor of Java and its Dependencies' appointing Waardenaar and a Dr. Ainslie commissioners to Japan. In reply to his question, 'Who is Raffles?' Doeff learned that Holland had been annexed to France, and Java occupied by the English. Doeff patriotically refused to believe in the annexation of Holland to France, and in spite of all the efforts of Waardenaar to shake him, he declined obedience to an order coming from a colony in hostile occupation. His mind thus made up, Doeff called in the Japanese interpreters, and communicated to them the true state of the case. Alarmed for their own safety, they made to Waardenaar frightful representations of the probable massacre of the crews, and burning of the vessels, should the secret go any further, especially considering the hostile feelings towards the English excited by the proceedings of the *Phaeton* in 1808; and finally the commissioners were persuaded to enter into an arrangement by which Doeff was to remain as director and to dispose of the cargoes as usual, first paying out of the proceeds the debt (160,000 gulden) which, since 1807, the factory had been obliged to contract for its sustenance. Ainslie was also to remain as a factory physician, but passing as an American."

By this venture the English lost about 28,000 dollars. The elephant they brought as a present for the Shōgun was declined on the ground of the difficulty of transporting it to Yedo.¹

"In 1814, a single ship was sent from Batavia with Heer Cassa again on board. He brought tidings of the insurrection in Europe against France, and relied upon the probable speedy restoration of Java to Holland as an argument for inducing Doeff to submit

¹ It is astonishing to find how quickly intelligence was transmitted in Japan even in those days. While the vessels were still in Nagasaki, Golownin was in Matsumaye ready to leave for Hakodate. One day Takahashi and Ueyehara casually told him that two large Dutch ships laden with East India goods had arrived at Nagasaki from Batavia. "They gave us a minute description of these vessels, telling us their length, breadth, depth, burthen in tons, the number of the crew on board each, and to what nation each individual belonged. One of these vessels must have been very large, since it was upwards of 100 feet in length and had more than 100 men on board. An elephant which the Dutch had brought from the Island of Sumatra, as a present for the Japanese Emperor, was described with the greatest minuteness imaginable. No circumstance was omitted, the place of his nativity, his age, length, height, thickness, the food he was accustomed to consume, and how many times in the course of the day, and in what portions he was supplied with the different articles, were all carefully noted. A native of Sumatra, who was the keeper of the elephant, was described with corresponding precision." All this reminds us of Arai Hakuseki's meticulous details about Father Sidotti.

temporarily to the English—an object which Sir Stamford Raffles had very much at heart. When Doeff refused, Cassa resorted to intrigue. He gained over two of the interpreters, through whom he endeavoured to induce at Yedo a refusal to allow Doeff (whose term of office had already been so unusually protracted) to remain any longer as director. Doeff, however, got wind of this intrigue, frightened the two interpreters by threatening to tell the whole story to the Governor of Nagasaki, and finally carried the day. He paid, however, rather dearly for his obstinacy as Raffles sent no more ships, and Director Doeff was obliged to pass three years more without either goods or news, cooped up and kept on short allowance in his little island, with the satisfaction, however, that there, if nowhere else in the world, the flag of Holland still continued to wave."

In 1813, J. Cock Blomhoff, Doeff's assistant, had returned with the English vessels to Batavia. As he refused to forward Raffles's projects he was sent to England as a prisoner. On regaining his liberty he went home, and furnished the Dutch authorities with full information about the state of affairs in Japan; and, in 1817, he reappeared in Nagasaki to relieve Doeff and take charge of the Dutch-Japan trade, now a monopoly of the Netherlands-India Government. Along with Blomhoff came several ladies, among them Mrs. Blomhoff with her infant child. This threw the Japanese officials into great consternation, and although Mrs. Blomhoff was ultimately allowed to land, she had to go back to Batavia with the returning ships. Probably the precedent of 1662 had been forgotten by both Japanese and Dutchmen. In 1818, and again in 1822, the new director proceeded to Yedo, where he met with an extremely cordial reception, and became exceedingly popular. On the last occasion he was able to obtain an increase to 11,000 piculs in the annual allowance of copper for export, at which figure it stood till 1828, when the diminished returns of the mines occasioned a reduction to 7,000 piculs. Inasmuch as one ship was sufficient for this lading, and as the Dutch obtained the copper at half the rate the Chinese paid for it (25 taels, which was in turn five taels under the current price in Japan), the reduction did not affect their profits materially, especially as their charges for presents and factory maintenance were considerably lessened at the same time. Camphor continued to be the only other considerable item among the exports, the average value of which, from 1820 to 1826, was 339,000 gulden, a little more than one-third of what it had been in Kämpfer's days, and one-ninth of what it had been in 1671. In the early 'forties there was a considerable drop in the value of imports.

In 1840, cloth and woollen goods were sold to the value of 111,786 gulden, but during the next six years the average annual sales only amounted to about 68,000 gulden. Mizuno, Echizen no Kami's drastic campaign against luxury in Yedo was evidently not without its effect upon the foreign trade of the empire.

Chinese competition in the supply of European wares, chiefly obtained through the English factory in Canton, was meanwhile giving the Dutch increasing trouble. No more than a dozen junks were now permitted entry, but the value of the maximum return freights that were allowed them might reach 900,000 taels, five or six times as much as the average value of the Dutch lading between 1820 and 1826. As much as 360,000 taels of this went in the form of copper; the remainder had to be taken in marine produce and miscellaneous Japanese wares. The Chinese still, as in Kämpfer's time, found the stress of weather a very convenient excuse, and the people of the Satsuma sea-board still kept up their reputation as adepts in the art of smuggling. Others besides the Chinese would appear to have had illicit dealings with the men of Satsuma. Great quantities of Satsuma *soy* in neat little jars and bottles were finding a sale in Holland, and there is fairly good evidence to indicate that the *soy* was shipped from Ōshima, or from some other part of the Lūchūs. Even in Deshima itself, one interpreter was executed for smuggling, and another committed *hara-kiri* to escape the penalty for the same offence. The old private trade still flourished; and it was in connexion with this that most of the smuggling took place. Many vain attempts were made to suppress it, even after it had been farmed out at 30,000 gulden annually for the benefit of those interested in it.

Siebold urges—and perhaps rightly—that the Dutch lost a great opportunity in 1814, when the United Provinces became a kingdom and William I ascended the throne of the Netherlands. In his famous instructions to the mission of 1649–50, Caron asserted that the Japanese had no respect for a republic, and the Portuguese and even Cocks were fully conscious of this fact, and took full advantage of it in the early seventeenth century. It might have been advisable to send a special mission to Yedo to make official announcement of the new order of things in the Netherlands, but nothing of the sort was done; and although the Dutch East India Company had been dissolved in 1798, and all its territories declared national colonies, the missions to Yedo were still in the name of

the defunct corporation, and matters in connexion with it remained in much the same condition as they were in the early days of Deshima. No exhibition of the clownish antics Kämpfer and his companions had to provide before the fifth Shōgun was now exacted but, apart from this, Siebold's account of the reception of the mission in 1826, differs but little from the extracts from Kämpfer's narrative cited in a previous chapter. Even the old instructions regarding the Portuguese were given at the audience of leave. In Deshima, too, things continued to move along in the same old traditional grooves, although there had been one innovation. The Director had no longer to return to Batavia and make way for a new man every year. Doeff's involuntary sojourn in Deshima may have had much to do with this change of a time-honoured prescription. The authorities in Nagasaki now professed a preference for the "old" officials in Deshima, that is, for those who were acquainted with, and readily accepted, the established routine, and had no idea of introducing innovations and reforms. Pestilent "reformers" were now and then banished from Japan and told to come no more. Siebold mentions van Sturler, Fisscher, and Nimen as having brought their fate upon themselves by an excess of zeal in the cause of honesty, and it was only by a seasonable change of tactics that the astute and far-seeing Meylan was able to remain in Deshima.

In the seventeenth century, when the Japanese became dissatisfied with the Portuguese, they encouraged their rivals, the Dutch and the English, to establish factories in Japan. In the first half of the nineteenth century they were now and then far from pleased with their prisoners in Deshima, but they cherished no thoughts of adopting the policy of Iyeyasu and his successors. Quite the contrary, indeed. The Russian attacks in the north, and the *Phaeton* episode in Nagasaki, had occasioned the utmost indignation, and the resentment was profound. For the next few years following these so-called outrages, coast-defence was the great problem; but by the early 'twenties of the nineteenth century, attention to this had begun to relax. However, the whaling industry in neighbouring seas at that period commenced to be prosecuted with considerable vigour, and year after year whalers were to be seen off the Japanese coasts. Sometimes, they sent boats ashore to obtain water or supplies and then the local troops would be mobilized and the whole district thrown into the greatest commotion.

The Yedo Councillors were holding many conferences about this, when a very unpleasant episode was reported by the Satsuma authorities. In 1824 an English vessel appeared at Takara-shima to the south of Kagoshima Gulf and sent men ashore for provisions who acted with a high hand, slaughtering cattle and committing various other depredations. The islanders ran to arms, and in the hard-fought conflict that ensued, several were killed and wounded on both sides. This incident enabled the Bakufu to come to a definite decision, and on 4th April, 1825, the famous "Expulsion Decree" (*Uchi-harai-Rei*) was issued for promulgation throughout the empire. The text of it is as follows :—

"As to the mode of proceeding on the arrival of foreign vessels many proclamations have formerly been issued, and one was expressly issued in 1806 with respect to Russian ships. Also several years ago an English vessel committed outrages at Nagasaki (the *Phaeton*, in 1808) and in later years the English have visited the various ports in boats, demanding fire-wood, water, and provisions. In the past year, they landed forcibly, and seized rice and grain in the junks and cattle on the islands. The continuation of such insolent proceedings, as also the intention of introducing the Christian religion having come to our knowledge, it is impossible to look on with indifference. Not only England, but also the Southern Barbarians and Western Countries are of the Christian religion which is prohibited among us. Therefore, if in future foreign vessels should come near any port whatsoever, the local inhabitants shall conjointly drive them away; but should they go away (peaceably) it is not necessary to pursue them. Should any foreigners land anywhere, they must be arrested or killed, and if the ship approaches the shore it must be destroyed."

In 1837 the enforcement of this "Expulsion Decree" occasioned some commotion in Japan and provoked considerable unfavourable comment abroad. Six years before, a Japanese junk was blown across to Queen Charlotte Island where the crew were rescued and ultimately sent to London and thence to Macao; and some American philanthropists interested in mission work now fitted out a small vessel, the *Morrison*, named after the famous missionary, to convey these waifs back to Japan. On reaching Uruga, "the official visitors, discerning she was unarmed, at once showed their contempt and next day she was fired at with shotted guns." She then made for a point in Kagoshima Gulf; a day or two she remained unmolested, but ultimately preparations were made to open fire, and before she could get under way a battery opened upon her. In both cases, the delay in opening fire had been occasioned by the

local officials appealing to their respective headquarters for precise instructions as to how they were to act.¹

The hesitation of the local authorities to act promptly on the "Expulsion Decree" of 1825, is perhaps not so very remarkable, for any mistake on their part in such a matter might cost them dear,² and they generally endeavoured to shirk all onerous responsibilities. What is remarkable is the vigorous protest this action of the authorities elicited from some of the Dutch scholars in Yedo, a topic that will be dealt with in the following chapter. Although these writers suffered for their temerity, their courageous stand was not without its effect.

In the *Yume Monogatari*, a pamphlet then published by Takano Chōei, much was said about the greatness of England and her power in Far-Eastern seas ; and as the pamphlet was read by officials as well as others, some of them began to be impressed with an exaggerated idea of the might of England, and a lively sense of the probable consequences of provoking her wrath. Shortly after this incident came the so-called "Opium War" with China (1840), the Treaty of Nanking, the cession of Hong-Kong, the opening of several Chinese ports to foreign trade, and the payment of an indemnity by China. All these incidents were duly embodied in the yearly reports of foreign occurrences which the Director of the Deshima Factory had to compile and send to the Governor of Nagasaki upon the arrival of the annual Dutch ship. In Yedo, these reports made a great impression upon Mizuno Tadakuni, then at the head of the Great Council, and he came to the conclusion

¹ An account of the *Morrison* episode will be found in the *Chinese Repository* for September and December, 1837. Its author was Dr. S. Wells Williams, a very distinguished American missionary and a brilliant Chinese scholar who was afterwards interpreter to the Perry expedition and, in subsequent years, official interpreter to the United States Legation at Peking, who was one of the thirty-seven people on board the *Morrison*. Some of his remarks are interesting : "A people who show the decision of character of the Japanese, silently erecting their batteries to drive away their enemies by force of arms, and bringing their cannon several miles to plant in a favourable position, are not to be lightly despised or to be insulted with impunity. If the immediate aggressor escapes, vengeance usually lights upon some unwary and innocent straggler, and the mutual hatred is thus increased. At Satsuma, a pilot is sent to bring the ship into an anchorage, and the officers are made acquainted with our object, which they apparently approve. It would seem that here too great distrust of the foreigners existed, from the report that the people took us for pirates ; and a rumour of such marauders must have reached their ears." Mr. Williams evidently knew nothing of the Takara-shima incident of 1824 ; and the Satsuma men, no doubt, retained a very lively recollection of it.

² A Governor of Nagasaki had been dismissed in 1639 for sending away a Portuguese vessel without having informed the Yedo authorities of her arrival.

that there would be wisdom in mollifying the harshness of the "Expulsion Decree" of 1825. Accordingly, in spite of much opposition, he caused the following important document to be distributed among the officials and feudatories :—

"In accordance with the ordinance of 1825, all foreign vessels must be driven away. But now that the administration has reverted to the principles of the Kyōhō-Kwansei periods, it is the Shōgun's gracious will that all measures should be taken in a humane spirit.

"It is not thought fitting to drive away all foreign ships irrespective of their condition, in spite of their lack of supplies, or of their having stranded, or their suffering from stress of weather. In accordance with the ordinance of 1806, after investigating the circumstances of each case, you should, when necessary, supply them with food and fuel and advise them to return, but on no account allow foreigners to land.

"This does not mean that less attention is to be paid to coast defence. Still greater care must be taken than before, both as regards armament and men. Even in case vessels sail along the coast to observe the situation, you must still act in accordance with the gracious principles of humanity, not being unreasonably disturbed by their proceedings. If, however, after receiving supplies and instructions they do not withdraw, you will, of course, drive them away, adopting such measures as are necessary.

"As regards coast defence, other instructions will be issued."

Next year (1843) the Deshima Director sent in a document of very serious import. It enlarged upon the power and commercial prosperity of England, and the recovery of France since Waterloo and said that these countries were on the point of sending vessels to the Lūchūs to establish tradal relations there, and that they might even go on to Japan. In great anxiety over possible developments, the king of the Netherlands had determined to send a mission to the Shōgun's Court, and that mission had already been dispatched on board a national man-of-war. It was desirable that the envoy, who stood in quite a different position to the Deshima Director, and who would be accompanied by a suite and an escort, should be received with international courtesy, and should tender his dispatches to the Shōgun in person. When the purport of this communication became generally known, there was a terrible ferment. Many advocated the repulse of the envoy by arms, and the probability of a war with the other barbarians was eagerly discussed.

In the late summer of the following year (1844) the *Palembang*, under the command of Captain Koop of the Dutch navy, made her appearance at Nagasaki, but the envoy was not permitted to proceed to Yedo and could meet no higher official than the local

Governor who was charged with the duty of receiving and entertaining him. The king's dispatch which he bore was handed to the Governor for transmission to Yedo, where Mizuno had been recalled to the Rōjū for the purpose of dealing with the exigencies of the situation. By this time, the Bakufu had imposed its censorate upon the Dutch books and Dutch scholars, and all communications from the Dutch; but in spite of this the purport of the royal dispatch leaked out among the Daimyō, and became the subject of much heated discussion.¹

Nearly a year passed before any reply to the dispatch was vouchsafed, it was only on 5th July, 1845, that the Great Councillors put their names and seals to the answer; and before this date Mizuno had already fallen for the second and last time. To the implied suggestion that it would be well to reopen Japan to foreign intercourse, the Rōjū returned a *non possumus*.

"Although the suggestions offered are worthy of adoption, there are reasons why this cannot be. When the founder of the dynasty entered upon his career, intercourse and trade with countries beyond the sea were in an unsettled condition. Later, when the time came for determining with what countries communication should be permitted, intercourse was limited to Korea and Lūchū, and trade to your Excellencies' country and China. Aside from these countries, all communication was strictly disallowed. If now, it were desired to extend these limits, it would be in contravention of the ancestral law. Now, since the ancestral law has been once fixed, posterity must obey. Henceforth, pray cease correspondence. If not, although it should be attempted a second or a third time, communications cannot be received. Pray do not be surprised at this. Letters from your Excellencies will have the same treatment and receive no response . . . Pray communicate this to your Excellencies' Sovereign."

In August, 1609, Iyeyasu made no trouble about entering into personal communication with a "King of Holland" who was no "King" at all, but merely a Count of Nassau. Now, when a real King of the Netherlands goes so far as to send a special envoy with a dispatch to his "Friend, the very noble, most serene, and all-powerful sovereign of the Great Empire of Japan" the *fainéant*, Iyeyoshi, thinks it beneath his dignity to vouchsafe any reply from himself. His ministers, the Great Councillors, address a communication to the "*Oranda Koku-Seifu Shokō Kakka*" which Dr. Greene translates "The Government of Holland". And in their reply they

¹ For the full text of the dispatch, and the Bakufu's reply, see Dr. Greene's paper in *T.A.S.J.*, vol. xxxiv, pt. iv.

assure the Government of Holland that "our Lord in no wise fails in respect towards Your Excellencies' Sovereign, but on the contrary, *deeply appreciates his sincere loyalty*". One other point has to be noted in this Bakufu dispatch. Christianity had been sternly proscribed by definite enactments in the seventeenth century, and the Spaniards and Portuguese had been banished for ever, as it was supposed, from Japanese soil, but the small officials of the Bakufu would search the Tokugawa statute-books in vain for any decree limiting the intercourse of the empire to Koreans, Lūchūans, Chinese, and Hollanders. As pointed out in a preceding chapter, the "ancestral law" on this point was a figment of the latter-day Bakufu imagination.

Meanwhile the Dutch Factor's warning that French and English warships might be expected in the Lūchū was soon shown to have been based on substantial grounds. In that very year (1843) the British began surveying operations among the southern islands of the Lūchū chain, and the work was continued during 1844 and 1845. In 1846 a medical missionary, Dr. Bettelheim, was permanently installed at Naha in the main island. Previously to this, one of the survey ships, the *Samarang*, had entered Nagasaki harbour, and had been freely supplied with such provisions as she needed. The Japanese informed the captain that they knew perfectly well of his operations in the Lūchū, and that they had been apprised of his intended visit by the Dutch. With great difficulty permission to land was obtained to make some astronomical observations, but the Japanese officers earnestly begged that this might not be repeated till they could consult their superiors in Yedo, urging as a reason their own danger of getting into serious trouble. Four years later on (1849) the British surveying ship *Mariner* entered Yedo Bay and charted the anchorage off Uraga. The captain (Matheson) sent his card to the Governor with a note in Chinese, proposing to wait upon him, but the Governor replied that it was contrary to law for foreigners to land, and that he should lose his life if he allowed the captain to come ashore or to proceed any higher up the Bay. Thereupon Matheson went round to the Shimoda coast, off which he spent a week, and actually once went ashore. He was visited on board by Egawa, the Daikwan of Nirayama, then a commissioner for coast defence, who caused the vessel to be supplied with fish, and boats to tow her out. In both cases the British were very courteously treated; at Nagasaki they had been

strongly impressed with the dignified yet respectful behaviour of the Japanese.

Far different was the experience of the officers of the first French war vessel that ever dropped anchor in a Japanese port. When Admiral Cécille, in command of a frigate and two corvettes, arrived in Nagasaki on 29th July, 1846, he was treated with extreme rudeness by the officials who came on board.¹ On the second day he felt constrained to curb their insolence by assuming a rather haughty tone. The reason for the truculent demeanour on the part of the petty officials was that the Japanese were fully aware of what the Admiral had just been doing in Lūchū, and that they regarded him as a dangerous aggressor. Indeed, all unknown to himself, Admiral Cécille had thrown the supreme council of the empire, and even the Shōgun himself, into the greatest perturbation.

Of late years the Roman Catholic missionaries in China and Korea had been revolving many plans for regaining a footing in Japan. Now, the gallant Admiral was a staunch supporter of missionary enterprise, and the missionaries in turn exerted themselves strenuously to find fit and proper interpreters for him. Detained in China by the Lagrené embassy, the Admiral determined to detach a vessel to reconnoitre the Lūchūs. A Roman Catholic priest was left at Naha by this vessel, ostensibly for the purpose of learning the language so as to be able to serve as interpreter for the Admiral when he paid his intended visit later on. This was in April, 1844, but there was no appearance of the Admiral until June, 1846. Meanwhile the missionary, M. Forcade, had had his efforts restricted and impeded by a series of tortuous devices, some of them amusing enough. In 1844 Duplan, the Commander of the *Alemène*, told the Lūchūan authorities that the French "Emperor" wished to enter into a treaty of commerce with them, and that the Admiral would presently arrive to settle its terms. On reaching Naha, Cécille delivered a rather lengthy document in which it was proposed in the name of the "Emperor" of the French that Lūchū should enter into a treaty similar to the one that had just been concluded between France and China. The French had been made participants in the advantages secured by the treaty of Nanking, and had obtained the free exercise of the Christian religion. Missionaries were to be admitted into China, and the old Churches,

¹ See account in Marnas' *La Religion de Jésus ressuscitée au Japon*, vol. i, p. 146. For events in Lūchū see same work, vol. i, pp. 91-188.

which had not been turned into public edifices, were to be restored to them. After a seven weeks' stay at Naha the Admiral, who then took M. Forcade away with him, obtained a guarantee that the two new priests he was to leave behind should not have their personal liberty interfered with in any way. But the islanders had implored him not to force any treaty of commerce upon them. They were poor, and had few surplus products; such slender outside supplies as they needed came from the isle of Fu-kia-la (?) which belonged to Japan; and if the Japanese heard that Lūchū had made a treaty with France, they would stop trading, and then how could the Lūchūans find the means of furnishing the tribute to China? Cécille was not satisfied with this unexpected refusal, which, he said, made it necessary for him to refer the matter to the "Emperor", and he promised that, within a year, a vessel would arrive to announce His Majesty's decision.

The anomalous position of the "king" of Lūchū has already been adverted to. All real power was in the hands of a Satsuma Resident, who it may be remarked, retired to the depths of the mountains on the rare occasions when a Chinese envoy appeared. It was this Resident who stood behind the Lūchūan authorities in their negotiations with Cécille. Through Kagoshima and the Satsuma *yashiki* in Yedo, the Bakufu was promptly informed of what was occurring, and its instructions were requested. Shimadzu Nariakira (Saihin), the heir to the Satsuma fief, already recognized as one of the ablest men of his day, saw in this conjuncture of affairs a great opportunity. He was convinced that the old seclusion policy would presently have to be abandoned, and he was anxious that the change should be made with as little friction and disturbance as possible. A beginning could readily be made with Lūchū, which, although nominally independent, was really an appanage of the Satsuma fief, and thus indirectly under Bakufu control. Personally he would welcome the conclusion of a treaty between France and Lūchū, for that would mean that Satsuma would furnish all the staples of export, and that she could import European products freely. His views on this point, as well as on a good many others, were not generally acceptable in Kagoshima, for the Conservative faction was very powerful in the Satsuma fiefs, and Nariakira had to beat down a strong opposition there. His Liberal views actually endangered his succession to the headship of the great southern fief: a strong party looked askance at his partiality for foreigners

and foreign science, and wished to have Nariakira set aside in favour of his younger brother, Hisamitsu. Nariakira was quite aware that the Bakufu was helpless in this Lūchū question. With the old law forbidding the construction of warships of more than 500 *koku* burthen, Japan could do absolutely nothing against the small French and English squadrons now and then appearing at Naha. Besides, China was supposed to know nothing about the Japanese connexion with Lūchū, and it was highly desirable that she should have no opportunity of learning about it. Nariakira was anxious that Satsuma, or rather he himself, should be given a free hand to cope with the exigencies of the situation. The Bakufu submitted the question to a meeting of the Three Magistracies (Jisha, Machi, and Kanjō-Bugyō); and this assembly proved hostile to Nariakira's propositions. At the same time, Hayashi, the Rector of the University, and Tsutsui had been ordered to investigate the matter, and render an opinion as to what should be done, and they reported in favour of Nariakira's suggestions. Nariakira meanwhile seems to have won over Abé Masahiro, the head of the Rōjū, to his views. At all events, the Shōgun presently took the unusual step of summoning Nariakira and his father, Lord Nariaki, to an audience, and giving them a free hand to deal with the Lūchūan question, only they "were to be careful to do nothing that might breed future trouble". This incident was supposed to be a State secret, but like most State secrets of the time, it leaked out, and greatly excited the wrath of Lord Nariaki of Mito when it reached his ears. Nariakira, like his ancestor Takahisa in Xavier's time, was eager for foreign trade, but he wanted nothing to do with foreign religion. Thus, the two French missionaries (one of them soon died) in Naha found that they could not make a single convert, and on 27th August, 1848, the last of them left for Manila. Intelligence of this was promptly transmitted to Yedo. To the Bakufu councillors it was welcome news indeed, for the incident had caused them the gravest anxiety.

Although Lūchū entered into no treaty with France, yet in Nariakira's time (1851-8) a considerable Satsuma foreign trade was maintained by way of Lūchū. Arms and machinery were the chief items of import. In 1857, Nariakira, with the sanction of the Bakufu, had completed preparations for opening Naze in Ōshima to foreign trade, but his death, in 1858, threw the power into the hands of the reactionary element in the fief. He had actually

engaged the Dutch to bring a cargo to Naze ; these imports were sent to Kagoshima and thence to Nagasaki ; while the ships and guns sent by the French to Lūchū were disposed of at Foochow through the Lūchūans. It is to be noted that through this intercourse with the outside world through Lūchū, Nariakira and his ministers became fairly well apprised of events abroad, and just before his death, Nariakira had formed the project of secretly dispatching a number of Satsuma youths to prosecute their studies in Europe ; a project that was only realized in 1865.

England so far had shown no inclination to question the right of the Japanese to adhere to their traditional policy of seclusion. Neither had France done so any further than by pressing a treaty of commerce upon the reluctant Lūchūans. Admiral Cécille had really all unwittingly done a great deal to open a new tradal communication with the hermit empire. Holland, as we have just seen, had gone as far as she could possibly go in persuading the Bakufu that the time for the amendment of their " old law " was approaching, and that it would be better for Japan to amend the " old law " of her own free-will, and on her own initiative than to subject herself to the humiliation of having to abrogate it under armed pressure from abroad. The well-meant advice was fruitless ; and within eight years, in 1853, the Bakufu found that it had to deal with a diplomat who had something more than the mere beauties of moral suasion to rely upon in case of need.

CHAPTER XV

DUTCH LEARNING IN JAPAN

THE native accounts of the rise and progress of the study of Dutch, and hence of Western science, in Japan, are in their way no less interesting than the most thrilling romances penned and published during the Yedo period. The unfortunate thing, however, is that they do not always agree in their details with the data which have been incidentally furnished us by the residents of Deshima. Yet this, perhaps is nothing very strange, when we remember certain of the characteristics of the Japanese histories of the events immediately preceding the Revolution of 1868.¹ However, there is no reason to question the good faith of Sugita, the author of *The Beginning of the Study of Dutch*. As regards the immediate events, "quorum magna pars fuit," in the latter half of the eighteenth century, Sugita's testimony may be accepted as unimpeachable. It is in the account of the state of affairs preceding his own days that some of his statements would seem to call, if not for correction, at all events for qualification.

We are told that :—

¹ A Dutch writer on the Arima Rebellion (1637-8), adverting to the failure of the Japanese historians to allude to the assistance then rendered by Koeckebacker and the Hollanders, explains it by the jealousy displayed by the Japanese generally when there is any question of acknowledging foreign aid or influence, and adds :—" Thus, for instance, it happens but rarely that the Japanese author of the *Kinsé-shi-riyaku* (translated from the Japanese by Mr. E. M. Satow, Yokohama, 1876) recognizes the influence and aid rendered on many occasions by the Dutch at Nagasaki. The efforts made by the Hollanders before and in 1849 to open the country for the world ; the autographic letter addressed to this effect to the Shōgun by King William II ; the subsequent efforts made by the chiefs at Deshima, Messrs. Levysohn, F. A. Rose, J. H. Donker-Curtius ; the services rendered by the two Dutch naval expeditions, under Pelsrycken in 1855-7, and Huyssen van Kattendyke in 1857-61 ; the introduction at Nagasaki of the first steam-engine, foreign printing presses, the art of photography, telegraphy, foreign medicine and sciences ; and the names of O. Mohnike (1849), J. H. van den Broek (1854), H. Hardes (1857), A. A. s' Grauwen (1855), H. O. Wichers (1857), Pompe van Meerdervdort (1857), and many others are forgotten or ignored by Japanese historians."

Siebold also gives an amusing illustration of this. In 1825, the Netherlands-India Government sent two of their new field-pieces—six-pounders—with all their accessories as a present to the Shōgun. On the part of the Shōgun this present was officially declined, while a certain Takaki, commander of the guard at Nagasaki, contrived to procure them secretly.

“The eighth Shōgun, Yoshimune (1716–44), being much interested in astronomy, and learning that the Dutch were proficient in that science, summoned one Nishikawa, a native of Nagasaki, to be questioned; that upon this the interpreters Nishi, Yoshio, and others applied to the Government for permission to learn to read and write Dutch, and that on the permission being granted in the period of Kiōhō (1716–35) the Dutch language was then for the first time learned from books.”

That the last assertion at all events, is erroneous we learn incidentally from Kämpfer. His statement on this particular matter is a very brief one, but the whole long paragraph in which it occurs throws so much light upon the relations between the Dutch and the Japanese in 1691 and 1692—three to four decades before the alleged beginning of the study of written Dutch in Japan—that it may not be amiss to reproduce it here in full. He tells us that it was his object to get all the knowledge he possibly could of the present state and past history of Japan, and that in achieving it the difficulties he had to encounter were immense. The Japanese officers with whom the Dutch came in contact were all bound by an oath, renewed every year, not to talk with the Dutch, not to make any disclosures to them regarding the domestic affairs of the country, its religion or its politics; and, furthermore, they were also bound by oath to watch and report each other—which fear of being informed against was indeed their chief dread and restraint. Kämpfer’s own description of them is as follows:—

“Naturally the Japanese are, their pride of warlike humour set aside, as civil, as polite and curious a nation as any in the world, naturally inclined to commerce and familiarity with foreigners, and desirous to excess to be informed of their histories, arts, and sciences. But, as we are only merchants, whom they place in the lowest scale of mankind, and as the narrow inspection we are kept under must naturally lead them to some jealousy and mistrust, so there is no other way to gain their friendship and to win them over to our interest but a willingness to comply with their desire, a liberality to please their avaricious inclinations, and a submissive conduct to flatter their vanity. ’Twas by this means I worked myself into such a friendship and familiarity with my interpreters and the officers of our island, who daily came over to us, as I believe none before me could boast of, ever since we have been put under such narrow regulations. Liberally assisting them as I did with my advice and medicines, with what information I was able to give them in astronomy and mathematics, and with a cordial and plentiful supply of European liquors, I could also in my turn freely put to them what questions I pleased about the affairs of their country, whether relating to the government in civil or ecclesiastical affairs, to the customs of the natives, to the natural and political history; *and there was none that ever refused to give me all the information he could when we were alone, even of things which they are strictly charged to keep*

secret. The private informations thus procured from those who came to visit me were of great use to me in collecting materials for my intended history of this country ; but yet they fell far short of being entirely satisfactory, and I should not, perhaps, have been able to compass that design if I had not by good luck met with other opportunities. and in particular the assistance of a discreet young man, by whose means I was richly supplied with whatever information I wanted concerning the affairs of Japan. He was about twenty-four years of age, well versed in the Chinese and Japanese languages, and very desirous of improving himself. Upon my arrival he was appointed to wait upon me as my servant, and at the same time to be *by me instructed in physic and surgery.* The Ottona, who is the chief officer of our island (Deshima), having been attended by him under my inspection in a serious illness, suffered him to continue in my service during the whole time of my abode in the country, which was two years, and to attend me in our journeys to Court, consequently four times, almost from one end of the empire to the other—a favour seldom granted to young men of his age, and never for so long a time. As I could not well have attained my end without giving him a competent knowledge of the Dutch language, I instructed him therein with so much success that in a year's time *he could WRITE and READ it better than any of our interpreters.* I also *gave him all the information I could in anatomy and physic,* and further allowed him a handsome yearly salary to the best of my ability. In return I employed him to procure me as ample accounts as possible of the then state and condition of the country, its government, the Imperial Court, the religions established in the Empire, the history of former ages, and remarkable daily occurrences. There was not a book I desired to see on these and other subjects which he did not bring me, and explain to me out of it whatever I wanted to know. And because he was obliged in several things to inquire or to borrow, or to buy of other people, I never dismissed him without providing him with money for such purposes, besides his yearly allowance. So expensive, so difficult a thing it is to foreigners, ever since the shutting up of the Japanese empire, to procure any information about it.”¹

¹ In Kämpfer's time there were eight interpreters employed in Deshima—all living on fees and presents and perquisites from the Dutch. The position of the chief of these was worth about 3,000 taels—say £750 or £800 ; of a subordinate interpreter about half that sum. Then there were also eight *apprentices or learning interpreters*, who went to the Dutchmen every day to learn Dutch and *Portuguese*, “as well as the art and mystery of dealing with foreigners.” Besides, there were more than 100 so-called *house interpreters* employed by private Dutchmen in their own houses. They were merely spies, for scarcely one in ten of them understood a word of Dutch.

“Two fundamental maxims the interpreters go upon,” writes Kämpfer, “to do what lies in their power insensibly to increase the yearly expenses of the Dutch to the advantage of their countrymen as becomes true patriots ; to conceal as much as possible all the tricks and cheats they perpetually play upon us, lest the natives should come to know them. Both these ends they endeavour to obtain by confining us still more and more, looking upon this as the surest means to keep us ignorant of the language of the country, and to prevent all conversation and familiarity with the natives. If there be any of our people that hath made any considerable progress in the Japanese languages, they are sure under some pretext or other to obtain an order from the Governors to expel him from the country.”

The last clause italicised in the foregoing extract would seem to invalidate not only the assertion that the study of written Dutch began only between 1716 and 1735 but also the statements that,

“till then medical students in Nagasaki could only take down what the foreign physician imparted to them orally, and that even the interpreters were not allowed to study Dutch, but noted in *kana* what they heard.”

The existence of Kämpfer's discreet young man of twenty-four, to whom the worthy doctor gave all the information he could in anatomy and physic, is also not a little awkward for Sugita's contention that down to 1771 no Japanese had had correct ideas on the structure of the human frame. However, this young man seems to have taken such knowledge as he possessed to the grave with him, for in 1775, eighty-three years after Kämpfer had left Japan, Thunberg in Yedo,

“found that the Japanese doctors knew nothing of anatomy or physiology, and were ignorant of the circulation of the blood, feeling the pulse for a quarter of an hour first in one arm and then in the other, not knowing that both beat alike.”

This foreign evidence would also appear to tell somewhat against the absolute correctness of some other very important statements in Sugita's book, as will be seen presently.

But, indeed, owing perhaps to a not unnatural desire to appropriate an ample share of the credit that subsequently attached to those that played the *rôle* of pioneers in the introduction of Dutch learning into Japan, we meet with not a few puzzling discrepancies in the various documents examined in connexion with the matter. From one source, for example, we learn that the Shōgun, Yoshimune (1716-44), procured a European almanac and *had it translated by a certain Nakane Genkei*. Then we learn elsewhere that the same Shōgun, having obtained several other Dutch books, was so interested with their engravings that he wished to know the meaning of the explanatory text, and commissioned the Government librarian, Aōki Bunzō, who was continually urging the benefit to be derived from the study of Dutch books, to apply himself to the study of the foreign language. Accompanied by his friend Noro, he went year after year to visit the Dutch when they came to Yedo, but progress was slow. At last, in 1744, or shortly afterwards, they were ordered to Nagasaki to study under the interpreters Nishi and Yoshio, but the results of several years' work there were excessively meagre. By the end of his stay Aōki had

acquired a knowledge of about 400 words of daily use, of the various shapes of capitals and of small letters, of the foreign way of spelling monosyllables, together with the method of combining syllables into words. Before his return to Yedo, Yoshimune had died (1751), "and his position was not the same as formerly, for he found himself without a teacher, without fellow-learners, and without books to pursue his studies. He could on this account do no more than publish the books *Dutch Letters*, *Dutch Conversation*, and others.

From what we glean from foreign sources we cannot help suspecting that the Nagasaki interpreters had been somewhat slack in their pedagogic office. Probably they had no desire to see a knowledge of Dutch become general in the empire, for in such a development they no doubt saw a menace to their own importance. The language of Nishi to Mayeno, a later pupil of Aōki's, is certainly very strange, as may be judged from Sugita's account of the matter:—

"I do not remember exactly when it was, but early in the period of Meiwa (1764–7), one spring when the Dutch had come as usual to pay their respects to the Shōgun, Mayeno came to my house, and, on my inquiring whither he was bound, said that he was going to the Dutch quarters to have a talk with the interpreter, and if he favoured it, to begin the study of that language. When we arrived at our destination, we laid our plan before Nishi, the chief interpreter of the year. After hearing what we had to say, he replied discouragingly: 'It is entirely useless for you to try. It is not by any means an easy thing to understand their speech. For instance, if we want to ask what drinking water or wine is, we have no means but to begin by gesture. If it is wine, we first imitate pouring wine into a cup, and then, lifting it up to the mouth, ask what that is. They will say "Drink". But when we want to know what drinking *much* or *little* is we have no means of asking . . . I was born in a family of interpreters, and have been used to these things all my life. Yet I am fifty years old now, and I understand for the first time the meaning of the word "To like" on this journey. . . . It is by such a tedious process that even we who must see the Dutch every day have to learn. You who live in Yedo must not hope to do much. For this reason two gentlemen, Aōki and Noro, who apply themselves very hard, cannot make any progress. It is by far the best for you not to begin at all.' I do not know what Mayeno thought, but I gave up entirely the idea of undertaking such a troublesome task."

Now there is very strong reason to believe that, to put it mildly, the crafty Nishi was here playing the rôle of a diplomat in the interests of that close corporation of which he was the chief. Certainly it is somewhat strange, in view of Nishi's assertion, to

find that while in the days of Kämpfer (1691-2) not one in ten of the hundred odd so-called house interpreters in Deshima could understand a word of Dutch, in Thunberg's time (1775-6), only a decade or so after this Yedo episode, the native servants of the Hollanders "had learned to speak the Dutch language!" At the same time the Dutchmen were strictly prohibited from learning Japanese. We are also told that the interpreters, having adopted the practice of medicine after the European manner, were very inquisitive as to matters of physic and natural history, and very anxious to obtain European books, *which they studied diligently!* Again, a little later (1779-84), Titsingh was able to make translations of some Japanese books with the aid of the Japanese interpreters. "I found," he says, "among the interpreters belonging to our factory four individuals sufficiently well-informed for my purpose." And from Arai Hakuseki's *Seiyō Kibun*, published in 1712, we learn that the Japanese interpreters in Deshima were then tolerably efficient at least. In view of all these considerations it is somewhat to be feared that in his interview with Mayeno and Sugita, the worthy Nishi, for reasons best known to himself, was a trifle over-modest as regards the extent of his linguistic acquirements. It is certainly suggestive to find that about this time one of the Nishi family of interpreters at Nagasaki contrived to obtain a position as physician to the Shōgun, thanks to his knowledge of Dutch medicine and surgery.

However, Mayeno (1722-1803) was not to be balked in his project. Like his junior, Sugita, he was a physician in the service of Okudaira, Daimyō of Nakatsu, in Buzen, one of the few Liberal and progressive feudal lords of the time. After some tuition from Aōki, he was sent by this Daimyō to learn Dutch at Nagasaki, whence he returned with a knowledge of some 600 or 700 words. It would appear that the interpreters adopted the same sort of tactics towards him as they had in the case of Aōki, for we are told that "he once more went to Nagasaki, but owing to the fact that the interpreters knew only a few words, and that none were able to read books or to translate, although for several years he sought from them a more perfect knowledge, he failed to acquire anything but the mere elements of the Dutch language". Finally he *secretly acquired a translated vocabulary* and several medical works, with which he returned to Yedo.

It is at this point that the real thrilling interest of Sugita's

recital begins. One of Mayeno's and Sugita's friends, Nakagawa, —like themselves a doctor in the service of the Daimyō of Nakatsu— was keenly interested in the products of different countries, and was a constant visitor at the quarters of the Dutch whenever they came to Yedo. One day in 1771 the interpreter exhibited two Dutch books on anatomy which were for sale, and he took them home and showed them, among others, to Sugita. The latter, who could not read a word, was struck by the fact that the illustrations of bones and organs represented them to be very different from what he had believed them to be. He wished to buy the book but was too poor. Fortunately, however, he succeeded in persuading a *karō* (councillor) of the clan to pay the price from the public treasury of the fief.¹ Ever after this Sugita longed for an opportunity to test which of the theories was correct.

He had not long to wait for the *experimentum crucis*, for, as chance would have it, he was shortly afterwards invited to witness a dissection which was to take place on the public execution ground of Kozukappara, near Asakusa. Thither on the appointed day he repaired with several friends, among them Nakagawa and Mayeno, the latter of whom brought with him a Dutch book on anatomy he had purchased while he was in Nagasaki. On examination this turned out to be another copy of the work the Daimyō had lately bought for Sugita. When the grisly function performed by the public executioner (an *eta* who had some experience in such work) was over, the spectators found that, worthless as may have been the life of the old crone who furnished the *corpus vile* for the operation, her death had proved of the utmost service to the country. As Sugita, Nakagawa and Mayeno walked homewards they talked earnestly.

“Shame that they should have lived all their lives as physicians and not know till now the construction of the human body on which the science of medicine was necessarily founded. If they could under-

¹ Dr. Mitsukuri, whose synopsis of Sugita's book has been used here, writes in a footnote: “I have the pleasure of knowing a descendant of Mayeno. He once showed me a book which belonged to his illustrious ancestor, and which, I believe, was this very Anatomy mentioned above. It was carefully kept in a box of *kiri* (name of a kind of wood), wrapped in a purple *fukusa*. It was, I should say, about 4 inches by 6 in breadth and length and 2 in thickness. My friend told me that it cost 200 *rios*; and as Mayeno was too poor to buy it, he had the price paid at the cost of his *daimyō*, of whom he seems to have been a favourite, and who seems to have appreciated him fully. The book was yellow with time, and looked as if it was not worth a quarter of a dollar.” *T.A.S.J.*, vol. v, pt. i.

Dr. Mitsukuri was himself a son of a student of Dutch.—L. H.

stand the true principles of anatomy from the real objects they had just seen, if they could translate this book which they had obtained so luckily, they would do an immense service to the country, and would not have lived in this world in vain. So they went on, and when they separated for the night they had come to the agreement that they would try their best to master the strange language, and that as such things were the better the sooner begun, they would commence the very next day." *T.A.S.J.*, vol. v, pt. i.

When they set about the task they found it "was like managing a ship out on the ocean without a rudder". Mayeno naturally was chosen the leader, and the other two undertook to learn from him the little he already knew. This was soon done, and they then proceeded to attack the book. In it there was a chart of the exterior of the human body, with the names of the different parts. Now they, knowing the corresponding Japanese names, could compare them together, and thus get at least a foothold which might enable them to proceed from the exterior to the internal construction of the body. Writes Sugita :—

"At that time we did not know anything about such auxiliary words as *de*, *het*, *als*, and *welke*, and therefore, though we might occasionally meet with words which we knew, we could not make any connected sense out of them. For instance, such a simple sentence as 'the eyebrow is hair growing a little above the eye' was all confusing, and we had to spend a long spring day, even till dark, thinking and thinking as hard as we could. One day, when we came to the nose, it said that it was the thing *verheven*. We did not then have any dictionary, but in looking over the list of words which Mayeno had brought from Nagasaki, it said that the tree is *verheven* when a branch is cut off; and also that when a garden is swept and the dirt put together, it is *verheven*. As usual, we fell to thinking, but could not make it out. A bright thought came to me that when the tree whose branch has been cut off heals, the place is slightly elevated; and again, that the dirt accumulated will, of course be 'elevated'. Then the word must mean 'elevated'. All agreed that this was quite reasonable, and decided that *verheven* should be translated 'elevated'. The feeling which I experienced then cannot be told. I felt as if I had obtained a whole castle full of precious stones."

It is interesting to observe that in this enterprise "the help of the interpreters was not desired". That may have been so for one, or some, or all of several reasons. Mayeno may have discovered that these gentlemen always made a point of keeping their knowledge of Dutch to themselves. Or he may really have been deceived by their shamming ignorance so far as to regard them as grossly incompetent. What is more likely, perhaps, is that this company of Yedo scholars wished to have the whole and sole credit of introducing and spreading Dutch scholarship

and Dutch science among their countrymen. Thus, unaided, in a little over a year they were able to get over ten lines of coarse print in a day, and four years after beginning the actual work of translation Sugita had a work on anatomy ready for publication. The manuscript of this work had been rewritten ten times! Meanwhile, long before this, other enthusiasts had joined the original trio of pioneers, among them Katsuragawa, the Shōgun's Court-surgeon. The latter, however, was certainly not without assistance from one of the most distinguished European scientists of the time. When Thunberg arrived in Yedo on 28th April, 1776, we are told that "the first who called upon the Dutch were five physicians and two astronomers, prompted especially by Thunberg's scientific reputation which the interpreters had noised abroad. Two of the doctors could speak Dutch—one of them tolerably well." They also had some knowledge of natural history, collected partly from Chinese and Dutch books, and partly from the Dutch physicians who had visited Yedo, but who frequently had not been very well able to instruct them, as they were often, to use Thunberg's expression, "little better than horse-doctors."

"One of the two Japanese, quite a young man, was the Emperor's body-physician; the other, somewhat older and better informed, was physician to one of the chief princes." The former of these was Katsuragawa; the latter Nakagawa. "Both were good-natured, acute, and lively. They attached themselves to Thunberg with great zeal, coming to see him every day and often staying late at night. Though wearied with their questions, yet so insinuating were they in all their manners and so anxious to learn, that the Swedish scholar found much pleasure in their society. They had a number of Dutch works on botany, medicine, and surgery, and Thunberg sold them others. They were particularly struck with the fine set of surgical instruments which he had brought from Amsterdam and Paris."

Just before Thunberg's departure from Yedo, at the request of his two pupils in medicine, he gave them a certificate, in Dutch, of their proficiency, with which they were as highly delighted as ever a young doctor was with his diploma. A warm friendship had sprung up between him and them, and, even after Thunberg's return to Europe, a correspondence was kept up and presents exchanged for some years, down at least to the publication of his travels.¹ From this it would appear that the so-called pioneers

¹ Thunberg (1743–1828) had been a pupil of Linnæus, whom he succeeded in the Chair of Botany in Upsala University in 1784. At the date of his death he was an honorary member of no fewer than sixty-six scientific societies.

of Dutch learning in Japan, most diligent and devoted men as they were, were not quite so self-sufficing or so unaided as Sugita would have his readers believe they were.

Be that as it may, however, the fortunes of the original trio are worth following. Nakagawa died in 1781 without achieving anything very remarkable. Sugita's work on anatomy, when published, was not only left untouched by the censor, but copies of it were accepted by the Shōgun and the chief Court nobles of Kyōto; while, later on, the author was appointed head of the new hospital and medical school established in Yonezawa in Northern Japan by the Daimyō, Uyesugi Yōzan, perhaps the greatest reformer and the ablest administrator of his times. As for Mayeno, he devoted himself to Dutch scholarship generally, and before his death in 1803 had published a number of compilations from the Dutch which contributed not a little to intensify the interest of his countrymen in Western science and in the affairs of Europe.

"Intensify" in the last sentence we write purposely, for, in spite of Sugita's assertions, it is a mistake to suppose that the Nakatsu trio of so-called pioneers constituted the only centre from which an interest in foreign affairs was diffused throughout the empire. For example, we know that one Hayashi Shihei (1738-93), a *samurai* of Sendai, went three times—in 1775, 1777, and 1782—to Nagasaki to acquire information about Europe from the Dutchmen at first hand. There he became exceedingly friendly with the occupants of Deshima, and he was sufficiently honest to acknowledge the extent of his obligations to them for information and instruction. He was especially impressed by what he learned about the encroachments of Russia in Asia, and early discerning a danger threatening Yezo (Hokkaidō) from that source, he endeavoured to rouse his countrymen to a sense of it in two remarkable publications. The first of these, the *Sangoku Tsuran* ("Exhaustive View of Three Countries"), finished in 1785, and printed in the following year, dealt with the menace itself; in the second, the *Kaikoku Heidan* ("Talks on the Military Affairs of the Sea-Country"), begun in 1777, and printed at Sendai in 1792, Hayashi treated of the fashion in which it should be met, and handled the problem of coast-defence generally. The scurvy reward that attended his patriotic efforts has already been alluded to.

But indeed in the last quarter of the eighteenth century the

number of Japanese who knew or at all events, studied, Dutch is much greater than native accounts indicate.

"During my residence in Japan (1779-84)," writes Titsingh, "several persons of quality at Yedo, Kyōto, and Ōsaka applied themselves assiduously to the acquisition of the Dutch language and the reading of our books. The Prince of Satsuma, father-in-law of the present Shōgun, used our alphabet in his letters to express what he wished a third person not to understand. The surprising progress made by the Prince of Tamba, by Katsuragawa Hōshun, physician to the Shōgun, and Nakagawa, physician to the Prince of Wakasa, and several others enabled them to express themselves more clearly than many Portuguese born and bred among us in Batavia. Considering the short period of our residence at Yedo, such proficiency cannot but excite astonishment and admiration. The privilege of corresponding with the Japanese above mentioned, *and of sending them back their answers corrected*, without the letters being opened by the Government, allowed through the special favour of the worthy Governor, Tango-no-Kami, *facilitated to them the learning of Dutch.*"¹

This and the preceding extracts from European authorities may perhaps serve to indicate how salutary the exercise of caution is in dealing with purely native authorities, and with how great reserve their statements must occasionally be taken. They do not wilfully pervert truth, it may be that they do sometimes handle it so very carelessly that certain of the impressions they convey are substantially misleading. Sugita's book, already alluded to, is certainly not free from errors, while Ōtsuki's sketch of the progress of Dutch learning in Japan is not merely at variance with Sugita's account but is disfigured by several palpable inherent inconsistencies. However, his account of the services rendered by his own grandfather, Ōtsuki Gentaku (1756-1827) of Sendai, is not destitute of interest and value. This Ōtsuki, after some training

¹ Among the books Titsingh took home was Hayashi's *O dai ichi-ran*, which, edited by Klaproth, was published at the expense of the Oriental Translation Fund in 1834, under the title of *Annales des Empereurs du Japon*. It is refreshing to find that Titsingh was by no means inclined to take the early so-called Japanese History on trust, as Kämpfer had done, and as Siebold, Hoffman, and Rein subsequently did. In a letter to the Prince of Tamba, by whom is meant Kuchiki, Daimyō of Fukuchiyama, he writes :—"Must we not suppose that the Japanese, so jealous of their neighbours the Chinese, have, in writing their own history, endeavoured to fill up many gaps in it by prolonging the reigns of their earlier Dairi? There is in your history a period of one thousand and sixty-one years occupied by the reigns of only sixteen Dairi. The duration of the life of Jimmu, of the reigns of Koan, of Suinin, and the life of Ojin, appear altogether improbable. The first died at the age of one hundred and twenty-seven years. The second reigned one hundred and two years, the third ninety-nine years. The last lived one hundred and ten years. These statements are too extraordinary to be blindly believed. Grant, even, that a chaste and frugal way of living may have secured for these princes a very advanced age, how does it happen that after Nintoku Tennō, the seventeenth Dairi, none exceeded the ordinary limit of human life?"

first under Sugita and then under Mayeno, proceeded to Nagasaki to learn Dutch from the Dutchmen, and on returning to Yedo published his *Steps to the Dutch Language*, in consequence of which the grandson will have it that "it became possible for all Japanese to learn, read, and understand Dutch books". The elder Ōtsuki had a number of pupils, the most distinguished of whom was perhaps Udagawa, and the fame he acquired procured him official employment.

"In 1807, difficulties with the Russians took place in the northern parts of the empire. In the following year the appearance of the English on the western coast caused considerable commotion. The Shōgun's Government decided, therefore, to make itself acquainted with the condition of these two countries, and Ōtsuki received orders to compile an account of these two countries from Dutch books. Accordingly he composed the works in regard to the Russian question. In 1811, the Shōgun's Government paid Ōtsuki twenty ingots of silver, and continued this payment yearly, making him translator of Dutch works. In 1822, he at length received a monthly salary. The above was the first instance of the Shōgun's Government directly encouraging Western learning."

It must be added to this that, in consequence of the Russian aggressions of 1806 and 1807, and the *Phaeton* episode at Nagasaki in 1808, the Yedo authorities had ordered the college of interpreters at Nagasaki to take up the study of Russian and English in 1809. Thus, when Captain Gordon entered Yedo Gulf in June, 1818, his little craft of sixty-five tons was boarded by two interpreters, one speaking Dutch, the other *some Russian, and both a little English*. The English was probably acquired from some of the Dutch in Nagasaki; but this is only a surmise. As regards the Japanese study of Russian at that date, we are on surer ground. The cast-aways brought back by Laxman in 1792, were the pioneer instructors in this language; and some of the Yedo officials, like Takahashi, the astronomer, made some progress under their tuition. Then in Golownin's *Narrative of his Captivity* in 1811-13, we meet with many references to Japanese students of Russian and of European science.¹

¹ See especially chaps. v, viii, and x, and especially x. The author was evidently born a grave and serious man; yet he has penned some rather amusing passages: "We saw plainly," he writes, "that the Japanese were deceiving us, and did not intend to set us free, because they wished to make use of us as teachers, but they had made a great mistake. *We were ready to die, but not to become the instructors of the Japanese.*" And again, "We have already declared that we would rather sacrifice our lives than remain in Japan on any conditions, *still less will we*

As a fact, Golownin and his companions spent a good deal of their time in instructing Japanese in Russian and in compiling a grammar for their use. One of the Nagasaki interpreters had been sent for for the purpose of being taught Russian, although he had tried to conceal the fact; Takahashi had come from Yedo to learn more Russian and mathematics, while Mamiya Rinzō, the explorer of Yezo and of the Amur, whose treatise is translated in Siebold's *Nippon*, tried to utilize the prisoners for his own purposes, and incurred their hearty contempt:—

“We were now daily visited by the Dutch interpreters and the learned man, i.e. Takahashi, the astronomer. The interpreter began to fill up and improve the Russian vocabularies; he used to refer to a French and Dutch Lexicon for acquiring through the French (*sic*) such Russian words as he did not know; he then searched for these words in a Russian Lexicon *which he had in his possession*. He was about twenty-seven years of age; and as he possessed an excellent memory and considerable knowledge of grammar he made rapid progress in the Russian language.”

He soon applied himself to translate a *treatise on vaccination*, which one of the returned Japanese had brought from Russia. Later on yet another interpreter arrived from Nagasaki who besides Dutch, spoke some Russian and *had a knowledge of French*.

As regards (Siebold's friend) Takahashi, he busied himself in translating a Russian school treatise on arithmetic, also carried to Japan by one of the returned Japanese in 1792; but his object in this was merely to see the Russian methods of dealing with this science and for practice in Russian. Takahashi understood the Copernican system, was acquainted with the orbit and satellites of Uranus, knew the nature and doctrine of sines and tangents, and was familiar with the difference between the old and the new styles. He assured Golownin that Japanese astronomers could calculate eclipses with much exactness; and he studied with great attention a treatise on physics which with other books had been sent on shore in Golownin's chest. Nor were the Japanese without knowledge of political events in Europe. They informed Golownin of the capture of Moscow by the French, a piece of information

suffer the Japanese to make pedagogues of us . . . We were told that one interpreter was not sufficient for the translation of our memorial, the law requiring two; having consented to teach another, we are now requested to instruct a boy. In this way, a whole school will soon be formed, and that we will never agree to. We are few in number and unarmed, and our lives may soon be taken, but we are resolved not to be made schoolmasters.”

which he refused to credit. In fact, the width and accuracy of the knowledge of foreign affairs displayed by some of the Japanese officials Golownin had to deal with must startle any one who peruses the record of his captivity.

Meanwhile work of rare importance for the study of Dutch in Japan was being done at Nagasaki. From 1809 to 1817 there was no Dutch trade there, for Holland had been seized by France and all her colonies by the English. The merchants in Deshima were reduced to such straits that they had to be supported by the Japanese authorities.

“ But the Japanese Government, obliged to advance the means for the support of the factory, did not leave the Director (Doeff) entirely idle. He was set to work, with the aid of ten Japanese interpreters, in compiling a Japanese and Dutch dictionary for the use of the Japanese men of science and the Imperial interpreters. A copy of this work was deposited in the Imperial library at Yedo ; another, made by Doeff for his own use, was lost with all his other papers and effects on his return to Europe. The original rough draft of the work was found afterwards, however, at Deshima by Herr Fisscher, and, having made a transcript, though less perfect than the original, he brought it home in 1829, and deposited it in the royal museum at Amsterdam.”

In this extract, there is one slight error. It was not a Japanese-Dutch, but a Dutch-Japanese Lexicon that was then compiled by Doeff and his assistants, who used a Dutch-French dictionary as a basis to work from. The Doeff-Halma, as Doeff's Lexicon was generally called, did much to smooth the path for the hundreds of students that directed their energies to the acquisition of Dutch as the key to the mastery of European science, an acquaintance with which was now finding its way into the most unexpected quarters. For instance, in the *Summary of the Ancient Way*, by Hirata, the great apostle of Shintō, we actually meet with a short outline of Kämpfer's *History of Japan*, while the Dutch are there very highly praised for their achievements in natural science and placed far above the Chinese as philosophers.

It seems that the study of Dutch was getting firmly rooted in Japan in the seventh decade of the eighteenth century, about the date of Thunberg's arrival. During Titsingh's three sojourns (amounting in all to about three and a half years) it received a great impetus. It then began to assume the appearance of a fashionable craze, though not so intense, perhaps, as the Portuguese craze at Hideyoshi's Court two centuries before. To the patronage

of Shimadzu Shigehide, the vigorous and accomplished Lord of Satsuma, it evidently owed a great deal. Shigehide had been using Dutch letters and words in his correspondence in Titsingh's time (1780-4); more than forty years later on we find him frequently calling upon or meeting with Siebold when the latter visited Yedo in 1826. Between these dates, we hear of Shigehide's visits to Doeff in 1806, when he solicited the honour of a Dutch name from the envoy. Then he and several other Daimyō had shown great attention to Fisscher in 1822. To a party given by the Master of the Mint and the conductor of the Embassy many of the Japanese guests came rigged out in Dutch clothes; and as these had been collected through long intervals and preserved as curiosities, they presented a very grotesque and antique appearance. Fisscher's own party were laid under contribution in the same way, their lady visitors unpacking and rummaging their trunks, and putting them to the necessity of giving away some of the most valuable articles.

Four years later (1826) when in Yedo, the Dutch gave a party, which Siebold described as "*das originellste Lustspiel das ich je in meinem Leben gesehen*". The remark was no ill-humoured one, for he dwells upon the part the three Dutchmen—or rather the Swiss and the two Germans—tricked out as if they had walked out of one of Vandyke's pictures in the costume of the seventeenth century, contributed to it. At this function the ex-Daimyō of Satsuma, then in his eighty-fourth year, but looking no more than sixty or sixty-five, and Okudaira, the Daimyō of Nakatsu, "assisted" with all the zest of a pair of Burschen.

We have very strong evidence of the high proficiency the Nagasaki interpreters had meanwhile attained in 1823. In that year Siebold, then a young man of twenty-seven, arrived from Batavia, ostensibly in the character of physician to the factory, but really charged with a mission by Van der Capellen, Governor-General of the Dutch East Indies, to investigate and report upon the natural history, the politics and general state of affairs in Japan. Before landing he was interviewed by some interpreters:—

"who caused me no little perplexity, inasmuch as they spoke Dutch more fluently than I, and asked some suspicious questions about my native country. Unfortunately, a few years before, a Belgian doctor had, by orders of the Japanese, been dismissed from the Factory because the Japanese could not understand him, while at first they

had made great difficulties about the Swedish naturalist Thunberg.¹ Meanwhile a lucky translation of the word 'Hochdeutscher' by 'Yama Oranda', that is 'Dutch mountaineer', had nationalized me for the Japanese."

Of course, these interpreters owed their command of Dutch not to the tuition of Mayeno or Sugita or Ōtsuki, or to any of the coterie of Yedo scholars, but to their intercourse with the foreigners in Deshima.

Although certain of the native writers who have written on the progress of Dutch learning in Japan have little to say about Siebold²—one of them does not even mention his name—there can be no question that the obligations he laid Japanese scholars under were immense. During the greater portion of his six or seven years' stay in Japan (1823-9) his villa at Narutaki near Nagasaki was thronged with eager pupils from almost every quarter of the empire. It was a practice of his to award certificates of proficiency to the most deserving of these, one condition being that they should submit to him satisfactory dissertations on some one or other of the subjects with which he wished to make himself acquainted. As these theses had all to be written in Dutch—mostly after his students had left him and returned to their native provinces—it is plain that a knowledge of this language must, through him, have penetrated to some of the most sequestered nooks of Japan. And from these dissertations, and from his free and unrestrained intercourse with his troops of learned Japanese friends, Siebold found himself in a position to furnish some most interesting details about the previous progress of Western science in the country.

It will have been observed from some of the previous quotations that whenever the Dutch went to Yedo they were sure to be visited by the astronomers. A good deal of attention began to be directed to astronomy in the times of Tsunayoshi (1680-1709) when an

¹ One of these difficulties was somewhat amusing. After being six months in Deshima, he obtained liberty to go botanising in the neighbourhood of Nagasaki. A precedent of a similar permission, formerly granted to medical men of the factory, was found, but upon a critical examination of Thunberg's commission he appeared to be a surgeon, while his predecessor who obtained the favour had been a surgeon's mate. It took three months to get over the difficulty and to persuade the Japanese that these two officers were in substance the same. As it was, Thunberg's botanising proved somewhat expensive. Every excursion cost him sixteen or eighteen taels (say £4 to £5), as he was obliged to feast from twenty to thirty Japanese, by whom he was always attended.

² On the other hand the centenary of his arrival was celebrated publicly in Nagasaki.—L. H.

Astronomical Bureau was founded in Yedo and placed under the charge of Yasui-Santetsu, one of the two distinguished mathematicians of the time.¹ According to the Japanese accounts, Yasui had been originally a brilliant exponent of "Go" (an intricate game of checkers introduced from China); but, possessing natural talents for mathematics, had discovered upon comparison that the sun's actual position and motion did not always correspond with the place and motions indicated in the almanac, which had been in use for more than eight centuries—since 862. He therefore compiled a new and corrected one, which was distributed throughout the empire under the name of the Jōkiō almanac, and for that service he was made Government Astronomer in 1684. The eighth Shōgun, Yoshimune (1716–44) was keenly interested in astronomy, made some astronomical instruments himself, built a new observatory, in which he placed a large celestial globe constructed to his order by one Katō, an artificer from Kishū, and, as has been said before, he had a European calendar *translated*, and he summoned Nishikawa from Nagasaki to compile a new almanac. This task was completed in 1749, but, before it could be adopted, a farce had to be gone through no less amusing than the one enacted at the same time in connexion with the adoption of the Gregorian calendar in England.² From time immemorial all matters in connexion with the stars had to be referred to the head of the Tsuchi-Mikado family of Court nobles in Kyōto for sanction. Hence this new and corrected almanac was subjected to the examination of Abe-no-Yasukuni, and his approval of the corrections requested, upon which Yasukuni went through the ceremony of an astronomical calculation on the winter solstice of the third year of Hōreki (1753), to participate in which the author, Nishikawa, went to Kyōto.

As it was from Nagasaki that he was summoned, it is not at all improbable that Nishikawa was considerably indebted to the Dutch for his astronomical and mathematical erudition. But it might, indeed, have come from another source. Siebold tells us that it was to Ricci, Schaal, and Verbiest that not merely the

¹ The other was Seki Shunske (1642–1708). Seki and his immediate successors studied the Binomial Theorem, Theory of Numbers, the Properties of Maxima and Minima, Determinants, and Spherical Trigonometry. Ajima Naomaro in the eighteenth century was acquainted with four series of π , and also dealt with the Ellipse; in the early nineteenth century Wada Enzō was acquainted with the Catenary and Cycloid.

² Of course we refer to the astronomical *kudos* reaped by Lord Chesterfield on that occasion.

Chinese but also the Japanese owed their knowledge of the higher mathematics. The scientific works of these Jesuits, which had appeared in Chinese in one hundred parts or volumes in Peking, found a ready reception in Japan—provided the monogram of the “Society of Jesus” did not appear upon them. However, it is noteworthy that from the time of Nishikawa the Dutch in Deshima found a constant demand for books, maps, and scientific instruments. Not many years after, at the express request of the Court of Yedo, the “Nautical Almanac” was regularly sent from Batavia, while Japanese artificers were entrusted with the construction of mathematical and astronomical instruments in imitation of those forwarded from time to time by the Hollanders. Siebold tells us :—

“We had an opportunity during our stay in Yedo, of seeing a splendidly made sextant of this description ; and the quadrant in the Kyōto Observatory is also said to have been made by a native artificer.”

These and similar data furnished by Siebold may excuse the suspicion that the achievements of Japanese cartographers at the beginning of the last century, undoubtedly great and meritorious, were not after all quite so miraculous as certain modern scholars would have us believe, though the most famous of these cartographers, Inō Chukey, was certainly a man of extraordinary ability. Born in 1744, he was adopted into the family of a saké brewer as husband of the daughter and heiress, who thought so little of her spouse as to refuse to allow him to eat with the family, banishing him instead to the servants’ mess. When his father-in-law died, his business affairs were found to be at a parlous pass. Inō thereupon came to the rescue, retrieved the situation, and, after amassing considerable wealth, transferred the business to his son, and retired. At this time (1794) he was fifty years of age—somewhat too far on in life, one would say, to begin the study of astronomy. The books at his disposal, we are told, were all in Chinese, and contained many obscure passages which he in vain tried to understand. However, remembering what Siebold has told us about the origin of these Chinese books, we should most likely err if we pitied Inō for having had to waste time over so much mere trash. But Inō availed himself of something better than mere text-books ; he went to Yedo and became a pupil of the Takahashis, father and son, astronomers to the Shōgun. Under the tuition of the Takahashis the elderly student must have made excellent progress for, in 1800, we find him setting out, with the permission of the Government,

to survey the island of Yezo at his own expense. In the following year he was commissioned to survey all the coasts and islands of Japan. In this task, his field work, in which he was assisted by thirteen others, four of whom were pupils studying under him, was completed in 1818; and five years later the old man of nearly eighty saw his splendid map of Japan engraved.¹

Six years after its completion this map of Inō's was the occasion of a tragedy, in which Siebold was involved. In 1826, van Sturler had gone on the quadriennial embassy to Yedo, on which he was accompanied by the illustrious "Dutch mountaineer", whose scientific fame had long preceded him. Eighty miles from Yedo the party was met by an envoy sent by the Daimyō of Nakatsu to escort them to the city, while at Ōmori they had a visit from the Daimyō himself, who was accompanied by the eighty-four years' old ex-Daimyō of Satsuma, all eagerness to make the great doctor's acquaintance. In the city itself Siebold met with a magnificent reception from the scholars of the capital, who exerted themselves heartily to procure permission for him to remain behind after the ambassador had returned. Their device seems to have been to get him engaged as a translator of botanical works, and he had actually been entrusted with the task of translating a Danish edition of Weimann for the Shōgun, when some trivial difficulties, raised by van Sturler, offended the Council and caused the miscarriage of

¹ The results of Inō's labours are given in the *Dai Nippon En-Kai-jis-soku-roku*, or, the "Record of the True Survey of the Coasts of Japan" (1821; 14 volumes). This treatise remained in manuscript until 1870 when it was published by the Tokyo University. Three kinds of maps were constructed, the largest consisting of thirty different sheets, the medium sized of two, and the smallest of one. These maps have been the basis of all subsequent ones; and for many places in Japan Inō's measurements of latitude and longitude are the only ones which have yet been made. In Takahashi's preface to Inō's *Table of Latitudes and Longitudes* the following remarks, translated by Professor Nagaoka, are interesting: "The Europeans are of opinion that the magnetic needle generally deviates towards the west, never pointing true north, and that there exist local variations. These statements are to be found in Dutch books. In the coast survey made by Inō the compass needle formed an essential part of his stock of instruments. The best needles are made in Europe, but Inō was under no obligation to Western skill. With needles of his own construction he determined the configuration of the coast line, as well as the positions of mountains and islands . . . He found that the needle always pointed true north and south, and had no westward deviation . . . He says again that in using the needle one must have no steel ("hammered iron") near. For under the influence of the spirit (or atmosphere) of iron the needle points sometimes east, sometimes west, and cannot then be said to have no deviation. Hence the sword ought not to be worn during survey work, nor should there be any piece of iron allowed near the body." (As Inō was compelled by national etiquette to wear the appearance, at least, of a sword, he filled his scabbard with a wooden one). In Inō's time in Japan the direction of magnetic north really coincided with the direction of geographical north. Now, the magnetic variation has a mean value of about 5° W. for the whole of Japan.

the project. Possibly the intrigues of the physicians who followed the practice of Chinese medicine, against which Siebold fought strenuously, had also something to do with Siebold's abrupt dismissal. To ensure Siebold's prolonged sojourn none had worked harder than Ōtsuki, the official translator, then seventy years of age; the Court physician, Katsuragawa (Wilhelm Botanikus); and the astronomer Takahashi. This, the younger of the two Takahashis (for the father had died in 1804) was the identical "Takarō Sampei" to whom Doeff had given the name of "Globius" in 1806. He had shown Siebold the sheets of Inō's map, and had promised to furnish him with a copy of the smallest edition of it in exchange for a lately issued Russian map of the world which was incomplete or inaccurate only in so far as it regarded Japan and especially Yezo.

Although it was a serious offence for a Japanese to supply a foreigner with maps or plans of the country Kämpfer, Thunberg and Titsingh had all carried off such documents in perfect safety, and Siebold, in December, 1828, was on the very eve of his departure before any attempt was made to check him from doing so. Inasmuch as many erroneous accounts of this important incident are current, it may be excusable to give a condensed translation from Siebold's own diary :—

DEZIMA, 16th December, 1828.

"My learned friend Yoshio Tsujiro, under-interpreter in the Factory, comes to me in the forenoon as usual to assist in translating from Japanese books . . . He was very absent-minded, and appeared to be in a bad humour, which struck me so forcibly that I asked him the reason of his unusual discontent. I had promised to leave him my pocket-chronometer as a souvenir when I left Japan; as my departure was now at hand, and as I had not yet fulfilled my promise, I believed that in that I saw the grounds of his slackness; and so, opening my desk, I said to him in a friendly tone: 'Look! There lies your chronometer. But as I have no good watch, you must leave it with me for a few days yet.' My friendly words made a visibly moving impression upon him, and after a mental conflict he threw the book upon the desk and sprang up with the words, 'Now I am the worst Japanese in the Emperor's service.' And I replied quite quietly, 'And I believe you have gone mad!' 'No!' he replied firmly and earnestly; and after a pause he said, 'The affair of the map has been betrayed; I have just come, after taking the Blood-oath—from the Town-house, whither the Governor summoned me. All the details are known, and the part I have taken; it is known that I am the agent and the friend of the Court astronomer Takahashi. I was arrested and only set free after I had sworn to fetch at least the maps I myself had brought from Yedo and to discover whether and where you kept the other maps and

forbidden documents. I had even the commission to bring with me some forbidden books which might serve as incriminating evidence.

"This was a weighty disclosure, and no instant was to be lost in saving my friends and my literary treasures. To gain time we resolved that in the afternoon Tsujiro should hand over to the Governor some maps I had in duplicate, and should promise that possibly the other maps should be forthcoming on the morrow. At the same time I promised that I should also deliver to him on the following day the great map of Yezo and Saghalin, on which they appeared to lay especial stress, and which Tsujiro himself had brought me from Takahashi. He hinted that a further investigation would then be dispensed with. Meanwhile the trusty companion of all my excursions in the neighbourhood of Nagasaki, and my most intimate confidant, Inabe Ishiguro, came into the room. Before him there was no secret. The occurrence surprised him not less than us, and threatened him with a like danger. He was deeply touched—moved to tears, the staunch kindly man. I promised both of them to do everything possible, even to the sacrifice of my own life, to save them, and besought prudence and silence. They went away, and now I was alone; for at the instant I did not venture to communicate the incident, whose consequences were not to be reckoned, to any of my European acquaintances, much less to report it to the Director of the Factory. The most pressing task was now to rescue for science the map of Yezo and the Kuriles, unquestionably the most valuable geographical document I had received from the Court astronomer. In the afternoon I shut myself up in my study, and, working on into and through the night till next morning, completed a true copy of this map, together with the translation of the text . . . On the next day, 17th December, Tsujiro came towards 10 o'clock and said that he had given up the maps and that he was also required to deliver immediately the map of Yezo which he had brought me from Yedo, and that my house would be searched next morning. He advised me to rescue as much as I could. He confided to me that he anticipated being arrested. I handed him the original map, and he left me deeply touched. My friend Ishiguro came not, nor did any of my Japanese acquaintances, and none of my pupils were in the house. In such a dreadful loneliness, I had to consider what in my situation was to be done. My resolution was short; everything that was absolutely necessary for my description of the Empire of Japan, such as manuscripts, maps and books, I would pack into a big tin box, and hide as well as possible, and at the same time I would notify the Director of the Factory (Meylan) of the incident. With the copy of the map of Yezo I repaired to him and informed him of what impended next day. At the same time I handed him the map, sealed in a roll, requesting him to deposit this valuable document in the archives of the Factory, as well to save it as in case of need as to furnish proof that my conduct was excusable on account of the importance of the geographical discovery made."

Siebold's house was frequently searched, as was also the warehouse where he had deposited some of his treasures, and many of these were confiscated, while his servants were arrested and

barbarously put to the torture. On 28th January, 1829, he was forbidden to quit the country, and on the following day he had to appear on his knees before the Governor in the first of a series of strict judicial investigations. On these occasions he did everything possible to save Takahashi and his other friends who had meanwhile been arrested, while he spent the greater part of his savings in relieving the needs of the prisoners and their families. His servants were liberated in June, although his pupils and friends were still kept in gaol, and on 22nd October, he was again brought before the Governor, who, in the name of the Great Council, banished him from the country for ever, and told him to leave by the first opportunity. On 30th December, he embarked for Batavia; on the following day one of his best friends, disguised as a fisherman, approached the vessel to bid him farewell; on the next he secretly landed at Kosedo, where some of his liberated pupils bade good-bye to him "with heavy hearts", and on 2nd January, 1830, he left Japan. When he revisited it again in 1859, he found a changed country, and still more remarkable changes in progress.

In certain quarters in Japan voices had been raised in strong protest against the treatment meted out by the Shōgun's Government to the foreigner who had rendered such services to the empire. Some of the Daimyōs showed the greatest eagerness to afford an asylum to Siebold's persecuted pupils. Among these Shimadzu of Satsuma and Daté of Uwajima were prominent, and in these two fiefs European learning made some headway during the following decades. As for the unfortunate Court astronomer, "Globius" himself, he died in prison while his case was pending. According to some Japanese accounts, his body was preserved in salt till the actual trial, the result of which was that Takahashi would have had to pay the death-penalty if he had been living.¹

This untoward incident had the effect of putting the Dutch into ill-odour with the Tokugawa authorities. Intercourse between the residents of Deshima and their Japanese acquaintances was now carefully and jealously guarded, while the successive quadrennial embassies to Yedo were kept under the strictest surveillance on their route to and from, and during their stay in, the capital. All this proved a great check to the progress of Dutch

¹ It is said that the secret of Siebold's possession of the map was betrayed by one of the draughtsmen employed on it to whom Takahashi had given some offence.

learning in the immediate domains of the Shōgun, where the practitioners of Chinese medicine rejoiced at being relieved from a rapidly growing menace. Others of much greater influence than the Chinese physicians had also become embittered against the "Barbarian Company" as they contemptuously termed the votaries of Dutch science. Chinese scholars generally looked with no friendly eye upon the new learning, for they instinctively felt that its spread was threatening to undermine their authority and social prestige. It must not be overlooked, however, that many of the students of Dutch were themselves well versed in Chinese philosophy, and so were in a position to criticize its shortcomings with effect. Watanabe Kwazan, for example, the founder of the "Old Men's Club" for the study of Western science took lessons from a Kangakusha till the age of thirty-four at least. Several of the most prominent Dutch scholars of the time had finished their course in one or other of the Great Provincial schools, a few even in the Tokugawa University of Yedo itself.

It was, however, the alumni of this University of Yedo that organized the opposition to the spread of Dutch learning. Nor is this a circumstance to be wondered at when we recall what has already been said, in a preceding chapter, about the traditions of the *Seidō*, where the tenets of the Teishu school had to be accepted unquestioningly; any signs of a lapse from orthodoxy, any appearance of a tendency to think for oneself, meant expulsion. And the *Seidō*, it must be remembered, was the nursery of the Bakufu civil service. Naturally enough officials trained in such traditions considered any attempt to question authority—especially to question *their* authority, as a very heinous crime, but even in Yedo, the fortune of Dutch learning showed signs of recovering from the terrible setback it had received from the Siebold-Takahashi episode. A few years thereafter we meet with quite a number of Siebold's former pupils in Yedo, mostly as physicians. These formed the nucleus of an informal association, which from the place of residence of most of the members became known as the "Down-town Club". This was in contradistinction to another coterie, interested not so much in medicine as in Western science generally, that had its headquarters in the samurai quarter of the city, and was spoken of as the "Up-town Club". In this latter, Watanabe Kwazan (1794–1840) was perhaps the most prominent figure.¹ He

¹ See Miss Ballard's paper in *T.A.S.J.*, vol. xxxii.

was over thirty before he became interested in the new learning, which he absorbed mainly from converse with friends, and from the translations of foreign works (Dutch and a few Russian) that were then becoming rather numerous. To the end of his life he himself could read little, or no, Dutch, but he was a great stimulating force. It was he who founded the "Old Men's Club" already alluded to. Its avowed aim was the study of foreign history and geography, but its members also had the secret purpose of studying with a view to improving the defective maritime defences of the empire. Some of the Daimyō would occasionally submit difficult questions in politics to their consideration, and would place young men under their influence, actions which gave the *Seidō* men in the Civil Service no great satisfaction.

Watanabe's chief source of information, if not of inspiration, was his friend, Takano Chōei.¹ Takano had been a pupil of Siebold's for a short time, and after opening a dispensary in Yedo, he was encouraged by one of the Shōgun's physicians to take up the work of translation. In 1832 he established his reputation by the publication of his *Essentials of Medical Science*, and a work on anatomy. From this date his pen seems to have been seldom at rest; before his death in 1850 he had written or translated no fewer than fifty-two separate works, some of them running to twenty volumes or over. Half of these were on medical subjects, but there were several on military science, and a *History of the Netherlands* in seven volumes was also among them. It is chiefly by the record of his imprisonment, by an essay on the potato and buckwheat, and above all, by his *Story of a Dream* (*Yume Monogatari*) that Takano is best known among his countrymen. The *Story of a Dream* was widely read at the time and several imitations of it were written and published. The circumstances that led to the publication of the little pamphlet were rather peculiar.

It had become customary for the Dutch Director in Deshima to compile an account of all the items of interest as to events in Europe which he had been able to learn from the annual ship, and to send his compilation into the Government office in Nagasaki. Here the report was translated, and the translation forwarded to Yedo for the use of the Great Council. At the close of a meeting of the Dutch scholars on 26th November, 1838, when only fourteen members

¹ See Dr. Greene's Essay on Takano Nagahide, *T.A.S.J.*, vol. xli, pt. iii.

remained, Haga, a clerk of the Hyōjōsho, took from his sleeve a document, and said that it seemed to him a matter of importance to the State, and so he had copied it. The document was a resolution which had just been adopted by the Council with regard to the anticipated coming of what was thought to be a British man-of-war, the *Morrison*. Now, as a sober matter of fact, the *Morrison*, as related in the preceding chapter, had already paid her visit to Japan and had been cannonaded, both at Uraga and Kagoshima, in the summer of the previous year, 1837. The Great Council (by a majority of four voices to one) had now decided that the (supposed) man-of-war should be repulsed, and that, if any attempt at a forcible landing was made, the invaders were to meet with no mercy, the ship was to be sunk or burned, and all on board whether crew or passengers, put to death. The seven Japanese castaways said to be on board were not to be received; they were ordered to be delivered to the Dutch to be brought to Japan on the next Dutch vessel to make the annual voyage. Takano and his friends at once jumped to the conclusion that the authorities had confused Morrison the man, with the ship, and that, as a matter of fact, the British, to emphasize the importance of the mission, had put the vessel in charge of Dr. Morrison as a special envoy. They knew something of Morrison's distinguished work in China, but none of them knew that he had been laid to rest in the terraced cemetery of Macao in 1834, more than four years before. They regarded the supposed confusion of the man with the ship as evidence of the gross ignorance of the Bakufu, and they felt assured that the execution of the resolution of the Great Council could only result in disaster and great discredit to Japan. They also felt that their own knowledge of Western affairs created a special responsibility to make the public aware of the ignorance and incapacity of the Government, and to effect this purpose Takano wrote and published his famous *Story of a Dream*.

The short pamphlet contains several ludicrous misconceptions and two misstatements. For instance, it gives the number of British warships at 25,860 vessels with a complement of about 1,000,000 men, and represents Dr. Morrison as being in command of all the warships in the Southern Seas, where he was training from 20,000 to 30,000 sailors. The writer insists strongly on both the inhumanity and want of policy in repulsing a mission which was one of peace and goodwill.

“Should our authorities drive the British ships away, it may lead to great damage to our own shipping; for there are many islands relatively near to us under England’s control, and her ships are continually passing to and fro. Her enmity would be a great calamity to Japan.”

This pamphlet and the popular favour with which it was received, occasioned profound resentment among the *Seidō* men in the Civil Service. Some of them exerted themselves strongly to get the brochure suppressed, and the insolent audacity of its author punished, but Mizuno, Echizen-no Kami, the strongest man in the Great Council, although he had found himself in a minority of one regarding the reception to be accorded to the *Morrison*, ignored the promptings of his rancorous subordinates, the most prominent among whom was a certain Torii, at that time on duty at Uraga. Torii was really the second son of Hayashi, the Rector of the University. He had had a distinguished course in the University, where he had become thoroughly imbued with the despotic, intolerant and narrow-minded traditions of the institution. To him Dutch learning was an utter abomination, and Dutch scholars hateful in the extreme. The former was often at variance with the “Books” and the latter had no regard at all for authority and orthodoxy. Just about this time he found new and more personal grounds for resentment. A coast survey had been ordered, and one of Torii’s friends had sent in a map which was found to be very defective, while another, the work of a surveyor recommended by Takano to Egawa, the official in charge, was found to be very satisfactory. This was a great triumph for the new learning, and vastly mortifying to Torii, who had just been made a *metsuke*, or censor, and was eagerly on the outlook for an opportunity to ruin the “Barbarian Company” utterly.

About this time, some men interested in Dutch learning conceived the idea of getting Government permission to colonize the Bonin Islands. By an intrigue, Torii succeeded in inducing one of the new school to bring a serious charge against his associates, and against Dutch scholars generally. Some of them it was alleged were trying to open up communications with the Barbarians under the pretence of colonizing uninhabited islands. The informer sent in a list of persons, high and low, who were infected with the craze for Western science, and he alleged:—

“These are associated together. They respect the Barbarians and are gaining influence by publishing such books as the *Yume Monogatari*.

... All this is due to the baneful influence of the Barbarian learning, and it is in danger of bringing untold damage to the state."

Torii at once reported the matter to his patron, Mizuno, and this time Mizuno felt constrained to take action. But the heir to the great Satsuma fief was among those denounced as revolutionaries, and Mizuno was not inclined to proceed against such powerful antagonists as the heir of Satsuma, and one or two others mentioned along with him, smaller fry, such as Takano and Watanabe, could, however, be dealt with promptly. The latter was ultimately sentenced to confinement in his own house, and in 1840, to avoid causing trouble to his Lord, he committed *hara-kiri*. Takano was condemned to imprisonment for life in the common gaol, but on the occasion of a fire in the prison in 1844, he escaped. He was in northern Japan for some time; for a few weeks at Uwajima, and for some months in Satsuma, but most of the time between 1844 and his death in 1850, he lurked in Yedo, where he earned considerable sums of money by his translations of Dutch works on military science, many of his ventures being commissions from various Daimyō, and some of them even from sympathetic Bakufu officials. His position was a very precarious one, for one thing, he was an escaped convict, and for another, his translations were an infringement of a lately issued Bakufu decree appointing a censor for Dutch books, and forbidding the study of Dutch to all but physicians. The smaller officials were still on the outlook for Takano, and at the end of October, 1850, they finally ran him to earth. He was not taken alive; he cut down two of the seven officers sent to arrest him, and then committed *hara-kiri*.

His chief foe Torii had already met with condign punishment in 1845, but, in the year before his fall he had contrived to bring undeserved suffering upon another pioneer of Dutch learning in Japan. A certain Takashima Shūhan (1797-1866) had learned a great deal about European military science, especially gunnery, from a former Dutch army officer who had come to Deshima. Takashima soon made a reputation for himself among the Western Daimyō, who consulted him on many matters, and now and then sent some of their retainers to study under him. His fame presently reached Yedo; and the Bakufu summoned him to the capital and made him instructor in gunnery and cannon-founding. As Takashima and his best pupil, Egawa, were ardent votaries of Western science, Torii very soon came into collision with them, and did

everything he could to make them uncomfortable. Presently Takashima went back to Nagasaki. In connexion with the *Morrison* episode, he had expressed himself very freely about Japan's chances in any war with a European power; and he had thereby given grave offence to many of the samurai who maintained that the issue of a war did not depend so much upon armaments as on the spirit of the combatants, and that nothing could stand before their own *Yamato-damashii*. In 1842, a petty officer went up to Yedo and brought a wild charge that Takashima was laying in military stores and had formed a project of seizing the Gotō Islands as a base for operations against the Shōgunate in conjunction with foreigners. The accusation was absurd but, for peculation and other alleged offences disclosed in the course of the trial, Takashima was sentenced to death. Just at this time Torii fell, and Takashima's punishment was commuted to domiciliary confinement for life in the charge of Ichibashi, Shomōsa no Kami. Eight or nine years later, the arrival of Perry in 1853, made Takashima's knowledge and services indispensable, and he once more found himself a very busy man.

This incident again brought Dutch learning into evil odour. The *Seidō* reactionaries had already clamoured for its suppression in connexion with the Siebold-Takahashi case in 1829; they now sent in another petition praying that all further study of Dutch should be strictly prohibited. On the other side, the physicians, Sugita and Katsuragawa, sent in a counter-petition in which it was asserted that the study of Dutch was indispensable for medical men, if their science was to make any progress. The Great Council hesitated to arrive at a decision. Dutch scholars were undoubtedly troublesome; they often supplied the Daimyō with full translations of the Dutch Factor's annual report, and of Dutch treatises on military and political matters; and this was proving very inconvenient. Besides, mainly owing to Dutch scholars, a great commotion was arising about the insufficiency of the coast-defences, for which the Bakufu was held responsible. On the other hand, some of the Councillors, notably Hotta, and perhaps Sanada and Mizuno, had come to have a high regard for the Dutch school of medicine. At this time, the astronomer, Shibukawa Rokuzō, put forward the proposal that the Dutch text of the Deshima Factor's annual reports on foreign events should no longer be translated and retained in Nagasaki, but should be sent on to himself in Yedo, and that physicians alone should be permitted to study Dutch.

The Bakufu at once adopted the memorial, and issued a decree in which its chief points were embodied. The natural result was that henceforth every student of Dutch was professedly a student of European medicine, and a Japanese historian maintains that this is one of the circumstances that go to account for the comparatively advanced state of medical science in modern Japan, although many students attached themselves to physicians of the Dutch school who had no earthly intention of practising medicine at all. In 1838 Dr. Ogata established his school in Ōsaka,¹ and in the twenty-four years of its existence, 3,000 pupils passed through it. Among them, were such men as Ōmura Masujiro, Hashimoto Sanai, Fukuzawa Yukichi, Ōtori Keisuke, Hanabusa, and Sano, all of whom afterwards became prominent figures in modern Japanese history, but not one attained fame through his medical acquirements.

Even before the Shibukawa edict was issued the cause of Dutch medicine had been making great progress in the capital. As the Daimyō, who had all periodically to reside in Yedo for certain terms, were accompanied by their physicians, not a few of the men trained by Siebold thus came to find themselves together in Yedo, and a few years after his departure—before 1843 at all events—we hear of:—

“Itō in the service of the Daimyō of Saga, Totsuka in that of the Daimyō of Satsuma, Ōtsuki in that of the Daimyō of Sendai; Hayashi, physician to the Lord of Kokura, and Takenouchi from Maruoka, establishing themselves in the metropolis and practising medicine on European principles there. A little later, in the hope of arresting the great mortality among Japanese children, they added vaccination to their other practice.² In 1858, these doctors, having formed themselves into a society, established, with the permission of the Government, a private institution for vaccination. During this year the Shōgun

¹ An interesting account of Ogata's school is given in Fukuzawa's *Autobiography*, a précis of which, by W. Dening will be found in the *Transactions of the Japan Society*, vol. xii, 1913.

² In Siebold's *Diary* we meet with several passages referring to his attempts to introduce vaccination into Japan. For example: “April 23rd, 1826.—The Court physicians pass the whole day with me; they disclose their wish—at first indeed in secret—that I should remain some time in Yedo, and sketch a plan how to accomplish this with the Shōgun. To do this I was invited to give a lecture on children's small-pox and vaccination, and there I took the opportunity of proposing a plan for the introduction of this great benefit into Japan. I declared myself ready, at the order of the Shōgun, to fetch the lymph from Batavia myself and practise vaccination here.” “April 27th.—Vaccinated two more children.”

In Dr. Whitney's paper in *T.A.S.J.*, vol. xii, pt. 3, will be found some details about the introduction of vaccination into Japan. As early as 1813, Golownin tells us the Dutch interpreter then learning Russian at Matsumaye occupied himself in translating a treatise on vaccination that had been brought from Russia twenty years before.

Iyesada, being sick, sent for Itō, Totsuka and Takenouchi, and made them his Court physicians. This is the first instance in which physicians of the European school who were not also surgeons were appointed to the dignity of Court physicians."

From this sketch it may be apparent that at the time of the arrival of the "black ships" in 1853, the Japanese were by no means so unacquainted with modern science and Western affairs as the Americans anticipated. For such knowledge as they possessed they had to thank the Dutch solely. In fact, it was mainly in order that they might be apprised of what was passing in the outside world that the Yedo authorities maintained their connexion with the Hollanders. The latter, indeed, thought of their profits merely; but Siebold is very strong in his contention that the Shōgun's advisers set very little store upon the continuance of the foreign trade at Nagasaki for its mere commercial advantages. He points out that limits were placed upon the quantity of copper the Dutch might export chiefly to ensure their prolonged stay in the country, the Japanese being persuaded that on the exhaustion of the mines the Hollanders would be sure to withdraw, and he quotes the remark of one of the councillors (1790) to the effect that:—

"The cause of the friendship with the Netherlanders is trade, and the trade is maintained by the copper. But the copper is diminishing year by year, and if the mines are once exhausted, our friendship with the Netherlanders will also be at an end."

Nor is extraneous evidence lacking to confirm the correctness of Siebold's contention. In the document handed to the Russian captain, Rikord, by the two Japanese commissioners at Hakodate in 1813, the following paragraph occurs:—

"Our countrymen wish to carry on no commerce with foreign lands, for we know no want of necessary things. Though foreigners are permitted to trade to Nagasaki, even to that harbour only those are admitted with whom we have for a long period maintained relations, and we do *not trade with them for the sake of gain, but for other important objects*. From these repeated solicitations which you have hitherto made to us, you evidently imagine that the customs of our country resemble those of your own; but you are very wrong in thinking so. In future, therefore, it will be better to say no more about a commercial connexion."

The Dutch eagerness for trade, although it disarmed all Japanese suspicion of aggressive territorial designs on their part, and so made them more tolerable in the country than the Spaniards or the Portuguese, had yet at an early date excited displeasure, if

not disgust, in certain quarters in Japan. In an interview with Caron in 1637, Suyetsugu Heizō, the Daikwan of Nagasaki, had told him that the

“Hollanders ought to consider it was far more to their interest to please such high statesmen than to think always of their own affairs; they followed a line in many instances prejudicial to themselves, giving always in the first place their attention to their commerce, and thinking only in the second place of matters of politeness and courtliness. High statesmen had remarked this, their peculiarity, sufficiently, and he deemed it a much wiser plan to give in the first place their attention to the Court and courtly manners, as all their trade and profits accrued from them, and because their interest would be promoted by doing so. He said that it would certainly be disadvantageous to them if those high lords should sometimes hear their unwise answers and proposals. ‘Indeed, you talk always of your profits, of your gain, and I don’t know what else, as if everybody owed these to you. Consider that no one may earn if he has not sowed and worked for it. One ought to do some service for the profits one enjoys.’”

The service, then, the Tokugawa authorities wished to impose upon the prisoners in Deshima was the discharge of the functions of “Merchants of Light” for Japan.¹ All things considered, the Hollanders discharged these functions not inefficiently. The telescope became of practical use only about 1608 or 1609, and yet, before his death in 1616, Iyeyasu was able to make a present of one to his son Yorinobu, Lord of Kishū, and this was the first of a long succession of European inventions brought to Japan by the Dutch. However, such “light” as they purveyed was far from proving of the general national benefit it might well have done. The Shōgunate was just as anxious to monopolize that, as it was determined to monopolize all foreign trade. Its interests were bound up in the maintenance of the *status quo* as far as possible; and, exceedingly jealous of the great subject feudatories, it was utterly averse to the diffusion of new practical knowledge in, or the introduction of pestilent inventions into, the fiefs, where they might very well ultimately lead to menacing developments. Hence a partial explanation of the cast-iron restrictions upon all free intercourse with the “Merchants of Light” in Deshima. The Yedo bureaucracy were anxious indeed to have the “light”, but they were no less anxious to retain full and perfect command over

¹ “For the several employments and offices of our fellows; we have twelve that sail into foreign countries, under the name of other nations (for our own we conceal), who bring us the books, and abstracts, and patterns of experiments of all other parts. These we call ‘Merchants of light’.”—Bacon’s *New Atlantis*.

the meter, so that in its distribution and diffusion there might be the strictest economy—and not the slightest risk of explosion.

In 1842, at the date of the repeal of the Expulsion Decree of 1825, Mizuno instructed the Hollanders to supply models of all useful European machines and copies of illustrated books and journals dealing with them, and, ere long, such publications as the *Illustrated London News* began to find their way to the Council room in Yedo Castle. It is not so very strange, therefore, that when the “Governor” of Uraga and his suite were entertained on board Perry’s flagship in 12th July, 1853, they should have been found:—

“to be not unacquainted with the general principles of science, and of the facts of geography. Their inquiries in reference to the United States showed them to be not entirely ignorant of the leading facts connected with the material progress of the country. They had heard of roads, probably meaning tunnels, cut through the hearts of mountains and they inquired whether the canal across the isthmus was yet finished, the object of which they knew was to connect two oceans. When invited to inspect the vessel, they never for a moment lost their self-possession, but showed the utmost composure and quiet dignity of manner. They evinced an intelligent interest in all the various arrangements of the vessel, observed the big gun and rightly styled it a ‘Paixhan’, and exhibited none of that surprise which would naturally be expected from those who were beholding for the first time the wonderful art and mechanism of a steamship. The engine evidently was an object of great interest to them, but the interpreters showed that they were not unacquainted with its principles. Much of this cool but not unobservant composure may have been affected in accordance with a studied policy; but yet there can be no doubt that, however backward the Japanese themselves may be in practical science, the best educated among them are tolerably well-informed of its progress among more civilized, or rather cultivated, nations.”

CHAPTER XVI

THE REOPENING OF JAPAN

AMERICAN vessels had been occasionally chartered by the Dutch for the annual voyage to Nagasaki towards the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth century. At that date the American flag was becoming no rare sight in Far Eastern seas. At Canton, which was in China much what Nagasaki was in contemporary Japan, above half-a-score of American vessels were regularly employed in the Chinese trade. By 1832-3, their number had increased to about sixty, while in 1834, the volume of American exports and imports at Canton was valued at \$17,000,000. No wonder, then, that the United States Government should take steps to tap the rich Far Eastern trade at other points. In 1832, Edmund Roberts was named President Jackson's agent for the purpose of examining in the Indian Ocean the means of extending the commerce of the United States by commercial arrangements with the Powers whose dominions border on those seas. Among other instructions he was ordered to be very careful in obtaining information respecting Japan, the means of opening communication with it, and the value of its trade with the Dutch and Chinese. Later on, in the same year, he was told by Livingstone, the Secretary of State, that the United States had it in contemplation to institute a separate mission to Japan. If, however, a favourable opportunity presented, he might fill up a letter and present it to the "Emperor" for the purpose of opening trade. But Roberts died at Macao in 1836.

Shortly afterwards came the "Opium War" and the Treaty of Nanking. The Americans, naturally enough, were desirous of participating in the commercial advantages then conceded by the Chinese; and in 1844, Caleb Cushing negotiated his treaty of thirty-six clauses, which down till 1860 served as the basis for the settlement of nearly all disputes arising between foreigners and Chinese. In President Tyler's letter to the Emperor of China, it was stated that:—

“ On the west we are divided from your dominions only by the sea. Leaving the mouth of one of our great rivers and going constantly towards the setting sun, we sail to Japan and the Yellow Sea.”

And in 1845, Congressman Pratt, chairman of the select committee on statistics introduced a resolution recommending :—

“ That immediate measures be taken for effecting commercial arrangements with the Empire of Japan and the Kingdom of Korea.”

In consequence of this, Commodore Biddle, who was soon after dispatched to the China Seas with a considerable naval force, was instructed among other things to ascertain if the ports of Japan were accessible, to present a letter from President Polk to the Emperor, and to negotiate a treaty of commerce. On 20th July, 1846, Biddle with the *Columbus* and *Vincennes*, arrived off Uraga, where he made a stay of nine days. He tendered copies in Chinese of the English, French, and American Treaties,¹ lately concluded with China ; but the Japanese officers declined to receive them. We are told by Hildreth that :—

“ On the 28th an officer with a suite of eight persons came on board with the Emperor’s letter, which, as translated by the Dutch interpreter, read thus : ‘ According to the Japanese laws, the Japanese may not trade except with the Dutch and Chinese. It will not be allowed that America make a treaty with Japan or trade with her, as the same is not allowed with any other nation. Concerning strange lands all things are fixed at Nagasaki, but not here in the bay ; therefore you must depart as quickly as possible, and not come any more to Japan.’ ”²

As to this so-called letter, it has to be remarked that what Biddle received was no letter from the “ Emperor ”, but a document without any address, seal, signature, or date, and as to its contents, there was, as has already been pointed out, no Japanese statute confining trade to the Dutch and Chinese. Biddle had been requested to go on board a junk to receive the communication, but he insisted that it must be delivered on board his own ship. The officer yielded, but remarked that Biddle’s letter, having been delivered on board the American vessel, he thought the “ Emperor’s ”³ letter should be delivered on board a Japanese one. Biddle, to gratify the officer, thereupon told the interpreter that he would take delivery of the letter on board the junk. An hour afterwards Biddle went alongside

¹ The Bakufu, of course, had been duly informed of the concession of these Treaties by the Dutch.

² For a full translation see Nitobe’s *Intercourse between the United States and Japan*, p. 34.

³ It is always to be remembered that “ the Emperor ” signifies the Shōgun.

the junk, in uniform, of course. As he was stepping on board, a Japanese on the deck pushed him back into the boat. Biddle thereupon called to the interpreter to have the man seized, and returned to the *Columbus*. His instructions cautioned him not to do anything "to excite a hostile feeling, or distrust of the United States", so he readily accepted the apologies tendered. A year later, a shipwrecked American sailor chanced to threaten his Japanese guards with vengeance from some American ships of war; they told him they had no fears of that, as the year before a common soldier had knocked down an American Commander at Uraga, and no notice had been taken of the matter. In 1849, Dr. Bettleheim in far-off Lūchū informed Commander Glyn of the *Preble* that very exaggerated reports had reached these islands of chastisement inflicted upon an American "chief" who had visited Yedo in a "big" ship. Biddle had of course refused to surrender his powder and armament; but otherwise he had carried complaisance to an extreme, and had met with but a sorry reward. A week later Admiral Cécille adopted a very different tone at Nagasaki but his visit there was entirely on his own initiative, and had never been sanctioned by his government.

The appearance of these men-of-war with their powerful armaments was an unpleasant revelation, of the strength of Western Powers, to the Japanese authorities. The arrival of the *Columbus* and *Vincennes* at Uraga had excited a great commotion. Two Musashi Daimyō had just before been entrusted with the defence of Yedo Bay; and one of them (Kawagoye) had now to furnish 516, and the other (Ōshi) 480, guard-boats. Ii of Hikone and Hoshina of Aidzu were soon afterwards ordered to share the responsibility. About this time a Japanese publicist caused much excitement by pointing out that, although Yedo Bay might be made impregnable, yet Yedo could be reduced to starvation if the "barbarian" ships merely confined their operations to interrupting the coastal junk traffic, and cutting off the supplies for the capital. In some quarters there was a strong agitation for the revival of the "Expulsion Edict" of 1825, but clear-headed statesmen, like Abe Masahiro, were convinced that this would be most inadvisable. From Tsushima, and from the sea-board fiefs in northern Japan, he was now getting constant reports about the appearance of foreign ships in their harbours. As things stood, this put the feudatories to much trouble and expense. The duty of initiating actual hostilities when

these vessels appeared would be still more onerous, to say nothing of the ulterior consequences that might be involved. The project of embodying a peasant militia to deal with such contingencies he pronounced to be quite impracticable.

The main cause of the rapidly increasing frequency of these uninvited and most unwelcome guests was to be found in the remarkable development of American whaling enterprise in the Northern Pacific. In 1821, Russia had tried to exclude navigators from Behring Straits and the Pacific Coast of her possessions, a step which at once elicited protests from the United States and Great Britain. With the latter the treaty of 1825 placed matters on a satisfactory footing while, in the preceding year (1824), the United States treaty had provided that the navigation and fisheries of the North Pacific should be equally free to Russians and Americans. In 1838, a second convention guaranteed to citizens of the United States freedom to enter all ports, places, and rivers on the Alaskan coast under Russian protection. The citizens of Nantucket, and, later on, of New Bedford were not slow to avail themselves of the advantages of these two Conventions; at the latter town, in 1851, Perry found that American capital to the amount of \$17,000,000 was invested in the whaling industry in the Northern Pacific. The whalers found their chief base for necessary repairs at the Sandwich Islands; their temporary supplies were also drawn from these islands, and from the Bonins, where a small colony of English, Americans, and Sandwich Islanders had established itself under the Union Jack. In these circumstances it is but small wonder that necessitous whalers should chafe at being denied the hospitality of Japanese havens. When shipwrecked in northern Japanese seas, as they sometimes were, the whalers had but little good to say of the treatment generally accorded them by their reluctant hosts. They were usually confined in what were rather kennels than prisons, and were ultimately conveyed in *kagos* to Nagasaki, where they were handed over to the Dutch to be sent out of the country.¹ What made this treatment the more galling was the contrast it presented to such acts as those of Captain Cooper of the *Mercator*, who took much pains to repatriate eleven Japanese he rescued from a sinking junk in 1845.²

¹ For some particulars, see Hildreth's *Japan*, pp. 499-504, and Nitobe's *Intercourse between Japan and the United States*, pp. 35-8.

² See Hildreth, pp. 495-6.

In 1849, Captain Geisenger, the American commissioner at Canton, was informed that there were some fifteen foreign seamen in ward at Nagasaki, and that they would probably be kept there till the next annual visit of the Dutch ship. Geisenger, thereupon dispatched Commander Glyn, in the *Preble* (sloop-of-war) to bring the prisoners away. At Naha, Glyn heard from Bettelheim how Biddle had been "chastised" at Uruga in 1846; accordingly, on reaching Nagasaki, he assumed a very firm attitude with not unsatisfactory results.¹ On returning to America, Glyn proceeded to Washington and there endeavoured to get sent on a diplomatic mission to Japan with a naval force to support him. Meanwhile the importance of making an attempt to induce, or to force, the Japanese to resume intercourse with the outside world had been kept before the public and the Washington officials by Mr. Palmer, of New York, who was a voluminous writer on the subject of Japan. He sent in memorials to the President and the Secretary of State; and in this he was backed by some of the principal merchants of New York and Baltimore. By this time, it must be noted, steam navigation had been making remarkable progress, and the question of coaling depots in the Far East—and especially in Japan—had become a pressing one for American naval commanders and steamship owners. In 1851, the year when Glyn went to Washington, the Dutch Minister there assured Daniel Webster, then Secretary of State, that there would be no modification of her exclusive policy by Japan, whereupon Webster resolved to take practical measures. Commodore Aulick, who had just been appointed to the command of the China squadron, suggested to him that it might further the objects of any Japan expedition if some Japanese castaways, picked up by the *Auckland* a few years before,² were taken back with it to Japan. Webster approved of his suggestion,³ and the castaways were ordered to be embarked on the Pacific coast and sent on to Hong-Kong to await the arrival of the warships there. Webster, furthermore, drafted a letter to be signed by the President for presentation to the "Emperor" of Japan, and on

¹ See Hildreth, who quotes Senate Documents 1851-2, vol. ix, as his authority.

² For details, see Heco's *Narrative of a Japanese*, vol. i. Heco was one of the castaways and was afterwards in the Japanese, as well as the American, service.

³ See his letter in Lanman's *Leading Men of Japan*, p. 392. For some particulars about the originators of the Japan expedition, see Lanman; Griffis' *Matthew Galbraith Perry*; and Nitobe's *Intercourse between Japan and the United States*.

30th May, 1851, Aulick received his commission to negotiate and sign a treaty with Japan. His command was, however, a short one. His commission was cancelled on 18th November, in the same year.¹ On 24th March, in the following year, Perry was formally appointed in his stead, and instructed to assume command of the East India squadron. It was not until 24th November, just seven months later on, that the new Commodore was able to leave Norfolk on his mission; and even so, all the "squadron" he had with him consisted only of the *Mississippi* steamer, which carried his flag.

It should be said that, at this date, the most important foreign station in the American naval service was the Mediterranean, and that Perry was expecting to be appointed to this command. In his letter to the Secretary of the Navy on 3rd December, 1851, he stated that he considered the relief of Commodore Aulick:—

"a retrograde movement . . . unless indeed, as I have before remarked, the sphere of action of the East India squadron and its force be so much enlarged as to hold out a well-grounded hope of its conferring distinction upon its commander."

It was finally understood that Perry should have an imposing squadron of about twelve ships to support him in his diplomatic mission to Japan. Some of these were on the East India station already; others were to be sent on as soon as duly equipped. Perry asked, and received, permission to write his own instructions, and Everett, who succeeded Daniel Webster as Secretary of State, made no alteration in the original draft of which Webster expressed his approval. It would perhaps have been well if Everett had changed as little in the letter Webster had drafted for presentation to the "Emperor" of Japan,² which was expanded to more than double its original length by Everett, and the expansion can hardly be regarded as an improvement. The months before his start had been employed by Perry in selecting presents for the Japanese, in collecting and mastering the voluminous literature on Japan, and in working out the details of the projected expedition.

"Great interest was naturally excited among literary and scientific circles in the expedition, and numerous applications poured in from all parts of the civilized world for permission to join it; but all such requests were, for obvious reasons, met with unqualified refusal. The most stringent restrictions, moreover, were imposed upon all those who embarked in the enterprise. They were prohibited from making

¹ p. 283 seq.

² The original letter will be found in Hildreth and Lanman.

any communications to the public journals touching the movements of the squadron, or the discipline and internal regulations of the vessels composing it ; and even private letters to friends were to avoid these topics. All journals and memoranda kept by members of the expedition were to be considered the property of the government, until permission should be given to publish them. The object of these regulations was to withhold information from other powers, which, if communicated, might imperil the success of the enterprise.”¹

Perry arrived at Hong-Kong on 6th April, 1853, and found the sloop-of-war *Saratoga* and *Plymouth*, and the store-ship *Supply* in the harbour. The steamer *Susquehanna* had gone to Shanghai, where Perry also proceeded, and on his arrival there he transferred his flag to the *Susquehanna* on 17th May, 1853. This vessel was the largest in the squadron ; but she was of no more than 2,450 tons, with an armament of sixteen guns. On 23rd May, the squadron left Shanghai for the Lūchūs, where it arrived on the 26th. Here a stay of thirty-eight days was made, although Perry occupied the fortnight between 9th June and 23rd June on a visit to the Bonins with the *Susquehanna* and *Saratoga*. Something like a base of supplies was established at Naha ; and Americans remained in charge here all the time that Perry was absent on his visits to Japan. Perry was not accurately informed about the real political situation in Lūchū, but from an entry in Wells Williams' Journal (8th June) it is clear that some of the American surmises came very near the truth. Perry believed that any success which might attend his attempts at negotiations in Lūchū would materially facilitate his object in Yedo itself. The most energetic measures of a pacific character were therefore determined on ; while the officers did not neglect to make provision against the possible failure of all such efforts. It was arranged that if the Japanese Government refused to negotiate, or to assign a haven of resort for American merchant and whaling ships, to take under surveillance the island of Great Lūchū, not, however, as a conquered territory, but as a “ material guarantee ” for the ultimate concession of the American demands. It will be remembered that Admiral Cécille had, seven years before, unwittingly driven the Yedo councillors to their wits' end by much less drastic action than this proposed step.

¹ Perry's own official *Narrative* edited by Hawks, and Wells Williams' *Journal of the Perry Expedition to Japan*, are the main foreign “sources”. From the Japanese side, the *Zoku Tokugawa Jikki*, vol. iii, gives many interesting details, while there is much excellent work in Mr. Kobayashi's *Bakumatsu-shi*.

Wells Williams records a visit to some Japanese junks in Naha on 8th June, one of which had just come in from Kagoshima. It may be safely assumed that the Kagoshima authorities were quite well apprised of what was occurring in the Lūchūs at this time, and that they passed on the intelligence to the Bakufu officials. Accordingly the arrival of the American squadron off Uraga on 8th July, 1853, could not possibly have been the staggeringly unexpected event it is sometimes represented to have been. Perry left Naha on the "glorious" fourth of July, with four ships, the *Susquehanna* with the *Saratoga* and the *Mississippi*, with the *Plymouth* in tow. The squadron anchored off Uraga about four o'clock on the afternoon of 8th July "the two steamers being nearest the town". On this occasion the Commodore's stay was a brief one, between eight and nine days :—

"17th July: We got under weigh this morning, and each steamer, taking a sloop in tow, passed out of the bay at the rate of nine knots, in a calm, showing most plainly the power of steam to the thousands who watched us. . . . Near Cape Sagami fully a thousand boats were seen, all of them without sails, each containing six to ten people apparently abroad for no other object than to see the ships depart. To a maritime people, the contrast between their weak junks and slight shallops, and these powerful vessels must have made a deep impression."

And on 27th May, 1905, a little more than a brief half-century after Wells Williams jotted this down in his *Diary*, Japan was to fight and win the Battle of the Sea of Japan, the greatest sea-fight since Trafalgar !

In a measure Commodore Perry may be said to have met the Japanese on their own ground. It has always been customary for the Japanese to consider all their plans and projects very carefully and materially before proceeding to execute them, and to arrive at a clear-cut decision as to the manner in which they are to be carried out, and to determine the deportment and conduct of their representatives in all negotiations or public functions. Perry had devoted much thought to what his attitude should be towards the Japanese ; and when he came into contact with them he had the immense advantage of knowing his own mind on this all-important matter. In his own words :—

"In conducting all my business with these very sagacious and deceitful people, I have found it profitable to bring to my aid the experience gained in former, and by no means limited, intercourse with the inhabitants of strange lands, civilized and barbarian ; and this

experience has admonished me that, with people of forms, it is necessary either to set all ceremony aside, or to out-Herod Herod in assumed personal consequence and ostentation."

Perry was quite familiar with Langsdorff's account of the Russian mission of 1804, and he was fully resolved to expose himself to none of the mortifications Rezánov had then been subjected to with such elaborate sham courtesy. He knew, furthermore, that Biddle's extremely conciliatory and complacent attitude seven years before had brought him not a jot nearer the accomplishment of his purpose, while the wonderful self-restraint he had exhibited in very trying and aggravating circumstances had been so grossly misinterpreted as to bring the American name into contempt among at least the smaller Japanese officials. Perry was in thorough earnest in his determination to submit to no humiliations, and to be put off with no tergiversations. He came resolved to demand as a right, not to solicit as a favour, those acts of courtesy which are due from one civilized nation to another—not to tolerate those petty annoyances to which his predecessors had been subjected—and to disregard both the acts and the threats of the authorities, if derogatory to the dignity of the American flag. From the very first the Americans now showed the Japanese officials that they meant serious business. The vessels were all prepared for action—ports open, ammunition ready, men at their quarters, while the squadron anchored so as to command with its guns the entire range of forts and batteries around Uraga.¹ Perry had instructed his captains to allow no one to come on board, and none but proper officials were to be admitted to the flagship. Biddle's vessels in 1846, had been freely open to all visitors who had partaken of the officers' hospitality without hesitation, and had made themselves so much at home that when spoken to about going ashore they had answered by signs that it was impossible to do so. Perry decided that there should now be no repetition of this conduct on board his ships. In this he was emphatically right, for few things could lower the prestige of the visitors more among the aristocracy and officials than a readiness to admit all comers to an easy familiarity.

¹ The last paragraph of the communication handed to Commodore Biddle in 1846, was as follows: "In conclusion, we have to say that the Emperor positively refuses the permission you desire. He earnestly advises you to depart immediately and to consult your own safety in not appearing again upon our coast." Perry consulted his own safety by appearing on the coast with an armament that was irresistible.

The squadron had been making way against a slight head wind just before anchoring, and the Japanese were rather surprised and startled at the sight. Two guns were discharged from the forts, a rocket went up, and a number of guard boats put off to intercept the intruders. But the Americans paid no heed either to the boats or to the gun that was fired just after they anchored, and when the Japanese began to surround them with the usual cordon of guard-boats, and to clamber unceremoniously aboard the various vessels, the visitors took very vigorous and unexpected action. "When they attempted to get alongside and on board the *Saratoga*, the ropes with which they attached themselves to the ship were unceremoniously cast off. They then attempted to climb up by the chains, but this the crew was ordered to prevent, and the sight of pikes, cutlasses, and pistols, with other indications that the American officers and men were thoroughly in earnest, induced them to desist from the attempt. Several of the commanders in the Japanese boats signified their dissatisfaction at not being permitted to board the ships, but the commander's orders were strictly obeyed throughout the negotiations. One of the boats came alongside the flagship and it was observed that a person on board had a scroll of paper in his hand, which the officer of the *Susquehanna* refused to receive, but the bearer held it up to be read alongside the *Mississippi*, when it was found to be a document in French charging the ships to go away and forbidding them to anchor at their peril. Of course the American squadron had already anchored; and their peril was nothing of consequence. Next day the American survey-boats reported that the "fortifications of Uraga were not very formidable, and that their construction did not exhibit much strength or art. Their position and armament were such as to expose them to an easy assault, the parapets being of earthwork, while many of the buildings, the barracks, and magazines, appeared to be of wood. The few guns mounted were of small calibre, and the embrasures so wide as greatly to expose them". What the Americans could not know, of course, was that, for the only effective pieces in the armament of the forts, the Japanese then did not have so much as ten rounds of ammunition, and that the Governor of Uraga had just written to Yedo that an American assault on his forts would at once expose the utter uselessness of the whole system of coast defence with most disastrous consequences to the Empire! In truth such "peril" as there was

in the situation was entirely on the Japanese side, and the Japanese were only too well aware of the fact. The Governor was soon again writing that his uninvited guests were exceedingly calm and collected in their demeanour, and that "these vessels were really not to be easily dealt with".

The chief functionary, as his boat reached the side of the *Susquehanna*, made signs for the gangway to be let down. This was refused, but the Chinese and Dutch interpreters were directed to inform him that the Commodore would not receive anyone except a dignitary of the highest rank, and that he might return on shore. The interpreter in the Japanese boat (Hori Tatsunosuke) was very pertinacious in urging to be allowed to come on board, but was constantly refused permission, and was told that the commander of the squadron was of the highest rank in the service to which he belonged, in the United States, and could only confer with the highest in rank at Uraga. It was then stated that the Vice-Governor of Uraga was in the boat, and the speaker pointed to one of those in authority at his side, who, he said, held the highest position in the city, and was the proper person to be received. He was now asked why the Governor himself did not come off, to which he replied that he was prevented by the laws from going on board ships in the roads, and proposed that the commodore should appoint an officer of corresponding rank with the Vice-Governor to confer with him, as he was desirous of communicating to the Government the object of the squadron's visit. The Commodore, after some intentional delay, consented to this request, and appointed his aide, Lieutenant Contee, to receive him. The gangway ladder was accordingly lowered, and the "Vice-Governor", Nakashima Saburosuke, accompanied by his interpreter, who spoke Dutch, came on board and was received in the captain's cabin, where a conference was held, in fact, with the Commodore, who, however, studiously kept himself secluded in his own cabin, and communicated with the Japanese through his aide only.

Nakashima was told that the commodore had come on a friendly mission to Japan, with a letter from the President to the Emperor, and that he desired a suitable officer to be sent to receive a copy in order that a day might be appointed for the envoy to formally deliver the original in person. Nakashima made answer that the squadron must go to Nagasaki—whereupon he was told that the commodore had purposely avoided Nagasaki, and that he

would not go to Nagasaki. The envoy expected the letter to be duly and properly received where he then was, and that while his intentions were perfectly friendly, he would submit to no indignity. If the guard-boats then collecting around the vessels were not immediately removed *they would be dispersed by force*. Nakashima thereupon went to the gangway and ordered these boats away. A few still remained, however, and an armed boat from the flagship was sent to deal with them. Nothing more of the guard-boats was seen during the stay of the squadron. Nakashima presently took his leave, saying that he had no authority to reply to the commodore's communications, but that next morning an officer of higher rank would probably be sent with definite instructions.

That Perry's attitude was a judicious one will be more readily conceded if we bear in mind that the Japanese had just been playing off a gross fraud upon him. The assertion that Nakashima was Vice-Governor of Uraga was an outrageous lie, for this man was merely a humble *yoriki*, an insignificant officer of police.¹ Next morning the Japanese went on with the farce. At seven o'clock, the arrival of Kayama Yezaimon, who presented himself as the governor and greatest functionary of Uraga, was duly announced to the Commodore, who ordered that this dignitary should be received by Commanders Buchanan and Adams and Lieutenant Contee, the Commodore still refusing to give an interview to anyone but a counsellor of the Empire! The governor was attired as a noble of the third rank! He was duly received by the officers named, and immediately commenced a conference with them, which, however, was in reality with the Commodore, though he still preserved his seclusion. This new functionary had also to be told that it was utterly bootless to mention Nagasaki; the envoy intended to deliver the letter where he was, and moreover, if the Japanese government did not see fit to appoint a suitable person to receive the documents addressed to the Emperor, he, whose duty it was to deliver them, would land with a sufficient force and present them in person. Kayama thereupon hurriedly said that he would send to Yedo for further instructions at once. But, he added, it would take four days to obtain them. As an hour's steaming would have taken the ships in sight of Yedo, the governor was informed that the Commodore would wait three days only for a definite reply.

¹ A parallel would be a serjeant of police at Gravesend, an officer just one degree above the constables who were termed *dōshin*.

Meanwhile, before and during this interview, the American surveying parties had been at work. At one time there seemed to be so lively a prospect of one of these coming into collision with the Japanese that the officer in command ordered his men to rest upon their oars *and fix the caps upon their carbines*. The "Governor" informed the Commodore that it was contrary to the Japanese law to allow such examinations, whereupon he was courteously told that the American laws required them and that the Americans were as much bound to obey the laws of their country as the Japanese were bound to obey those of Japan. The "Governor" was also shown the President's letter, and the Commodore's letter, and the envoy's credentials, and was so evidently impressed with the exquisite workmanship and costliness of the magnificent boxes in which they were enclosed that, for the first time, he offered water and refreshments for the squadron but was told that they were not then required. He was also informed that further discussion would be unnecessary until the time appointed for the delivery of the answer from the Japanese government should arrive.

At this time, the Americans seem not to have had the slightest suspicion of the trick the Japanese were persistently playing. This "Governor" of Uraga, Kayama Yezaimon, was like Nakashima, no more than an insignificant police-officer (*yoriki*). It should be said that there were really two Governors of Uraga, one Toda, Izu no Kami, actually resident in the place; the other, Ido, Iwami no Kami, then in Yedo, for it was the practice for the Tokugawa Government to have duplicate sets of officials for almost every post. These governors, it should be remembered, stood rather low in the official hierarchy; between them and the "Councillors of the Empire" with whom alone Perry intended to discuss matters, were more than a score of ranks at least. Next day (10th) was Sunday, and nothing was done. But, early on the morning of the eleventh, the surveying boats protected by the *Mississippi* were ordered to penetrate the bay higher up towards Yedo.

"This step was taken partly for the purpose of ascertaining the navigable capacities of the harbour, and *partly to overawe the Government*, and thereby increase the chances of a favourable answer. The 'Governor' of Uraga on seeing the advances of the war-steamer, visited the flag-ship with the ostensible object of stating that the letters would be received on the following day (12th), and forwarded to Yedo, but really for the purpose of learning why the *Mississippi* has ascended the bay. The Commodore, anticipating the inquiry,

directed that the 'Governor' should be informed that unless the business which had brought the squadron to the bay of Yedo were arranged during the present visit, he would be *obliged to return in the ensuing spring with a larger force*, and, as the anchorage in front of Uraga was not convenient or safe, he was desirous of seeking a more favourable situation nearer to Yedo, which *would facilitate his communication with that city.*"

Next day, the 12th, the "Governor" appeared in great state, and was received by Buchanan and Adams. Perry, through them, now consented to deliver the translations *and* originals of letter and credentials, as also a letter from himself to the "Emperor", provided the latter should appoint a Japanese officer of the highest rank to receive them directly from his hands. The "Governor" replied that a building would be erected on shore for the reception of the Commodore and his suite, and that a high official personage, specially appointed by the Emperor, would be in attendance to receive the letters; but, he added, that as no answer could be given in the Bay of Yedo, it would be transmitted to Nagasaki, through the Dutch or Chinese superintendents.

"Thereupon Perry wrote down the following statement for the 'Governor's' benefit: 'The Commander-in-Chief will not go to Nagasaki, and will receive no communication through the Dutch or Chinese. He has a letter from the President of the United States to deliver to the Emperor of Japan, or to his Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and he will deliver the original to none other; if this friendly letter of the President to the Emperor is not received and duly replied to, he *will consider his country insulted, and will not hold himself accountable for the consequences. He expects a reply of some sort in a few days, and he will receive such reply nowhere but in this neighbourhood.*'"

At a second visit to the flagship on the same day the "Governor" intimated that one of the highest dignitaries of the Empire would arrive at Uraga in two days for the purpose of receiving the documents, and that the interview would take place at a house on shore, but that no discussion could take place on the occasion. On the afternoon of the 13th, the "Governor" again went on board the flagship and exhibited the original order of the "Emperor" addressed to the functionary who had been deputed to receive the Commodore. The translation of the order ran as follows:—

Letter of Credence given by the Emperor of Japan to his highness, Toda, Prince of Idzu.

"I send you to Uraga, to receive the letter of the President of the United States to me, which letter has recently been brought to Uraga by the Admiral, upon receiving which you will proceed to Yedo, and bring the same to me."

There was really no great need to send Toda to Uraga, for he was already there and had been there all the time. The Americans were led to believe that he was territorial Prince of Idzu, a province where he owned not a foot of land, and where he exercised no administrative rights whatever. A police officer had been temporarily promoted to the office Toda actually held—the governorship of Uraga. And as promotion seemed to be the order of the day, the Shōgun became Emperor and Commodore Perry an Admiral. Meanwhile the Japanese had been hastily constructing a building for the reception of the envoy at Kuri-ga-hama at the head of a little inlet a short distance from Uraga. Perry had sent a survey party to the inlet, and it was found that the vessels could readily be brought within gunshot of the place. On the following morning, the 14th of July, the two steamers dropped down the bay and anchored off the spot. The “Governor” of Uraga, who was to act as master of ceremonies on this fateful occasion, had already settled all the details of the interview, and he now made his appearance alongside the flagship. Three hundred armed Americans in fifteen boats now put off for the shore, and presently a salvo of thirteen guns indicated that the envoy was stepping into his barge :

“The Americans were for the most part very vigorous, able-bodied men, who contrasted strongly with the smaller and more effeminate-looking Japanese. These latter had mustered in great force to the number the ‘Governor’ of Uraga stated, of 5,000 ; but this, it was believed, was far below the real number.”

In this case, however, the “Governor’s” statement seems to have been correct. Some of these 5,000 troops were Bakufu men ; but they mostly came from the four fiefs of Oshi, Kawagoye, Hikone, and Aidzu, which were entrusted with the coast defence of the four provinces round Yedo Bay. Their commanders had been charged to do nothing that might lead to “untoward incidents”.

The newly erected structure consisted of an entrance hall and an inner chamber. As the Commodore and his suite ascended to the reception room the two dignitaries who were seated on the left arose and bowed, and the Commodore and suite were conducted to the arm-chairs which had been provided for them on the right. These seats had been hurriedly brought from the local temples, and were really *kyokuroku* or chairs used by Buddhist priests in conducting funeral services ! The interpreters announced the

names and titles of the high Japanese functionaries as *Toda, Idzu no Kami*, or *Toda, Prince of Idzu*, and *Ido, Iwami no Kami* or *Ido, Prince of Iwami*. As has been explained, these two men were really the Governors of *Uraga*; *Ido*, who had just come from *Yedo*, had been acting as a *metsuke* (censor) until a few weeks before.

From the beginning the two "princes" assumed an air of State formality, which they preserved during the whole interview, as *they never spoke a word*, and rose from their seats only at the entrance and exit of the Commodore, when they made a grave and formal bow. For some minutes after the Americans had taken their seats there was absolute silence in the room, not a single word being uttered on either side. At last *Hori*, the interpreter, inquired whether the letters were ready for delivery; he announced that "Prince" *Toda* was prepared to receive them and that the scarlet box at the upper end of the room was the proper receptacle for them. *Perry* thereupon beckoned to the two pages with the boxes to advance. The two gigantic negroes that escorted the pages followed immediately in the rear of the boys, and marching up to the scarlet receptacle, received the boxes from the bearers, opened them, took out the letters and displaying the writing and seals, laid them upon the Japanese box—all in perfect silence. The envoy instructed his own interpreter (*Portman*) to indicate to *Hori* the natures of the various documents, upon which the latter and *Kayama*, the "Governor" still kneeling both bowed their heads. *Kayama* now rising approached the "Prince" of *Iwami*, and prostrating himself on his knees before him, received from him a roll of papers, with which he crossed over to the Commodore, and again falling upon his knees delivered it to him. This was the "Imperial" rescript. The Dutch translation of it thus rendered into English at the time, was fairly correct:—

"The letter of the President of the United States of America, and copy, are hereby received and delivered to the Emperor. Many times it has been communicated that business relating to foreign countries cannot be transacted here in *Uraga*, but in *Nagasaki*. Now, it has been observed that the Admiral in his quality of ambassador of the President, would be insulted by it; the justice of this has been acknowledged; consequently the above-mentioned letter is hereby received in opposition to the Japanese law. Because the place is not designed to treat of anything from foreigners, so neither can conference nor entertainment take place. The letter being received, you will leave here."

Upon delivery of this "imperial rescript", the hall again relapsed into profound silence. This was at last broken by the envoy instruct-

ing his interpreters to inform the Japanese that the squadron would leave in two or three days for the Lūchūs and Canton, and that he would be pleased to take any dispatches or messages they might wish to send to these places. He also stated that it was his intention to return to Japan in the following spring, and Hori then asked him if he would return with all four vessels. "All of them," was the reply, "and probably more, as these are only a portion of the squadron." At this point it becomes advisable to quote from Wells Williams' *Journal* :—

"Perry then added that there was a revolution in China by insurgents who had taken Nanking and Amoy, and wished to introduce a new religion. 'It will be better not to talk about revolutions at this time,' was the significant reply, and proper one too, for I thought it very mal-apropos to bring in such a topic. Yet one might regard it with interest as ominous of the important changes which might now be coming on the Japanese, and of which this interview was a good commencement."

Rarely indeed has a shaft from a bow drawn thus at a venture hit the mark so shrewdly as in this special case. The writer does not seem to observe that this momentous interview took place on the fateful 14th July—on the sixty-fourth anniversary of the fall of the Bastille and the beginning of the French Revolution. Fifteen years later, on the 4th July, 1868, the ninety-second anniversary of the American Declaration of Independence, the last defenders of the Tokugawa Shōgunate in the Shōgun's own capital were to be hopelessly routed and scattered to the winds in the battle of Uyeno Park !

In so much as even obtaining this interview with the Bakufu commissioners at Uraga, Perry had dealt a serious blow to the supposed Japanese "ancestral law". Yet the Bakufu tried desperately to save appearances even in this conjuncture. Uraga was no place for the discussion of foreign affairs—Iyeyasu had tried hard to induce both Dutch and English to establish their factories there—and so the commissioners had been instructed not to utter a single word and to make the interview as short as possible. Even with all its long pauses of solemn and profound silence it had not lasted thirty minutes. It may be noted also that the commissioners appeared in their war-hats, and with body armour under their robes. However, on the American side the preparations for the interview had been no less conspicuously strenuous and menacing. Besides the contents of their cartridge boxes, the landing

party carried a full thousand charges of ball, while the two steamers had been anchored so that they could rake the little bay, with decks cleared, and everything ready for action. Howitzers were placed in boats alongside to be dispatched at a moment's notice at the first appearance of any trouble on land, and the ships' guns were ready to shower shot and shell on the whole line of Japanese troops if they opened hostilities.

"Therefore, as the letter has been received, you can leave." Perry, to show how little store he set upon this intimation, at once got the whole squadron under way up the gulf towards Yedo, and in the afternoon the vessels came to anchor fully ten miles in advance of their previous holding-ground. Presently the very hard-worked "Governor" of Uraga appeared upon the scene in great consternation, and he and the interpreters did everything they could to get the squadron to return and depart. The Americans paid little heed to his remonstrances; so the "Governor" consoled himself with the magnificent feast that was presently set before him and his companions. On the 15th, the Commodore went on board the *Mississippi*, and proceeded up the gulf as far as Hommoku, while a dozen surveying parties were busy at various points. On the 16th, the "Governor" came on board to renew his assurance of a favourable reception of the President's letter; and as nothing was now said of sending the answer to Nagasaki, it seemed that the nearer the Commodore approached to Yedo, the more conciliating and friendly the Japanese became. That afternoon when, after having been generously entertained with abundance of champagne, the "Governor" was informed that the squadron was to leave early next morning, his "Excellency" protested that his affection for his American friends was so great that he would not be able to restrain his tears on their departure.

Perry was anxious as to the safety of his fellow-countrymen in Shanghai, which the Taiping rebels were then menacing. He was also in need of fresh supplies, and he did not wish to be dependent on the Japanese for anything at this time. Above all he wished to give the Japanese ample time to reflect on the position, before he returned with a much stronger force to receive their reply to the President's letter to the "Emperor". So far we have told the story as gathered from American sources; now let us turn our attention to what the Japanese were meanwhile doing and thinking.

To judge from the panic and confusion in the Bakufu Councils

and in the nation at large, one might naturally suppose that the arrival of the American squadron at Uraga had fallen upon the Japanese like the proverbial bolt from a blue sky. As a matter of fact the authorities had been early apprised of the American preparations for the expedition. The Dutch Minister at Washington had been requested to inform his government of the American intentions, and the Dutch government had promised its moral support. Acting under its instructions, the Governor-General at Batavia had dispatched the astute and able Donker Curtius to Japan to replace the Factor in Deshima, and to watch events. On his arrival at Nagasaki, Donker Curtius at once informed Maki, the Governor, that he carried an important dispatch from the Governor-General to the Bakufu, and that he was anxious that this should be delivered. Maki, who had brought trouble on himself in regard to the Dutch king's letter in 1845, was now very cautious, and he referred the matter to Yedo. Here the affair was referred to the censors, and they reported that, as the Dutch government had been ordered to send no more missions or dispatches to Japan, it would be impossible to receive any dispatch from the Governor-General of the Dutch East Indies. If, however, the document was placed on the footing of the ordinary annual report from the Deshima Factor, to which no reply was necessary, it might be received. And in this way, the communication ultimately reached Yedo, the greatest precautions being taken to keep its purport secret.

Donker Curtius informed the Governor of Nagasaki about the objects of the projected American expedition, and hinted not obscurely that if the Japanese on this occasion could not see their way to relax the rigours of their "ancestral law" there might be very serious difficulties. He therefore recommended that traders of all nations should be admitted to Nagasaki, where commerce might still be conducted along the traditional lines. On 2nd November, 1852—eight months before Perry's arrival at Uraga—he sent to the Governor the draft of a treaty

"based on the laws, customs, and usages of Japan, which would attain the end (of opening the country) in such a way as no other means can reach, and which, in case the Netherlands succeed, could confer the same advantage upon all other nations."

In his covering letter of the same date explaining the points in the draft submitted Donker Curtius writes :—

“ His Majesty the King of the Netherlands hopes and expects that peace will be granted Japan, should it answer the wishes of the U.S. President in this wise.”

There is no reason to suppose that Perry ever knew anything of this proposed treaty, but the fact remains that a good many of its provisions coincided with those of his own treaty of March, 1854. However, all knowledge of Donker Curtius' action was confined to the Bakufu officials and on these it made little or no impression. Many of these fancied that the Americans were merely a branch of the English pirates and barbarians, with whom the Dutch were now in collusion for the purpose of breaking through the “ ancestral law ” of Japan, and reaping more tradal advantages for themselves. They also recalled the fact that the solemn warning from the King of the Netherlands, which had given them so much concern in 1844 and 1845, had remained unjustified by the course of events.

All this being duly considered, we can understand the general consternation that prevailed along the shores of Yedo Bay on the evening of 8th July, 1853. The Americans then saw beacon-fires flaming upon every hill-top, and along the coast as far as the eye could reach, while the men on watch could hear the constant tolling of a great bell all the night through one of the many alarum bells then being set in motion. The nine o'clock gun on the flagship seemed to produce a great commotion on shore ; many of the beacon-fires went out, for their watchers had no desire to be targets for the enemy's cannon.

At Yedo, where messengers by land and water kept constantly arriving, the popular panic was intense, and the officials had no small difficulty in stopping the general exodus that threatened. Indeed the officials themselves at first were at their wits' end ; and to many of them it was a great relief that the Americans had come on a “ friendly ” mission. Abe and his fellow-councillors were not long in making up their minds that the President's letter must be received, and the Americans sent away peaceably as soon as possible. Uraga was the most strongly fortified point on Yedo Bay ; most of the guns there were obsolete and for the few serviceable pieces there were not more than ten rounds of ammunition. Besides the barbarians could throttle the junk traffic utterly ; and if they chose to do so, Yedo would have to face a famine in a few days. By way of preparing for the worst and of

putting as brave a show upon the matter as possible, orders were issued to the seven strong clans of Fukui, Himeji, Chōshū, Kumamoto, Yanagawa, Takamatsu and Tokushima to mobilize their men and protect the sea-board to the south of Yedo. Abe also appealed to Lord Nariaki of Mito for counsel. Nariaki's reply was that as his own warnings had been neglected for years, and the measures he had long advocated had never been adopted, he had nothing to suggest at the moment. However, he did not go so far as to say that the American dispatch should not be received, and hostilities provoked, for although he did not know the very worst, he was quite aware that the Bakufu was helpless for the time being. From the Shōgun, Abe could not expect to receive much inspiration; indeed Iyeyoshi was so ill that news of the arrival of the Americans could not be communicated to him for some days. The only thing to be done was to get the barbarians away peaceably at any price, and yet to save the "ancestral law" as far as possible. Hence the strange silent interview at Kuri-ga-hama. When, after that, the American ships pushed on up the bay on the following day the consternation in Yedo was extreme. That evening the Great Councillors, the Junior Councillors, the Magistrates, and some other officials repaired to the Castle in war-dress and sat far into the morning in earnest deliberation. Eight days after Perry's departure from Uraga the Shōgun Iyeyoshi died (27th July), after recommending Abe to avail himself of the counsel of Lord Nariaki of Mito, in all matters of importance. As was not unusual, the Shōgun's demise was not made public for a month; and during this time there was much history in the making.

On the first day of the seventh month (5th August, 1853) when the Daimyōs made their customary visit to the Court, Abe distributed copies of the translation of the President's letter among them, and requested them to express their opinions on the various points in it in written memorials. This was a most extraordinary and totally unprecedented step for any Bakufu Councillor to take. Assemblies of all the Bakufu functionaries for general deliberation were not unknown, indeed they were not unusual. The heads of the three houses of Owari, Kishū and Mito had frequently been convoked to discuss matters of high policy, while great Fudai like Ii of Hikone and Hoshina of Aidzu, had often been consulted on difficult matters of state. It had, however, hitherto been the set policy of the Tokugawa Shōgunate to allow the feudatories at large

and especially the great "outside" feudatories no part or voice whatsoever in its councils, while all criticism of Bakufu policy or Bakufu officials was generally sternly repressed. This particular step of Abe (taken with the full approval of Lord Nariaki of Mito) was something more than a mere innovation. It was really the beginning of a revolution. It is true that it was from the Daimyō only that Abe invited an expression of opinion on a special question at this time. But it is easy to see that the discussion of the matter would not be confined to the Daimyō. Some of them indeed were too stupid to be able to express any reasoned opinion at all, and such would be entirely dependent upon the wits of their retainers. Others, perhaps nearly all, submitted the President's letter for discussion to their vassals, and invited them to give their opinions freely, just as they themselves had been requested to do by the Chief of the Great Council. Hitherto the expression of opinion on matters of policy had generally been a costly luxury for the ordinary samurai for the Tokugawa secret service was ubiquitous. Now that a free expression of opinion had been actually invited there was an eager babel of voices in almost every fief in Japan. At present it was only on one topic; but there was no reason why other and perhaps more dangerous subjects for discussion should not be found when the present was exhausted. The result was that we find the policy, the conduct, and finally the status of the Bakufu discussed and criticized in a fashion that would not have been tolerated for a moment at the beginning of the century, much less in the days of Yoshimune, Tsunayoshi or of Iyemitsu.

By this time Lord Abe must have begun to realize fully that he stood in a very difficult position. To the Daimyō he had affected to speak of the fateful Uruga interview as a mere temporary expedient. But he must have been fully convinced in his heart that, if Perry returned with the increased armament he spoke of it would be no light matter for the Bakufu to refuse the requests in the President's letter. In spite of the utmost efforts of the Bakufu in the meanwhile, Yedo Bay and consequently the fate of Yedo, would be in the foreigner's grip. And Abe knew what perhaps only a dozen or so of the officials knew, that the state of the Bakufu finances made any thought of a determined opposition utterly impracticable. The accumulation of a national debt was still an unknown luxury in Japan, it is true, and there was none. But almost every year there had been a serious deficit in the balance

of the Bakufu accounts, and it had only been by frequent issues of a more and more debased coinage that the perennial shortage had been made good. This could not go on for ever; and there were no fresh sources of revenue to tap. If this fact is henceforth borne carefully in mind, it will serve to explain much that was unavoidable in the Bakufu's action, much that must otherwise seem incomprehensible and even childish. For this reason the Bakufu could never adopt the strong line of policy against the foreigner that was expected by its supporters and demanded by its critics and especially by the Court of Kyōto. But neither Abe nor any other Tokugawa minister dared to make this explanation public, lest some of the great outside feudatories might be only too prompt to take advantage of the Shōgunate's weakness. In the present situation too, the support of the clans was of the utmost consequence to the ministers, now that the empire was menaced with the threat of foreign aggression. To make sure of being able to present a united front to the foreigners Abe laboured unceasingly to conciliate Lord Nariaki of Mito, the leader of the *Joi* or "Expel-the-Barbarian" party, whose enormous latent power was just on the point of being recognized.

When the memorials from the Daimyō presently came pouring in, it was found that almost every one of them was strongly inspired—or infected—with this *Joi* feeling. They nearly all laid it down as axiomatic that the foreigners were coming to Japan with designs upon the independence and territorial integrity of the empire. Nor perhaps was it all so very wonderful that they should be so. Japanese then believed that the Portuguese of old had had territorial designs upon Japan, which they had prosecuted with the two weapons of trade and the propagation of their religion, and that their expulsion had been the natural consequence of the discovery of their real purpose. As for the English, the *Phaeton* incident at Nagasaki in 1808, and the Takarashima episode of 1824, had never been forgotten, while the Dutch accounts of the British conquest of Hindustan, of the "Opium" war and the cession of Hong-Kong, and of the forced opening of Chinese ports to commerce had excited the liveliest apprehension in Japan. Then the Russian aggressions in Saghalin and the Kuriles were still kept fresh in the people's memories—especially by Lord Nariaki of Mito, and his fellow-thinkers. Krusenstern, who had brought Rezánov to Japan in 1804, had published an account of his voyage, and this book

had been translated by Siebold's friend Takahashi and a collaborator in 1826. The passage, in which Krusenstern adverted to the extreme weakness of Japan's position in the Northern seas, and the ease with which she could be stripped of Saghalin, Yezo, and the Kuriles, had made a marked impression when the translation appeared, and we find it often referred to at this time. The memorialists were all opposed to any extension of foreign trade. Arai Hakuseki's short tract which has been already quoted expressed the modern doctrine on the subject; and the Daimyō were not minded that the "bones" of the empire—gold, silver, and copper—should be exchanged for mere gewgaws and trifles which the Japanese could very well do without. Some of the Daimyō, notably Saga and Fukui, also dwelt upon the importance of the (supposed) sacred "ancestral law" which forbade any dealings with foreigners save the Dutch and Chinese. But it was among the Bakufu officials—who had also been ordered to send in written opinions—that this point was especially emphasized.

Among the Daimyō there was, on the other hand, a small minority who recognized that the times had changed since Japan had secluded herself two centuries before, and that a rigid and bigoted adherence to the "ancestral" law could not continue much longer. A good deal has been said about Lord Nariakira of Satsuma in a preceding chapter. At this juncture his blood-relations, Kuroda of Chikuzen, Okudaira of Nakatsu, with Date of Uwajima and a few others, expressed themselves in favour of extended foreign intercourse as a temporary measure. But there were two pronouncements still more remarkable than any of these. One was from Hotta, the Daimyō of Sakura, who had been Mizuno's colleague in the Great Council in the earlier forties. The other was from Ii Naosuke, the Lord of Hikone, the chief Fudai in the empire. Hotta as has been already remarked, had for more than a decade been prosecuting a vigorous reform in his fief mainly along modern occidental lines, and as all his councillors were pro-foreign there is perhaps not so much to be surprised at in the tone and tenor of his very enlightened and statesmanlike memorial. But Ii had had to buffet against the stream not merely amongst his fellow-Daimyō but even in his own clan. With one striking exception, all his vassals proved to be orthodox Conservatives of a very pronounced type; yet he boldly adopted the heretical views of Nakagawa and sent in a memorial setting forth strong reasons

why a conciliatory reply to the President's letter should be given, for the time at least. Among the Bakufu officials there were also a very few who adopted similar views to those of the two great territorial lords, Koga, the son of the distinguished Dutch scholar, and Toda the Governor of Uraga incurred much odium by implicitly throwing doubts on the possibility of upholding the "ancestral law" any longer. And a very remarkable document came from Takashima, the famous gunnery instructor whom "Viper" Torii worked so hard to ruin.

Long before there was time to read, much less to absorb all these memorials, the Bakufu discovered that the Americans were not the only foreigners with whom it had to deal. Early in August a special report from the Deshima Factor came stating that the Russian Admiral Putiatin was on his way to Japan with several warships, probably for the purpose of watching the operations of Perry's squadron. This warning was very soon followed by reality. On 21st August, 1853, four Russian men-of-war actually entered Nagasaki harbour, but withdrew and anchored for the night outside. That was a night of great confusion in and around Nagasaki. The troops of Kuroda and Nabeshima and the other clans, charged with the port defences, were hastily called out; and the scenes the Americans had witnessed around Uraga Bay were again repeated here. Next morning the vessels again entered the harbour, and came to anchor. When the Japanese officials went out to them, they were readily admitted on board and most hospitably entertained. Putiatin's conduct here was the complete reverse of Perry's at Uraga; the Russians kept open ship and laid themselves out to conciliate the goodwill of all their visitors. The Admiral wrote to the Governor (Ozawa) that he had purposely come to Nagasaki out of respect for the "ancestral law" of Japan, that he was not seeking small trading advantages, but that he was the bearer of an important dispatch from the Russian Foreign Minister, Nesselrode, to the Bakufu, which he desired to deliver to their Excellencies. This communication was sent on to Yedo at once and instructions requested. In a council of all the high Bakufu officials the matter was fully discussed, and no voice was raised against receiving the dispatches, although Rezánov had been told in 1804 that all further intercourse with, or communications from, Russia would be declined. This fact was to be recalled to the Admiral but, if he still insisted on it his dispatches would be received.

There would be no need for him to proceed to Uraga ; a special commission would be sent to Nagasaki to discuss matters with him. Meanwhile the Admiral was to be treated with the greatest courtesy. On 21st September, Putiatin with his suite was received with great ceremony at the Government office ; the Japanese seemed to be convinced that they could no longer afford to treat a Russian envoy in command of four modern warships as they had treated Rezánov half-a-century before. On this occasion, Nesselrode's dispatch and a letter from Putiatin himself were handed over for transmission to Yedo.

The two practical points in the Russian dispatch were a suggestion for the delimitation of the Russian and Japanese territories in the Northern Seas, and a request that Japan should open one or two ports to Russian vessels and trade. Putiatin in his letter said that to carry on negotiations at Nagasaki would waste too much time, and that it would be advisable for him to proceed to Yedo to settle matters personally with the supreme authorities. After some little delay the Bakufu dispatched two commissioners to Nagasaki to treat with Putiatin—Tsuitsui, a Nishimaru official, and Kawaji. The latter was a Kanjō Bugyō, and knowing better than anyone else the deplorable state of the Tokugawa finances, he was strongly in favour of settling matters peaceably with Americans and Russians alike. So was Koga, the son of the famous Dutch scholar, who was attached to the mission. The commissioners were instructed to say that, in consequence of the Shōgun's death and other circumstances, the authorities had such a pressure of business to deal with that they could not discuss the delimitation question. The necessary information, however, would be collected, and in the course of four or five years the question might be discussed and satisfactorily settled. As to the opening of the ports, they had to fall back upon the "ancestral law" of Japan. Meanwhile, Putiatin had become annoyed at the delay, and seeing that his extremely complaisant action was bringing him no real practical advantage he had begun to change his tone towards the two Governors of Nagasaki. There was no need to receive answers through the Dutch, he told them, for Russia had plenty of warships of her own. His threat to leave the port greatly alarmed the Governors, for they fancied he intended to proceed to Yedo Bay. As a matter of fact he did leave Nagasaki in the middle of November—for he had heard of the outbreak of the Crimean War—but his

destination was Shanghai. He was back in Nagasaki again by 7th January, 1854, where the commissioners from Yedo arrived five days later. In the course of the next three weeks there were many meetings between the commissioners and Putiatin, with a considerable amount of banqueting and entertaining. Putiatin was exceedingly anxious to get the delimitation question settled, and there was much discussion about Saghalin, which the Japanese claimed up to the fiftieth degree of latitude, and the Kuriles, all of which they insisted had belonged to them for 1,000 years. As views on these points differed widely, and as the commissioners insisted they had come only to explain the Bakufu dispatch and nothing more, no result was reached. About the opening of a port near Yedo and another in the north, all they could say was that Russia would be placed on the same footing as other foreign countries. Putiatin often alluded to the defenceless state of the Japanese sea-board, and urged upon the commissioners the advisability of Japan coming to a good understanding with Russia to secure support against possible aggressors. When he left Nagasaki on 5th February, 1854, the Russian Admiral had so far obtained no material advantage, though in their intercourse with him the Japanese had certainly changed their attitude since the "silent" interview of 14th July, at Uraga. Six days after the Russians left Nagasaki. Perry with a vastly increased squadron entered Yedo Bay on his second visit.

Perry's advance to Hommoku on his previous visit had clearly shown that the coast defences of Yedo Bay were useless and that Yedo itself lay open to attack. The Bakufu felt that the capital must be provided with defences, and a new special commission had at once been constituted to take this and similar projects in hand. The real brain of the body was Egawa, the Daikwan of Nirayama in Idzu. Egawa had been a pupil of Takashima, the famous gunnery instructor, and when the latter had been imprisoned, Egawa had taken up his work. He had established a foundry and a cannon range at Nirayama, and here, during the last few years, pupils not only from Yedo but from various fiefs had placed themselves under his instruction. From the early forties he had acted on commissions for coast defence, but the poverty of the Bakufu made the execution of the projects he proposed, impossible. Even now it was only by a forced contribution of "Thank-money" from the merchants of Yedo and Osaka that funds were found for the

construction and armament of a line of forts extending in the sea from Shinagawa to Susaki immediately in front of Yedo, and for the extension of the Nirayama cannon foundry. A still more important step, although it involved no immediate outlay, was soon taken by the Bakufu. On 17th October, 1853, Iyemitsu's old decree forbidding the construction of warships of more than 500 *koku* was repealed. It will be remembered that Nariaki of Mito had insistently urged the abrogation of this decree for many years ; that Shimadzu Nariakira of Satsuma and Dutch scholars like Koga and Sakuma had condemned it as unsuited to the changed conditions of Japan and the outside world, while Ii of Hikone, soon to be Nariaki's dearest foe, in his recent memorial had not merely advocated its repeal, but had further recommended that Dutch masters and mariners should be engaged to instruct the Japanese in the art of navigation.

Meanwhile the question as to how Perry was to be dealt with on his second visit was being eagerly discussed. At last, on 1st December, 1853, Abé informed the Daimyō, on their usual visit to the Castle, that the Shōgun had ordered that no definite reply should be given to the envoy's demands, and that he should be sent away without any treaty of amity and commerce. Endeavours should be made to effect this as pacifically as possible, but in the event of any appeal to force the Japanese, both high and low, must see to it that the empire was subjected to no indignity or disgrace. A week later, the Daimyō and Hatamoto were informed that careful preparations were necessary, and that they must be ready for emergencies. In January, 1854, the officials were instructed that if the Americans did not stop at Uraga, but pushed on further into Yedo Bay, they must be regarded as coming with hostile intent, and promptly repelled by force. Abé was thus apparently assuming a very stalwart attitude, but it is questionable whether he did so on his own initiative, and was really convinced of the wisdom of such a course. At this date, Lord Nariaki of Mito was very powerful, and these decrees and instructions were no doubt largely prompted by him. He had already been confidentially informed of the deplorable state of the Bakufu treasury, but he does not seem to have allowed that consideration to weigh overmuch with him. Abé was extremely anxious to have no internal dissensions or commotions at this fateful conjuncture ; and his bold front was assumed to secure the support of the Daimyō, especially of Nariaki and his

huge "Repel-the-Barbarian" following. The crisis was rapidly becoming too acute for the wily and cautious Abé; in spite of all his suppleness, or rather, perhaps, in consequence of it, he was drifting into an irretrievably false position.

Meanwhile Perry's ships were turned towards Japan for a second time. After touching at Naha on his return voyage, where a vessel was left to attend to the dépôt, the Commodore went on to the Canton river, and spent the next five months—August to December—at Hong-Kong, Macao, and other Chinese ports. It had been his original intention to remain in that neighbourhood till the spring, but, towards the end of the year (1853) he learned that the French frigate *Constantine* had started on a secret mission to Japan while, a little later on, he received information of Putiatin's presence at Nagasaki. Accordingly he deemed it well to hasten his departure, all the more so, as he had been joined by fresh vessels from America, one of which brought the presents intended for the Shōgun and the Japanese officials. On 20th January, Perry was at Naha for the fourth time. During his short stay there he received a communication from the Governor-General of the Dutch East Indies, conveying information of the death of the Shōgun soon after the reception of the President's letter. The Japanese Government had requested the Dutch Factor at Nagasaki to make this known to the Americans, as this event, according to the laws and customs of Japan, made ceremonies of mourning and arrangements for succession to the "throne" necessary, and consequently all consideration of the President's letter must be postponed for some considerable time. It was therefore most earnestly desired that the American squadron should not return to the Bay of Yedo at the appointed date. Perry suspected that this request was a fabrication, a mere ruse to obstruct the negotiations while, even if true, he saw nothing in the circumstances to delay him. Accordingly he sent on most of his vessels at once; and on 11th February, 1854, the *Susquehanna* arrived off Kamakura. Here it was found that one of the sailing vessels, the *Macedonian*, had run aground, but she was soon towed off without any damage. On 13th February, the squadron stood into Yedo Bay, and the three steamers each with a sailing vessel in tow, swept on past Uraga and dropped anchor twelve miles above that town. Here a seventh vessel, the *Southampton*, had been lying for the previous three days. On his first visit, Perry had only had two sloops-of-war in addition to the

steamers *Susquehanna* and *Mississippi*. Now he had a third steamer, the *Powhatan*, which served as his flagship during his sixty-four days' sojourn in Yedo Bay, while there were presently four sloops-of-war and two storeships. A tenth vessel, yet another storeship, came in later. Altogether the squadron now mounted some 250 guns, and carried about 1,600 men.¹

Japanese boats had hurriedly put off from Uruga in the vain hope of getting the squadron to stop there, and presently some officials appeared alongside the *Susquehanna* whence they were directed to the *Powhatan*. On board the *Powhatan* they told Captain Adams their object was to induce the Commodore to return to Uruga, where they said there were two high officials in waiting, while more were expected who had been appointed by the "Emperor" to meet and treat with the Americans.

This statement was correct, although the "high officials" were by no means of such exalted rank as the underlings from Uruga represented them. On 8th February, a commission for the reception of the Americans had been constituted, the chief of which was Hayashi, Daigaku no Kami, Rector of Yedo University, who was only a Hatamoto with an annual revenue of 3,000 or 4,000 *koku*. Along with him acted Ido, a City Magistrate; Udonon a *metsuke* (censor); Izawa, one of the Governors of Uruga, and Matsusaki, a Chinese scholar.²

On the following days Japanese officials frequently visited the squadron to urge its return to Uruga, but the Americans refused

¹ Dr. Wells Williams writes in his Journal: "Three powerful steamers like the *Susquehanna*, *Powhatan*, and *Mississippi*, each carrying another vessel, the *Vandalia*, *Macedonian*, and *Lexington*, showed the Japanese the means we had at command, and may have inclined them to receive us now we had come, and not refer to the strong letter they had written Perry through the Dutch requesting him to stay away for three years."

² Matsusaki was regarded as rather an equivocal character by the Americans. "He was always present at the conferences, but took his seat constantly at a distance from the other dignitaries, on the further end of the sedan. By him there continually crouched, upon his knees, a scribe who was employed in taking notes of what was passing, occasionally under the promptings of his superior. Matsusaki was a man of sixty years at least, had a long-drawn-out meagre body, a very yellow bilious face, an uncomfortable dyspeptic expression, which his excessive shortsightedness did not improve, for it caused him, in his efforts at seeing, to give a very wry distortion to a countenance, naturally not very handsome. After the great banquet on board the *Powhatan* on 27th March, "the excited Matsusaki, on leaving, threw his arms about the Commodore's neck, crushing in his heedless embrace a pair of new epaulettes, and repeating in Japanese the words, 'Nippon and America all the same heart.' He then proceeded to his boat supported by some of his steadier companions."

to do so, on the plea that the anchorage there was unsafe. It was then suggested that they should go to Kamakura, a proposal that was summarily brushed aside. On 18th February, the visitors announced that the "high official" of whom they had spoken had arrived at Uruga, and that they had been sent to request the Commodore to return to meet him there. Perry thereupon wrote saying that he expected to be received at Yedo, agreeably to the customs of all countries; that so far from returning to Uruga he intended to proceed higher up the Bay towards Yedo where the vessels could be more secure. Meanwhile, Captain Adams was sent to Uruga to see the commissioners, but when he arrived there, the only incident of note that occurred was the reappearance of Kayama Yezaimon, the *soi-disant* "Governor" of Uruga on the previous visit. On 24th February, Perry did actually move his squadron up the Bay, and came to anchor at Kanagawa. Here Captain Adams presently brought the Commodore a letter from Hayashi, Daigaku no Kami, stating that:—

"We desire the Admiral to come to Uruga, there to have the interview in the building aforesaid, and would gratefully acknowledge the friendly meeting of the Lord Admiral in complying with this order of the Emperor and our own wishes."

Presently their old friend the "Governor" of Uruga, arrived to make a final effort to get the Americans to return. On finding Perry immovable and evidently inclined to advance still nearer to Yedo, the "Governor" suddenly withdrew the previous ultimatum of the Japanese commissioners as to the place of meeting, and suggested a spot in the immediate neighbourhood of the village of Yokohama, directly opposite to where the ships were then anchored:—

"Thus after having for ten days interposed all possible objections to the squadron's moving further up the bay, and having used every inducement to prevail upon the commodore to return to Uruga, they relinquished the position from which they so frequently declared they could not possibly be moved. The explanation of this was found in the fact that the Squadron was now only eight (really fourteen) miles off their capital."

As the spot now suggested for the interview was well under the range of the ships' guns, Perry accepted the new proposal at once. A pavilion was to be erected there as had been done at Kuri ga hama

on the previous visit, and the 8th March was appointed as the day for the conference. On the 7th, the form of the proceedings for this momentous occasion was arranged through the indispensable and indefatigable "Governor" of Uraga.

On the appointed day the Commodore landed with great parade, with all the pomp and circumstance of glorious war and of diplomatic etiquette. After the purely ceremonial part of the proceedings, the Commodore was invited to enter a smaller room, and here practical work began. A roll of paper was handed to the envoy which proved to be a reply to the President's letter :—

"The return of Your Excellency," it ran, "as the ambassador of the United States to this Empire, has been expected according to the letter of His Majesty, the President, which letter Your Excellency delivered last year to His Majesty the Emperor of this Empire. It is quite impossible to give satisfactory answers at once to all the proposals of your government, as it is most positively forbidden by the laws of our imperial ancestors ; but for us to continue attached to the ancient laws, seems to misunderstand the spirit of the age ; however, we are governed now by imperious necessity.

"At the visit of Your Excellency last year to this Empire, His Majesty, the former Emperor, was ill, and is now dead. Subsequently His Majesty, the present Emperor, ascended the throne ; the many occupations in consequence thereof are not yet finished, and there is no time to settle other business thoroughly.

"Moreover, His Majesty, the new Emperor, at the accession to the throne, promised to the princes and high officers of the Empire, to observe the laws. It is therefore evident that he cannot now bring about any alteration of the ancient laws.

"Last autumn, at the departure of the Dutch ship, the superintendent of the Dutch trade in Japan was requested to inform your government of this event, and a reply in writing has been received.

"At Nagasaki arrived recently the Russian ambassador to communicate a wish of his government. He has since left the said place, because no answer would be given to any nation that might express similar wishes. However, we admit the urgency of, and shall entirely comply with, the proposals of your government concerning coal, wood, water, provisions, and the saving of ships and their crews in distress. After being informed which harbour Your Excellency selects, that harbour shall be prepared, which preparation it is estimated will take about five years. Meanwhile a commencement can be made with the coal at Nagasaki by the next Japanese first month (16th February, 1855).

"Having no precedent with respect to coal, we request Your Excellency to furnish us with an estimate, and upon due consideration this will be complied with, if not in opposition to our laws. What do you understand by 'provisions' and how much coal ?

"Finally, anything ships may be in want of that can be furnished from the productions of this Empire shall be supplied. The prices of

merchandize and articles of barter to be fixed by Kurakawa Kahei and Moriyama Yenosuke. After settling the points before mentioned, the treaty can be concluded and signed at the next interview.

"Seals attached by order of the high gentleman,

MORIYAMA YENOSUKE."¹

The Commodore having returned the document requesting that it should be signed by the high commissioner and delivered to him next day, entered at once upon the subject which was uppermost in his mind, the negotiation of a treaty. He remarked that it would be better for the two nations that a treaty similar to the one between the United States and China should be made. He had been sent, he continued, by his government to make such a treaty, *and if he did not succeed they would probably send more ships for that purpose*, but he hoped that everything would be soon settled in an amicable manner, and that he would be able to dispatch two of his ships, *as he desired to prevent others from coming*. A copy of the Chinese treaty, written in English, Chinese, and Dutch, accompanied by two notes from the Commodore and a letter in answer to one sent by the high commissioner from Uraga, were now handed to the Japanese, when they asked for time to have the documents translated into their own language.

On 10th March, the reply to the President's letter, duly certified and signed by the Japanese commissioners, was brought on board the *Powhatan*. In his letter the President had stated that the only objects for which Perry had been sent were "friendship, commerce, a supply of coal and provisions, and protection for our shipwrecked people". In the sixth paragraph of the Japanese

¹ Dr. Williams tells us (*Journal*, 3rd March) that this Moriyama was a new and superior interpreter "who had recently returned from Nagasaki, whence he arrived in twenty-five days and hurried on at that. He speaks English well enough to render any other interpreter unnecessary, and thus will assist our intercourse greatly. He inquired for the captain and officers of the *Preble* and asked if Ronald McDonald was well, or if we knew him. (This young man, one of the sailors rescued by the *Preble*, had taught Moriyama English during his stay at Nagasaki in 1848-9.) He examined the machinery and at last sat at dinner in the ward room, giving us all a good impression of his education and breeding". But Moriyama soon came to be regarded as a colossal liar by Perry and his people, and Harris was afterwards staggered at his unblushing mendacity. He was very busy in 1858 and in the subsequent years, and in 1863 he accompanied Sir Rutherford Alcock to England. His English was of no very great service on this occasion. Perry spoke to Portman, his Dutch interpreter, the latter spoke in Dutch to Moriyama, and Moriyama then turned the Dutch into Japanese. In an adjoining room, all unknown to the Americans, sat Nakahama Manjirō, to whom all English and Chinese documents were submitted. Nakahama was a Tosa man who had drifted out to sea, been picked up by an American ship and taken to the United States in 1841. In America he got a good common school education, and about 1851 he returned to the Lūchūs viā Hawai. See Griffis' *Perry*, pp. 351 and 366.

reply it will be seen that the last two points were conceded without any difficulty, while the Japanese authorities were now, or at least now professed to be, in a somewhat different frame of mind from that of eight years before, when they warned Commodore Biddle that he would be consulting his own safety in not appearing again upon their coasts. The only one of the President's requests they actually refused to entertain was the request for commerce. But even in this matter Perry was determined to force their hand. His action at this juncture excited the indignation of his interpreter, Dr. Wells Williams, whose comments on the matter are somewhat noteworthy :—

“ The answer to the reply delivered by Hayashi has been translated to-day, and in it, while Perry is pleased that the Japanese Government has granted what Fillimore asked for, which was all that Cabinet at Washington expected to obtain, he says that it is by no means all *he* wants, nor all the President intended, and ‘ will not satisfy his views ’. The letter last year asked for one port ; Perry now wants five. They desired the Japanese to give assurances of good treatment ; now Perry demands them to make a Treaty, and threatens them in no obscure terms with a ‘ larger force and more stringent terms and instructions ’ if they do not. The Japanese may be disposed to comply, but they may not. Yet what an inconsistency is here exhibited, and what conclusion can they draw from it except that we have come on a predatory excursion ? I hardly know just the position in which to place such a document as this, but the estimation of its author is not dubious, Perry cares no more for right, for consistency, for his country than will advance his own aggrandisement and fame, and makes his ambition the test of all his conduct towards the Japanese. Yet if they will, either from fear, from policy, or from inclination to learn and see more of their fellowmen, open their ports and for once do away with the seclusive system, great good to them will result, their people will be benefited, and the stability of the state increased, perhaps. Yet I despise such papers as this drawn up this day, and it may defeat its own object ; it certainly has lowered the opinion I had of its author.”¹

Before the next interview on 17th March, the commissioners sent a note in reply to Perry's communication of the 11th, in which they stated that :—

“ as to the opening of a trade such as is now carried on with China by your country, we certainly cannot yet bring it about.”

¹ In two or three other passages the interpreter criticizes Perry's conduct rather freely. On 11th March, 1854, he writes, “ The vexatious manner in which Perry can annoy those under him without himself caring for the perplexity he occasions makes me glad that I was never disciplined to the navy, where undistinguishing obedience is required.” 25th February, “ I do not at all like the way in which this nation is spoken of by the Commodore and most of the officers, calling them savages, liars, a pack of fools, poor devils ; cursing them and then denying practically all of it by supposing them worth making a treaty with. Truly, what sort of instruments does God work with.”

Asserting that Nagasaki was the only Japanese port that could be frequented by American vessels for their supplies. At this second interview, the commissioners interposed, with great pertinacity, all manner of difficulties to the adoption of the American views, strenuously contending that the laws of the Empire positively forbade the grant of the concessions demanded :—

“ They insisted, for example, that Nagasaki was the place set apart for strangers ; they stated that the inhabitants and authorities of that city had been trained to enforce the laws with respect to foreigners, and declared that if the Americans were to have another port assigned to them, five years would be required to make similar preparations. The Commodore replied that *the fact of Nagasaki having been appropriated to foreigners was one of the grounds of his objections to it ; that its inhabitants and authorities, having been so long accustomed to the servility of the Dutch, would doubtless exact more from the Americans than they would be inclined to submit to, and serious consequences might follow.* Moreover, the Commodore declared that he desired it to be well understood, that his countrymen visiting Japan must be free from all those oppressive laws which had hitherto been imposed upon foreigners. *In a word, he declared emphatically that he would not think of accepting Nagasaki as one of the ports.*”

The Commodore then informed the commissioners that he should expect five ports to be ultimately opened to the American flag, but would content himself for the present with three—Uraga or Kanagawa in the Main Island, another in Yezo, suggesting Matsumaye, and Naha in the Lūchūs. After innumerable evasions, the commissioners at last made answer that, as the Commodore positively refused to accept Nagasaki, and as they themselves objected to Uraga, Shimoda would be offered. With regard to Lūchū, they declared that, as it was a distant dependency, over which the Emperor had but limited control, they could entertain no proposition, and as for Matsumaye, that also stood in similar relations to the Japanese Government. In spite of all this, Perry persisted in pressing his demands. Finding him thus unbending the commissioners requested to be allowed to retire to another apartment for private consultation. An hour afterwards they said that a longer time would be required before they could give an answer about the opening of Matsumaye ; it was not in the power of the Emperor to grant the use of that port without consulting the hereditary prince by whom it was governed, and to do so would require a year. Perry replied that he could not leave without a reply of some kind, and proposed, if that prince were an independent sovereign, to proceed to Matsumaye

and negotiate with him directly. Thereupon the commissioners promised to return a definite answer on the 23rd March. In regard to Shimoda, it was now agreed that the Commodore should dispatch one or more vessels to that port, and the commissioners, a Japanese officer of rank, to meet them, in order that the harbour might be examined and its fitness for the required purposes determined, it being clearly understood that if it did not answer the expectations of the Americans in all respects, another place, somewhere in the south of the main island would be insisted on. The *Vandalia* and the *Southampton* were accordingly dispatched to examine the proposed harbour. On the 23rd March, the answer about the opening of Matsumaye was sent to the *Powhatan*, the purport of it was that American ships, in want of provisions, wood, and water, should be supplied at Hakodate as was desired. As time for preparations would be required, the 17th September, 1855, was fixed for a beginning there. This concession was also accepted on the condition that the harbour, on examination, proved serviceable for the purpose intended. Exception, however, was taken to the unreasonable delay.

Meanwhile, on 13th March, several boat-loads of presents for the "Emperor", his consort, the members of the Great Council, and the five commissioners had been sent ashore, handed over, and the receipt thereof acknowledged in very courteous terms by the Japanese.¹ On 24th March, the Commodore was invited to go ashore to receive some gifts from the Japanese. Meanwhile, the telegraph the Americans brought had been installed, and the rails for the toy locomotive and car laid, and after the collation on shore, these appliances of modern civilization were set in operation for the enlightenment and entertainment of the Japanese. The telegraph had already been worked, but its interest was found to be inexhaustible, and all the beholders were unceasing in their exclamations of wonder and admiration. The Lilliputian locomotive also was a source of immense delight to the spectators who gathered along the track in great crowds. On the 27th, there was

¹ The "Emperor" and eight of the other recipients were presented with standard literary works. The "Empress" was the only one who received no whisky. The Shōgun received a barrel of it, and the Great Councillors ten gallons each—Abé getting a double allowance of twenty gallons. Hayashi also received twenty gallons, but his four fellow commissioners no more than that quantity between them. Cases of champagne and cherry cordial were also presented, as well as perfumery, rifles, revolvers, clocks, and stores.

a great banquet on board the *Powhatan*, towards the end of which the commissioners, with the exception of the grave and austere Hayashi, waxed rather hilarious, for they all appreciated the champagne. Next day (25th March) when the conferences were resumed, the Japanese representatives were unusually grave and subdued. They handed over a letter which had just been received from the American officer sent to Shimoda, containing a favourable report on its suitability as a harbour, and Perry at once accepted it as one of his three ports, declaring, however, that it must be opened without delay. Hakodate, he added, would serve for another, and Naha for the third, but in the discussion of the extent of the privileges to be granted to Americans who might visit Shimoda, it became clear that the Japanese meant to prohibit the permanent residence of Americans in Japan. The proposition to have consular agents resident in Japan also occasioned the utmost anxiety, but it was ultimately conceded that one should reside at Shomida, though he was not to be appointed for a year or eighteen months from the date of the Treaty.

At last the Treaty was drawn, and stood ready for signature. Three drafts of it had been prepared, each in four different languages—English, Dutch, Japanese, and Chinese—all of which were duly signed by the accredited representatives of the two nations on 31st March, 1854. The following is a short synopsis of its contents:—

- I. Peace and friendship between the two countries.
- II. Shimoda and Hakodate open to American ships, and necessary provisions to be supplied.
- III. Relief to shipwrecked people.
- IV. Americans to be free as in other countries, but amenable to just laws.
- V. Americans at Shimoda and Hakodate not to be subject to restrictions; free to go about within definite limits.
- VI. Careful deliberation in transacting business.
- VII. Trade in open ports subject to local regulations.
- VIII. Wood, water, coal, and provisions to be procured through Japanese officers only.
- IX. Most-favoured Nation clause.
- X. American ships restricted to Shimoda and Hakodate except when under stress of weather.
- XI. U.S. consuls or agents permitted to reside at Shimoda.
- XII. Ratifications to be exchanged within eighteen months.

The Most-favoured Nation Clause is said to have been inserted at the suggestion of Dr. Wells Williams, while it was owing to Dr. Williams' representations that Perry did not insist upon extra-

territorial jurisdiction for Americans. On 9th April, notwithstanding a note from the commissioners urgently remonstrating against the movement, Perry announced his intention of advancing as near to Yedo as the depth of water would allow. Two interpreters came off and did everything they could to dissuade him from his purpose. He paid no heed to them, however; and although he ultimately turned round in a hundred feet of water four miles behind his surveying boats, he came within sight of Shinagawa. Not wishing to endanger friendly relations by going too far, he went back to the American anchorage whence he presently proceeded to inspect the port of Shimoda (18th April). Here he now made a first stay of twenty-five days, and another twenty-five days were spent in a trip to Hakodate. Thither the Commodore went mainly for the purpose of settling the Treaty limits; but he found no one empowered to deal with the matter, and it was agreed that it should be referred to the commissioners at Shimoda. The outcome of the opening of Hakodate was that the Daimyō of Matsumaye was expropriated (being assigned an annual stipend) and his fief was declared Bakufu land. Three Governors of Hakodate were appointed, one to reside there and another in Yedo, while the third was to move about wherever his presence might be necessary in Yezo and the northerly dependencies of the Empire. Bands of colonists—*rōnin* among the number—were either sent to or induced to settle in Yezo for the exploitation of its resources and the protection of its coasts, while the two great northern clans of Sendai and Kubota (Daté and Sataké) were saddled with the responsibility of the coast defence of the extreme north of the main island, and the duty of reinforcing the Bakufu troops in Yezo in case of need.

During his second (and final) stay of eighteen days at Shimoda, Perry settled a number of vexed points with the commissioners—now seven in number—and the results of the discussions were embodied in a supplementary convention of twelve articles. Most of these are unimportant, but one of them—the ninth—was afterwards productive of trouble. Its terms were:—

“Whenever goods are selected in the shops, they should be marked with the name of the purchaser and the price agreed upon, and then be sent to the government office, where the money is to be paid to Japanese officers and the articles delivered by them.”

To the official mind, the only way of trading with foreigners was the immemorial way in vogue at Nagasaki, and all through

the early sixties we shall find the foreign merchants continually protesting against the Bakufu underlings interfering with their transactions.

At last everything was finished, and on 28th June, 1854, after a stay of 135 days, Perry said "good-bye" to Japan. At Naha, in July, he signed a convention with the Lūchū Regent, legalizing commerce with Americans, and making various other arrangements. Naha thus promised to become an open port for the special benefit of the astute and progressive Prince Nariakira of Satsuma.

Perry had already, on 4th April, 1854, dispatched Commander Adams to Washington with a copy of the Treaty of Kanagawa for ratification. In 296 days, on 26th January, 1855, Adams was back in Shimoda to procure the Shōgun's seal and signature. The commissioners had plumed themselves on being able to keep the Shōgun's signature out of the document; now they made difficulties about getting it appended, while they insisted that the ratifications were to be exchanged not *within* but *after* the lapse of eighteen months. After a good deal of discussion they felt constrained to yield on both points, and on 21st February, 1855, the exchange of ratifications was made with all due formality. Perry's Japan Expedition thus turned out to be a brilliant success; indeed as we have seen the Commodore was able to exact a good deal more than he had been sent to obtain. But to talk of "the moral grandeur of his peaceful triumph", as has become the fashion in certain quarters, is surely somewhat beside the mark. The Commodore had appeared at Uruga with an irresistible armament, and his attitude and action at once convinced the Japanese that he would not hesitate to employ it in case of need. Later on, he "threatened them in no obscure terms with a larger force". His own manly and straightforward narrative leaves us in no doubt as to the means and methods by which his brilliant success was achieved.¹ Much was owing to his foresight, his thorough grasp of the exigencies of the situation, his stern determination, and his diplomatic tact. His organization too, although he never had the fleet of twelve vessels for which he had asked, was thoroughly efficient. Although it was to these factors mainly that Perry really owed his good luck, yet "Perry's luck" became proverbial in

¹ See some judicious remarks of Professor Chamberlain on Perry in his *Things Japanese*. Dr. Wells Williams says some very sensible and one or two rather amusing things in his *Journal*, pp. 222, 226.

the squadron. The only really bad weather he met, was on his passage to the Lūchūs after his first visit to Japan, when the two steamers had to cast adrift the two sloops they were towing. Curiously enough, at this very time, the Court of Kyōto had sent solemn missions to the Sun-Goddess in Ise, and to the six other leading shrines to implore the gods to raise the blasts and disperse the invaders, even as they had scattered and overwhelmed the Mongols nearly six centuries before. Another very important point is adverted to by Dr. Williams :—

“ The general good health of the 1,600 persons in the squadron, destitute as almost all of them have been of fresh provisions since last January, and the good condition of most of the stores brought on board calls for particular mention, as the converse might have hampered the whole enterprise. The Japanese could not easily collect fresh provisions for so large a body of people, and the extremity of sickness might have driven us to the extremity of forcibly supplying ourselves with food at some rate, even if the alternative was instant hostilities and the attack of Yedo itself. Such a procedure, necessary as we might have deemed it for our own preservation, and not to be thought of in almost any position, might have been resorted to by some one less patient, and (I can conceive) might have removed the peaceful opening of Japan to an indefinite period. Now, not a shot has been fired, not a man wounded, not a piece of property destroyed, not a boat sunk, not a Japanese to be found who is the worse, so far as we know, for the visit of the American expedition.”

It was also fortunate for a peaceful issue to the enterprise that Perry proceeded to Uraga and persistently kept away from Nagasaki. For while Uraga was practically defenceless, Nagasaki was so no longer. Some time before this Nabeshima the Daimyō of Saga had engaged the famous Egawa to superintend its fortification, and the harbour was now protected by a number of forts with really serviceable armaments. In all probability these would have offered resistance ; and in that case the re-opening of Japan might have been the reverse of peaceful.

B

Mention has already been made of the Bakufu's announcement, towards the end of 1853, that it had been decided to avoid hostilities if possible and yet send the Americans away without any concessions, or with as few and insignificant concessions as might be. Abé took this step to allay the rapidly growing commotion

among the Daimyō, and more especially to appease Lord Nariaki of Mito and his *Jōi* followers. In May, 1855, the Bakufu let it be known that concessions had been made, unavoidably and under stress of dire necessity, and attempted to justify its action by pointing to the incompleteness of the national defences at the time of the negotiations with Perry, expressing the conviction that a short interval would suffice for perfecting arrangements to enable the government to resist any further demands.

Abé soon began to appreciate the consequences of having taken the most extraordinary and unprecedented step of inviting free and unrestrained discussion by the territorial magnates of an all-important question of public policy. To say nothing of Nariaki of Mito and his party, the outside feudatories were now very free in the expression of their opinions, and the weak-kneed inconsistency of the Bakufu was sternly denounced in almost every great *yashiki* in Yedo. Even among the Bakufu officials themselves there were malcontents and unfriendly critics. Tsutsui and Kawaji had just succeeded in baffling Putiatin at Nagasaki, and had contrived to send him away without yielding in one iota to any of his demands. On their way back to Yedo they learned of what was happening at Yokohama and, later on, they were not slow to express the conviction that, if they had been in Hayashi's place, the negotiations which eventuated in the Treaty of Kanagawa would have found a very different issue. They failed to appreciate the fact that Putiatin and Perry were very different men and in vastly different situations at the time. Putiatin had begun with blandishments, and with the avowal of a profound respect for the "ancestral" law of Japan. When all this failed to carry him a single step towards the attainment of his object, he had had recourse to threats. Furthermore, in the negotiations he discussed and argued, and argued and discussed, and now and then changed his ground, a circumstance of which the astute Kawaji and Tsutsui were prompt to take advantage. Perry did not condescend to argue and he never changed his ground. He simply stated his demands and insisted on getting them, occasionally hinting that he was anxious to send home intelligence that would make the dispatch of any more ships unnecessary. This was a hint that could be disregarded when it was dropped by Putiatin, for at that time the Russian Admiral, as was well known to the Japanese, had to be very careful to keep out of the way of the superior French and

British naval forces then on the eager outlook for him in Far Eastern Seas.

Although, however, rebuffed for the time, Putiatin had no intention of abandoning his Japan mission as a hopeless task. Before leaving Nagasaki on 5th February, 1854, he sent in a note to the officials saying that he would return in the spring to have the boundary question definitively settled; that if the Japanese did not send a commissioner to Sagahlin, the Russian officials would proceed thither independently; and that originally he had thought of going to Yedo, but had come to Nagasaki out of deference to Japanese susceptibilities, hinting that his next visit would be to the capital. After a short visit to Shanghai he returned to Nagasaki for the third time, on 25th April, 1854, but his stay there this time was a brief one. In June he was known to be in Saghalin, where he instructed Possiet to write to Tsutsui and Kawaji that after withdrawing the Russian garrison from Aniwa Bay he (Putiatin) would proceed to Ōsaka. The Japanese fondly plumed themselves that the evacuation of Aniwa Bay was a tribute to their own national prestige, but in truth the troops were necessary for the defence of Petropavlosk, where a French and British attack had actually to be beaten off in the following autumn. This letter of Possiet's was laid before the Rōjū on 18th November, 1854, but already ten days before (8th November) Putiatin in the frigate *Diana* had made his appearance off Ōsaka. The result was a panic in Kyōto, where an attack upon the Imperial Palace was actually feared by the courtiers. Presently the Ōsaka Commandant received urgent instructions to send Putiatin round to Shimoda, and the *Diana* leaving Ōsaka on 22nd November, arrived at Shimoda twelve days later on, 4th December. Here Putiatin expressed great dissatisfaction with the harbour—it was so narrow and so unsafe that he said he could not trust his vessel in it, and he spoke of taking her to Yedo. Meanwhile a commission for the reception of the Russian envoy had been constituted, consisting of Tsutsui, Kawaji, and Koga, as before, with the addition of the Governor of Shimoda, a Censor (*Metsuke*), and Muragaki, who had just come back from an exploring trip in Saghalin. These six had their first meeting with Putiatin on 20th December, and after a return visit to the frigate on the following day, negotiations were begun and proceeded with. Two days later, on 23rd December, the great earthquake of 1854 occurred, which shook nearly the whole of the Pacific face of the main island.

In Shimoda harbour the waters rose and fell as if in a boiling cauldron, then they rushed out leaving the bottom nearly bare. After a short pause they poured in with impetuous velocity, piling up into a wave thirty feet above high-water mark, which swept up to the base of the foot-hills carrying everything before it. Then the waters swept furiously out to sea again, once more exposing the bottom of the harbour, and this performance was repeated five several times. The whole of Shimoda with the exception of fourteen houses was carried away, but the loss of life was much less than might have been expected, for out of the 4,000 inhabitants of the town only eighty-five perished—not a single official being among the victims. The Russians on board the *Diana* had a very thrilling experience. The 6 fathoms of water in which they were anchored fell to less than 4 feet, and they could distinctly discern the stock and upper fluke of their anchor. Luckily the anchor held, but the heavy hull of the vessel (with 52 guns and 250 men on board) was carried round and round like a cork in an eddy making forty-three complete revolutions in a space of thirty minutes. The officers and crew became giddy on account of these gyrations, while some of them anticipated that the bed of the harbour might be rent assunder and their vessel swallowed up. The ship was so badly damaged that it was found necessary to send her guns ashore and to overhaul her hull thoroughly. When the Russians asked for a port to be assigned to them for the purpose, the Japanese commissioners found themselves with a fresh anxiety to face, for to open another port in addition to Shimoda or to substitute another port for it would not at all suit the purpose of the Bakufu at this delicate conjuncture. Fortunately the Russians were satisfied with the small fishing village of Heda, 40 miles round the Idzu coast on Suruga Bay. On her way thither under tow, the *Diana* encountered a gale and went to the bottom, her complement escaping with some difficulty.

The Japanese showed no lack of sympathy with the envoy in his unfortunate predicament. His request for shipbuilding materials and facilities was promptly complied with, and henceforth throughout the winter Russian shipwrights and Japanese carpenters were busy with the construction of two schooners. The Japanese freely acknowledge that their earliest instructors in the art of modern shipbuilding were those Russians whom they were to

outclass so hopelessly on the blue water just half a century later on.¹

Meanwhile the *Powhatan* arrived at Shimoda (26th January, 1855) with the ratified American treaty, and from her Putiatin was able to procure supplies. On 15th March, an American trading schooner also came to Shimoda, and the Admiral succeeded in purchasing her cargo of stores and in chartering her to convey part of the *Diana's* complement to Kamchatka. He himself left Japan in the schooner his own men and the Japanese had built, after tendering the Bakufu his written thanks for the kindness he had received. Count Nesselrode, the Russian Foreign Minister, also wrote to express his appreciation of what had been done, and by the Tsar's orders made a gift of the *Diana's* armament of fifty-two guns to the Bakufu.

The negotiations so unexpectedly interrupted by the great tidal wave of 23rd December, were resumed on 11th January, 1855. As regards the boundary question, the Japanese at first refused to budge from the position they had assumed at the Nagasaki conferences; and finally it was understood that Saghalin for the present should be left equally open for both nations. Muragaki, specially added to the Commission, had just been over the island, and he was convinced that it was next door to worthless. With respect to the Russian demand for commerce the Japanese also stood firm, and no more was granted to Putiatin than had been conceded to Perry. In fact, although the Russian Treaty signed at Shimoda on 7th February, 1855, consisted of but nine articles with four clauses of additional regulations, it was in the main identical with the Treaty of Kanagawa, with the exceptions that in addition to Shimoda and Hakodate, Russian vessels were to be free to visit Nagasaki as well. It was also stipulated that Russia might, in 1856, post agents not only at Shimoda, but at Hakodate as well. To this provision Abé objected most strongly when he received a copy of the agreement three days after it was concluded, so much so that he wrote to the commissioners charging them to get it expunged. In this also we can detect the influence of Lord Nariaki of Mito, with

¹ Titsingh's attempts to teach marine architecture about 1780 have been alluded to. The earliest foreign-rigged vessel constructed in Japan seems to have been built in a Satsuma harbour under the direction of two Spanish adventurers ten or twelve years before Will Adams appeared upon the scene. This vessel was afterwards used by the Satsuma men in the Korean war. A year or two before the arrival of Perry, Shimadzu Naiakira had secretly set his clansmen to work on two or three foreign-style craft at Iso near Kagoshima.

whom Abé was in constant communication at this time. The question of Christianity was also brought up, apparently by Nariaki. Neither Putiatin nor the commissioners had alluded to it in any way during the negotiations. Now the commissioners, acting under instructions from Yedo, sent in a note to Putiatin stating that Christianity was strictly proscribed in Japan, and the envoy thereupon wrote in reply that Russian officials never interfered with the religious affairs and beliefs of other peoples.

The Russian treaty of Shimoda was the third and not the second agreement which Japan had so far entered into with foreign countries. In the autumn of 1854, Sir James Sterling, with a squadron of four British ships, arrived in Nagasaki and negotiated a convention with the Governor of the Port and a Censor (*Metsuke*), who acted under instructions from Yedo. Sterling, in his communication to the Governor, explained the state of hostilities between Russia and the Allies, and accused Russia of territorial designs upon Japan. The Bakufu had, however, no wish to offend Russia, and while from apprehension of the consequences of a refusal, they consented to British vessels frequenting Nagasaki and Hakodate for supplies and to refit, it forbade all hostilities in Japanese ports or territorial waters. By his convention of seven articles (14th October, 1854) Sterling obtained nothing more than Perry had just done, and nothing was said about Shimoda. The convention was ratified on 9th October, 1855.

Since Cécille's visit to Nagasaki in 1846, the Japanese had had no dealings with the French, and they were not particularly eager to renew their intercourse with them. While the *Powhatan*, with the ratified treaty, was at Shimoda, a French cruiser appeared there for the purpose of restoring two Japanese castaways. The Governor of Shimoda refused to receive these and maintained that as Japan had no treaty with France, French vessels had no right to come there under any pretext whatsoever. Supplies were refused, and all direct communication with the vessel declined. The castaways were then transferred to the *Powhatan*, and ultimately received from the Americans.

Meanwhile American traders had not been slow to avail themselves of the provisions of the treaty of Kanagawa. Within fifteen days from Perry's departure from Shimoda, the clipper ship *Lady Pierce* arrived at Uraga. This vessel had been fitted out in San Francisco by a Mr. Burrows, who coveted the distinction of taking

the first ship to Japan after the opening of commercial relations. The castaway he had on board was readily received, and the *Lady Pierce* was allowed to approach within ten miles of Yedo. Burrows received many presents and remained on the best of relations with the Japanese who came on board his vessel in crowds. He was informed, however, that foreign intercourse with Yedo could not be permitted, and that all vessels must proceed to Shimoda or Hakodate. With the next company of Americans that appeared in Japan relations were by no means so pleasant. It has been mentioned that Putiatin purchased the stores of an American vessel and chartered her to take some of his shipwrecked men to Kamchatka. The owners (Reed and Dougherty) meanwhile went ashore and passed ten weeks at Shimoda making purchases of merchandize. This was by no means agreeable to the Japanese officials; and their anxiety was not greatly lessened by the circumstance that the Americans were accompanied by three ladies and some children.¹ They requested the traders to leave, insisting that the treaty of Kanagawa gave Americans no right to a permanent residence in Japan. Commander Rodgers, of the survey ship *Vincennes*, just then arrived in Shimoda, and by interpolating some words in the seventh clause of the treaty of Kanagawa, the Japanese succeeded in inclining him to adopt their view of the matter,² so that the merchants had to depart. At Hakodate they were also denied the right of permanent residence, while an American ship (the *Wilmington*) was not allowed to discharge any part of her cargo at Shimoda in August, 1855.

Before the close of 1855, the Japanese had entered into yet another convention, this time with their old acquaintances and servants, the Dutch. During the last ten years, there had been no Deshima Mission to Yedo, but the annual presents had continued to be forwarded, while the Factor had regularly sent in his annual report on foreign occurrences to the Governor of Nagasaki. We

¹ "We do not want any women to come and remain at Shimoda," were the words of the commissioners. When Hayashi got so far as to agree to the opening of Shimoda and Hakodate, he tried to stipulate that *no American women should be brought to Japan*. When this was interpreted to Perry, the Commodore straightened up, threw back his boat-cloak and excitedly exclaimed, "Great Heavens! if I were to permit any such stipulation as that in the treaty, when I got home *the women would pull all the hair out of my head!*" The Japanese fairly trembled at the Commodore's apparent excitement, supposing that they had grossly offended him. When, however, the explanation was made by the interpreters, they all laughed right heartily, and the business continued. Griffis' *Perry*, p. 365.

² See Griffis' *Townsend Harris*, p. 133.

have seen that the draft treaty sent from Batavia to be submitted to the Rōjū had been accepted only as an ordinary annual report to which no answer was necessary,¹ for as we have seen, the Yedo authorities rarely, if ever, deigned to take any official recognition of communications from the Deshima Factor. Perry's success must naturally have had an ultimate effect upon the position of the Dutch, but so long as they were represented by an agent who was considered a mere trader in Japan, the Dutch Government was aware that it could not hope to meet with the international courtesies due to it. Accordingly, the Governor-General at Batavia deemed it expedient to raise Dutch prestige by the dispatch of the steam frigate *Soembing* to Nagasaki. The step proved to be a very judicious one, for the Commander and his officers were visited by Japanese officials of high rank, who had just before been treating the Agent with covert disdain, in spite of the substantial services he was rendering to them and the empire.

¹ Dr. Nitobe's comparison of this draft with the treaty of Kanagawa is of considerable interest. He writes (*Intercourse between the United States and Japan*, p. 56) "It still remains to be seen how much Perry availed himself of this draft. The first article of Perry's treaty about peace and amity, is but a weaker repetition of the Netherlands' proposal, where the Dutch king assures Japan of his friendship in case the latter should be implicated in war. Perry's demand (Article II) to have Shimoda and Matsumaye as ports for the reception of American ships is expressed in the Dutch treaty, Article IV, section 1, where two coaling stations are asked for, the one in the north, in 'the Bay of Good Hope', and the other in the south, on one of the islands of the Linschoten Archipelago. What Perry asks for, in articles III and IV, respecting shipwrecked citizens of the United States, is found in substance in the Dutch Article II. In Article IV, though the point conceded is in the main the same as that implied in the Dutch Article VI, section *b*, still the former has included an express phrase to the effect that American citizens should not be confined and restricted as the Dutch and Chinese in Nagasaki. In Article VI Perry would have any business arrangement to be settled by 'careful deliberation between the parties', and here he deprived the Shōgunal government of the right to have everything its own way, as suggested by the Dutch Article IV, sections *d*, *e*, and *f*; but in Article VIII, Perry conceded that some articles should be obtained only 'through the agency of Japanese officials appointed for the purpose'. The Most-favoured Nation clause, in Perry's Article IX, is equivalent to Article VI of the Dutch treaty. Change the name of Nagasaki in section *a*, Article IV, of the Dutch treaty to Shimoda and Hakodate, and we have Article VII of Perry's treaty. Perry's Article XI, in regard to the residence of United States consuls or agents in the treaty port, corresponds exactly to section *b* of the Dutch Article IV. The twelfth and last Article of Perry's treaty about ratification finds its parallel in the concluding article of the Dutch. 'Thus considered and compared, one finds but little in Perry's treaty that is original. If it is an improvement that he introduced into Articles IV and V, an express demand for freedom for his countrymen, so can it be said on the other hand that he left out what section *j*, Article IV, of the Dutch treaty requires, namely, extra-territorial rights.'

"However, to speak of Perry availing himself of this draft treaty is somewhat beside the mark, for Perry never saw it, never knew of its existence, and so could not possibly owe anything to it. Doubtless it was an intelligent anticipation of what he would be likely to demand, and so far may have been of service in preparing the Bakufu officials. On the other hand, there seems to be no positive evidence of these having studied it minutely, although some of them may very well have done so."

Shortly after Perry left, in 1853, the Bakufu, adopting Lord Nariaki's suggestion, commissioned the Dutch to procure foreign-rigged vessels for them from Holland. The officials had only the vaguest ideas of the cost of a man-of-war, and in giving his order, the Governor of Nagasaki spoke of fifty or sixty vessels, but on account of the great demand for shipping in consequence of the Crimean War, which was in progress at that time, it had been found impossible to furnish even the two steamers which the Bakufu finally ordered. In communicating this intelligence on 7th August, 1854, Donker Curtius, the Dutch agent, said that his Government was about to send one of its steam frigates to Nagasaki, and that her officers and crew would be ready to instruct the Japanese in marine architecture, navigation, and gunnery during the stay of the vessel. The Bakufu expressed its pleasure in accepting the offer, and the *Soembing* was very well received when she arrived soon afterwards. Her officers and the Japanese officials met on equal terms, and this led to the restrictions on the "prisoners" in Deshima being gradually relaxed, so that they could at last visit the town and suburbs of Nagasaki freely. It would seem that the old practice of trampling on the cross (*Fumi-ye*) which had been regularly observed as the years came round for more than two centuries, was also quietly allowed to lapse towards the end of 1853, without anything being said about it officially at that time. When the *Soembing* left she carried a Japanese order for two steam corvettes and, on her return in the following year (1855) she was presented to the Bakufu by the orders of the King of the Netherlands.¹ In the same year the Japanese established a navigation school and shipbuilding yards in Nagasaki, and here, under the instruction of twenty-two Dutch experts, some of the great seamen of modern Japan began their professional careers. Katsu Rintarō, the historian, and in a measure the founder of the Japanese navy, was the most distinguished of the seventy youths then selected by the Bakufu, both from their own domains and various fiefs, to prosecute their studies in the new school. Along with

¹ This vessel, which was the first unit of Western construction to be acquired by the Japanese navy, was renamed the *Kanko*, and was used as a training ship, attached to the new naval school which was formed at Tsukiji, Yedo, simultaneously with that at Nagasaki. She is described as a steam paddle-wheel corvette of 6 guns. It is interesting to note that the "*Hinomaru*", the Red Sun on a white ground, was at this time adopted as the national flag, and the *Kanko-maru* was possibly the first ship on which it was ever hoisted.

them worked picked men from Satsuma, Saga, Tsu, Fukui, Kakegawa, and Lord Abé's own fief of Fukuyama. A little later on, Dr. Pompe van Meerdervoort assumed charge of a School of Medicine at Nagasaki, also established by the Bakufu.¹ Shortly afterwards this gentleman was appointed attending physician to the first modern hospital established in Japan.

Meanwhile, the Dutch had been feeling their way towards a formal convention with the Japanese Government, and at last an agreement was signed on 9th November, 1855, and a treaty in the following January. The only difference between these two documents was that the treaty withdrew the right of the Dutch to lease the ground and purchase the buildings at Deshima, which had been affirmed by the convention. It may be worth noting that one article of this treaty provided that "within the buildings at Deshima the Dutch may practice their own or the Christian religion".²

In the following April (1856) official orders were at last formally issued to discontinue the enforcing of the annual *Fumi-ye* (trampling on the cross); and in 1857 this was the subject of one of the additional articles then obtained by the Dutch. At the same time, however, the Japanese commissioners declared that it was still strictly forbidden to teach "the pernicious doctrine" (Christianity), or to import books, pictures and images relating to Christianity or to *any other foreign religion*. Before this the Bakufu

¹ The Doctor claims that: "The first public instruction in the medical and surgical sciences given by any European in Japan was my inaugural address delivered on the 15th November, 1857." Siebold gave lectures, and in 1649 Dr. Caspar Schambergen, who actually remained some months in Yedo, also seems to have given public instruction in medical and surgical science.

² The Japanese regarded Christianity and Roman Catholicism as identical. Although the "Evil Religion" had been strictly proscribed in 1614, Hatch, the English preacher of the *Palsgrove*, discharged his clerical functions in Hirado about 1620 without the slightest objection or interference from the Japanese authorities. In 1662 a Dutch minister married and baptized in Deshima, in the presence of the officials. Kämpfer indignantly repudiates the story that the Dutch, when asked if they were Christians, replied, "What, what, Christians, we are Dutchmen". But he admits that *one* Hollander actually did make this answer, to wit, Michael Sandtvoort, Will Adams' old shipmate, who afterwards carried on business at Nagasaki down to 1639. Bk. iv, section viii.

This man Sandtvoort seems to have occupied an altogether exceptional position at Nagasaki and to have lived and traded together with another Dutchman in the town quite independently of his fellow countrymen in the factory. He had originally been stranded on the coast (how Kämpfer does not state) and it was afterwards on being challenged by the Japanese officials on the establishment of their inquisition that to save his own and his companion's life he was guilty of the abjuration quoted above. Kämpfer may have been indignant at the application of the charge, for which only one of his countrymen was liable, to the whole Dutch community, but he writes with entire self complacency of their ignoble share in the destruction of many thousands of the native Christians at Shimabara in the fear of being expelled from this golden Ophir.

officials had been instructed to take every precaution to keep the people from being infected by the "pernicious doctrine", and to restrain them from all intercourse with foreigners so far as possible. This goes a long way in enabling us to understand the stiff battle the Americans and, later on, the British and the French had to fight against the persistent attempts made to isolate them from all social intercourse. As we have seen, these tactics had already entirely nullified the efforts of the French missionaries in the Lūchūs, and had occasioned them to abandon their work there as utterly hopeless.

The Dutch were extremely anxious that their treaty (of January, 1856) should be taken as the model for all the commercial treaties which they foresaw Japan would presently have to enter into with the various Western Powers. Shimoda and Hakodate were to be open for the purposes specified in Perry's treaty, but Nagasaki was to remain the sole port for commercial transactions, and commerce there was still to be conducted much along the old lines, with the Geldkammer (*kwaishō*) on the system of tendering by the privileged merchants of the Five Imperial Towns, no contact between individual foreign and Japanese traders, and no export of Japanese money. The Russians, not being very much concerned about commerce, were not averse to these arrangements, and on his fourth visit to Nagasaki in October, 1857, Putiatin signed a new convention of twenty-seven articles embodying most of the stipulations contained in the Dutch convention of forty articles. Before this, it had already become only too plain to the Bakufu that the Americans would not be satisfied with the commercial concessions that had just been made to the Dutch, and promptly accepted by the Russians. So much the new Consul-General, Harris, who had arrived at Shimoda and taken up his post in August, 1856, had given the local Japanese officials clearly to understand. Before dealing with Harris and his achievements, it may be well to have clear and precise ideas of the state of the government he had to negotiate with.

It is often asserted that at this time there was no stability whatever in the Rōjū, and that its personnel was now constantly changing. Between 1841 and 1844, during Mizuno's attempts at Reform, there *had* been a good many changes in the Great Council, but, after 1844, matters in it returned to their normal course. The four Councillors, who signed the answer to the king of the Nether-

lands in 1845, were Abé, Makino, Aoyama, and Toda. One of the last two had since died and the other had been dismissed in 1848, but Abé and Makino were still in the Rōjū when Harris arrived in Japan in 1856. In 1848, Naitō and two Matsudairas had entered the Great Council, and these, together with Abé and Makino, signed Perry's Treaty of Kanagawa in 1854, and received presents from him. A sixth man also signed that Treaty, Kuze, specially added to the Rōjū in 1853 in consequence of the grave difficulties of the situation. The two Matsudairas must be carefully distinguished. One, Matsudaira, Idzumi no Kami, Daimyō of Nishio in Mikawa, was not of any special consequence. But the other, Matsudaira, Iga no Kami, Daimyō of Uyeda in Shinano, now and then showed the possession of a will of his own, and his stubbornness presently brought him into such conflict with Lord Nariaki of Mito that his retirement from the Rōjū became advisable. This retirement was only temporary, however, in Harris's time, Matsudaira, Iga no Kami, was after Hotta the most influential member of the Council. The two Matsudairas had some little time before being added to the new commission for Coast Defence, originally composed of Abé and Makino only. These commissioners had been making a special study of foreign affairs, and they had already become sufficiently convinced in their own minds that Western powers were much too formidable to be wantonly trifled with or to be set at naught.¹ A good many of the smaller Bakufu officials had also had to devote much attention to foreigners and foreign affairs, and these had nearly all felt themselves driven to adopt the views of Toda, the Governor of Uruga, who had got himself into much trouble by dwelling, in his memorial of 1853, on the helplessness of Japan in any contest with Westerners. Even among the Daimyō there were a few, although only a few, who were modifying their originally uncompromising opposition to foreign intercourse. The most noted instance among these, perhaps, was Matsudaira Yoshinaga (Shungaku) the Lord of Fukui in Echizen, whose conversion was greatly owing to the arguments of the brilliant young Hashimoto Sanai and a few other enlightened and progressive retainers.

¹ A small incident may be worth mentioning in this connexion. In addition to twenty gallons of whisky, a box of champagne, perfumery, and other items, Abé had been presented by Perry with copies of Kendall's *War in Mexico*, and Ripley's *History of that war*. The illustrations to these works were of a rather grim, grisly and realistic nature, and Abé is said to have been very uncomfortably impressed whenever he turned to them.

But although liberal views were surely making headway in these quarters, the bulk of the nation (by which is meant the Daimyō and their vassals) was still bitterly opposed to any intercourse with the despised and hated barbarians. At each new concession, the indignation of the great *Jōi* party found still fiercer expression. Lord Nariaki had been greatly incensed by the Treaty of Kanagawa, the Stirling Convention of October, 1854, and the Russian Shimoda Treaty of February, 1855, had added still further to his wrath. He roundly taxed the Bakufu with its cowardice and incompetence, laying most of the blame upon the two Matsudairas, especially upon Iga no Kami, whom he accused of persistently thwarting the counsels he tendered. Abé, fearing that Nariaki would withdraw his support, at last dismissed both the Matsudairas in September, 1855, and Nariaki then seemed to be likely to become all-powerful in the Councils of the Empire. Hitherto he had gone to the Castle three times a month; now, he was requested to favour the Rōjū with his advice on every alternate day. Abé thus seemed to have succeeded in conciliating the Daimyō, but it was not long before he discovered that his sacrifice of the two Matsudairas had not been such a very judicious step as it was thought at first. The dismissed ministers had many sympathizers among the lower Bakufu officials, and, furthermore, Abé soon was made aware that his action had excited strong discontent in another quarter that had to be seriously reckoned with.

About the Taman-tsume dokoro Daimyō, something has been said in a previous chapter. At this date there were seven of these Lords, of whom Hikone (Ii), Aidzu (Hoshina), Kuwana (Matsudaira) and Takamatsu were the chief. Hotta, Daimyō of Sakura in Shimosa, who had been dismissed from the Rōjū by Mizuno in 1843, had also been assigned a place in the chamber. These eight Daimyō were all more or less opposed to Lord Nariaki of Mito, and the measures he counselled, and Ii of Hikone was also very strongly opposed to him. We have already spoken of the remarkable memorial on foreign intercourse Ii had sent in to the Bakufu in 1853, and we have mentioned that Hotta had expressed himself in favour of limited foreign intercourse for a time as an experiment on that occasion. Hotta was rather well posted in foreign affairs; for the previous fifteen years or so he had greatly encouraged the study of Dutch and European science among his own vassals, and had introduced modern weapons and foreign drill among the levies

of his fief.¹ Ii and his fellow Daimyō now insisted that one of the vacant places in the Great Council should be assigned to Hotta ; and Abé felt himself constrained to yield to the demand. Accordingly, on 18th November, 1855, Lord Hotta entered the Rōjū for the second time, after a seclusion of twelve years. Not only that, Abé, who had been Chief of the Great Council since 1844, was beginning to find the responsibility of the position too onerous for his comfort, and he now vacated the first seat in favour of the newcomer. Abé, however, still continued to be powerful. His main efforts continued to be directed towards smoothing over differences between his colleagues and Lord Nariaki—a task that became increasingly difficult as events developed themselves. His health meanwhile had become impaired ; early in 1857 he began to absent himself from the sittings of the Council, and on 6th August of that year he passed away. In ordinary circumstances Abé Masahiro would have ranked high among the long line of statesmen that administered Tokugawa Japan. But by the date he entered the Rōjū, the power of that august body had been seriously undermined by Iyenari, the eleventh Shōgun, while the desperate and deplorable weakness of the Bakufu finances made it impossible for him to deal with the Daimyō as they had been dealt with hitherto for, in the face of what was considered foreign aggression, their active support had been indispensable. This consideration partly accounts for the extraordinary step of formally inviting their counsels on the question of foreign intercourse, a step which really heralded the fall of the Bakufu. Abé Masahiro was intellectually one of the ablest men of his time, but he trusted overmuch to adroit trimming, and to the conciliation which tries to conciliate the irreconcilable. It was only a man of steel like Ii of Hikone that could have saved the Bakufu during the last four years of Abé's tenure of office.

Even before Abé's death the breach between Lord Nariaki and the Bakufu had become all but irreparable. Embittered at having the shrewdest of his counsels over-ridden or ignored, the haughty and fierce-tempered old man had ceased to attend the meetings of the Councils early in 1857. At last, on 11th September, 1857, his appointment as Adviser to the Rōjū was cancelled ; and on 20th October, Abé's vacant place was filled by the re-entry of

¹ See Mr. Satoh's *Lord Hotta, the Pioneer Diplomat of Japan*.

Matsudaira, Iga no Kami, who had been previously denounced by Nariaki for obstructing his plans, and was dismissed by Abé. Lord Nariaki was now in undoubted opposition; a little later on we shall find him mining and burrowing in the old capital of Kyōto—(which suddenly begins to regain something of its ancient importance)—and there bringing wreck and ruin upon the dearest projects of the Bakufu, just when they seemed to be on the very verge of success. Hotta and Abé were both convinced that foreigners would not be likely to rest satisfied with such documents as the Treaty of Kanagawa. For one thing, that Treaty was in no sense a Treaty of Commerce; and the Dutch continuously repeated their warning that, for her refusal to grant commercial treaties Japan would be presently menaced as China had been and was being menaced. In August, 1856, Donker Curtius wrote to the Governor of Nagasaki that he had been requested to say that the British were not satisfied with Stirling's convention, and that Sir John Bowring, Governor of Hong-Kong, proposed coming to Japan with a strong squadron for the purpose of negotiating a genuine commercial treaty. Curtius sent in further letters on the following days, explaining among other things the recent wonderful development of trade among Western nations and the high importance placed on it by foreign governments. In case Japan obstinately persisted in her present attitude, she would probably find herself confronted with an irresistible coalition of foreign powers bent on forcing her hand, and she would be consulting her own safety as well as her dignity if she made the desired concessions of her own free will before any menacing force appeared to exact them. The two censors (*metsuke*) then in Nagasaki, later on transmitted these recommendations to their superiors in Yedo, and Abé seemed to discern a gleam of hope of being able to repair the desperate financial fortunes of the Bakufu from the profits of an extended foreign trade, believing, of course, that commerce would still continue to be conducted on the traditional lines as a virtual government monopoly. He was very anxious about the threatened exhaustion of the copper mines, although he was beginning to grasp the idea that copper supplied at ruinously low rates need not necessarily constitute the staple of the new and enlarged foreign trade. To clarify his ideas in the matter, he instructed the officials to investigate and report on the various methods of trade.

Before this, however, Harris had already established himself

at Shimoda and his attitude and demeanour were giving great concern to the Bakufu. To cope with the situation, Lord Hotta was specially commissioned to take charge of all matters concerning foreigners; in other words, he was practically appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs (14th November, 1856). His first proceeding was to constitute a commission of eight officials for the consideration of foreign commerce and the problems connected with it. From the tenor of the written instructions furnished to this Commission, it seems tolerably clear that while strongly inclined to open the country to commerce, Hotta was more or less imbued with Abé's idea of making it a mere device for replenishing the Bakufu's sadly depleted treasury. The notion still was that all transactions were to be controlled by government officials; there was no thought of bargaining being a private affair between individual Japanese and foreign traders, the merchant was still to be under the control of the two-sworded man, and to labour for his support. In the discussions that presently followed with the American envoy, we shall do well then to bear in mind that the term "free-trade", wherever it appears, is not used as the antithesis to protection—it rather means the right for individual merchants to make bargains free from all official interference or control.

It will be remembered that the eleventh article of the Treaty of Kanagawa provided that the United States Government was free to appoint consuls or agents to reside at Shimoda after the expiration of eighteen months from 31st March, 1854, "provided that *either* of the two governments deem such arrangements necessary." This provision had proved especially objectionable to Lord Nariaki; in it he discerned the first step in an attempt on the territorial integrity of the Empire on the part of the hated barbarians. Abé, it will be recalled, tried when too late to have a similar article in Putiatin's Shimoda treaty expunged. Now, Abé, reading "*both*" for "*either*" in the clause just quoted, fancied it would be possible to escape the danger and so he instructed the Governor of Shimoda to refuse to receive any consular officer. Harris, on arriving with Commodore Armstrong in the *San Jacinto* ¹ on 21st August, 1856,

¹ It may be interesting to mention that the *San Jacinto* which carried the first consular officer of a Western power to Japan acquired much notoriety a few years later at the beginning of the Civil War in America by arresting on the high seas two Confederate diplomatic agents while travelling to Europe on a British steamer, an incident which very nearly provoked war between Great Britain and the United States.

at once dispatched letters ashore "to the Governor of Shimoda and to the Minister of Foreign Affairs", sending to the latter a communication from Mr. Secretary Marcy. These documents were promptly transmitted to Yedo; and from them Abé perceived that his own interpretation of the eleventh article of the Kanagawa Treaty needed reconsideration. On submitting the question to the Great Censors and the Censors, the law-officers of the time, he was told that it was not possible to refuse Harris a landing and a place of residence. Thereupon he dispatched the Censor, Iwase, together with a new Governor (Inouye, Shinano no Kami) to Shimoda with instructions to see to it that the people should not become infected with "the pernicious doctrine" or with the customs of the barbarians, and that Harris's residence at Kakizaki should be closely watched, and Harris himself and his people kept under the closest surveillance.¹ A due appreciation of these instructions will enable us to put the correct interpretations on a good many rather puzzling entries in Harris's *Journal*. At the new Consul-General's first business interview with the local authorities—when no fewer than *seven* scribes were employed to record the proceedings—he was told that they had not expected the arrival of a consul; that a consul was only to be sent when some difficulty arose, and no such thing had taken place:—

"Shimoda was a poor place, and had recently been destroyed by an earthquake. They had no residence prepared for me, I had better go away, and return in a year, when they hoped to have a house ready. The Treaty said that a consul was to come *if both* nations wished it, that it was not left to the simple will of the United States government."

On the following day the local authorities maintained:—

"that the treaty provide for a consul but not for a Consul-General; that the additional articles had not been sent out as ratified, that they expected the Government of the United States would send out an ambassador with the ratified articles, and *then* enter on negotiations about sending a consul. They were anxious to know whether I was resolved to go to Yedo, if not received here. I said that would be settled after consultation with the Commodore. They were greatly agitated when I mentioned the going up to Yedo."

At last when the temple at Kakizaki was accepted by Harris as a residence, he was informed that three rooms in it would be required for the Japanese officers who were to be with him night and day "to await his pleasure". Harris at once sent word that

¹ See *Townsend Harris*, by Dr. E. W. Griffis.

he needed all the rooms, and that in no circumstances would he permit any Japanese except servants to be in his house, or even to enter it without his permission. That same day the surgeon of the *San Jacinto* had given a Japanese a prescription for a cutaneous affection, and had directed him to go on board the *San Jacinto* for the medicine. An hour later the man returned in great agitation, forced the paper into the doctor's hand, "making significant motions with his finger that his head would be cut off if he took the paper to the ship." On 1st September, Harris and the Commodore met the new Governor.¹ The Commodore was now asked if he would take a letter to the American Government explaining their embarrassed position, and begging for Harris's removal. Next he was asked if he himself would write to his Government—explaining the reasons why the Japanese refused to receive the Consul-General. Harris was then appealed to to write to his Government for his own removal! Later on, the Governor inquired what Harris's powers and privileges were as a consul. After receiving his reply, the Japanese again begged him to write to his Government stating the strong objections they had to receiving a consul at this time, saying that they had opened Shimoda to the Dutch and Russians, and that these too, would send consuls as soon as they knew that he (Harris) was received there. Harris replied that if their Minister of Foreign Affairs wrote on the subject, he might depend on receiving a speedy answer; but the Japanese replied that their laws forbade this.

On taking up his residence at Kakizaki, the Consul-General had great difficulty in hiring Japanese servants. The authorities strove "hard to have the boys leave at sunset and return at daylight", but Harris would not hear of that. A guard had been placed in the grounds of the temple, and in spite of protests it was some months before it was withdrawn. At the same time, the Consul's servants were constantly hampered in their marketing. Here also Harris had to take up a firm position. On 26th December, he gave notice that he:—

"would not allow any spies to come into his presence, or even on his premises; that when the authorities wished to see him he would only receive the principals and interpreters, excluding spies and secretaries."

On 5th June, 1857, he rated the Vice-Governor severely about

¹ "I do not like the new Governor. He has a dark sullen look, and I fear I shall have trouble with him; I much regret the change." But Inouye, the "Prince of Shinano" presently became one of Harris's very best friends.

the marketing, and furthermore demanded the instant removal of the guards, as their presence made him in reality a prisoner, and was a gross outrage and open violation of the treaty.

"The poor Vice-Governor shook in every joint, and the perspiration streamed from his forehead and that of his secretary."

Two days later, at an interview with the two Governors, the Consul-General pressed this matter home; and after some rather strong language from Harris the Governors gave an assurance that the guards would be removed on the following day.¹ Meanwhile Harris had been asserting the rights of his status, in other directions and other matters, and had entered upon negotiations with the local authorities about the currency; the right of permanent residence at Shimoda and Hakodate with the privilege of leasing land and owning buildings at either place; extra-territorial jurisdiction and similar matters. By June, 1857, these negotiations had come to a definite issue, and on the 17th of that month a convention was signed, which, to quote Harris's own words, "contained the following provisions":—

1. Opens the port of Nagasaki to American ships.
2. Gives the right of *permanent* residence to Americans at Shimoda and Hakodate, and the right to appoint a vice-consul at the latter port.
3. Settles the currency, so that where we paid one hundred, we now pay only thirty-four dollars and a half.
4. Americans to be exclusively under the control of their consuls, and to be tried by American law.²
5. Concedes the right of the Consul-General to go where he pleases in Japan, and to be furnished with Japanese money to enable him in

¹ "The Russians dealt with the spy nuisance in a more drastic fashion. On 26th November, 1856, Commodore Possiet and Harris's Secretary, Heusken, took a walk south-east from Shimoda and were followed by a Gobangoshi. The Commodore in a decided and stern manner ordered him to go about his business and not to follow him, and the man left them. But soon afterwards he reappeared and pertinaciously kept with them. The Commodore then seized the man and gave him a thorough shaking, and when the Gobangoshi was released he started off running like a deer, and no more appeared."

In 1869, when I first arrived in Japan, and for at least two years later, a special corps of samurai known as the *Betto gumi* was maintained for the protection of Europeans in the capital. A large detachment was posted at the Legation gates and every member of the staff who went outside, whether on foot or on horseback, was invariably attended not by one but by three guards, and their protection was eminently advisable in view of the great numbers of anti foreign samurai who were always on the streets. The unfortunate fellow who received such rough treatment from the overbearing Commodore was perhaps meant as a guard, and in any case was only doing his duty.—J. H. L.

² This was the germ of the system of extritoriality which afterwards became a festering sore in the corporate body of the nation, and was only ended in 1899, after long years of weary diplomatic negotiation. As the Americans were the first to institute the system, so they were the first to *propose* its abolition, but Great Britain was the first power to *accomplish* it.

person, or by his servants, to make purchases without the intervention of any Japanese official.

This is even more than I was instructed to ask by my special instructions dated 4th October, 1855. No classes of Americans are named in the second article so that *missionaries may actually come and reside in Japan*.

Early in October, 1856, the Dutch steam-frigate *Medusa* had called at Shimoda, and from Captain Fabius Harris then received copies of the Dutch Treaty of January of that year, and of the convention of 1855. This helped him greatly in his task, thanks to the Most-favoured Nation Clause in the Treaty of Kanagawa. In denying the existence of these Dutch agreements, the Japanese officials lied most stoutly, the record of deceit in Harris's *Journal* is at once appalling and amusing, and it is therefore no wonder that we meet with the following significant entry in the *Journal* (8th January, 1857):—

“I am determined to take firm ground with the Japanese. I will cordially meet any real offers of amity, but words will not do. *They are the greatest liars on earth.*”¹

By some over-zealous admirers of Mr. Harris it has been ostentatiously asserted that in his dealings with the Japanese he never once had recourse to threats or intimidation. There are, however, stray passages in his *Journal* that tell a somewhat different tale. For example, on 3rd March, 1857, he writes:—

“At last I told them I had something of great importance to communicate confidentially and to them alone. To my great surprise the room was at once cleared of all but the two Governors and Moriyama (the interpreter). I then read to them an extract from a letter to me from the Secretary of State, which was to the effect that, if the Japanese sought to evade the Treaty, *The President would not hesitate to ask Congress to give him power to use such arguments as they could not resist.* The fluttering was fearful, the effect strong. They thanked me for the confidence I had placed in them by reading that part of the Secretary's letter, and asked if they might communicate the same to their Government. I told them they could do so.”

Seven or eight weeks later on we find this note in the *Journal*:—

“I cannot see what it is that keeps away Commodore Armstrong; if I had a vessel-of-war here I should have speedy answers to my

¹ Sir Rutherford Alcock, writing about five years later, is scarcely less damning of the Japanese in this respect than Harris. In both cases, their verdicts were to no small degree founded on ignorance. Where the Japanese were apparently lying they were probably and frequently speaking truths which were quite unintelligible to their hearers. As the result of over thirty years' residence in Japan and association with natives of all degrees, both high and low, from courtiers to coolies, I can assert without hesitation that the standard of truth in Japan is not lower than it is in Christian countries.—J. H. L.

demands on the two points, but I feel sure they will not be settled so long as no ship-of-war comes here."

Shortly after this (5th May, 1857) he jots down :—

"The absence of a man-of-war also tends to weaken my influence with the Japanese. *They have yielded nothing except from fear, and any future ameliorations of our intercourse will only take place after a demonstration of force on our part.*"

If it be objected that all these passages are comparatively early entries in the *Journal* made at Shimoda while Harris was only winning his way into the confidence and goodwill of the Japanese, the following passage needs consideration :—

"To-day the Prince of Shinano visited me for the first time in three days. I determined to bring about a crisis, and therefore began by saying, that it was now twenty-nine days since I had made some very important communications to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, of which no official notice had since been taken ; that they would not even name a period within which I should have a reply. That such treatment could not be submitted to ; that the President had sent me to Yedo on a most friendly mission, having solely the benefit of Japan in view ; that the United States asked nothing for themselves ; that the trade of Japan was no object to us ; that all we cared for was that our ships could make repairs and get supplies in their harbours, and that we had already got that point ; that they must open their eyes and then they would see that I neither asked, nor would I accept, any favours from Japan ; that ten days ago I offered to give them explanations on any points on which they needed information ; and would reply saying *their treatment of me showed that no negotiations could be carried on with them unless the Plenipotentiary was backed by a fleet and offered them cannon-balls for arguments.* I closed by saying that unless something was done, I should return to Shimoda. Poor Shinano listened in evident trepidation . . . This was apparently a bold step on my part, but from my knowledge of this people I felt that I ran no kind of danger of breaking off my negotiations by what I did ; and the more I yielded and acquiesced, the more they would impose on me ; while by taking a bold attitude, and *assuming a threatening tone, I should at once bring them to terms.*"

This passage, be it remarked, was penned in Yedo itself as late as 9th January, 1858 ; by which date Harris had already achieved the seemingly impossible by obtaining an audience with the August Shōgun or Tycoon himself, by having had several long interviews with the Foreign Minister and Chief of the Rōjū, and so being a long way on the road towards the brilliant accomplishment of the main purpose for which he had been dispatched to Japan. Harris had been very careful to say nothing at all about the chief object of his mission to the local authorities at Shimoda. From

their query at the meeting of 1st September, 1856, as to what the *secret* object of Harris's government was in sending him to Japan, it would seem that they suspected something, but none of them appear to have divined the actual truth—that Harris had been dispatched to convert the Treaty of Peace and Amity signed at Kanagawa for no specified time into a Treaty of Amity and Commerce for a definite term of years.

Two months after his arrival in Shimoda (25th October, 1856) Harris handed the Governor a letter for transmission to the Rōjū. In it he stated that he was commissioned by his government to make representations to the Japanese government regarding a matter of the very highest consequence to Japan, and that he was the bearer of a letter from the President to the Shōgun which could only be delivered to His Highness in person. To discuss and arrange all this it was necessary for him to deal with the very highest officials directly. As soon as arrangements could be made for him to do so, he would proceed to Yedo, and furnish the very highest officials there with further information. He had refrained from going to Yedo in a warship, because he did not wish to excite any commotion among the ignorant people; and had come accompanied only by a secretary and a few servants. In a postscript to the letter he made reference to Bowring's projected expedition to Japan, of which the Rōjū had just been fully apprised by the Dutch, and he enclosed a Dutch translation of the Treaty he himself had concluded with Siam on his way out to Japan. This letter was submitted to the Commission for Coast Defence. Some of the members of the Commission, such as Tsutsui and Iwase, recommended that Harris should be brought to the capital on the status of the Dutch envoys from Deshima, pointing out that in case his request was not acceded to, *he might ultimately come up the Bay with an American squadron, in which case they would have to yield to force.* The majority of the officials refused to endorse this recommendation, and by this time Japanese public opinion¹ had become a force that the Bakufu could no longer affect to ignore. Accordingly it was resolved that the Governor of Shimoda should be instructed to deal with the

¹ "Public Opinion," it is to be borne in mind, here, as always, during the existence of feudalism in Japan, means the opinion of the military classes, i.e. of the territorial nobility and their armed retainers, constituting with their families about one-fifteenth of the whole population. The commoners had neither voice nor part in any political or social reforms. They were never consulted and never thought themselves of obtruding their opinions in discussion of their bodies in fighting.

matter, and that no direct reply should be returned to Harris's communication. On 7th January, 1857, the Governor informed Harris that they had been charged to give an answer to his letter. To quote the *Journal* :—

“ I inquired if it was a written answer ? They said it was not. I told them I must decline any verbal answer delivered by a third person to a written letter from me. They asked if I objected to their rank. I told them no. They told me that the laws of Japan forbade the writing of letters to foreigners. I told them I knew better ; that letters had been written by the highest officials, and even by the Emperor himself to Commodore Perry, to the Russians, and to the Dutch, that to assert such palpable falsehoods was to treat me like a child, and that if they repeated it, I should feel myself insulted.”

On the following day Harris wrote to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, protesting strongly against the attempt to fob him with a mere verbal answer delivered through a third party ; and he notes that one of the Governors is starting for Yedo—“ I suppose in consequence of the flare-up of yesterday.” What the Rōjū now learned from Inouye, Shinano no Kami, about the resolute front Harris was showing in Shimoda, disquieted them greatly, and the officials were again ordered to deliberate on the question of allowing him to come up to Yedo. Meanwhile the Great Councillors deemed it well to send a written reply to Harris. To quote the *Journal* again :—

“ 25th February, 1857. (The Governors) brought in, with great ceremony, a box which was reverentially placed before me. Then a vice-governor opened the box, which I found contained five pieces of a very poor satin damask, which I was told was from five members of the Regency at Yedo, one piece from each person. This over, another box was brought in, which, as I was told, contained an answer to my two letters to Yedo, and at last they mustered courage to open it, and unfold a sheet of paper about five feet long by eighteen inches wide, written quite full, and bearing the seals and signatures of the following princes, who are members of the Regency, with a Dutch translation, which they placed in Mr. Heusken's hands :—Hotta, Bitchū no Kami ; Abé, Ise no Kami ; Makino, Bizen no Kami ; Kuze, Yamato no Kami ; Naitō, Kii no Kami. I directed Mr. Heusken to put the letter and the translation into the box and close it. The Governors wished me to have it translated into English at once. This I declined, saying I should prefer having it done at leisure, and that in the meantime I should like to hear their answer on the currency question. On reaching home, Mr. Heusken translated the Dutch copy of the letter, and I found it to be a simple announcement that all business was to be transacted with the Governors of Shimoda, or Hakodate, and not one word in reference to the President's letter to the Emperor of Japan of which I told them I was the bearer.”

On the following day (26th February) the Governors told Harris that they had full powers to receive any propositions he had to make, and to treat on all matters referred to in his two letters to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Harris asked them if they really could give him answers at once on all matters he might propose without waiting to hear from Yedo. On assuring him in the most solemn fashion that they could do so, he then inquired whether they could make a new treaty without such reference. "Their answer soon proved what I before suspected, that in any minor matter they could decide, but on any important matter they could only hear and report." Five days later Harris dropped a bomb-shell by reading the threatening passage from the American Secretary of State's letter already quoted. Then, to cite the *Journal* once more:—

"1st April, 1857. Dispatch letter, dated 28th March, to Council of State, in reply to their letter received on 25th February. I have delayed writing this letter so long in the hope of bringing things to a quiet close here. 3rd April. Governors wish to see me. Go to Go-yosho at 2 p.m. They wish to know the contents of my letter to the Council of State. Sorry, but it would be improper in me to disclose it."

In that dispatch Harris had told the Rōjū that it was insulting in them to have made not the least reference to the President's letter in their communication of 25th February, and that it was quite impossible for him to discuss the all-important matter he had originally referred to with subordinate officials. The Great Councillors meanwhile were desperately eager to learn what this all-important matter was; and Harris, surmising as much, began and continued to play on their curiosity with great adroitness.

On 15th April, 1857, Moriyama, the interpreter, told Harris he wished to ask him a question, and that he wanted him to consider it as a dream! Suppose the Governors of Shimodā should wish to make a commercial treaty with him, what would he do?

"I replied that I should first ask to see their full powers, and, if those were satisfactory, that I should show them mine; and after that we would go to work at a treaty at once. He said if that was so they had misunderstood me; that they supposed that I would only negotiate at Yedo, and with the High Council. I told them that they had confounded two things; that what I had to say confidentially, as from my government, could only be said at Yedo; so also the President's letter could only be delivered by me at Yedo, and in the Imperial presence, etc.; that negotiations were a different thing; that I was ready to negotiate with any person of proper rank who could show me the requisite full powers."

The party among the Bakufu officials in favour of receiving Harris had meanwhile been making converts among their fellows. It was known, however, that the Daimyō would be sure to interpose strong objections, and so it was determined to exhaust every means to worm Harris's secret out of him and to obtain the President's letter from him without allowing him to leave Shimoda. On 22nd June, the Governor showed Harris :—

“An Imperial mandate, under the seal and signature Royal, commanding them to receive the President's letter and bring it to Yedo, and they are now quite dumbfounded that I refuse to yield to the mandate.” On 8th July, 1857, “Shinano no Kami started for Yedo for the purpose of reporting my refusal to deliver the letter of the President anywhere but in Yedo or to anyone but the Emperor. They assure me that it is quite preposterous to even think of an audience of His Majesty, as the laws of Japan forbid it. As it happens, they also told me that the Council of State could not write to any foreigners (the laws forbidding it), and as the Council *has written to me*, I am shrewdly inclined to think that they will be found equally pliable in the matter of the audience.”¹

In this surmise, Harris proved to be correct. But the Councillors after sanctioning his visit to Yedo, fought the audience question to the very last ditch, insisting that the President's letter should be delivered to themselves. However, the following entry in the *Journal* tells the whole story succinctly enough :—

“25th September, 1857. The Governors informed me that they had received letters from Yedo relating to the President's letter. That after many consultations it was finally settled that I am to go to Yedo in the most honourable manner ; and after my arrival I am to have an audience of the Shōgun, and then present the letter of the President. The manner in which I am to salute the Shōgun is to be the same as in the courts of Europe, i.e. three bows. They made a faint request that I would prostrate myself and ‘knockhead’, but I told them the mentioning such a thing was offensive to me. The Governors informed me that Shinano no Kami was ordered to Yedo for the purpose of assisting in the arrangements to be made for my visit. They said a great deal was to be done in the way of preparation, and that it would probably require some two months to complete the arrangements.”

¹ The reader may be again reminded that the terms “seal and signature Royal”, “Emperor”, and “His Majesty”, all apply not to the Emperor at Kyōto but to the Shōgun, who had not a particle of right to any one of them. This remark applies to these and similar terms wherever they are used throughout this and previous chapters. Harris and all early diplomatists were at the outset of their careers in Japan almost entirely ignorant of the true status of the legitimate Emperor, and of the relative positions of Emperor and Shōgun, as were the Jesuit writers of the seventeenth, and the Dutch writers of the eighteenth and early nineteenth, centuries. An exception may perhaps be made as regards the Dutch in the case of Titsingh, whose *Illustration of Japan* was published in English in 1822, but even he speaks of the “reigning dynasty of the Shōguns” as “Sovereigns of Japan”.—J. H. L.

As a matter of fact, the Bakufu deemed the two months' delay necessary for a strenuous attempt at conciliating public opinion and blunting the hostility of the Daimyō. At last, on 28th October, Harris was told that his start was fixed for 23rd November, 1857 ; and at the same time he was informed that :—

“ the Shōgun is not the proper appellation of their ruler, but that it is Tai-Kun. *Shōgun* is literally ‘ generalissimo ’, while *Tai-Kun* means ‘ great ruler ’. The genius of the people shines out in this. For more than a year I have spoken and written ‘ Shōgun ’ when referring to their ruler, and they never gave me any explanation ; but now, when I am on the eve of starting for Yedo, they give me the real word.”

On the journey up to Yedo Harris threatened to turn back (26th November) if the Japanese persisted in subjecting his palanquin to any inspection by the guard at the Hakone barrier. At Kanagawa, he was :—

“ much surprised by the sight of three ships, of European build and rig, which with two schooners were lying about midway between Kanagawa and Yokohama. These ships have been purchased from the Dutch by the Japanese as the beginning of their navy. To the north-east from Kanagawa, I saw the steamer which the Dutch presented to the Japanese. On 30th November, 1857, I could boast that I was the first American who had ever entered Yedo. I calculated the number of persons that lined the street from Shinagawa to my residence at one hundred and eighty-five thousand. On getting near to the site of the present French Embassy, my bearers started on a full run, rushed through a gate-way, across a court and ended by bearing me into the house. This was doing the matter in the most honourable Japanese manner. Mr. Heusken had to leave his *norimono* (palanquin) at the outer gate. As I got out of mine, I was warmly welcomed by *my old friend*, the Prince of Shinano, who conducted me to my rooms and pointed out the arrangements made for my comfort.”¹

Next day, the Prince of Shinano (the “ Prince ” was really a small Hatamoto with a few hundred *koku* revenue) enlarged on the difficulties he had overcome, and the great labours he had performed to enable Harris to get to Yedo ; he spoke of his anxious days and sleepless nights ; that care and anxiety had taken away his appetite, so that he had become lean in his person ; that his blood had frequently gushed from his nose from his great agitation, “ that he had done all this from his friendship for me, etc., etc.” Harris took the opportunity of informing Shinano no Kami that he had come

¹ “ The new Governor was cold and rude ; not even the raw brandy, which he and others drank, seemed to warm his heart or thaw him towards us.” *Journal*, 2nd September, 1856. At that date, Inouye Shinano no Kami had just appeared in Shimoda to keep Harris out of Japan if he could.

to Yedo as the Representative of the United States and not in his private capacity ; that the United States did not ask anything from the government of Japan *as a favour* ; that it only demanded its rights, and that nothing would be accepted on the ground of favour ; that :—

“ my mission had for its object the good of the Japanese empire ; and that it was no favour to me or to my country that they should listen to my advice, but that it was the Japanese who should feel grateful to the President for the friendship he had shown to Japan, by the messages with which I was entrusted ; that for myself individually I had no wish to come to Yedo and that I only came because my official duty required it ; that I hoped he now fully understood not only my object in visiting Yedo but that he would clearly see that it was not any favour to me, either in my private or in my official capacity, to receive me in Yedo.”

The Prince was quite chapfallen at this, and no very great wonder perhaps, that he was so. The “ Prince ” was considered to be the envoy’s host—or rather “ keeper ”, as Harris suggested—but he was only one of a commission of eight members (*Ōsetsu-gakari*)¹ appointed to look after the American Ambassador. Hayashi, Daigaku no Kami, and Udonō, who had treated with Perry at Yokohama in 1854, served on it along with Tsutsui and two or three Censors. On 3rd December, Harris wrote to the Minister of Foreign Affairs (Lord Hotta, who was also chief of the Rōjū) enclosing a copy and a translation of the President’s letter to the Taikun (or Shōgun) and stating that he would pay His Excellency a visit of ceremony whenever he should be ready to receive it. Next morning was the time appointed.²

At the interview Harris presented Lord Hotta with a copy of his intended address to the Taikun, on the day of the audience ; and after retiring to consider the document, Hotta came back in half an hour to say that this address was quite satisfactory. At

¹ Ōsetsu-gakari, interviewing or reception officials.

² The *Journal* has a good deal to say about this function. The Dutch used to be objects of great interest to the ladies of Yedo. After telling us that “ The buildings on the street have projecting windows like the houses at Cairo and Alexandria ”, Harris goes on, “ Through the grass screens to these openings we saw plenty of fair faces, and it would appear that Mother Eve’s failing is fully inherited by her daughters in Yedo. Every possible part of the window from its sill to the top was plastered with a female face.” Next year, while the authorities were considering what course they should adopt towards Lord Elgin’s party, then anchored off Shinagawa, “ pleasure parties from the city came to look at the ships and their crews. Boat-loads of ladies, with a great deal of white powder on their cheeks, lips painted a brilliant vermilion, and some with teeth dyed hideously black, gazed on the strangers with the utmost interest and delight, making apparently witty remarks, and then laughing immoderately. They were not at all shy like the Chinese ladies, but peeped in at the port-holes with the greatest curiosity and inquisitiveness.”

the same time he handed Harris the Taikun's reply, explaining that as the interpreters could not be admitted into the Imperial presence, he thus furnished the envoy with a copy of the answer, so that by having it translated beforehand, the presence of an interpreter would not be necessary.

On the momentous day of the audience with the Shōgun (7th December, 1857) the envoy was taken to the Palace an hour before the time, for the purpose, as it turned out, of rehearsing his part in the audience chamber under the tutelage of Shinano no Kami. Harris gently but firmly refused to do anything of the kind :—

“ At last I was informed that the time had arrived for my audience, and I passed down by the poor daimyōs, who were still seated like so many statues in the same place ; but when I had got as far as their front rank, I passed in front of their line and halted on their right flank towards which I faced. Shinano here threw himself on his hands and knees. I stood behind him and Mr. Heusken was just behind me. The audience chamber faced in the same manner as the room in which the great audience was seated, but separated from it by the usual sliding doors, so that although they could see me pass and hear all that was said at the audience, they could not see into the chamber. At length, on a signal being made, the Prince of Shinano began to crawl along on his hands and knees, and when I half turned to the right and entered the audience chamber a chamberlain called out in a loud voice ‘ Ambassador Merican ! ’ I halted about six feet from the door and bowed, then proceeded nearly to the middle of the room, where I again halted and bowed. Again proceeding, I stopped about ten feet from the end of the room, exactly opposite to the Prince of Bitchiū (Hotta) on my right hand, where he and the other five members of the Great Council were prostrate on their faces. On my left hand were three brothers of the Tai-Kun¹ prostrate in the same manner, and all of them being nearly ‘ end on ’ towards me. After a pause of a few seconds I addressed the Tai-Kun as follows :—

“ ‘ May it please your Majesty : In presenting my letters of credence from the President of the United States, I am directed to express to Your Majesty, the sincere wishes of the President for your health and happiness, and for the prosperity of your dominions. I consider it a great honour that I have been selected to fill the high and important place of plenipotentiary of the United States at the court of your Majesty, and as my earnest wishes are to unite the two countries in the ties of enduring friendship, my constant exertions shall be directed to the attainment of that happy end.’

“ Here I stopped and bowed.

“ After a short silence the Tai-Kun began to jerk his head backwards over his left shoulder, at the same time stamping with his right foot. This was repeated three or four times. After this, he spoke audibly and in a pleasant and firm voice what was interpreted as follows :—

¹ Really the Go-san-ke.

“ ‘ Pleased with the letter sent with the Ambassador from a far distant country, and likewise pleased with his discourse. Intercourse shall be continued for ever.’ ”

“ Mr. Heusken, who had been standing at the door of the audience chamber, now advanced with the President’s letter, bowing three times. As he approached, the Minister for Foreign Affairs rose to his feet and stood by me. I removed the silk cover over the box, opened it, and also raised the cover of the letter so that the Minister could see the writing. I then closed the box, replaced the silk covering, and handed the same to the Minister, who received it with both hands, and placed it on a handsome lacquered stand which was placed a little above him. He then knelt down again, and I turned towards the Tai-Kun who gave me to understand my audience was at an end by making me a courteous bow. I bowed and retreated backward, halted, bowed again, retreated again, halted and bowed again, and for the last time. So ended my audience when I was reconducted to the original room where I was served with more tea.”

The most interesting, and perhaps the most valuable, part of Kämpfer’s *History of Japan* is his narrative of the two missions he accompanied to Yedo in the last decade of the seventeenth century. His account of the reception of the Dutch envoy by the Shōgun has already been reproduced in this work. It is of deliberate purpose that Harris’s very own words have now been cited ; for in dealing with such significant incidents as this audience of his was, it is the best course to let the actor or the eyewitness speak for himself. On the following day, Shinano no Kami assured Harris that “ all who were present at the audience yesterday were amazed at his ‘ greatness of soul ’, and at his bearing in the presence of the mighty ruler of Japan ; they had looked to see him ‘ tremble and quake ’ and to speak in a faltering voice. He added that the Americans were a very different people from the Dutch.” The truth is that the importance of this incident can hardly be over-estimated ; for in a way it marks the beginning of modern Japan. The Japanese had no respect for a republic—in fact they could scarcely grasp the idea of a republic. It is of some consequence to note that Harris with the Deshima envoys down to Doeff’s time was a Republican and originally a “ mere ” merchant.

In an almost equally important matter it is also advisable to reproduce Harris’s *ipsissima verba*. On 12th December, 1857, the envoy had his second and most important interview with Lord Hotta, the chief of the Rōjū, and in his *Journal* he gives the following synopsis of his discourse on that occasion :—

“ It related to the changed condition of the world by the introduction of steam ; that Japan would be forced to abandon her exclusive policy ;

that she might soon become a great and powerful nation by simply permitting her people to exercise their ingenuity and industry ; that a moderate tax on commerce would soon give her a large revenue by which she might support a respectable navy ; that the resources of Japan, when developed by the action of free trade, would show a vast amount of exchangeable values ; that this production would not in any respect interfere with the production of the necessary food for the people, but would arise from the employment given to the actual surplus labour of Japan, etc., etc. ; that foreign nations would one after another send powerful fleets to Japan to demand the opening of the country ; that Japan must either yield or suffer the miseries of war ; that even if war did not ensue the country would be kept in a constant state of excitement by the presence of these large foreign armaments ; that to make a concession of any value, it must be made in due season ; and that the terms demanded by a fleet would never be as moderate as those asked by a person placed as I was ; and that to yield to a fleet what was refused to an ambassador would humiliate the government in the eyes of all the Japanese people, and thus actually weaken its power. This point was illustrated by the case of China in the war of 1839 to 1841, the events succeeding that war, and the present hostilities.

I told him that by negotiating with me, who had purposely come to Yedo alone and without the presence of even a single man-of-war, the honour of Japan would be saved ; that each point should be carefully discussed ; and that the country should be gradually opened. I added that the three great points would be : first, the reception of foreign ministers to reside at Yedo ; second, the freedom of trade with the Japanese, without the interference of government officers ; and the third, the opening of additional harbours. I added that I did not ask any exclusive rights for the Americans, and that a treaty that would be satisfactory to the President would at once be accepted by all the great Western powers.

"I did not fail to point out the danger to Japan of having opium forced upon her, and said I would be willing to prohibit the bringing of it to Japan. I closed by saying my mission was a friendly one in every respect, that I had no threats to use ; that the President merely informed them of the dangers that threatened the country, and pointed out a way by which not only could those dangers be averted, but Japan made a prosperous, powerful, and happy nation. . . . When I had finished, the minister thanked me for my communication, and said it should be communicated to the Tai-Kun, and have that consideration which it merited, and that it was the most important matter ever brought before the Government."

This summary can scarcely be described as downright inaccurate ; yet, from the Japanese records of the interview, it becomes plain that the astute American made a rather liberal use of the cheap and very convenient British bogey on this occasion. He said :—

"A nation, in order to be aggressive, must have a station in the vicinity of the country where it intends to gain new territory, but the United States had no rendezvous in the Orient, clearly proving the

absence of any aggressive intentions on her part. He strongly condemned the policy of aggression as simply piratical, and said that the national principle of the United States was prohibitive of such a policy : never since the United States became a nation had she taken even an inch of another's territory. All the countries of Europe, especially England, were placed under the absolute necessity of opening relations with Japan *even at the risk of war*. In support of this contention, he referred to the situation then prevailing in the English territory of India. He said that India, rich and fertile as she was, could never keep herself free from the menace of Russia from the north. The late (Crimean) war fought against Russia by the combined armies of England and France had for its object the checking of the Russian advance. They knew that Russia wanted to secure Saghalin and Amur from whence to come down on Manchuria so as to effect the ultimate descent upon the English territory of India. England would find it no easy task to arrest this Russian advance. *She might be forced to wrest Yezo or Hakodate from Japan*, so as to establish a station whereby the Russians might be checked from the rear. Great Britain could not adopt better tactics. . . . The envoys of both England and France had asked the American Government to join in their invasion of China, but the proposal was flatly rejected on the ground that such was not in conformity with the principle guiding the policy of the United States Government, which would not fight against a weak nation without any cause of provocation. . . . He then spoke of his conversation with Governor Bowring at Hong-Kong, who on learning of his mission, told him that he also intended soon to enter the Bay of Yedo with a fleet of ten ships in order to demand the opening of the country, and that he *was quite prepared to open hostilities should the demand be refused*. . . . He had reason to believe that France also would appear on the coasts of Japan. He attributed the delay of both the English and the French arrival to the situation in China demanding their attention at that time. . . . Should Japan conclude a treaty with the United States, he had reason to believe that England and France would not make any exorbitant demands. Even if they should do so, he was prepared to say that his Government would exert its influence to have peace maintained and the safety of Japan assured."

It will be well to keep the purport of these citations carefully in mind when we come to consider the developments of July, 1858. On 21st December, the Commissioners called on Harris inquiring about the object of sending ministers to foreign countries, their duties, their rights under the laws of nations. On this occasion the envoy handed them :—

" a written paper containing the basis of a commercial treaty which I explained to them article by article, and told them I wished that paper might be taken into serious consideration. I then gave them champagne which they appeared to understand and to like. I may be said to be now engaged in teaching the elements of political economy to the Japanese and in giving them information as to the working of commercial regulations in the West."

In spite of all these interviews and all the teaching, the American envoy could boast of no practical results, until he was summoned to a third interview with Lord Hotta, on 16th January, 1858, when the Shōgun's answer to the envoy's requests was given. The demand for the residence of a Minister at Yedo was admitted, his place of residence and the rights he was to exercise to be settled by negotiation. The right of "free trade" was also conceded, and commissioners were to be appointed to settle the details. Three harbours having been already opened, and Japan being a small country, the number could not be increased; but as Shimoda had been found unsuitable, another port would be opened in lieu of it. Harris earnestly recommended a reconsideration of the decision about the number of ports, it being impossible for him to make a satisfactory treaty under such restrictions. He was informed that the commissioners to negotiate with him would be appointed immediately, and that the first conference would be held at his own quarters on the next day but one, 18th January, 1858. On that day, he found that he had only two commissioners to deal with; his own "old friend" the formerly dour and sullen-visaged Governor of Shimoda, Inouye, Shinano no Kami, whose coldness had been impervious to raw brandy even, and Iwase, Higo no Kami, a Censor (*metsuke*). Both these men were simple Hatamoto of a rather low rank. Harris shrewdly divined the situation:—

"Although the Commissioners will have full powers, yet in reality I shall be negotiating with the whole Council of State. The Commissioners will hear my arguments and then request time to consider them. They will repeat what I have said to the Council, who will consider the matter and then dictate what the Commissioners shall say. I feel just as sure of this as though I had been told it by themselves."

And on 28th January, when the negotiations were well under way, he puts down:—

"The Commissioners arrive at half-past one p.m. They go to the Castle in the Council of State at nine a.m., and leave at one, eat a hearty meal, and then are ready for business."

But all things considered, the negotiations actually marched much faster than might have been expected, and by 26th February, 1858, after thirteen conferences, Harris was able to hand a clean draft of the treaty to the Japanese. On the next day the commissioners send him word that "they will require until Tuesday next, 2nd March, to examine with the Council of State the final

draft of the treaty. If any doubt had existed in my mind that I was in reality negotiating with the Council and that the commissioners had no real full powers, this significant circumstance would remove it.¹

The name of Harris is a revered one in Modern Japan, and Japanese publicists are ungrudging in their generous recognition of the services he undoubtedly rendered to the Empire. But it is well to bear in mind that he occasionally allowed himself the luxury of some very frank and candid criticism in his *Journal*. On 25th January, 1858, for instance, he writes :—

“ In this Journal I shall confine myself to the leading facts of actual transactions, omitting the interminable discourses of the Japanese, where the same proposition may be repeated a dozen times ; nor shall I note their positive refusal of points they subsequently grant, and meant to grant all the while, nor many absurd proposals made by them, without the hope, and scarcely the wish of having them accepted ; for all such proceedings are according to the rule of Japanese diplomacy, and he who shows the greatest absurdity in these matters is most esteemed. *They do not know the value of a straightforward and truthful policy ; at least they do not practise it. They never hesitate at telling a falsehood, even where the truth would serve the purpose.*”

To almost every article in Harris's draft the commissioners made a point of raising some objection or other, with the notable exception of Article VIII, on which he writes :—

“ This article I had inserted with scarce a hope that I should obtain it. It provides for the free exercise of their religion by the Americans, with the right to erect suitable places of worship, and that the Japanese would abolish the practice of trampling on the Cross.² To my surprise and delight this article was accepted. I am aware that the Dutch have published to the world that the Japanese had signed articles granting freedom of worship and also agreeing to abolish trampling on the Cross. It is true that the Dutch proposed the abolition, but the Japanese refused to sign it.”

Neither was there any real difficulty about the grant of extra-territorial jurisdiction over American citizens in Japan, for this had already been conceded in the Shimoda Convention. When Harris brought up the question at Shimoda, his demand had been accepted without the slightest demur as being the most natural thing in the world to ask for. When a Bakufu constable arrested any outside samurai for any cause, the offender was invariably

¹ For synopsis of Mr. Harris's treaty see Nitobe's *Intercourse between the United States and Japan*, pp. 66-7.

² As we have seen, this had already been done by official order in 1856 ; while in 1853, the practice had been quietly and silently discontinued.

handed over to his own clan authorities for trial and punishment. By Iyeyasu's Charter of Privileges, the English Cape Merchant had full authority over his fellow-subjects in Japan ; and in Hirado the English had hung, and the Dutch beheaded, their murderers and mutineers without the least interference on the part of the Japanese. The simple fact of the matter is that the Bakufu Councillors saw endless difficulties if they assumed judicial control over the " barbarians ", and they had not the smallest wish to do so. Only when the Japanese, later on, became conscious of the fact that in modern states, apart from the rights or privileges of envoys, there was no such thing as extra-territorial jurisdiction, did they become restive about their own concession of extra-territoriality to the Western powers. And then the main objection was not against the injustice or inconvenience of the system ; it was mainly because it was seen to affect the national prestige. As a matter of sober fact, it was a most convenient expedient for the Japanese at the time it was granted, for it undoubtedly saved them from many dangerous quarrels and disputes. Anglo-Saxons, accustomed to the maxim that every accused is to be treated as innocent until proved guilty and to a fair trial by his peers, could not possibly have been subjected to the laws of feudal Japan without producing a tremendous amount of friction. At Shimoda, Harris had inspected the prison and had found nothing much to say against it. But he goes on :—

" There were three prisoners in jail awaiting trial, two for gambling, and one for a small larceny ; they were to be tried to-day, and will go home acquitted or else well whipped to-night. Whipping is inflicted with a small bamboo or rattan over the shoulders or back. The Japanese cannot understand our imprisonment as a punishment. They say for a man to be in a good house and have enough of food and clothing cannot be a punishment for a large portion of men, who only care for their animal wants and have no self-respect, and as they never walk for pleasure they cannot think it hard to be deprived of wandering about."

Prisons were usually for untried suspects ; but at the beginning of the eighteenth century we met with record of several accused detained in Yedo gaols for so many years that none of the oldest officials could say when or for what they had been brought there ! And Japanese prisons generally were far from being as comfortable as Harris found the Shimoda lock-up to be. As regards trial, the accused rarely saw the face of the judge that passed sentence on him, and the confrontation with, or cross-examination of, witnesses

was unknown. That is towards the end of the Bakufu ; in Yoshimune's time it had been otherwise, especially in Ōoka's court. Moreover the application of torture, whether to obtain evidence, or to extort confession, was perfectly legal and of everyday occurrence, while witnesses no less than accused were often treated in a very outrageous fashion. In view of all this—and a good deal more might well be said—the omission of the extra-territorial clause in Perry's treaty can be regarded only as a piece of ill-judged mawkish sentimentality, likely to be productive of an endless crop of difficulties and dangers to Japanese as well as Americans.

The Commissioners fought hard to keep the prospective American Minister out of Yedo, and to make him reside at Kanagawa or Kawasaki. When their hand was forced on this point, they vainly begged that no Minister should be sent to Yedo before 1861. Harris for some time feared that the treaty would be wrecked by the Commissioners' persistent opposition to the article giving diplomatic and consular officers the right to travel freely in any part of the Empire, for they correctly pointed out that the great feudatories claimed the right of excluding for all time from their domains any of their own fellow-countrymen to whom they might think fit to object, and foreigners would certainly be regarded there as uncomparably more unwelcome intruders. On this point the envoy had to make a small compromise ; but he had to drop his proposal that every well-conducted American who had resided one year in Japan might travel about as freely as the natives of the Empire. The Shōgun in his reply to Harris's communication had granted "freedom" of trade ; yet, at the first conference, the commissioners informed him that it had been determined to open trade with the Americans on the same terms as the Dutch and Russians had just agreed to. Harris appealed to the most favoured nation clause in Perry's treaty ; as to the recently concluded Dutch and Russian treaties, he declared that the conditions were disgraceful to all parties engaged in making them ; so far as trade was concerned these documents were not worth the paper on which they were written ; were he to sign any such stipulations the President would recall him in disgrace. He then demanded that the promise of the Taikun "that freedom of trade should be granted" should be made good. Five days later

"to my great surprise the commissioners added that the American may buy where he can best suit himself as to quality and price, and

sell to whom he pleases, *without the intervention of any Government officer*. This is a complete abandonment of the leading principle of the Dutch and Russian treaties, and is one of the chief points I have so long contended for."

It was, however, the question of the new ports to be opened that Harris calls "the Sebastopol of the treaty". In his draft he had claimed Hakodate, Shinagawa, Ōsaka, Nagasaki, another port in Kyūshū near the coal mines, Hirado, and two ports on the west coast of Nippon, making together eight open ports, and he also claimed that the cities of Yedo and Kyōto should be opened. Hakodate and Nagasaki were already open, Kanagawa was substituted for Shimoda, while Niigata on the Japan Sea was offered and accepted. The Commissioners said that coal had been discovered within a few miles of Nagasaki, and that Hirado was a poor place with no trade; so Harris dropped his demand for two extra ports in Kyūshū as well as for another besides Niigata on the west coast. After a very stubborn fight, Harris succeeded in getting it arranged that Yedo should be opened on 1st January, 1862, and Ōsaka a year later on. In their attempts to keep the foreigner out of Ōsaka the commissioners had offered Sakai; but later on Hyōgo was substituted and this harbour was to be opened at the beginning of 1863. As regards Kyōto the commissioners were unyielding and inexorable. At the very first mention of it, they assured Harris that the idea was absolutely impossible, that to attempt to open the city for a permanent residence of foreigners would excite a rebellion. The proposal that the Americans after a year's residence should be free to travel anywhere was also utterly impracticable.

"Many other propositions of the treaty were excessively difficult, but still might be carried into effect, but these two points were absolutely impossible, and here they made a very sensible remark; they said if foreign nations would go to war with them on account of these two points, they must make the best they could of the calamity; but under no circumstances was war from abroad so much to be feared as intestine commotion."

By 22nd February, 1858, all the articles of the treaty itself had been agreed to; and the tariff regulations were then taken up. Harris pronounced the stipulations in the Russian treaty to be at once imperfect and oppressive, and on pointing out the injustice of such regulations to the Commissioners, they admitted the force of his objections, confessing that they really were entirely in the

dark on the subject, not having any experience to guide them. They now proposed a tariff of $12\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. on exports and imports alike. The duty was finally fixed at 5 per cent. on exports and also on supplies imported for ships' use; 20 per cent. on most other imports, and 30 per cent. on all intoxicating liquors. This tariff was to be open to revision after five years.

Early in March the treaty was ready for signature, but Harris had meanwhile to rest content with a written promise from Lord Hotta positively pledging the signatures to the document on or before the 21st of April, 1858. As early as 17th February, the envoy had learned that the signing of the treaty was not likely to be the very easy and simple thing he had expected it to be. On that day the Commissioners told him that :—

“on the eleventh, the treaty as it then stood had been submitted to the Daimios, and instantly the whole Castle had been in an uproar . . . the government could not at once sign such a treaty except at the expense of bloodshed.”

For once, at least, there was a good deal of truth in what the Japanese diplomats asserted. To Harris's very presence in Yedo there was an exceedingly strong opposition. Hotta had indeed prepared the officials for the American's visit to the capital, and in two lengthy memoranda he had set forth to them why and wherefore it had become advisable to yield to his demand for an audience with the Shōgun. Even among his own subordinates Hotta met with opposition over this matter, but that he over-rode without much difficulty. As for the Daimyō, he did not consult them, he merely notified them of the arrangements that had been made. Deputations from the most favourably disposed feudatories waited upon him to expostulate with or to caution him, while Lord Nariaki of Mito and his fellow-thinkers were in a ferment of indignation, and, in a memorial which he presented to the Council, Nariaki emphatically declared :—

“Above all to allow a Barbarian to come near the person (of the Shōgun) is very dangerous, and as one of the Go-san-ké duty forbids me to remain silent in the circumstances, even if this memorandum be left unnoticed.”

Shortly after he sent his trusted retainer Ajima to concert measures with one of the Councillors of the Echizen fief to prevent Harris from entering Yedo, but on the ground that the matter had been already decided upon, and that it was then too late to do anything, the Echizen man refused to enter into the project. Lord

Nariaki, however, was far from being at the end of his resources. His consort, the mother of the young Daimyō of Mito and of Nariaki's favourite (seventh) son, now adopted into the Hitotsu-bashi family, was a daughter of Arisugawa, one of the Princes of the Blood, while one of his younger sisters was the wife of the Court noble Nijō, and another the wife of the ex-Kwambaku, Takatsukasa. He thus had ample means of communicating with the Court of Kyōto. In 1856, he had endeavoured to get his views laid before the Emperor through Takatsukasa, but the Kwambaku, Kujō, had early obtained knowledge of the incident. Now Takatsukasa and Kujō were on notoriously bad terms; whatever policy the one might favour, the other was certain to oppose out of mere personal rancour to his rival, a circumstance that has to be kept in mind when we come to deal with affairs in Kyōto in the next chapter. Shortly afterwards the Bakufu sent secret instructions to the *Shoshidai* that he was to give the Court nobles to understand that they would do well to pay no heed to communications from Lord Nariaki. Just at this juncture, Nariaki forwarded another memorial to Takatsukasa, in which foreigners were said to be looking at Japan with greedy and gloating eyes, eager to devour the Empire, while the Bakufu was fiercely attacked for its supineness in general, and specially for allowing the American envoy to proceed to Yedo. It was urged that the sovereign should unite the Empire by issuing a decree commanding the "*brushing away of the Barbarians*". Some authorities maintain that the document which passes current as the text of Nariaki's memorial is a forgery. But it certainly does not misrepresent the sentiments he habitually expressed; and it is also certain that he had trusted retainers and agents at work propagating these sentiments with great effect among the Court nobles.

It will be remembered that after his interview with Lord Hotta, on 12th December, 1857, Harris could make no progress in his negotiations till after a further interview in the middle of the following January. The reason for this delay was that the Bakufu officials were discussing the envoy's proposals, and trying to come to some definite conclusion regarding them. At the same time, Lord Hotta caused the record of the interview with Harris to be distributed among the Daimyō, requesting them to express their views on the subject in writing. Shimadzu Nariakira of Satsuma frankly declared himself in favour of opening the empire, while

the Daimyōs of Fukui, Tokushima and Akashi showed themselves to be well on the way to conversion to Shimadzu's views. Lord Nariaki now sent in such an extraordinary memorial that the Bakufu quietly returned it to one of his retainers without comment ; a proceeding that greatly enraged the Mito clansmen.¹ Later on, when visited by Kawaji and Nagai, Gemba no Kami, two of Hotta's best workers, Nariaki declared that Hotta and Matsudaira, Iga no Kami, should be ordered to disembowel themselves, and that Harris should have his head struck off. In nearly all the memorials the *Jōi* feeling was intense, and from none of them, with the few exceptions mentioned, was it entirely absent. But the very remarkable thing was that a great majority of the Daimyōs now recommended that the decision of the Court of Kyōto should be invoked. This seemed to be striking an entirely new note, one of sinister import for the hitherto autocratic Bakufu. But, it was the fact that, in 1853, after Perry's first visit, one Daimyō had already proposed that the question of how Perry should be received on his second visit should be referred to Kyōto. And the most remarkable fact of all perhaps is that the Daimyō who made this startling proposition was no other than the chief of the Tokugawa Fudai—Ii Naosuke of Hikone. The Bakufu Councillors were now greatly impressed with the hold this idea had obtained among the feudatories, and Kawaji had no difficulty in getting them to adopt his proposal to dispatch Hayashi, Daigaku no Kami, and the Censor, Tsuda, to explain the situation to the Court and to obtain its sanction for the opening of the ports.

On 15th February, 1858, Harris :—

“discovered that they wished to delay the signing of the treaty until a member of the Council of State could proceed as Ambassador to the spiritual Emperor at Kyōto and get his approval ; that the moment that approval was received, the Daimios must withdraw their opposition. On Harris inquiring what they would do if the Mikado refused his consent, they replied in a prompt and decided manner that *the government had determined not to receive any objections from the Mikado*. Previously, on 28th January, the Commissioners spoke almost contemptuously of the Mikado, and roared with laughter when I quoted some remarks concerning the veneration in which he is held by the Japanese. They say that he has neither money, political power, nor anything that is valued in Japan ; he is a mere cypher.”

By 20th February, Harris was getting to be seriously puzzled

¹ For some remarks on this document see Mr. Satoh's *Lord Hotta*, p. 66.

about the real power and position of the Mikado ; on that day the commissioners assured him that :—

“ even those most violently opposed to the treaty will say, if he decides in favour of the treaty, ‘ God has spoken, I submit.’ This does not agree very well with the almost contemptuous manner in which the Japanese speak of this potentate.”

The commissioners were meanwhile beginning to get undeceived about the supposed powerlessness of Kyōto. When it had been resolved to open negotiations with Harris, instructions had been transmitted to Wakizaka, the Kyōto *Shoshidai*, to inform the Court of the exact posture of affairs ; and thus the ground had been prepared for Hayashi and Tsuda, who were dispatched from Yedo on 25th January, 1858. The two *Tensō*, Hirohashi and Higashibojō, were then summoned by the *Shoshidai* ; and to them Hayashi gave a resumé of what had occurred since the arrival of Perry, explaining that the altered conditions of the outside world, and the weakness of the empire’s defences made it impossible for Japan to persist in her traditional policy of seclusion any longer. He set forth all Harris’s various demands, and recounted the assiduous efforts of the Bakufu to minimize them, laying the greatest stress upon the Bakufu’s determination to allow the foreigners no access to Kyōto or its neighbourhood. Most of the Court nobles confounded the opening of the ports with actual cessions of territory to the Barbarians, who, they were convinced, were bent upon the conquest of the whole Empire. Moreover, they were terribly and grievously offended by Hayashi’s accounts of the irresistible superiority of the barbarian armaments. Presently the Court was in a ferment of indignation ; and it soon became only too plain that Hayashi’s failure was complete. Among other things, the courtiers professed to consider themselves insulted by the Bakufu sending officials of such low rank on such an important mission. All this was promptly reported to Yedo ; and it was in consequence of this that the Commissioners informed Harris on 17th February that a member of the Council of State was to proceed to Kyōto to procure the sanction of the Mikado for the signing of the treaty. Meanwhile :—

“ they proposed that we should go on with the treaty until it was completed and engrossed ; that I should amuse myself by going about, and if I wished to make a trip to Shimoda, the Government would send me down and bring me back in their steamer. In answer I said that what they had told me was unprecedented in the history of

negotiations ; that it was much like the acts of children, and unworthy of wise statesmen like those who ruled Japan ; that it was trifling with a serious matter ; that it would be sure to give the President great concern ; that it would have been far better not to have negotiated with me at all than to refuse to sign a treaty which had cost so much labour, for so very trifling a reason, etc. I added that the mere *act* of signing the treaty might be kept as secret as they chose, as I should not divulge it in Japan. They replied that it was impossible to keep anything secret that passed between us (and I have no doubt they spoke truly) ; that they were acting in good faith, and I might rely that the treaty should be executed. I finally told them that I had no power to compel them to execute the treaty ; that I could not give them an answer to their proposition, but I proposed to put that matter aside for the present and proceed to complete the treaty, but they must clearly understand that I did not agree to accept the delay asked for."

Next day Harris made the following suggestion to Shinano no Kami :—

" Let us proceed and complete the treaty as soon as possible, and have it engrossed and ready for signature. Then let the Council of State, or the Minister of Foreign Affairs, write me a letter saying that the Commissioners appointed to negotiate with me a commercial treaty between the United States and Japan had completed their labours, and that the treaty was now ready for signature ; but for certain important reasons, the signing of the treaty must be postponed for sixty days, on or before the expiration of which time the treaty as it now stood should be signed. Thereupon I would return to Shimoda to prepare my dispatches for my government ; that at the end of fifty days, if not before, the government should send their steamer to Shimoda for bringing me again to Yedo, for the purpose of executing the treaty."

On the following day (19th February) Harris was informed that his proposition had been accepted and

" that the letter pledging the faith of the Government that the treaty should be executed within sixty days from the date would be signed by Hotta, Minister of Foreign Affairs—and that the steamer should be sent to Shimoda ten days before that time to bring him to Yedo."

All these promises were duly implemented. Lord Hotta had determined to undertake the Kyōto mission himself, taking with him the astute Kawaji, and Iwase, one of the two Commissioners negotiating with Harris. Hitherto a word from a member of the Great Council had always proved sufficient to overawe the Kugé, and as the Kugé suffered from chronic impecuniosity, they were notoriously open to the argument of the purse. Harris on 20th February, 1858, notes that large sums of money had already been distributed among the officers of the Mikado, and that larger sums will be applied in the same manner. Hotta was so confident of

success that he informed the Daimyō of Echizen that ten days in Kyōto would be ample for the accomplishment of his purpose. He set out on 6th March, and reached the old capital on 19th March. After a stay of ten days there he could easily be back in Yedo again by 12th April; so he was acting in perfect good faith when he promised Harris that he would sign the treaty on or before 21st April, 1858. In the result, he did not get back to Yedo until 1st June, and he then returned an utterly beaten and baffled man.

Five days after his arrival in Kyōto, Hotta had gone to Court when he was kept waiting four long hours for an audience. The Kwambaku, Kujō, made no appearance that day, and nothing could be done, and when Hotta called upon the Kwambaku at his mansion next day he was not received. At Takatsukasa's mansion also he failed to get an interview. However, the long memorial he had sent in had been submitted to the Mikado, who ordered the Court nobles to consider it and to express their views upon it. The document in question was a remarkable one in several ways.¹ Alluding to the calamities that had overtaken China, it went on to say that the condition of international affairs forbade any country to remain secluded, either a war had to be fought or amicable relations established. If Japan persisted in her seclusion, she would presently find herself menaced not by one single nation, but by the whole world; and in any such contest, she would be helpless. Among the rulers of the world, there was then none so noble or illustrious as to command universal vassalage. Let Japan enter the comity of nations, develop her military strength and her resources in every way, and join hands with the powers whose principles were identical with her own. When her national position and prestige became assured, all the peoples of the world would look upon the Mikado as the Great Ruler of all nations, and they would all come to follow Japan's policy and submit themselves to her judgment, for Japan was beyond comparison with other countries where ruling dynasties and national institutions had suffered frequent changes :—

“ Now is the opportune moment offered us by the changed condition of the world to abandon the traditional policy of the last two centuries, and make a united national effort to seize the opportunity for realizing the great destiny awaiting our country. For this purpose, speedy permission is respectfully and humbly solicited for opening up intercourse with foreign nations.”

¹ For a synopsis see Mr. Satoh's Monograph on *Lord Hotta*.

In spite of his assertion of the superiority of the Japanese sovereign to other rulers, and of Japan to the rest of the world, Hotta now gave most deadly offence to many of the courtiers by dwelling upon the might and high civilization of barbarian countries. The *Jōi* feeling in Kyōto had long been strong; and it was rapidly acquiring a complete ascendancy. Besides Lord Nariaki and his emissaries other formidable underground forces were at work in the old capital, of which Lord Hotta had no idea. In certain quarters the possibilities of utilizing the *Jōi* cry as a means of embarrassing the Bakufu were now beginning to be realized. Kawaji and Iwase had meanwhile been busy explaining and using golden arguments, and had clearly made an impression upon the two *Tensō*, upon Higashibōjō especially. Still more important, the Kwambaku, Kujō, had been won over to the Bakufu side by the devices of Nagano, a secret emissary of Ii of Hikone, who was a connexion of Kujō's by marriage. In spite of this the subterranean forces vigorously at work were proving altogether too powerful for Hotta's representations, and the arguments of his henchmen, Kawaji and Iwase. When, about the middle of April, Hotta was shown a draft of the Imperial reply to his memorial, he was still inclined to be hopeful of ultimate success, although the tone of the document was vague and evasive. It set forth the grave anxiety of the sovereign over the question of foreign relations, and recommended that the opinions of the Go-san-ké and of the Daimyō generally should be obtained, but in its final clause the Yedo government was authorized to use its own discretion in dealing with the question. This draft was never formally delivered to Hotta, who had just received an urgent message from the Rōjū, reminding him that Harris's treaty had to be signed on or before 21st April, and saying that the Councillors would not sign it till they had obtained the express sanction of the Mikado to do so.

On 20th April, Sanjō Sanetsumu and six other high Court officials sent in a memorial strongly denouncing the policy of opening the empire to the hated and despised Barbarians, and five days later, eighty-eight Court nobles memorialized the Kwambaku to expunge the final clause in the draft of the Imperial reply, giving authority to the Yedo Government to "use its own discretion". Two days later, on 29th April, these eighty-eight nobles, after a tumultuous meeting in one of the chambers of the Palace, assembled after nightfall, all armed with swords, proceeded

to Kujō's mansion and intimidated him into deleting the objectionable final clause from the Imperial reply. A new draft was prepared by Sanjō, and on 3rd May, this document was formally handed to Lord Hotta at an assembly of the high Court officials. Its purport was that the Imperial mind was gravely concerned over the transactions with the United States, they constituted a dire menace to the prestige of the Land of the Gods, involving, as they did, national dangers of the most serious nature ; that any innovation in the fundamental traditional policy instituted by Iyeyasu would be a rank offence against the spirits of the Imperial Ancestors, and of the ancestors of the Shōgun ; that any relaxation of that policy would tend to perturb the national feelings, thereby jeopardizing the permanent peace of the Empire ; that the Shimoda convention, which had been signed some time before, was in itself an outrage, and to add to it a new treaty was considered (by the Mikado) to be a forfeiture of the national dignity ; that in view of such momentous questions, it would be imperative to confer first with the Go-san-ké and the other Daimyō as well, before asking for the Imperial sanction.

All this came as a most unwelcome surprise to Lord Hotta and the intensity of his disappointment and chagrin may be readily imagined. He had fondly counted on being able either to persuade or to bully the Court into acquiescence within ten days from his arrival in Kyōto. Down to this date, a stern word, or an angry frown from a Great Councillor had sufficed so make the boldest among the Court nobles quail. Now threats and stern looks had so much lost all their terrors for the courtiers that it was the Bakufu officials who had to listen to haughty language from the Kugé. Instead of terrorizing the Kyōto nobles into accepting his views within ten days, Lord Hotta and his able subordinates, Kawaji and Iwase, had spent six strenuous weeks in explaining, expostulating, cajoling, and bribing, and the net result promised to be rank and utter failure. However, Hotta felt he could not afford to give up the battle as lost. So he prepared a fresh memorial in which he most humbly expressed his sorrow for causing uneasiness to the Imperial mind ; but firmly asserted at the same time that the urgent nature of the task at issue demanded that the Bakufu should be at liberty to take special measures regarding the treaty, and he therefore begged that the Shōgunate should be authorized to adopt any measure which the exigencies of the situation might

demand. He also stated in another letter that he had sent Iwase to Yedo with the Imperial reply ; and that although he had himself received from the Council strong representations urging him to return to Yedo without further delay, he felt that he could not leave Kyōto until a satisfactory solution had been found for the present crisis.

In due course Hotta received his answer. It was quite impossible to grant his request ; if the foreigners should resort to extreme measures while the matter was under consideration by the Daimyō, the Court was prepared to face the inevitable, and the utmost efforts must be made to carry out the Imperial will. The Bakufu should see to it, (1) that permanent safety should be ensured so that the Imperial anxiety might be removed, (2) that measures should be taken to uphold the national dignity and safeguard the Empire from calamities, and (3) that the national defences should be placed on an efficient footing since the refusal to grant anything beyond the Shimoda treaty might be made a cause of war. In case the conference of Daimyō should find it difficult to arrive at a final decision, the Great Shrine of Ise was to be consulted. On 8th May, Hotta was still more clearly notified of the impossibility of entertaining the proposals of the American envoy and of sanctioning the new treaty, it was also definitely stated in this communication that if the other party should remain obdurate and resort to violence, war should be declared. Although he remained for a few more days in Kyōto, Hotta now saw that the case was hopeless. On 1st June, 1858, he was back in Yedo, a very chastened and humbled man, with a situation of the utmost gravity to face.

Harris, who had gone through a serious illness at Shimoda, reappeared in Yedo on 17th April, to find that nothing could be done, for Hotta was still in Kyōto. Presently, a letter came from Hotta outlining the situation, and requesting a short postponement of the date for the signing of the treaty. Two days after his arrival in Yedo, he invited Harris to his mansion, and entered into a lengthy explanation of the absolute necessity of further delay. *Thereupon Harris threatened to proceed to Kyōto to enter into negotiations with what he now was convinced was the real Sovereign power in Japan.* As we have seen, he had been slowly groping to a sense of the fact that Titsingh had firmly grasped and clearly set forth in his book of Japan seventy years before—that it was the Mikado in Kyōto, and not the Shōgun in Yedo, that was the lawful sovereign

of the Empire. The point on which the Court had expressed most concern in its communications to Hotta had been the possible appearance of the Barbarians in Kyōto or its neighbourhood ; both Hayashi and Hotta had had to asseverate over and over again that the Bakufu would never allow foreigners to approach the old capital and that it would exert every effort to cancel the clauses in the new treaty admitting them ultimately to Ōsaka and Hyōgo. Harris's threat to proceed to Kyōto could, of course, never be carried out but it was extremely embarrassing. An attempt to proceed to Kyōto might give rise to the gravest complications, all the more so as the prospect of the speedy arrival of the " English barbarians " with an invincible armament now obsessed the Bakufu officials like a hideous nightmare.

Immediately on his return, Hotta had consulted Matsudaira, Iga no Kami ; and they had resolved to ask Harris for a further delay of two months. On 4th June, only three days after his return to Yedo with the story of his failure, Hotta ceased to be head of the Great Council ; on that day Ii Naosuke, the Lord of the great fief of Hikone, holding also high rank at the Imperial Court, was suddenly and most unexpectedly appointed to the extraordinary office of Tairō (chief minister), and it at once became apparent that he intended to wield dictatorial powers. The new Tairō said that two months were quite insufficient ; six months' delay at least would be necessary. Iwase and Inouye, Shinano no Kami, were entrusted with the unpleasant task of dealing with Harris on this matter ; and on 5th and 7th June, they had long interviews with him. In the end, Harris expressed himself ready to consent to a delay of three months provided no English or French armament appeared in Japanese waters ; *if any such armament did appear the treaty must be signed the day after its arrival*. Inouye and Iwase would not consent to this ; and it was finally agreed that the signature of the treaty was to be postponed until 4th September, 1858, the Japanese to give a written pledge "*not to sign any treaty or convention with a foreign power until the expiration of thirty days after the signing of the American treaty*". The Council of State was furthermore to write Harris a letter

" in which they would pledge their faith, and that of the Tycoon, that the treaty should positively be signed on the date named above, no matter what might be the state of public feeling at the time."

It should be said that the Dutch had also meanwhile been

moving in the matter of getting a new and more satisfactory treaty with Japan. Donker Curtius came to Yedo on 23rd April, 1858, and had an audience with the Shōgun on 8th May. He had been indiscreet enough to say that he was prepared to make such a commercial treaty as *would* be acceptable to the Daimyō; and by the stipulation of the thirty days just mentioned, Harris had very adroitly relieved himself from the annoyance of Dutch rivalry. Harris, in transmitting the letter from the Grand Council to the American Secretary of State, writes as follows:—

“The Minister of Foreign Affairs also delivered to me a large box containing a letter from the Tycoon addressed to the President of the United States. I was assured that no letter had been addressed by the Tycoon to any foreign power for more than 240 years, and that the answer to the letter of the King of Holland had been written by the Council of State.”

The very first question the Tairō had to deal with was whether the Imperial reply to Hotta should be communicated to the Daimyō or not. Matsudaira, Iga no Kami, who was a staunch and stubborn upholder of the prerogatives and dignity of the Shōgun and the Bakufu, and who loathed the interference of the outside feudatories in State affairs, was strongly of opinion that the text of the reply should not be published, while Hotta maintained that it should. The Tairō at once said that it was to be published, immediately too. Accordingly, on 6th June, copies of it were distributed among the Daimyō in the presence of the Tairō and the Great Councillors. On this occasion Hotta entered into explanations, dwelling especially on the fact that the Mikado really did not wish for war, and that every effort must be made to find a solution that would obviate any recourse to arms. Immediately, the Yedo *yashiki* were again perturbed with heated discussions about the advantages or disadvantages of the treaty. The Lord of Echizen, who had been co-operating with Lord Nariaki of Mito in the great succession question then pending, tried hard to abate the rancour of the fierce old man's opposition to the opening of the country, but with little success. Some others of the great feudatories, alive to the fact that the Kyōto courtiers were factiously utilizing the situation to embarrass the Bakufu, quite regardless of the probable consequences to the Empire at large, were also working to secure the approval of their fellows to the treaty; but so far without very much result. Suddenly, on 27th July, 1858, a startling communication was received from Harris, who had gone back to Shimoda on 18th June.

Meanwhile, since Harris's arrival in Japan, events had taken place in China which he was not slow to utilize for the promotion of his own objects. In December, 1857, the British captured Canton, in May, 1858, they reduced the Taku forts at the mouth of the Peiho river, the gateway to Peking, and Lord Elgin had proceeded to Tientsin where he secured the Chinese Emperor's assent to the treaty known by the name of that city. Of course, the Dutch continued to send to the Japanese their annual reports of all foreign occurrences, and so Harris's references to events in China and elsewhere were never without their effect. His biographer tells us :—

“ All this time Mr. Harris had used no menace or threats of force, though he had not failed to hint at contemporaneous events in India and China, and at the presence of large British and French fleets in neighbouring waters. He showed how much the Japanese would gain by inaugurating foreign intercourse by a commercial treaty granted reasonably and freely, before they were compelled by force to make disastrous concessions.”

Generally speaking when Harris's diplomacy is unprejudicedly reviewed long years afterwards, there are good grounds for this claim on his behalf, and for many others equally honourable to his memory, but on 3rd March, 1857, he certainly did use something analogous to a threat, and two months later on, he notes in his own diary :—

“ The absence of a man-of-war also tends to weaken my influence with the Japanese. *They have yielded nothing except from fear, and any future ameliorations of our intercourse will only take place after a demonstration of force on our part.*”

He made good his want of naval support under his own flag by reiterated references to what Japan had to expect from the speedy arrival of the aggressive English with a formidable fleet, statements that the Japanese credited all the more readily, as they had never forgotten the *Phaeton* episode at Nagasaki in 1808, and the Takarashima outrage seventeen years later.

On 3rd July 1858, the U.S. S.S. *Mississippi* suddenly arrived at Shimoda and the “ Stars and Stripes ” ensign was again displayed in Japanese waters by the ship that was so prominent in Perry's squadron. She brought intelligence of the suppression of the Sepoy mutiny, the capture of the Taku forts, the treaty of Tientsin, and the speedy arrival in Japan of British and French plenipoten-

tiaries with strong squadrons to support them. On the following day, Harris addressed a letter to Hotta, in which he epitomized the news and urged "the very great importance of having the treaty signed without the loss of a single day". Next day, the *Powhatan* also arrived; and Harris proceeded in her to Kanagawa on 27th July; and from there he sent on his letter of 24th July. On 26th July, a Russian vessel, with our old acquaintance Putiatin in command, also appeared at Shimoda for the express purpose of notifying the speedy approach of the British squadron. Putiatin, in spite of the Governor of Shimoda's attempt to detain him, also proceeded to Kanagawa. On receipt of Harris's letter, the Bakufu at once dispatched Iwase and Inouye by steamer to Kanagawa. They came to anchor alongside the *Powhatan* at midnight on 28th July, and, despite the rule against salutes after sunset, they were received with a salvo of seventeen guns. After hearing all particulars from Harris—it seems he assured them that the English were coming with "several tens" of warships—they were back in Yedo again early on the morning of the 29th. Among the Councillors the great question was whether it was possible to proceed before the Imperial assent had been formally obtained. Hotta had not a word to say. Matsudaira, Iga no Kami, was strongly in favour of signing the treaty at once, and spoke very contemptuously of the Kyōto courtiers. Ii, the Tairō, himself dwelt on the desirability of waiting for the Imperial assent; but in this view he found his sole supporter in the person of Honda, a Junior Councillor. Iwase and Inouye, who were supposed to know more about foreigners than any of the others, kept on dilating on the terrible dangers of delay; and Ii, after procuring the Shōgun's assent, finally dispatched them to Kanagawa with full powers. Harris now wrote a letter to the Council of State asserting

"his belief that the American Treaty would be accepted by the English and French, and that he was willing to act as a friendly mediator should any difficulties arise . . . The Commissioners went to their steamer for the purpose of translating the letter which, being complete, they returned to the *Powhatan* at three p.m., and the treaty was then signed. After the signatures had been affixed, Commodore Tatnall hoisted the Japanese and American flags at his masthead and saluted them with twenty-one guns."

A Commission of Five, including Iwase and Inouye, had meanwhile been constituted for the reception of the English and French missions; and on 16th August, 1858, the new office of *Guwaikoku*

Bugyō, or Commissioners for Foreign Affairs, was instituted, the first appointees being Iwase, Inouye, Hori, and Nagai.

Before this, Putiatin, now on his fifth visit to Japan, had claimed attention. On 12th August, he had gone on to Shinagawa, and had been assigned quarters in the Shimpukuji¹ in the Shiba ward. Next day, he met the Japanese Commissioners, and on 19th August, 1858, a treaty of seventeen articles, with Customs Regulations, based on the American treaty, was signed. On the following day, Putiatin went to the Castle to be received in audience by the Shōgun, but as the Shōgun was alleged to be indisposed, he had to be content with appearing before the youthful heir. The fact was that the Shōgun, Iyesada, the thirteenth of the Tokugawa line, had died six days before, on 14th August, although his death was not announced, nor mourning ordered for him, until the 14th of September. Meanwhile, the indefatigable Iwase, together with Nagai and the Governor of Nagasaki, then resident in Yedo, had been negotiating yet another treaty with Donker Curtius, the Superintendent of Dutch trade, whom Harris had side-tracked so very ingeniously. This last Dutch agreement of ten articles was signed on 18th August, 1858, four days after the death of the Shōgun.

Before this, the much-dreaded English "pirates" whom Harris had so effectively utilized as a bogey² to intimidate his Japanese friends into complying with his wishes, had really arrived in Japan. Naturally enough, in using the British to frighten the Japanese into making up their minds promptly about the American treaty, Harris had been incidentally forwarding the purposes of the Earl of Elgin, who was commissioned by Lord Palmerston to open up diplomatic relations with Japan after the accomplishment of his task in China. The treaty of Tientsin had been signed on 26th June, 1858; but preliminary to carrying out his Japan instructions,

¹ Shimpukuji—a Buddhist temple of the Shingon sect.

² "While demonstrating the 'peaceful and friendly policy' of his own Government, which 'required no material force, and kept no fleets in Eastern seas to make aggressive wars on distant potentates and peoples', Mr. Harris was really invoking the effective aid of the belligerent resources and prestige which were the objects of his reprobation. This bellicose and aggressive action of England . . . was never brought more decisively to bear; but this time it was in a new country and by the apostle of peace—the Representative of the United States in person. This was a veritable *tour de maître*, to use and turn to such account the belligerent Allies, holding them *in terrorem* over the Japanese, and to do this in a way that should give the United States all the benefit and the credit without any of the cost of great expeditions; while to Great Britain was left only the odium of a reputation at once bellicose and exigent." Alcock's *Capital of the Tycoon*, chap. x.

Lord Elgin "allowed a sufficient time to elapse for the news of his success to reach the authorities in Japan, presuming that it would strengthen his mission there". On 12th August, when he appeared in Yedo Bay, the British plenipotentiary was found to be attended not by twenty or thirty battleships, as Harris had said he would be, but by two steam frigates and a small gunboat only. In addition to these there was, indeed, yet another ship, but this was a magnificently equipped yacht which was to be delivered to the Shōgun as a present from Queen Victoria. At Kanagawa, Lord Elgin steamed past Putiatin's squadron, then anchored there, and pushed straight on up the Bay to Shinagawa. To the request that the vessels should go back to Kanagawa he paid no heed. A letter was at once sent ashore to the "Prime Minister" stating that the Plenipotentiary had come to make a treaty of commerce, and to present a yacht to the "Emperor", and also requesting that the mission might be lodged in suitable quarters ashore.

From Laurence Oliphant's narrative it would appear that Iwase and Inouye and their three colleagues must have taken infinite pains and trouble to do justice to their position as Commissioners for the reception of the English mission. In the quarters assigned Lord Elgin and his suite

"the apartments were fitted up after the foreign style, and it was quite wonderful how they had forestalled the wants of their European guests. It appears that they were first made acquainted with these requirements of furniture through the American furnishings at Shimoda which they ingeniously copied; so that the members of the mission were delighted to find not only beds but mattresses and mosquito-curtains, and comfortable dressing-gowns in a city where all such articles had been unknown."

Although Inouye, Shinano no Kami, had known about mosquito-curtains and dressing-gowns from his infancy, he had no doubt contrived to learn a good deal more than mere diplomacy from Mr. Harris, who had also introduced him to raw brandy and champagne, as appears from the *Journal*. Shortly afterwards, Lord Elgin proceeded to have an interview with the "Prime Minister", but it was Ōta, a new member of the Rōjū and not the Tairō, that he met on that occasion. Next day negotiations began with the ubiquitous, indefatigable, and indispensable Iwase and Inouye, assisted this time by four others. At the luncheon preceding the actual work, the *pièce de résistance* was an English ham, and of this the commissioners partook so freely, and with so much gusto,

that one of them expressed the hope that the treaty would not taste of ham and champagne. The negotiations proceeded apace, and on 26th August, the "ham and champagne" treaty of twenty-four articles was ready for the eighty-four signatures that had to be appended to its various editions in Dutch, Japanese, and English. Then came the delivery of the yacht. Lord Elgin proceeded on board, where

"he found the Commissioners awaiting him all dressed in their most gorgeous robes. He then formally addressed them, handing over, on behalf of Her Majesty, the yacht which she had presented to the Tycoon as a token of friendship and good-will. Then down came the English ensign, and up went the red ball on the white ground, the signal for the forts to salute . . . With perfect precision the native gunners fired twenty-one guns, with an interval of ten seconds between each. Then came the sharp ringing response from the 68-pounders of the *Retribution* and *Furious*, and the yacht got slowly under way, commanded by a Japanese captain, manned by Japanese sailors, and her machinery worked by Japanese engineers."

After a sumptuous banquet on board the *Retribution*, the high-contracting parties and their subordinates bade each other farewell in the most friendly manner. In spite of all Harris's vaticinations of dire and impending calamity from them, the English "pirates", with their insatiable earth-hunger, had proved to be rather hospitable, harmless, easy-going, amiable people on the whole. Harris, however, it should be said, had lent the English mission the invaluable services of Heusken, his very able secretary and interpreter, and had shown the British envoy every possible attention when he had put into Shimoda.

There was still more treaty-making in store for Iwase and Inouye and their colleagues. On 25th September, Baron Gros arrived off Shinagawa as French plenipotentiary. The Shōgun's death had been publicly announced some ten days before; and the Japanese expressed themselves averse to engaging in any negotiations while the mourning lasted. Besides, 300 people were dying of cholera in Yedo every day,¹ so the French had better go away and come another time. From the racy and witty account by the Abbé Mermet, who accompanied the mission as interpreter, it is easy to see that the Japanese scarcely ever expected that their

¹ During the months of July and August in this year an epidemic of cholera spread through the country, and in Yedo alone, 30,000 people died. Such a domestic calamity must have added to the embarrassments of the Government, already distracted by their foreign affairs and the difficulty of steering a course between the foreign Legates and the bigotedly conservative courtiers of Kyōto.

objections would be seriously entertained. The Frenchmen were assigned the quarters the Russians had occupied in the Shimpukuji, and on 9th October, Baron Gros was able to sign his treaty with Iwase and Inouye and four other commissioners. With this the rain of treaties ceased for a space, but Iwase and Inouye had yet no rest from their labours.

The Tairo, Ii, had taken no part in the negotiations which eventuated in Harris's treaty; and he now expressed strong dissatisfaction with the opening of Kanagawa as a place of residence for foreigners. It was a post-station on the Tōkaidō, along which Daimyō, with their armed trains of vassals, were constantly passing. Collisions between foreigners and foreign-hating *samurai* were not merely possible but actually inevitable, and any such collisions at this time would throw the whole country into such a ferment that war would be the almost certain result. To change the course of one of the main high roads of the Empire on account of the presence of foreigners would also give rise to formidable difficulties, such a thing would be almost universally regarded as a wound to the national dignity. Accordingly, Ii determined that the aliens should not be allowed to settle at Kanagawa, and Inouye and Nagai were sent to Harris to explain the difficulties and to obtain his consent to substituting Yokohama for Kanagawa as the seat of the nascent foreign settlement. Harris discerned in this proposition a subtle and insidious attempt to convert the new settlement into a second Deshima, and refused to entertain it. Being pressed again and again by the Japanese on the question, he finally declared that he could not give an answer until he had consulted with the other foreign representatives, none of whom had as yet arrived in Japan.¹ Inouye and Nagai therefore reconciled themselves to having to open Kanagawa, and Ōta, the Rōjū in charge of foreign affairs, thought there was no other course left. But Ii, the Tairō, would not hear of this for a moment. He at once dismissed three of the original Commissioners for Foreign Affairs, and appointed new

¹ Sir Rutherford Alcock, the first British minister to Japan, had arrived shortly afterwards, and took up his post on 6th July, 1859. He was entirely in accord with Mr. Harris in his opposition to this action on the part of the Japanese. Experience soon proved that both were utterly wrong, and that in this instance, as in many others, the Tairō showed the practical wisdom of a prudent and far-seeing statesman. At the Yokohama anchorage, shipping of the usual tonnage of that period could lie within a quarter of a mile of the shore, with deep water up to the very verge. At Kanagawa, a couple of miles of shallow mud banks, bare at low tides, would have intervened between ships and shore.

ones—Mizuno, Muragaki, and Katō, and sent them to reopen the question with Harris. Harris now got very angry for once, and told them he would return no answer until June, 1859. Thereupon the Tairō at once issued orders for a causeway (over two miles along) to be built through the marsh between Kanagawa and Yokohama; to have the ground at Yokohama prepared for building; shops and storehouses erected; stone jetties built; a custom-house and warehouses constructed. He judged that foreigners would find it difficult to argue against accomplished facts, all the more so as the anchorage at Yokohama was far better than that off Kanagawa, and in this forecast he proved to be perfectly correct ¹ :—

To quote the author of the *Genji Yume Monogatari* :—

“ The Tairō, Ii, Kamon no Kami, assumed more and more authority, and being no longer afraid of anybody or anything opened resolutely at Yokohama in Musashi a port and a town; erected factories for the Russians, English, Dutch, Americans, and French, and built shops and native houses, and drove a brisk trade. A brothel quarter was also set apart beautified as much as possible, pleasure gardens full of artificial scenery, of fountains, and of the flowers which flourish each season. The vessels of all sizes of the five barbarians came and anchored in numbers in the port; the sight was most beautiful and incomparable, and the place became the busiest harbour of all the Kwantō; nay, it was enough to make any one wonder.”

In truth, Yokohama very soon became a busy and bustling mart; in 1860 its imports amounted to £197,023, and its exports to £823,812 in value. In the following year (1861) its foreign community of 126 included 55 British, 38 American, 20 Dutch, 11 French, and 2 Portuguese residents. Mr. Harris removed his consulate from Shimoda to Kanagawa on 1st July, 1859, and six days later he proceeded to Yedo and established the American Legation at the Zempukuji. In Yedo he was no longer to be the solitary figure he had been for nearly three years in Shimoda; on 26th June, Rutherford Alcock, the British Representative, had already steamed up to the capital and he accepted the Tōzenji as a place of residence. On 6th September, the French *chargé d’Affaires*, Duchesne de Bellecourt, arrived and along with him came the Catholic priest, M. Girard, who was soon appearing at public functions *en soutane* without eliciting the slightest protest from the Japanese. M. Girard was really a missionary in charge of Yedo and Yokohama—a fellow-worker of the brilliant and witty M. Mermet,

¹ See Alcock’s *Capital of the Tycoon*.

who established himself at Hakodate before the year was out. At Nagasaki, three Protestant missionaries (among them Mr. Verbeck) were soon quietly at work, while three American missionaries, also Protestants, Dr. Hepburn, Dr. Simmons, and Mr. Brown, settled at Kanagawa in the autumn of 1859. But Christianity was still a proscribed religion for Japanese; the placards offering extravagant rewards for denouncers of *religieux* and Christian believers still stood in all public places, and were still to stand there for yet another decade, though the intimation to the survivors of the Macao Embassy of 1640 was now but a vain threat:—

“So long as the sun warms the earth, let no Christian be so bold as to come to Japan, and let all know that if King Philip himself, or even the very God of the Christians contravene this prohibition, they shall pay for it with their heads.”

Every intelligent Japanese must have perceived that the days for holding language of that sort had now gone by. Yet when Harris remonstrated with his Japanese friends about their bigoted intolerance they would make reply:—

“Do not press us on that point. On the article of the Christian religion, our hearts are not of stone—they are of iron. Let time have its course.”

It will be noticed that in the foreign census of Yokohama for 1860, two Portuguese were included. The Bakufu concluded a convention with Portugal on 3rd August, 1860, although over 200 years ago the Portuguese had been banished from Japan *for ever*! Furthermore, the Dutch envoys from Deshima had been solemnly cautioned on each visit to Yedo to see to it that the Dutch should hold no communication with the Portuguese; that they should notify the Japanese of any Portuguese projects against Japan, and should apprise the Japanese authorities if the Portuguese should conquer any new places or countries, or convert them to the Christian sect. In spite of all this, the hated Portuguese are again securely established in Japan, free, too, to make public profession of that detested Christian religion which had been the main cause for their expulsion in the past. If anything, surely this indicated that the age of seclusion was at an end, and that the main theme of the present volume is exhausted. Meanwhile, since Perry's appearance at Uraga, there were various domestic happenings of the highest interest and importance of which nothing so far has been said, and it is imperative to devote a good deal of space to a full consideration of these momentous developments.

CHAPTER XVII

II, TAIRŌ

IN the preceding chapter it was incidentally remarked that shortly after the arrival of Perry the old capital of Kyōto began to assume something of its ancient importance. How rapidly the Court nobles were regaining power and prestige may be inferred from the fact that they had been able to thwart all Lord Hotta's efforts to procure the Imperial sanction for the treaty he had just negotiated with the American envoy in Yedo. It thus becomes advisable to look somewhat minutely into the situation at Kyōto and to follow the course of recent events there with more than ordinary attention.

It will be remembered that in 1613, and still more fully in 1615, Iyeyasu and Hidetada had subjected the Kyōto Court to special legislation, and had entrusted the Shōgun's representative, the *shoshidai*, with special control over it. For the next sixty years or so this control was very strict indeed. Then came a change, during the latter years of the fourth Shōgun, relations between the Bakufu and the Court began to become rather amicable. In the time of Tsunayoshi, the fifth Shōgun, this tendency became still more marked ; and in Arai Hakuseki's day, under the sixth and seventh Shōguns, Kyōto influence, as we have seen, was actually threatening to become as strong socially in Yedo as it had been at Kamakura four centuries before. The eighth Shōgun, Yoshimune, deemed this state of affairs detrimental to his prospects of achieving the reforms he intended to institute among the military class ; and so there was somewhat of a reversion to the attitude of the earliest Shōguns towards the Court. Under the ninth and tenth Shōguns (1744-86) the Bakufu treated the Imperial Court not merely with studied neglect but with considerable rigour, and during the minority of the eleventh Shōgun, Iyenari, there was no very great improvement in the situation. It was at this time that the Imperial Title question arose ; and, as has been explained, the action of Matsudaira Sadanobu in this affair actually lost him the sympathy and support of the collateral Tokugawa houses who had

been mainly instrumental in raising him to the Regency. About the beginning of the nineteenth century the Bakufu began to put forth great exertions to conciliate Kyōto; the Shōgun Iyenari's thirst for Court rank and honours was insatiate, and his favourite, Mizuno Tadashige, laid himself out to procure the coveted distinctions for his master. We have already noted that although his official revenue was raised about this time, the *Shoshidai* was constantly falling into debt, for his social duties were getting to be very onerous, and many secret appeals from Court nobles had to be met.

Under the twelfth Shōgun, Iyeyoshi, the good relations between Yedo and Kyōto continued unimpaired. At this time Lord Nariaki of Mito was zealously propagating his doctrine of *Kinnō*; of loyalty and devotion to the Imperial line. The reforming minister, Mizuno Tadakuni, needed Lord Nariaki's support; and to ensure that, despite the protests of some of his colleagues, he gave the sovereign and his Court several substantial marks of consideration and respect. After Mizuno's fall came Abé Masahiro; and Abé was astute enough to appreciate the value of a good understanding with Nariaki of Mito, although removed from the headship of his family and fief and ordered into seclusion, for Nariaki still continued to exercise a potent influence upon the public opinion of the time. Hence, to a certain extent, perhaps, Abé's friendly and deferential attitude towards Kyōto. It must also be borne in mind that the works of Motoori and Hirata had meanwhile been making a profound impression upon outside public opinion no less than upon the courtiers of Kyōto, whose self-esteem was greatly flattered by the tendency of the doctrines therein expounded. It was just shortly before this time, too, in 1851, that the *Dai-nihonshi*, the great national history down to 1413, projected by Lord Mitsukuni of Mito, was first committed to print. The tendency of this huge book was extremely imperialistic, although its cardinal doctrines were rather suggested than categorically emphasized. It is indeed questionable whether it ever had the immense direct influence often attributed to it as a factor in precipitating the revolution of 1868; for in the first place it was not printed until 1851; in the second place, it was too scholarly to be popular among illiterate samurai, and in the third, it was much too long for the general reader. Doubtless, extracts from it in manuscript had been current, and these could not have been without their effect. Still more effective

perhaps, must have been the lectures on it delivered by Mito scholars to the numerous pupils that thronged to learn from them. Far more effectual, as propagandist literature, perhaps, were the works of Rai Sanyō (1780–1832) the *Nihon-gwaishi* and the *Nihon-seiki*. The latter, a posthumous book, sets forth the history of the Empire from Jimmu Tennō down to the abdication of Yōzei II in 1596, and discusses the character and conduct of each sovereign in turn. The late Prince Itō often asserted that he had conned this work over and over again in his youthful days, and that it had made a profound impression upon him, and doubtless others of the great actors in the drama of 1868 had drawn inspiration from it. But the more popular of Rai's two books was the *Nihon-gwaishi*, published in 1827, after two decades of strenuous and incessant toil. It commences with the reasons for the decay of the Imperial power, and the rise of the Taira and Minamoto in the twelfth century, and ends with the establishment of the Tokugawa Shōgunate. Further than this point Rai could not bring the story; for the writing of a Tokugawa history was forbidden. It was only privileged and official or semi-official authors like Narushima, or Arai Hakuseki, or Hayashi that were allowed to deal with events after 1603; and even Hayashi found the publication of his work interdicted when it was submitted to the Bakufu and the Go-san-ké. As it was, Rai Sanyō's books were repeatedly purged by the Yedo censors, for he did not hesitate to say in clear, if not emphatic, language what the more cautious and more voluminous *Dai-nihonshi* only implied. To attain his purpose he permitted himself to be extremely unjust to the Hōjō of Kamakura, and did not scruple to stigmatize them as "serpents, fiends, beasts", for their treatment of the sovereigns and courtiers of Kyōto. In recounting the overthrow of the Mongol invaders he writes that "the repulse of the Tartar barbarians by Hōjō Tokimune, and his preserving the dominions of our Son of Heaven were insufficient to atone for the crimes of his ancestors". And upon some of the Ashikaga Shōguns he is equally severe. In short the *Nihon-gwaishi* was a *Tendenz* history, if ever there was one; in it, although by implication only, the Tokugawa Bakufu was sternly arraigned at the bar of judgment, and that the author found many of his countrymen ready to sit as judges is indisputable. A Tosa samurai, for instance, too poor to buy the book, spent his leisure time in the clan *yashiki* in Yedo copying out the whole work, and carried his

manuscript back with him to Kōchi as one of his most cherished possessions. Although it consists of as many as twenty-two volumes, the *Nihon-gwaishi* is really not a very long work, and so it became very effective as a political propagation which, from its bulk and its difficult style, the *Dai-nihonshi* could never be. Much secret discussion followed the publication of the *Nihon-gwaishi* in 1827 ; when the Bakufu in a fashion legalized the expression of public opinion by consulting the Daimyō about Perry's proposals in 1853. Rai Sanyō's books soon began to be publicly discussed everywhere, and his doctrines applied to the political situation of the time. Here too, the Court nobles found a strong support to the efforts that they were presently to put forth to regain something of their ancient prestige and to curb what they characterized as the arbitrary insolence of the Bakufu. Just at the time public opinion was beginning to be dangerous to the Shōgunate, the chief of the Rōjū had practically removed the chief traditional restraints upon its free expression.

It may be safely assumed that this public opinion thoroughly approved the action of the Bakufu when it resolved to notify the Court of Perry's sudden and embarrassing appearance at Uraga on 8th July, 1853. On 14th July, the very day when Perry was having his remarkable interview with the two silent commissioners (on which occasion, it will be remembered, he was told it " would be well not to speak of revolutions "), Wakizaka, the Shoshidai, sent for the Tensō, and informed them of the portentous event, assuring them that every precaution would be taken and that the Court need not allow itself to be perturbed by the wild rumours that would soon be rife in Kyōto. Shortly afterwards the Court intimated its desire that solemn prayers should be offered up in seven temples, and the seven chief shrines in the Empire for the repulse of the Barbarians, and this was done on 21st July. On that day, Perry's squadron was labouring in the heavy seas that are so often experienced south of Satsuma, " with yards and topmasts sent down, guns lashed, and steam reduced." So that, had the Court but known of it, the orisons for a wind like that which wrecked the Mongol armament in 1281 might well have seemed to have been favourably answered.

In connexion with the installation of the new Shōgun, Iyesada, on 23rd December, 1853, the Court noble, Sanjō Sanetsumu, proceeded to Yedo ; and in an interview with the Rōjū on 27th

December, he delivered a dispatch from the Kwambaku expressing his opinion about the American affair, while Sanjō verbally set forth the state of feeling in Kyōto. Abé thereupon went into a full explanation of what had been done, dwelling on the fact that the unsatisfactory condition of the coast defences made it necessary for the Bakufu to act with great caution and restraint. He freely acknowledged that it was the duty of the Rōjū to relieve the Imperial anxiety, and he actually requested that the sovereign should favour the Bakufu with an expression of his wishes, whenever he saw occasion to do so. Some authorities even go so far as to maintain that Abé now gave Sanjō to understand that nothing would be finally settled in connexion with this grave affair without the concert and assent of the Imperial Court.

On 2nd May, 1854, the Imperial Palace was burned to the ground and the Bakufu at once set about restoring it, and not only so, but, on the representations of the Lord of Owari, on a more extensive plan and with finer materials than before. The Lord of Owari was connected by marriage with the house of *Konoye*, as was also Shimadzu Nariakira of Satsuma, and it seems that it was really Lord Nariakira who prompted the Lord of Owari to move in the matter. Nariakira was on the best of terms with Abé, and the Satsuma chieftain also expressed his view to Abé on the subject. Furthermore, he presented the Mikado with a large sum of ready money for his personal use, a gift that was acknowledged by an autograph Imperial poem sent to Nariakira. Daimyō were still carefully excluded from Kyōto by the Bakufu, but presently we hear of Nariakira visiting some of the Court nobles like Konoye and Sanjō incognito and discussing national affairs with them. About this time he used rather remarkable language in an address to his vassals:—

“The land of Satsuma and its people have been entrusted to my care by the Emperor at Kyōto, and I do not in any way consider them my own possession or subjects.”

Presently we hear of Lord Nariakira receiving secret Imperial instructions to proceed to Kyōto at once in case of a national crisis, and there assume the protection of the Palace. At the same time, however, Nariakira was a staunch supporter of the Bakufu in what he believed to be its legitimate work; and down to the assumption of power by Ii of Hikone, in June, 1858, he continued to be on the friendliest terms with the Shōgun and Rōjū. For the

few years immediately preceding this event he was perhaps the most influential man in Japan outside the Rōjū. Lord Nariaki's rashness and bigotry had begun to discredit him, and Lord Nariakira had latterly endeavoured to avoid contact with him as much as possible. But he was intimate with Lord Nariaki's two sons—the Daimyō of Mito and the young chief of the house of Hitotsubashi. Over Matsudaira Yoshinaga, the Daimyō of Echizen, and Lord Daté of Uwajima, two of the four ablest feudal chiefs of the day, he exercised a strong influence, while among the Daimyō and samurai at large he had practically succeeded to the position which Lord Nariaki of Mito held during the preceding twenty years. His *Kinnō* doctrines were readily accepted by them; but in his unreserved advocacy of the reopening of Japan to foreign intercourse he had a terribly uphill battle to fight. However, even here his infinite tact was surely making converts; and if he had lived a few years longer, the subsequent course of events might well have been very different from what it actually was. Unfortunately this great Japanese passed away just at the time when his services were most sorely needed. He was only 49 when he died on 25th August, 1858.

In connexion with the re-erection of the Imperial Palace and of the mortuary chapels of Shiba and Uyenō, which had been destroyed by fire shortly before, the following passage from the *Kinse Shiryaku* is very instructive:—

“In olden times, whenever any works of the kind were required, the clans were called upon to contribute towards the expense, but the rule was departed from on the present occasion, in view of the great charges they had been put to during the last year or two in maintaining garrisons at various places. The Bakufu treasury, was, however, reduced to a very low ebb.”

In its dire penury the Bakufu felt that the hearty and unconstrained support of the outside feudatories was indispensable now that irresistible foreign armaments might have to be faced. It was no longer advisable to saddle the clans with exhausting corvée work, or to subject them to the humiliations customary during the preceding 250 years. Security against external aggression was only to be found in a policy of internal conciliation. Indeed the Rōjū now laboured to induce the clans to husband their resources for the development of military power. What Satsuma, Hizen, and Chōshū were now doing would have been promptly checked a generation or so before; now the efforts of these energetic clans

met with the high approval of the Bakufu. The Bakufu had meanwhile been issuing fresh *Ken'yaku-rei* (Thrift-ordinances), and had discussed a modification, if not a suspension, of the enforced residence of the Daimyō and their families in Yedo. The result was that the feudatories were privately informed that they might send back all superfluous dependents to their provinces, for an open suspension of the old system was felt to be pregnant with danger, even although down to 1858 not a single clan had shown the slightest disposition to question the authority of the Shōgunate.

Putiatin's brief visit to Ōsaka Bay in the autumn of 1854 was a rather costly matter for some of the clans. Ii of Hikone, one of the Daimyō then guarding Yedo Gulf, was ordered to shift his levies to Kyōto, while the troops of two neighbouring fiefs were also mobilized for the protection of the Court on that occasion. Later on, three or four clans held the approaches to Kyōto from the Sea of Japan, and a strong cordon of clan samurai lay around the city itself, while Ōsaka, Sakai, and Hyōgo were put in charge of detachments from Tsu, Okayama, Tottori, Chōshu, and Tosa ; some of these corps having been actually moved down from their former positions in Yedo Bay. Thus, by 1858, the defence of Kyōto must have become a rather serious drain upon the treasuries of several of the Western fiefs. In 1855 the Bakufu proposed to seize the bells of the monasteries throughout Japan and convert them into ordnance, and on the proposal of Lord Nariaki of Mito, it appealed to the Kyōto Dajō-Kwan for a decree sanctioning the measure. The decree was issued, but on account of the opposition of the Princely Abbots of Chion-in and Uyeno, the project had to be abandoned. This was also an unprecedented step on the part of the Bakufu ; and in the opinion of Ii of Hikone, who protested against it, a most ill-judged one ; for it furnished the Court with a precedent for interfering in matters that the Bakufu was entitled to decide for itself. Ii, too, it must be remembered, although the staunchest champion of the Bakufu, had advocated the reference of Perry's proposals to the Imperial Court in 1853. Ii was undoubtedly influenced by the reviving doctrine of *Kinnō* but, like many others, he saw nothing at all in this inconsistent with the strictest loyalty to the Bakufu. In fact, in 1853, many of the feudatories were of the same mind with Ii in this respect ; at that date it is questionable whether a single one of them entertained the slightest idea of opposing, much less of overthrowing, the Bakufu,

any more than the average Frenchman dreamed of the abolition of Monarchy in France in the early months of 1789. Furthermore, in 1855, the Court and the Bakufu were still on very amicable relations. In the spring of that year the Court had been informed of the negotiations with Putiatin at Shimoda, and in August, copies of the American, English, and Russian agreements had been forwarded and submitted to the Kwambaku and the Emperor. The Kwambaku, Takatsukasa, was then not only friendly but very friendly to the Bakufu ; and he had no difficulty in obtaining an Imperial decree virtually approving of what had been done, and expressing sympathy with the Bakufu in the difficult and trying circumstances in which it had so unexpectedly found itself. Yet, by the spring of 1858, we have found a complete change in this complaisant and sympathetic attitude of the Court ; it was then actually flouting and humiliating Lord Hotta, the Chief of the Rōjū, who had taken the unprecedented step of proceeding to Kyōto to explain and to implore.

To enable us to understand the important developments that now followed it may be well to cast a brief glance at the general situation in the Court at this particular date. In 1858, the 122nd sovereign of Japan, the Emperor Kōmei, then a young man of twenty-seven, had been on the throne for a dozen years. Next to him came the four princely houses of Fushimi, Arisugawa, Katsura, and Kanin, who could supply an heir to the throne in case the Emperor died without issue. These houses had nominal revenues of 1,016, 1,000, 3,006, and 1,006 *koku* respectively, but they were supposed to be much wealthier than the figures would lead us to expect them to be. With the exception of Arisugawa, none of them makes any great figure in the stirring events of the time. Then there were several princely incumbents of the fourteen abbacies assigned for the support of princes of blood. The chief of these establishments was that of Uyeno in Yedo with a revenue of 13,000 *koku* ; but most of them had only about a tenth of that income. At this date some of them were vacant, while most of the actual incumbents were of very little personal importance. The chief exception was the Abbot of the Shōren-in, a man of many names, for at different times we have to deal with him as Shōren-in Miya, Awata no Miya, In no Miya, Prince Nakagawa, and finally as Prince Kuni. Born in 1824, he was at this time in the full vigour of manhood, able, energetic, and ambitious, with much greater liking for politics than for

religion. He now began to make his influence felt ; and during the great part of the next stirring decade he was perhaps the most prominent and powerful personage in the Court.

Around the palace were domiciled 137 *Kugé* families. Some of these were miserably poor ; indeed, thirty of them had no resources beyond a small allowance of rice from the Imperial granary. Of the others, only twenty-one had an income of 500 *koku* or over ; the total amount devoted to the maintenance of the 137 houses only amounting to something between 40,000 and 50,000 *koku*. The wealthiest, as might be expected, were the Go-sekké, the five families from whom the Kwambaku, the Sesshō, and the Emperor's chief consort had to be taken. Of these, Konoye's nominal revenue was 2,860, Kujō's 2,043, Ichijō's 2,044, Nijō's 1,708, and Takat-sukasa's 1,500 *koku* ; but some of them had other considerable sources of income ; Konoye, for example, owning some of the great saké-brewing establishments between Ōsaka and Hyōgo. Marriages between Daimyō and *Kugé* families had been frowned upon by the early Bakufu, but Mitsukuni of Mito's bride had been a Court lady, and so had the consort of Tsunayoshi, the fifth Shōgun. Since that time, marriages between *Kugé* and members of the collateral Tokugawa houses had become not uncommon ; we have already spoken of Lord Nariaki's bonds of affinity with the Court. The Lord of Owari was now similarly connected with it ; and so indeed were some of the outside Daimyō, the Lords of Satsuma, Tosa, Awa, Sendai, and Kaga being among the number. Confidential communications could thus easily pass between these feudatories, and the *Kugé* families with whom they were connected ; and in permitting such a state of affairs to come about, the Bakufu had exposed itself to a great future danger.

To a still graver and rapidly growing menace in Kyōto, the Bakufu remained blissfully unconscious down to this year of 1858. The Prohibition of Heresies, and the exclusion of all but adherents of the orthodox Teishu tenets from service under the Shōgunate and in nearly all the fiefs have already been alluded to. The sturdier spirits that refused to sacrifice their convictions had to make a livelihood somehow ; and not a few of them proceeded to Kyōto to find a meagre subsistence by lecturing to the Court nobles. Some of these men got taken into the regular service of the more well-to-do *Kugé* in various capacities, and many of them, being men of ability with a knowledge of the outside world, acquired a

great influence over their employers, by whom indeed, some of them came to be regarded as veritable political oracles. Almost to a man, these heterodox scholars detested the Bakufu, and were only too happy to find an opportunity of embarrassing its officials. When the question of foreign intercourse began to be referred to Kyōto and discussed there, the "heretics" were very prompt to avail themselves of the situation. It is quite true that Lord Hotta had had to deal with Lord Nariaki's intrigues, and with his emissaries in Kyōto in 1858, but the ground had been splendidly prepared for both Lord Nariaki and his agents by the scholars serving in various Kugé households. Furthermore, outside samurai, less attached to the Bakufu than their lords were, now began to frequent Kyōto in increasing numbers, while the old capital was becoming a great place of assembly for the *rōnin* lurking or wandering in the various quarters of the Empire. Free discussion, specifically of the Barbarian question, but soon practically of all questions, presently became the order of the day, and the better instructed, keener-witted and bolder among the *rōnin* suddenly found themselves becoming personages. These soon were the loudest in their shouts of "Honour to the Emperor" and "Away with the Barbarian!" That at present was enough to embarrass the Shōgun's officers; it was yet a year or two before the third cry of "Down with the Bakufu!" came to be heard.

In the spring of 1858, the situation at Kyōto was at once very peculiar and very perplexing. Lord Hotta then had to fight a desperate battle against the machinations of Lord Nariaki and his agents, who were resolved to thwart his mission at any price. Yet at the very same time he was in a measure co-operating with these agents, in forwarding a project in which Lord Nariaki was perhaps more keenly interested than he was in the exclusion of these Barbarians, for whose admission into the ports of the Empire, Hotta was then labouring so strenuously to procure the Imperial sanction. The project in question was the nomination of Lord Nariaki's own favourite son as heir to the fainéant and decrepit Shōgun.

The thirteenth Shōgun, Iyesada, was in his 29th year when he succeeded to power in 1853. But his father had known perfectly well that Iyesada would be incompetent for the position, now that the administration had to face difficulties of such exceptional gravity. As a matter of fact, the new Shōgun scarcely ever evinced the

possession of any will of his own. Whatever was submitted to him for approval by the Rōjū, he generally approved of without question or discussion; in domestic affairs he was entirely under the control of his mother. This was a state of affairs that caused extreme anxiety to the more intelligent Daimyō and samurai; and there was a growing desire in certain quarters that some strong man should now be appointed to stand by the side of the Shōgun as Hoshina of Aidzu had done in the case of Iyetsuna. By no one perhaps was the necessity of this more deeply felt than by Shimadzu Nariakira of Satsuma. But Satsuma was an outside clan, and outside clans, of course, had no right to interfere in such matters. Lord Nariakira, however, was on very intimate terms with Lord Yoshinaga of Echizen, and Echizen was not only a Tokugawa house, but Lord Yoshinaga had been adopted into the house from the Tayasu family, one of the San-kyō houses that might supply an heir to the Shōgunate in the case of a Shōgun dying without male issue. Thus, Lord Yoshinaga was in a position to move in the matter; and he and Shimadzu Nariakira now agreed to endeavour to place some real statesman by the side of the Shōgun with supreme control of national affairs. Although they felt the advisability of keeping the project secret for the time, Lord Yoshinaga opened his mind to Abé Masahiro. Abé assured him that he was in full agreement with his views, but that precipitate action would be highly injudicious. Lord Yoshinaga presently endeavoured to get the Lord of Owari to pledge his support for Nariaki of Mito, and when Nariaki's collisions with the Bakufu officials made his appointment to the position impossible, Lord Yoshinaga urged the Lord of Owari to accept the office himself. But the Lord of Owari did not receive his overtures favourably. Meanwhile, Nariaki's own favourite son, although still a mere youth, had been giving great promise of ability and force of character; and a party was presently forming in support of him as successor to the Shōgun, Iyesada, who had no son of his own, and, as it was generally known, never could have one. Among the early measures taken by Abé Masahiro to conciliate Lord Nariaki had been his recommendation that Nariaki's seventh son should be made heir of the house of Hitotsubashi, one of the San-kyō, and the house from which the eleventh Shōgun, Iyenari, had actually come. At the time a son of Iyenari's was the head of the Hitotsubashi family, and by him Yoshinobu or Keiki, the ten-year-old son

of Nariaki, was adopted in 1847. Yoshinobu thus came to have prospects of succession to the Shōgunate in case Iyesada should die without issue. But yet another son of Iyenari had been adopted into the Kishū house which, of course, could also furnish a successor to a childless Shōgun, and a boy born to this son in 1846 was more nearly related by blood to Iyesada than Hitotsubashi Yoshinobu.

About 1856, Yoshinaga of Echizen began to exert himself strongly on behalf of Hitotsubashi Yoshinobu. He still failed to enlist the open support of the Lord of Owari because the latter feared to offend the Bakufu, but Hachisuka of Awa (really another of Iyenari's multitudinous sons), Daté of Uwajima, Tachibana of Yanagawa, and Nabeshima of Hizen, were all now of the same mind as Shimadzu Nariakira, while some of the Fudai Daimyō, like Itakura, were also inclined to co-operate with Yoshinaga of Echizen. In the spring of 1857 Yoshinaga again broached the subject to Abé Masahiro, and the matter then became more or less of a public question. Abé was sympathetic, but he died in the autumn of that year, and later on Matsudaira, Iga no Kami came back into the Rōjū. Iga no Kami had owed his dismissal to Lord Nariaki, Yoshinobu's father, and hence it was presumed that he would now find his opportunity to satisfy the grudge he cherished against Nariaki. However, he assumed the mask of friendliness, and up to the last professed to be well-disposed towards young Hitotsubashi and his supporter, Lord Yoshinaga of Echizen. As regards the exact position of Lord Hotta, the chief of the Rōjū, on this question, the evidence is conflicting. According to some seemingly well-informed authorities he was opposed to Hitotsubashi at first; he was particularly displeased to find that outside Daimyō had been presuming to meddle in an affair which had always hitherto been considered a purely domestic matter for the Shōgun and his house. But others, perhaps as competent to speak, maintain that Lord Hotta was favourable to Hitotsubashi all along; for one thing, he wished to placate Lord Nariaki, and thus mitigate the virulence of his opposition to the reopening of the Empire to foreign intercourse. Be that as it may, what seems to be certain is that most of Hotta's trusted subordinates were Hitotsubashi's supporters, among them being Toki, Udino, Nagai, Hori, Kawaji, and Iwase, the latter two of whom accompanied Hotta on his mission to Kyōto.

Lord Nariaki was naturally very eager to see his own favourite

in the Shōgun's seat, and in 1855 in his eagerness he compromised himself and his son's prospects very badly by writing to Takatsukasa, the Kwambaku, on the subject. The Rōjū soon discovered what he had done, and their knowledge of his manœuvres did much to widen the breach that was already beginning to open between them and him. Besides, Nariaki was very unpopular among the Ladies of the Great Interior, Honjūin, the Shōgun's mother, had an especial dislike for him and his pestilent notions of reform. It was about this time that Shimadzu Nariakira's adopted daughter (Tenshōin) became Iyesada's third consort; she entered the Great Interior with a mission to counteract the influence of the Shōgun's mother. It was also about this time that Shimadzu gave his friend Yoshinaga of Echizen a friendly hint to drop his intimacy with Lord Nariaki. It should also be noted that the Lords of Echizen and Satsuma were now in full accord on the question of the reopening of the Empire to foreign intercourse as well as on the succession question. Yoshinaga of Echizen had by this time become fully converted to Shimadzu's views, which were strongly advocated by Yoshinaga's own vassal and counsellor, the gifted and brilliant, though very youthful, Hashimoto Sanai. In a remarkable memorial, Hashimoto had demonstrated the impracticability of persisting in the isolation of the Empire any longer. If the national independence was to be maintained, the country must be opened, and not only opened, but reformed. At such a critical juncture, a strong, vigorous, and enlightened Shōgun was indispensable; it was useless to urge that if a proper Minister were secured, the reforms might be effected.

“ That is a grave mistake, and facts prove that it is so. The different ministries of the Bakufu were not lacking in capable men. Such men as Matsudaira, Etchū no Kami, Ōkubo, Kaga no Kami, Mizuno, Echizen no Kami and Abé, Ise no Kami, were all men of no ordinary calibre. But on their removal from office, either from having incurred the Shōgun's displeasure or from loss of popular confidence, their policies also went with them, thus leaving the administration without any firm and definite line of policy. Each Ministry following its own special ideas, the administration of the Bakufu was never free from the evil of lack of unity and continuity in its political principles. The state of uncertainty attending such a system of administration was most embarrassing even in times of national tranquillity. Much more, then, is it to be deprecated at a period like the present when the country is confronted with the grave problem of opening up commercial relations with the other countries of the world. At this crucial moment, it is absolutely necessary to have a wise and full-grown Shōgun at the

head of affairs, able to grasp the reins of government with his own hand, and to maintain a consistent and consecutive line of policy after it has been formulated from a careful consideration of the views of the Daimyō on the question of the day. Without firm and fixed principles to guide the administration, apart from all Ministerial changes, the accomplishment of the great national reform of reopening the country to foreign intercourse cannot be hoped for. The urgent necessity at the present moment is the speedy appointment of Hitotsubashi Keiki as the Shōgun's heir, through whom the accomplishment of great reforms in the national policy may be effected."

Long before this, others besides the Lord of Echizen had come to the conclusion that the succession question was of the most urgent importance, although they had vastly different views of how the question was to be settled. The head of this party was the chief of the Fudai Daimyō, that Ii of Hikone whom we have seen advocating the opening of the country in 1853. His views then were in diametrical opposition to those of Lord Nariaki of Mito, although, strange to say, Ii then proposed that this grave problem of foreign policy should be referred to Kyōto for settlement. About the same time Lord Nariaki had urged the construction of the Shinagawa forts on the immediate sea-front of Yedo, and Ii had publicly ridiculed the project, which he pronounced to be worse than useless. While in charge of the defence of Kyōto in 1854, the Bakufu had censured Ii for some falsely reported shortcomings in his conduct on that occasion, and Ii gave Lord Nariaki the credit for this. In 1853, Lord Nariaki's authority in the Mito fief had again become sufficiently strong to enable him to oust Yuki and the other conservative *Karō* who had been in power since 1844, and to get his own right-hand men Fujita and Toda reinstalled in office. These two were among the alleged 104,000 victims of the great earthquake of Yedo in 1855, a loss to Nariaki of the utmost consequence, for upon the death of Fujita Lord Nariaki's counsels began to lose all semblance of sobriety and sanity. Yuki now began to intrigue to get back to power, and actually induced the Daimyō of Takamatsu and Ii of Hikone to interfere on his behalf in the affairs of a fief that belonged to neither of them. When he got to know of this, Lord Nariaki was furious, and Yuki and a good many of his partisans were promptly put to death (1856). Thus it is by no means difficult for us to understand why Lord Nariaki and Ii of Hikone should not love each other.

As early as 1854, Ii had communicated with his friend Matsu-daira, Idzumi no Kami, then in the Great Council, about the

succession question, expressing a hope that it would soon be attended to. He did not then discuss the selection of an heir, but it may be readily surmised that he had no wish to see the son of his hated foe in the seat of the Shōgun. Presently a strong party in favour of the youthful Daimyō of Kishū was being formed ; Mizuno, the Lord of Shingū, an appanage of Kishū, wishing to establish himself as an independent Daimyō, was working zealously in the Shōgun's Court, and spending money lavishly there in the interests of the boy Daimyō of Kishū. Soon, most of the officials of the Shōgun's palace had been won over, and--what was most important of all--Honjūin, the Shōgun's mother, had espoused the cause of the Kishū candidate. As, according to precedent, the appointment of an heir was entirely a matter for the Shōgun himself, the Kishū party now regarded their success as certain, for Iyesada might safely be expected to do just as his mother told him in this matter, for his new consort, Tenshōin, had soon perceived that she was no match for her mother-in-law, who cherished no special love for her.

The Lord of Echizen and his partisans thus saw that they had but scant hope of success for their candidate, if the succession question was to be decided in Yedo according to the traditional custom of the Tokugawa house. So it was resolved to adopt the very irregular and extraordinary course of carrying the matter to Kyōto, and there obtaining an Imperial decree in favour of Hitotsubashi's claims. The Lord of Echizen, on the advice of Yamanouchi of Tosa, who was connected by marriage with the Sanjō family, now dispatched Hashimoto Sanai to Kyōto to expound his views to Sanjō in the first place and, through his introduction, to the Court nobles generally. Hashimoto's mission, however, it should be said, was a twofold one ; for, besides advocating the necessity of a " full-grown and enlightened person " as heir to the Shōgun, he had instructions to exert himself on Lord Hotta's behalf. In this latter part of his mission he had no success at all ; but in the promotion of the cause of Hitotsubashi his efforts soon proved effective. Sanjō was easily convinced, and so was Konoye, who had just received a letter from the Shōgun's consort, Tenshōin, setting forth what really were the essential points in the memorial of Hashimoto, quoted above. Hashimoto, furthermore, soon became very friendly with Mikuni and Kobayashi, two retainers of the ex-Kwambaku, Takatsukasa, and through them Takatsukasa was presently won over to the Hitotsubashi cause. It should be said

that Takatsukasa, who had originally been a strong Bakufu supporter, had been replaced by Kujō as Kwambaku in 1856. Down to that date Kujō had not been well-disposed towards Yedo ; but he now changed his attitude. This meant that Takatsukasa might presently be expected to alter his sentiments, for, as has been said, Kujō and Takatsukasa were on very bad terms. From this date (March, 1858) Takatsukasa and his son began to show a determined opposition to the Bakufu. They exerted themselves strongly to thwart Lord Hotta's mission, and they worked hard to procure an Imperial decree in favour of Hitotsubashi, while Kujō followed a diametrically opposite line of conduct in these matters. Hashimoto, as we have just seen, was supporting both Hotta *and* Hitotsubashi.

Equally peculiar was the fact that at this time Ii of Hikone, who had really placed Hotta in the Yedo Cabinet in 1855, and who had all along been a steady supporter of his nominee, sent a confidential agent to Kyōto to work on Hotta's behalf. This man, Nagano Shūzen by name, was gifted with extraordinary astuteness and infinite resource. In a way he is reminiscent of Fouché, but morally perhaps he was a better man than Fouché, for although utterly unscrupulous and ruthless in his dealings with opponents, he was devoted heart and soul to the interests of his lord and master, Ii of Hikone, in whose service he was always ready to sacrifice his life at any moment. Nagano, on reaching Kyōto, began to work through Shimada, a trusted retainer of Kujō, the Kwambaku, just as Hashimoto was working through Mikuni and Kobayashi in the household of the ex-Kwambaku, Takatsukasa. Thanks to Shimada, Nagano was soon readily admitted into Kujō's presence. One day Kujō casually informed Nagano that Mito and Satsuma men were working on behalf of Hitotsubashi, and that they were actually trying to procure an Imperial decree appointing him heir to the Shōgun, which they hoped would be issued simultaneously with the Imperial reply to Lord Hotta. Sanjō and Konoye had already memorialized the throne on the subject, and incidentally they told him (Kujō) that Satsuma was in favour of the project. Kujō also recapitulated their arguments, which were really those of Hashimoto's famous memorial. He went on to say that Lord Nariaki had several times in the last few months sent letters to Takatsukasa urging the claims of his son, Hitotsubashi. He himself (Kujō) thought all this very strange ; especially

strange that an outside clan like Satsuma should presume to meddle in such a matter. He ended by asking Nagano to let him know what views his master, Ii of Hikone, entertained about all this. Now, Nagano held the same position with Ii of Hikone that Hashimoto did with the Lord of Echizen; as Nagano was the man who inspired and often drafted Ii's pronouncements he was in a position to answer Kujō's query on the spot. The reply he now made amounted to a complete and thoroughgoing repudiation of Hashimoto's arguments. The peace of the last quarter of a millennium was entirely owing to the prestige and virtue of the House of Tokugawa. Japan differed from other and less favoured countries in cherishing monarchical principles, and in transmitting the supreme power in an unbroken line of succession according to nearness in blood. The personal ability of the head of the nation or of the house did not enter into the question at all; any defects on the part of the Sovereign or the Shōgun were made good by the devoted support of his relatives and by the selection of faithful and intelligent ministers. So much for the general principle. In the present case the Shōgun was by no means so deficient in ability as the Hitotsubashi faction represented him to be. Furthermore, the attempt to impose an heir upon him was an unpardonable trespass upon the Shōgun's authority. The Shōgun intended to be succeeded by the young Lord of Kishū, who was his nearest blood relation, and who was possessed of abilities and virtues which fully qualified him for the succession, Hitotsubashi, though full-grown and able, was a son of that Lord Nariaki of Mito, who, instead of supporting the Bakufu, as was his duty, had been strenuously opposing and thwarting it, and who at the present moment was trying to bring its authority to naught by his intrigues at the Court of Kyōto.

Nagano lost not a moment in transmitting a full report of all this to Ii of Hikone, who thus became fully apprised of what the Hitotsubashi party were doing in Kyōto. Meanwhile the Rōjū had also got to know of what was really in progress, for the Lord of Echizen had thought it expedient to take Matsudaira, Iga no Kami, into his confidence with the idea of making certain of his powerful support. Although pretending to be sympathetic, Iga no Kami was really furiously indignant, for he had very strong ideas about the prerogatives of the Shōgun, and the authority of the Bakufu; and the attempt

to impose an heir upon the Shōgun by Imperial decree he regarded as a most flagrant outrage. He was equally incensed to learn that outside clans like Satsuma and Tosa had presumed to interfere in such a matter. Meanwhile it had been found that Hitotsubashi personally was by no means anxious for the honour his supporters were working so strenuously to thrust upon him, for he dreaded the responsibilities of the position. His reluctance was only overcome when an understanding was reached that the Lord of Echizen should at the same time be entrusted with the supreme direction of the administration. Later on, when the Bakufu got to know of this, the Hitotsubashi partisans, and especially the Lord of Echizen, found themselves in a very dangerous situation; the knowledge that such projects had really been seriously entertained goes a long way to account for the extreme rigour with which the newly appointed Tairō, Ii of Hikone, acted in the summer and autumn of this year (1858).

All this time, the position of Kujō, the Kwambaku in Kyōto, was the reverse of easy or enviable. In his support of Hotta's attempt to obtain the Imperial sanction for the new American treaty, the Kwambaku had to bear up against an almost unanimous Court; and in this matter, as we have seen, his failure was complete. Meanwhile the succession question had become acute, and even here, if not actually Hotta, at all events Hotta's trusted subordinates were exerting themselves strenuously in favour of Hitotsubashi. Now the Rōjū in Yedo, and Ii of Hikone had given Kujō to understand that there must positively be no Imperial decree in favour of Hitotsubashi; but Takatsukasa, Konoye, and Sanjō had meanwhile secured the support of nearly all their fellow nobles, and a note had actually been prepared (3rd May, 1858) approving the appointment of a "full-grown and enlightened" heir to the Shōgun. Three days later formal approval of this by the Throne was to have been issued. This, of course, meant that the young Lord of Kishū's claims had to be abandoned in favour of Hitotsubashi. But Kujō quietly expunged the words "full-grown and enlightened" and thus the appointment of the heir was virtually left to the Shōgun's own discretion after all. It is no great matter for wonder to find that Kujō now enjoyed the distinction of being the best-hated man in Kyōto.

About the same time there were startling developments in train in Yedo. Matsudaira, Iga no Kami, while still retaining the mask

of sympathy for the Hitotsubashi factions, and the Lord of Echizen, was using every effort to get Ii of Hikone appointed Tairō. They soon succeeded in convincing the leading personages in the "Great Interior" of the advisability of this step, and were assured of their hearty support and co-operation. Iga no Kami's idea was, to use the expressive Japanese phrase, to "borrow" Ii's name and prestige, and therewith crush both the Mito faction and, more especially, the interfering outside clans. But for once Iga no Kami was reckoning without his host; like most people around him he had seriously failed to take the real measure of Ii of Hikone. One evening in this May of 1858, Hiraoka, one of the Shōgun's confidential attendants, found his master unusually melancholy and morose. Hiraoka, divining what was troubling him, now ventured to speak the word in season, and remarked that trustworthy help was to be found in the person of Ii, Kamon-no-Kami, and that it might be well to make him Tairō. Iyesada caught at the idea eagerly. A little later (1st June, 1858) Lord Hotta returned from his futile mission to Kyōto, fully convinced that the situation demanded the speedy appointment of Hitotsubashi as the Shōgun's heir. He had also got a hint of the plan to entrust the Lord of Echizen with the supreme direction of affairs, and he was inclined to approve it. At his first audience with the Shōgun after his return, he broached the subject; but he was then brusquely informed that it had been already decided to instal Ii, Kamon-no-Kami, as Tairō! On 3rd June, a joint letter from the Rōjū summoned Ii to appear at the Castle on the following day; and on that very day (4th June) he received his commission as Tairō from the Shōgun himself. On the 5th, the new Tairō appeared in the Council Chamber, entered into argument with the ministers, opposing their views when need was, and settled some very important points of policy in a very downright and autocratic fashion. Thus, Ii was remarkably prompt in indicating that, on this occasion at least, the office of Tairō had to be taken quite seriously.

It is somewhat startling for us at this date to discover that down to June, 1858, Ii of Hikone was held in such scant respect by the general run of his contemporaries. The truth is that, until that time, very few indeed had had any opportunity of learning anything very definite or authentic about him, for his early life had been somewhat peculiar. Born in 1815, the youngest son in a family of fourteen, he had lived as a simple samurai five-and-thirty years,

with no prospects before him of ever taking any active part in the affairs of the nation. His time had been chiefly spent in strenuous study in the retirement of the fief. His few friends were mostly selected for their knowledge, ability, and personal character. His condition of life and his discussions with his friends naturally made him better acquainted with practical everyday affairs, both the social conditions of the fief and the political affairs of the nation, than Daimyō or Daimyō's sons generally had the opportunity of making themselves acquainted. With the exception of the heir to the fief, all his elder brothers had been adopted into other families, and thus when his eldest brother died without issue in 1850, Ii Naosuke suddenly and most unexpectedly found himself Lord of the Hikone fief and chief of all the Fudai Daimyō. He at once proceeded to carry out various reforms among his vassals, and to administer the fief in a very vigorous fashion, but as several other clans were trying to reform themselves about that time, Ii Naosuke's innovations do not seem to have attracted any marked measure of public attention. It was not till 1853 that he became prominent in any way, and his sole distinction at that time was that he was one of the two or three Daimyō who took the extremely unpopular course of recommending the reopening of the Empire to foreign intercourse. Ii Naosuke, it should be said, had no real personal liking for foreigners, but he had been convinced by the arguments of Nakagawa, one of his most trusted friends and retainers, that a refusal of Perry's demands would probably precipitate hostilities which could only end in a great national humiliation. As a member of the Tamaritsume Shū he had to express opinions on the various questions of policy submitted to it for consideration by the Bakufu, from time to time; and on several occasions he had condemned the more extreme measures recommended by Lord Nariaki of Mito. Thus, his few fellow Daimyō of the Tamaritsume Shū soon began to recognize his real calibre, but to the outside world he remained an unknown man. When they heard of his sudden and totally unexpected appointment as Tairō, the Bakufu officials generally were greatly concerned. Some of them declared him to be no more fitted for the position than a child was, while most of them fancied that the Rōjū had just been provided with the luxury of a figure-head, and nothing more. The able men we have found chiefly concerned in the negotiations with foreigners were nearly all strongly opposed to Ii's appointment, Toki, Kawaji, Udonō, Nagai,

and Iwase all expressed their strong disapproval and lent strong support to the project of placing Lord Yoshinaga of Echizen at the head of affairs instead of the nonentity they considered Ii of Hikone to be. But the malcontents were mostly all transferred to offices of no practical importance, and a little later on dismissed and punished severely. Iwase and Nagai were indeed retained but they were retained merely because their knowledge and experience were felt to be indispensable for the time being.

Within two months of Ii's appointment as Tairō, the composition of the Rōjū had been greatly changed. Lord Hotta seems to have incurred the ill-will of the Ladies of the Great Interior and the Shōgun himself now evinced a wish to be rid of him. The Tairō exerted himself on Hotta's behalf for some time, but it was all to no purpose, and on 2nd August, 1858, Lord Hotta found himself summarily dismissed, ostensibly for his mismanagement of affairs in Kyōto. This was the end of Lord Hotta's public career. In 1859, he retired from the headship of his own fief, and at the beginning of 1863, an official note was sent to the new Lord of Sakura, reprimanding his father for the grave offences committed by him in his dealings with foreigners while in office, and punishing him by perpetual seclusion in his own house. Lord Hotta was undoubtedly an able, honest straightforward man, a true Japanese with the very best interests of Japan closely at heart. It is not without reason that many of his fellow-countrymen now regret the scurvy fashion in which his strenuous labours were rewarded. Along with Hotta, Matsudaira, Iga no Kami was also unceremoniously dismissed. His efforts to "display the power of the Bakufu" had brought so much odium upon him that Ii was convinced his continued presence in the council chamber might compromise his administration. Ii knew, too, that although Iga no Kami had been most strenuous in his efforts to get him (Ii) appointed Tairō, yet Iga no Kami was all along resolved in his own mind to have the real ordering of affairs. Already there had been one or two sharp collisions between the two strong-willed men, and the Tairō was not a man to brook opposition from any subordinate.

One of the vacant places was filled by the return to office of Ii's own personal friend, Matsudaira, Idzumi no Kami, while Manabe, a descendant of Arai Hakuseki's associate of the same name, now entered the Rōjū together with Ōta, whom we have seen according an interview to Lord Elgin. The two great problems the Tairō

had to grapple with were the signing of the new American Treaty, and the settlement of the succession question. How he disposed of the former has been recounted in the preceding chapter. As regards the latter, the Shōgun now decided it by selecting the young Daimyō of Kishū for his successor, and on 11th July, this fact was notified to the Go-san-ké and related Daimyō. The appointment, however, had to be sanctioned by the Emperor, but this was regarded as a mere formality and a matter of course, and the date of the public announcement of the adoption was fixed for 29th July. The Tairō, some time before, had summoned the Lord of Echizen and Daté of Uwajima to his mansion, and had informed them that, besides other imperative reasons, the previous Shōgun had left instructions that, in case of need, the heir to the Shōgunate should be taken from the house of Kishū, and his two visitors then seemed to be reconciled to the situation. But nevertheless the Hitotsubashi party had by no means abandoned all hope even now, for, although vanquished in Yedo, it was still powerful in Kyōto, and gaining strength there every day. As a result of its intrigues, the Imperial approval of the selected heir, although dated 19th July did not arrive in Yedo until 3rd August, five days after the signing of the American Treaty, and on the very day when the changes in the Rōjū took place. The 6th of August was then fixed as the date for the proclamation of the heir apparent. But on 4th August, a very dramatic incident occurred. On that evening Lord Nariaki and his son the Daimyō of Mito, the Lord of Owari, and Yoshinaga of Echizen, suddenly presented themselves, demanding an interview with the Tairō. Their abrupt appearance was a breach of the etiquette of Yedo Castle, where Daimyō could only appear on certain fixed days, or after summons, or at all events after due notice. Manabe now counselled the Tairō to keep in the background, but Ii at once gave orders for the three Go-san-ké to be admitted to his presence. Lord Nariaki began by censuring Ii for signing the American Treaty before the Imperial sanction to do so had been received. The Tairō explained why it had been an unavoidable necessity, and expressed his confidence that his action would meet with the Imperial approval when the exact circumstances were known. This subject was dropped, and the visitors now began to dilate on the need of the times for a "full-grown able" man to be appointed heir to the Shōgun, and warmly recommended Hitotsubashi. To this the Tairō replied that the appointment of an heir

rested with the Shōgun alone, and that no subject had any right to interfere in the matter ; moreover the question had been already settled, and so it would be improper to enter into any discussion of it. Lord Nariaki thereupon advised the Tairō to postpone the public announcement for a time, and thus manifest a proper sense of respect and deference towards the Imperial cabinet, especially necessary since the Bakufu had signed the American Treaty without the Imperial sanction. Naosuke answered that he had perfect confidence his action would be approved, and that any further delay in the matter of the Shōgun's heir was contrary to the Imperial will. Nariaki next inquired why an envoy had not been sent to Kyōto to explain the circumstances of the signing of the Treaty, and was informed that it had been decided to dispatch Manabe on such a mission, and that he was to receive his official instructions on the following day. Lord Nariaki then made the extraordinary proposal that Yoshinaga of Echizen should be made Tairō. To this Ii made answer that in such a question he was powerless. At this point a small exhibition of wit on the part of Manabe relieved the tension of the situation, and the interview came to a close. The Lord of Echizen had meanwhile been in conference with Kuzé, a member of the Rōjū, for the Tairō objected to his presence on the ground that his official and social standing did not entitle him to a place in the Hall of Audience.

A great object with the Mito faction had been to get the Tairō summoned to Kyōto, where he would find himself as helpless as Hotta had done. If so much could be effected they believed that the prospects of Hitotsubashi need not even yet be a subject of despair. To compass this end, they made full use of the circumstance that the Tairō had concluded the American Treaty without obtaining the Imperial sanction to do so. The so-called exclusion party is often identified with the supporters of Hitotsubashi. But the chief workers on Hitotsubashi's behalf had been Shimadzu of Satsuma, from the very first a strong advocate of the reopening of the country, and Yoshinaga of Echizen, a convert to Shimadzu's views in the field of foreign policy. Then Hotta had latterly been a Hitotsubashi supporter, and so were almost everyone of Hotta's subordinate officers, all of whom were now opposed to the exclusionists. In Kyōto, it is true, the Court nobles were at once anti-foreign and pro-Mito almost to a man. But the strange fact here is that, in winning over the foreign-hating *Kugé* to the

support of Hitotsubashi's claims, the chief agent had been that Hashimoto Sanai who had exerted himself so successfully to convince his master, Lord Yoshinaga of Echizen, of the absolute necessity of resuming intercourse with the outside world.

The Shōgun, Iyesada, became dangerously ill early in August, but he learned of the extraordinary visit of Lord Nariaki and his companions to the Castle. He at once gave orders that they should be subjected to condign punishment, and on 13th August, Lord Nariaki was ordered into strict confinement in his own Komagome mansion in Yedo and forbidden to hold communication with any one. On the same day, the Lords of Owari and Echizen were also ordered into close confinement, and were further removed from the headship of their fiefs which were entrusted to junior members of their families. As for the young Lord of Mito, he was cautioned to be more careful in his conduct. These measures occasioned intense surprise among the general public, that the Shōgun should thus deal with what had been hitherto regarded as the main props of his own house struck many critics as an extremely rash and suicidal policy.

Immediately on the signing of the American Treaty, the Rōjū sent (30th July) a joint note to the Kyōto Tensō, stating what had happened, and requesting them to inform the Court. In the enclosure was a full *exposé* of what Harris had just told the Bakufu officials. There was also an apology for transmitting such grave intelligence in such an informal way, and an assurance that an official of proper rank would be presently dispatched to Kyōto to explain everything verbally. Meanwhile it was of the utmost importance that the Imperial sanction for the signing of the treaty should be promptly obtained. The Tensō, however, were able to effect nothing; while a Court decree was issued summoning a member of the Go-san-ké and the Tairō to Court. This decree reached Yedo on 14th August, the very day on which the Shōgun Iyesada died, and a day after Lord Nariaki and the Lords of Owari and Echizen had been ordered into strict confinement. On the 17th August, the Bakufu replied that it was impossible for the Tairō to leave Yedo at the time, but that later on he would start for Kyōto. Meanwhile Manabe, the Rōjū, together with Sakai, the new Kyōto *Shoshidai*, would be dispatched at once, and they would furnish full particulars of the situation. However, in consequence of the Shōgun's death (which was not announced till 14th

September) and various other matters, Manabe's departure had to be postponed. Meanwhile the Tairō wrote to Kūjō, the Kwambaku, informing him how matters stood, and saying, among other things, that certain unscrupulous persons were factiously trying to thwart the purposes of the Bakufu, and that they must be summarily dealt with. The reference undoubtedly was to the Hitotsubashi party. The Tairō soon received such alarming news from Kujō, the Kwambaku, that it was deemed desirable to hurry off the new *Shoshidai*, Sakai, to Kyōto at once, while that prince of secret service men, Nagano Shūzen, was dispatched along with him. But Nagano hastened on in advance, and entered Kyōto on 8th September, some days before the *Shoshidai* arrived, and while the *Shoshidai* was still several stages distant, Nagano had mastered the intricacies of the situation and hurried back to urge him to drastic action.

Nagano had learned, among other things, that Kujō was tottering to a fall; if he went, Manabe would find no means of getting the Emperor's ear, for Konoye, the new Kwambaku, was one of the three or four leaders of the pro-Mito, anti-foreign, and thus anti-Bakufu faction. Takatsukasa, Konoye and Sanjō had so prejudiced the Mikado against Kujō that he had been constrained to tender his resignation. However, as the appointment of a new Kwambaku had to be sanctioned by the Bakufu, there was still room for hope, "only," wrote Nagano to the Tairō, "let Manabe start on his mission at once." Manabe's original mission had been merely to obtain the Imperial sanction to the Bakufu's action in signing the American Treaty; he was now further commissioned to prevent Kūjō's resignation taking effect. Before reaching Kyōto, he found himself with yet a third commission to execute, and a commission too that brooked of no delay. Bakufu officials had seized a suspicious person at Kusatsu, and found that he was the bearer of a letter from some of the most prominent pro-Mito Court nobles to one of Lord Nariaki's councillors. From this document it appeared that the Court had been consulted as to whether Lord Nariaki's release from confinement could be ordered by an Imperial decree. The answer to this was that if the Tairō were dealt a proper blow there would be no need for any Imperial decree. Nagano had been greatly surprised at the rapidly growing boldness of the pro-Mito Court nobles; and he soon came to the conclusion that they were being used as tools and puppets by obscure men of

considerable ability at least. In a few days he was in possession of strong evidence that Umeda, the Chinese scholar and lecturer, was responsible for a great deal of what was going on, indeed, some of the language of Umeda's memorials to his patrons had been reproduced in the Imperial decree which had summoned the Tairō to Kyōto. In some of his letters, Umeda had gone so far as to denounce the Tairō as a "rebel" for signing the American Treaty without the Emperor's sanction, and these letters and other equally compromising documents soon fell into Nagano's hands. In the numerous assemblies of excited Kugé that were now being held almost daily, eloquence was mostly expended in assailing the Tairō for his infraction of the Imperial decree issued to Hotta, and Nagano had no difficulty in discovering that the selection of this special line of attack had really been prompted by Umeda and his fellow Chinese scholars in the service of the chief Kugé houses. In course of time Nagano got possession of the correspondence of Ajima, one of Lord Nariaki's chief agents, and from this he was able to unravel all the intrigues that had gone on, and were indeed still going on in connexion with the succession question. A little later on Nagano was in a position to supply his master with full information regarding an incident that occasioned the Bakufu great perplexity at the time, and which has often been incorrectly narrated by historians. Says the *Kinsé Shiriyaku*, for example :—

"In September, 1858, secret instructions were sent from Kyōto to the ex-Prince of Mito which ran thus : 'The Bakufu has shown great disregard of public opinion in concluding treaties without waiting for the opinion of the Court, and in disgracing princes so closely allied by blood to the Shōgun. The Mikado's rest is disturbed by the spectacle of such misgovernment, when the fierce barbarian is at our very door. Do you therefore assist the Bakufu with your advice ; expel the barbarians, content the mind of the people, and restore tranquillity to His Majesty's bosom.'"

This summary of the document omits all reference to the complaint that neither the Tairō nor one of the Go-san-ké had proceeded to Kyōto in compliance with the former decree ; it says nothing about the necessity of uniting the Court and the camp in a common effort, and it gives no hint of the important fact that the decree had to be made known to the Go-san-ké, the Sankyō and all the Daimyō. The author is also in error in saying that this communication was addressed to the ex-prince of Mito, for it was really sent to Lord Nariaki's son, the Daimyō of Mito. Lord Nariaki knew how

the decree had been procured, but his son did not. It really had been obtained by Konoye and Sanjō and their fellows, in spite of all that Kujō could do to prevent its being issued. On 14th September a copy of it had been handed by Sanjō to Ukai, Mito's house-steward in Kyōto, and Ukai at once dispatched his own son and a certain Kusakabe with it to Yedo. Two days later, a similar decree was delivered by the Tensō for transmission to the Bakufu by the ordinary routine. This document reached Yedo on 24th September, and on the same day the Lord of Mito sent in a notification that he had been honoured with direct instructions from the Sovereign. Ōta and Manabe were sent to inspect the dispatch, and they were then requested by the Lord of Mito to tell him what he should do. The Tairō presently sent word that the Imperial decree might be shown to the Go-san-ké and the Sankyō, but to none else. As an imperial instruction on political matters to anyone besides the Shōgun had been an unheard of thing hitherto, Konoye, Sanjō, and their fellows had shown great audacity in getting this decree addressed to the young Lord of Mito. At this time, too, the Chinese scholars, the Satsuma, Mito, and Tosa samurai, who had been working in the Hitotsubashi cause, and the *rōnin* were keeping Kyōto in wild commotion by the rumours they fabricated. Shimadzu Nariakira of Satsuma, it was said, was soon to start with 3,000 picked troops to assault Hikone Castle, to crush the Tairō, and free the Imperial Court from its long thralldom, while it was generally credited that Mito, Owari, and Echizen troops would soon appear in force in the old capital. So persistent and so circumstantial were these rumours that Nagano dispatched emissaries to watch all the great highways leading to Kyōto.

Nagano had already urged Sakai, the Shoshidai, to arrest Umeda, but Sakai, afraid lest the arrest should exacerbate the Kugé beyond measure, was inclined to wait for the arrival of Manabe before adopting drastic measures. Nagano, then at Ōtsu, sent word that if Sakai refused to act, he would bring up men from Hikone and act on his own responsibility. Thereupon Umeda was summoned to the City Magistrate's office and placed in ward there, while the seizure of some of Nariaki's agents about the same time placed a great amount of important secret correspondence in Nagano's hands. Manabe, meanwhile, had started from Yedo on 9th October and Nagano now hurried back to meet him on his way in order to report on the situation in Kyōto and urge

the prompt arrest of Ukai and the two-sworded men concerned in the issue of the Imperial letters to the Lord of Mito. Manabé's sanction was readily given, and Nagano, at once hurrying back to Kyōto, had all his victims in close ward before Manabe actually entered the city on 23rd October. Manabe at once saw that, before taking up the original object of his mission, Kujō must be restored to office, and that a necessary preliminary was the arrest of all the Chinese scholars, and the other obscure men that were the real prompters of the recalcitrant Court nobles. Sakai, the *Shoshidai*, was averse to interfering with the retainers of the Court nobles, but Nagano succeeded in getting Manabe to over-ride the *Shoshidai*, and several retainers of Takatsukasa, Sanjō, Shōren-in, Konoye, and other magnates were presently seized and imprisoned. To Nagano's mind the "examination" they were subjected to in Kyōto was not sufficiently rigorous; and in January, 1859, he succeeded in getting them all sent on to Yedo, to be tried there together with about a score of people meanwhile arrested in the Kwantō for intriguing against the Bakufu. In Yedo also, Lord Nariaki was now kept under the strictest surveillance, for it had been discovered that he had been walking abroad in disguise, and under cover of darkness. The authorities could now flatter themselves that they were relieved from all obstruction on the part of Lord Nariaki and his emissaries.

Manabé's, or rather Nagano's, drastic action in Kyōto had a wonderful effect upon the Court nobles, and it soon became apparent that the unwonted courage the Kugé had lately displayed was really nothing so very heroic after all. Sanjō even went so far as to assure the *Shoshidai* that he cherished no hostility to the Bakufu. Konoye alone seemed inclined to persist in public opposition, and even Konoye was constrained to withdraw his objections to the reinstatement of Kujō in his offices of Nairan and Kwambaku. On 28th November, Kujō again made his official appearance at Court, and Manabé, now having a friendly avenue of communication with the sovereign, addressed himself to the task of obtaining the Imperial sanction for the signing of the American Treaty. His first visit to the Court was on 29th November, but he had to attend often, and explain and argue much before he got a formal reply on 2nd February, 1859. The sovereign was bitterly opposed to any intercourse with the barbarians, and their residence in Japan was not to be thought of. But what was especially objectionable

was the opening of Hyōgo as a port, and the permission for barbarians to visit Ōsaka. The *Shoshidai* urged that these special clauses in the treaties should be cancelled, in spite of the fact that the Tairō had laid it down that it was impossible to play fast and loose with all-important provisions in a treaty that had once been acceded to. Ii also pointed out that the treaty was not with America alone, but with four other nations as well. Any repudiation of the stipulations that had just been entered into would probably precipitate a joint attack of the barbarians on Japan ; and Japan needed time to develop her resources and organize her forces before she could hope to make any effectual resistance.

At one time Manabé was told that nothing could be conceded beyond what had been accorded to the Russians by the Convention of Shimoda, and the envoy felt so disheartened that he was eager to make the best of a bad business and get back to Yedo as soon as possible. But the Tairō kept sending him imperative instructions to stand firm and press the matter at all costs. At last, on February 2nd, 1859, Manabé was handed a decree, which was supposed to be the sovereign's last word on the subject. The question, it was therein said, had been a constant source of anxiety to His Majesty, inasmuch as it involved a departure from immemorial tradition, and seriously compromised the dignity of the Land of the Gods ; but the unavoidable circumstances and the necessities of the situation having been fully recognized by His Majesty, and the Bakufu having given assurance of its purpose to resume the traditional policy of exclusion, time is granted for the taking of proper measures, and the Shōgun is authorized to adopt the temporary measures suitable for the exigencies of the situation. But it was to be clearly understood that the barbarians were in no case to be allowed to approach Kyōto or to establish themselves at Hyōgo or to visit the neighbouring seas. This, it will be seen, was the reverse of a favourable issue to Manabé's mission. By it the Bakufu was pledged to revert to the old exclusion policy at the earliest opportunity, and it was clearly given to understand that it was to press forward its preparations for a forcible expulsion of the barbarians with the utmost expedition. In the course of the discussions with Manabé it had been suggested that as the foreigners came for the profits of trade, it would be possible to arrange matters in such wise that there should be no profits, and that the unwelcome and avaricious barbarians might thus be brought to withdraw

without any need of an appeal to arms. What is exceedingly important to grasp here is that from this date (2nd February, 1859) down to 1865, the Yedo Government was under a strong Imperial mandate to effect the expulsion of the barbarians at the earliest possible moment. The Tairō, however, was convinced that it would not be possible to execute the mandate, and he accordingly concentrated his energies upon the task of securing such an ascendancy in Kyōto that he could by and by count upon forcing the Imperial sanction for the opening of the country. Meanwhile the leaders of the faction so hostile to himself and his policy in Kyōto had deemed it advisable to efface themselves for a time; some of them took the tonsure and nearly all of them retired from office, while about half a score of those who had made themselves particularly conspicuous by their activities, were subsequently sentenced to domiciliary confinement. For the present no more open opposition was to be expected from either Takatsukasa, Konoye, or Sanjō. The Tairō now went on to attempt to negotiate a marriage between the youthful Shōgun and the Emperor's sister, a stroke of policy from which he could have reaped great advantages for the Yedo Government but which actually proved of no great efficacy when it was realized a year or two after his death. Manabé, taking with him some fourteen or fifteen suspected persons for trial, got back to Yedo on 17th April, 1859, and a difference of opinion soon displayed itself between him and the Tairō as to whether the Imperial decree of 2nd February should be made publicly known or not. Manabé argued that, for its promulgation, Kujō's assent was necessary, and for some time the matter was left in abeyance. Meanwhile, other differences between the Tairō and Manabé cropped up, and the usual result speedily followed. In January, 1860, Manabé one morning received a note from the Tairō saying that "he (Manabé) was not now very strong, and that he had better retire from the worries of public office".

Before this, the fate of the Tairō's opponents arrested in Kyōto and elsewhere had already been determined. Matsudaira, Idzumi no Kami was entrusted with the supervision of their trial which was supposed to be conducted by a full Hyōjōsho, composed of the Three Bugyō, the Ōmetsuke, and the Metsuke. Nagano, the secret service agent, had already cast his net very wide, but he intended that none implicated in the opposition to his master should be allowed to escape. Itakura and another judge showed

a disposition to limit the scope of the inquiry, and evinced a spirit of independence which, however creditable to themselves, made them objects of suspicion and dislike to the Tairō. They were forthwith dismissed from office, and their places filled by men who could safely be reckoned on to display proper zeal in the interests of the administration. It seems that one of Lord Nariaki's agents had succeeded in securing an appointment under Ikeda, one of the City Magistrates; this man now kept the Mitō party informed of all the incidents of the trial, and later on assassinated Ikeda for his severity. We get an inkling of how this trial was conducted from some remarks dropped by the biographer of Umeda, that staunch disciple of Yamazaki Anzai, who had done so much to foment opposition among the *Kugé*, and who had been the first of Nagano's captures. His examiners constantly pressed him to acknowledge that he had been instigated by others and to give their names. "The officials examined him many times in a day, sometimes flogging him unmercifully and sometimes compelling him to hold up a heavy stone for hours.¹ The torture which he had undergone made him appear at the point of death, but the attendants took great care to revive him. Umeda, however, died in prison, as did also two or three of his fellows—probably they were simply tortured to death. At length, towards the end of September, 1859, it was known that sentence was soon to be passed upon the accused. Just previous to this the Tairō presented 5,000 *ryō* to the Emperor, made gifts to many of the Court officials, and distributed 20,000 *ryō* among the rank and file of the Court nobles, a tolerably effective device, no doubt, for stifling inconvenient criticism from that quarter. Of the accused fifty, three were punished by transportation to distant islands, banishment from cities, domiciliary confinement, and other penalties. Ajima, Lord Nariaki's councillor and chief agent, was ordered to commit *hara-kiri*; the two Ukai and one or two other Mito retainers were beheaded. Among the non-Mito men who were immolated on this occasion, Rai Mikisaburō is noteworthy mainly because he was the son of his father, the distinguished historian Rai Sanyō. A more remarkable figure was Yoshida Shōin, or Torajirō, not unknown to English readers on account of R. L. Stevenson's well-known

¹ See Mr. John Carey Hall's fourth paper on *Tokugawa Legislation*, *T.A.S.J.*, vol. xli, pt. v, p. 805.

sketch. Yoshida had been a pupil of Sakuma Shōzan, whom we have already mentioned as an early advocate of the reopening of Japan to foreign intercourse. He went to Nagasaki early in 1854 with the intention of going on board Putiatin's vessel. But Putiatin had left there before he arrived, and in the following summer Yoshida and a companion vainly endeavoured to get on board one of Perry's ships then at Shimoda.¹ For this offence he was handed over by the Bakufu to his own clan authorities for punishment, and by them he was condemned to domiciliary confinement at home in Chōshū.

Yoshida Shoin's aim was to master Western science and apply it in Japan so as to be able to meet intruders with their own weapons and ultimately attack them on their own soil. All along he was really a bitter anti-foreign fanatic, and from his confinement in Chōshū he organized a determined opposition to the treaties with the barbarians. Emissaries of his were at work in Kyōto, and there they presented a violent manifesto of Yoshida's to Ōhara, one of the ablest and most influential of the Court nobles. A little later, Yoshida concocted a plot for the assassination of Manabe, whose arrests of "patriots" had excited his fiercest wrath. Yoshida had been handed over by the clan authorities to the Bakufu officers, who mistakenly suspected him of co-operating with Umeda. It was from his own lips that the Yedo officials first heard of the memorial to Ōhara and the assassination plot. Some of those who were destined to be among the greatest statesmen of the Meiji era were Yoshida's pupils; after the lapse of half-a-century it was to be shown that their rancour against Ii, Kamon no Kami, for what they held to be the judicial murder of their beloved teacher was still unappeased. It is sometimes assumed that the severity of the Tairō on this occasion was in a measure justified by the necessity of crushing a factious opposition to his comparatively liberal and advanced notions of foreign policy. It is to be remembered, however, that Ii looked upon the reopening of Japan as an unfortunate necessity, a mere tentative temporary measure that might be revoked when the nation was strong enough to trust to its armaments. But Hashimoto Sanai was of opinion that the reopening of the Empire would be quite as advantageous to his own country-

¹ See Hawks's *Narrative* and Wells Williams' *Diary*. Also the *Kinsé Shiryaku*, p. 4, p. 13. For Sakuma Shōzan, see some notes in Nitobe's *Intercourse between the United States and Japan*, p. 27.

men as it would be to the foreigners then clamouring for a footing in the ports. And yet Hashimoto was among the Tairō's victims on this occasion. It is indeed difficult to pardon Ii of Hikone for the enormity of ending the life of this brilliant young statesman of 25 by the hands of the public executioner.

About the same time the Tairō proceeded to ruin the remnant of the officials who had worked so strenuously under Lord Hotta, all of them, be it remarked, advocates of the reopening of the Empire. Iwase and Nagai had been slightly punished in 1858, but as their services were then still felt to be indispensable they were not dismissed. Now, in September, 1859, they were summarily and ignominiously dismissed. While Kawaji and Toki were stripped of their revenues, and ordered to confine themselves within their own doors. To oppose the Tairō in his foreign policy would thus appear to be no specially heinous offence; the great crime, the unpardonable sin, was to oppose him and try to thwart him in anything. Another instance was that of Ōta, who was introduced not long previously into the Rōjū by Ii himself. He was found to have been making injudicious remarks and was promptly relegated to private life. It was against the supporters of Hitotsubashi's candidature for the succession to the Shōgun that the Tairō's wrath was chiefly directed. Daté of Uwajima and Yamanouchi of Tosa were now further punished by being ordered to confine themselves to their own mansions, and Hitotsubashi himself was dealt with in a similar fashion. As for Lord Nariaki, the Bakufu had already dealt with him in a very rigorous and drastic fashion. Now, however, it recapitulated all the numerous offences against the administration of which the evidence in the recent trial proved him guilty and sentenced him to be kept in ward in his own castle of Mito for the rest of his natural life. It is scarcely necessary to say that all these sensational developments provoked much secret criticism and great indignation in many quarters of the Empire.

The Tairō was, however, feared even more than he was hated, and men generally felt that they had to be exceedingly careful in the expression of their sentiments. All opposition seemed to be effectually crushed; as a matter of fact it had only been driven underground to gather force and virulence. Even in Mito itself the Tairō was presently to find that he could not do as he chose, even though the old Yuki party now held the reins of the clan administration, and were unswerving supporters of the Bakufu.

It has already been stated that the Court had been induced to favour the young Lord of Mito with an Imperial decree ; and it has been pointed out that in communicating thus directly with a vassal, the Court had slighted the prestige of the Bakufu greatly. The Tairō was determined to get possession of this document in order to return it to the Court, and Nagano Shūzen was commissioned to see to it that a new Imperial decree should be issued ordering the Lord of Mito to deliver up the dispatch with which he had been favoured. This course became necessary because the Lord of Mito declared himself to be unable to comply with the Bakufu's request that he should hand over the decree : a strong party in Mito would prevent him doing so by force of arms if necessary, and the Bakufu had no wish to precipitate civil strife at this time. However, when Kujō, the Kwanbaku, endeavoured to comply with the Bakufu's request, expressed through Manabe and the Shoshidai, he found the task extremely difficult. The Court nobles who had been parties to the Mito decree naturally enough offered strong opposition to what would be a stultification of their action on that occasion, and so, appreciating the situation, the Bakufu left the matter in abeyance till the fate of the conspirators on trial in Yedo was decided. As the result of this trial, the leaders of the anti-Bakufu party among the Court nobles found it advisable to withdraw into private life ; Kujō was left with a free field for the time being, and on 12th December, 1859, an Imperial decree was addressed to the Lord of Mito instructing him to return the document that had been issued to him in September, 1858. This new decree was to be transmitted to Mito through the Bakufu, and, according to its terms, the 1858 decree was to be returned to the Court not directly, but through the Bakufu. On 28th December, 1859, the Lord of Mito went to the Castle, and on that day the Tairō and the Junior Councillor, Andō, Tsushima no Kami, told him that the 1858 decree had to be returned at once. On the following day, Andō went to the Mito mansion, produced the lately received Imperial decree, and threatened the young Lord with most serious consequences if the document were not handed over within three days. However, as the Imperial paper was then not in Yedo but in Mito Castle, where Lord Nariaki was now in strict confinement, the delivery of the decree was ultimately postponed till 17th January, 1860. Couriers were now repeatedly sent to Mito with letters explaining the situation, and ordering the prompt

return of the document, but without the least effect. The old supporters of Lord Nariaki, now out of office, were fully determined that the decree should *not* be returned, and in the face of their opposition the pro-Bakufu fief Councillors, divided in purpose among themselves as they furthermore were, found themselves powerless. The more hot-headed young men, under the leadership of Takahashi Taiichirō, went into camp at Nagaoka, some five miles out of Mito, and there intercepted all correspondence between Yedo and Mito. Moreover they got possession of the decree, and depositing it in the mausoleum of the Mito family, vowed that it never should be taken from there. It was all to no purpose that another month's grace was obtained; on 17th February, 1860, the decree was still in the Mito mausoleum, and the Nagaoka malcontents still continued to examine all the messengers and correspondence between Mito and the capital. The authority of Lord Nariaki, who now dreaded a confiscation of the fief, had also been invoked, and although sorely against his will, he had at least felt constrained to order an attack upon Nagaoka by the troops of the clan. It was with the utmost difficulty that a small body of these at last got mobilized, and these were doubtless mightily relieved to find that at the very last there was no need for their services. On 17th March, 1860, the Nagaoka samurai and *rōnin* broke up and suddenly disappeared, while at the same time a great many of the discontented opposition party formally severed their connexion with the Lord of Mito and became *rōnin*.

Among the Nagaoka band there had been a sharp division of opinion; some were for obeying Lord Nariaki's last instructions and crushing those who still opposed them by force. Even among the stalwarts there was a split. Takahashi, with a few companions, dashed off for Kyōto to rouse the Satsuma, Inaba and Chōshū samurai against the Bakufu, a project that ended in speedy destruction to himself. Sano urged the execution of a still more audacious scheme; and seventeen others joined him in vowing that they would sacrifice their lives in an attempt to take the head of that tyrant and traitor, Ii, Kamon no Kami, the Tairō. The eighteen conspirators were all Mito men with the exception of a certain Arimura, a Satsuma *rōnin*, who did not sign the general manifesto carried by each of his fellows, and who only joined in the plot immediately before its execution. One of the band had already tried to shoot their intended victim three months before, but

although the bullet passed through his palanquin, the Tairō had then escaped unscathed.

The Tairō's personal friends were extremely anxious about his safety, and several of his own retainers, as well as of the Bakufu officials, suggested the advisability of his retiring into private life. On 21st March, just three days before Ii, Kamon no Kami met his fate, Lord Matsudaira of Yada had gone to the Hikone mansion and had most earnestly pressed the Tairō to resign his office. "My own safety is nothing when I see the danger threatening the future of the country," was the reply. The Tairō had a way of getting rid of importunate and inconvenient guests by telling them that it was time to go to Court, and then abruptly retiring into another room. On this occasion his friend seized him by the sleeve of his robe and tried to detain him, and part of the garment was left in his clutch. As Lord Matsudaira withdrew he cautioned some of Ii's retainers to be prepared for an emergency at any moment. At this interview the Tairō was advised to strengthen his bodyguard, but he refused to do so; its numbers had been fixed by statute, he said, and he as Tairō could not venture to modify the regulations for the sake of his personal safety. In truth his guard seemed to be quite strong enough to cope with any danger that might be apprehended. His mansion was only a few hundred yards distant from the Sakurada gate of the Castle; from that point up to the Palace everything was perfectly secure. Furthermore, the Tairō trusted greatly to the efficiency of his secret service. Besides the police spies swarming in every nook and corner of Yedo, Ii had his own confidential agents burrowing all over the Empire. Nagano Shūzen was only the most remarkable of a number of sleuth-hounds engaged in similar work. It is stated that one of these agents, operating along the Tōkaido, got to hear of the coming attempt on his master's life; he failed to reach Yedo in time, merely because a sudden flood delayed him for a day at Odawara. The success of Sano's plot was mainly due to the very simplicity and audacity of its conception. The third day of the third month (24th March, 1860) was a stated day for the Shōgun's levee; on that morning all the approaches to the Castle would be thronged by processions of armed men escorting their lords to court. The conspirators determined to await the Tairō's procession at the end of the 400 or 500 yards that separated the Hikone mansion from the Sakurada gate of the Castle, and there see what could be effected by a sudden and

determined assault. They had apparently found their way to Yedo some week or so before the attempt, and had been lurking about in twos and threes in various quarters of the city. How some of them had whiled away the time becomes clear from a document found on the person of one of them who committed *hara-kiri* immediately after the accomplishment of their purpose. This was a receipted account from one of the houses in the Yoshiwara itemizing the particulars of a frolic two of the band had indulged in on 18th-19th March.¹ On the night of 23rd March, the whole band met in a house of pleasure at Shinagawa, arranged their final plans, and exchanged the orthodox farewell cups of water. Just as dawn was breaking they passed out and sauntered along the way to Atagoshita in Shiba. Everything seemed to favour the enterprise in the most wonderful way. The morning had begun with a driving sleet and rain, and the sleet had ultimately given way to a thick fall of soft and fleecy snow. There was a cold and cutting blast whistling down from Tsukuba-san, and it whirled the snow-flakes about in such a way that the outlines of objects a few paces distant were all blurred and indistinct. The Tairō's escort would all be cumbered with raincoats; moreover, they would be sure to have their sword hilts in bags to protect the ornamental work from the wet. Presently, about nine o'clock, the band began to straggle down towards the Sakurada gate in threes and fours, dressed in a variety of fashions, some with clogs and paper umbrellas, others in short drawers with bare legs, others with raincoats, the intention being to simulate a fortuitous and haphazard concourse of peaceful inoffensive merchants, artisans, and peasant folk. Before the gates of the Hikone mansion were thrown open they were all loitering about in the open spaces in front of the Sakurada gate and attracting no particular attention from the guards or any one else, a fact not much to be wondered at as "at the time, so much snow was falling as to make it impossible to see a yard before one." Presently the head of the Tairō's escort of fifty or sixty samurai began to emerge from the Hikone mansion, and the fateful moment for action had arrived.

What now happened was really a matter of seconds rather than of minutes. As the escort approached the gate, some crouching

¹ Two *bus* (3s.) for Tamayoshi and two for Chitose, two girls; one *bu* (1s. 6d.) for a singing-girl, one *bu* for drink, two *bus* for fish, and ten *tempos* (6d.) for rice, with half a *bu* as a present to the servants of the house.

figures assailed its advance-guard from both sides, and cut down the *metsuke* in command and another officer. At the same time others of the band roused the ire of the Hikone men by perpetrating the dire feudal offence of jumping in front of the procession and seizing the spears with tufted tassels always borne upright at the head of the Daimyō's cortège. Naturally the samurai around the palanquin at once rushed forward to inflict condign punishment upon the audacious offenders, and at the same instant others of the conspirators hurled themselves upon the Tairō's rearguard. Taken completely by surprise, hampered by their rain-gear, and unable to draw their blades from the scabbard, the Hikone men were cut down or mercilessly slashed about and driven furiously back up the hill. A pistol shot was sent into the palanquin, whereupon the bearers threw down their burden and ran. Three or four of the *rōnin* at once thrust their swords fiercely into the palanquin, the door was torn open and the occupant (in all probability already a corpse) pulled out by the right hand. Arimura, the Satsuma man, at once lopped off the head, and uttering a pæan of triumph held it gloatingly aloft for a few seconds and then dashed off with it along the causeway. A badly-wounded Hikone samurai struggled after him and succeeded in maiming him with a blow from behind, but was himself cut down in turn. Meanwhile, when all too late, the rear-guard, reinforced by a swarm of men from the Hikone mansion, came pouring down the slope, and the *rōnin* suddenly disappeared. Four of the Hikone men had been killed on the spot, four others mortally, and fifteen others seriously, wounded. Of the assailants, five either fell or committed *hara-kiri* on the spot, eight delivered themselves up to Hosokawa of Higo and another Daimyō, while five got safely away for the time. Sano, the leader, ultimately died of his wounds in prison ; all the others, including the fugitives with one single exception, suffered the extreme penalty of the law in August, 1861.

The wounded Arimura, with the Tairō's head still in his clutch, had committed suicide in front of the mansion of Endō, the Junior Councillor, and the head had been taken up by some of Endō's retainers. The Bakufu ordered it to be delivered to the Hikone men, not as the head of their master, but of one of the vassals who had fallen in his defence. At the same time, the Hikone Councillors were instructed to keep the death of their Lord a secret ; they were to send in a report that he had been suddenly attacked by a band of

ruffians and somewhat seriously wounded in the *mêlée*. For some weeks formal messengers continued to be sent from the Castle to inquire after the distinguished patient's progress towards recovery. At last on 20th April, 1860, Ii of Hikone was relieved of office as Tairō, and on the following day his death was officially announced. About the same time, the Lord of Mitō was forbidden to appear at the Castle.

During all this time, Naitō, who had now become chief of the Rōjū, was at his wit's end. Cannon had been planted in the grounds of the Hikone mansion, and throngs of vassals came pouring into Yedo from Hikone itself, and from the Hikone appanage of Sano, in Shimotsuke, while the Mito samurai were working strenuously upon the defences of their Yedo *yashiki*. At one time the Mito and Hikone men seemed to be on the point of springing at each other's throats, and an internecine war between two powerful clans, both of which had been the strongest traditional supports of the Bakufu, was at once to be dreaded and deplored. The adroitness of Naitō's diplomacy, however, proved sufficient to avert the disaster that at one time seemed to be imminent, perhaps even unavoidable. A little later on the Rōjū was reorganized. Kuze and Naitō, who had been in the Great Council from Perry's time, and even before, still remained at their posts, and three new men were now called to their assistance. The most important of these was the Junior Councillor Andō, Tsushima no Kami, who was now specially charged with foreign affairs, and who is frequently mentioned with sympathy and respect by the British minister Alcock, in his fascinating book *The Capital of the Tycoon*. It is important to note that Sano and his associates expressly disavowed all hostility to the Shōgunate. They solemnly declared:—

“ Our conduct *does not indicate the slightest* enmity to the Bakufu. We swear before Heaven and Earth, gods and men, that our action proceeds entirely from our hope of seeing the Shōgunate resume its proper form, and abide by the holy and wise will of the Emperor. We hope to see our national glory manifested in the expulsion of foreigners from the land.”

In truth, at this date, the cry of “ Down with the Bakufu ” had so far been scarcely heard at all. Individual samurai, like Yoshida Shōin, had actually written against a stray pamphleteer who *had* ventured to assail the Tokugawa Government, and it was only when the Tairō had laid a heavy hand upon Lord Nariaki and the

Lords of Echizen and Owari, thus estranging the fiefs that had been the staunchest supports of the Shōgunate, that Yoshida changed his mind, and declared that the Bakufu could not be saved. But even in 1860, any idea that the Bakufu could be possibly overthrown had occurred only to a few obscure thinkers, who had as yet no influence in the administration of the fiefs. At this time not a single one of the outside Daimyō or of their Councillors had any intention of opposing the Yedo Government by force of arms. Even in Mito the responsible authorities were extremely pliant to the will of the Bakufu, and here we find some of the Nagaoka malcontents even protesting their loyalty to the Shōgun. It was against the person of the Tairō solely that their rancour was directed. To make that much perfectly clear it may be well to cite the gist of the chief manifesto the conspirators carried on their persons :—

“ While fully aware of the necessity for some change in policy since the coming of the Americans to Uraga, it is entirely against the interest of the country and a stain on the national honour to open up commercial relations with foreigners, to admit foreigners into the Castle, to conclude treaties with them, to abolish the established practice of trampling on the picture of Christ, to permit foreigners to build places of worship for the evil religion, and to allow the three foreign Ministers to reside in the land. Under the excuse of keeping the peace, too much compromise has been made at the sacrifice of national honour ; too much fear has been shown for foreigners’ threats. Not only has the national custom been set aside and the national dignity impaired, but the policy followed by the Bakufu has no Imperial sanction. For all this the Tairō, Ii, Kamon-no-Kami, is responsible. Taking advantage of the youth of the Shōgun he has assumed unbridled power, and to effect his autocratic ends he has gone so far as to confine, under false charges, Daimyō who would be faithful and loyal to the Imperial Court and the Shōgunate. He has proved himself to be an unpardonable national enemy. The power of Government in his hands will be too dangerous for harmonious relations between the Court and the Shōgunate, for he has gone so far as to interfere in the succession. Our sense of patriotism could not brook this abuse of power at the hands of such a wicked rebel. Therefore we have consecrated ourselves to be the instruments of Heaven to punish this wicked man, and we have taken on ourselves the duty of ending a serious evil, by killing this atrocious autocrat.”

Yet another document recounted the chief incidents of Hotta’s and Manabe’s missions to Kyōto, and stated that the signatories were fully resolved to carry out the Emperor’s mandate expressed in the decree of 2nd February, 1859, to expel all the hated barbarians from the Empire. It also made mention of as many as sixty Mito men being banded together for this purpose, and what lends

countenance to the belief that action was not confined to Sano and his seventeen associates is the fact that on the very day the Tairō was killed an abortive attempt was made upon the life of his friend and coadjutor, the Lord of Takamatsu in Sanuki.

By this time it seemed as if a very epidemic of murder had broken out in Japan. During the preceding course of the Tokugawa Shōgunate there had been occasional cases of political assassination, but on the whole such incidents were of comparatively rare occurrence, often with long intervals of time between them. Indeed, since the murder of the younger Tanuma in 1784, apart from Ōshio Heihachirō's émeute in 1837, there had been scarcely anything of the sort down to the arrival of Perry. More than one hot-headed patriot had thirsted for the portly Commodore's blood, and had concocted ingenious plans for taking his head. Then in Yedo, in January, 1858, Harris had been told that two desperadoes had been arrested and were on trial for a premeditated attempt upon his life. These two *rōnin* we are told, died in prison, probably a euphemistic way of saying that they were tortured to death. A year later came Yoshida's plot against Manabe, and this may be taken as the first instance of the long succession of murderous designs that were constantly being evolved and carried out in Japan during the next decade. The political assassination mania probably reached its culmination in 1862 and 1863. But already, even before the murder of the Tairō, the assassin had begun his horrible work. In the late summer of 1859, three Russians were literally hacked to pieces at Kanagawa, and a little later in the same year a Chinaman in the employ of the French vice-consul had also been cut down. Then in January, 1860, the native linguist at the British legation was assassinated in broad daylight, while on the following 25th February two Dutch merchant-captains were cut to pieces in the main street of Yokohama. Shortly before this, Harris had sent word to the British Minister that it had been reported to him that fifty men had been seized the night before by the police, it having been discovered that they had gone to Yokohama to make an end of all the barbarians there. At first it was the hated barbarians that were the chief victims in this virulent epidemic of assassination. But presently the agents of the Bakufu came to receive their due share of attention in the carnival of political murder. In the autumn of 1862, not a week passed without the head of some alleged official "criminal" being exposed in Kyōto

with a placard recounting the crimes that had brought the avenger upon him. On 15th November three constables in the service of the Kyōto City Magistrate were treated in this most summary fashion. The notice placed over their exposed heads stated :—

“Since 1858 these men have assisted Nagano Shūzen and Shimada Sakon in their traitorous schemes and have caused innocent patriots to be condemned unjustly. They are hereby punished for their crimes. A crowd thronged to stare at the sight. In consequence the Bakufu officials concerned with affairs since 1858, were in a great state of alarm; one of the police, Odera by name, disembowelled himself, while another shaved his head and disappeared no one knew whither. Some abandoned their hereditary appointments, their household goods, and families, and fled far away to hide their shadows from sight. They dreaded the *rōnin* as if they had been tigers or wolves, and remained shrivelled up with fear.”¹

At the great siege of Ōsaka in 1615, Iyeyasu had found an opportunity of clearing the Empire of *rōnin* for the time being, and nearly 100,000 of them were then exterminated. Although another crop of them got effectually dealt with at the date of the Shimabara revolt in 1638, yet the great *rōnin* conspiracy of 1651 had thrown the Bakufu into a panic of fear and dismay. Now, after the lapse of fully two centuries, the *rōnin* is again a sinister figure of dread in the land; a spectre that ever haunts the dreams of the officials making the weaker-kneed among them sweat the cold sweat of terror. In truth, on probing into the heart of the political situation of the times, it becomes tolerably plain that it was the *rōnin* and their sympathizers that were chiefly responsible for the fall of the Bakufu.

It is noteworthy that the usual ground for their earliest attacks on the Shōgunate was the notorious failure of the authorities to carry out the instructions of the famous Imperial decree of 2nd February, 1859, which ordered the Bakufu to perfect its military preparations and expel the barbarians from the sacred soil of the Land of the Gods at the earliest possible date. It thus becomes necessary to consider how far the Tairō really tried to comply with the Imperial commands, and also how far he sought to give effect to the stipulations of the treaties he had just concluded with the foreign powers, in all good faith, as the foreign plenipotentiaries presumed. In this connexion the memorial transmitted by the Tairō to Kujō the Kwambaku in 1858 is of some considerable importance. The following is the gist of that document :—

¹ *Genji Yume Monogatari*, vol. ii.

“The question of foreign intercourse is pregnant with serious consequences. The reason why the treaty with America was concluded was because of the case requiring immediate action. The English and French squadrons, after their Chinese victories, were very soon expected on our coasts, and the necessities of holding conferences with different nations at the same time might cause confusion from which little else than war could be expected. These foreigners are no longer to be despised. The art of navigation, steam-vessels, and naval and military preparations have found full development in their hands. A war with them might result in temporary victories on our part, but when our country should be beset by their combined armaments, the whole land would be involved in consequences which we can divine from China’s experience. This question of foreign intercourse has been referred to the Daimyō, and most of them appreciate the disadvantages of war with foreigners. In these circumstances no other recourse was found than to conclude a treaty and open some of the ports to their trade. *Trying this policy for ten or twelve years, and making full preparation for protecting the country during that period, we can then determine whether to close up or to open the country to foreign trade and residence.* To commit the nation to the policy of exclusion before any experiment, appears to be highly inadvisable. If it were only a single nation with which we had to deal, it would be much easier, but several nations coming at the same time with their advanced arts, it is entirely impossible to refuse their requests to open intercourse with our country. The tendency of the times makes exclusion an entire impossibility. Compliance with their requests will tend to bring safety to the whole land, and thus we shall be able to keep His Majesty free from cares and anxieties for his subjects.”

From this language it would appear that the writer was inclined to give his experiment of ten years intercourse with foreigners a fair trial; and we have seen that, when Sakai and Manabe wrote to him from Kyōto saying that the objections of the Court to the opening of Hyōgo were insuperable, and suggesting that one or two clauses in the recently-concluded treaties should be cancelled, the Tairō replied that the matter had been already settled, and that important stipulations of treaties solemnly agreed to could not be wantonly trifled with in the manner proposed. Thus there is no room to doubt the Tairō’s good faith when he sanctioned the signing of the American treaty. On the other hand, the Imperial decree of 2nd February, 1859, could not fail to place him in an extremely difficult position. Thus, while on the one hand he laboured to obtain Imperial sanction for a permanent opening of the country, it would not be strange that he should meanwhile endeavour to restrict the foreigners to a minimum of the rights actually accorded them by treaty. At Kyōto, it had been suggested to Manabe that, as the barbarians came for the profits of trade,

they might be induced to withdraw from the country of their own accord if matters were so ordered that they were allowed no profits to reap, and if their sojourn in the land was made as unpromising and uncomfortable for them as was possible. From what did happen there is ample ground for suspicion that this hint was actually acted upon by the Tairō. It was undoubtedly the Tairō that insisted upon Yokohama and not Kanagawa being made the site for the new foreign settlement; and we have seen that the British and American representatives were prompt to discern in this an insidious attempt to establish a new Deshima on the shores of Yedo Bay. Ii's new arrangement certainly was found to give the Japanese officials an opportunity of interfering in almost every commercial transaction, if not of controlling the trade as effectually as it had been controlled in Nagasaki from of old. For a year or so, the complaints of the foreign merchants on this score were incessant, and vigorous protests on the part of the Foreign Ministers were necessary before execution was given to the treaty stipulation providing that trade should be perfectly free from the intermeddling of any Japanese official. Harris, as we have seen, had plumed himself greatly upon settling the currency question as he fancied he had done. The ratio of gold to silver in Japan at this time was about one to six, and although the amount of alloy in the Japanese coins was large, the foreigners made immense profits by the purchase and export of Japanese *Kōban* and other pieces. But the Bakufu now promptly minted a new coinage expressly for foreign trade, and the rate of exchange insisted upon for this made nearly all transactions unprofitable, which was no doubt the very object aimed at. Alcock had much trouble in settling this difficulty, and has a good deal to say about it in his dispatches and in his book on *The Capital of the Tycoon*.

The Japanese had entered into the treaties mainly because they had been led to suppose that the British and the French would come with armaments to extort them, and that these armaments would certainly be found irresistible by Japan as they had been by China. Now, in 1859, the French met with disaster in Cochin-China, and at the Taku forts the dreaded British fleet lost three out of nine gunboats and 464 men out of the 1,300 they had had in action to force the boom across the Peiho, and to carry the forts by assault. Shortly after intelligence of these events arrived in Japan, Harris had a second audience with the Shōgun, and his

experience on this occasion was by no means so pleasant as it had been at his famous reception by Iyesada. No pains were now taken to keep his passage to the palace free, while his palanquin was hustled and he himself jostled and incommoded in a most unseemly way, by the retainers, grooms, and lackeys hanging about the outer courts as he passed in. It took him the best part of a year to get any satisfaction for this studied slight. A few weeks after taking up his residence at Yedo, Harris's secretary Heusken, then in company with the Dutch consul, got stoned and pelted with mud near Nihon-bashi, while two-sworded officials looked on with calm amusement, and about the same time the inmates of the British legation had to complain of gross rudeness from the populace in the streets. No doubt, the commoners had got a hint that they might safely indulge in that sort of thing; at all events, after a very vigorous protest from Alcock to the government, the ordinary street population became uncommonly civil and respectful. Alcock frequently complains that the Ministers and their suites were kept in a sort of moral quarantine, allowed to have intercourse with no Japanese except the armed officials detailed to "protect" them, who interfered with and hampered their movements on every possible occasion and in every possible way, while the extortion to which they were systematically subjected must have been something colossal. In the summer of 1861 Alcock writes as follows:—

"Life was insecure, trade was being daily restricted, and no remonstrance, protest, or argument, within the scope of diplomatic means had hitherto much availed to turn the authorities from a policy the manifest tendency of which was to nullify the treaties, restrict all intercourse, and ultimately revert to the former state of isolation by the expulsion of foreigners. To make trade unprofitable by restrictions, extortions, prohibitions imposed on their own people, with whom their power is absolute, and render life not only so insecure, but so intolerable in the conditions of residence that no foreigner would long submit or find such an existence endurable, seemed really to have been the chief object kept in view during nearly two years. This was the summary of their policy; and if these milder measures failed, the bravo's sword for assassination was always in reserve, and held *in terrorem* over the heads of the intruders on their soil, to be resorted to as occasion might serve without ruth or scruple."

A month before this, Alcock seems to have got something like an intuition of the real situation. He had steamed down to Nagasaki, and thence came up to Yedo mainly overland. In Hizen, the officials of Nabeshima's fief of Saga had insisted on making

him keep strictly to the high-road, and at Uyeno, in the domains of Tōdō of Tsu, he had met with a similar experience. In connexion with these incidents, he writes :—

“ It was impossible not to perceive that the ‘ free right to travel through the Empire ’ especially stipulated in all the treaties as the privilege of diplomatic agents, was effectually limited by the several Daimyō, with the connivance of the Tycoon’s officers, *to the high road*. I think this gave me the first clear insight as to the actual relations established by the treaties entered into on the part of the Tycoon. He had made treaties, but the Mikado had never ratified or sanctioned them, *and the Daimyō could not therefore be compelled to observe them*. Without the Mikado’s imprimatur they were binding and obligatory upon no one out of the Tycoon’s territories, the ports opened to foreigners and the capital of Yedo, and not upon the Daimyō and their subjects, even at Yedo ! For when these come within the limits of districts wholly under the sway of the Tycoon, they made no scruple in offering insult, or wounding and slaying the treaty-guaranteed foreigner. The Western powers had not made treaties with the Empire or its sovereign, but with the Tycoon, only reigning in five imperial ports with their adjoining districts. Later, when I returned to Yedo, and startling events brought the whole question of the Tycoon’s powers under discussion, I found full confirmation of the correctness of this view of the basis of treacherous quicksands on which our actual relations with Japan rest. Notwithstanding the affirmation of the Minister for Foreign Affairs *that the Mikado had ratified the treaties*, I think there can be little doubt that, to this day, they want the sanction of the only recognized sovereign of the Empire ; and this supplies a key to much of the vacillation and weakness of the executive under the Tycoon’s authority. They are paralyzed by the want of legality in the treaties, which they are nevertheless constrained to make a show at least of executing in good faith. Hence their confessions of compulsory regard to ‘ public opinion ’, of the impossibility of efficient action contrary to it, and their last *petitio ad periculum* as well as *ad misericordiam*, to be released from the clauses which stipulate for the opening of Yedo on 1st January, 1862, and three more ports, Niigata, Hyōgo and Ōsaka. The riddle thus read leaves little further to explain in regard to the jealous obstruction encountered through all the Daimyō’s territories.”

The Tairō had been killed more than a year before the overland trip from Nagasaki to Yedo which did so much to open Alcock’s eyes to the reality of the position. But since his death there had so far been no change in the policy of the Rōjū, and the Court of Kyōto was meanwhile kept assured that the preparations for the expulsion of the barbarians ordered by the Imperial decree of 2nd February, 1859, were being pressed vigorously forward. Alcock came very near indeed to divining the exact purport of what he saw going on around him ; a short extract from his chapter on “ The Foreign Relations with Japan ” will make that much clear enough :—

"These defences," he says, "have ever since been vigorously advanced. Large numbers of cannon have been cast, new batteries erected, steamships have been bought, and enough powder expended in ball practice and drill to have supplied ammunition for a campaign. These preparations for contingent hostilities were far too obvious and significant to escape the notice of the Foreign Representatives; and Her Majesty's Government had been more than once advised of the facts and the unavoidable inferences, namely, that the Japanese either regarded a collision with some foreign power and an attack as probable at no distant period, or they had themselves determined on a rupture, and were preparing to resist any attempt on the part of one or all to enforce the treaties. And if the progress of affairs and the succession of events since the opening of the ports be carefully studied, it is difficult to feel any doubt that the latter course was the one really contemplated from the beginning.

"In the meantime there is reason to believe that, in order to gain time, the least violent and reactionary of the party were put in office to maintain relations between the Government and the Foreign Representatives with outward professions of amity and good faith, but secretly under a pledge steadily to pursue a system which should render virtually inoperative all the more important clauses of the treaties in respect to trade, locomotion, and freedom of intercourse; and more especially to instil a feeling of insecurity and danger into the minds of all foreigners, beginning with the Representatives themselves, as the effect of a strongly excited state of public feeling, increasing and fast becoming intolerable. In support of which, various outrages and assassinations would not be wanting, until one of two things must result—either the Foreign Representatives would be reduced to the state of prisoners in the capital, or they would be driven to abandon the position as wholly untenable. It would not matter very much which; the desired end would be clearly in view in either case.

"If this were not really the policy and preconcerted line of action among all who exercise a controlling power in the Government of Japan, it would be something marvellous that the whole chain of effects should so perfectly and exactly correspond to the attributed causes. . . . It is not easy to believe in the perfect good-faith of a Government under such circumstances, and how can we trust to their professions of a sincere desire to observe the obligations imposed by treaties with the reservation 'so far as the state of public opinion will permit', which, by their own showing, is not at all."

Meanwhile, although pledged to effect the "expulsion of the Barbarians" as soon as possible, the Bakufu had been constrained to conclude a new treaty with yet another "barbarian" power. After five months negotiations, Count Eulenberg's Prussian treaty of commerce was signed on 21st January, 1861. In this treaty only Yokohama, Nagasaki, and Hakodate were mentioned, for the Bakufu officials were then exerting themselves to get the stipulated opening of Yedo on 1st January, 1862, and of the city of Ōsaka with the port of Hyōgo, postponed. Already, in the

summer of 1860, they had approached the foreign representatives on this matter, and the latter were found to be not unwilling to entertain the proposal. Eventually the Shōgunate dispatched a mission (February, 1862) to Europe to negotiate, which visited all the European Treaty Powers in succession, and returned to Japan at the beginning of 1863, after successfully accomplishing the main object. This was the second mission sent abroad by the Bakufu ; a previous embassy had been dispatched to America (13th February, 1860) to exchange ratifications of the Harris Treaty and to procure a fresh copy of the Perry Treaty.

Mr. Heusken, the secretary of the American Legation, had put his services at the disposal of the Prussian envoy. On the evening of 14th January, 1861, on his way back from the envoy's quarters, Heusken was assassinated. Mr. Harris claimed and obtained 10,000 dollars as an indemnity for this outrage, but he did not join the other foreign representatives in striking their flags and removing to Yokohama. After a month's negotiations, Harris's colleagues again returned to Yedo upon promises from the Bakufu of satisfactory protection, promises which the Bakufu was powerless to implement. On the night of 4th-5th July, the British Legation was assailed by a band of fourteen Mito *rōnin* ; about a year later on (26th June, 1862) it was again the scene of a murderous attack. On 1st February, 1863, the new British Legation buildings, just approaching completion on Goten-yama, were burned down by some Chōshū clansmen, one of whom was the future Prince Itō. In the May of that year the American Legation was also destroyed by incendiarism, and Pruyn, Harris's successor, was then constrained to join the other foreign representatives in Yokohama, whither all the consular officials at Kanagawa had meanwhile judged it expedient to retire for refuge. Thus, on 25th May, 1863, there was not one single foreigner residing in Yedo or at Kanagawa, while Nagasaki was being literally deserted by Europeans and Americans. The Bakufu might thus not unreasonably consider itself justified in claiming that it was really doing not a little towards the execution of the Imperial instructions given to Manabe on 2nd February, 1859.

CHAPTER XVIII

THE FALL OF THE BAKUFU

A

FROM hundreds of private contemporary letters now available in print, it is easy to realize that the death of the Tairō, Ii, created a tremendous sensation even in the remotest corners of Japan, and that the news of his assassination was received with intense jubilation by many, especially among the younger clan Samurai of inferior rank. The Tairō had been swift to crush all and sundry who presumed to thwart any of his projects; but it was upon those who had opposed him in the succession question that his hand had fallen most heavily. His signature of the American treaty, without waiting for the Imperial sanction, a few weeks after he assumed office, was a step that augured ill for the popularity of his administration. But that was not the only thing, nor even the chief thing, that concentrated the hate and execration of his enemies upon him. His treatment of opponents was at once arbitrary and merciless, and some of the keenest thinkers of our time in Japan roundly assert that it was the judicial murder of the suspects arrested in 1858 that really brought about the fall of the Bakufu. In their memorial the Mito assassins protested their loyalty to the Bakufu—it was solely against the Tairō, that their animosity was directed. But, even by this time, there were some in the land who drew no such distinction. Already in addition to the cries of “Honour the Emperor” and “Away with the barbarians” a third was beginning to be heard. This was “Down with the Bakufu!” But so far it had been confined to the *Rōnin*, for in 1861 there was not one single clan administration in Japan that had any thoughts or intentions of a revolt against the Tokugawa Shōgunate.

In the history of the fifteen years between the arrival of Perry and the overthrow of the Shōgunate, four clans played a very important part. In the early days it was Mito that was most prominent on the stage, and about Mito a good deal has been said in the preceding chapters. It has already been pointed out that Mito was distracted by two rival factors contending for place and

power since the fourth decade of the nineteenth century, and the course of the strife between them has been roughly sketched down to the death of Nariaki in September, 1860. It remains to be said, however, that shortly after the murder of the Tairō, the order to Mito to return the famous Imperial letter was recalled, and that posthumous honours were bestowed upon Nariaki in 1862. Meanwhile, however, the administration of the clan continued in the hands of the party that had been hostile to Nariaki and his favourite Councillor, Fujita Tōko. Fujita's son, a young man of twenty-five, resented this, and as a way of ultimately getting the better of the "Wicked Party" he raised the cry of "Honour the Emperor" and "Expel the barbarians", and left the clan with some three hundred armed followers. After extorting requisites from the townspeople in the neighbouring fiefs the band established itself on Mount Tsukuba, where it was presently besieged by Mito levies reinforced by Bakufu troops (1864). At the same time, Ichikawa, the head of the "Wicked Party" in Mito, had been laying a heavy hand upon his opponents that had not gone with young Fujita. They appealed to the Daimyō of Mito in Yedo, and the latter dispatched Takeda Kōunsai, a member of Nariaki's old faction and a friend of Hitotsubashi, to effect a reconciliation between the contending factions, while the Bakufu sent a commissioner for the same purpose. Both were refused admission into Mito, and assailed by an ambuscade of matchlock men. In the fighting that went on for weeks afterwards, Takeda was joined by Fujita and his band from Tsukuba, and Ichikawa was thus presently enabled to obtain the aid of Bakufu troops to crush the "rebels". The struggle went on for several months, but towards the end of the year (1864) the "Wicked Party" became altogether too strong for the rebels, their opponents. At this date Hitotsubashi was in Kyōto, and Takeda determined to make his way thither and appeal to him. With about a thousand followers, Takeda fought his way along the Nakasendō as far as Mino, when he learned that by Hitotsubashi's orders a strong force had been thrown forward to oppose his further advance. Thereupon the band wheeled to the right over the passes into Echizen, and in January, 1865, at last surrendered to an army from Kaga which it found in front of it at Imago. In March, 1865, Takeda and 350 of his companions were sentenced to death and the rest of the band to exile. For the next three years the "Wicked Party" was supreme in Mito; but in 1868 the tables were turned

completely. Ichikawa, who had escaped, was captured in 1869, brought to Mito, and "publicly crucified, head downwards, in broad daylight".

This bitter internecine strife effectually sapped the vigour and vitality of Mito; and as a clan unit after 1860, it had none of the influence it had wielded in the days of Nariaki. Down to 1864, the Mito *Rōnin* continued to be formidable, however; they assaulted a chief of the Rōjū, attacked the British Legation, and kept the foreign community in Yokohama in a state of constant ferment by rumours of impending massacre at their hands.

Tosa was one of the four great clans that played the most prominent parts in the drama of the Imperial Restoration. About Tosa a good deal has been said in an early chapter of this volume. The Yamanouchi family were established in Tosa by Iyeyasu, who transferred Yamanouchi Kazutoyo from the small fief of Kakegawa (50,000 *koku*) on the Tōkaidō to one of 220,000 *koku* at Kōchi. Yet Yamanouchi was not one of Iyeyasu's household vassals or Fudai; from first to last the family was ranked among the Tozama, or outside feudatories. But its successive heads never forgot the exceptional favour with which their ancestor had been treated by Iyeyasu in 1600, and down to the very last Yamanouchi Yōdō (1827-72) remained loyal to what he considered the true interests of the House of Tokugawa. We have noted the prominent part played by this Yamanouchi Yōdō in the succession question; a part for which he was rewarded by the Tairō by deposition from the headship of the fief and strict domiciliary confinement. From this confinement he was presently released in 1861; and from that date he at once began to play an all-important role on the political stage of his time. Through his marriage connexions with the house of Sanjō, Yamanouchi's intercourse with several of the court nobles became intimate, and in Kyōto he exercised a very considerable personal influence. In truth, he was one of the four or five feudal chiefs of this time who were distinguished for the possession of any real political insight or ability. Since the demise of the great Shimadzu Nariakira in 1858, Yamanouchi was perhaps the ablest man among the Daimyō class. Furthermore, he was served by some vassals of high capacity, and great force of character.

It has already been mentioned that Tosa was one of the few provinces of Japan where the *Gōshi*, or farmer-samurai, continued to linger. From their practical acquaintance with the actualities

of business these men were usually more intelligent than the average samurai, and at this date in Tosa there were some first-class intellects among them. Ever since the days of Yamazaki Anzai there had been a tradition of *Kinnō* or Devotion to the Imperial House in Tosa, and the stirring events since 1853 had done much to quicken this sentiment among the lower samurai. Among the Yamanouchi vassals there was a strong *Kinnō* party by 1862, though none of the party were in office. The great man in Tosa at this time was Yoshida Tōyō, who was an out-and-out partisan of the Bakufu. Yoshida's vigorous administration had greatly advanced the prosperity of the fief; in fact critics not at all too well-disposed towards him go so far as to admit that it was mainly Yoshida who made modern Tosa. However, the *Kinnō* faction recognized in him an insuperable obstacle to their plans and projects; and so it was resolved to remove him. He was assassinated one dark night in front of his house; and although his assassins had to seek safety in flight and become *rōnin*, the new clan administration did not frown upon the propagation of *Kinnō* sentiments as Yoshida had done. The leaders of the *Kinnō* party had already been coming to the conviction that the Bakufu was impotent to save Japan from foreign aggression; the only hope of national salvation, they held, seemed to lie in restoring the power of the Court, and entrusting the unified forces and resources of Japan to a vigorous Imperial Government. The cry "Down with the Bakufu" was now getting rife among the *rōnin* whose numbers were increasing every day; and some among them were beginning to dream of the possibility of overthrowing the Bakufu by the efforts of *rōnin*. This matter was discussed by Takechi, the leader of the Tosa *Kinnō* party, with Kabayama of Satsuma and Kusaka of Chōshū. Takechi maintained that such a notion was chimerical. The great object to strain after was the conversion of all the great clans to *Kinnō* sentiments, to get the administration of the clans into the hands of loyalists, and so have all the resources of the respective fiefs available for a united effort. Where possible, Takechi now argued, *rōnin* should be induced to return to their clans, and work for this object with heart and soul. From this point onwards, the loyalists in Tosa and to a less extent in Satsuma and Chōshū worked along the lines now indicated by Takechi.

In Satsuma also there was now a *Kinnō* party. Just before his death (25th August, 1858) Shimadzu Nariakira was making preparations to start for Kyōto, with a strong force of vassals behind him,

for the purpose of getting the Bakufu to institute certain reforms, to establish harmonious relations between the Imperial court and the Shōgunate, and to reach an agreement as to how the foreign powers were to be dealt with. For some time before this he had a confidential emissary at work in Kyōto, who was entrusted with a large measure of discretion. This agent was that Saigō Takamori, whose name was subsequently to become one of the very greatest in the history of modern Japan. Saigō had already given ample proof of devotion and ability in the discharge of some weighty and delicate missions where the utmost tact and astuteness were indispensable. He had a great deal to do with the negotiations that led to Nariakira's adopted daughter becoming the Shōgun's consort. He was also concerned in the dispatch of the secret Imperial letter to the Lord of Mito, and would certainly have caused the project to be dropped if he had returned from his secret mission to Yedo a day earlier than he did. The news of the death of Shimadzu Nariakira was a terrible blow to him, for besides rendering his present work in Kyōto ineffective, he felt sure that there would be a radical change in the policy of the clan administration. Nariakira's successor was his youthful nephew and adopted son, who was to be under the guardianship of his own father, Shimadzu Hisamitsu, a man of a very determined, haughty and autocratic temper. Probably the first result of his accession to power would be the recall to office of the aristocratic conservative councillors and officials whom Nariakira had been constrained to replace by more progressive and abler men of inferior birth. If that were so, the prospects for the Satsuma *Kinnō* party, to which Saigō belonged, would be the reverse of favourable, for all the older Councillors were warm partisans of the Bakufu. At the moment, too, the situation of the loyalists in Kyōto had become critical, for Nagano Shūzen was already at work there and Manabe was on his way. Saigō had contracted an intimate friendship with the loyalist priest Gesshō, who was now secretly harboured in the Konoye establishment, and he was presently requested to convey Gesshō to a place of greater safety. Saigō smuggled the priest out of Kyōto, under the eyes of the emissaries searching for him; but he soon perceived that there would be no hope of concealing him for long in the neighbourhood of Ōsaka or Kyōto. Accordingly he escorted him to Chikuzen and entrusted him to his friend Hirano, and then passed on to reconnoitre in Satsuma. A week or two later, and the hunt for Gesshō had

become so keen that Hirano deemed the sole hope lay in making for Satsuma at once, although no messenger from Saigō had so far arrived. On applying for shelter in a temple in Satsuma, the request was declined; and the clan authorities were furthermore promptly notified of the incident. From them, Saigō first learned of the arrival of his friend, and of the fact that Gesshō had been placed under surveillance. In a few days the priest was condemned to "banishment beyond the Western frontier". This seemingly harmless formula, which was frequently made use of when Tokugawa spies were detected in Satsuma, meant that the exile was to be summarily cut to pieces by his escort as soon as the party reached the Hyūga boundary of the clan. Saigō, on being apprised of the sentence, hurried to Gesshō's place of detention and conveyed him and Hirano to a boat ready for them on the Iso strand of the Bay. A mile or so on their course, Saigō and Gesshō went to the prow of the boat, and to Hirano they seemed to be admiring the splendour of the glorious moonlight scenery. They were really exchanging the orthodox and inevitable stanzas that Japanese samurai and scholars were accustomed, and, it may be, still are, to pen before taking leave of life. Gesshō was drowned; but there was still life in Saigō when the boat's crew recovered his body. The clan authorities reported his death to the Bakufu, and exiled him to the island of Ōshima under a change of name.

The incident occasioned intense excitement among the young samurai of the Satsuma *Kinnō* party—an excitement that went on increasing as successive reports arrived of the enormities of the "Swaggering" Tairō, who had meanwhile established a veritable reign of terror in Yedo and Kyōto. At last, matters came to such a pitch that a large party of the clansmen resolved to abandon the fief and wage war against the tyrant as *rōnin*. This was serious enough to make Shimadzu Hisamitsu pause. Towards the end of 1859 an autograph proclamation over the name of Tadayoshi, Nariakira's heir, was issued, in which the views of the dead chieftain were appealingly rehearsed, and his vassals cautioned against rash and precipitate action. This had a magical effect, the emotional samurai now tendered a written oath of devotion attested with the blood-seal to the ruling Lord of Satsuma. At this time of stress and strain only two men left Kagoshima to become *rōnin*, although several samurai deserted from the clan *yashiki* in Yedo and Ōsaka. Shortly afterwards, the old aristocratic conservative councillors

were dismissed, and replaced by men of greater mental elasticity. The result of this was that, for the next decade or longer, Satsuma really acted as a unit with individual counsels. At this date, it is to be remarked that Shimadzu Hisamitsu, the real ruler of the fief, cherished no intention of overthrowing the Bakufu. That was to come with lapse of time—about 1866–7—at present all that Hisamitsu aimed at was to induce the Shōgunate to effect certain needful reforms in its conduct of national affairs. For the present, Hisamitsu was anxious to keep away from Yedo and to avoid the necessity of passing the usual alternate year there, which all Daimyō were required to do, he actually caused his Yedo *yashiki* to be “accidentally” burned down. Thus, by one device or another, he was able to defer his journey to Yedo until the beginning of 1862. Before this his Councillors had represented to him that in such trying and troublous times, the sage counsel of Saigō Takamori would be invaluable; and so Saigō was presently recalled from his three years’ exile in the rain- and wind-swept island to which he had been banished. A few weeks later on, Saigō again found himself employed in his old role of secret emissary for his Prince—this time getting but a scurvy reward for the great services he was rendering. But before following him on his mission, it will be well to consider what the Bakufu had been doing during the preceding two years.

On the death of the Tairō (24th March, 1860) the chief responsibilities of the Bakufu seemed to fall upon the shoulders of Naito and Kuzé. These two were veterans who had been in the Great Council in Perry’s time, and even before that; but they were now soon overshadowed by a younger man who had just shortly before been promoted from the Junior Council. This was Andō, Tsushima no Kami, who was more especially concerned with foreign affairs after the death of the Tairō. In other matters, also, his influence soon became preponderant. It was he, for example, who completed the project already set afoot by Ii for the marriage of the Shōgun to an Imperial Princess. The Emperor had a sister (subsequently known as Kadzu Miya) of the same age as the youthful Shōgun, who was born in 1846. This Princess had already been betrothed to a Court noble; and apart from this initial impediment to Andō’s project, there was sure to be a great deal of opposition in the Court to any marriage-alliance between the Imperial line and the house of Tokugawa. A century and a half before, when Arai Hakuseki had proposed that Imperial Princesses should be disposed of in

marriage to the Shōgun or his heirs, the idea was well received in Kyōto. But Arai's suggestion had never been acted upon, and now the times had greatly changed. However, by great exertions in Court circles, which were assured that the Barbarians would be expelled in ten years, if the Court and Bakufu were united in counsels, Andō at last succeeded in obtaining the sovereign's sanction to the proposed marriage, and towards the end of 1861, the Princess left Kyōto for Yedo, attended by an escort of some 35,000 men. The nuptials were celebrated in 1862. In overcoming difficulties in Kyōto, the court noble Iwakura had rendered Andō invaluable service. Iwakura was a man who played one of the chief roles in the history of the Restoration; but the part he had taken in promoting these marriage negotiations presently led to his confinement to his own house for five years or more, and the temporary effacement of one of the two ablest men at the Imperial Court.

Andō fondly fancied that this stroke of his would go far to allay the general unrest among the Samurai. But in this expectation he was utterly mistaken—the marriage-alliance only added fresh fuel to the blazing wrath.

“During this period,” according to the *Kinsé Shiryaku*, “the samurai deserted from their clans in daily increasing number. They allied themselves with the *rōnin* in all parts of the country to raise the cry of ‘Honour the Mikado and expel the Barbarians’, thus creating a great ferment throughout the empire”.

Before the Shōgun's nuptials were celebrated, Andō disappeared from the political stage. On 14th February, 1862, he was attacked by a band of *rōnin* (six of them Mito men) and although he escaped with severe wounds, it was judged advisable that he should not reappear at the Council board. At the same time, the Bakufu exerted itself to conciliate the goodwill of the Court nobles by increasing the stipends of some twenty houses and by various other measures. At this juncture, too, it turned to one of the great Outside clans for support—to Chōshū!

Among the Chōshū samurai the *Kinnō* feeling and the *Kinnō* party were exceedingly strong. The moral influence of Yoshida Shōin was of great consequence among the clansmen, and among his pupils were some of the men who have played leading parts in moulding the destinies of modern Japan. By them, what they regarded as the murder of their revered teacher was never forgotten or forgiven, and at this time their resentment against the Bakufu

was intense. Chōshū men were hand-in-glove with Mito *rōnin*, weaving intrigue after intrigue against the authorities, and doing everything they could devise to bring these authorities into collision with the hated foreigners. Nowhere was the ardour for the "expulsion of the barbarian" more intense than among the rank and file of Mōri's vassals. They suspected that Satsuma was secretly organizing a great effort for this purpose, and they were greatly disturbed to think that their own clan might be deprived of the honour and glory of "leading the van", and playing the most prominent part in the work. But, just as had been the case in Satsuma, the clan councillors in Chōshū were conservative and inclined to move in concert with, and in submission to, the Bakufu and its instructions. A very able man, a certain Nagai, Uta no Kami, had the largest share in the confidence of the Lord of Chōshū at this time. As the result of his investigations on a secret mission, he had warned Mōri of the likelihood of the *rōnin* tendering their support to some of the great Daimyō of the west in an attempt to get possession of the Emperor's person, and to utilize the Imperial name possibly for the overthrow of the Bakufu and certainly for the expulsion of the barbarians by force of arms. Mōri, at this time, was on intimate terms with Kuzé, who was now the chief man at the Great Council board; and Mōri, seems to have spoken to Kuzé about the dangers of the situation in a very frank tone. Kuzé saw that every effort must be exerted to conciliate the court, and to establish harmony and unity of counsels between Yedo and Kyōto. This was the *Kōbu Gattai* (Union of Court and Camp) movement; and Nagai was dispatched on a mission to Kyōto to promote it. Among other things Nagai tried to convince the court nobles of the impossibility of expelling the barbarians at that time, and had recourse to the arguments that had been used by Lord Hotta four years before. It was this that chiefly occasioned his failure. His fellow-clansmen were so indignant with him that they lay in wait to assassinate him; and on his return to Yedo, he was condemned to domiciliary confinement. A year later on, he was ordered to commit *hara-kiri*. For the time being, Mōri, his master, lost much in prestige. And yet, in a year from this date, Mōri had all the *rōnin* loyalists at his beck and call, and in yet another year, his clan was able to defy the embattled might of the Bakufu and its supporters! For the moment the *rōnin* ceased to repose their hopes in Mōri, and turned to Shimadzu of Satsuma, who

was now on his way up to Kyōto and Yedo with a thousand picked clansmen behind him.

Here again the ardent hopes of the *rōnin* were doomed to a bitter disappointment, for whatever the sentiments of his vassals, Shimadzu Hisamitsu was exerting himself to bring about an effective unity of counsels between the Court and the Bakufu. Saigo, who had been dispatched to reconnoitre in advance, knew this quite well, of course; but he found it impossible to carry out his orders to have no dealings with the *rōnin*. He had also been instructed to await Shimadzu's arrival at Shimonoseki; but he found the general situation to be much more disturbed than could have been expected, and so he pushed on to Ōsaka for the purpose of repressing the intemperate zeal of the *rōnin* there, and utilizing them instead of allowing them to try to utilize Shimadzu and Satsuma. For this breach of instructions, and for supposed complicity with the *rōnin*, Shimadzu, on his arrival at Hyōgo, ordered Saigō to be placed under arrest and sent back to Satsuma. On reaching Satsuma, he was not allowed to land, he was at once conveyed to Tokunoshima as an exile, whence he was subsequently removed to a smaller and still lonelier islet, where he was subjected to a harsh and rigorous confinement.

Saigō had found the district around and between Ōsaka and Kyōto swarming with *rōnin*, all ready for any venture that might promise advantage to the cause. The chief spirit among them was that Hirano Jirō who assisted Gesshō in his flight to Satsuma and who witnessed his suicide. Ōsaka, Hyōgo, and Sakai he pointed out, had to be opened next year (1863).

“If these three ports were opened the barbarians would erect forts there under the name of factories, and would garrison them strongly. Thus they would get possession of the great strategical points, and cut us off from going to each other's assistance—dividing the Empire into two halves as it were. Then the Imperial residence would be in as precarious a situation as the proverbial pile of eggs. The expulsion of the barbarians would then be hopeless; it was plain that we should have to fold the left lap over the right, to take to writing across the page, and to have to use their stinking calendar.”

A few hundred *rōnin* could not accomplish much by themselves perhaps; but he knew what the sentiments of the Satsuma samurai were.

“Now let Shimadzu Hisamitsu capture Ōsaka Castle, advance on Kyōto, put the Shōgun's garrison in Nijō Castle to the sword, drive out all the Bakufu officials, set free the Tairō's imprisoned victims, and

after issuing the Mikado's orders to all the Daimyō of the seven circuits to carry the phoenix-car (the Mikado's palanquin) over Hakone and punish the crimes of the Bakufu."

Here we are brought fairly face to face with the new aspect in the situation—the cry now is "Down with the Bakufu!" This cry was unheard till 1859, and few were venturesome enough to mutter it while the Tairō was alive.

Shimadzu Hisamitsu, however, was in no mind to give any heed to it. The points he was going to urge at Court were that an Imperial edict should be sent to Yedo ordering that Kuzé, the chief of the Great Council, should repair to Kyōto, that Andō should be formally dismissed, that all the Tairō's surviving victims should be freed from all pains and penalties, that the ex-Lord of Eichizen (Matsudaira Yoshinaga) should be made *Sōsai* or Director-General of the Administration, and that Hitotsubashi should be appointed the Shōgun's guardian. Shimadzu aimed merely at a rather drastic reform of the Bakufu, not at its destruction. As for Saigō, even at this date he really held that the Bakufu must go down before Japan could be saved; but he had laboured strenuously to convince Hirano and his followers that the time for its overthrow had not yet ripened. Leaving half his men in the Satsuma yashiki in Ōsaka, Shimadzu pushed on to Kyōto with the others and took up his quarters in the old capital without any disturbance, much to the relief of the Shogun's commandant who had looked forward to an attack. Through the Konoye house, Shimadzu found ready access to Court, where his memorial was well received. When the Rōnin became apprised of its contents, there was a great commotion, the Satsuma men among them being especially disturbed, while some of the young Satsuma samurai left behind in Ōsaka were furiously angry. A band of these started for Kyōto to remonstrate, but Shimadzu, getting timely notice of this, sent some trusty followers to meet them in Fushimi and bring them to reason. The meeting took place in the Teradaya, an inn on the river's bank. When the ringleaders proved recalcitrant to their Lord's commands, the emissaries suddenly fell upon them with the sword. Eight of them were killed on the spot, while nearly all the assailants were wounded and one killed outright. In Satsuma, ideas of discipline were always very strict, and the methods of enforcing it drastic. Shimadzu was now requested to pass some time in Kyōto for the purpose of pacifying the *rōnin*, on whom the object-lesson of the Teradaya had a very

salutary effect for the time being, although all *rōnin* sympathy and respect were effectually alienated from Satsuma.

As for Shimadzu's memorial, the Court decided to act upon it in a modified form. Ōhara, a court noble, was appointed Imperial envoy, and Shimadzu was to escort him to Yedo. But the rescript he carried ordered not Kuzé, *but the Shōgun himself* to appear at Kyōto, while in addition to Shimadzu's proposals about appointments, an alternative suggestion was put forward that the Bakufu might now do well to imitate Hideyoshi's device and appoint five of the greater Daimyō whose territories lay on the coast, to be Chief Ministers (*Tairō*). This special suggestion was not adopted, but the others were, and the ex-Lord of Echizen and Hitotsubashi were presently installed in their new offices. And—most important point of all—the Shōgun undertook to repair to Kyōto :—

“ In order to come to a complete understanding with the Mikado, and to give expression to his sincere sentiments and intentions, thus laying the foundations of a complete accord and enabling the military prestige of Japan to be developed until she became the most powerful nation in the world.”

For two hundred and thirty years or so, not one of eleven successive Shōguns had deigned to honour Kyōto with his presence, and during their government, the Imperial Court would not have dared to summon even a Bakufu Counsellor to appear before it. A few years before, a Tairō found it easy to ignore its mandate to repair to Kyōto. Things were now moving rapidly indeed. Towards the end of the year, yet another imperial mission appeared in Yedo (escorted by Yamanouchi of Tosa) ordering the Bakufu to clear away abuses and reform the administration, and calling upon the Shōgun to repair to Kyōto in the following spring, there to issue his orders to the clans and proceed to achieve the expulsion of the barbarians without delay. In his written reply to this imperial mandate the Shōgun actually signed himself “*Shin*” or vassal! Such a thing was unprecedented.

Shungaku, as the ex-lord of Echizen was also called, acted as Sōsai or Director-General of the Tokugawa administration for no more than ten months; yet during that short time there were greater changes in Yedo than there had been during the preceding quarter of a millennium. On the occasion of the Shōgun's marriage with the Emperor's sister there had been a sort of amnesty for some of the Tairō's victims, and Shungaku himself, the ex-Lords of Tosa,

Owari and Uwajima and some court nobles were released from constraint and allowed to appear in public life. Now, there was a general rehabilitation of all those who had suffered in 1858, while drastic punishment was meted out to those who had acted as Ii's tools and satellites. His son and successor in the fief of Hikone was deprived of 100,000 *koku* of his assessed revenue; Naitō, Kuzé, and Andō were all dismissed from office, stripped of portions of their domains and ordered into close confinement. Almost every one connected with the negotiation of the foreign treaties was made to suffer, the lesser Bakufu officials being dismissed in tens and dozens. All this was of little consequence in comparison to the mortal wound the Bakufu now dealt itself.

On 17th October, 1862, an edict was issued with reference to official dress and the attendance of the feudatories in Yedo. About the change in dress and similar regulations there is no great need to waste time. But the new provisions about the residence of the feudatories in Yedo were nothing short of revolutionary. Instead of passing every alternate year in Yedo as they had had to do for two centuries and more, the Ōbiroma Daimyō—that is the great “Outside” feudatories like Kaga, Satsuma, Sendai, Tosa—were henceforth expected to remain in Yedo for no longer than one hundred days in three years. The lesser outside Lords and the greater vassals of the Tokugawa house were to spend one year out of three, while the length of residence demanded from the others was also curtailed. Henceforth, also, the Daimyō were no longer obliged to keep their wives and children in their Yedo *yashiki*. All this simply meant that the system of political hostages—the great sheet-anchor for the security of the Tokugawa Shōgunate—was abandoned! To quote the *Genji Yume Monogatari* :—

“In consequence all the Daimyō and Hatamoto who owned lands sent their wives and children to their country residences, and in the twinkling of an eye, the flourishing city of Yedo became like a desert, so that the Daimyō allied to the Tokugawa family and the vassals of the Shōgunate of all ranks, and the townspeople, too, grieved and lamented. They would have liked to see the military glory of the Kwantō shine again, but as the great and small Daimyō, who were not vassals of the Tokugawa, had cut at the root of this forced residence in Yedo, and few of them obeyed the commands of the Bakufu any longer, they also began to distrust it, and gradually the hearts of the people fell away. And so the prestige of the Tokugawa family, which had endured for three hundred years, which had really been more brilliant than Kamakura in the age of Yoritomo on a moonlight night when the stars are shining, which, for more than two hundred and

seventy years, had forced the Daimyō to come breathlessly to take their turn of duty in Yedo and had day and night eighty thousand vassals at its beck and call, fell to ruin in the space of one morning."

In the circumstances, as might have been easily foreseen, the political centre of gravity now speedily shifted to Kyōto. The author of the *Genji Yume Monogatari* was a resident of Kyōto, and at various dates he refers to the growing magnificence of the ancient capital. Towards the end of 1862, he notes that the Western Daimyō were beginning to assemble in Kyōto :—

" These were the vanguard of a body of more than forty Daimyō who came up to Kyōto the following spring (1863) and stayed there. All the large temples of the capital were occupied as the headquarters of Daimyō, and those who could not be accommodated within the city got temples in the neighbouring villages. Kyōto had never been so crowded since the visit of Iyemitsu, the third Shōgun in 1634."

It soon became clear that the feudatories were to be no mere birds of passage, roosting in temples for a short season. By the summer of 1863 :—

" The prestige of the court had become so great that every Daimyō tried to obtain an official residence in the capital. The Prince of Satsuma built a residence covering 2,000 or 3,000 *tsubo* in front of the Temple of Sōkokuji. The Princes of Tosa, Chōshū, Kurumé, Yanagawa, Sendai, and Unshū also enlarged the sites of their residences, while the Princes of Chikuzen, Inshū, Higo and others obtained new sites within the city, and the Princes of Owari, Echizen, Kishū, Awa, Aki, Aidzu, Kuwana, obtained sites outside, on which they all built residences. All the other clans, both great and small, and even the Hatamoto, cleared land both within and without the city, to the number of more than a hundred, and erected mansions for themselves. As all these places were filled with troops, the town assumed a very busy and flourishing aspect ; shops were opened everywhere, and the whole population down to the lowest classes began to get rich."

The Bakufu had been careful to keep the feudatories aloof from Kyōto. Even a few years before Shimadzu Nariakira of Satsuma, who was on the best of terms with the Shōgun's ministers, could find no access to the Sovereign ; when actually in Kyōto he would go secretly to the neighbourhood of the Imperial palace to make an obeisance from a distance, while his visits to the various court nobles had to be incognito. Contrast this with the state of things seven or eight years later on, in 1863 :—

" All the Daimyō present in Kyōto went to court to offer their felicitations to the Mikado, in the order of their rank, clad in court dress ; and among them were the court nobles in their court dress also . . . It was truly a beautiful sight. Outside the nine gates were

crowds of spear-bearers, matchlock-men, led horse and baggage coolies awaiting the exit of their masters. When the evening came on, hand-lanterns and lanterns on poles were lighted in such numbers that it seemed to be broad daylight in the palace. Such a splendid exhibition of the greatness of the court had not been known since the earliest ages."

One of the earliest of the Daimyō to establish himself in Kyōto was Yamanouchi Yōdō of Tosa. He had received a message from the Court requesting him to join his efforts to those of Satsuma and Chōshū "who had lately been exerting themselves on the Imperial behalf". Here we have the origin of the compound *Sat-Chō-To*—the combination of Satsuma, Chōshū, and Tosa, which was destined to exercise such a decisive influence upon the march of events during the next generation.

However, as regards Satsuma and Chōshū, there was already a rift in the lute. Iwakura, who was eager for the "Union of Court and Camp" had said that Satsuma and Chōshū were as the two wheels of a carriage or the two wings of a bird, and that their co-operation was indispensable. But there was a good deal of secret jealousy between the two clans; each dreaded the possibility of having to play a secondary role to the other. Mōri, Lord of Chōshū was at first a strong advocate of a "Union of Court and Camp" but his zeal had cooled, and the clansmen, who wished to settle accounts with the Bakufu, were now dominant in his Councils. When Shimadzu Hisamitsu left Kyōto for Yedo, the younger Mōri was in Kyōto. Shimadzu was requested to co-operate with the elder Mōri when he reached Yedo, but the day before he entered Yedo, Mōri had taken the Nakasendō route for Kyōto, and while Shimadzu was still in Yedo, the younger Mōri arrived with a fresh edict from the Court for presentation to the Shōgun. In one of its clauses reference was made to the Teradaya episode, for which Shimadzu was censured by implication. Until that clause was deleted he refused to meet Mōri. This was one of a number of incidents that made any real co-operation between the two great clans impossible, and led up to the furious combat between them that took place in the streets of Kyōto two years later.

Meanwhile, preparations were being pushed forward for the great event—the Shōgun's visit to Kyōto. Early in February, 1863, Matsudaira Katamori—the Lord of Aizu, was sent there, not as Shoshidai, but as military Governor, which was a new office! The Aizu samurai were among the most warlike men in Japan, and a

strong force of them now followed their chieftain to act as a Bakufu garrison for the Castle of Nijō in the old capital. A little later on, Hitotsubashi, the Shōgun's guardian, appeared, while Shungaku of Echizen arrived soon after. The agitation for the speedy expulsion of the barbarian had become intense in Kyōto, and the *rōnin* and the lower class samurai were insistent that the date for the great exploit should be definitely fixed at once. The court noble Sanjō, with some others, acted as their mouthpiece and visited Hitotsubashi to ascertain when operations were to begin. At the same time, Mōri called on the Kwambaku and urged him repeatedly to get the date fixed. Next day Yamanouchi Yōdō of Tosa saw Hitotsubashi and warned him of the seriousness of the position. All that Hitotsubashi, Shungaku and their advisers could do was to put off the evil day by temporisingly asserting that the date might be fixed after the Shōgun's arrival.

This great event took place a fortnight later, on 21st April, 1863. The last occasion on which a Shōgun appeared in Kyōto was in 1634 ; and on that occasion Iyemitsu was accompanied by 307,000 armed men. The Shōgun now brought a retinue of about 3,000 with him ; but among these there were only about a hundred cavalry and some eight hundred musketeers. Just twelve days before, the heads of the wooden statues of the first three Ashikaga Shōguns were found pilloried in the river bed, which was commonly used as an execution-ground, and the contumelious placard attached to them left no room for doubt as to the significance of the incident. In Iyemitsu's time such a thing would have been at once impossible and unthinkable. Aidzu succeeded in arresting some of the perpetrators, but Mōri interceded for them, winning great popularity among the *rōnin* in consequence, and in the end the culprits got off very lightly. Aidzu seems to have divined the danger of Mōri's gaining such an ascendancy over the *rōnin*, and he made arrangements to take a certain number of them into the Tokugawa service, a step that was presently adopted on a greater scale in Yedo. Mōri, however, was able to attract the better class of men, and in the subsequent struggle between Chōshū and the Bakufu, the *rōnin* did great work for Chōshū.

At this time it was highly imperative to do something to bring the *rōnin* under control. Since the summer of 1862, they had been guilty of a series of terrible atrocities. The *Genji Yume Monogatari* has a monotonous and melancholy tale to tell of those that fell

victims to the political assassin; but even the long list given in its pages is far from complete. In the first place, it was the late Tairō's minions, and those connected with them, who had been especially singled out for attack. Then merchants who raised their prices got summarily cut down. Next, those who had supported the "Union of Court and Camp" were assailed. The Court noble, Chigusa, had supported the Shōgun's marriage suit; the *rōnin* now murdered his trusted retainer and sent one arm of the corpse to his master, and the other to Iwakura, while the head, with a threatening paper attached, was deposited on a charger before Hitotsubashi's door. Freshly severed heads were even cast into the Imperial Palace itself. Iwakura had been ordered to take the tonsure and retire into privacy, while the ladies of his house who had served in the Palace were driven out, much to the grief of the Emperor. The cry of "*Kōbu Gattai*" was now replaced by that of the "Vengeance of Heaven", and Mōri was the great patron of those *rōnin* who relentlessly "punished" the discredited advocates of the policy which Mōri had at first zealously promoted. He now had a strong party in his favour among the court nobles, who, under the leadership of young Sanjō, pressed for the speedy expulsion of the barbarians with all the vehemence of Hirano Jirō or the most bigoted and bloodthirsty *rōnin* in the land.

The Shōgun had intended to pass no more than ten days in Kyōto; as a matter of fact he was detained there for ninety-four days, and in the end his vassals had almost literally to tear him away. On 24th April (1863) he paid his first visit to the Palace and "worshipped the dragon countenance". Four days later, he escorted the Mikado on his progress to the Upper and Lower Kamo Shrines, where His Majesty went to worship as a preliminary to beginning the task of "sweeping away the barbarians". After another audience with the Mikado on 5th June, a notification was issued to the Daimyō that the 25th June, 1863, had been determined as the date for the expulsion of the barbarians, while a subsequent decree ordered each Daimyō to muster a force in proportion to the assessed revenue of his fief, to be placed at the service of the Imperial Court.

On 8th June, the Shōgun again went to Court and begged urgently for permission to set out for the Kwantō where the posture of affairs had become highly critical. Permission to leave *was* accorded; but it was speedily withdrawn, and the Lord of Mito was dispatched

to Yedo to deal with emergencies there. A little later, Hitotsubashi followed him for the purpose of accomplishing the closing of the ports, which the Lord of Mito had of course been unable to effect. Presently came word from Hitotsubashi that he had found everything in confusion, and that it was totally impossible to execute the Imperial mandate for the closing of the ports. As for himself, he humbly awaited punishment and begged to be allowed to resign his post of Guardian of the Shōgun. Shungaku of Echizen had already (8th May, 1863) retired from the General Superintendence of the Administration, for he was convinced that the project of the expulsion of the barbarians was impracticable. But the Shōgun was still detained in Kyōto; the extremists, who were now determined to overthrow the Bakufu, saw the advantage of having him in their power there, while the exponents of the "*Kōbu Gattai*" policy fancied that his presence in Kyōto would strengthen their cause. At last, the Yedo Councillors dispatched an armed force in two chartered steamers to Ōsaka to bring him back by main force; and this force had got as far as Fushimi (22nd July) when it was learned that the Shōgun was really to leave Kyōto on 24th July. In Yedo, the Shōgun's presence had perhaps never been so absolutely indispensable as it was during the troublous hundred days of Iyemochi's absence. To make that much plain, however, it becomes necessary to hark back to an important incident of the previous year (1862).

On his way back from Yedo, Shimadzu Hisamitsu's retinue was met by a party of four British excursionists (one lady among them) at Namamugi, not far from Kanagawa on the Tokaidō. They did not break through the cortege, as nearly all Japanese accounts say they did, but in the opinion of Shimadzu's attendants they failed to show proper deference for their Lord, for instead of dismounting, they walked their horses along the side of the road past the procession. Narabara, the officer in charge, was an ardent exponent of the "*Sonnō Jōi*" doctrine, and he at once drew sword to punish this exhibition of foreign insolence. The lady's hat was slashed, but she got off safely; her three male companions were all wounded, and one so seriously that after fleeing back along the road he fell from his horse. Whether he expired at the moment, or whether he was hacked to pieces a few minutes afterwards is not perfectly clear. The Namamugi affair, as the Japanese call Richardson's murder, created a tremendous excitement at the time, not only

among the little foreign community in Yokohama, but also among the Japanese, and especially among the Bakufu officials. For the murder of two sentries in the last attack on the British Legation, the Bakufu had been taken sharply to task, and the settlement of that troublesome question was still pending ; now there was a still more serious affair to complicate matters. On 4th December, 1862, an indemnity of £10,000 was demanded for the death of the sentries, on 6th April, 1863, Lieut.-Col. Neale, the British Representative, acting under instructions from the British Foreign office sent in a long dispatch demanding an apology from the Bakufu for the Namamugi outrage, and an indemnity of £100,000. In addition to this, the assassins were to be brought to justice, and £25,000 more handed over to be distributed among Richardson's relatives and his companions who had been assaulted. To these demands a categorical answer had to be made within twenty days.

Meanwhile preparations for the Shōgun's visit to Kyōto had been completed, and Iyemochi had already left Yedo on 3rd April, taking about half of the Councillors with him, while his Guardian, Hitotsubashi, and the Director-General, Shungaku of Echizen, had been in the western capital for some time. Small wonder then that the officials left in Yedo professed to be at their wits' end, and did all they could to evade a settlement. When they perceived that further procrastination would surely lead to the opening of hostilities they signed an agreement to pay the indemnity in instalments on 14th June. On 17th June they wrote to say that payment was impossible, and the British representative thereupon broke off all communication with them, and placed the matter in the hands of Admiral Kuper who was then in Yokohama with the greater part of the China squadron. At one o'clock on the morning of 24th June, the representative was asked at what hour the money might be brought to the Legation, and four hours later the whole sum of £110,000 was duly paid over in Mexican dollars ! Less than three weeks before this, it had been determined in Kyōto that the expulsion of the barbarians and the closing of the ports should be undertaken on 25th June ! Now after the money had been paid over, later on, on the very same day, came a dispatch from Ogasawara, one of the Great Councillors in Yedo stating that :—

“ Orders of the Tycoon had been received from Kyōto to the effect that the ports were to be closed and the foreigners driven out, because

the people of the country do not desire intercourse with foreign countries."

The foreign representatives, each of whom had received a copy of this extraordinary dispatch, at once returned very vigorous replies. Nine days after, a formal apology for the Namamugi outrage was tendered, one sentence in which was rather strange in the circumstances.

"Thus we hope that affairs likely to break off the intercourse between the two countries may not arise again."

On 18th June, when war seemed to be inevitable, there was a general exodus from Yedo, where many officials absented themselves from duty. The Bakufu officials knew only too well that the closing of the ports and the expulsion of the barbarians were impossibilities, but the orders from Kyōto could not be entirely ignored. The Tycoon's envoys verbally assured the British and French representatives that the:—

"Mikado's edict of expulsion conveyed to representatives of the Treaty Powers as a matter of obligation by the Tycoon was a dead letter with respect to all action in regard to it."

Yet, a few months later, on 26th October, 1863, the Bakufu requested the American and Dutch representatives to:—

"Inform their Governments that the notification of Ogasawara relating to the expulsion of foreigners will be withdrawn, and to ask their consent to have the trade transferred to Nagasaki and Hakodate."

A few days later (12th November, 1863) the astonished representatives received the following communication:—

"As our government has for the present changed its former policy, we request you to return to us the dispatch which Ogasawara Dzusho no Kami addressed to you while he was still in office regarding the closing of the ports."

Of course, the key to what Neale characterized as the "mysterious policy and proceedings of the Shogun's government" at this time, was to be found in Kyōto.

Meanwhile, however, if the Bakufu showed itself so hopelessly lukewarm in the project of expelling the barbarians, the task had been taken vigorously in hand in other quarters. Along the classic strand haunted by the ghosts of the Tairā who had perished in the battle of Dannoura seven centuries before, Chōshū had erected a series of powerful batteries, while the steamer, the brig and the barque, which constituted the nucleus of the navy the clan was

forming, were generally kept moored outside the eastern exit of the Straits of Shimonoseki. On 25th June, the very date fixed for the expulsion of the barbarians, an American steamer—the *Pembroke*—passed through the straits and received the fire of two of Chōshū's men-of-war. A few days later the French aviso, *Kien-Chang*, was hulled in seven places, and only escaped destruction by slipping her cable and running out through the Bungo Channel. Again, on 11th July, the Dutch corvette *Medusa* had to fight a vigorous action to get through the straits, she was struck by thirty-one shots, while three 8-inch shells burst on board and four of her crew were killed and five wounded. A few days after this, two French men-of-war appeared to punish the outrage on the *Kien-Chang*; and on 20th July, a sharp action was fought, when some of the batteries were destroyed. The United States war-steamer *Wyoming* also proceeded to the Straits, and sank Chōshū's steamer, and inflicted other damage at the cost of one man killed and five wounded (16th July). During these encounters, the south side of the Straits remained perfectly quiet, and some time afterwards an Imperial edict reproved the Kokura clan, whose fief lay on that side, by implication for not taking part in the attack on the barbarians. "The neighbouring clans ought to send assistance," it said, "for the peril of Chōshū was the peril of the Empire."

The representatives of Great Britain, France, the United States, and the Netherlands, assembled at Yokohama on 25th July, and determined :—

"To establish a concert of all the disposable military and naval forces, for the purpose of opening the Straits of Shimonoseki, if the Bakufu failed to take prompt action to punish Chōshū for the series of outrages—outrages which were regarded as an attempt to carry out the edicts of the Mikado communicated through the Tycoon for the expulsion of the foreigners."

Six days after this (31st July) the Shōgun at last arrived back in Yedo. One of the first things now done by him was to address a memorial to the Mikado, representing that in the opinion of Mito and Hitotsubashi, with whom he had been directed to consult, the present juncture was an unfavourable one for carrying out the exclusion policy. To attempt it now would merely be playing into the hands of the barbarians. So soon as order was introduced into the administration, and harmony of opinion established, the necessary steps should be taken. He suggested that the fixing of a date should be left entirely to his discretion. This last clause

ignored the fact that the date had not only already been fixed, but had expired six weeks before. In the Imperial reply the Shōgun was commended for having come to court and so revived the excellent practice that had remained in abeyance for more than two centuries, thus placing the relations of sovereign and vassal on a proper footing. But the Shōgun was rebuked for failing to keep the Mikado apprised of his doings, for having returned by a steamer instead of overland, and for his unsatisfactory language in regard to the breaking off of foreign intercourse. He deserved to be called to account for his conduct, but out of gracious consideration, proceedings against him would be delayed. Ten short years before this, Kyōto would have quailed at the thought of saying even one tithe of this to a Great Councillor, to say nothing of a Shōgun!

In Kyōto, meanwhile, the advocates of the discredited "*Kōbu Gattai*" policy were gradually pulling themselves together in a supreme effort to wrench the control of affairs from the hands of the extremists. These latter were now represented in the first place by the Chōshū clan, in which that perfervid loyalist Kusaka had become exceedingly influential, by Takechi of Tosa, and by the *rōnin*, while the sympathies of many of the lower class samurai in the various clans went heartily with them. The rank and file of the court nobles, among whom the most influential was Sanjō, were also hostile to the Bakufu as well as to the barbarians. But the higher court nobles were still pledged to the "Union of Court and Camp". Prominent among these were Takatsukasa, Nijō, and the Konoye, father and son, with whom Shimadzu of Satsuma's relations were intimate. But the dominant figure in this coterie was that Shōren-in who had played a prominent part on the political stage four or five years before, and who now, under the title of Prince Nakagawa, and later on of the In no Miya, seems to have been the real power behind the throne at this troublous crisis. At all events this Prince of the Blood had a larger share in the Imperial confidence than any of the court nobles—such at least is the inference from the numerous private notes and letters that passed between him and the Sovereign. From some of these notes it is clear that the Emperor himself wished to proceed with the task of the expulsion of the barbarians with a good deal of circumspection, and that he was greatly concerned over the violent counsels that were then getting the upper hand in Kyōto. He profoundly distrusted the rashness of the extremists. For one thing they aimed at the overthrow of the

Bakufu, while the Emperor, down to the very last, wished to act through the Bakufu. He held the "Union of Court and Camp" to be a prime necessity; it was only a united Empire that could hope to make head against the insistent menace of foreign aggression. In April, 1863, repeated messages were transmitted to Shimadzu Hisamitsu (now called Shimadzu Saburō), that staunch upholder of the "*Kōbu Gattai*" policy, urging him to come up to Kyōto; and at last Shimadzu did appear there with a strong following at the beginning of May. In consultation with Prince Nakagawa and his fellow-thinkers, Shimadzu advocated a very strong and drastic way of dealing with the extremists, while Nakabara, the Satsuma samurai, who had distinguished himself in the Teradaya episode and who had cut down the Englishman Richardson on the great eastern highroad, now sought ways and means of making an end of Kusaka of Chōshū, the most active figure among the expulsion zealots. But a few days in Kyōto convinced Shimadzu that the policy of repression he so strenuously advocated could only be enforced by bringing up the whole armed might of Satsuma. Just at this juncture the whole armed might of Satsuma was imperatively needed at home; and after a brief sojourn in the ancient capital, Shimadzu hurried back to prepare for the British attack presently to be launched against Kagoshima, the capital city of the great fief.

When the British demand for the arrest and trial of Richardson's murderers, and an indemnity of £25,000 was transmitted to the Satsuma authorities by the Bakufu, the Satsuma men determined at all hazards to resist it to the last. On the death of Nariakira in 1858, the conservatives, who had then returned to power in the clan administration, abandoned most of Nariakira's progressive enterprises and projects. Now, under the impending menace of a foreign attack, the Satsuma men were at last in a position to appreciate the dead chieftain's work and foresight, and there was a sudden resumption of his policy. The defences of Kagoshima were rapidly strengthened, and with the completion of nine forts mounting about eighty guns along two miles of the strand in front of the city, and on Sakurajima and one or two other small islands adjacent, the clansmen began to fancy that they had made Kagoshima absolutely impregnable. When announcing the approaching departure of the British China squadron for Kagoshima, the Bakufu informed the Satsuma authorities in Yedo that the English demanded Shimadzu Saburō's head; and this falsehood naturally had the

effect of still further strengthening the determination of the clansmen to fight to the last.

On 11th August, 1863, the British China squadron appeared at the mouth of Kagoshima Bay. It consisted of seven vessels ; but four of these were small craft mounting no more than sixteen guns between them. The *Perseus* carried 17, the *Pearl* 21, and the flagship, the *Euryalus*, 35 guns, most of which were Armstrong breach-loading 40-pounder and 100-pounder cannon, a type of gun that was now to be tested in action for the first time. On this occasion the method of closing the breach proved to be defective—but, in spite of that, the destructiveness of the Armstrong gun came as a terrible surprise to the Satsuma clansmen, “the bravest men in Asia.” As soon as the squadron came up the gulf and anchored close to the southern end of the city of Kagoshima on the 12th, negotiations began. They were bound to be abortive, but it is interesting to observe that the Satsuma minister laid it down that in everything Satsuma had acted in accordance with the orders of the Yedo Government.

“We have heard something of a treaty having been negotiated in which a certain limit was assigned to foreigners inside which they might move about ; but we have not heard of any stipulation by which they are authorized to impede the passage of a road . . . The insufficiency of the Yedo Government, who govern and direct everything, is shown by their neglecting to insert in the treaty (with foreigners) the laws of the country (in respect to these matters) which have existed from ancient times.”

Here one of the great and venerable institutions of Japan stood upon its defence behind eighty pieces of modern artillery ; and the supporters of the Daimyō's right to make every commoner crouch and knock his head on the ground as the procession swept along the highway had not the slightest intention of yielding. At this point, ninety-eight samurai of the clan were drinking farewell cups of water with their Lord ; they were setting out in the guise of pedlars to get on board the various barbarian vessels and cut down the officers, while the batteries were to open fire at the same time. The largest body of thirty-two did actually get on board the flagship but the precautions with which they were received precluded any attempt at the execution of their desperate project. Some of these desperadoes have since held not merely high office but the very highest offices in Japan.

On the evening of the 14th, the British representative felt constrained to place matters in the hands of Admiral Kuper, who

commanded the squadron. Next forenoon (the anniversary of Xavier's landing at Kagoshima) three Satsuma steamers, which were lying further up the Bay at Shigetomi, were seized. These had just cost the clan 305,000 dollars—thrice the amount of the indemnity demanded. As soon as this action was reported to Shimadzu Saburō and his son, orders were given to open fire on the "pirates". Taken by surprise, the British ships had to cut their cables before they could form in line of column and treat the batteries to their broadsides in succession. Just at this time (noon of 15th August, 1863) a torrential downpour of rain began, which continued till noon of the following day, while the typhoon that accompanied it raged for some hours longer. Nearly all the batteries were silenced, and the chief fort all but demolished; but the actual Japanese loss of life was wonderfully small, for only ten men were killed, and eleven wounded, against thirteen killed and fifty wounded in the squadron. On the other hand, the loss of property was enormous. The three arrested steamers and some large Lūchū junks were fired and sunk, the arsenal burned, and the greater part of the city of Kagoshima reduced to ashes. The deadly efficiency of modern armaments made a tremendous impression upon the Satsuma men. Although they at once set vigorously to work to repair damages, and to put themselves in a position to meet a second British attack, there was nothing they dreaded more. It would be disastrous to their own fief, and with the chaotic state of affairs in Kyōto and elsewhere, it might well prove disastrous to Japan. Ōkubo, the ablest among the clan councillors, was dispatched to Yedo, there secretly to direct the negotiations which it was determined to open with the British representative. Some of the Satsuma men in Yedo were bitterly opposed to instituting any such negotiations; on returning to what had been the city of Kagoshima, however, they speedily changed their minds. Four months later on, the indemnity was paid for Satsuma by the branch clan of Sadowara, and an engagement given to search for Richardson's assassins, while Neale undertook to facilitate Satsuma's purpose of purchasing a man-of-war in England. This was really the beginning of the extremely friendly relations that have ever since subsisted between the men of Satsuma and the British diplomatic officials in Japan. Shimadzu Saburō was kept perfectly well-informed of all that then passed in Yokohama; but the anti-foreign feeling was so strong in Kyōto where he was then strenuously at work that he

had to make a pretence of punishing his agents who "had compromised the honour of the clan". The withdrawal of the British squadron from Kagoshima was generally regarded as a glorious victory for Satsuma. Shimadzu was eulogized both by the Court and the Bakufu, and his "brushing away of the barbarians" did much to regain the esteem of the *rōnin* whom he had so sadly disappointed in 1862. But now, as then, Shimadzu wished to have nothing to do with the *rōnin*. In fact, he was sternly resolved to make an end of the *rōnin* nuisance once for all.

Meanwhile, the extremists had met with a serious set-back in Kyōto. One of their leaders, the Court noble Amenokoji, was assassinated, and as some Satsuma men were suspected of the crime, the Satsuma troops were relieved of their ward of the palace gate that had been entrusted to them, and Chōshū became still more powerful in Kyōto. Kusaka, the Chōshū loyalist, and his friends all saw their opportunity in the failure of the Bakufu to close the ports as had been ordered. It was now notified that as an immediate preliminary to "sweeping away the barbarians" the emperor was to go to pray at the tomb of Jimmu Tennō and the Kasuga Temple in Yamato, and afterwards, at the Great Shrines of Ise, while orders were sent to the Daimyō to furnish military contingents in proportion to their assessed revenue. Kusaka's real object seems to have been, if not to obtain control over the person of the Emperor, at all events to obtain Imperial sanction to "Chastise the Bakufu". The Emperor gave Prince Nakagawa to understand that he was really opposed to any such precipitate measures as had been announced. The Prince thereupon took counsel with his friends, summoned Aidzu and Satsuma samurai then in Kyōto secretly on 27th and 29th September, and arranged with them for what was practically a *coup d'état*.

On 30th September, 1863, the Chōshū commandant was informed that henceforth no Chōshū man could be allowed within the precincts of the Palace. At the same time all the nine gates were manned by a strong force of Aidzu and Satsuma samurai, and Inaba, Bizen, Yonezawa, and some others were ordered to send detachments at once, while Sanjō and his friends were stripped of their offices. The result of the terrible commotion that ensued was that the Chōshū men withdrew from Kyōto, taking with them Sanjō and six other court nobles who were soon after put to the ban. The repression of *rōnin* truculence in Kyōto was now taken vigorously

in hand, and the city was soon relieved from the unwelcome presence of these blood-thirsty swashbucklers. Some of them, under Nakayama, a court noble, raised a great disturbance in Yamato, where they killed a number of Bakufu officials, seized the government buildings and were only dispersed after the levies of the neighbouring clans had been mobilized to deal with them. Later on, in November, there was another *rōnin* émeute at the mines of Ikuno in Tamba, in which Hirano Jirō and Sawa, one of the seven exiled court nobles were compromised. But Chōshū was now the great refuge for the lordless two-sworded men ; there they were organized in regiments and companies for service against the barbarians, or for any other enterprise that might offer.

Chōshū was presently called upon to explain his action in firing on foreign ships, and in attacking the Kokura clan. His defence was that the 25th June, 1853, was the date fixed for the expulsion of the barbarians, and that it was to be presumed that hostile action was to be immediate, inasmuch as any parleying that might have been contemplated would have already taken place. As the Kokura clan had failed to support the Chōshū efforts, there was surely nothing irregular in sending people to expostulate with it. The Chōshū chieftain also sent in repeated memorials protesting against the events of 30th September, and begging for the restoration of Sanjō and his fellows to office, but without effect. The clans of Inaba, Bizen, Yonezawa, and Tsuyama were all more or less in sympathy with Chōshū, they urged that the Shōgun should be called to task for his failure to close Yokohama, while they warned the Bakufu that "if the offences of the seven nobles and Chōshū were not condoned, calamity would closely follow". Others, however, were meanwhile getting bold enough to say publicly that the task of expelling the barbarians was an impossible one. The Bakufu had long since realized this much, and Shimadzu and his able councillors now also began to do so. But they could scarcely afford to say as much openly just yet. Shungaku of Echizen was tolerably frank, however. Since his resignation he had kept at home at Fukui, and he now sent up a memorial to the effect that the Court and the Bakufu were both pursuing a mistaken policy. For the Empire to remain isolated was impracticable, and to break off connexions with the Five Western Powers without just reason would amount to a breach of faith. The "pernicious doctrine" so much talked about was quite different from the "Kirishtan" of former times, and as

far as he could hear no harm need be anticipated from its toleration. Commerce would enrich Japan, as it had done other countries. Until the Court changed its foreign policy, Shungaku and his son would keep aloof from it.

Before the year (1863) was out, however, Shungaku again found himself in Kyōto. At Otsu he was met by Komatsu, another of Shimadzu's able and trusty Councillors, and Komatsu now said some very remarkable things to him. He said that Japan could not continue to go on as she was doing. To deal with foreign powers a strong government was absolutely necessary. Either the Bakufu must be rehabilitated in its authority, or failing that, *power must be transferred to the Imperial Court*. When a responsible minister of one of the greatest and most powerful fiefs in the Empire began to express views of this sort, matters might be expected soon to get serious for the Bakufu. Meanwhile, Shimadzu Saburō was really exerting himself strenuously for the rehabilitation of its power. For the third time since 1862, he again appeared in Kyōto (13th November, 1863) and at once sent requests to the ex-lords of Tosa, Echizen and Uwajima, to join him there. All of these, it will be observed, were loyal to the Bakufu, and at the same time adverse to the exclusion policy. Shimadzu was also urgent that the Shōgun and Hitotsubashi should pay another visit to Kyōto, to retrieve the mischances of the previous one. Among the Bakufu officials the opposition to this proposal was exceedingly strong; and after this had been overcome the burning down of Yedo Castle afforded the objectors an excellent excuse for cancelling the arrangements. Shimadzu, however, finally triumphed over all obstacles, and the Shōgun was again in Kyōto from 22nd February to 10th June, 1864. On this occasion, the results were as auspicious for the Shōgun as they had been humiliating on the original visit. He was granted several Imperial audiences, and many addresses and communications passed between him and the Sovereign during the one hundred and thirteen days of his stay. In an early decree the Mikado was made to say that:—

“The subjugation of the ugly barbarians is a fundamental law in our polity, and we must set an army on foot to strike awe into them and chastise them. But we like not, in truth, a reckless attack upon the barbarians. Do you, therefore, ponder an efficient scheme and submit it to Us. We will then discuss its merits with care and come to a firm and irrevocable determination.”

In the last Imperial instructions to the Shōgun (3rd June, 1864)

a few sentences indicate how thoroughly the good understanding between the Court and the Camp had been established :—

“ The duties of the Bakufu are, on the one hand, to govern the Empire in peace, and on the other to subjugate the barbarians . . . His Majesty in the exercise of his wisdom *has seen fit to commit full powers to the Bakufu*, and he desires that the orders of government shall therefore proceed from a single centre so that the suspicions of the popular mind shall not be excited. He therefore orders you to fulfil the duties of your office enumerated above. Further, you must accomplish without fail the exploit of closing the port of Yokohama. With respect to the punishment of Chōshū, His Majesty gives you no special directions as to the runaway nobles and the turbulent retainers of that clan but you are ordered to punish them as you think fit, full powers being entrusted to you for that purpose.”

About the closing of Yokohama it should be said that on the very day the Shōgun left Yedo for Kyōto, envoys set out for Europe to negotiate that matter with the various treaty-powers. Their ostensible purpose was to tender an apology to the French Government for the murder of Lieutenant Camus, who had been foully assassinated near Yokohama on 14th October, 1863. Shimadzu Saburō had hotly attacked the project of closing one port and leaving others open ; and he now maintained that this mission of the Bakufu to the various governments would be totally abortive. The reception the envoys met with in Paris sufficed to convince them that the mission was hopeless elsewhere ; in August, 1864, when they returned with a convention engaging the Shōgun to open the Straits of Shimonoseki within three months, they were punished by relegation to private life. Shimadzu was not pleased to find that his views on this point were slighted ; and the Bakufu must have had its misgivings about disregarding them—all the more so, as an Imperial decree had just designated him and the Lord of Aidzu, and the ex-Lords of Echizen, Tosa and Uwajima, as the five most trusty military men in the Empire, and had ordered the Shōgun “ to be affectionate to them, and to work with them ”.

In all these decrees, the Mikado spoke as the real Sovereign of Japan addressing a subject who had to obey. Ten years before he could have presumed to do no such thing. Furthermore, the Shōgun now really behaved as a respectful and submissive vassal. He sent in a memorial of eighteen articles proposing among other things that all future Shōguns should proceed to Kyōto for their investiture, as should also the Go-san-ké and other Daimyō on succeeding to their fiefs, while all the Western Daimyō were to pay

their respects to His Majesty on their way to and from Yedo. We must always remember that for generations all access to the Sovereign had been forbidden to the feudatories by the Bakufu ! The Daimyō were also to make annual gifts to the Mikado of the products of their fiefs, while several other new services for the benefit of the Court were imposed upon the Bakufu, the feudatories, and the nation at large. Although the Shōgun had now been reduced to his real status of a vassal, the entrustment of full powers to him was a bitter disappointment to the extreme loyalists whose wrath was gathering apace :—

“ The two provinces of Nagato and Suwo (Chōshū) began to get highly excited, and it was soon reported at Kyōto and Ōsaka that the assembled *rōnin* of Chōshū would shortly call upon Lord Mōri and the seven nobles to take command of them and lead them to Kyōto. When this rumour became commonly known men’s minds became ill at ease, and all felt as if they were walking on a thin sheet of ice.”

Meanwhile the Chōshū men had been giving fresh provocation. In the autumn of 1863, the Bakufu sent a mission to Kyūshū on board one of its own steamers. It was fired upon as it entered the Straits of Shimonoseki, and on word being sent ashore that the vessel belonged to the Bakufu, the Chōshū men replied that any vessel of barbarian construction would be fired at and destroyed. Two censors on board were ordered to land ; they did so and were shortly afterwards assassinated, while the Kokura pilots in the vessel had to commit *hara-kiri*. On 1st February, 1864, a Satsuma steamer was fired on and sunk and the greater part of her crew killed or wounded. The Satsuma men wished to take vengeance, but the Court induced them to leave the settlement of the affair to the Bakufu, whose duties were to *maintain peace in the Empire*, and to subjugate the barbarian. The Chōshū men were now putting forth every effort to have their chieftains reinstated in the favour of the Court, and the seven banished nobles restored to rank and office.

“ Numerous petitions were addressed to the Heavenly Court, but the clouds which floated in the air had not yet cleared away, and still continued to obscure the sky. They had alternation of lamentation and wrath, until at last their indignation became so strong that there was nothing left but to go up to Kyōto, with a display of military force, sweep away the traitor, and the wicked man from the Sovereign’s side, and force the Heavenly Court to listen to their petitions.”

The first expeditionary force of 400 men that set out from Chōshū on 22nd July, consisted largely of *rōnin*. Reaching Ōsaka by sea, on the 24th, it pushed on to Yamazaki between Kyōto and Ōsaka,

and established a base on the high grounds of Tennōzan. The commander, Fukubara, advanced to Fushimi with part of the force, and took up his quarters in the clan *yashiki* there (26th July). Meanwhile the Chōshū men who had been permanently staying in their Kyōto *yashiki* had withdrawn to the Tenryūji in Saga to the west of the city. On the last day of the month, a strong body of men were moved up from Yamazaki to Saga, and early in August another Chōshū *Karō*, Kunishi, Shinano no Kami, arrived in Saga with a body of two hundred troops fresh from the fief. Kunishi's ostensible mission was to restrain the impetuosity of the rank and file. A week or so later yet another Chōshū *Karō*, Masuda, was dispatched with another body of troops for a similar purpose. He took up his quarters at Yamazaki on 15th August, 1864. Thus the Chōshū men could operate from the three bases of Yamazaki, Fushimi, and Saga. In the fighting of 20th August, however, it was only the Saga and Yamazaki divisions that appeared in Kyōto, the Fushimi men being effectively held in check by the Bakufu partisans opposed to them. All told, these three bands could not have amounted to as much as 2,000 men. Kyōto at this time was held by some Bakufu troops, and a considerable force of Aidzu samurai under their Lord, Katamori, while there were a good many men in the *yashiki* of the Fudai and outside Daimyō also available for the defence of the palace. Nevertheless, Hitotsubashi, who had resigned his office of Guardian and was now staying in Kyōto as Protector of the Palace and Commander-in-Chief of the Maritime Defences, sent out urgent orders to all the neighbouring clans to hurry up their levies to the capital. Negotiations began by the presentation of a petition from the division at Yamazaki. "They asked that the seven nobles and Mōri and his son might be exonerated from the imputations so unjustly cast upon them, since the two latter had obeyed His Majesty's desire that the barbarians should be expelled. That hoping His Majesty would announce that he had renewed his determination of expelling the barbarians, the clansmen and the servants of the seven nobles had ventured to come and make their tearful prayer." In the council held to discuss this petition, Hitotsubashi and Aidzu—and Aidzu especially—were for stern and rigorous measures. But many of the court nobles and of the outside samurai dwelt on the dangers of the situation and suggested that it might be well to accord the petitioners a patient hearing. Later on, on learning of Masuda's arrival at Yamazaki with fresh

troops, Aidzu and the Bakufu men at once memorialized the Mikado to order summary chastisement, and in this they were supported by the all-powerful Prince Nakagawa, now known as the In-no-Miya. On the other hand, no fewer than seventy court nobles signed a petition praying His Majesty to deal with the matter in a spirit of clemency, while a similar document was presented by the outside clansmen. "Thus the counsels of the Court divided between the two courses of action were like the bubbling up of a boiling cauldron." The In-no-Miya and Aidzu stood resolute, however. All the troops in Kyotō, including the samurai of Satsuma, Echizen, Hikone and other clans were ordered to hold themselves in readiness to march, and on 19th August, a document was transmitted to the leaders at Yamazaki and Saga, which indicated that there was absolutely no room for any further parleyings.

"As this attempt to intimidate the Imperial Court is an offence of the highest magnitude, the Imperial Court has decreed the chastisement of the Chōshū clansmen collected in various places. As it is probable that the two provinces of Nagato and Suwo share in the agitation, they will also be chastised severely. Those who have come up to the capital since the rebellion will be dealt with as they deserve, and, if any improper behaviour is manifested in their native country, forces will be continuously poured upon them for their chastisement."

The Chōshū men thereupon at once determined on the wager of battle, and before dawn on the following day (20th August) the Saga band advanced upon Kyōto in two divisions, and succeeded in entering the city, the Saga division in the van. Their great object was to make an end of their arch-foe the Lord of Aidzu, who for the last ten days had been encamped in the grounds of the palace. The fighting that followed was of the most furious description. At first, the Chōshū men forced their way into the palace grounds, and attacked those of Aidzu with such dash that the latter were forced to give way. Satsuma, however, came to the rescue and the Chōshū men were hopelessly overborne by weight of numbers, for in addition to the Shōgun's troops and those of the clans already mentioned, they had to deal with levies from Kuwana, Hikone, Ōgaki, and several smaller clans. The author of the *Genji Yume Minogatari* was a terror-stricken, yet fascinated, eyewitness of the conflict, and in his pamphlet of two-hundred and forty pages he devotes more than seventy to the four hours' fighting that went on around him on the forenoon of 20th August, 1864. There are numerous passages in his narrative that read like a rather poor prose translation of the battle-

scenes in the Iliad. It is startling to reflect that from this Homeric engagement of 20th August, 1864, to the Yalu and Port Arthur and the great battles in Manchuria which are now studied¹ as the most up-to-date practical expositions of the art of war, is only a matter of forty years. It was in this fierce and furious encounter that Kusaka, the great Chōshū loyalist, lost his life. Another, who had been almost as distinguished an exponent of *Kinnō* (Devotion to the Emperor) as Kusaka, also perished on this occasion. Another *Kinnō* apostle, Maki, Idzumi no Kami, escaped with fifty men from the city and withdrew to Yamazaki and there awaited the pursuing Aizu forces. There they were attacked on the following day, and when, after a desperate resistance to far superior forces, it was seen to be hopeless, the survivors of the fight died by their own hands. A Shintō priest of Kurume in Chikugo had been unwearying in the good cause. For some time he had found a refuge in Chōshū, where he had been one of the most strenuous advocates of the dispatch of the ill-fated and disastrous expedition. Now, rather than return, a baffled and beaten man, he committed *hara-kiri* at Yamazaki along with Maki's little band. Hirano Jirō had been in prison since his capture at Ikuno; he was presently sent with other prominent samurai to kneel at the blood-pit, and all their heads were exposed in public, as those of common criminals. And about the same time, the great Tosa loyalist, Takechi, the coryphaeus of the movement in modern Japan, was sentenced to death ostensibly for his share in the murder of Yoshida two years before, but really because Prince Nakagawa had cautioned the ex-Lord of Tosa about the possibly serious consequences of his machinations. In Mito, too, this year the course of events proved disastrous to the loyalists. Everywhere throughout the Empire, the partisans of the Bakufu now seemed to have gained the upper hand. In Kyōto the destruction of property during the fight was very great. The Takadzukara and many of the Yashiki, both of the Kuge and Daimyōs, as well as of the dwellings of the ordinary citizens, were burnt, and both on the streets of the city and the roads leading from it, the bodies of the slain and wounded were everywhere. One very significant episode has to be noted. In the rout of the Chōshū men the Satsuma troops had done yeoman service; at more than one crisis of the fight their appearance on the scene

¹ This was probably written before the Great War.

served to decide the issue. But when first appealed to for aid by Hitotsubashi, the Satsuma officers, Saigō and Komatsu, refused to stir; they regarded the struggle as one between Aizu and Chōshū, and they declined to participate in any "private" broil. Only when they got orders from the Court itself to act would they do so, and in this resolution they stood firm. By his action in this incident Satsuma virtually emancipated himself from the control of the Bakufu!

Another incident has also to be noted. Saigō made his reappearance on the political stage. For the last few years Shimadzu Saburō's chief councillors had been Nakayama, Komatsu, and Ōkubo. It was the first of these that was by far the most influential with him; and it was to Nakayama that Saigō mainly owed his exile. Shortly after the British attack on Kagoshima, Nakayama lost all his influence and was relegated to an obscure local administrative office. Saigō's numerous friends in the clan then made a strong effort to get him recalled, as the Chōshū extremists such as Maki, Idzumi no Kami, had strange to say, already done. Ōkubo had incurred Shimadzu's wrath by hinting at the advisability of Saigō's recall, but now that the matter was urged by almost all parties in the clan, it was possible for him to support the proposal with effect. Ōkubo and Komatsu had hitherto been staunch supporters of the "*Kōbu Gattai*" policy; they now began to ask themselves how far that policy was likely to be of real advantage to the empire at large. The answer depended upon the future action of the Bakufu, and the use it would make of its recently recovered authority. From this point onward, Saigō, Ōkubo, and Komatsu maintained a critical attitude, and the destinies of Satsuma were under the control of that trio rather than of Shimadzu Saburō. For the time being, Satsuma and Aizu were regarded as the great powers while the Chōshū men spoke of the "Satsuma Brigands" and the "Aizu rascals" in the same breath.

It was impossible for Chōshū to do anything to retrieve the situation, for the clan was assailed by a combination of four of the Treaty-Powers. Sir Rutherford Alcock had returned to Japan on 2nd March, while the new French representative, Roches, arrived towards the end of April, 1864. Presently, strong squadrons were concentrated in Japanese waters, on board the British vessels being 800 marines from England. On 30th May, Alcock wrote inviting the Bakufu authorities to withdraw the request for the

closing of Yokohama, and to see to it that there should be no more obstruction in the Straits of Shimonoseki. The reply of 30th June was deemed so unsatisfactory that a conference of the four foreign representatives determined that a *note identique* should be sent in making a final appeal, and threatening that the settlement of matters would be placed in the hands of the naval authorities at the end of twenty days if no satisfactory redress was meanwhile obtained. Just at this point, the strange intervention of two unknown Japanese youths occasioned a delay in the opening of the threatened hostilities. In the spring of 1863, five Chōshū striplings had been sent to England. As the decree against any Japanese leaving Japan was not cancelled until 1866, their departure had to be in secret. Some of the five had been among the band that had just burned down the British Legation in Goten-yama; but that did not prevent them taking passage on a British vessel. Their avowed purpose was to master the science of the foreigner, in order to use it to oust the foreigner from Japan. At Shanghai they had already begun to entertain doubts about the feasibility of the project, when they got to London they had no longer any doubts about the matter at all, for the forcible expulsion of the foreigner was, they were convinced, a vain imagining. Chancing to read in *The Times* an account of what had been happening at Shimonoseki, two of the party determined to hurry back to Japan to try to save their Lord and fellow-clansmen from the calamities that were bound to attend the mistaken course that was being followed. On arriving at Yokohama they promptly got in touch with the British representative, and Alcock (21st July) requested the Admiral to afford the two young men the means of returning to their province so that they might lay their views before their feudal lord. A warship at once set out, and the self-constituted envoys were duly landed in Chōshū. As might have been expected, their efforts proved utterly abortive. On 6th August, they returned with a mere verbal message from their Prince to the effect that he could do nothing without the sanction of the Emperor and the Shōgun, which he would try to obtain if a three months' delay were accorded him. In doing as he had done, he was acting on orders which he had received once from the Tycoon, and oftener from the Mikado. The youthful envoys suggested :—

“ It as a good measure that the foreign Representatives should throw the Tycoon overboard, and going to Ōsaka, demand an interview with the Mikado's ministers, and conclude a treaty with him. They spoke

with great bitterness of the Tycoon's dynasty; that they kept all the trade, not only foreign, but native also, to themselves by seizing all places where trade was likely to develop itself, such as Niigata and Nagasaki, and they told me that those feelings were shared by most of the people of the country."

In the making of modern Japan perhaps no two men have borne a larger share of the burden and heat of the day than Prince Itō and Marquis Inouye. The preceding remarks are consequently of high significance, for it was from the lips of Itō and Inouye that they fell.

The attack on the batteries of Shimonoseki presently followed. The combined fleet consisted of nine British, four Dutch, and three French warships, besides a chartered steamer with a Parrot gun and a crew of fifty Americans on board. A three hours' cannonade on the afternoon of 5th September, 1864, wrecked several of the batteries, and the destruction was virtually completed before noon next day. The landing parties met with no great opposition, although a few casualties were sustained. On the 7th the work of embarking the captured guns was commenced, and the whole sixty-two of them were safely on board the various ships of the fleet by the evening of the tenth. Through Itō on the 8th, and his chief *Karō* on the 10th, Mōri made his submission. Ships passing the Straits were thenceforth to be treated in a friendly manner and were to be allowed to coal and take in provisions. There were to be no more batteries along the strand. And a ransom was to be paid for the town of Shimonoseki. On 22nd October, a convention was signed by the foreign representatives and the Tycoon's plenipotentiary in terms of which the Bakufu was pledged to pay an indemnity of 3,000,000 dollars, in six quarterly instalments of 500,000 dollars each. If it consented to open Shimonoseki or some other port in the Inland Sea, the indemnity would be waived. Of course, the Bakufu was not likely to undertake to open any more ports; and it would never consent to see a port opened in the territories of an outside feudatory for Itō and Inouye had not libelled it when they spoke of its commercial policy in the bitter terms they used. A sum of about 500,000 dollars was paid to France, Holland, and the United States for specific outrages on their vessels, and the remainder of the 3,000,000 dollars was divided equally among the three powers.

As a result of the encounter of 15th August, 1863, the men of

Satsuma had conceived a deep admiration for the effectiveness of British naval armaments. So far from cherishing any resentment for the attack they were eager to establish a cordial friendship with the British. At the interviews in Yokohama the Satsuma envoys several times hinted that foreign merchants would find a ready welcome at Kagoshima if the port of Yokohama was closed. Now, during the fortnight in which the combined squadrons lay in the Straits of Shimonoseki after the bombardment, the intercourse between the crews and the inhabitants was amicable in the extreme. Two months later, an English gentleman who passed through the Straits was treated with "the utmost kindness and hospitality" by officials and townspeople alike. Henceforth the Chōshū men were as eager for foreign intercourse as they had formerly been averse to it—fully as eager for it as the people of Satsuma already were. Furthermore the great leaders among the Rōnin and the lower samurai, who had been convulsing the Empire with their insistent clamour for the "brushing away of the Barbarians" had just lately perished—Kusaka of Chōshū, Takechi of Tosa, Hirano Jirō, and Maki, Idzumi no Kami, were now all under the sod, while the Mitō extremists were being mercilessly hunted from pillar to post. Yet the old fierce, ferocious, anti-foreign spirit was still in evidence here and there. On 21st November, 1864, Major Baldwin and Lieut. Bird were slashed to pieces at Kamakura by two *rōnin*, one of whom had journeyed from Aomori in the extreme north of Japan to join Chōshū only to find that for the time being Chōshū had no more need of *rōnin*. This time the Bakufu really bestirred itself promptly to secure the culprits and to have justice done upon them. And the fact was remarkable that ever since then, all Japanese who assaulted foreigners with murderous intent got caught and dealt with according to law.

B

In demolishing the Shimonoseki batteries the combined foreign squadron was really doing the work of the Bakufu which had actually sent instructions to the neighbouring clans to leave Chōshū to its fate, and to lend it no help. Two days after the great fight in Kyōto, and a fortnight before the attack on Shimonoseki, the Court had declared Chōshū to be the *Chōteki* (a rebel) and had commissioned the Bakufu to chastise the clan and reduce it to submission. On the

following day (24th August, 1864) the Bakufu issued orders to Satsuma and some twenty other fiefs to mobilize troops for the attack.

In the very hour of its triumph, the Bakufu set to work to dig its own grave. To the Rōjū and most of the officials the supreme object was to regain the full plenitude of authority over the clans that had been lost during the preceding four or five years. The abolition of the enforced residence of the Daimyō with their wives and heirs in Yedo in 1862, was seen to have been a fatally disastrous step; and the Councillors were determined that this fundamental error should be retrieved at all costs, and they now deemed it expedient to speak of restoring the old conditions. But the mere hint of such an intention produced a lively commotion, and vigorous protests and warnings at once proceeded not only from the great outside feudatories but from some of Bakufu's own most loyal supporters, from Owari and Echizen, and even from Aidzu. Dissension thus broke out between the Yedo Councillors and the Bakufu supporters in Kyōto, while the advocates of the "*Kōbu Gattai*" policy were now forced to reconsider the wisdom of the course they had been following. Furthermore, Yedo now asserted itself in connexion with the selection of the Commander-in-chief of the Chōshū expedition. The clansmen were expecting to serve under Hitotsubashi, but the ex-Lord of Ōwari was appointed, although he had no desire for the post. Parleyings over this question consumed much time, and it was only on 24th November, 1864, that the Commander-in-Chief held his first Council-of-War in the Castle of Ōsaka, and only on 1st December that he left for the headquarters at Hiroshima. By 19th December, however, he had practically achieved all the purposes of the expedition, and on 30th January, 1865, he was able to order the disbandment of the "army of chastisement". Not a shot had been fired, and not a single man had fallen in battle, for Saigō had meanwhile scored a signal success as a diplomatist.

In Chōshū, as elsewhere, there was an influential conservative party, and the rout of the extremists in Kyōto had enabled its leaders to regain the ascendancy they had lost two or three years before. They had placed the three *Karō* mainly responsible for the Kyōto expedition under arrest, and were now anxiously casting about for ways and means of arranging terms with the Bakufu. Saigō knew that the Bakufu favoured the harshest measures, and

that an accommodation on its terms would be impossible. With the sanction of the Commander-in-Chief, he started on a mission to Chōshū early in November, and with the help of some Chikuzen men, he was able to induce the Chōshū conservatives now in power to order the three *Karō* to commit *hara-kiri*, and to punish a dozen of their abettors ; to undertake to demolish the new fortifications of Yamaguchi, and to send the banished court nobles out of the territory, on the understanding that the expeditionary force would be disbanded and a reasonable penalty afterwards inflicted upon the clan. It was only with the utmost difficulty that the extremists could be got to consent to the withdrawal of the Court nobles ; but at last they were removed to Dazaifu in Chikuzen and placed under the guard of troops from Satsuma and several other Kyūshū clans. The Bakufu presently ordered that the Mōri, father and son, should be conveyed to Yedo as prisoners, and the Uwajima clan was instructed to send troops into the Chōshū territory to assume charge of their persons. This, and other ill-considered steps, called forth a severe rebuke from the Mikado who again summoned the Shōgun to proceed to Kyōto and settle with him what measures should be taken to restore foreign and domestic peace to the country.

The disbandment of the expeditionary force occasioned much anger in Yedo ; and the subsequent course of events in Chōshū seemed to indicate that Ōwari, the Commander-in-Chief, had committed a serious error of judgment in breaking up his army so soon. At this date there were at least two men in Japan who possessed something uncommonly like military genius. Takasugi Shinsaku of Chōshū was then only in his twenty-fifth year, of slight figure, sharp ferret-like features, and with a head of close-cropped hair that reminded one of the burrs of a chestnut rind. He was already in the grip of that pulmonary consumption to which he was destined presently to succumb (1867). To quote the *Kinsé Shiryaku* :

“ So far back as 1863, Takasugi had arrived at the conclusion that the luxurious samurai class was of no practical value in the field, and he obtained permission to organize troops on a new model. This consisted in breaking through the prejudice which existed in favour of birth, in selecting strong, able-bodied men from the common people, as well as from the samurai class, and in fixing the pay of the battalions he thus formed at a high figure. The strictest discipline was enforced, and even the most ruffianly vagabonds cheerfully obeyed him. His troops were bold and valiant in fight, and went by the name of the *Kiheitai* or Irregular troops.”

The conservatives had tried to arrest Takasugi together with his

friends, the three *Karō*, but he made good his escape into Chikuzen, while the *Kiheitai* dispersed and went into hiding. Now on the very day of the order for the break-up of the expeditionary force, Takasugi with a small band suddenly captured Shimonoseki and summoned all loyal men to his standard. In a brief space, Hagi, the clan capital, was in his hands. The chiefs of the conservative party now met with short shrift, and their heads soon graced the public pillories. "From this moment dissension ceased, and the whole clan worked strenuously for one common object." The two princes were carried off to Yamaguchi, where the fortifications, instead of being razed, were further strengthened, while every preparation was made to meet the new attack which it was felt the Bakufu was presently bound to level at the clan. Fortunately the Chōshū men were left with plenty of time to organize their defence, for they had no actual fighting to do for eighteen months. The Yedo authorities announced the new expedition against Chōshū in May, 1865, the Shōgun this time was to take the field in person. In July, His Highness arrived in Kyōto for the third time, where he had an audience of the Mikado, and then withdrew to Ōsaka Castle, which was henceforth destined to be his abode until his death on 19th September, 1866.

This second expeditionary force was supposed to attain a total of 120,000 men. Some 50,000 troops were to be furnished by the various Western clans; the main body of 70,000 men consisted of Tokugawa retainers. Of these about 10,000 were equipped in semi-European fashion; but as a rule the samurai despised the rifle, and there was no great enthusiasm among the Bakufu vassals for new-fashioned weapons and tactics. Foreign spectators who witnessed the passage of the Tokugawa hosts along the Tōkaidō expressed no very high respect for it or its potentialities. Yet the Bakufu officials assured themselves of success. The quick and easy triumph of the first expeditionary force had deluded them into extravagant expectations and a haughty elation that could scarcely fail to find its nemesis. To equip this motley host was a terrible task for the financial officers; forced loans had to be exacted from the citizens of Yedo and Ōsaka, and from the towns of Hyōgo and Nishinomiya, as well as from the officials. But everything now seemed to justify a supreme effort to crown the work of restoring the prestige of the Bakufu, which had really been growing steadily since the end of September, 1863. The officials unfortunately overlooked the

prominent part that had been played by the great clans, notably by Satsuma, in the rehabilitation of the Shōgunal power. Now these great clans clearly perceived that after Chōshū their own turn would come next. The ex-Lord of Ōwari declined to act as Commander-in-Chief, and the Lord of Kishū had to be appointed in his stead. Inshū (of Tottori, 325,000 *koku*) a brother of Mito by blood, remonstrated against the vagueness of the expression "dangerous schemes" used as a justification for renewed coercion, and warned the Shōgun against the defeat and loss of prestige he foretold. Echizen also protested. And as for Satsuma, she flatly refused to send a single man.

In the West, subterranean forces had been at work, of which the Bakufu, with all its battalions of lynx-eyed spies, never got the slightest hint until the mine was all but ready for the explosion that was to bring the Shōgunate to utter ruin. The eight Chōshū men captured by Satsuma in the Kyōto fight of 20th August, 1864, were royally treated by their captors, and Chōshū felt bound to send a mission to return thanks when the eight were at last sent home to recount their experiences. This was largely Saigō's work; but Saigō felt that it would be hazardous to make any overtures so Chōshū just yet, for the resentment against Satsuma he knew to be strong and rankling. He had learned a lesson from the great Nariakira. One day he had expressed deep sympathy with his Lord in what he supposed to be his anxiety about the death of his young son and the succession to the headship of the house of Shimadzu. Nariakira then assured him that such matters were of small consequence compared to the future of Japan—it was that that chiefly lay heavily on his mind and caused him concern. Saigō had for long been convinced that it was hopeless to expect the Bakufu to settle the question of foreign intercourse satisfactorily, or to maintain the independence, much less the prestige, of the Empire. He had found Katsu Awa, with whom he had had his first interview in the autumn of 1864, to be nearly of the same opinion. Katsu was a loyal servant of the Shōgunate, but he was a strong advocate of keeping faith with the foreign powers, and of putting Japan on a footing to enter into the comity of modern nations. A strongly unified central government was an absolute necessity. Something might be hoped from a concert of the great Daimyō, or rather of their chief retainers, from the men at the Bakufu Council-boards scarcely anything could be expected. At this date, Katsu, as head of the Tokugawa

Admiralty was organizing a dockyard and a naval school at Hyōgo, where he had men from most of the maritime clans among his pupils. Towards the end of 1864, he was suspected of intriguing with Chōshū, and was dismissed from office. To one of his students, a certain Sakamoto Ryūma, he gave a letter of introduction to Saigō asking the latter to find employment for the men in the rapidly growing Satsuma marine. This Sakamoto was a Tosa *Gōshi*, one of the most devoted followers of the loyalist Takechi. In 1862, he became a *rōnin*, one of a batch of ardent spirits that then deserted the clan. Hearing that Katsu was a strenuous advocate of opening the country to foreign intercourse, Sakamoto called upon him with the intention of killing him. Katsu coolly told him he divined the purpose of his visit—only before drawing sword it might be well to listen to what he had to say. The would-be assassin left the house a sincere convert, after begging to be allowed to become a humble pupil. Katsu introduced Sakamoto to Saigō in the autumn of 1864; he was considerably amused a few days later when, on his inquiring what he thought of Saigō, Sakamoto coolly said that Saigō was a fool—but whether a great fool or a small one still remained to be seen. On taking up his quarters in Saigō's house in Kagoshima, he had ample opportunity of arriving at an accurate estimate of his host's real mental and moral calibre.

While Saigō was not slow to recognize the fact that his guest was a man of real political genius, Sakamoto was insistent in preaching the imperative necessity of an alliance between Satsuma and Chōshū, and in advocating that very policy which Saigō had been secretly maturing for years. Strangely enough, yet another Tosa man, a certain Nakaoka, had also arrived at the same conclusions. He had connexions both with Chōshū and the banished court nobles; and on hearing of the second punitive expedition against Chōshū, he had hurried down to Yamaguchi with a friend to obtain the consent of the Chōshū men to his opening up communications with Satsuma on their behalf. Meanwhile Saigō had been holding back for fear of a rebuff, but Sakamoto, as a neutral Tosa man, had at last extorted his permission to go and sound the Chōshū leaders. He had made some progress in his mission when Nakaoka, who had just been to Kagoshima, arrived at Shimonoseki to say that Saigō was on his way and would appear on the spot in a day or two. Saigō, however, had meanwhile received urgent instructions while on the way to Shimonoseki to hurry up to Kyōto

at once ; and his failure to appear roused the wrath of the Chōshū men, who declared they were being duped and mocked. Sakamoto and Nakaoka thereupon hurried to Ōsaka and took Saigō severely to task. Sakamoto now indicated two steps by which the opening breach might be repaired. In the first place, Chōshū could buy no arms or ammunition in Nagasaki ; for the Bakufu officials there were extremely vigilant. In such circumstances it would be of high moment if Chōshū purchases could be made in the name of Satsuma. In the next place, Satsuma would presently need rice, if it came to a contest with the Bakufu. Chōshū had then plenty of rice to sell, and she needed money for the purchase of arms. With these projects as guarantees of Satsuma good faith, Sakamoto now hastened back to Chōshū and readily prevailed upon Kido, the leading politician in the clan, to make a secret visit to Saigō and Komatsu in Kyōto. At this juncture everything stood in danger of being wrecked by some of the fiery Chōshū leaders standing upon the point of honour. To make a pact with outsiders at this crisis, and especially with their dearest foe, Satsuma, would be cowardly and an indelible stain upon their fair fame as *Bushi* (warriors). Sakamoto hereupon told them very roundly that it might be well for all if they would put their pride in their pocket. What he really had been working so assiduously for was neither their interests nor those of Satsuma particularly, but the interests of the Empire of Japan. All opposition to Kido's journey was now withdrawn, and accompanied by a friend of Saigō he left for Ōsaka by sea on 15th February, 1866. When Sakamoto went up some three weeks later on, Kido told him that Saigō and Komatsu had been feasting him like a lord, but so far they had not said a single word about the projected alliance between the two clans—consequently he had now as good as resolved to return to Chōshū. Sakamoto at once went to Saigō and said some very sharp things to him. Saigō had wished to make absolutely sure of Chōshū's good faith, but he was in danger of carrying caution and circumspection too far. On 9th March, 1866, the treaty was finally arranged, and next day Kido sent Sakamoto an outline of its main provisions. The most important of these were that Satsuma should put forth every exertion to get Chōshū reinstated in the good graces of the Court. The two clans were thenceforward to co-operate in all sincerity for the good of the Empire, pledging themselves to restore the Imperial power and prestige. Sakamoto's first visit to Shimonoseki was on 23rd June,

1865, the negotiations had thus lasted for nearly eight months. It was not till the beginning of 1868, that the co-operation between the two clans became open and was publicly avowed.

Meanwhile, the Bakufu troops had been assembling at Hiroshima. Here, in January, 1866, two of the Chōshū clan councillors appeared before Tokugawa judges, and in their evidence endeavoured to exculpate the Princes of Chōshū as far as they could, and finally tendered a declaration on their behalf expressing complete submissiveness to the Shōgun, and readiness to accept whatever pains and penalties might be imposed. But the leaders of the new Chōshū army, who were also examined, protested that the Princes, in everything they had done, had merely obeyed the orders of the Shōgun as well as of the Court, and hinted not obscurely that there were no grounds for inflicting penalties at all. The Hiroshima tribunal reported the proceedings to the Great Council, and in March, 1866, a memorial, signed by two Great Councillors, Hitotsubashi and Aidzu, was presented to the Mikado, setting forth that although the Chōshū Princes might have acted with no treasonable intent, yet they ought to be held responsible for their lax exercise of authority over their vassals. In consideration of the loyal conduct of the Mōri family for successive generations, it was recommended as a lenient sentence that 100,000 *koku* of Chōshū land should be confiscated, that the two Princes should be condemned to seclusion for life, the younger prince's son being made head of the clan, while the families of the three *Karō* who had been responsible for the disturbance in Kyōto in 1864, should be attainted. This memorial was at once approved of by the Court, only it was recommended that care should be taken to occasion no popular commotion. The sentence was duly communicated to the Chōshū authorities who were accorded thirty days to decide whether they were to submit to it peaceably or not. As the communication was simply ignored by them, the Bakufu at last applied to the Court for leave to attack.

It was only on 23rd July, 1866, that real hostilities began—nearly two years after Chōshū had been declared a rebel, and eighteen months after the first punitive expedition had been disbanded. Takasugi and his able officers Yamagata (afterwards Prince Yamagata), Inouye (afterwards Marquis Inouye), and Ōmura, had thus ample time to organize their forces and bring their men of the “new model” to a high state of efficiency. The assessed revenue of Chōshū was only 369,000 *koku* and that of the cadet Mōri houses

100,000 *koku* more. But a land survey in the early Tokugawa age had made it clear that the actual annual yield of the two provinces of Suwo and Nagato was over 1,200,000 *koku*. Thus, there was no lack of means for the purchase of breech-loaders and the most efficient modern artillery. Mobility was regarded as of prime importance by Takasugi; all cumbersome armour was discarded in favour of close-fitting cloth uniforms, and more trust reposed in the rifle than in sword or the spear. Takasugi also had the advantage of holding interior lines, and could shift the 40,000 men at his disposal from any one of the three frontiers attacked to another with great ease and rapidity.

The Chōshū men had already crossed the Strait and formed the league of Kokura, and the Higo and other Kyūshū troops, who mustered to the summons of the Bakufu, were never able to dislodge the besiegers from their lines. On the coast of the Sea of Japan, the invading column met with a speedy repulse, and here the Chōshū men were presently in a position to carry the war into the enemy's country, and reduce the Castle of Hamada and some other strongholds. On the Hiroshima front, the contest was less one-sided, and the Chōshū troops met with occasional checks from the superior numbers massed against them. But even here, on 16th September, they drove the Bakufu levies back upon Hiroshima, and three days later (19th September, 1866) the young Shōgun died.

On 3rd October, the Court utilized this event as a pretext for ordering a discontinuation of the operations against Chōshū, which orders were at once notified by the Bakufu to all the clans. Later in the same month, Katsu, Awa no Kami, was sent down to Hiroshima to offer terms to Chōshū and to withdraw the Bakufu troops. He met Inouye and Hirozawa, the Chōshū commissioners, and communicated to them the will of the Mikado and the instructions of the Bakufu. The Chōshū troops were at first disinclined to listen to any terms; but the two commissioners:—

“Unwilling to disregard the Shōgun's orders, and grateful to Awa no Kami, succeeded in pacifying them, and they returned in great triumph to their native province. The war was now over at last. During its continuance the Bakufu had expended vast sums of money until its treasuries were almost exhausted, and yet it was unable to have its way with Chōshū. From this time onwards the great clans neglected to obey the commands of the Bakufu, and its power eventually decayed.”

As has been said, the second expedition against Chōshū had been undertaken mainly with the idea of putting the crown to the

work of restoring the prestige of the Bakufu, which, sadly impaired between 1860 and 1863, had been growing apace ever since the *coup d'état* of 30th September, in the latter year. And what was the result? Never in its long history of two hundred and sixty years had any effort of the Tokugawa Shōgunate so miscarried. The incompetence and impotence of the Yedo Government now stood revealed in such a glaring fashion that few could doubt that its days were numbered.

Two years before this date such a state of affairs would have been regarded with the gravest anxiety by the foreign representatives in Japan. In a dispatch to the Foreign Office written in November, 1864, Sir Rutherford Alcock said :—

“The Tycoon’s power with that of the moderate party in the country has been greatly strengthened, and there is now for the first time a fair prospect of obtaining the Mikado’s formal adhesion to the existing treaties and thus putting an end to a conflict of authority between Kyōto and Yedo which has been a constant source of danger. . . . The dissolution of the Government apart from any immediate danger would be the destruction of the Treaty-making power. To the Tycoon and his Government alone could we look for support against those most hostile to the maintenance of the foreign relations . . . In the dissolution of his Government and existing relations, we should lose the only solid foundation for the assertion of Treaty rights. To take new ground and go to Kyōto in search of a better basis from the Mikado would involve a costly expedition to begin with; and an explorative voyage of discovery in unknown regions of political difficulty. *This one danger, above all others, therefore, the disorganization and disappearance of the Tycoon’s Government, was, if possible, to be averted.*”

Within a few days over a year from the date of this dispatch, the following decree was transmitted by the Court to the Shōgun :

“Imperial consent is given to the treaties, and you will therefore make suitable arrangements.”

The very course of taking new ground and going to Kyōto so greatly deprecated by Alcock was adopted by his successor; and the issue of the foregoing Imperial decree on 22nd November, 1865, relieved the foreign representatives from any further anxiety about the fate of the Shōgunate, for the dissolution of the Tycoon’s Government could no longer be held to be destructive of the Treaty-making power.

On 18th July, 1865, Sir Harry Parkes, the new British Minister to Japan, arrived in Yokohama. This very remarkable man entered the public service at the age of fourteen, and in the course of three and twenty years had worked his way up from an apprentice interpreter to the distinguished position he now filled.

“ His energy is untiring, never sparing himself in any way ; personal danger and personal comfort were never thought of when he could in any way advance the public service.”

So Sir Charles van Straubenzec had written about him to Lord Elgin six years before. He was before all things a masterful man, with a consuming hate and contempt for all duplicity, sham, and humbug—in short just the sort of man that Carlyle would have selected for one of his heroes. A high Japanese official who had had many years' experience of him and his ways, said of him : “ Sir Harry Parkes was the only foreigner in Japan whom we could not twist round our little finger.” With such a man who already had twenty years' intimate experience of Chinese diplomacy, the evasions and tergiversations of the Bakufu officials would not be likely to be so efficacious as they had been hitherto. Down to this time, the French and British ministers had almost invariably worked in hearty mutual accord, in fact, if anything broke the concert of the foreign representatives during the years 1861 to 1864, it was the rather peculiar attitude of the American ministers Harris and Pruyn. But with the advent of Léon Roches, a strong chief had come to the French Legation in Yokohama. Roches had earned his spurs as a dragoman in the Algerian campaigns, and he has been well described as a handsome swashbuckler, who always seemed as if he ought to be wrapped in a white burnous astride an Arab charger. Like Parkes, he was a man minded to have his own way, and during the next three years there was a good deal of rivalry between the British and French representatives, marked by some rather lively passages-at-arms from time to time.

It was the Chōshū question, more particularly in relation to the Shimonoseki indemnity, that first occupied Parkes' attention. On this he had a difference of opinion with his colleagues, but by tact and patience, unanimity of counsels was restored. On 21st August, 1865, the first of the six instalments of 500,000 dollars of the indemnity was paid, and the Rōjū then proposed that an interval of twelve months should elapse between the payment of the first and second instalments, and kept silent regarding the discharge of the remaining sums. But Parkes would have no procrastinations or tergiversations ; so much he made clear on his first visit to Yedo, when he incidentally learned that the Shōgun, who was accompanied by no fewer than four of the Councillors, would be likely to remain in Ōsaka for a long time. On a second visit to Yedo, Parkes broached

the subject of the ratification of the treaties by the Mikado, but the answer he got was evasive. He thereupon induced his colleagues to agree to proceeding to Ōsaka "with a naval expedition in force, although with no hostile intent". On the Japanese ministers learning that such a step was contemplated, they came down from Yedo to Yokohama to dissuade the representatives from undertaking it. This is noteworthy as the first occasion on which any member of the Rōjū had called on a foreign minister at his own residence.

On 4th November, 1865, a squadron of six British, two French, and one Dutch warships appeared in Ōsaka Bay with the representatives of Great Britain, the United States, France, and the Netherlands on board. The Shōgun was then in Kyōto attended by the Councillors most conversant with foreign affairs, but it was arranged that one of these Abé, Bungo no Kami, would meet the representatives on board ship on the 9th. The interview actually took place on the 11th. Besides the ratification of the treaties by the Mikado, the representatives urged the revision of the customs tariff and the immediate opening of Hyōgo and Ōsaka, in return for which concessions all further instalments of the indemnity were to be remitted. Abé admitted that the hostile Daimyō had abandoned their advocacy of active opposition, and that if the Mikado's approval of the treaties were once obtained, all obstruction to foreign intercourse would disappear. Abé was to meet the representatives again on the following day, but on that day he sent to say that everything had to be submitted to a council, and that this would prevent his attending till the 14th. But on the 14th, only subordinate officials appeared to tender excuses, and to ask for delay, while on the 19th, it was learned that Abé and a colleague who supported his views had been dismissed by the Mikado!

In Kyōto at this time, Hitotsubashi, Aidzu, and his brother, Kuwana, who all enjoyed the confidence of the In no Miya and Nijō the Kwambaku, were exceedingly powerful, and they were especially occupied in an effort to get the Court to sanction their Chōshū policy. In opposition to them, Ōkubo of Satsuma insisted that a council of the great feudatories should be convoked to deal with this matter, and to settle the national policy generally. As usual, it was through Konoye that Ōkubo was now operating. On the appearance of the foreign squadron, Ōkubo also argued that the ratification of the treaties, the opening of Hyōgo and the whole attitude towards foreigners should be discussed and decided by his proposed council

of Daimyō. Against Konoye's arguments, Hitotsubashi and his supporters asserted that matters were so urgent that there was no time to convoke a council of the territorial magnates. He did not know that Ōkubo had actually gone to Fukui to urge Shungaku to proceed to Kyōto, and that he had sent express messengers to Daté of Uwajima, Yōdō of Tosa, and to his master Shimadzu to hurry up to the capital. It was the proposal to accelerate the opening of Hyōgo and Ōsaka that excited most commotion at this time. Aidzu was especially opposed to the proposal. He roundly declared that with his own samurai alone he would try conclusions with the foreigners if they insisted in the matter. Hitotsubashi, however, declared that the opening of Hyōgo could be deferred, but the Imperial sanction for the treaties was a different matter. Abé and his colleague, Matsumaye, had compromised themselves over the opening of Hyōgo, and Hitotsubashi now hurried down to Ōsaka on 14th November and ordered them into seclusion. On his return to Kyōto, he obtained an Imperial decree stripping them of rank and office. For the Court to presume to punish a Tokugawa Councillor was unprecedented. The result was that the Shōgun promptly presented his resignation, recommending Hitotsubashi as his successor. At the same time he sent in a memorial reviewing the general situation of affairs and insisting that the opening of the Empire to foreign intercourse was inevitable. Thereupon, he left Ōsaka for Yedo, and had got as far as Fushimi when he was met by Hitotsubashi, all eagerness to capitulate, for the resignation of the Shōgun had taken him completely by surprise, and had occasioned the greatest consternation in the capital. Inspired by Ōkubo Konoye alone had strongly urged that the resignation should be promptly accepted, that the Court should forthwith assume the direction of affairs, and at once convoke the projected council of great feudatories. It was in such circumstances that the famous decree of 22nd November, 1865, sanctioning the treaties, was issued. This was communicated to the foreign representatives on 24th November, but the second of its three clauses was suppressed. This set forth that there were several stipulations in the existing treaties that did not harmonize with the Mikado's views, that a report must be made on these points after careful examination, and that the Imperial decision would be given after discussion by the clans. The third clause was that "the question of opening Hyōgo must be dropped". The Bakufu officials now merely

informed the representatives they were unable to discuss that point at the moment ; they would continue to pay the indemnity, and instructions would be sent to Yedo to negotiate the amendment of the tariff.

“The appearance off Ōsaka of an imposing naval force, though not employed for coercion, or to support a menace, would at least serve to remind the faction that had hitherto placed itself in opposition to the treaties that the Powers, with whom these engagements have been concluded, possess the means of insisting upon the fulfilment of them when they see fit to do so, and speaking after the event, I can assert with confidence that had it not been for the presence of the allied fleet on this occasion, the Tycoon would not have been persuaded to make to the Mikado those energetic remonstrances and representations without which union between these rulers on the subject of the Treaties and the foreign policy they render necessary, would not have been effected.”

In this dispatch to Earl Russell, who was then Minister of Foreign affairs, it is all very well for Parkes to speak of the naval force not being employed for coercion or to support a menace. Hitotsubashi firmly believed that in case the Imperial sanction for the treaties were withheld, the squadron would certainly proceed to hostilities, and he had little difficulty in convincing the Court nobles of this. From first to last, from Perry in 1853 and 1854 down to Parkes in 1865, the “gun-boat” policy was the determining factor in foreign relations with Japan. Harris was really no exception; at an early stage he had recourse to mysterious threats, and had sighed for the presence of a man-of-war; later on he had most adroitly terrorized the Bakufu officials with his lurid accounts of the aggressive British and the prospect of their speedy appearance to press things in Japan at the mouth of the cannon.

The treaties of 1858 were finally amended or supplemented by the new tariff convention of 25th June, 1866, an instrument which in conception and execution was practically the work of the indefatigable Parkes. The tariff was generally reduced to a five per cent. ad valorem rate; the convention abolished many customs-house abuses and provided against interior customs duties being levied either on exports (as had been the case) or imports. The creation of a free mint was contemplated, and an efficient bonded warehouse system was established. And finally what Harris had to fight for so strenuously was now guaranteed. The freest commercial and social intercourse with foreign countries and with foreigners at the open ports was now granted to all classes and conditions of

Japanese people without any government interference or supervision whatever.

Towards the end of 1865, Parkes got into touch with Chōshū officials at Shimonoseki, who expressed satisfaction on being shown a copy of the Mikado's decree sanctioning the treaties. At Nagasaki, the agents of the great Kyūshū Daimyō also assured Parkes of their approval of the step just taken by the court of Kyōto. In 1866, the envoy was invited by Shimadzu Saburō and his son to visit Kagoshima.¹ Nothing could possibly have been more hearty than the reception accorded to the Minister and his party, while the Satsuma men could not fail to be highly pleased with the salutes from the warship and the other marks of respect tendered the Prince and his father on that occasion. Intercourse on this footing between a Daimyō and a foreign representative was something entirely new; the very notion of such a thing would have been inconceivable three short years before. Ōkubo was now pressing on his reforms with feverish activity. Cannon were being cast, breech-loaders manufactured, and steamers purchased—as many as six were acquired in Nagasaki in 1865, in addition to some in 1864. Two or three Satsuma men accompanied the first Bakufu mission to Europe; some of these now took charge of a batch of Satsuma youths who were quietly smuggled on board ship from a sequestered islet of the fief for a course of instruction in England. The leaders of the party were able to communicate their views to Lord Clarendon, the British Foreign Secretary; a fact that was in due official course communicated to Parkes. In 1865, the customs dues of Yokohama alone amounted to 452,000 dollars, and the whole of this amount together with the revenues of Nagasaki and Hakodate went into the Bakufu's coffers. Satsuma, and those who thought with him, regarded this as unfair.

“ They have no objection to the Tycoon drawing a profit from foreign trade, but they do object to his drawing the whole, and to this feeling is to be traced . . . the difficulty made lately in admitting foreigners to trade at Ōsaka, so long as the Tycoon would alone profit from it. This difficulty is not likely to be removed even when the appointed time for opening the port arrives unless the cause of it is removed . . . The Tycoon's government now stands between two dangers—hostility on the part of the foreigners, if they evade the fulfilment of their engagements, and hostility on the part of the Daimyō if they attempt to fulfil them according to the system acted upon at present.”

¹ An account of this episode will be found in Black's *Young Japan*, and fuller details in the files of the *Japan Herald*.

Ōkubo was resolved that the Bakufu should never open Hyōgo and Ōsaka to foreign trade ; this was to be done by Imperial decree after a council of the great feudatories sanctioned the step. At present this was the ground on which he fancied he could best mass the attack on the Bakufu which he was meditating, and great was his disappointment when he ultimately perceived that he would have to seek another base of operations.

From Kagoshima, Parkes proceeded to Uwajima and met with an equally warm reception there from that most astute politician, Daté Muneki, the Hatamoto's son. Later on, a similar visit was paid to Lord Hachisuka of Awa, while a letter was sent to Yamanouchi Yōdō of Tosa to say that it was only because the harbour was too shallow to admit the vessel that the British Minister did not then call at Kōchi. From the very first the officials attached to the British Legation were noted for their ability ; under Parkes, the Japan diplomatic and consular service was brought to the highest possible efficiency. Some of the members of his staff attained a perfect command over the spoken, and a considerable mastery of the exceedingly difficult written, language of the country, and the energetic minister saw to it that none of his subordinates kept his talents wrapped up in a napkin. Of the various currents and undercurrents of opinion Parkes was kept wonderfully well apprised, and he had no great difficulty in coming to the conclusion that a revolution was imminent. At the earliest possible opportunity he gave it to be clearly understood that, in the case of an internal commotion, the government he represented would observe a strict neutrality.

Parkes' rival, the French representative, M. Léon Roches, adopted a different course. He laid himself out to gain the confidence and goodwill of the Shōgunate, and there is reason to believe that he gave the Bakufu to understand that in certain contingencies it might count upon French support in a contest with the feudatories. Shortly after the opening of the Chōshū campaign in July, 1866, a French warship is said to have notified the Chōshū authorities at Shimonoseki that :—

“ France had entered into an alliance with the Japanese Government, and that if Chōshū refused to obey the order of the latter, they, the French, would be compelled to assist their allies . . . It is said the French had been to Nagasaki on a secret errand for the Bakufu.”

At this time Roches was exerting himself to obtain for a French

firm in Yokohama extensive Bakufu contracts for the construction of docks and arsenals, and the supply of arms, uniforms, and stores for the Tokugawa army and fleet. One day, it is said, Roches in a rather aggressive mood informed Parkes that he was going to bring over a *mission militaire* to drill the Shōgun's troops. This roused Parkes to say: "Then I shall get my Government to send over a *mission navale*," and he did. The French mission was headed by Colonel Chamoine, who was many years later on to earn some notoriety in connexion with the Dreyfus affair; the naval mission was led by Captain Tracy. These two men, Chamoine and Tracy, with their staff officers, had much to do with laying the foundation of that modern Japanese army and navy whose achievements have startled the world. In February, 1868, Roches addressed a memorial to his colleagues advocating the extension of the support of the Treaty Powers to the Shōgun in his contest with the "loyal" clans that had just then begun. Saigō was obsessed with the dread of such a French intervention; his biographers enter into long accounts of the artful fashion in which he had sounded Parkes and Satow on the subject some months before he threw off the mask.

When the fourteenth Tokugawa Shōgun died, childless, in September, 1866, Hitotsubashi became the head of the house of Tokugawa, and the deceased Shōgun had designated him as his successor; but Hitotsubashi, who had only been a reluctant candidate for the office in 1858, was now even less enamoured of the post. Since 1862, as Guardian of the Shōgun, and later as Protector of the Palace, he had had ample opportunities of appreciating the extraordinary difficulties of the position, and the failure of the second Chōshū expedition, which he had pressed upon the Emperor, did much to weaken his own influence with the Sovereign. The Chōshū men were still in arms, for they urged that there was no guarantee that the war would not be renewed immediately after the mourning for the Shōgun was over. To control the great feudatories was now getting to be an exceedingly difficult task, while even in the domestic councils of the Bakufu, union was sadly lacking. Shungaku of Echizen tried to dissuade Hitotsubashi from accepting the dangerous office; but the clamour of Aidzu, Kuwana, and the Bakufu's own vassals finally determined him to assume the responsibility. However, he made it a condition of his doing so that the Mikado should listen to his counsels, and the Daimyō should not only approve of his appointment, but

promise him their loyal support in the execution of the domestic and foreign policy he might deem it necessary to pursue. It was not until 10th January, 1867, that he was formally invested as Shōgun. The ceremony took place not in Yedo, as had been the custom for more than two centuries, but in the Castle of Nijō in Kyōto, and during the last year of the existence of the Tokugawa Bakufu, the Shōgun was never in Yedo at all.

Three weeks after the Shōgun's investiture, the Emperor Kōmei died of small-pox on 3rd February, 1867. The Court thereupon ordered the troops on both sides in the Chōshū struggle to be disbanded, and this order was at once promulgated by the Shōgun. During the fifty days of mourning, no national business could be transacted, while, after that, some time was consumed in connexion with the accession ceremonies of the new Sovereign. This means that on the surface there was a lull in public affairs down to the beginning of April, 1867. The death of the Emperor Kōmei was a severe blow for the new Shōgun, Keiki, as we must henceforth call Hitotsubashi. The new Sovereign, a boy of fifteen years, was the son of the Lady Nakayama, and, as was usual, the relatives of the Emperor's mother now became powerful at Court. Lord Nakayama, a bitter foreign-hater, was not a man of any commanding ability, but he had the Emperor's ear, and so he found himself courted by everyone opposed to the Bakufu, to the In no Miya, and the Kwambaku, Nijō, the sturdy supporters of the Bakufu at court. The two Konoye were on intimate terms with Lord Nakayama, and it was through the Konoye that Ōkubo of Satsuma had constantly worked in his efforts to influence the counsels of the court. Many, perhaps the great majority of the courtiers, were still hostile to the Bakufu, but with the degradation and enforced seclusion of some twenty of its leaders in 1863 and 1864, this faction had ceased to be formidable. Now it began to group itself around Nakayama, while behind Nakayama, the Bakufu, although it was blissfully unconscious of the fact, had presently to deal with a much more redoubtable antagonist.

It will be remembered that Iwakura had a great deal to do with arranging the marriage of the Emperor's sister and the Shōgun. For this he was afterwards degraded and sentenced to perpetual seclusion. Recently, the clan leaders had been paying surreptitious visits to his suburban retreat, and even the very ablest of them was impressed by his grasp, originality and fertility of resource in political discussion.

It was easy for Saigō and Ōkubo to perceive that Iwakura was quite as much on their side as were Sanjō and his companions at Dazaifu. Hitherto, Sanjō had been able to effect nothing in Kyōto on account of the lack of any man of ability among the anti-Bakufu court faction; it was now desired to bring Sanjō in Dazaifu and Iwakura in his suburban Kyōto retreat into touch with each other. But Sanjō cherished a bitter detestation for Iwakura, and this was a difficult obstacle that it was necessary to overcome. Nakaoka, the Tosa samurai who co-operated with Sakamoto in forming the Chōshū-Satsuma secret alliance, now undertook the task of inducing Sanjō to consent to work with Iwakura, and by using the same tact and perseverance that he had done in the first case, he was once more successful, and a most formidable underground combination was the result—a numerically strong party of courtiers with two of the subtlest intellects in the land to direct it. If Sanjō did not possess the full measure of the In no Miya's ability, Iwakura certainly did, and on him fell the chief share in the elaboration of the special scheme of Imperial government that was lying ready for use the moment the Shōgun should tender his resignation.

During the period of national mourning, when the Bakufu could do nothing, the conspirators were very busy. In Kyōto, Saigō took the clansmen of Aki and Uwajima into his confidence to a certain extent, and disclosed some of his projects to them, and then, leaving Ōkubo behind, he hastened down to Kagoshima to urge Shimadzu Saburō's presence in Kyōto. On this occasion he ensured the support of Ōmura, Hirado, and various other Kyūshū clans, and then crossed to Shikoku where Daté Muneki and Yamanouchi Yōdō both promised to proceed to Kyōto at once. On 15th May, 1867, Saigō himself reappeared there, together with Shimadzu Saburō and 700 picked Satsuma troops. Shungaku of Echizen had already arrived, and on 7th June, 1867, Shungaku, Daté, Yamanouchi Yōdō, and Shimadzu Saburō, attended by their chief retainers, met in conference in the Echizen *yashiki*. Before this date, however, the Shōgun had begun to appreciate the fact that there were new forces at work in the court at Kyōto. The real brain of the Bakufu was now a certain Hara Ichi-no-shin; and Hara divined correctly enough that it was really Ōkubo that was organizing the opposition. From this point onwards some writers regarded the struggle of the next few months as a duel between the wits of Ōkubo and the wits of Hara.

The new Shōgun invited the foreign representatives to wait upon him at Ōsaka early in April, when he received them in public and private audience and entertained them at his own table in accordance with French etiquette. The main business was to discuss the opening of Hyōgo, Ōsaka, and Yedō to foreign trade, which in 1862 was deferred with the consent of the Treaty-Powers until 1st January, 1868. On 9th April, the Shōgun memorialized the Court about the opening of Hyōgo. The orders to give up the question of opening Hyōgo, he pointed out, was not communicated to the Foreign Representatives in 1865, on account of the complications that might have resulted. The treaties were sanctioned in general terms by the Imperial decree of 22nd November, 1865, and nothing was then said about Hyōgo to the foreign ministers. However, the latter were constantly urging that the matter should be definitely settled as the stipulated date was fast approaching. The Shōgun himself was convinced that the only safe course to pursue was to carry out the treaties in all good faith, for any other policy would interfere with the most urgent need of the moment, viz., that Japan should acquire the ships and arms in which the foreigners were superior, and that she should develop her national resources. He dwelt on the value of international treaties as guaranteeing the weak against the strong, and declared that in the present state of the world it was no longer practicable to maintain a policy of seclusion. The reply to this memorial said that it was impossible, out of respect to the late Emperor's memory, and in view of the opinions expressed by the various clans, to sanction the opening of Hyōgo. On 26th April the Shōgun begged for a reconsideration of the matter, as it was of such vital importance to the interests and safety of the country. But Ōkubo was determined that this question should not be settled till a council of the feudatories had debated it, and it, together with the question of an amnesty for Chōshū, was what mainly occupied the attention of the conference of feudatories in the Echizen *yashiki* on 6th June, 1867.

Another point then urged was that men of real ability should be selected for service in the Court, and the names of several anti-Bakufu Court nobles were submitted to the Kwambaku as suitable for various offices. Hara countered this by presenting another list of pro-Bakufu Kugé for the posts indicated, while he also succeeded in getting the Court convinced that the opening of Hyōgo was a more pressing question than the pardon of Chōshū. An edict was

accordingly issued on 26th June, 1867, annulling the second and third clauses of the decree of 22nd November, 1865, which had ordered the treaties to be amended and the question of the opening of Hyōgo to be dropped. At the same time, another decree recommended a lenient settlement of Chōshū's case.

It was only after repeated urging that the four Daimyō consented to wait on the Shōgun at his castle of Nijō; indeed Shimadzu Saburō was at the time acting as if there was no Shōgun, while Yamanouchi Yōdō began to divine that it was the purpose of Satsuma to overthrow the Shōgunate at all costs, by an appeal to arms if need be, and that the necessity of such an appeal would be rather welcomed than regretted. Some very lively passages-at-arms took place between Shimadzu Saburō and Yōdō; and all the efforts of Daté and Shungaku were required to keep the peace between them. The conference presently broke up, and the four Daimyō left Kyōto without having effected anything of consequence. Ōkubo and Saigō were fully convinced that the Bakufu was only to be got rid of by an appeal to the last argument of armed force. While the conference of the four Daimyō was still in progress, secret emissaries from Chōshū were lurking in the Satsuma *yashiki*, and they, now fully persuaded of Satsuma's good faith, returned home to have everything made ready for emergencies. Satsuma was very insistent in its advocacy of a speedy pardon for Chōshū, mainly because that would allow Chōshū troops again to appear openly in the capital. At the same time, an influential party in the Tosa clan, led by Itagaki and Tani, had pledged themselves to co-operate with Saigō, and to endeavour to induce their lord, Yōdō, to abandon his support of the Bakufu.

After Yōdō's departure from the capital, Gōtō was sent to assume direction of the Tosa *yashiki* in Kyōto. Gōtō was rapidly coming to the front in the politics of the clan, and his abilities now made an impression upon Saigō, who at once saw that Gōtō was a man who would have to be seriously considered. The two soon came to an agreement to have the national affairs put on such a basis that the territorial integrity and the honour of Japan could be effectually safeguarded. The rule of the Mikado was to be restored, and the Shōgun was to revert to his constitutional position as one among the vassals of the crown. But Saigō was careful to tell Gōtō nothing about his intention of effectively clipping the wings of the Tokugawa clan and of appealing to arms if need be to effect

his purpose. Gōtō, however, speedily got to know of it from other sources. In conversation with Sakamoto, he expressed his great anxiety about the situation and its impending developments, and Sakamoto then threw out the suggestion that the danger of hostilities might be averted and Tokugawa prestige saved if the Shōgun could be induced to tender his resignation voluntarily. The best way to bring this about would be to get Lord Yōdō to memorialize him to do so. Gōtō thereupon set to work to draft such a memorial; he then submitted the paper to some of his own clansmen in Kyōto, to some Aki retainers, and to Saigō and Ōkubo. Various slight amendments in the wording were proposed, but none of these came from Satsuma. Saigō and Ōkubo, however, expressed their approval of the project, and got Shimadzu Saburō to write to Lord Yōdō urging him to fall in with the views of Gōtō, who presently arrived at Kōchi, the capital of the fief, to submit them. To Yōdō the suggestion came as a most welcome way of exit from his troubles; he had seen that a continuance of the dual system of government was an impossibility, but, on the other hand, he was sincerely devoted to the best interests of the House of Tokugawa.

On 18th October, 1867, Gōtō set out for Kyōto to submit the following all-important document for the Shōgun's consideration:—

“It appears to me that although the government and the penal laws have been administered by the military class ever since the middle ages, yet from the arrival of the foreigners we have been wrangling among ourselves, and much public discussion has been excited. The East and the West have risen in arms against each other, and civil war has never ceased, the effect being to expose us to insult from foreign nations. The cause of this lies in the fact that the administration proceeds from two centres, causing the Empire's eyes and ears to be turned in two different directions. The march of events has brought about a revolution, and the old system can no longer be obstinately persevered in. Your Highness should restore the governing powers into the hands of the Sovereign, and so lay a foundation on which Japan may take her stand as the equal of all other countries. This is the most imperative duty of the present moment, and is the heartfelt prayer of Yōdō. Your Highness is wise enough to take this advice into consideration.”

Appended to this document was a brief outline draft of a national constitution in which the anti-foreign policy was definitively discarded. This was really the work of Sakamoto who had accompanied Gōtō to Kōchi, but who had not been accorded an interview by Yōdō. The paper was signed by Yōdō, Gōtō and two other

Tosa samurai ; it was sent in as an enclosure along with the actual memorial, which was signed by Yōdō alone.

It was no easy matter for Gōtō to ensure that these documents should reach the hands of the Shōgun. On 12th September, Hara was assassinated by three anti-foreign fanatics who had heard that he was chiefly responsible for the opening of Hyōgo, and who came from Yedo for the express purpose of taking his head. The loss of what a Japanese writer calls his "wisdom-bag" was a signal misfortune for the Shōgun, Keiki. Gōtō, now that Hara was no longer available to forward his purpose, had recourse to the good services of the Junior Councillor, Nagai, who could read the signs of the times better than any one else in the Bakufu service, with the single exception of Katsu, Awa no Kami. Itakura, the chief of the Rōjū, was a stubborn upholder of the Bakufu authority ; and if Yōdō's memorial were tendered through him he would be likely to pigeon-hole, if not to destroy, it. At last, after due preparations, Gōtō did present the memorial on 27th October, 1867, to Itakura, who found that matters had been so arranged that he could not venture to keep it back from the Shōgun. Nagai had no difficulty in convincing Keiki of the wisdom of Yōdō's advice, for the recommendation to surrender the administrative power jumped very closely with his own natural inclination. On 8th November, the representatives of some forty clans were summoned to Nijō Castle to express their opinion on the Shōgun's purpose. The cardinal passage in the two documents then laid before them ran as follows :

"I confess with shame that the present unsatisfactory condition of affairs is due to my shortcomings and incompetence. Now that foreign intercourse is becoming more extensive, unless the administration is directed from a single central authority, the foundations of the state will be imperilled. If, however, the old evils be amended, and the administrative authority restored to the Imperial Court, if national deliberations be conducted on a broad basis and the Imperial decision secured, and if the Empire be sustained by the harmonious efforts of the whole people, then our country will be able to maintain its rank and dignity among the nations of the earth. Such is my view, but you will express your opinions without the slightest reserve."

As a matter of fact there was no discussion. Nagai produced a sort of note-book and requested those who approved to sign their names in it. Komatsu of Satsuma first wrote his own name and then those of Tsuji of Aki and of Gōtō and Fukuoka of Tosa, as it had been previously arranged he should do, and all the others present thereafter signed in succession. The Shōgun then summoned

Komatsu and the three others who had signed into another room, and Komatsu, Tsuji, and Gōtō all dwelt upon the absolute necessity of the step he was taking—Fukuoka merely saying that he agreed with Gōtō. Next day was a ceremonial day at Court, and so the memorial could not be presented then. But the four men saw the Kwambaku at once, and insisted that Court usage should for once be broken through on such a momentous occasion; and on 9th November, the Shōgun's surrender of administrative authority was duly presented. In the last clause it was stated that the step had been communicated to the clans.

On the very next day, 10th November, Keiki was notified that his surrender of the administrative power was accepted. He was instructed to exert himself in harmony with the empire, and still to defend and protect the realm so as to ensure the tranquillity of the Imperial mind. A special paper of instructions directed him to deal with foreign affairs in conference with the Daimyō, and to continue to use the Gisō and the Tensō as the medium of communication with the Court for routine business. All other matters were to be settled after the arrival of the Daimyō in Kyōto. Some other paragraphs were so ambiguous that Keiki had to write to the Kwambaku for a definite interpretation of their purport. Convinced at last that the object was to place him in a false position, he sent in his resignation of the office of Shōgun on 19th November. Before this, some fifty Daimyō, each with revenues of more than 100,000 *koku*, had been summoned to Kyōto and on 16th November, it was resolved to order all feudatories of not less than 10,000 *koku* to assemble in the capital.

Many of the Bakufu officials, such as Itakura, were exceedingly mortified at the course events had taken. They expected that the Shōgun's surrender of administrative power would not be accepted by the Court. As for the clans more intimately connected with the Bakufu, Aidzu, Kuwana, and Kishū, they were greatly excited, while many of the Fudai were profoundly dissatisfied with the new aspect of affairs. Even in Tosa, when there were no fewer than four factions besides Gōtō's party, there was a group of conservatives pledged to maintain the Bakufu in all the plenitude of its powers. Itagaki and his followers, on the other hand, were for extreme measures against it, in spite of the Shōgun's surrender of authority, for Itagaki had already committed himself to co-operation with Saigō, Ōkubo, and Iwakura. That trio had brought their schemes

to a head early in November, and on the very day on which the Shōgun sent in his memorial to the Court, an Imperial Decree was issued to Satsuma and Chōshū instructing them to chastise the Bakufu, Aidzu and Kuwana by force of arms. The Kwambaku knew nothing about this decree, nor did the In no Miya, nor the Gisō, nor the Tensō. It had been surreptitiously obtained by Lord Nakayama, who at once took it to Iwakura's suburban cottage, and by Iwakura it was at once handed to Saigō of Satsuma and Hirosawa of Chōshū.

The surrender of his powers by the Shōgun at first threatened to interfere with the plans of the conspirators. Tsuji of Aki, and even Komatsu of Satsuma thought there would be no occasion to appeal to arms, and that a new government could be organized without any serious disturbance. Saigō, however, was of a different opinion. The resources of the House of Tokugawa were immense, and so long as the Tokugawa chieftain had these resources at his disposal, it would be possible for him to overawe the other clans and to impose his will upon the Empire. Besides surrendering the administrative power, Tokugawa Keiki must also *surrender his lands and his revenues, the private property of his house, to the Sovereign*. Saigō contended that an Imperial Decree should be issued instructing him to do so. In case of any hesitation to comply on his part, let him forthwith be declared a rebel, and a commander appointed to direct the "army of chastisement" against him. Thus, Gōtō was premature in congratulating himself that he had out-generalled Saigō by inducing the Shōgun to make a voluntary surrender of his administrative powers, for the sacrifice Saigō was bent on exacting from Keiki went far beyond that—a fact which Gōtō had not suspected. The sacrifice involved not only the abolition of the Shōgunate under which the nation had been governed for 700 years, and for the last 250 years of that period in absolute peace, and the surrender by the head of the Tokugawa House of their hereditary office of royal dignity and of more than royal authority but the financial ruin of that great and nobly descended House. Saigō's project commended itself to both Ōkubo and Iwakura, while, of course, the Chōshū men would have been satisfied with no other course of action.

Three days later, Komatsu, Saigō, and Ōkubo left for Satsuma, accompanied by the Chōshū men who had been lurking in Kyōto. At Yamaguchi the three Satsuma councillors had an interview with

the Chōshū princes and made arrangements for concerted military action between the two clans and Aki which had adhered to the secret alliance some time before. Komatsu remained in Satsuma, and Ōkubo presently returned to Kyōto while Saigō was to come up with the young Lord of Satsuma, and a strong body of troops a week or so later.

Satsuma troops were soon disembarked at Mitajiri in Chōshū, and here, on 12th December, Saigō arranged the details of the ensuing campaign with the Chōshū and Aki commanders. Five days later Saigō entered Kyōto with his troops, while the Chōshū vanguard advanced and occupied Nishinomiya on 23rd December, the main force being then at Ōnomichi waiting for instructions from Kyōto. On 28th December, Saigō and Ōkubo called on Gōtō and informed him of the full scope of their plans and asked for the co-operation of Tosa in their execution. Gōtō was astounded ; he merely said that no definitive reply could be given until Yōdō's arrival which was expected a day or two later. Ōkubo had already given Shungaku of Echizen a hint of what was designed, and after immediate communication with Gōtō, Shungaku immediately sent an outline of the plot to the ex-Shōgun. Keiki kept his own counsel ; he remained the only one in Nijō Castle who was aware of the great crisis that was impending. As for the Kwambaku, the In no Miya, and most of the Court functionaries, they had not the faintest inkling of what was really in train.

Lords Nakayama, Saga, and Nakamikado, were the agents through whom Iwakura, Saigō, and Ōkubo were mining and moling. On 2nd January, 1868, there was some very important business dealt with at Court. The nobles who had been in enforced seclusion since 1863 were restored to rank and office as were the five banished Kugé at Dazaifu, while the Chōshū princes were pardoned, and their presence in the capital sanctioned. Of course, this meant that Chōshū troops were once more free to appear in Kyōto, and on the preceding evening Saigō actually sent a messenger with a copy of the decree to be issued to the Chōshū commander at Nishinomiya and—perhaps most important of all—Iwakura was restored to rank and office. For six long years he had been unable to pass the doors of his cottage. Now, on the following day, he was to appear at Court once more. On this fateful occasion he was to bring with him the box which contained the decrees and documents which made an end of the Shōgunate, and re-established the personal rule of the Mikado !

Everything was now ready for the great *coup d'état*. Saigō, who assumed command of the "loyal" troops, assigned to the contingents from the five clans of Satsuma, Aki, Tosa, Echizen, and Ōwari, their positions at the various gates of the palace. There they were found in possession when the ordinary guards from Aidzu and Kuwana appeared only to be told that they were relieved of their duties by Imperial Decree. They sullenly withdrew to the Castle of Nijō, which was presently humming like an angry hive. Among the various instructions given to the new guards was one to the effect that only those indicated to them as being summoned to court were to be admitted into the palace. By three or four o'clock on the afternoon of 3rd January, 1868, three Princes of the Blood, eight court nobles, and five Daimyō, with fifteen of their clansmen, had been admitted. It presently appeared that these were the personnel of the new government that was just about to be promulgated as replacing the Shōgunate.

When all had been marshalled to their places, the youthful sovereign appeared and charged "the nobles and the others to exert themselves on behalf of the country". Then the great decree restoring the old and original rule of the Emperor was solemnly read out. Imperial sanction for this had been obtained by Nakayama, Saga, Nakamikado, and Iwakura. Among other points it declared that the offices of Kwambaku and Shōgun were abolished, as were also those of the Gisō and Tensō, together with the Protectorship of Kyōto (now held by Aidzu) and the Shoshidai (filled by Kuwana). The new provisional government was to be in the hands of a *Sōsai*, or President, of Ten Gijō or Ministers, and twenty Sanyō or Councillors, Prince Arisugawa, the head of the Princely House that was next in seniority to the Emperor and heir presumptive to the throne, was designated as Sōsai. The Gijō comprised two princes of the blood, three court nobles (Nakayama and his two confederates) and the five Daimyō of Satsuma, Aki, Tosa, Echizen, and Ōwari. The Sanyō included five court nobles, the most important personage among them being Iwakura—and three retainers from each of the five clans. Among these latter, Gōtō of Tosa, and Saigō and Ōkubo of Satsuma, were the leading figures. On this occasion, Saigō did not sit in the assembly; his hands were fully occupied with the direction of the guards outside, for an assault from Nijō Castle might be expected at any moment.

The first question the newly-born government had to settle was

its attitude towards the former Shōgun and the house of Tokugawa. Yōdō of Tosa began by asking why Tokugawa Keiki had been excluded from the administration. Why was he not present with them? Iwakura now disclosed what the real aims of the conspirators were. Keiki, he said, might be admitted to a seat in the Council, when he had given a pledge of his good faith by resigning his Court offices, and by *surrendering his lands and revenues*. Hot words were exchanged between Yōdō and Iwakura, while Gōtō twitted Ōkubo with what he called the baseness of Satsuma intrigue. In the midst of this the Emperor ordered a recess. Saigō, on hearing for the first time how things were going, sent word to Iwakura that it was a dirk that was wanted, and Iwakura then indirectly gave Yōdō to understand that if he persisted in his attitude he would be invited to an ante-chamber where he and Iwakura would poniard each other. On the discussion being resumed, it appeared that Aki sided with Satsuma, while Echizen and Ōwari, though siding with Yōdō, were working for a compromise. The ultimate result of the debate, which was protracted till past midnight, was that Echizen and Ōwari were deputed to wait upon Tokugawa Keiki on the following day and inform him that his resignation of the office of Shōgun was accepted, at the same time suggesting that he should further resign his Court offices and surrender his lands and revenues.

Next morning the Kwambaku Nijō, the In no Miya and some twenty Court nobles, who had supported the Bakufu cause, found themselves stripped of rank and office and ordered into seclusion, while Echizen and Ōwari as they set out for Nijō Castle met Chōshū's vanguard defiling through the streets of the capital. In the courtyard of Nijō the two Daimyō were welcomed with angry scowls and muttered maledictions. Each of them had done his part in the work that had brought the Shōgunate to the dust. Ōwari had misconducted the first expedition against Chōshū, and it was Echizen who had been mainly responsible for the ruin of Yedo when he abolished the immemorial forced residence of the Daimyō, their wives and their heirs, as hostages in the Tokugawa metropolis. If the samurai had been conversant with the full purport of their present mission, the two Lords would probably have never lived to discharge it. The acceptance of his resignation was quite in order, Keiki remarked; as for speaking about the other two points, it was out of the question at present, for the samurai in Nijō were in too ugly a mood as the Princes could readily see for themselves. On the following day,

Keiki sent for Echizen and informed him that the purport of his previous visit had leaked out, and that the situation was getting too serious for his control. Keiki's last wish at this time was to precipitate a conflict and to get promptly branded as a rebel. He had a lively recollection of the terrors and horrors of the strife in Kyōto on 20th August, 1864, when the greater part of Kyōto was reduced to ashes, and he had no desire for a repetition of that baneful experience. Under cover of darkness, he slipped out of Nijō Castle on the night of 6th January, and proceeded to Ōsaka, where he was presently joined by the garrison of Nijō and all the Bakufu troops in Kyōto. Just before leaving he sent in a document to the Court explaining his reasons for doing so.

“I trust that the Emperor will understand that I am taking this action solely in the interests of the Throne, being anxious that order should be preserved and tranquillity maintained within the precincts of the palace. I ought to have begged for leave from the Throne before quitting Kyōto, but it would have taken time to obtain permission, and I was apprehensive lest in the interval, through some inconsiderate incident, a grave national crisis might be precipitated.”

Keiki signed this merely as head of the Tokugawa house, for the Tokugawa Shōgunate was now a thing of the past. The destinies of Japan were henceforth in the hands of the newly-born, or—as the patriots maintained—restored Imperial government. The most urgent question that first confronted that Government was the treatment to be accorded to the House of Tokugawa. Events showed that this problem could only be solved by an appeal to the sharp arbitrament of the sword, as Ōkubo and Saigō had foreseen it would have to be. Tokugawa vassals or partisans remained in arms against the new government for a period of eighteen months, albeit entirely against the will of Tokugawa Keiki. The history of that period really belongs to the history of the Meiji era, and is in fact only a part of the larger question of the transition from the hoary feudal system to modern national institutions, and will be more conveniently dealt with in a possible future volume.

CHAPTER XIX

IMPERIAL GOVERNMENT RE-ESTABLISHED

THE author of this volume concluded his task with his description of Yoshinobu's resignation, as he considered that event to mark the close of the Tokugawa epoch of Japanese history. His story must, however, be carried a step further, until the time when the last expiring struggles of the Tokugawa partisans came to an end. It was only then that the dual system of government, which had continued without a break since its foundation at the close of the twelfth century by Yoritomo, the first Sei-i-Tai-Shogun, the Barbarian-subduing-great-General, came to an end, and the legitimate Emperor, the descendant of the gods of Heaven and their vicegerent on earth, was once more vested with the national executive which had theoretically belonged to him ever since the foundation of the Empire. For a brief space after Yoshinobu's formal resignation it seemed as if all would be well and that the head of the Tokugawa house having bowed to the times and surrendered his office, peace would be established and the Restoration accomplished without further bloodshed. But this was not to be, and many events, some of a very gruesome nature, with much shedding of blood, were yet to take place before the great change was completed and Japan was able to enter safely on her new career which was destined to convert her from an Oriental Empire, scarcely known to the world otherwise than as a geographical entity, into one of the great military and commercial powers of the world.

Now the great Taikun had resigned and was practically a fugitive from the Imperial capital, which until now had shivered under his control. Slighted at every turn by the Court party, and unable to bear the repeated humiliations cast upon him, he withdrew to Osaka, the great commercial city, twenty-seven miles from Kyoto, where he owned another lordly castle and palace even more imposing than his home in Yedo. His faithful followers there gathered around him, his own loyal vassals and the clansmen of Aidzu and Kuwana, all hot with anger at the injustice and treachery

of which they considered he and they had been made the victims. The Lords of Owari and Echizen, both great Daimyo, both of Tokugawa blood and closely related to the Taikun, were sent as Imperial messengers from Kyoto to Osaka, to urge him to stifle his resentment and return with a small escort to Kyoto, where he would be admitted to the presence of the Emperor, and where his personal safety would be guaranteed by his own relatives who were around the Emperor. These inducements were placed before him as the commands of the Emperor, and at first he was inclined to obey them, but the same night the two lords of Aidzu and Kuwana and his own councillors gathered around him and urgently impressed upon him :—

“No faith can be placed in the declaration of the two lords. If your Highness determines to go your servants will follow, even at the risk of their own lives. On this expedition we will remove from the Emperor his bad counsellors and try the issue with them by the sword.”

The Taikun yielded and determined to enter Kyoto at the head of his forces. The Foreign Diplomatic representatives were in Osaka at the time, whither they had all temporarily moved from Yokohama in expectation of the opening of the city of Osaka and the port of Hiogo to foreign trade and residence. This event, against which the late Emperor had continued to protest with all his strength, till his death, had actually occurred on the 1st January : but the Foreign Representatives were between the devil and the deep sea. They had hitherto been accustomed to deal with the officials of the Shogunate, though they were by this time well aware of the true position of the Taikun *vis-à-vis* the Emperor. Now the Shogunate was at an end, but no new government was as yet visible, and political chaos seemed to reign both in Kyoto and Osaka, while news came of serious disturbances in the eastern capital. They were received in formal audience by the Taikun, and in answer to their inquiry, voiced by the Minister of France as the *doyen* of the diplomatic corps, he explained to them clearly enough how he had been ousted from the Government, with which he had been charged when his resignation of the Shogunate was accepted by the Court Guardians of the young Emperor, yet his sole objects were to preserve the unity of the Empire, and to prevent the outbreak of hostilities. With those objects in view, he had left the capital, and come down to Osaka, but he could not view with indifference those now possessed of the person of the young

Emperor giving rein to their own selfish desires under the name of the Emperor's wishes and distressing the people by the political unrest which they provoked. He therefore proposed to ask the opinion of the majority of a general council of the nation, and, until the form of Government was settled in accordance with those opinions, by a majority of the whole country, it was his office to observe the Treaties and conduct Foreign affairs generally.

This audience took place on 10th January. His good intentions lasted only a fortnight. It was on the night of the 25th that he received the exhortations already described of his own principal and trusted retainers; and on that night he made up his mind and determined to enter Kyoto with the clans of Aidzu and Kuwana in the front of his following.

The die was cast, and news of the Taikun's decision reached Kyoto almost as soon as it was taken. Two roads, each about twenty-seven miles in length, lead from Osaka to the capital, one on each side of the river Yodo; one passing round Fushimi, a town seven miles from Kyoto on the left bank of the river, and the other through Toba, a smaller town on the right bank, somewhat nearer. Troops from the Satsuma and Chōshu clans, the latter especially animated with a bitter hatred engendered by what they had suffered during the previous four years, were hastily dispatched to block the roads both at Fushimi and Toba, with orders to prevent at any cost, the Taikun continuing on his march to Kyoto, if accompanied by a large force, while the Aidzu and Kuwana clans were to be absolutely forbidden to pass under any circumstances.

On the 27th Tokugawa messengers came to the barrier and announced the intention of the Taikun to force his way through if obstructed. They were soon followed by the van of their army, and a battle, which lasted for three days, was begun. It was fought with intense determination and heavy loss on both sides. The numbers engaged on both sides have been very variously stated, but the nearest correct estimate may be taken as that of Sir E. Satow: 10,000 of the Tokugawa followers, and 1,500 of the Kwangun, the Imperial army, mostly Satsuma and Chōshu clansmen. With such a disparity in numbers it seems strange that victory should have been on the side of the smaller force. But the larger had to advance across exposed rice-fields that lay in front of Fushimi, and by narrow paths through open fields in front of Toba, both exposed to the fire of strongly entrenched artillery.

There was a still stronger explanation ; treachery, which has so often played its part in the great events of Japanese history, here decided the day as it had done in the great sea-fight of Dan-no-Ura five centuries before, and at Sekigahara, Iyeyasu's crowning triumph, in 1600. The samurai of the Tsu clan, who were implicitly trusted by the Tokugawa, were posted on the left flank of their army and the safeguarding of that position was left entirely in their charge. On the night of the second day of the battle they went over to the Kyoto army, and admitted its artillery to their position. On the following day fire was at once opened on the unsuspecting Tokugawa, and a general attack in strength soon followed. A panic ensued, and the whole army was soon in full retreat to Osaka where their lord the Taikun and some of his chief officers had been waiting events. He had not led the van of his own army. All was now over. His army, utterly broken and disorganized, was pouring into Osaka with the pursuing enemies on its heels, and on the spot he could do nothing more. Yedo was still his own home, and all his influence and authority in the Gokinai, the five Home Provinces that lay around Kyoto, even in his own family town of Osaka, was gone. He gave a hasty warning to one of the foreign representatives, who were all still there, that he could no longer guarantee their safety, and then fled himself, proceeding down the river by boat, getting safely across the dangerous bar, on which a few weeks before the American Admiral and his whole boat's crew had perished, and the English Admiral, the redoubtable old sea-dog, Sir Harry Keppel, and his staff, together with Lord Redesdale who was with him, had only escaped by a miracle ; and taking refuge on the U.S.S. *Iroquois*, that was with other foreign ships of war lying in the roadstead. There he was not recognized nor did he announce his own identity, but after a short stay he was able to transfer himself to one of his own ships, the *Kayo Maru*, and in her he proceeded at once to Yedo.

Osaka was still in disorder. There was no government and the excited troops of both armies were pouring into it in confusion, and no one knew what was going to happen. The great and splendid palace within the castle walls was set on fire and, with all its art treasures, burnt to ashes. The temporary Legations of the Dutch and French Ministers were plundered and burnt. The ministers and their staffs, having previously packed their archives, followed the Taikun's example, and escaped as he did, by boat down the

river, but only proceeding as far as Hiogo (Kobe of the present day) there to await events, and finding such accommodation as they could in the few buildings that had as yet been erected in the newly opened port, thankful that they had roofs over their heads, fresh food and a bottle of curaçoa over which the diplomatic body made merry.

We may now turn aside from the fortunes of the beaten and fugitive Taikun, and tell what took place at Hiogo, where the Foreign Ministers continued their temporary residence. Many gruesome incidents were destined to occur before peace and good order were firmly established, and the new port fairly started on its career, which was ultimately to make it one of the greatest seats of foreign trade and shipping in the East. On the downfall of their lord, the Tokugawa officials, who had now over ten years' experience of European intercourse, and who had been sent from Yokohama to make the necessary arrangements that were incidental to the opening of the port, all abandoned their posts and, following the example of their master, fled to Yedo. There was no administrative or governing authority left on the spot, and the Representatives of the Powers had to take into their own hands the arrangements that were pressingly necessary for the establishment of Europeans at the port, and indeed generally to maintain order until the officials of the new Imperial Government should come upon the scene. Foreign traders of several nationalities were already arriving, in not inconsiderable numbers, the majority, as was almost invariably the case in those days throughout the Far East, being of British nationality, and these were impatient to initiate their business, from which great things were expected. The first step was to provide them with land on which warehouses and residences suitable to their present and prospective requirements could be erected.

For this purpose the site had already been marked out for a foreign settlement, that is a place where foreigners could acquire land on perpetual leases for purposes of trade and residence, which was to a certain extent exempt from the jurisdiction of the native authorities, and from which native subjects were entirely excluded as residents. Such settlements existed, and in China still exist, under slightly varying local conditions at all the open ports both of Japan and China. That chosen in this case was a piece of ground on the sea front, measuring 600 by 400 yards, and lying on the north-

east of Hiogo. Kobe was the name of the little fishing village that was formerly on this site, and the name was given, at the beginning, to the new settlement, and it was subsequently extended to the great town that has since grown up around it.

On the afternoon of the 2nd February, about two o'clock, some of the Ministers were busily engaged in supervising the partitioning of this site into suitable lots, and many of their countrymen, interested in the proceedings, were also present, when a party consisting of several hundred samurai of the Bizen fief made its appearance, marching in regular military order, and debouching from the main street of Hiogo which led directly on the north side of the proposed new settlement. They were all *kerai* of Matsudaira Ikeda, Bizen no kami, a daimyo of 310,000 *koku*, whose capital was Okayama, a town on the Inland Sea, about 90 miles from Kobe, with a population of 32,000 people. They had come from Okayama, and had just landed at Hiogo, on their way to Kyoto, whither they had been summoned by their lord to join the Imperial forces already in that city. The foreigners on the settlement site were fully exposed to their view as they passed along its northern boundary. Various conflicting versions are given, even by those who were actually on the spot at the time, and at this date it is difficult to describe with complete confidence what actually occurred.

It was said that a member of the military escort which attended the French Minister, but who was not on duty at the time, broke the line of the Bizen procession, a most serious offence in feudal Japan, and received a slight lance prick from one of the angered men. The officer in command thereupon suddenly dismounted from his horse and gave an order to fire. The whole party, newly armed with modern American rifles, thereupon opened a rapid fire on the European ministers and their staffs, naval officers and expectant merchants. All the latter, who were entirely unarmed, very naturally sought with all speed such shelter as could be found, and when the men of Bizen had no more to fire at, they continued on the march towards Kyoto. Fortunately they had just recently received their new rifles, and had not yet learned the proper use of the sights, which were fixed at too high an elevation, so that the bullets passed high over the heads of the foreigners, and the only casualty that occurred, apart from the lance-pricked Frenchman, was a sailor boy of the U.S.S. *Oneida*, slightly wounded by gunshot.

An incident of this nature had not been entirely unanticipated by the Europeans, though it was not expected from the direction from which it came, and arrangements had been made to meet it, so the Bizen men were not allowed to proceed in peace. Large forces of seamen and marines with field guns were promptly landed from the ships of war in harbour, and with both the mounted guard of the British Minister and a small detachment of the 9th regiment of the line, now the Norfolk regiment, which also attended him, at their head, all lead by the Minister in person, they were soon in hot pursuit. The Japanese, who were greatly outnumbered, did not wait for them, but abandoning their baggage, broke and fled to the hills near at hand where they were soon lost to sight. An examination of the abandoned baggage subsequently showed that they were well equipped with every requisite for taking the field, including medical and surgical appliances. The pursuit was then abandoned, and the whole international force of British, French, and United States sailors and marines returned to the settlement, which was at once placed in a state of siege, breastworks thrown up, Armstrong and other field guns posted, full directions given to the civilian residents as to their conduct in case of a night attack, and all proper preparations made to resist an attack in force. The whole place was also, it is to be remembered, well under the guns of the powerful fleet anchored in the harbour. The latter played its part by taking immediate possession of all the Japanese merchant steamers that chanced to be in the adjoining harbour of Hiogo.

The only casualty in this affair, in addition to the lance-pricked Frenchman and the American sailor boy, was one very old woman of the *eta* class, who received a slight gunshot wound during the cavalry charge of the mounted guard of the British Minister. The whole affair, with all its panoply of war—it may be added that both sailors and marines, when the danger was over, indulged in extensive looting at the expense of both Western and Japanese traders—may well appear to have partaken largely of the character of a burlesque, but it had both its serious side and its tragic aftermath. It was serious in that it testified to the hatred of Europeans cherished by the clansmen of wealthy and powerful feudatories, who were the most ardent supporters of the restoration of the Emperor, whose policy was summed up in three words, “*Sonnō Joi Sakko*.” “Honour the Emperor, expel the Barbarians, close

the ports," who, in the faith that the restoration was a prelude to the enforcement of their policy in its fullest details, had given their whole-hearted support to the forcible deposal of the traitorous Taikun who had betrayed his country in assenting to its pollution by "savage beasts" and who were now influential parties in the new Government. If this incident was a fair index of the spirit of the majority of the clansmen and their officers throughout the Empire, there were still stormy times in store before trade and intercourse could start on their fair way, before foreigners could reside in Japan with any confident sense of personal safety. It was possible that none of these men of Bizen, all samurai of gentle birth, had until now ever set eyes on Europeans, for whom equal hatred and contempt had been instilled into them from their earliest years.

They had displayed the natural results of this training by a very offensive demeanour to the few foreigners whom they met on their march through the narrow streets of Hiogo prior to the main incident, and in some cases their offensiveness threatened to turn into actual physical violence. Some excuse may, however, be made for them in that they had been accustomed to see their own fellow-countrymen kneel and bow their heads to the very ground whenever a high officer passed by, while here were mere despicable foreigners meeting and passing their officer, a man of high degree in their own fief, not only without outward simulation of deference, but with an apparent and arrogant sense of equality, of having the right to the streets which, in accordance with all feudal tradition, was for the moment the sole prerogative of the samurai marching on service in formal array. Indignation had no doubt already reached the boiling point, when the Frenchman unwittingly added the final insult. There were not only scores of other clans in the Empire in the same position and cherishing the same spirit, but hundreds of *rōnin* who were responsible to no one but themselves, and who were roaming all over the country singly and in bands, all ready at any moment to cut down foreigners to gratify their own hatred, confident that in doing so they were rendering the highest service to the gods, their Emperor, and their country. Their attitude in the future, whenever either clansmen or *rōnin* were brought into contact with foreigners, became a serious problem, and its possible danger had to be guarded against by every legitimate expedient that could be taken.

The first expedient that naturally commended itself was the punishment of the chief offender in this case. There could of course, be no question as to his identity, and here came the most tragic part of the whole incident. The officer primarily responsible for it "was a Karo of the clan, named Taki Zensaburo, a stalwart man, thirty-two years of age, with a noble air." He was surrendered by the Lord of Bizen to the Government without demur, and after the completion of the proper formalities was condemned to death by hara-kiri, the punishment provided by law for a samurai guilty of grave offences. The penalty was duly paid on the evening of the 2nd March, in the temple of Seifukuji in Hiogo. It had been arranged that one representative of each of the Treaty Powers, seven in all, should be present, and Lord Redesdale was the one who appeared on behalf of Great Britain. He has described in his *Tales of Old Japan*, the whole of the imposing and solemn scene in impressive and eloquent language. "It was horrible." No more need be said here, either of the incident itself, or of its last gruesome episode, beyond that a full apology was demanded from, and readily given with all proper formality, by the new Government. Fortunately no European had been sufficiently injured to justify the demand for a pecuniary indemnity that in those days seemed to attend every controversy that arose in our relations with the countries of the Far East, and elementary decency forbade any idea of imposing on the Japanese any responsibility for the looting of the stores by the allied sailors and marines.

During the month which elapsed between the outrage (2nd February) and the payment of the last dread penalty for it much had been done.

Two proclamations were issued to the Japanese public at the time when the foreign settlement in Kobe was put into a state of siege, one by the Foreign Ministers to assure all peaceable Japanese that they need be under no apprehensions, and that all unarmed persons were at perfect liberty to proceed about their business, the other, similar in effect, by some of the Chōshu officials. These and the Satsuma officials who were in the port, tried to bring about a settlement of the difficulty; but the foreign representatives declined to listen to anyone who was not empowered to treat with them by the Emperor. Accordingly Higashi Kuze, an important member of the Court nobility, was sent to Hiogo as an envoy from the Emperor, and assured the foreign representatives that it was

the sincere desire of His Majesty to uphold and carry out the engagements entered into by the Shōgun, and that foreigners would be protected from any assault and disturbers of the peace punished. A proclamation to this effect was issued on the following day. The foreign representatives thereupon put an end to the state of siege, the Japanese ships were released, and the guards of blue-jackets and marines were sent back to their ships.

On the 10th the Imperial envoy returned to Kobe, and formally announced that Ito Shunské was appointed Governor of Hiogo. Under this name the future Prince Ito was then known. His part in making arrangements for the residence of foreigners in the newly opened port may be counted as not the least of his many achievements.

On 8th March, another attack on foreigners by a party of samurai occurred. The French Vice-Consul at Kobe and Commandant Roy, of the French corvette *Venus*, set off from Osaka to see the town of Sakai and its neighbourhood, and asked that a boat from the *Dupleix* should be sent to meet them. Arrived at a bridge, they were turned back by a band of armed men who were guarding it. These armed men, samurai of Tosa, then went to the landing-place at Sakai to await the French boat. After the crew had landed, and most of them had returned to the boat, the Tosa men opened their surprise attack, seized the two Frenchmen who were ashore and fired on the boat till they had accounted for all the others except an engineer, who had remained hidden in the water between the launch and a Japanese boat. He was the only one of the crew who returned to his ship alive, some of his mortally wounded comrades helping him to hoist a sail and turn the boat round. On hearing of this occurrence the French Minister immediately demanded an apology from the New Government, an indemnity of 150,000 dollars, and the decapitation of the assassins. All these demands were accepted, and on the 16th March, eighteen of the Tosa men and two officers were led to execution in the presence of many French officers and seamen. When eleven of these had been executed, M. Roches, the French Minister, requested that the rest should be spared, as the boat's crew which had suffered their attack was only eleven in number.

On the 22nd March, the British Minister was on his way to present his credentials to the Emperor, at Kyoto, when a sudden

attack was made upon him and his mounted escort. The Minister's life was saved by Gōtō Shōjiro (afterwards known as General Gōtō) who promptly dismounted from his horse and cut off the head of the nearest assassin. Gōtō was at that time in command of the Tosa forces.

It will be seen that the New Government, as soon as it felt its power secure, quite abandoned the anti-foreign sentiment which it had used to help it attain its commanding position, and proceeded to show much moderation both in dealing with the West and with its own opponents, who were still making an unsuccessful resistance, pursued by the Imperial army, of which Prince Arisugawa Takehito was appointed Commander-in-Chief on the 9th February. By the 5th March he had entered Shizuoka, sacred to the memory of Iyeyasu, who had spent the last eleven years of his life there. Proceeding northward, he was about to attack Yedo when the ex-Shōgun sent a deputation headed by Ōkubo and Katsu Awa to negotiate for peace with the Emperor through Saigo Takamori, who, though years afterwards prominent as a rebel, was at that time a mainstay of the Imperial army. Saigo personally submitted the terms proposed by the deputies to the Emperor, for his assent, and the matter was arranged. The Imperial army occupied Yedo, the last of the Shōguns retired to Mito, his original home, and a revenue of 700,000 *koku* was apportioned for the maintenance of the Tokugawa family.

Some of the Tokugawa partizans, however, could not feel reconciled to these conditions, so they entrenched themselves at Uyēno, a northern suburb of Yedo, in the grounds of To-ei-san, the temples enshrining the tombs of many of their lord's predecessors, and prepared to defend themselves. They were driven out on 4th July, 1868, and Ōtori Keisuke, their leader, retreated with them towards the north, but his little band was routed by the Imperial troops at Utsunomiya, and again at Nikko.

On the following 6th November, the castle of Wakamatsu, the stronghold of the Aidzu clan, fell to the Imperial army. Matsu-daira (Hoshina) Katamori, the Daimyō of Aidzu, with the Daimyō of Sendai, Morioka, and Tsurugaoka, who made their submission as soon as the castle, the last hope of their side, was taken, were condemned to detention. Hoshina was afterwards allowed an honourable retirement as guardian of the Tōshōgu temple at Nikko,

the fane built to hallow the tomb of Iyeyasu. His descendants to-day enjoy the title of viscount. Ōtori escaped to Hakodate, and the war on the main island of Japan was ended.

Meanwhile the Emperor had been formally enthroned at Kyoto on the 12th October, and on the 9th February following his marriage was celebrated, the Empress being a daughter of the *kugé* family of Ichijo. In April the Court was transferred to Yedo, henceforth to be known as Tokyo, the Eastern Capital, in distinction to Saikyo (Kyoto) the Western Capital. At this time, and for some years afterwards, the foreign settlement at Yokohama was guarded from possible violence of *rōnin* and other lawless characters by a portion of a British regiment. When the Imperial *cortège* was due to pass, the regimental band was led to the point where the Tokaido, the great main road from Kyoto to Yedo, came nearest to Yokohama and, as the palanquin containing His Majesty came into view, it was saluted with music, the band playing "The British Grenadiers" in default of a more suitable tune, as at that time no Japanese National Anthem had been established.

The last of the pro-Tokugawa party were still holding out at Hakodate in Yezo (Hokkaido) where they were strongly fortified and under the able leadership of Enomoto Takeaki, an officer in the Shōgun's navy, who had spent six years in Holland from 1860 to 1866. On the deposition of the Shōgun, he had gone to Hakodate with several warships, with the intention of establishing a separate State on the Northern Island. Ōtori Keisuke joined him there after the fall of Wakamatsu castle. Hakodate town is situated on a small peninsula and looks towards the southernmost mountains of Yezo across a fine large harbour, which is bounded on the side opposite the entrance by a long narrow sandy strip connecting the little range of high hills which constitute the peninsula with the mainland. A strong fort of massive stone masonry half-way across the sandy isthmus and another at the mouth of the harbour, made the defences apparently complete. It was not till 27th June, 1869, that the rebel garrison was finally captured. The Imperial forces were brought unobserved to the back of the peninsula, which only measures a few miles in any direction, and landed quietly by night in small boats at the foot of the range of hills, rising to just over 1,000 feet at its highest peak, which on that side slopes down steeply to the water's edge. These slopes, though far too rugged to be used on ordinary occasions, were not inaccessible to resolute

climbers, so the defenders of Hakodate were surprised from the rear, and were forced to surrender to Kuroda Kiyotaka, a Satsuma samurai, who afterwards, as General Kuroda, took a prominent part in suppressing the Satsuma rebellion, headed by Saigo Takamori.

Thus ended the last struggle against the unification of the country under its ancient dynasty of rulers, an unification which has since been made extremely thorough.

The formerly paramount House of Tokugawa is now only one among the many noble houses of Japan, loyal to its Sovereign, and contributing its share of members to the public services, but without the least territorial jurisdiction in any part of the Empire. So, on a peaceful note, ends the record of the Tokugawa epoch in Japanese history.

As a postscript it may be added that

Enomoto was kept prisoner in Tokio for three years, which time he devoted largely to study. He was liberated on the petition of his vanquisher, General Kuroda. Shortly after his liberation he was given an appointment by the Imperial Government as Secretary General of the Department for the Colonization of Yezo, and in this post did valuable work. He subsequently was appointed Vice-Admiral in the Imperial Navy, was Ambassador to Russia and to China, and held various positions from time to time in the Ministry under Japan's modern constitution. Ōtori, like Enomoto, was imprisoned for a relatively short time, only two years, and then pardoned. He was also given a post in the administration of Yezo, and afterwards occupied various high positions under the Imperial Government. He is principally remembered as the Japanese Minister to Korea, just previous to the outbreak of the war between Japan and China.

The rank and file of the rebel army were set to work on the task of erecting, at Hakodate, the raised terrace surrounded by a stone embankment, which forms a forecourt to the shrine dedicated to the spirits of those who lost their lives on the Imperial side. Samurai did the work of navvies, overseen by their conquerors, who never reprimanded a man twice for slackness; the first time it was a word, the second time the offender was cut down—so says local tradition. This suitable penance accomplished, they were set free, and like their chiefs, became loyal subjects of the Emperor, and took their places among the makers of modern Japan in the Meiji era.

APPENDICES

I.—LIST OF EMPERORS.

POSTHUMOUS NAME	BIRTH	ACCESSION	ABDICATION	DEATH	POSTHUMOUS NAME	BIRTH	ACCESSION	ABDICATION	DEATH
	B.C.	B.C.	B.C.	B.C.					
1. Jimmu	711	660		585	46. Kōken *	718	749	748	
2. Suisei	632	581		549	47. Junnin	733	759	758	765
3. Annei	567	548		511	48. Shōtoku *		765	764	769
4. Itoku	553	510		477	49. Kōnin	719	770		781
5. Kōshō	506	475		393	50. Kwammu	736	782		805
6. Kōan	427	392		291	51. Heijō	774	806		824
7. Kōrei	342	290		215	52. Saga	785	810	809	842
8. Kōgen	273	214		158	53. Junwa	786	824	823	840
9. Kaikwa	208	157		98	54. Nimmyō	810	834	833	850
10. Sujin	148	97		30	55. Montoku	827	851		858
				A.D.	56. Seiwa	851	859	876	881
11. Suinin	70	31		70	57. Yōzei	868	877	884	949
			A.D.		58. Kōkō	830	885		887
12. Keikō	12	71		130	59. Uda	867	888	897	931
					60. Daigo	885	898		930
	J.-C.				61. Shujaku	923	931	946	952
13. Seimu	83	131		190	62. Murakami	926	947		967
14. Chūai	149	192		200	63. Reizei	950	968	969	1011
Jingō (Regent)	170	201		269	64. En-yū	959	970	984	991
15. Ōjin	201	201		310	65. Kwazan	980	987		1011
16. Nintoku	290	313		399	66. Ichijō	968	985	986	1008
17. Richū	336	400		405	67. Sanjō	976	1012	1016	1017
18. Hanshō	352	406		411	68. Go-Ichijō	1008	1017		1036
19. Inkyō	374	412		453	69. Go-Shujaku	1009	1037		1045
20. Ankō	401	454		456	70. Go-Reizei	1025	1046		1068
21. Yūryaku	418	457		479	71. Go-Sanjō	1034	1069	1072	1073
22. Seinei	444	480		484	72. Shirakawa	1053	1073	1086	1129
23. Kensō	440	485		487	73. Horikawa	1078	1087		1107
24. Ninken	448	488		498	74. Toba	1103	1108	1123	1156
25. Buretsu	489	499		506	75. Sutoku	1119	1124	1141	1164
26. Keitai	450	507	531	531	76. Konoe	1139	1142		1155
27. Ankan	467	536		539	77. Go-Shirakawa	1127	1156	1158	1192
28. Senkwa	466	534		535	78. Nijō	1143	1159		1165
29. Kimmei	510	540		571	79. Rokujō	1164	1166	1168	1176
30. Bitatsu	538	572		585	80. Takakura	1161	1169	1180	1181
31. Yōmei	540	586		587	81. Antoku	1178	1181	1183	1185
32. Sushun	523	588		592	82. Go-Toba	1179	1184	1198	1239
33. Suiko *	554	593		628	83. Tsuchimakado	1195	1199	1210	1231
34. Jomei	593	629		641	84. Juntoku	1197	1211	1221	1242
35. Kōgyoku *	594	642	645		85. Chūkyō	1218	1221	1221	1234
36. Kōtoku	596	646		654	86. Go-Horikawa	1212	1222	1232	1234
37. Saimei *		655		661	87. Shijō	1231	1233		1242
38. Tenchi	626	662		671	88. Go-Saga	1220	1243	1246	1272
39. Kōbun	648	672		672	89. Go-Fukakusa	1243	1247	1259	1304
40. Temmu	622	673		686	90. Kameyama	1259	1260	1274	1305
41. Jitō *	646	687		703	91. Go-Uda	1267	1275	1287	1324
42. Mommu	683	697	695	707	92. Fushimi	1265	1288	1298	1317
43. Gemmei *	662	708		722	93. Go-Fushimi	1288	1299	1301	1336
44. Genshō *	681	715	714	748	94. Go-Nijō	1285	1302		1308
45. Shōmu	699	724	723	756	95. Hanazono	1297	1309	1318	1348

* Empress

POSTHUMOUS NAME	BIRTH	ACCESSION	ABDICATION	DEATH	POSTHUMOUS NAME	BIRTH	ACCESSION	ABDICATION	DEATH
96. Go-Daigo	1287	1319		1338	109. Myōshō *	1623	1630	1643	1696
97. Go-Murakami	1328	1339		1368	110. Go-Kōmyō	1633	1644		1654
98. Chōkei	?	1369	1372	?	111. Go-Saiin	1637	1655	1662	1685
99. Go-Kameyama	1347	1373	1392	1424	112. Reigen	1654	1663	1686	1732
100. Go-Komatsu		1392	1412	1433	113. Higashi-yama	1675	1687	1709	1709
101. Shōkō	1401	1413		1428	114. Nakamikado	1702	1710	1735	1737
102. Go-Hanazono	1419	1429	1464	1471	115. Sakuramachi	1720	1736	1746	1750
103. Go-Tsuchi mikado	1442	1465		1500	116. Momozono	1741	1746		1762
104. Go-Kashiwabara	1464	1501		1526	117. Go-Sakuramachi*	1740	1763	1770	1813
105. Go-Nara	1497	1527		1557	118. Go-Momozono	1758	1771		1779
106. Ōgimachi	1517	1558	1586	1593	119. Kōkaka	1771	1780	1816	1840
107. Go-Yōzei	1571	1587	1611	1617	120. Ninkō	1800	1817		1846
108. Go-Mi-no-o	1596	1612	1629	1680	121. Kōmei	1831	1847		1867
					122. Meiji-tenno	1852	1868		1912
Northern Dynasty					The 123rd Emperor, His Majesty now reigning				
(1) Kōgon	1313	1331	1333	1364					
(2) Kōmyō	1322	1336	1348	1380					
(3) Sūkō	1334	1349	1352	1398					
(4) Go-Kōgon	1338	1353	1371	1374					
(5) Go-En-yū	1359	1372	1382	1393					
(6) Go-Komatsu	1377	1383	1392						

* Empress.

II.—LIST OF SHŌGUNS.

NAME	Born	Nomi- nated	Abdi- cated	Died	NAME	Born	Nomi- nated	Abdi- cated	Died
Minamoto (<i>Kamakura</i>)					6. Yoshinori	1394	1428		1441
1. Yoritomo	1147	1192		1199	7. Yoshikatsu	1433	1441		1443
2. Yoriie	1182	1202	1203	1204	8. Yoshimasa	1435	1449	1474	1490
3. Sanetomo	1192	1203		1219	9. Yoshihisa	1465	1474		1489
Fujiwara (<i>Kamakura</i>)					10. Yoshitane (1)	1465	1490	1493	
1. Yoritsune	1218	1226	1244	1256	11. Yoshizumi	1478	1493	1508	1511
2. Yoritsugu	1239	1244	1252	1256	Yoshitane (2)		1508	1521	1522
Imperial Princes (<i>Kamakura</i>)					12. Yoshiharu	1510	1521	1545	1550
1. Munetaka	1242	1252	1266	1274	13. Yoshiteru	1535	1545		1565
2. Koreyasu	1264	1266	1289	1326	14. Yoshihide	1564	1568		1568
3. Hisa-akira	1274	1289	1308	1328	15. Yoshiaki	1537	1568	1573	1597
4. Morikuni	1302	1308		1333	Tokugawa (<i>Yedo</i>)				
5. Morinaga	1308	1333	1334	1335	1. Ieyasu	1542	1603	1605	1616
6. Narinaga	1325	1334	1338	1338	2. Hidetada	1579	1605	1623	1632
Ashikaga (<i>Kyōto</i>)					3. Iemitsu	1604	1623		1651
1. Takauji	1308	1338		1358	4. Ietsuna	1641	1651		1680
2. Yoshiakira	1330	1358	1367	1368	5. Tsunayoshi	1646	1680		1709
3. Yoshimitsu	1358	1367	1395	1408	6. Ienobu	1662	1709		1712
4. Yoshimochi	1386	1395	1423	1428	7. Ietsugu	1709	1712		1716
5. Yoshikazu	1407	1423		1425	8. Yoshimune	1684	1716	1745	1751
					9. Ieshige	1711	1745	1760	1761
					10. Ieharu	1737	1760		1786
					11. Ienari	1773	1786	1837	1841
					12. Ieyoshi	1793	1837		1853
					13. Iesada	1824	1853		1858
					14. Iemochi	1846	1858		1866
					15. Keiki	1837	1866	1868	

III.—LIST OF YEAR-NAMES OR NENGO.

Taikwa	645-650	Chōgen	1028-1037	Kempo	1213-1219
Hakuchi	650-655	Chōryaku	1037-1040	Shōkyō	1219-1222
.....	Chōkyū	1040-1044	Tei-ō	1222-1224
Sujaku	672	Kwantoku	1044-1046	Gennin	1224-1225
Hakuhō	673-686	Eishō	1046-1053	Karoku	1225-1227
Shuchō	686-701	Tenki	1053-1058	Antei	1227-1229
Taihō	701-704	Kōhei	1058-1065	Kwanki	1229-1232
Keiun	704-708	Chiryaku	1065-1069	Tei-i	1232-1233
Wadō	708-715	Enkyū	1069-1074	Tempuku	1232-1234
Reiki	715-717	Shōhō	1074-1077	Bunryaku	1234-1235
Yōrō	717-724	Shōryaku	1077-1081	Katei	1235-1238
Shinki	724-729	Eihō	1081-1084	Ryakunin	1238-1239
Tempyō	729-749	Ōtoku	1084-1087	En-ō	1239-1240
Tempyō-shōhō	749-757	Kwanji	1087-1094	Ninji	1240-1243
Tempyō-hōji	757-765	Kahō	1094-1096	Kwangen	1243-1247
Tempyō-jingo	765-767	Eichō	1096-1097	Hōji	1247-1249
Jingo-keiun	767-770	Shōtoku	1097-1099	Kenchō	1249-1256
Hoki	770-781	Kōwa	1099-1104	Kōgen	1256-1257
Ten-ō	781-782	Chōji	1104-1106	Shōka	1257-1259
Enryaku	782-806	Kashō	1106-1108	Shōgen	1259-1260
Daidō	806-810	Tennin	1108-1110	Bun-ō	1260-1261
Kōnin	810-824	Ten-ei	1110-1113	Kōchō	1261-1264
Tenchō	824-834	Eikyū	1113-1118	Bun-ei	1264-1275
Shōwa	834-848	Gwan-ei	1118-1120	Kenji	1275-1278
Kashō	848-851	Hōan	1120-1124	Kōan	1278-1288
Ninju	851-854	Tenji	1124-1126	Shōō	1288-1293
Seikō	854-857	Taiji	1126-1131	Einin	1293-1299
Ten-an	857-859	Tenshō	1131-1132	Shōan	1299-1302
Jōkwan	859-877	Chōshō	1132-1135	Kengen	1302-1303
Genkei	877-885	Hōen	1135-1141	Kagen	1303-1306
Ninwa	885-889	Eiji	1141-1142	Tokuji	1306-1309
Kwampyō	889-898	Kōji	1142-1144	Enkei	1309-1311
Shōtai	898-901	Ten-yō	1144-1145	Ōchō	1311-1312
Engi	901-923	Kyūan	1145-1151	Shōwa	1312-1317
Enchō	923-931	Nimpyō	1151-1154	Bumpō	1317-1319
Shōhyō	931-938	Kyūju	1154-1156	Gen-ō	1319-1321
Tenkei	938-947	Hōgen	1156-1159	Genkyō	1321-1324
Tenryaku	947-957	Heiji	1159-1160	Shōchū	1324-1326
Tentoku	957-961	Eiryaku	1160-1161	Kareki	1326-1329
Ōwa	961-964	Ōhō	1161-1163	Gentoku	1329-1331
Kōhō	964-968	Chōkwan	1163-1165	Genkō	1331-1334
Anwa	968-970	Eiman	1165-1166	Kemmu	1334-1336
Tenroku	970-973	Nin-an	1166-1169	Engen	1336-1340
Ten-en	973-976	Kaō	1169-1171	Kōkoku	1340-1346
Teigen	976-978	Shōan	1171-1175	Shōhei	1346-1370
Tengen	978-983	Angen	1175-1177	Kentoku	1370-1372
Eikwan	983-985	Jishō	1177-1181	Bunchō	1372-1375
Kwanwa	985-987	Yōwa	1181-1182	Tenju	1375-1381
Eien	987-989	Juei	1181-1184	Kōwa	1381-1384
Eiso	989-990	Gwanryaku	1184-1185	Genchū	1384-1393
Shōryaku	990-995	Bunji	1185-1190	Northern Dynasty	
Chōtoku	995-999	Kenkyū	1190-1199		
Chōhō	999-1004	Shōji	1199-1201	Ryaku-ō	1338-1342
Kwankō	1004-1012	Kennin	1201-1104	Kōei	1342-1345
Chōwa	1012-1017	Genkyū	1204-1206	Teiwa	1345-1350
Kwannin	1017-1021	Ken-ei	1206-1207	Kwan-ō	1350-1352
Chian	1021-1024	Shōgen	1207-1211		
Manju	1024-1028	Kenryaku	1211-1213		

Bunwa	1352-1356	Ōnin	1467-1469	Genroku	1688-1704
Embun	1356-1361	Bummei	1469-1487	Hōei	1704-1711
Kōan	1361-1362	Chōkyō	1487-1489	Shōtoku	1711-1716
Jōji	1362-1368	Entoku	1489-1492	Kōhō	1716-1736
Ō-an	1368-1375	Meiō	1492-1501	Gembun	1736-1741
Eiwa	1375-1379	Bunki	1501-1504	Kwampō	1741-1744
Kōryaku	1379-1381	Eishō	1504-1521	Eikyō	1744-1748
Eitoku	1381-1384	Tai-ei	1521-1528	Kwan-en	1748-1751
Shitoku	1384-1387	Kyōroku	1528-1532	Hōreki	1751-1764
Kakei	1387-1389	Tembun	1532-1555	Meiwa	1764-1772
Kōō	1389-1390	Kōji	1555-1558	An-ei	1772-1781
Meitoku	1390-1393	Eiroku	1558-1570	Temmei	1781-1789
		Genki	1570-1573	Kwansei	1789-1801
		Tenshō	1573-1592	Kyōwa	1801-1804
		Bunroku	1592-1596	Bunkwa	1804-1818
Meitoku	1393-1394	Keichō	1596-1615	Bunsei	1818-1830
Ō-ei	1394-1428	Genwa	1615-1624	Tempū	1830-1844
Shōchō	1428-1429	Kwan-ei	1624-1644	Kōkwa	1844-1848
Eikyō	1429-1441	Shōhō	1644-1648	Kaei	1848-1854
Kakitsu	1441-1444	Keian	1648-1652	Ansei	1854-1860
Bun-an	1444-1449	Shōō	1652-1655	Men-en	1860-1861
Hōtoku	1449-1452	Meireki	1655-1658	Bunkyū	1861-1864
Kyōtoku	1452-1455	Manji	1658-1661	Gwanji	1864-1865
Kōshō	1455-1457	Kwambun	1661-1673	Keiō	1865-1868
Chōroku	1457-1460	Empō	1663-1681	Meiji	1868-1912
Kwanshō	1460-1466	Tenwa	1681-1684	Taisho	1912
Bunshō	1466-1467	Teikyō	1684-1688		

IV.—LIST OF PROVINCES

AND THE CORRESPONDING MODERN PREFECTURES

PROVINCES	CHINESE NAMES	PREFECTURES OR <i>ken</i>	PROVINCES	CHINESE NAMES	PREFECTURES OR <i>ken</i>
Go-Kinai			Hokurokudō		
1. Yamashiro	<i>Jōshū</i>	Kyōto	1. Wakasa	<i>Jakushū</i>	Fukui
2. Yamato	<i>Washū</i>	Nara	2. Kaga	<i>Kashū</i>	Ishikawa
3. Kawachi	<i>Kashū</i>	Ōsaka	3. Noto	<i>Nōshū</i>	"
4. Izumi	<i>Senshū</i>	"	4. Echizen	<i>Esshū</i>	Fukui
5. Settsu	<i>Sesshū</i>	" , Hyōgo	5. Etchū	"	Toyama
			6. Echigo	"	Niigata
			7. Sado	<i>Sashū</i>	"
Tōkaidō			San-in-dō		
1. Iga	<i>Ishū</i>	Mie	1. Tamba	<i>Tanshū</i>	Kyōto, Hyōgo
2. Ise	<i>Seishū</i>	"	2. Tango	"	"
3. Shima	<i>Shishū</i>	"	3. Tajima	"	Hyōgo
4. Owari	<i>Bishū</i>	Aichi	4. Inaba	<i>Inshū</i>	Tottori
5. Mikawa	<i>Sanshū</i>	"	5. Hōki	<i>Hakushū</i>	"
6. Tōtōmi	<i>Enshū</i>	Shizuoka	6. Izumo	<i>Unshū</i>	Shimane
7. Suruga	<i>Sunshū</i>	"	7. Iwami	<i>Sekishū</i>	"
8. Kai	<i>Kōshū</i>	Yamanashi	8. Oki	<i>Inshū</i>	"
9. Izu	<i>Zushū</i>	Shizuoka			
10. Sagami	<i>Sōshū</i>	Kanagawa			
11. Musashi	<i>Bushū</i>	Tōkyō, Kanagawa, Saitama			
		Chiba			
12. Awa	<i>Bōshū</i>	"			
13. Kazusa	<i>Sōshū</i>	"			
14. Shimōsa	"	" , Ibaraki			
15. Hitachi	<i>Jōshū</i>	Ibaraki			
Tōsandō			San-yō-dō		
1. Ōmi	<i>Gōshū</i>	Shiga	1. Harima	<i>Banshū</i>	Hyōgo
2. Mino	<i>Nōshū</i>	Gifu	2. Mimasaka	<i>Sakushū</i>	Okayama
3. Hida	<i>Hishū</i>	"	3. Bizen	<i>Bishū</i>	"
4. Shinano	<i>Shinshū</i>	"	4. Bitchū	"	"
5. Kōzuke	<i>Jōshū</i>	Nagano	5. Bingo	"	Hiroshima
6. Shimotsuke	<i>Yashū</i>	Gumma	6. Aki	<i>Geishū</i>	Hiroshima
7. Iwaki	<i>Ōshū</i>	Tochigi	7. Suwō	<i>Bōshū</i>	Yamaguchi
		Fukushima,	8. Nagato	<i>Chōshū</i>	"
		Miyagi			
8. Iwashiro	"	"			
9. Rikuzen	<i>Ōshū</i>	Miyagi, Iwate			
10. Rikuchū	"	Iwate, Akita			
11. Mutsu	"	Aomori			
12. Uzen	<i>Ushū</i>	Yamagata			
13. Ugo	"	Akita,			
		Yamagata			
			Nankaidō		
			1. Kii	<i>Kishū</i>	Wakayama, Mie
			2. Awaji	<i>Tanshū</i>	Hyōgo
			3. Awa	<i>Ashū</i>	Tokushima
			4. Sanuki	<i>Sanshū</i>	Kagawa
			5. Iyo	<i>Yoshū</i>	Ehime
			6. Tosa	<i>Toshū</i>	Kōchi

PROVINCES	CHINESE NAMES	PREFECTURES OR <i>ken</i>	PROVINCES	CHINESE NAMES	PREFECTURES OR <i>ken</i>
Saikaidō			Hokkaidō		
1. Chikuzen	<i>Chikushū</i>	Fukuoku	1. Oshima		Hokkaidō-chō
2. Chikugo	„	„	2. Shiribeshi		„
3. Buzen	<i>Hōshū</i>	„ Ōita	3. Ishikari		„
4. Bungo	„	Ōita	4. Teshio		„
5. Hizen	<i>Hishū</i>	Nagasaki, Saga	5. Kitami		„
6. Higo	<i>Hishū</i>	Kumamoto	6. Iburi		„
7. Hyūga	<i>Nisshū</i>	Miyazaki, Kagoshima	7. Hidaka		„
8. Ōsumi	<i>Gūshū</i>	Kagoshima	8. Tokachi		„
9. Satsuma	<i>Sasshū</i>	„	9. Kushiro		„
10. Iki	<i>Ishū</i>	Nagasaki	10. Nemuro		„
11. Tsushima	<i>Taishū</i>	„	11. Chishima		„
12. Ryūkyū		Okinawa			

V.—THE LEGACY OF IYEFYASU

[The following translation of the Legacy of Iyeyasu was made by the late Mr. J. F. Lowder, formerly H.M. Consul at Yokohama, and published at Yokohama in pamphlet form in 1874. It has never been published in England, and as the original edition has been long out of print, it is here reprinted,¹ with the consent of the widow of the translator, leaving out some chapters which deal only with items of administrative detail. The explanatory notes are by the present writer.]

THIS manuscript, consisting of one hundred chapters, was written by Toshōgu of Kunō, in the province of Suruga. It is contained in the Imperial depository, and may not be seen by any but the Gorōjiu, who profoundly secreting it even when within the precincts of the official residence in order to conceal it from the sight of others, shall reflect upon, and record it in their hearts.²

CHAPT. I.—It is necessary before all to apply the undivided attention of the mind to that which is naturally distasteful, setting aside one's own inclinations.

CHAPT. II.—Show special commiseration for the widower, the widow, the orphan, and the lone ; for this is the foundation of charitable government.

CHAPT. III.—Keep your heart pure ; and as long as your body shall exist, be diligent in paying honour and veneration to the gods.

CHAPT. IV.—In future ages, in the event of there being no direct successor to a dynasty, the Chief Councillors of Ii, Honda, Sakakibara, and Sakai,³ will assemble in conference ; and after mutual deliberation and consultation, unbiassed by considerations of consanguinity or affinity, choose a fit and proper person, and duly insure the succession.

CHAPT. V.—The etiquette to be observed upon being installed as Sei-Shōgun, is to be patterned after the example of the Lord of Kamakura (Yorimoto).

The whole amount of the revenue of the Empire of Japan is 28,190,000 koku [of rice]. Of this, 20,000,000 is to be divided among the Daimiō and Shomiō, who render faithful service, and the remaining 8,190,000 koku form the public revenue, which should provide for the effectual protection of the Emperor, and for keeping in subjection the barbarians of the four coasts.⁴

¹ In "The Story of Old Japan", by J. H. Longford.

² This heading, which is that of the copy preserved in the Court of the Shōgun, is not part of the original manuscript. Toshōgu is the posthumous name of Iyeyasu, the name that is bestowed after death by the Buddhist priests. Kunō is the name of the temple near Shidzuoka in which Iyeyasu was first buried, prior to the erection of the great mausoleum at Nikkō, in which many people say that his remains still rest, only a hair of his head having been carried to Nikkō.

³ The four leading Fudai Daimios ; Ii, the first named, was the ancestor of Ii Kamon no Kami, in whose family the office of Tairō or regent for the Shōgun was hereditary.

⁴ Public revenue means the revenue of the Shōgun's Government, the chief duties of which were to guard the Emperor from danger, and to preserve peace in every quarter of the Empire. Rice was the standard of value, and one koku at that period was worth about fifteen shillings.

CHAPT. VI.—Although it has been said that ancient customs are to be preserved as laid down in the several articles of the laws framed for the military classes, these may be modified or supplemented as it becomes beneficial.

CHAPT. VII.—The Fudai are those samurai who followed me, and proffered me their fealty before the overthrow of the castle of Osaka, in the province of Sesshiu.

The Tozama are those samurai who returned and submitted to me after its downfall, of whom there are 86.

There are 8,023 Fudai cavalry-lancers. Besides these there are eighteen samurai of my own house, and five Guests of honour.

This division is recorded, that they be not regarded as all holding the same position.

CHAPT. VIII (Omitted).—Describes the castle at Yedo and its guards.

CHAPT. IX (Omitted).—Names the Fudai samurai who accompanied Iyeyasu from his ancestral seat at Mikawa, and directs that the members of the Gorōjiu shall be chosen from them.

CHAPT. X.—The Fudai Samurai, great and small, all have shown the utmost fidelity, even suffering their bones to be ground to powder, and their flesh to be chopped up for me. In what way soever their posterity may offend—for anything less than actual treason, their estate may not be confiscated.

CHAPT. XI.—If there be any one, be he Kokushi, Riōshiu, or Jōshiu, Tozama or Fudai—none are excepted—who shall disobey the laws, to the injury of the people, his territory or castle shall immediately be confiscated, that martial severity may be revered. This is a part of the Shōgun's duty.

CHAPT. XII.—In order to prevent any misunderstanding as to precedence among officers, of the higher grades of the same seniority, it is decreed that they take order according to the amount of their revenue. [This does not apply to the Gorōjiu and Wakadoshiyori.]

CHAPT. XIII.—The magistrates of the Civil and Criminal Courts are reflectors of the mode of Government. The persons invested with this office should be chosen from a class of men who are upright and pure, distinguished for charity and benevolence. Once every month one of the Gorōjiu should be sent unexpectedly, to inquire into their mode of administration; or the Shōgun should himself go unexpectedly, and investigate and decide the case on hand.

CHAPT. XIV (Omitted).—Table of precedence among the officials of the Shōgun's Government.

CHAPT. XV.—In my youth, my sole aim was to conquer and subjugate inimical provinces, and to take revenge upon the enemies of my ancestors. Yuyō teaches, however, that “to assist the people is to give peace to the Empire”, and since I have come to understand that the precept is founded on sound principle, I have undeviatingly followed it. Let my posterity hold fast this principle. Any one turning his back upon it is no descendant of mine.

The People are the foundation of the Empire.

CHAPT. XVI.—The reclamation and filling in of new ground was originated in the time of Yoritomo ; and there are doubtless ancient regulations extant, bearing upon this subject. Petitions having in view the recovery of land should be taken into consideration, and no opposition should be made to them ; but if there exists the slightest objection, according to ancient usages, it is strictly prohibited to entertain them.

CHAPT. XVII.—In the absence of precedent, forbid the making of new ground, new water courses, and so forth, and framing of any new measures of what kind soever. Know that disturbances always rise from such innovations.

CHAPT. XVIII.—It is forbidden to alter a faulty regulation if, through inadvertency, it has been allowed to remain in force during fifty years.

CHAPT. XIX.—There will always be some individual of ancient lineage to be found living among the lower classes of district towns and hamlets. Such a one as this should be selected for appointment to minor official situations ; but care should be taken not to choose refugees and the like.

The import of this should be notified to the Tax-Collectorates particularly ; and also to Kokushi, Riōshu, Jitō,¹ and downwards.

CHAPT. XX.—The Daimiō and Shomiō of the Fudai and Tozama classes who do not hold official appointments, are divided into two halves. One of these is to reside in Yedo, until relieved by the other.

When relieved, they are to employ their period of rest in making a tour of inspection into the prosperity or adversity of the population of their territories.

Those on service should be entrusted with the various duties connected with the castle, and the protection of the outer enclosures. They should lend assistance in repairing rents and damages, in the erection of new buildings, and in extinguishing fires, and so on.

These duties are not exacted solely for myself or my house ; but for the Shōgun, whose duty it is to protect and defend the Emperor.

CHAPT. XXI.—The modes of commending virtue and rewarding merit are :

1st—Grant of name or title [often bestowed after death].

2nd—Spoken commendation.

3rd—Rank and Revenue.

4th—Official situation.

5th—Minor superintendencies.

The modes for punishing crime for the repression of vice are :—

1st—Branding (or tattooing).

2nd—Splitting the nose.

3rd—Banishment.

4th—Transportation.

5th—Imprisonment.

6th—Decapitation and exposition of the head.

¹ Jitō=lord of a district.

7th—Crucifixion and transfixion.

8th—Burning.

9th—Decapitation, and so on.

These rewards are to be bestowed and punishments to be inflicted only after a strict investigation into the merits of commendable or criminal conduct; and although a notification to the above effect has been issued to the Courts of Law, particular pains should be taken to impress it upon their strict observance.

The infliction of the severe punishments of tying a criminal's legs to two oxen, and driving them in different directions, and of boiling in oil, is not within the power of the Shōgun.

CHAPT. XXII.—You should not hastily attach to your person officers of the higher grades who are ever ready and obedient; nor should you precipitately dismiss the lukewarm. They should be attached or dismissed in a quiet way, after due consideration of the behaviour of each, and consultation with the Gorōjiu. Neither should be done in a hurried or inconsiderate manner.

CHAPT. XXIII.—It has been said of old, “Although advised on all sides to put to death, put not to death: but when all the people of the country advise capital punishment, inflict it only after reiterated investigation into the merits of the case in question.

“Though advised on all sides to confer reward, confer not reward; but when all the people of the country advise the bestowal of reward, concede only after reiterated inquiry into the merits of the case in question.”

The art of governing a country consists in the manifestation of due deference on the part of a suzerain towards his vassals. Know that if you turn your back upon this, you will be assassinated, and the Empire will be lost.

CHAPT. XXIV.—Although a person of former days deprecates the custom of fishing with divers, and of hawking, such sauntering for amusement does not entail a needless destruction of life. “The tribute offering, by noblemen, of the spoil of the hunt and of the chase to the Emperor” is an ancient custom among the military class of other countries as well as of Japan. It tends to render soldiers expert in the use of the bow, and in horsemanship; and in times of great peace is beneficially remindful of the excitement of war. It is a custom which should not be discontinued.

CHAPT. XXV.—Although singing and instrumental music are not the calling of the military class, at times they expand the spirits, and relieve depression, and are delightful recreations in the joyfulness of great peace. In the first festivals of the years and months, these also should not be discontinued.

CHAPT. XXVI.—The successive generations of military chiefs of the family of Gen,¹ from Sadazumi Shin-no downwards, are enshrined

¹ The Minamoto family. Seiwa was the fifty-sixth Emperor (859–877) and Prince Sadazumi was his sixth son, from whom the Minamoto claimed to be descended. One of the Minamoto founded a branch family which took the surname of Nitta from its estate in the province of Hitachi. The branch again subdivided in later years into new families which bore the surnames, all of

at Momijiyama, in the Western Inclosure, for the repression of evil influences, and for the protection of the shrines dedicated to ancestors within the boundaries of the castle. Future generations shall pay them the highest respect and veneration, and shall be diligent in sacrificing to, and worshipping them.

CHAPT. XXVII.—I, although the offspring of Seiwa, and born in the family of Matsudaira of Mikawa, was overcome by inimical provinces and for a long time depressed and confined among the common people. Now, I am thankful to say, being engirdled with the favour of Heaven, the ancestral estates of Serata, Nitta, Tokugawa, and Matsudaira have returned to me. Henceforth let succeeding generations venerate these four families, and not depart from the teaching:—"Let there be a careful attention to parents, and let them be followed when long gone."

CHAPT. XXVIII.—Reverting to the scenes of battle at which I have been present during my career, there must have occurred eighty or ninety hand to hand encounters. Eighteen times have I escaped with my life from ten thousand deaths.

On this account I have founded eighteen "Danrin" (lit., sandal groves, or temples)¹ at Yedo as a thank-offering. Let my posterity ever be of the honoured sect of Jōdo (Buddhist sect).

CHAPT. XXIX.—With respect to the temple of Yeizan on the East of the Castle in the Military capital (Yedo) I have received much and repeated instruction from the late Daishi. Is it well that I should not demonstrate my gratitude? I have reverentially begged for him the office of Preceptor of the first degree, and Chief Priest of Tendai and have offered up prayers and supplications that wicked resentment may entirely cease, and that the country and its households may enjoy undisturbed peace and harmony.²

geographical origin, of Serata, Tokugawa and Matsudaira, and Iyeyasu was entitled not only to use any one of the four surnames, but that also of Minamoto. All the Kamon daimio (the daimio of the house and blood of the Tokugawas), exclusive of the San Kei, bore the name of Matsudaira, and the name is largely represented in the new peerage of the present day. There is an omission in the translation here. The chapter concludes with the instruction that Tokugawa should thenceforward be the distinguishing name of Iyeyasu's own family. Momijiyama (Maple Hill) is part of the gardens of the castle at Yedo, now the Imperial palace.

¹ These temples include not only those at Shiba and Uyeno in Yedo, but others in other parts of the Empire.

² Yeizan is the temple of Toyeizan at Uyeno, destroyed in the last fight of the war of the Restoration (*vide* p. 786). Daishi is the highest honorary title that can be given to a Buddhist priest. Tendai is one of the great Buddhist sects. This and the following chapter illustrate the far-seeing policy of Iyeyasu. The legality of his office depended on the Emperor, who, living at Kioto, might, though he was always closely guarded by Iyeyasu's own adherents, and though all the territorial princes were forbidden access to him or even to visit Kioto, sometimes fall into the power of, or, like Go Daigo, join enemies to the Shōgunate. A prince of the Imperial family was therefore always installed as Chief Abbot (or Preceptor) of Toyeizan, where he was always under the direct eye of the Shōgun, so that, in either of the above eventualities, the deposition of the Emperor and the installation of the Princely Abbot on the throne might be proclaimed at once. When the adherents of the last of the Shōguns were finally driven from Yedo in 1868, they endeavoured to put this policy in force, and carrying the Princely Abbot at that time with them to the North, they proclaimed him as Emperor.

CHAPT. XXX.—The Preceptor will be a sufficient provision for the defence of the royal castle; and in the event of the Imperial residence being assailed by inimical barbarians, he shall be elevated to the “Throne of divine blessings”, and the Shōgun shall aid and assist him in subjugating and exterminating them.

CHAPT. XXXI.—High and low alike may follow their own inclinations with respect to religious tenets which have obtained down to the present time, except as regards “the false and corrupt school” [Roman Catholic]. Religious disputes have ever proved the bane and misfortune of the Empire, and should determinedly be put a stop to.

CHAPT. XXXII.—The families of Gen, Pei, Tō, Kitsu, the two families of Kan and Ki-Ariwara and Kiowara,¹ derive their names from the Supreme Ruler (Emperor). It would be no shameless thing if one among these, attaining to the military command-in-chief, although apparently possessing the necessary capability, were nevertheless a man void of knowledge and erudition to whom the path of wisdom and virtue is dark, all whose deliberations proceed from his own mind, ignorant of the military accomplishments necessary in a military man.

From time to time colleges should be instituted, where by self-exertion others may be stimulated and encouraged to enter, and receive virtuous instruction.

CHAPT. XXXIII.—The way to govern a country and to keep an Empire tranquil originally proceeds from the “Gate of Perfection of Wisdom” (Confucian teachings).

To endeavour to attain to literary or military perfection in any other path is like “climbing a tree in search of fish, or plunging into the water to look for fire”.

Reflect that this is the height of shallow-brained stupidity.

CHAPT. XXXIV.—There is always a certain amount of sickness among the population of the Empire. A sage of old, being grieved at this, established a medical code; and although there may be proof, in the effectual cure of disease, that others have drawn from this stream, such should not be endowed with large territory, lest being in possession of landed estate they straightway become indolent in the exercise of their profession. A suitable reward should be bestowed upon them, adequate to the shallowness or depth of the cure effected.

CHAPT. XXXV.—By an ancient custom of the Empire, Niidono, the Spiritual Chief,² has the entire control of every particular connected with the physical study of the Heavens, and the management of the Spirits of the five grains. Should any one, however, set himself in opposition to the examples and precepts of the Military Chief of the Empire, there should be no hesitation or delay in punishing him severely.

Their subsequent defeat rendered the policy useless. The Abbot was subsequently known as Prince Kita Shirakawa. He forsook the priesthood for the army, became a distinguished general, and died while in command of the army engaged in the subjugation of Formosa after its cession by China.

¹ The families of Minamoto, Taira, Fujiwara, Sugawara, etc., all claiming divine descent through the Emperor, or directly as in the case of the Fujiwara.

² The chief Shintō priest.

CHAPT. XXXVI.—All wandering mendicants, such as male sorcerers, female diviners, hermits, blind people, beggars, and tanners, have had from of old their respective rulers. Be not disinclined, however, to punish any such who give rise to disputes, or who overstep the boundaries of their own classes, and are disobedient to existing laws.

CHAPT. XXXVII.—A girded sword is the living soul of a samurai. In the case of a samurai forgetting his sword, act as is appointed; it may not be overlooked.

CHAPTS. XXXVIII and XXXIX (Omitted).—Regulate the number of Cavalry soldiers to be furnished by each Daimio in proportion to the value of his domains as assessed in the survey of 1592.

CHAPT. XL.—By a fortunate choice on my part, Ii Manchio-maru is created Commander-in-chief, and holds the “Golden Baton”. Honda Hehachiro is created second commander, and holds the “Silver Baton”. Murakami Hikotaro is created third commander, and is authorized to bear the “Paper Baton”. It is necessary that every samurai should know these particulars.

CHAPT. XLI.—The boundary lines of possessions held by samurai may not be varied or trespassed upon so much as a hair's breadth. In the event of disputes of this nature being referred for decision, the plan in the Civil Court should be compared with the Register, and the boundary line fixed. But if there should be any difficulty in determining the matter, an Inspector, a Chief Supervisor, and a Judge should repair to the place in dispute, and in the usual manner give their decision in accordance with the Register. In the event of such decision not being accepted, and one of the disputants making still further complaint, the place in dispute shall be confiscated, and the amount of the possessions of the appellant reduced.

CHAPT. XLII.—There is a difference in the ceremonies to be observed by direct retainers and secondary retainers of rank.

CHAPT. XLIII.—Parties fighting and wounding each other with sharp instruments are equally culpable, but should be judged according to the severity of the wounds inflicted. The rule of procedure on such occasions is to arrest the criminal party; but at times it may not be expedient to trace him.

CHAPT. XLIV.—The strictest and most careful search shall be made for persons guilty of murder by stratagem, or with malice prepense—of poisoning for selfish purposes, and of wounding others while robbing a house—who, when found, shall be executed.

CHAPT. XLV.—The samurai are the masters of the four classes. Agriculturists, artizans, and merchants may not behave in a rude manner towards samurai. The term for a rude man is “other than expected fellow”; and a samurai is not to be interfered with in cutting down a fellow who has behaved to him in a manner other than is expected.

The Samurai are grouped into direct retainers, secondary retainers and nobles, and retainers of high and low grade; but the same line of conduct is equally allowable to them all towards an “other than expected fellow”.

CHAPT. XLVI.—The married state is the great relation of mankind. One should not live alone after sixteen years of age, but should procure a mediator, and perform the ceremony of matrimonial alliance. The same kindred, however, may not intermarry.

A family of good descent should be chosen to marry into; for when a line of descendants is prolonged, the foreheads of ancestors expand. All mankind recognizes marriage as the first law of nature.

This subject should be circulated, that it be not lost sight of.

CHAPT. XLVII.—A childless man should make provision, by the adoption of a child, to ensure the succession of the family estate; but it is not customary for a person under fifteen years of age to adopt a child.

An adopted son of the Emperor is called “Hom-miya”; of the Shōgun is termed Shōkun (heir apparent); of a Lord of a province is designated Seishi; of Hatamoto¹ and downwards is called Yōshi (adopted child).

The family estate of a person dying without male issue and without having adopted a son, is forfeited without any regard to his relations or connexions.

Nevertheless, as it is taught by the sages and worthies that the Empire is the Empire of its people and does not appertain to one man alone, in the event of an Infant on the point of death wishing to adopt a child, there is no objection to his being allowed to prolong his race in the person of one who is of age.

CHAPT. XLVIII.—In lieu of the practice which has hitherto obtained, viz., that of the Emperor in person making a tour of investigation to the several provinces for the purpose of hearing verbally from the Princes an account of their several administrations, let an Inspector be sent every five or seven years to the different provinces to examine into the traces of the behaviour of the Kokushiu and Rīōshiu during their absence from Yedo. The inspection into the well-being or dissatisfaction of the peasantry, the increase or decrease of the produce, the repairs and alterations effected in the castles, and so on, are not to be discontinued.

CHAPT. XLIX.—The territories entrusted to the Daimiō, with the exception of the Kokushiu, shall not be perpetuated to successive generations. They should be interchanged every year, the territories being apportioned relatively. Should the territory entrusted to one Daimiō remain in his possession for too long a time, he is certain to become ungovernable and oppress the people.

CHAPT. L.—If a married woman of the agricultural, artizan, or commercial class shall secretly have illicit intercourse with another man, it is not necessary for the husband to enter a complaint against the persons thus confusing the great relation of mankind, but he may put them both to death. Nevertheless should he slay one of them and spare the other, his guilt is the same as that of the unrighteous persons.

¹ Hatamoto were a class of territorial gentry created by Iyeyasu, who occupied a position inferior to that of the daimio, but as landowners higher to that of the squires or retainers of the daimio.

In the event, however, of advice being sought, the parties not having been slain, accede to the wishes of the complainant with regard to putting them to death or not.

Mankind, in whose bodies the male and female elements induce a natural desire towards the same object, do not look upon such practices with aversion ; and the adjudication of such cases is a matter of special deliberation and consultation.

CHAPT. LI.—Men and women of the military class are expected to know better than to occasion disturbance by violating existing regulations, and such a one breaking the regulations by lewd trifling or illicit intercourse, shall at once be punished without deliberation or consultation. It is not the same in this case as in that of agriculturists, artizans and traders.

CHAPT. LII.—In respect to revenging injury done to master or father it is granted by the wise and virtuous (Confucius) that you and the injurer cannot live together under the canopy of heaven.

A person harbouring such vengeance shall notify the same in writing to the criminal court ; and although no check or hindrance may be offered to his carrying out his desire within the period allowed for that purpose, it is forbidden that the chastisement of an enemy be attended with riot.

Fellows who neglect to give notice of their intended revenge are like wolves of pretext ; and their punishment or pardon should depend upon the circumstances of the case.

CHAPT. LIII.—The guilt of a vassal murdering his suzerain is the same in principle as that of an archtraitor to the Emperor. His immediate companions, his relations, and all even to his most distant connexions, shall be cut off (and mowed to atoms) root and fibre. The guilt of a vassal only lifting his hand against his master, even though he does not assassinate him, is the same.

CHAPT. LIV.—The position a wife holds towards a concubine is the same as that of a lord towards his vassal.

The Emperor has twelve Imperial concubines. The Princes may have eight concubines. Officers of the higher class may have five mistresses. A samurai may have two handmaids. All below this are ordinary married men.

A sage of old makes this known in his Book of Rites, and it has been a constant law from of old to the present day.

Silly and ignorant men neglect their true wives for the sake of a loved mistress, and thus disturb the most important relation. In olden times the downfall of castles and the overthrow of kingdoms all proceeded from this alone. Why is not the indulgence of passion guarded against ? Men so far sunk as this may always be known as samurai without fidelity or sincerity.

CHAPT. LV.—It is a righteous and world-recognized rule that a true husband takes care of outside business, while a true wife manages the affairs of the house. When a wife occupies herself with outside affairs, her husband loses his business, and it is a pre-evidence of ruin to the house ; it is as when a hen is afflicted with a propensity to crow

at morn, and an affliction of which every samurai should beware. This again is an assistance in the knowledge of mankind.

CHAPT. LVI.—The nine Castles, viz., those of Iwatsuki, Kawagoi, and Oshi in the province of Musashi, of Sakura, Sekiyado and Kogawa, in the province of Shimo-osa, of Takazaki in Kōzuke, of Utsunomiya in Shimōdzuke, and of Odawara in Sagami, are all branch-castles of the chief Castle at Yedo.

They may not be entrusted to the charges of any one but a samurai of the Fudai class specially appointed to the trust. They are outworks for the protection of the chief Castle.

CHAPT. LVII.—The two castles of Fuchiu and Kunō in the province of Suruga shall be intrusted to the guardianship of the Chief of the "Private Guards". They are accessory to the principal castle.

CHAPT. LVIII.—The Warden of the two castles of Osaka in the province of Setzu, and of Fushimi in the province of Yamashiro should be a vassal of ancient lineage, and above the "Fourth Grade". Certain of the "Guards" should be stationed there as resident guards. When war is made, one of these Castles should be the head-quarters of the Main Army.

CHAPT. LIX.—There are sixteen guard-houses established on the main roads and by-roads of the districts and provinces, some on the seashore, some inland, in order to prevent man or woman disturbing the public peace, and for defences of the boundaries of the state. The superintendence of these should be entrusted to a samurai of the Fudai class of ancient lineage, without regard, however, to his wealth. He shall see that the rules written for their regulation are properly carried out. Under certain circumstances not even a needle should be permitted to pass; but on ordinary occasions horses and vehicles may go through.¹

CHAPT. LX.—The protection of the Castle of Nijo² shall be entrusted to some reliable and trustworthy Fudai of good lineage, instead of to that of the Commander-in-Chief; he shall be called "The Kiōto Representative", and on all occasions of disturbance the Thirty Western States shall take their orders from him.

CHAPT. LXI.—The office of Prefect of Kiushiu has for a long time, since the time of Odone, been temporarily discontinued. This office

¹ From a very early period it was the custom to maintain barriers guarded by troops at certain mountain passes and other strategic points. Their original object was to guard against incursions by the savage Ainu into the Japanese colonies, but from the time of Yorimoto onwards, their sole object was to prevent treacherous communications between the Shōgun's Court in the Eastern provinces (Kuantō) and the Imperial Court of Kioto. The best known were Auzaka near Kioto (page 96) and Hakone (page 104). The latter was only abolished in 1871, and its remains still exist. A watch was kept here to prevent the wives of Daimios escaping from Yedo (page 213), and women proceeding to Yedo were also subjected to a strict search, lest they should be the medium of carrying treasonable documents. One curious result of this was a large number of barbers' shops in the town of Odawara, at the foot of the Hakone Pass, who drove a prosperous trade in redressing the locks of the ladies, dishevelled in the search to which they were subjected at the barrier.

² The castle used as a residence by the Shōgun when he visited Kioto—still existing.

should be entrusted on alternate years to the two houses of Shimadzu (Satsuma) and Nabeshima (Hizen).¹

It is forbidden to give this trust to any other house for ever.

CHAPT. LXII.—In the inner enclosure, beneath the Castle at Yedo, there are twenty-eight curtained guard-houses; and there are also twenty-eight in the outer inclosure.

The superintendence of the Inner Inclosure shall be entrusted to a Fudai, for the time being resident in Yedo; that of the Outer Inclosure to a Hatamoto on duty at the time.

They shall be directed as a matter of course to attend to the guard-house regulations, and to see that the military weapons, swords, insignia, and all the implements of war are kept clean and in proper order.

CHAPT. LXIII.—The several duties about the castle to be performed by the samurai on duty, and the work to be done in connexion therewith should be well considered, and allotted in proportion to their revenues; but they should not be appointed to high offices of state. Some three, four, or five of them should be set apart for the transaction of contingent official business.

CHAPT. LXIV.—Nagasaki, in the province of Hizen, being a port at which vessels of other countries touch, has dominion over three nationalities.² The administration of this place should be entrusted to the chief member of the Gorōjiu.

The resident guard shall consist of four chiefs from among the Fudai samurai, each in receipt of 3,000 koku upwards. They shall each be provided with a riding horse and foot soldiers, and are salaried officers.

CHAPT. LXV.—In the revolution of nature, lands, houses, mountains, rivers, and ferries become damaged and ruined, and considerable outlay is requisite to put them in repair.

A part of such expenses is to be borne by the neighbouring province in proportion to the number of koku it produces. This tax is called "Provincial thank-tribute".

Yorimoto introduced this custom, taking example from the period of the sages; the principle is by no means a selfish idea of my own. It is a custom which shall be observed by future generations for ever.

CHAPT. LXVI.—Regarding thoroughfares, both in Government territory and throughout the Empire, 36 feet is the proper width of the "great sea road"; but including the trees on either side, it should have a uniform width of 120 feet; 18 feet is the proper width of the

¹ Odonō—more properly Ōtomo—was the family name of the Territorial Princes of Bungo, who were the greatest feudatories in Kiushiu, until their power was destroyed by Satsuma early in the last quarter of the sixteenth century. From the time of Yorimoto until then, they had continuously held an office which might be described as the Vice-Royalty of Kiushiu. Both Ōtomo and Satsuma were said to be direct descendants of illegitimate sons of Yorimoto. Nabeshima was the territorial prince of Hizen, one of the Kokushiu daimios, whose direct descendant is now the Marquis Nabeshima, and was some years ago Japanese minister at Rome.

² Japanese, Chinese and Dutch, the two latter the only foreigners permitted to reside in Japan.

“small sea road”; but including the margins on either side it should be of a uniform width of 60 feet.

Twelve feet is the proper width of cross-roads and horse roads; inclusive of the side-walks 30 feet should be the uniform width.

Six feet is the proper uniform width of foot-paths, inclusive of margins on either side.

Three feet is the proper uniform width of by-paths, and paths through the fields, inclusive of margins on either side.

On either bank of a river, where crossed by a ferry, there should be an open space of 360 feet or thereabouts.

Post houses have been established at intervals for the dispatch of public business, and are also of manifest assistance to foot passengers.

This is an ancient regulation, handed down from Oinos'ke, an ancestor of the Tokugawa.

CHAPT. LXVII.—The several taxes leviable on hills, rivers, seas and ports, should not be exacted irregularly. They should suffice for the current expenses of the Imperial household.

CHAPT. LXVIII.—Dwellings shall not be erected on ground under cultivation by husbandmen, as the growth of bamboos and trees round the walls is prejudicial to the crops.

When disputes arising from a question of new and old plantations is referred for decision, the test is in the height of the trees forming the enclosure of such plantation.

If they are seen to be three feet high, the plantation may be known to be an old one; if they are not three feet high, the plantation is a new one, and the trees should be cut down, and the party in the wrong confined to his house for one hundred days.

CHAPT. LXIX.—If the boughs of large trees, in the immediate neighbourhood of villages in which the houses are built consecutively, become so large as to interfere with the drying of grain, or to interrupt the payment of annual tribute, in the first place the branches shall be cut off; and if that is not sufficient the whole tree shall be cut down.

Overshadowing branches should be lopped off annually.

CHAPT. LXX.—Although there are many bad roads and bridges in the frontier villages of the different provinces, there is a great deal of carelessness and neglect evinced, and the consequence is great inconvenience to travellers.

The care of aqueducts for water in case of fire also is neglected, and water is allowed to stagnate in the drains, because it is not the business of any particular individual to look after them. And the deepening or filling in of the beds of rivers is overlooked as entailing trouble.

Circular instructions should be issued in the customary years from the Inspectorate, that such neglect cease to exist.

CHAPT. LXXI.—From of old the harmony between lord and vassal has been likened to that existing between water and fish. Ought it not to be so? It is, indeed, no difficult thing! If the golden rule, “Do not unto others that which you would not have others do to you” be so firmly grasped in the heart as not to be lost sight of for a moment, the force of example will induce inferiors to conform to this virtuous

teaching ; and not only immediate attendants, but the population at large, will naturally flow smoothly along as water to its outlet.

CHAPT. LXXII.—My body, and the bodies of others, being born in the “ Empire of the Gods ”, to adopt the teachings of other countries *in toto*, such as Confucian, Buddhist, and Taoist doctrines, and to apply one’s whole and undivided attention to them, would in short be to desert one’s own master, and transfer one’s fidelity to another. Is not this to forget the origin of one’s being ?

Judging from a medium and unprejudiced point of view, a clear decision should be arrived at as to what is proper to adopt, what to reject. The delusions of witchcraft and superstitious arts should on no account be unquestionably accepted ; but on the other hand they should not be forcibly and obstinately rejected.

CHAPT. LXXIII.—Virtuous men have said both in poetry and standard works that houses of debauch for women of pleasure, and for street-walkers, are the worm-eaten spots of cities and towns. But they are necessary evils, which if forcibly abolished, men of unrighteous principles would become like unravelled thread, and there would be no end to daily punishment and flogging.

These separate characters are intended to suffice as a general basis to the law of the Empire ; but with regard to minute details affecting the inferior classes individually, learn the wide benevolence of Kōso, of the Kan dynasty.

CHAPT. LXXIV.—As a pattern for the house of Tokugawa, adjust your line by that of the Lord of Kamakura (Yoritomo) ; you may not adopt the fashions of other houses. Nevertheless, the tendencies of the Lord of Kōmatsu should not be entirely rejected.¹

CHAPT. LXXV.—Although it is undoubtedly an ancient custom for a vassal to follow his Lord in death, there is not the slightest reason in the practice. Confucius has ridiculed the making of Yo. These practices are strictly forbidden, more especially to primary retainers, and also to secondary retainers even to the lowest.

He is the opposite of a faithful servant who disregards this prohibition ; his posterity shall be impoverished by the confiscation of his property as a warning to those who disobey the laws.²

CHAPT. LXXVI.—A knowledge of military tactics, and the art of managing an army, are nothing but necessary accomplishments in a leader.

¹ Kōmatsu, the posthumous name of Higemori, Kiyomori’s eldest son, who died before his father, whose virtues and mercy were as prominent as his father’s vices and cruelty.

² The compulsory observation of this practice was forbidden by the Emperor Suinin, and its voluntary observation was several times forbidden by edicts of subsequent Emperors. It still continued, however, and there were frequent occasions not only in Iyeyasu’s lifetime, but afterwards, notwithstanding his drastic prohibition, in which vassals killed themselves on their lord’s death. Daté Masamune, one of the most celebrated of the territorial princes, both during Iyeyasu’s lifetime and in his son’s, when on his deathbed, honoured his retainers by selecting those who were to follow him in death, all of whom committed *hara-kiri* when he died. On the death of Iyemitsu, the third of the Tokugawa Shōguns, two of the daimios, who must have been well acquainted with the legacy of Iyeyasu, also committed *hara-kiri*.

An ordinary man is like a manufactured article, he is not composed of many bodies. Every manufactured article has its own separate use, and a hammer will not answer the purpose of a chisel, nor can a gimlet be used for the purpose of a saw.

In precisely the same manner, every individual man has a special use. Make use of a wise man's wisdom ; of a brave man's courage ; of a strong man's strength ; of a weak man's weakness ; of each, in short, according to his individual capability ; for just as a gimlet will not answer the purpose of a saw, neither will an ignorant nor a weak man answer the purpose of a strong man, and should therefore not be employed in his stead. The substance of this is inculcated as an incipient principle by the five virtues ; and the adoption or disregard of this principle tests the ability or inability of a chief.

In looking at the principle again as applied to men who are employed for purposes of war, unity of feeling among one another and mutual regard between high and low, will ensure peace and tranquillity in the Empire without having recourse to arms. This does not apply exclusively to times of war, but is equally applicable to all occasions.

CHAPT. LXXVII.—When military power becomes full to overflowing, even in the absence of all ambition, the proper veneration for the "Throne of Divine blessings" is apt to become blunted ; and there arrives a tendency, as has been demonstrated in the persons of so many of old, to remissness in respect, and oblivion of the origin of the "Kingdom of the Gods"—the source of self-desire is apt to overflow. Such a sin is not a light one, and will be undoubtedly followed by annihilation from Heaven.

CHAPT. LXXVIII.—The Shinnō and the several Miya, being related to the son of Heaven, should be treated with the highest respect. This immediately concerns the Shōshō. You should not set yourself in opposition to the Kugé, who by ancient custom come next in order. Impolite behaviour and a rough and indifferent manner are to be avoided.¹

CHAPT. LXXIX.—There are five families whose heads are by custom Guests of honour ; and mindful of the circumstances on record from which this custom originated, your intercourse with them should resemble the mutual friendship of neighbouring states. The manners, customs and fashions of their houses are not under the care of the Tokugawa family ; nevertheless, if any one among them evince contempt towards superiors, or injure the people by tyrannical oppression, he should be immediately reprimanded. This is a duty of the "Barbarian destroying Shōgun", and one which should not be delayed for a moment.²

CHAPT. LXXX.—With regard to the posterity of Owari, Kishiu, and Mito and the fifteen Kamon immediately following them, the

¹ Shinnō is the Prince Imperial and Miya are the other princes of the Imperial family. Shōshō (properly Sho-shi-dai) was the Shōgun's representative at Kioto.

² The five families were those of the five greatest territorial princes, who on their annual arrival in Yedo were entitled to the courtesy of being met and escorted to their palaces in the capital by a high officer of the Shōgun.

fortune descends to the eldest male child, and the revenue of their possessions shall not be divided among the remaining children. These last should choose some family of good pedigree and great wealth, and marry into it. The family thus allied shall rank only with the Kamon, who should receive them with amity. The thirteen families, however, may not become thus united.

CHAPT. LXXXI.—Daimiō with an annual revenue of 100,000 koku and upwards—the Gorōju, public officers, of the higher grades, and all Generals though in receipt of small incomes, are entitled to the same distinguishing insignia, etc., as the Lord of a province or a castle.

CHAPT. LXXXII.—The travelling *suites* of Fudai and Tozama, and likewise higher grades of officers, who may be on their way to assume their duties at Yedo, or returning from Yedo after being relieved, shall strictly observe the established rules. They shall not carry their flowery manifestations beyond the adjusted limits, neither shall they in aught detract from the regulations. They shall not disturb or harass the people at the post-houses, being puffed up with military pomp.

This subject should be impressed upon their attention by the Gorōju at the time of leave taking.

CHAPT. LXXXIII.—Regarding the charges for boats and rafts—men and horses, horse-hire, boat-hire, portage, and so on should be regulated by the distance to be travelled, and weight by scale. This regulation should be made generally known to prevent misunderstanding.

The Horse-express, and Government Carriers, however, are not included in this regulation; particular care should be taken to afford them every facility for speedy locomotion.

CHAPT. LXXXIV (Omitted).—Regulates the complimentary presents to be made by Daimio to the Gorōju.

CHAPT. LXXXV.—Among the many employés there will be some who flatter, adulate, and endeavour to bribe influential men having authority; again there will be others, true men, who evince a grave and decorous respect towards their superiors.

The faithful and unfaithful are clearly apparent among these, and ignorance in distinguishing between them tends to degeneracy in the Government. Much reflection and grave consideration is requisite; and a liberality in punishment and reward.

CHAPT. LXXXVI.—Regarding the erection of (temples called) “Ji-in” and “Sam-mon”.¹ At the time I established the “Sandal

¹ “Ji-in” means simply a Buddhist Temple or Monastery. Sandal Grove is the literal translation of the word Danrin, which is a fanciful term also for Buddhist Temples or Monasteries. Sam-mon means the front gate of a Buddhist Temple, but it is specifically used to denote Enriaku, the Temple of the Tendai Sect of Buddhists in Japan on Mount Hiei, founded by the Emperor Kwammu (782–806), the first Emperor to establish his capital at Kioto, destroyed by Nobunaga in 1591 (p. 174), and restored, though with very diminished splendour, by Iyeyasu. The Tendai sect took their name from Mount Tien-tai in China, where their doctrine was first preached, and where the welfare of the Emperor of China was specially prayed for. Kwammu erected an exact replica of the Chinese Temple on Mount Hiei, intending that the welfare of the Kioto Court should be specially prayed for as was that of China in the original Temple at Tien-tai. It was known as the Sam-mon, and the Abbot’s grievance was, that Iyeyasu had extended the honourable term to the other Temples which he built in Yedo and elsewhere.

Grove", an embarrassing remonstrance was made by the Chief Priest of the Sect of Tendai (Buddhist). He argued thus :

" My mountain is situated immediately under the Three felicitous stars exactly in the centre of the heavens, by permission of a former Emperor, who intended that it should give adequate protection to the Imperial Palace of the Empire. The idea was taken from the Tendai Sam-mon, instituted for the defence and protection of the Imperial Capital of another Empire [China]; and for this reason the term Sam-mon can be properly applied to my mountain alone throughout the Empire of the Rising Sun. By what right does the Shōgun raise another Sam-mon ? "

On this occasion I was dumb before him ! But at last I found words, and replied that I had established it in perpetuity in order that the omniscient Being of Kinjo [Emperor at the time] might attain eternal longevity ! I at the same time made a reform in the nomination of the " Ji-in " throughout the Sixty-six provinces and seventy-three different temples came to be termed " Sam-mon ". A memorandum was drawn up, setting forth their number and situation, and sent to the chief temple of Tendai on the eleventh day of the fourth moon of the second year of Bunroku (A.D. 1593).

From the first, though cognizant of the law, I yet wilfully made an innovation. This should not be done.

CHAPT. LXXXVII.—The title of Sei-Tai-Shōgun originated in the person of Yoritomo, and the ceremonies observed on appointment are the bestowal of the " Sancho-no-Fuyétsu " and " Chingo-no-In ", and the grant of the " Sambo-no-Gōréi " by the Emperor.

This office is similar to that of " Shingi-K'wan ",¹ inasmuch as samurai employed under it to fill official situations, high and low alike, are required, upon the death of a blood relation, to retire into solitary confinement to purify themselves from contaminating uncleanness, in accordance with ancient custom. This custom should be carefully and circumspectly maintained.

CHAPT. LXXXVIII.—To neglect one's daily occupation in gambling and excess in wine to stupefaction, is to rob the clear day light ; and although to yield to this can hardly be pronounced an insubordination, it is a practice eminently calculated to have an evil effect upon the lower classes, eventually resulting in the destruction of their families and the extermination of their lives.

It has been well said that " To be a teacher and not to teach, is the

¹ Shingi Kwan—more accurately Jingi Kwan—was in former ages, the department of the Imperial Government which administered all matters connected with the Shintō religion, both Temples and ceremonies. The writer has consulted several Japanese friends in London, as to the other terms in this chapter, but in the absence of reference books and of the original Japanese version of the Legacy, none are able to explain or even translate them any more than the writer. Sanchō-no-Fuyétsu probably refers to a sword bestowed by the Emperor on the Shōgun at his investiture, though Fuyetsu strictly means battle-axe. Sambo-no-Gōréi probably means the orders or commands of the three precious things—Buddha, the Law, and the Priesthood ; and Chingo-no-In, the protecting palace, perhaps the castle of Nijō. The two last explanations are in the circumstances little better than guess-work as Sambō and In both have many meanings, varying according to the original Chinese characters with which they are written.

fault of the teacher ; but to neglect his teaching is the fault of the pupil." By this rule the severity or leniency of the punishment should depend upon circumstances.

CHAPT. LXXXIX.—When the four classes neglect their several avocations, they are reduced to hunger and cold, and eventually commence to break the laws, and vex and disturb mankind. These are serious crimes, and should be distinguished as capitally punishable.

Incendiaries, forgers of seals, poisoners, forgers of coin, all these ruffians are liable to the severe punishments of burning, exposition of the head after decapitation, and crucifixion and transfixion.

CHAPT. XC.—In cases of investigation, if public and martial intimidating power is properly directed, there is nothing between Heaven and Earth, in the distant abodes of the Barbarians throughout the four quarters of the globe, at the roots of the grass, or even under the earth, which cannot be brought to light. The only thing which is difficult to discover is the thread of the heart of man. Yoritomo adopted an ingenious plan of Sokutaku of the Daito dynasty,¹ and caused the Sotsu-hearts of the lower orders to be reflected by suspending gold and silver, or advertising rewards, on notice boards which were exhibited in the thoroughfares and streets of the capitals.

This custom is still kept up ; but it is to be feared that there is an indisposition on the part of samurai to respond to the spirit of this principle of reflection.

CHAPT. XCI.—When the Imperial mode of government is unclear the five grains do not ripen.

When punishments and executions abound in the Empire, it may be shown that the Shōgun is without the virtue of benevolence, and degenerate. Such crises should induce reflection upon past conduct and concern not to act remissly or carelessly.²

CHAPT. XCII.—When laws are made by the eminent and issued to the people, a nonconformity to the provisions of such laws on the part of the eminent engenders ridicule and opposition on the part of the lower orders.

It is no easy matter to make one's practice conform to what one preaches ; so that it is incumbent to face one's own self, and investigate each particle of conduct with grinding torture.

CHAPT. XCIII.—When a Kokushiu or Riōshiu of great wealth shall unwittingly commit a fault against the Shōgun, or in the event of a difference of opinion between them, it hardly amounts to a punishable crime ; but when it is of such a nature as not to admit of its being lightly passed over, instead of criminating the offender, appoint him some arduous duty, incommensurate with the amount of his revenue.³

CHAPT. CXIV.—The departure from life of the Emperor, the Imperial Sire, the Imperial spouse or the Imperial mistresses, or any

¹ Daito, an Imperial dynasty of China.

² The five grains are rice, barley, millet, sorghum and beans. Wheat is included in barley.

³ This was the method employed by Iyeyasu, when he advised Hideyori to rebuild the Temple of Daibutsu at Osaka.

of the Imperial blood relations, are occasions of profound darkness, and great and ominous calamity for the whole Empire. In high antiquity on such occasions the eight sounds¹ were suppressed within the four seas; and holidays and festivals on the 1st day of the year and months, the "Gosek'ku", the feast of the first appearance of the Boar, and all kinds of festivals were observed in silence.

When an occasion of public mourning arises, a fixed term of mourning should be appointed for observance by the Ministers of State, the "Sanko";² the Shōgun in office at the time, and by all Government officers; during which every instrument that emits a sound, of what kind soever, shall cease.

CHAPT. XCV.—It is the duty of the Shōgun to provide the necessary expenses upon the accession of the Emperor to the throne, and for the "Daijoyé". They should not be parsimoniously diminished in an infinity of ways.

CHAPT. XCVI.—On those occasions when foreigners come to offer presents, they should be entertained with proper abundance and uniform politeness. The beauty and elegance of the military accoutrements and the caparisons of the horses should be made to appear to the utmost advantage. From the port at which the ship arrives, as far as the Yedo capital, whether the road lie through Government or other territory, the castles and moats, and all the houses on the way should be in a thorough and complete state of repair, that the broad and extensive affluence, and the intrepidity of the military power of the Empire may shine forth. The whole management should be undertaken by the Ministers of the Shōgun.

CHAPT. XCVII.—When foreign vessels arrive by chance at our shores information of the fact shall immediately be given, and by means of written communication through an interpreter their business shall be learned. According to circumstances, they shall be treated with commiseration and benevolence, or with dignified reserve. In all cases a guard shall be placed on board for their restraint.

CHAPT. XCVIII.—The accessor to the imperial throne should look upon the people as one who nourishes an infant. How much more should the Shōgun to whom the Empire is entrusted cherish this feeling. The term applied to this feeling is "benevolence"; and benevolence includes the whole of the five relations. Further through its practice the noble and ignoble become apparent.

I, having learnt this, distinguish between the attachment of the Fudai and the reserve of the Tozama; nor is this discrimination at all at variance with Heavenly principles; it is by no means a partial and one-sided idea of my own.

¹ The eight sounds included music, dramatic performances, street cries, etc. The Go Sekku were the five principal annual festivals. The last occasion of great public mourning was on the death of the Dowager Empress in 1897. All music, etc., was then strictly forbidden throughout the Empire for one month.

² The Sankō were the three principal ministers of state at the Imperial Court at Kioto, the Daijo Daijin, the Prime Minister, and the Sa Daijin and U Daijin—the ministers of the Left and Right. In Japan, the left takes precedence of the right.

I cannot particularly accord this for transmission to posterity by tongue or pen ; but it is a subject which will naturally develop itself if viewed with deep attention from a medium point between the two extremes.

CHAPT. XCIX.—When rewards and punishments are not properly administered, faithful servants are hidden, and not made manifest ; when they are properly regulated all mankind esteem the one and dread the other.

There should not be the difference of the slightest particle of dust either in excess or insufficiency ; but they should be administered with self-possession, and after deep reflection.

Confucius has exemplified my meaning in his “ Comments on the Law of the Mind ”.

CHAPT. C.—Since I have attained to my present office, I have increased and diminished the ancient examples of successive generations of the house of Gen ; and although I have drawn up these several heads of rules of conduct, my object has been to be a transmitter, not a framer. I have not allowed myself to be in the slightest degree influenced by selfish motives ; but have rather embodied the foregoing Chapters as an example, which, although it may not hit the mark, will not be very far wide.

In all questions of policy cherish precedents and do not give exclusive attention to small or large matters ; let this be the rule of your conduct.

There are further subjects I would bring under notice, but I have no leisure.

Let my posterity thoroughly practise with their bodies the particulars I have above declared. They are not permitted to be looked upon save by the Fudai-Gorōjiu. In them I have exposed and laid bare the limited reflections of my breast. Let no future generation be induced to ridicule me as having the heart of a venerable old grandmother.

I bequeath this record to my posterity.

LIST OF AUTHORITIES CONSULTED

- | | |
|-----------------------------|--|
| KAEMPFER . . . | History of Japan. |
| GRIFFIS . . . | The Mikado's Empire. |
| LONGFORD . . . | The Story of Old Japan. |
| MITFORD . . . | Tales of Old Japan. |
| WALTER DENNING . . . | Wounded Pride and How it was Healed.
(English Readers, book 5.) |
| VALENTYN . . . | Deshima Diary. |
| TITSINGH . . . | Illustrations of Japan. |
| INOUE . . . | Sketches of Tokio Life. |
| ZACHARIAS WAEGENAER | |
| MURRAY'S . . . | Handbook of Japan. |
| ASAKAWA . . . | Early Institutional Life of Japan. |
| ASTON . . . | Handbook on Japanese Literature. |
| PÈRE S. LE GALL . . . | Le Philosophe Tchou-Hi, sa doctrine son
influence. |
| B. H. CHAMBERLAIN . . . | Things Japanese. |
| ASTON . . . | Japanese Literature. |
| BRINKLEY . . . | Japan. Vol. IV. |
| Dr. N. G. MUNRO . . . | The Coins of Japan. |
| F. V. DICKENS . . . | The Chushingura or the Loyal League. A
Japanese Romance. |
| Sir RUTHERFORD ALCOCK . . . | The Capital of the Tycoon. |
| HULBERT . . . | History of Korea. |
| COCKS . . . | Diary. |
| Dr. NACHOD . . . | Die Beziehungen der Nederlandischen
Ostindischen Kompagnie zu Japan im
siezehnten Jahrhundert. |
| Dr. REIN . . . | Allerlei aus Japan. Vol. II. |
| DE HARLEZ . . . | Ecole Philosophique de la Chine. |
| KLAPROTH . . . | Translation of <i>Honcho Tsuyo Jiryaku</i> by
Arai Hakuseki. |
| L. DEPLACE, S.J. . . . | Le Catholicisme au Japon. |
| Rev. W. CAMPBELL . . . | Formosa under the Dutch. |

- VALENTYN . . . Oud en Nieuw Oost-Indien.
 MARNAS . . . La religion de Jesus ressuscitée au Japon.
 Tome I.
 ASAKAWA . . . Journal of the American Oriental Society.
 Vol. XXXI, part 2.
 UCHIMURA KANZO . . . Japan and the Japanese.
 IKEDA . . . Life of Uyesugi Harunori. 1906.
 SIEBOLD . . . Nippon.
 OYANGUSEN . . . Arte de la Lingua Japonica. 1738.
 ALVAREZ, S.J. . . . De Institutiones Grammatica libri iii cum
 versione Japonica. 1593.
 RODRIGUEZ . . . Arte du Lingua de Japon. 1604.
 COLLADO . . . Ars Grammatica Japonicæ Linguae. 1632.
 ASTON . . . Nihongi.
 MIHARU . . . Biography of the Regent Matsudaira
 Sadanobu.
 E. PAPINOT . . . Dictionnaire d'Histoire et de Geographie
 du Japon.
 HILDREDTH . . . Japan as it Was and Is.
 T. YOSHIMOTO . . . Translation of Tomita's Hotoku-ki.
 THUNBERG . . .
 KLAPROTH . . . Annales des Empereurs du Japon. 1806.
 MISS ATHERTON . . . North American Review. May, 1909.
 GOLOWNIN . . . Narrative of his Captivity.
 RIKORD . . . Account.
 S. WELLS WILLIAMS . . . Chinese Repository. Sept., Dec., 1837.
 E. SATOW . . . Translation of Kinsei Shiryaku. 1876.
 NAGAOKA . . . Translation from Takahashi.
 SIEBOLD . . . Diary.
 NITOBE . . . Intercourse between the United States
 and Japan.
 J. HECO . . . Narrative of a Japanese.
 LANMAN . . . Leading Men of Japan.
 GRIFFIS . . . Matthew Galbraith Perry.
 „ . . . Townsend Harris.
 WELLS WILLIAMS . . . Journal of the Perry Expedition to Japan.
 BLACK . . . Young Japan.
 . . . Japan Herald.
 . . . Japan Gazette. Jubilee Number, 1903.
 R. YOUNG . . . Japan Chronicle. Jubilee Number, 1918.

TRANSACTIONS OF THE ASIATIC SOCIETY OF JAPAN

WIGMORE	Vol. XX
McCLATCHIE	Vols. II, VI, VII
MILNE	Vol. VIII
SIMMONS and WIGMORE	Vol. XIX, Pt. I
J. C. HALL	Vols. XXIX, XXXV, XLI
CLEMENT	Vol. XXVI
E. SATOW	Vols. I, Pt. IV; III, appendix
Dr. KNOX and Mr. HAGA	Vol. XX, Pt. II
GALEN M. FISHER	Vol. XXXIV, Pt. II
Rev. ARTHUR LLOYD	Vol. XXXIV, Pt. IV
WALTER DENING	Vols. XXXVI, Pt. II; XLI
Rev. T. LINDSAY and J. KARN	Vol. XVI, Pt. II
C. W. KNOX	Vols. XX, Pt. I; XXIV, XXX
VAN DER POLDER	Vol. XII, Pt. II
WRIGHT	Vol. IX, Pt. II
B. H. CHAMBERLAIN	Vol. XVI
LONGFORD	Vol. V, Pt. II
GARRETT DROPPERS	Vol. XXII
Rev. R. C. ARMSTRONG	Vol. XXVII, Pt. II
W. G. ASTON	Vol. I, Pt. I
D. C. GREENE	Vols. XXXIV, Pt. IV; XLI, Pt. III
Dr. MITSUKURI	Vol. V, Pt. I
Miss BALLARD	Vol. XXXII
Dr. WHITNEY	Vol. XLI

MITTHEILUNGEN DER DEUTSCHEN GESELLSCHAFT FÜR
NATUR UND VOLKER KUNDE OSTASIENS

Dr. SCRIBA	Vol. XXIX
Dr. LÖNHOLM	Vol. LIV

BOOKS IN JAPANESE

Azuma Kagami.
Tokugawa Jikki.
Oshiroboshu.
Taiheki.

Nihon Shiryo.
Kujikata Osadamegaki.
Ooka Seidan.
Yume Monogatari.
Genji Yume Monogatari.
Tao Teh King (Chinese).

WORKS OF

Hayashi Shunsai.
Rai Sanyo.
Kuranari.
Bakin.
Shirakawa Rakuo.
Rin Shi-hei.
Ikheda.
Otsuki.
Moto-ori.
Hirata.
Takano Choei.
Arai Hakuseki.
Ino Chuhei.

INDEX.

- Abe Masahiro, Ise no Kami, 463, 465,
 571, 596-7, 674
 Abe Tada-aki, 5, 7, 63-5, 67, 163
 Aidzu Clan, 770
 Aidzu Guards, 773
 Aidzu Lords, 777
 Akimoto, Tajima no Kami, 376, 380
 Almanacs, 451, 540, 553
 American Convention, 626, 629
 American Treaty, 605, 607
 American Negotiations, 638-45
 Ando, Tsushima no Kami, 696, 701,
 707, 717-18, 723
 Ainu, 151-2, 154, 393
 Aoki Bunzo, 540
 Arai Hakuseki, 53, 137-258, 265, 319,
 482, 497, 542
 Arimura, 697, 700
 Arisugawa house, 670
 Arisugawa Takehito (Prince), 786
 Asano of Ako, 219
 Aston (W. G.), 478-81
 Atobe, 453-5
 Azuma Kagami, 177, 242, 315

 Bakin, 397
 Baldwin (Major), and Bird (Lieut.), 747
 Bancho, 34-5, 37, 382
 Bekké Shoemon, 81
 Biddle (Commodore), 570, 577
 Bikuni, 39
 Bizen Clan, 737, 781
 Bloemhoff (J. Cock), 525
 Blokhovius, 270
 Bōnin Islands, 269, 562, 575
 British Treaty, 758, 760
 Buddhism, 112, 493
 Buddhism, Jōdō Sect, 445
 Buddhism, Nichiren Sect, 445
 Buké Shohatto, 33, 319, 360, 409

 Cecile (Admiral), 573, 571
 Chamoine (Colonel), 763
 Chikamatsu, 198, 234, 275
 Chōshu Clan, 718, 740, 754, 778
 Chōshu Clan, declared rebel, 747
 Chōsokabe, 55
 Christianity, 123, 132, 136, 273, 280,
 300, 303, 308, 357, 532, 613, 617, 662
 Chwostoff and Davidoff, 517
 Coinage, 209, 266, 291, 354, 371, 591,
 706
 Conflagrations, 1, 82, 90, 211, 229, 332,
 346, 418, 455, 463, 779
 Confucius, 102, 182, 422
 Corvée, 374, 384, 435, 668

 Dai Nihonshi, 664
 Dairi, 361, 416, 468
 Danzaemon, 44, 87
 Dazai, 344, 422
 Deshima, 258, 261, 287
 Deshima Director, 270, 281, 498, 501,
 560
Diana frigate, 610, 611, 612
 Deff, 517, 523, 527, 550
 Doi Toshikatsu, 2, 165
 Doi, 463
 Donker-Curtius, 587, 622, 654, 657
Dupleix boat's crew attacked, 785
 Dutch agreement, 65
 Dutch Embassy, 270
 Dutch Treaty, 587

 Earthquakes, 1, 211, 395, 435, 610-11
 Egawa, 532, 562, 595, 608
 Elgin (Lord), 657
Eliza (S.S.), 509
 Enomoto Takeaki, 787
 Eta, 43, 87
 Expulsion Decree, 528, 530, 730
 Extra-territoriality, 640

 Famine, 348, 396-401
 Formosa, 276-81
 French Treaty, 660
 Fudai Daimyō, 2, 4, 16, 17, 18, 19, 23,
 32, 294, 433
 Fuda-sashi, 201, 354, 434, 450, 451
 Fujita Toko, 458, 463
 Fujita, 712
 Fujiwara Seigwa, 113, 122
 Fuji Umon, 416
 Fuku, *see* Kasuga no Tsubone
 Fukuzawa Yukichi, 566
 Fushimi and Toba battle, 778

 Gamo Kumpei, 417
 Genji Monogatari, 469-70
 Genji Yume Monogatari, 723, 726, 742
 Gesho, 715-16
 "Globius", *see* Takahashi
 Go-Kenin, 321
 Golownin, 522, 548
 Go-nin-Gumi, 47
 Gordon (Captain), 437
 Go-san-ké, 7, 24, 32, 34, 430
 Go-san-ké residences, 90

- Go-sankyō, 365, 433
 Goshi, 57, 61, 713
 Goto, 464, 767, 769-70
 Goto Shojiro, 786
 Gros (Baron), 659
 Guilds, 283, 447-52, 458
 Guilds of Beggars, 44
 Gungakusha, 323, 415
 Gwaikoku Bugyō, 657

 Haga, 561
 Hakodate (taking of), 787
 Hara Ichi-no-shin, 765, 769
 Hara-kiri, 784
 Harry Parkes (Sir), 756, 760-3
 Hashimoto Sanai, 675, 677, 694-5
 Hatamoto, 4, 7, 16, 24, 33, 37, 40, 55,
 58, 163, 179, 321, 409, 434
 Hatamoto (Kobushin), 327, 350
 Hayashi Razan *or* Dosan, 115, 117, 121,
 122
 Hayashi Shunsai, 121
 Hayashi Nobuatsu, 181, 249
 Hayashi Jussai, 424
 Hayashi, Daigaku no Kami, 182, 598,
 634
 Heusken, 626, 630, 633, 707, 710
 Hidetada, 316
 Higashi Kuze, 784
 Hildreth, 523, 570
 Hinin, 44
 Hi-no-maru, 513, 616
 Hiogo, 777, 785
 Hirado, 260
 Hirano Jiro, 720, 727, 737, 743
 Hirata Atsutane, 484, 490, 496, 550
 Hitotsubashi house founded, 365
 Hitotsubashi Harunari, 402
 Hitotsubashi Keiki, 673
 Honda Tadakatsu, 1
 Honda Masazumi, 2
 Honjuin, 675
 Hori, interpreter, 579, 584
 Hoshina of Aidzu, 23, 67, 142, 145,
 158-60, 161, 163, 181, 185, 431, 571,
 620, 786
 Hosokawa, 226, 362
 Hotta Masatoshi, 165-6
 Hotta Masayoshi, 178, 179
 Hotta, Sagami no Kami, 368
 Hotta of Sakura, 620
 Hundred Laws of Iyeyasu, 8

 Ichikawa, 712-13
 Ichikawa Danjuro, 460
 Ii Naomasa, 1
 Ii, 2, 6, 23
 Ii Naokatsu, 17
 Ii Naotaka, 66, 162
 Ii of Hikone, 252, 571
 Ii Naosuke, 592, 653, 681
 Ii Naosuke, assassination, 697-701
 Imperial Court at Kyōto, 663, 669
 Imperial Princesses, 413, 717
 Inaba, Mino no Kami, 163, 209, 285

 Inaba Masayasu, 178
 Indemnity, 729
 In no Miya, 670, 732, 736, 742, 764, 774
 In no Miya, *called also* Prince Nakagawa,
 Shōren no Miya, Awata no Miya,
 Prince Kuni
 Ino Chūkei, 437, 513, 554
 Inouye, 746, 754
 Inouye, Shinano no Kami, *see* Shinaŋo
 Iquon, 275
 Ishikawa Goyemon, 12
 Itagaki, 767
 Itakura, Sado no Kami, 362
 Itakura, 769-70
 Ito (Prince), 665, 746, 785
 Ito Jinsai, 140
 Iwakura, 718, 725, 764, 770, 772, 773
 Iyeharu, 376
 Iyemitsu, 2, 3, 5, 7, 9, 13, 21, 48, 54,
 61, 62, 64, 66, 147, 159
 Iyemoto, 402
 Iyenari, 442, 456
 Iyenobu, 236-9, 244, 247, 251, 334
 Iyesada, 666, 672, 686
 Iyeshige, 341, 366, 369
 Iyetsugu, 251
 Iyetsuna, 152, 156, 158, 159, 166-7,
 176, 367
 Iyeyasu, 1, 68, 111, 114, 115, 117, 318,
 531, 585
 Iyeyoshi, 440, 443, 456

 Joei Shikimoku, 339
 Joi, 591, 650
 Jujitsu, 149
 Junshi, 5, 63, 159
 Jusha, 168, 340, 342, 421

 Kaempfer, 163, 168, 171, 196, 197
 Kagoshima, 733-6
 Kaibara Ekken, 140
 Kangakusha, 467, 481
 Kano family (Tosa school of painters),
 186
 Karo, 56, 195
 Kasuga no Tsubone, 2-4
 Kato Kiyomasa's instructions, 52, 91,
 146, 147, 168, 199, 202
 Katsu Rintaro, 616
 Katsu Awa, 751-2, 755, 769, 786
 Kawamura Yoshiharu, 154, 158, 355
 Keian, 113
 Keiki, 673, 764, 769, 770, 771, 774-5
 Ketzer *or* Kayser, 321
 Kido, 753
 Kiheitai, 750
 Kinno, 462, 743
 Kinoshita Junan, 241
 Kira Yoshinaka, 218
 Klaproth, 547
 Kobe, 781
 Kobu Gattai, 719, 732, 744, 748
 Koishkawa garden, 331
 Kōjiki and Nihongi, 469, 477, 480
 Kōkaku Tennō, 419, 442

- Komatsu of Satsuma, 744, 771
 Kōmei Tenno (death of), 764
 Kōmyō II, 167
 Korean Embassy, 161, 252, 320, 346
 Koxinga, 162, 272, 275
 Kuge, 170, 185, 416, 421, 671
 Kumazawa Banzan, 124, 129, 137, 138, 142, 174, 196, 414
 Kumi-cho, 350
 Kuri-ga-hama, 583
 Kurile Islands, 369, 595
 Kuwana, 758, 773
 Kwanbaku, 680
 Kwangun, Imperial Army, 785
 Kyōto Soshidai, 10, 436, 441
- Label-market, 391
Lady Pierce clipper, 613
 Langsdorff, 577
 Lao-Tse, 104
 La Perouse, 512
 Laws, 334, 349
 Laxman (Lieutenant), 512, 548
 Legacy of Iyeyasu, 6, 111, 197, 232, 796
 Legations, 779
 Legations burnt down, 710
 Loyalty, 110, 414, 467, 196, 532
 Luchū Treaty, 533, 535
- Mabuchi, 473, 476
 Machi Bugyō, 12, 46, 172, 398
 Machi-Yakko, 42
 Manabe Norifusa, 247
 Manabe, 715
 Manyōshū, 469
 Marubashi Chuya, 69-78
 Matsudaira Ikeda, Bizen no Kami, 781
 Matsudaira Nobutsuna, 63, 67-9
 Matsudaira Norinaga, 65
 Matsudaira Norimura, 364, 368
 Matsudaira Takemoto, Ukon Shogen, 369
 Matsudaira Sadanobu, 401, 406, 409, 418, 427
 Matsudaira Nobuaki, 407, 432
 Matsudaira, Dzusho no Kami, 519
 Mayeda of Kaga, 384
 Mayeno, 540-4
 Merchants, 48, 207, 291, 410, 446, 452, 461
 Merchants of Light, 567
 Meyasu-bako, 328
 Mikado, 646, 652, 708, 727, 739, 758
 Ming Dynasty, 274
 Misasagi, 413
Mississippi (U.S.S.), 576, 578, 581, 598, 656
 Mitsukuni of Mito, 97, 145, 181, 196, 199, 213, 243, 285, 472
 Mizu-no-o, 167
 Mizuno Tadashige, 440
 Mizuno Tadakuni, 456, 464
 Mogami, 18, 25
 Monasteries, 11, 25, 169, 810
- Mori (Viscount), 404
 Mori of Choshū, 725, 754
 Moriyama, 601, 627, 631
Morrison, 528, 561
 Moto-ori, 344, 476, 507
 Mu-en-ji E-ko-in, 87
 Mura, villages, 51-2
 Muro Kyusō, 340
- Nagano, 650
 Nagano Shuzen, 678, 688, 696, 698, 704, 715
 Nakae Tōju, 53, 125, 181, 391
 Nakagawa, 543
 Nakayama, 417, 420, 421, 737, 764, 771
 Namamugi affair, 728, 733
 Nariaki of Mito, 457, 464, 535, 589, 596, 621, 696
 Nariakira of Satsuma, 414, 667, 713
 Nesselrode, 593-4, 612
 Nihon Gwaishi, 665
 Nihon Seiki, 665
 Ninomiya Sontoku, 465
 Nishi Maru, 6, 31, 213, 428, 438, 444
 Nō drama, 202-4
- Ōgata (Dr.), 565
 Ōguri, 174-5
 Ōgyu Sorai, 341, 343, 421, 481
 Oishi Kuranosuke, 222
 Okubo, 1, 2, 165
 Okubo (afterwards Count), 744, 758, 764, 770, 786
 Okudaira, 433, 542
 Ometsuke, 8, 11, 13, 14, 27, 45
 Ometsuke, Bureau, 293
Oneida (U.S.S.), 781
 Ōoka Tadasuke, 333, 343, 349, 356, 368, 372
 Ōoka Tadimitsu, 370, 372, 379-80
 Ōoka Tadayoshi, 379
 "Opium War", 529, 570, 591
 Ōshio Heihachiro, 453-5
 Ōta, 658, 660, 683, 689, 695
 Otona, 280, 290, 539
 Ōtori Keisuke, 786, 787
 Ōtsuki Gentaku, 547, 556
 Ōyōmei (Wang-Yang-Ming), 124
- Palembang*, 530
 Pellew (Captain), 518
 Perry (Commodore), 574
Phæton, 518, 527
 Poetry, 92, 96, 325, 471
 Pompe van Meerdewort (Dr.), 617
 Population, 357, 399
 Portuguese Embassy, 270
 Portuguese, 527
 Portuguese Language, 282
 Presents, 205, 285, 293, 370-1, 499, 606, 614
 President's letter, 573, 579, 583

- President's letter (opinions invited on), 591
 President's letter (reply to), 600
 Primogeniture, 364, 809-10
 Prussian Treaty, 709
 Putiatin, 523, 593, 609

 Raffles (Sir Stanford), 523
 Resanov, 492, 514
 Ri, Ki, and Ten, 109
 Rikord, 522, 566
 Rikuyu Engi, 339
 Rin-Shi-hei, 426
 Roches (Leon), 744, 757, 762
 Rōju, 4
 Rōnin, 38, 41, 46, 47, 53, 116, 163, 198, 456, 496, 606, 704, 726, 783
 Rōnin conspiracy, 68, 81
 Rōnin (forty-seven), 218-37
 Russian Treaty, 657
 Rusui, 202, 411
 Rutherford Alcock (Sir), 661, 701, 706, 744, 756

 Saghalin, 595, 610, 612
 Saigo Takamori, 715, 744, 751, 786
 Sakai Tadayo, 2, 3, 6
 Sakai Tadakiyo, 164-6
 Sakakibara Yasumasa, 1, 2
 Sakakibara family, 362
 Sakuma Shōzan, 459
 Samurai, 5, 35, 41, 53, 54, 55, 199-201, 316, 456
 Sanada of Matsushiro, 459, 462
San Jacinto, 623
 Sanjo Sanetsumu, 650, 660
 Sankin kotai, 23, 37, 360, 408
 San-kyo, 365, 673
 Sat-Cho-To, 725
 Schambergen (Dr. Caspar), 617
 Seido, 422, 559, 564
 Shimadzu Hisamitsu, 715, 721, 728
 Shimadzu Saburo, 733, 767
 Shimadzu, 16, 19, 22, 197, 210
 Shimonoseki, 731, 746
 Shimizu House founded, 365
 Shimizu Higehide, 432
 Shimizu Nariakira, 534
 Shimizu Shigehide, 551
 Shinano (Inouye, Shinano no Kami), 628, 633, 638, 658
 Shinto, 99, 143
 Shinto priests, 169, 801
 Shinto festivals, 184
 Shinto revival, 468, 473
 Shipbuilding, 324, 611, 616
 Shungaku of Echizen, 722, 763
 Sidotti (Père), 304
 Siebold, 277, 552, 553
 Silk, 283
 Silk Culture, 387, 393, 461
 Sobayōnin, 8, 9, 11, 179, 376, 430
 Sonnō-Joi, 462, 782
 Sorai, 140

 Soshaban, 8, 9
 Soshidai, 8, 10, 172, 436, 441
 Spagenberg, 512
 Stewart (Captain), 510
 Sugita, 537, 564

 Taiheiki, 198, 243
 Taikun (*or* Shōgun ?), 633
 Tairō, 5, 6, 8, 15
 Takahashi (astronomer), 549, 556, 558, 591
 Takano Chōei, 529, 560, 563
 Takashima Shuhan, 563, 593
 Takatsukasa, 645, 677
 Takayama Masayuki, 417, 421
 Takeda Kounsai, 712
 Takedaya Kahei, 515
 Takenouchi Shikibu, 414-17
 Tama river Aqueduct, 81
 Tanuma, 379-82, 394, 401-7, 422, 432, 505
 Tanuma, death of, 403-4
 Tanuma Mototomo (death of), 403-4
 Taoism, 104, 486
 Tariff Convention, 760
 Tashi-daka, 322
 Taxatic Handel, 284-6
 Taxation, 48, 351, 371, 373-4, 435
 Tayasu House founded, 365
 Tei-shu philosophy, 107
 Ten, 477
 Tenshōin, 675, 677
 Tensō, 14
 Tensō abolished, 773
 Teradaya, 721
 Thunberg, 500, 545
 Tittingsh, 502
 Toda, Idzu no Kami (Governor of Uraga), 581
 Tokugawa Jikki, 7, 326, 444
 Tokusei, 409
 Torii, 460
 Torture, 337, 642
 Townsend Harris, 623
 Townsend Harris (Audience with Shōgun), 632, 635
 Townsend Harris (2nd Audience), 706
 Tozama Daimyo, 5, 23, 32, 218, 294, 797
 Tracy (Captain), 763
 Tsuji of Aki, 771
 Tsunayoshi, 173, 178, 179, 182, 215, 313, 368
 Tsunayoshi and dogs, 186, 194, 200, 216, 352
 Tsutsui, 609, 610

 Umeda, 689, 693
 Uyesugi house, 20
 Uyesugi Kagekatsu, 17
 Uyesugi Daimyoate, 359
 Uyesugi Harunori, 385-92, 400, 406
 Uyesugi Yozan, 546

- Vaccination, 565
 Volcanic eruptions, 394, 435

 Wagakusha, 467
 Wakadoshiyori, 7, 45
 Watanabe Kwazan, 559
 Wells Williams, 529, 576
 "Wilhelm Botanikus," 556

 Yabuta, 327
 Yamabushi, 39, 169
 Yamagata Soko, 54, 137-40, 341
 Yamagata Dai-ni, 415
 Yamanouchi Kazutoyo, 5, 6
 Yamanouchi Tadatoyo, 57
 Yamanouchi Yodo, 713, 725, 726, 765
 Yamashi, 393

 Yamaguchi Anzai, 142-5, 183
 Yanagisawa, 180, 196, 205, 215, 236
 Yasui Santetsu, 553
 Yedo Castle, 227-33, 37-8, 346, 568
 Yedo Castle burnt down, 84, 463
 Yedo Castle rebuilt, 89
 Ye-fumi, 302, 617
 Yokohama, 660, 737, 761, 787
 Yonezawa, 353, 384, 389, 400, 423, 546
 Yoshida Shoin, 693, 701, 718
 Yoshida Toyo, 714
 Yoshimune, 314
 Yoshimune (death of), 367
 Yo and In (Yang and Ying), 108, 478
 Yui no Shosetsu, 69-81
 Yume Monogatari, 529, 560

 Zacharias Wægenær, 85

**UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO
LIBRARY**

**DO NOT
REMOVE
THE
CARD
FROM
THIS
POCKET**



